Karl Marx - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Karl Marx (1818–1883) is often treated as a revolutionary, an activist rather than a philosopher, whose works inspired the foundation of ... StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop KarlMarxFirstpublishedTueAug26,2003;substantiverevisionMonDec21,2020 KarlMarx(1818–1883)isoftentreatedasarevolutionary,an activistratherthanaphilosopher,whoseworksinspiredthe foundationofmanycommunistregimesinthetwentiethcentury.Itis certainlyhardtofindmanythinkerswhocanbesaidtohavehad comparableinfluenceinthecreationofthemodernworld.However, Marxwastrainedasaphilosopher,andalthoughoftenportrayedas movingawayfromphilosophyinhismid-twenties—perhapstowards historyandthesocialsciences—therearemanypointsofcontact withmodernphilosophicaldebatesthroughouthiswritings. ThethemespickedouthereincludeMarx’sphilosophical anthropology,histheoryofhistory,hiseconomicanalysis,his criticalengagementwithcontemporarycapitalistsociety(raising issuesaboutmorality,ideology,andpolitics),andhispredictionof acommunistfuture. Marx’searlywritingsaredominatedbyanunderstandingof alienation,adistincttypeofsocialillwhosediagnosislooksto restonacontroversialaccountofhumannatureanditsflourishing. Hesubsequentlydevelopedaninfluentialtheoryofhistory—often calledhistoricalmaterialism—centredaroundtheideathatforms ofsocietyriseandfallastheyfurtherandthenimpedethe developmentofhumanproductivepower.Marxincreasinglybecame preoccupiedwithanattempttounderstandthecontemporarycapitalist modeofproduction,asdrivenbyaremorselesspursuitofprofit, whoseoriginsarefoundintheextractionofsurplusvaluefromthe exploitedproletariat.Thepreciseroleofmoralityandmoral criticisminMarx’scritiqueofcontemporarycapitalistsociety ismuchdiscussed,andthereisnosettledscholarlyconsensuson theseissues.Hisunderstandingofmoralitymayberelatedtohis accountofideology,andhisreflectionontheextenttowhichcertain widely-sharedmisunderstandingsmighthelpexplainthestabilityof class-dividedsocieties.Inthecontextofhisradicaljournalism, Marxalsodevelopedhiscontroversialaccountofthecharacterand roleofthemodernstate,andmoregenerallyoftherelationbetween politicalandeconomiclife.Marxseesthehistoricalprocessas proceedingthroughaseriesofmodesofproduction,characterisedby (moreorlessexplicit)classstruggle,anddrivinghumankindtowards communism.However,Marxisfamouslyreluctanttosaymuchaboutthe detailedarrangementsofthecommunistalternativethathesoughtto bringintobeing,arguingthatitwouldarisethroughhistorical processes,andwasnottherealisationofapre-determinedplanor blueprint. 1.LifeandWritings 1.1EarlyYears 1.2Paris 1.3Brussels 1.4London 2.AlienationandHumanFlourishing 2.1TheBasicIdea 2.2ReligionandWork 2.3AlienationandCapitalism 2.4PoliticalEmancipation 2.5RemainingQuestions 3.TheoryofHistory 3.1Sources 3.2EarlyFormulations 3.31859Preface 3.4FunctionalExplanation 3.5Rationality 3.6AlternativeInterpretations 4.Economics 4.1ReadingCapital 4.2LabourTheoryofValue 4.3Exploitation 5.Morality 5.1UnpackingIssues 5.2The“Injustice”ofCapitalism 5.3Communismand“Justice” 6.Ideology 6.1ACriticalAccount 6.2IdeologyandStability 6.3Characteristics 7.StateandPolitics 7.1TheStateinCapitalistSociety 7.2.TheFateoftheStateinCommunistSociety 8.Utopianism 8.1UtopianSocialism 8.2Marx’sUtopophobia 9.Marx’sLegacy Bibliography PrimaryLiterature SecondaryLiterature AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.LifeandWritings 1.1EarlyYears KarlMarxwasbornin1818,oneofninechildren.Thefamilylivedin theRhinelandregionofPrussia,previouslyunderFrenchrule.Bothof hisparentscamefromJewishfamilieswithdistinguishedrabbinical lineages.Marx’sfatherwasalawyerwhoconvertedto Christianitywhenitbecamenecessaryforhimtodosoifhewasto continuehislegalcareer. Followinganunexceptionalschoolcareer,Marxstudiedlawand philosophyattheuniversitiesofBonnandBerlin.Hisdoctoralthesis wasinancientphilosophy,comparingthephilosophiesofnatureof Democritus(c.460–370BCE)andEpicurus(341–270BCE). Fromearly1842,heembarkedonacareerasaradicaljournalist, contributingto,andthenediting,theRheinischeZeitung, untilthepaperwasclosedbythePrussianauthoritiesinApril 1843. MarxmarriedJennyvonWestphalen(1814–1881),hischildhood sweetheart,inJune1843.Theywouldspendtheirlivestogetherand havesevenchildren,ofwhomjustthreedaughters—Jenny (1844–1883),Laura(1845–1911),andEleanor (1855–1898)—survivedtoadulthood.Marxisalsowidely thoughttohavefatheredachild—FrederickDemuth (1851–1929)—withHeleneDemuth(1820–1890), housekeeperandfriendoftheMarxfamily. Marx’sadultlifecombinedindependentscholarship,political activity,andfinancialinsecurity,influctuatingproportions. Politicalconditionsweresuch,that,inordertoassociateandwrite ashewished,hehadtoliveoutsideofGermanyformostofthistime. Marxspentthreesuccessiveperiodsofexileinthecapitalcitiesof France,Belgium,andEngland. 1.2Paris Betweenlate1843andearly1845,MarxlivedinParis,acosmopolitan cityfullofémigrésandradicalartisans.Hewas subsequentlyexpelledbytheFrenchgovernmentfollowingPrussian pressure.InhislastmonthsinGermanyandduringthisParisexile, Marxproducedaseriesof“earlywritings”,manynot intendedforpublication,whichsignificantlyalteredinterpretations ofhisthoughtwhentheywerepublishedcollectivelyinthetwentieth century.Papersthatactuallysawpublicationduringthisperiod include:“OntheJewishQuestion”(1843)inwhichMarx defendsJewishEmancipationagainstBrunoBauer(1809–1882),but alsoemphasisesthelimitationsof“political”asagainst “human”emancipation;andthe“Critiqueof Hegel’sPhilosophyofRight:Introduction”(1844)which containsacriticalaccountofreligion,togetherwithsomeprescient remarksabouttheemancipatorypotentialoftheproletariat.Themost significantworksthatMarxwroteforself-clarificationratherthan publicationinhisParisyearsaretheso-called“1844 Manuscripts”(1844)whichprovideasuggestiveaccountof alienation,especiallyofalienationinwork;andthe“Theseson Feuerbach”(1845),asetofepigrammaticbutrichremarks includingreflectionsonthenatureofphilosophy. 1.3Brussels Betweenearly1845andearly1848,MarxlivedinBrussels,thecapital ofarapidlyindustrialisingBelgium.Aconditionofhisresidencywas torefrainfrompublishingoncontemporarypolitics,andhewas eventuallyexpelledafterpoliticaldemonstrationsinvolvingforeign nationalstookplace.InBrusselsMarxpublishedTheHoly Family(1845),whichincludescontributionsfromhisnewfriend andclosecollaboratorFriedrichEngels(1820–1895),continuing theattackonBrunoBauerandhisfollowers.Marxalsoworked,with Engels,onaseriesofmanuscriptsnowusuallyknownasTheGerman Ideology(1845–46),asubstantialsectionofwhich criticisestheworkofMaxStirner(1806–1856).Marxalsowrote andpublishedThePovertyofPhilosophy(1847)which disparagesthesocialtheoryofPierre-JosephProudhon (1809–1865).AllthesepublicationscharacteristicallyshowMarx