False-belief tasks are distinct from theory of mind - Spectrum ...

Theory of mind is generally tested through a classic 'false-belief' task. This test provides unequivocal evidence that children understand ... 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SeeAllinViewpoint Opinion / Viewpoint False-belieftasksaredistinctfromtheoryofmind byHelenTager-Flusberg  /  15March2011 Topics:Signs&Symptoms SharetoFacebookSharetoTwitterSharetoPocketSendviaEmailPrint DownloadPDF Republishthisarticle Discussthisarticle SharetoFacebookSharetoTwitterSharetoPocketSendviaEmailPrint HelenTager-Flusberg SignupforSpectrum'snewsletters Weekly Daily Community NullandNoteworthy BytheNumbers SpokenSpectrum SpectrumLaunch Thanksforsubscribing! THISARTICLEISMORETHANFIVEYEARSOLD Thisarticleismorethanfiveyearsold.Autismresearch-andscienceingeneral-isconstantlyevolving,soolderarticlesmaycontaininformationortheoriesthathavebeenreevaluatedsincetheiroriginalpublicationdate. TheExpert: HelenTager-Flusberg Spontaneousgestures: Nicaraguansignlanguage,whichevolvednaturallyfromthe1970s,isanexampleofhowlanguagecancreatemind-blindness. AnnSenghas,2004 Theabilitytounderstandwhatothersthinkandbelieve—thecoredefinitionofacognitiveskillcalled‘theoryofmind’—isoneofthekeyareasofdysfunctioninpeoplewithautism.Havingtherightlanguageskillsisalsonecessarytopasstasksthattestfortheoryofmindability.Animportantstudytakesthislineofworkmuchfurther,byshowingthatdeafadultswhogrewupwithoutmuchexposuretolanguagefailfalse-belieftasks1. Thisstudy,publishedin2009byJenniePyersandAnnSenghas,showsthatlanguagecanhaveacausalroleinthedevelopmentoftheoryofmind. However,itisimportanttodistinguishfalse-belieftasks,whichrelyonlanguage,fromthefull-fledgedtheoryofmind,whichismoredeeplyimpairedinpeoplewithautism. Inthemid1980s,researcherspublishedaseriesofpapersdemonstratingtheearlydevelopmentoftheoryofmindintypicalpreschoolers.Theoryofmindisgenerallytestedthroughaclassic‘false-belief’task.Thistestprovidesunequivocalevidencethatchildrenunderstandthatapersoncanbemistakenaboutsomethingtheythemselvesunderstand.Forexample,childrenwatchasanitemismovedafteranotherviewerhaslefttheroomandarethenaskedwherethisviewerwouldlookfortheobject.Correctresponsestotasksliketheseshowthatchildrenareabletoreasonaboutthecontentsofanotherperson’smind. Bytheageof4or5,mostchildrenprovidetherightansweronsuchtasks.Themajorityofmucholderchildrenwithautismspectrumdisorders(ASD),however,failthesetasks,providingstrongevidenceforimpairmentsintheirtheoryofmindabilities. Followingtheearlyseminalpapers,researchersbeganexploringwhatmightexplainsomeofthevariationintheageatwhichbothtypicalandatypicalchildrenpassfalse-belieftasks.Studiesshowthatavarietyoffactors,includingsocial,suchasbirthorderormaternalcommunicationstyle;executivefunctions,suchasnotrespondingwiththemostobviousresponsebasedonthechild’sownknowledge;andespeciallylanguagecouldexplainsomeofthevariationinchildren’sperformanceonfalse-belieftasks. Theroleoflanguagegainedconsiderableattentionfollowingthepublicationofseveralpaperswhichshowedthatlanguage-impairedanddeafchildrenwhoarenotexposedtosignlanguagesdonotpassfalsebelieftasksuntiltheyarearound9or10yearsold.ThestudybyPyersandSenghastakesthislineofworkevenfurther. PyersandSenghasfollowedauniquegroupofdeafpeoplelivinginNicaraguawhoonlyrecentlycreatedasignlanguage,calledNicaraguanSignLanguage