developingandpromotinghisownviewsthroughfiercecriticalattacks oncontemporaries,oftenbetter-knownandmoreestablishedthan himself. Marxwaspoliticallyactivethroughouthisadultlife,althoughthe eventsof1848—duringwhichtimehereturnedtoParisand Cologne—inspiredthefirstoftwoperiodsofespeciallyintense activity.TwoimportanttextshereareTheCommunist Manifesto(1848)whichMarxandEngelspublishedjustbeforethe FebruaryRevolution,and,followinghismovetoLondon,TheClass StrugglesinFrance(1850)inwhichMarxexaminedthesubsequent failureof1848inFrance.Betweenthesetwodates,Marxcommentedon, andintervenedin,therevolutioninGermanythroughtheNeue RheinischeZeitung(1848–49),thepaperhehelpedto establishandeditinCologne. 1.4London Forwelloverhalfofhisadultlife—fromlate1849untilhis deathin1883—MarxlivedinLondon,acityprovidingasecure havenforpoliticalexilesandasuperbvantagepointfromwhichto studytheworld’smostadvancedcapitalisteconomy.Thisthird andlongestexilewasdominatedbyanintellectualandpersonal struggletocompletehiscritiqueofpoliticaleconomy,buthis theoreticaloutputextendedfarbeyondthatproject. Marx’sinitialattempttomakesenseofNapoleonIII’s risetopowerincontemporaryFranceiscontainedinThe EighteenthBrumaireofLouisBonaparte(1852).Between1852and 1862MarxalsowrotewelloverthreehundredarticlesfortheNew YorkDailyTribune;sometimesunfairlydisparagedasmerely income-generatingjournalism,theyfrequentlycontainilluminating attemptstoexplaincontemporaryEuropeansocietyandpolitics (includingEuropeaninterventionsinIndiaandChina)toanAmerican audience(helpfully)presumedtoknowlittleaboutthem. ThesecondofMarx’stwoespeciallyintenseperiodsofpolitical activity—aftertherevolutionsof1848—centredonhis involvementintheInternationalWorkingMen’sAssociation between1864and1874,andtheeventsoftheParisCommune(1871),in particular.ThecharacterandlessonsoftheCommune—the short-lived,andviolentlysuppressed,municipalrebellionthat controlledParisforseveralmonthsintheaftermathofthe Franco-Prussianwar—arediscussedinTheCivilWarin France(1871).AlsopoliticallyimportantwasMarx’s “CritiqueoftheGothaProgramme”(1875),inwhichhe criticisesthetheoreticalinfluenceofFerdinandLassalle (1825–1864)ontheGermanlabourmovement,andportraysthe higherstageofafuturecommunistsocietyasendorsingdistribution accordingto“theneedsprinciple”. Marx’scritiqueofpoliticaleconomyremainscontroversial.He neversucceededinfixingandrealisingthewiderprojectthathe envisaged.VolumeOneofCapital,publishedin1867,wasthe onlysignificantpartoftheprojectpublishedinhisownlifetime, andevenherehewasunabletoresistheavilyreworkingsubsequent editions(especiallytheFrenchversionof1872–75).Whatwenow knowasVolumeTwoandVolumeThreeofCapitalwereput togetherfromMarx’srawmaterialsbyEngelsandpublishedin 1885and1894,respectively,andMarx’sowndraftswerewritten beforethepublicationofVolumeOneandbarelytouchedbyhiminthe remainingfifteenyearsofhislife.Anadditionalthreesupplementary volumesplannedbyEngels,andsubsequentlycalledTheoriesof SurplusValue(or,morecolloquially,the“fourthvolumeof Capital”)wereassembledfromremainingnotesbyKarl Kautsky(1854–1938),andpublishedbetween1905and1910.(The sectionofthe“newMEGA”—seebelow—concerned withCapital-relatedtextscontainsfifteenthickvolumes, andprovidessomesenseoftheextentandcharacteroftheselater editorialinterventions.)Inaddition,thepublicationin1953—a previoustwo-volumeedition(1939and1941)hadonlyahighly restrictedcirculation—oftheso-calledGrundrisse (writtenin1857–58)wasalsoimportant.Whetherthistextis treatedasafreestandingworkorasapreparatorysteptowards Capital,itraisesmanyquestionsaboutMarx’smethod, hisrelationtoG.W.F.Hegel(1770–1831),andtheevolutionof Marx’sthought.Incontrast,theworkofpoliticaleconomythat Marxdidpublishinthisperiod—AContributiontoaCritique ofPoliticalEconomy(1859)—waslargelyignoredbyboth contemporariesandlatercommentators,exceptforthe,muchreprinted anddiscussed,summarysketchofhistheoryofhistorythatMarx offeredintheso-called“1859Preface”tothat volume. Marx’slateryears(aftertheParisCommune)arethesubjectof muchinterpretativedisagreement.Hisinabilitytodeliverthelater volumesofCapitalisoftenseenasemblematicofawiderand moresystematicintellectualfailure(StedmanJones2016).However, othershavestressedMarx’scontinuedintellectualcreativityin thisperiod,ashevariouslyrethoughthisviewsabout:thecoreand peripheryoftheinternationaleconomicsystem;thescopeofhis theoryofhistory;socialanthropology;andtheeconomicandpolitical evolutionofRussia(Shanin1983;K.Anderson2010). Afterthedeathofhiswife,in1881,Marx’slifewasdominated byillness,andtravelaimedatimprovinghishealth(convalescent destinationsincludingtheIsleofWight,Karlsbad,Jersey,and Algiers).MarxdiedinMarch1883,twomonthsafterthedeathofhis eldestdaughter.Hisestatewasvaluedat£250. Engels’swiderroleintheevolutionof,and,moreespecially thereceptionandinterpretationof,Marx’sworkismuch disputed.Thetruthhereiscomplex,andEngelsisnotalways well-treatedintheliterature.MarxandEngelsaresometimes portrayedasiftheywereasingleentity,ofonemindonallmatters, whoseindividualviewsonanytopiccanbefoundsimplybyconsulting theother.OtherspresentEngelsasthedistorterandmanipulatorof Marx’sthought,responsibleforanyelementofMarxiantheory withwhichtherelevantcommentatormightdisagree.Despitetheir familiarity,neithercaricatureseemsplausibleorfair.The best-knownjointlyauthoredtextsareTheHoly Family,the“GermanIdeology”manuscripts,and TheCommunistManifesto,buttherearenearlytwohundred shorteritemsthattheybothcontributedto(Draper1985: 2–19). ManyofMarx’sbest-knownwritingsremainedunpublishedbefore hisdeath.Theattempttoestablishareliablecollectededitionhas provedlengthyandfraught.Theauthoritative Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe,theso-called“new MEGA”(1975–),isstillaworkinprogress,begun underSovietauspicesbutsince1990undertheguidanceofthe “InternationalMarx-EngelsStiftung”(IMES).Inits currentform—muchscaled-downfromitsoriginal ambitions—theeditionwillcontainsome114volumes(wellovera halfofwhicharepublishedatthetimeofwriting).Inadditionto hisvariouspublishedandunpublishedworks,itincludesMarx’s journalism,correspondence,drafts,and(some)notebooks.Textsare publishedintheiroriginallanguage(variouslyGerman,English,and French).ForthoseneedingtoutiliseEnglish-languageresources,the fiftyvolumeMarxEngelsCollectedWorks(1975–2004) canberecommended.(ReferencestoMarxandEngelsquotationshereare totheseMECWvolumes.)Therearealsoseveralusefulsingle volumeselectionsofMarxandEngelswritingsinEnglish(including Marx2000). 