,orNSL.NSLfirstemergedinaprimitiveforminthe1970s,whenthefirstschoolfordeafstudentsopenedinNicaragua.Beforethistime,thestudentshadnolinguisticmeansforcommunicatingwithothers.Whentheywereplacedtogetherinacommunity,however,asimplesignsystemevolved.Asthenextgenerationsofyoungchildrenarrivedattheschoolinthe1980sand1990s,theyrapidlybuiltonthissimplesystem.Bycreatingforms—phonological,lexicalandgrammatical—forcommunicatingfarmorecomplexmessages,NSLevolvedtohaveallthefeaturesofafull-fledgedlanguage. PyersandSenghasadministeredtwosetsoftaskswithboththeoriginalcohortofadultswhocommunicatewithalimitedformofNSL,andthelatercohortofadolescentsandyoungadultswhohaveamorecompletelinguisticsystem.Inone,theyshowedaseriesofbriefvideosdesignedtoelicitavarietyofmentalstatesthattheparticipantswerethenaskedtodescribe.Theotherisanadaptationofthefalse-belieftaskinwhichtheparticipantsareshownastorysequenceinpicturesandaskedtocompletethestorybychoosingoneoftwoimages. Thefindingsareclearandstriking:Onlythoseparticipantswhousedmentalstatevocabulary—particularlylinguisticformsforverbssuchas‘think’and‘know’—wereabletopassthefalsebelieftask.Theseparticipantswereallinthecohortofstudentswiththemorecompletelinguisticsystem. Twoyearsaftertheinitialroundofdatacollection,theresearchersreturnedtoNicaraguaandretestedmostofthesameparticipants.Interestingly,bythispointmanyintheoriginalcohortofadultshadacquiredvocabularyandotherformsforcommunicatingaboutmentalstates.Theywere,inturn,abletopassthefalse-belieftasks.Theimportanceofthisstudyliesinitsconclusivedemonstrationofthecausalroleoflanguage—especiallylanguagefortalkingaboutcognitivementalstates—inthedevelopmentoffalse-beliefunderstanding. Implicitunderstanding: Researchsuggeststhatmanydifferentaspectsoflanguageareimportantfordevelopingtheoryofmind2.Theseincludecommunicationinsocialcontexts,suchasbetweenmotherandchildorinpeerinteractions,knowledgeofwordsandconceptsreferringtomentalstates,andcomplexgrammar—especiallysentencestructuresusedtoexpressmentalstates.PyersandSenghaswerenotabletopointtooneparticularaspectoflanguagethatmakesthedifference.Itisinterestingtonote,however,thatinteractingwiththeyounger,linguisticallymoresophisticatedgroupwassufficienttoenrichthevocabularyoftheoldercohortenoughtoallowthemtotalkabouttheirownandotherpeople’sthoughtsandtopassfalse-belieftasks. Akeyquestionremains:Beforetheyhadacquiredthelanguageofmentalstates,didthegroupofadultsreallyfailtounderstandandinterpretthoughtsandbeliefsinotherpeople?Toaddressthisquestion,otherkindsofstudiesthatuseimplicitmethodsfortestingfalse-beliefunderstandingareneeded. Oneexampleofsuchataskuseseyetrackingtoseeifchildrenwhodonotpassclassicfalsebelief-tasksanticipatewiththeireyeswherethepersonshouldlookfortheobject.Thefirststudytousethismethodfoundthattoddlerslookatthecorrectlocationwhilestillfailingtogivetherightverbalanswer3.Morerecently,researchershaveadaptedthesemethodstoprobeimplicitunderstandingofbeliefinevenyoungertoddlers4. OnewouldexpectthatthedeafNicaraguanadultsarealsoabletodemonstratethislevelofimplicitunderstanding,butnoonehascarriedoutthiskindofstudy.Still,thestudybyPyersandSenghasprovidesstrongevidencethatlanguageisimportantfortheemergenceofamoreexplicittheoryofmind,thoughitleavesquiteopenthemechanismsthatdrivethesedevelopmentalchangesatthelinguistic,cognitiveandneurobiologicallevels. Languageofautism: Whataretheimplicationsofthislineofworkforourunderstandingoftheoryofmindinpeoplewithautism? SomechildrenandadultswithASDpassfalse-belieftasks,andthereisstrongevidencethatlanguageisakeypredictorofwhowillpasstheoryofmindtests.Forexample,childrenwhohavemasteredthecomplexsyntaxfortalkingaboutwhatpeoplesayorthink—suchas,“JohnsaidthatMarywentshopping”or“FredthoughtthatMarywassleeping”—aremorelikelytopassfalse-belieftasksthanthosewhohavenotacquiredtheselinguisticforms5. Butcanwereallysaythatthesechildrenhaveacquiredafull-fledgedtheoryofmind? UnlikethedeafNicaraguanswhohaveacquiredthelexicaltermsforreferringtomentalstates,evenlinguisticallyablechildrenwithASDdonottalkaboutcognitivementalstatesinthemselvesorothers,suggestingthattheydonotspontaneouslyrefertothemineverydayconversation6.Wealsodon’tknowmuchabouttheirconceptualunderstandingofmentalstates.Eveniftheycancorrectlyimputetrueorfalsebeliefsinexplicittasks,dotheyviewmentalstatesasabstractrepresentationsinaperson’smind,oraretheysimplyreasoningtheirwaythroughthelogicalsequenceofatask? Onerecentstudysuggeststhatthemechanismsunderlyingtheperformanceofhigh-functioningverballyablepeoplewithASDontheoryofmindtasksmightbequitedifferentfromthoseusedbypeoplewithoutASD.PeoplewithASDwhopassstandardfalse-belieftasksfailtoshowtheexpectedanticipatoryresponseintheimpliciteye-movementtask,suggestingthattheirconceptualunderstandingoftheoryofmindiseitherquitedifferentorexceptionallyfragile7. Peoplewhogrowupwithoutexposuretoamaturelinguisticsystemhavedeficitsthatgobeyondtheabsenceoflanguageitself:PyersandSenghasshowthatthedeafNicaruagansareimpoverishedintheirabilitytoreasonandinfermentalstatesinothers.Thisdeficitsurelyimpactstheirdailylife:Theylackthemeanstopredictwhatpeoplearedoing,gossiporfollowcomplexnarrativesinmoviesorontelevision.Butoncetheyaregiventhewordstorefertothoughts,beliefs,memoriesandothermentalstates,thesocialworldsofthesedeafadultsarequitetransformed:theyareabletofullyengageintypicalsocialandcommunicativeexchangesthatmakeuptherichtapestryofeverydaylife. NotsopeoplewithASD.Evenwhentheyhaveacquiredthelanguagefortalkingaboutthemind,thesocialworldstillremainsasignificantchallengeandmysterytothem.Languagematters,butforpeoplewithASD,theoryofmindismorethanjustaprobleminhavingthewordsandsyntaxtounderstandtheirownorotherpeople’sminds. HelenTager-FlusbergisdirectorofdevelopmentalcognitiveneuroscienceatBostonUniversity. References: PyersJ.E.andA.SenghasPsychol.Sci.20,805-812(2009)PubMed Astington,J.andBaird,J.(Eds.)(2005).Whylanguagemattersfortheoryofmind.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. ClementsW.andJ.PernerCognitiveDevelopment9,377-395(1994)Abstract OnishiK.H.andR.BaillargeonScience308,255-258(2005)PubMed Tager-Flusberg,H.andJoseph,R.(2005)Howlanguagefacilitatestheacquisitionoffalsebeliefunderstandinginchildrenwithautism.InAstington,J.andBaird,J.(Eds.),Whylanguagemattersfortheoryofmind(pp.298-318).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Tager-FlusbergH.ChildDev.63,161-172(1992)PubMed SenjuA.etal.Science325,883-885(2009)PubMed TAGS:   autism,eyetracking,language,theoryofmind 1Comments JoinTheDiscussion Byjoiningthediscussion,youagreetoourprivacypolicy. SharetoFacebookSharetoTwitterSharetoPocketSendviaEmailPrint Wecareaboutyourdata,andwe'dliketousecookiestogiveyouasmoothbrowsingexperience.Pleaseagreeandreadmoreaboutourtermsandconditions.AGREE