2.AlienationandHumanFlourishing 2.1TheBasicIdea Alienationisaconceptespecially,butnotuniquely,associatedwith Marx’swork,andtheintellectualtraditionthathehelped found.Itidentifiesadistinctkindofsocialill,involvinga separationbetweenasubjectandanobjectthatproperlybelong together.Thesubjecthereistypicallyanindividualoragroup, whiletheobjectisusuallyan“entity”whichvariouslyis notitselfasubject,isanothersubject(s),oristheoriginal subject(thatis,therelationherecanbereflexive).Andthe relationbetweentherelevantsubjectandobjectisoneofproblematic separation.Bothelementsofthatcharacterisationareimportant.Not allsocialills,ofcourse,involveseparations;forinstance,being overlyintegratedintosomeobjectmightbedysfunctional,butitis notcharacteristicofalienation.Moreover,notallseparationsare problematic,andaccountsofalienationtypicallyappealtosome baselineunityorharmonythatisfrustratedorviolatedbythe separationinquestion. Theoriesofalienationvaryconsiderably,butfrequently:first, identifyasubsetoftheseproblematicseparationsasbeingof particularimportance;second,includeanaccount(sometimesimplicit) ofwhatmakestherelevantseparationsproblematic;and,third, propoundsomeexplanatoryclaimsabouttheextentof,andprognosis for,alienation,sounderstood. 2.2ReligionandWork Marx’sideasconcerningalienationweregreatlyinfluencedby thecriticalwritingsonreligionofLudwigFeuerbach (1804–1872),andespeciallyhisTheEssenceof Christianity(1841).OnekeytextinthisrespectisMarx’s “ContributionofHegel’sCritiqueofRight: Introduction”(1843).ThisworkishometoMarx’s notoriousremarkthatreligionisthe“opiumofthe people,”aharmful,illusion-generatingpainkiller (MECW3:175).ItisherethatMarxsetsouthisaccountof religioninmostdetail. WhiletraditionalChristiantheologyassertsthatGodcreatedmanin God’sownimage,MarxfullyacceptedFeuerbach’sinversion ofthispicture,proposingthathumanbeingshadinventedGodintheir ownimage;indeedaviewthatlongpre-datedFeuerbach. Feuerbach’sdistinctivecontributionwastoarguethat worshippingGoddivertedhumanbeingsfromenjoyingtheirownhuman powers.Intheirimaginationhumansraisetheirownpowerstoan infinitelevelandprojectthemontoanabstractobject.Hence religionisaformofalienation,foritseparateshumanbeingsfrom their“speciesessence.”Marxacceptedmuchof Feuerbach’saccountbutarguesthatFeuerbachfailedto understandwhypeoplefallintoreligiousalienation,andsoisunable toexplainhowitcanbetranscended.Feuerbach’sviewappears tobethatbeliefinreligionispurelyanintellectualerrorandcan becorrectedbypersuasion.Marx’sexplanationisthatreligion isaresponsetoalienationinmateriallife,andthereforecannotbe removeduntilhumanmateriallifeisemancipated,atwhichpoint religionwillwitheraway. Preciselywhatitisaboutmateriallifethatcreatesreligionisnot setoutwithcompleteclarity.However,itseemsthatatleasttwo aspectsofalienationareresponsible.Oneisalienatedlabour,which willbeexploredshortly.Asecondistheneedforhumanbeingsto asserttheircommunalessence.Whetherornotweexplicitlyrecognise it,humanbeingsexistasacommunity,andwhatmakeshumanlife possibleisourmutualdependenceonthevastnetworkofsocialand economicrelationswhichengulfusall,eventhoughthisisrarely acknowledgedinourday-to-daylife.Marx’sviewappearstobe thatwemust,somehoworother,acknowledgeourcommunalexistencein ourinstitutions.Atfirstitis“deviouslyacknowledged” byreligion,whichcreatesafalseideaofacommunityinwhichweare allequalintheeyesofGod.Afterthepost-Reformationfragmentation ofreligion,wherereligionisnolongerabletoplaytheroleevenof afakecommunityofequals,themodernstatefillsthisneedby offeringustheillusionofacommunityofcitizens,allequalinthe eyesofthelaw.Interestingly,thepoliticalorliberalstate,which isneededtomanagethepoliticsofreligiousdiversity,takesonthe roleofferedbyreligioninearliertimesofprovidingaformof illusorycommunity.Butthepoliticalstateandreligionwillbothbe transcendedwhenagenuinecommunityofsocialandeconomicequalsis created. AlthoughMarxwasgreatlyinspiredbythinkingaboutreligious alienation,muchmoreofhisattentionwasdevotedtoexploring alienationinwork.Inamuch-discussedpassagefromthe1844 Manuscripts,Marxidentifiesfourdimensionsofalienatedlabour incontemporarycapitalistsociety(MECW3:270–282). First,immediateproducersareseparatedfromtheproductoftheir labour;theycreateaproductthattheyneitherownnorcontrol, indeed,whichcomestodominatethem.(Notethatthisideaof “fetishism”—wherehumancreationsescapeour control,achievetheappearanceofindependence,andcometooppress us—isnottobeequatedwithalienationassuch,butisrather oneformthatitcantake.)Second,immediateproducersareseparated fromtheirproductiveactivity;inparticular,theyareforcedtowork inwayswhicharementallyand/orphysicallydebilitating.Third, immediateproducersareseparatedfromotherindividuals;contemporary economicrelationssocialiseindividualstoviewothersasmerely meanstotheirownparticularends.Fourth,andfinally,immediate producersareseparatedfromtheirownhumannature;forinstance,the humancapacitiesforcommunityandforfree,conscious,andcreative, work,arebothfrustratedbycontemporarycapitalistrelations. Notethattheseclaimsaboutalienationaredistinctfromother, perhapsmorefamiliar,complaintsaboutworkincapitalistsociety. Forinstance,alienatedlabour,asunderstoodhere,could be—evenifitisoftennot—highlyremunerated,limitedin duration,andrelativelysecure. Marxholdsthatworkhasthepotentialtobesomethingcreativeand fulfilling.Heconsequentlyrejectstheviewofworkasanecessary evil,denyingthatthenegativecharacterofworkispartofourfate, auniversalfactaboutthehumanconditionthatnoamountofsocial changecouldremedy.Indeed,productiveactivity,onMarx’s account,isacentralelementinwhatitistobeahumanbeing,and self-realisationthroughworkisavitalcomponentofhuman flourishing.Thathethinksthatwork—inadifferentformof society—couldbecreativeandfulfilling,perhapsexplainsthe intensityandscaleofMarx’scondemnationofcontemporary economicarrangementsandtheirtransformationofworkersinto deformedand“dehumanised”beings(MECW3: 284). Itwassuggestedabovethatalienationconsistsofdysfunctional separations—separationsbetweenentitiesthatproperlybelong together—andthattheoriesofalienationtypicallypresuppose somebaselineconditionwhosefrustrationorviolationbytherelevant separationidentifiesthelatterasdysfunctional.ForMarx,that baselineseemstobeprovidedbyanaccountofhumanflourishing, whichheconceptualisesintermsofself-realisation(understoodhere asthedevelopmentanddeploymentofouressentialhumancapacities). Labourincapitalism,wecansay,isalienatedbecauseitembodies separationspreventingtheself-realisationofproducers;becauseit isorganisedinawaythatfrustratesthehumanneedforfree, conscious,andcreativework. Sounderstood,andreturningtothefourseparationssaidto characterisealienatedlabour,wecanseethatitistheimplicit claimabouthumannature(thefourthseparation)whichidentifiesthe otherthreeseparationsasdysfunctional.Ifonesubscribedtothe sameformalmodelofalienationandself-realisation,buthelda differentaccountofthesubstanceofhumannature,verydifferent claimsaboutworkincapitalistsocietymightresult.Imaginea theoristwhoheldthathumanbeingsweresolitary,egoisticcreatures, bynature.Thattheoristcouldacceptthatworkincapitalistsociety encouragedisolationandselfishness,butdenythatsuchresultswere alienating,becausethoseresultswouldnotfrustratetheirbaseline accountofwhatitistobeahumanbeing(indeed,theywouldrather facilitatethosecharacteristics). 2.3AlienationandCapitalism Marxseemstoholdvariousviewsaboutthehistoricallocationand comparativeextentofalienation.Theseinclude:thatsomesystematic formsofalienation—presumablyincludingreligious alienation—existedinpre-capitalistsocieties;thatsystematic formsofalienation—includingalienationinwork—areonly afeatureofclassdividedsocieties;thatsystematicformsof alienationaregreaterincontemporarycapitalistsocietiesthanin pre-capitalistsocieties;andthatnotallhumansocietiesarescarred byclassdivision,inparticular,thatafutureclasslesssociety (communism)willnotcontainsystematicformsofalienation. Marxmaintainsthatalienationflowsfromcapitalistsocialrelations, andnotfromthekindoftechnologicaladvancesthatcapitalist societycontains.Hisdisapprovalofcapitalismisreservedforits socialarrangementsandnotitsmaterialaccomplishments.Hehad littletimeforwhatissometimescalledthe“romanticcritique ofcapitalism”,whichseesindustryandtechnologyasthereal villains,responsiblefordevastatingthepurportedlycommunitarian idyllofpre-capitalistrelations.Incontrast,Marxcelebratesthe bourgeoisie’sdestructionoffeudalrelations,andsees technologicalgrowthandhumanliberationas(atleast,intime) progressinghand-in-hand.Industryandtechnologyareunderstoodas partofthesolutionto,andnotthesourceof,socialproblems. Therearemanyopportunitiesforscepticismhere.Inthepresent context,manystruggletoseehowthekindoflarge-scaleindustrial productionthatwouldpresumablycharacterisecommunist society—communismpurportedlybeingmoreproductivethan capitalism—wouldavoidalienationinwork.Interestingresponses tosuchconcernshavebeenputforward,buttheyhavetypicallycome fromcommentatorsratherthanfromMarxhimself(Kandiyali2018).This isapointatwhichMarx’sself-denyingordinanceconcerningthe detaileddescriptionofcommunistsocietypreventshimfromengaging directlywithsignificantconcernsaboutthedirectionofsocial change. 2.4PoliticalEmancipation Inthetext“OnTheJewishQuestion”(1843)Marxbeginsto makeclearthedistancebetweenhimselfandhisradicalliberal colleaguesamongtheYoungHegelians;inparticularBrunoBauer.Bauer hadrecentlywrittenagainstJewishemancipation,fromanatheist perspective,arguingthatthereligionofbothJewsandChristianswas abarriertoemancipation.InrespondingtoBauer,Marxmakesoneof themostenduringargumentsfromhisearlywritings,bymeansof introducingadistinctionbetweenpolitical emancipation—essentiallythegrantofliberalrightsand liberties—andhumanemancipation.Marx’sreplytoBaueris thatpoliticalemancipationisperfectlycompatiblewiththecontinued existenceofreligion,asthecontemporaryexampleoftheUnited Statesdemonstrates.However,pushingmattersdeeper,inanargument reinventedbyinnumerablecriticsofliberalism,Marxarguesthatnot onlyispoliticalemancipationinsufficienttobringabouthuman emancipation,itisinsomesensealsoabarrier.Liberalrightsand ideasofjusticearepremisedontheideathateachofusneeds protectionfromotherhumanbeingswhoareathreattoourlibertyand security.Therefore,liberalrightsarerightsofseparation,designed toprotectusfromsuchperceivedthreats.Freedomonsuchaview,is freedomfrominterference.Whatthisviewoverlooksisthe possibility—forMarx,thefact—thatrealfreedomistobe foundpositivelyinourrelationswithotherpeople.Itistobefound inhumancommunity,notinisolation.Accordingly,insistingona regimeofliberalrightsencouragesustovieweachotherinwaysthat underminethepossibilityoftherealfreedomwemayfindinhuman emancipation.NowweshouldbeclearthatMarxdoesnotoppose politicalemancipation,forheseesthatliberalismisagreat improvementonthesystemsoffeudalismandreligiousprejudiceand discriminationwhichexistedintheGermanyofhisday.Nevertheless, suchpoliticallyemancipatedliberalismmustbetranscendedonthe routetogenuinehumanemancipation.Unfortunately,Marxnevertells uswhathumanemancipationis,althoughitisclearthatitisclosely relatedtotheideasofnon-alienatedlabourandmeaningful community. 2.5RemainingQuestions Evenwiththeseelaborations,manyadditionalquestionsremainabout Marx’saccount.Threeconcernsarebrieflyaddressedhere. First,onemightworryabouttheplaceofalienationintheevolution ofMarx’sthought.Theonce-popularsuggestionthatMarxonly wroteaboutalienationinhisearlywritings—hispublishedand unpublishedworksfromtheearly1840s—isnotsustainedbythe textualevidence.However,thetheoreticalrolethattheconceptof alienationplaysinhiswritingsmightstillbesaidtoevolve.For example,ithasbeensuggestedthatalienationintheearlywritings isintendedtoplayan“explanatoryrole”,whereasinhis laterworkitcomestohaveamore“descriptiveor diagnostic”function(Wood1981[2004:7]). Asecondconcernistheroleofhumannatureintheinterpretationof alienationofferedhere.Inoneexegeticalvariantofthisworry,the suggestionisthatthisaccountofalienationrestsonamodelof universalhumannaturewhichMarx’s(later)understandingof historicalspecificityandchangepreventshimfromendorsing. However,thereismuchevidenceagainstthispurportedlaterrejection ofhumannature(seeGeras1983).Indeed,the“mature” Marxexplicitlyaffirmsthathumannaturehasbothconstantand mutableelements;thathumanbeingsarecharacterisedbyuniversal qualities,constantacrosshistoryandculture,andvariable qualities,reflectinghistoricalandculturaldiversity(McMurtry 1978:19–53).Onesystematic,ratherthanexegetical,variantof thepresentworrysuggeststhatweshouldnotendorseaccountsof alienationwhichdependon“thick”andinevitably controversialaccountsofhumannature(Jaeggi2016).Whateverviewwe takeofthatclaimaboutourendorsement,thereseemslittledoubt aboutthe“thickness”ofMarx’sownaccountofhuman flourishing.Toprovideforthelatter,asocietymustsatisfynot onlybasicneeds(forsustenance,warmthandshelter,certainclimatic conditions,physicalexercise,basichygiene,procreationandsexual activity),butalsolessbasicneeds,boththosethatarenotalways appreciatedtobepartofhisaccount(forrecreation,culture, intellectualstimulation,artisticexpression,emotionalsatisfaction, andaestheticpleasure),andthosethatMarxismoreoftenassociated with(forfulfillingworkandmeaningfulcommunity)(Leopold2007: 227–245). Third,wemayaskaboutMarx’sattitudetowardsthedistinction sometimesmadebetweensubjectiveandobjectivealienation.Thesetwo formsofalienationcanbeexemplifiedseparatelyorconjointlyinthe livesofparticularindividualsorsocieties(Hardimon1994: 119–122).Alienationis“subjective”whenitis characterisedintermsofthepresence(orabsence)ofcertainbeliefs orfeelings;forexample,whenindividualsaresaidtobealienated becausetheyfeelestrangedfromtheworld.Alienationis “objective”whenitischaracterisedintermswhichmake noreferencetothebeliefsorfeelingsofindividuals;forexample, whenindividualsaresaidtobealienatedbecausetheyfailtodevelop anddeploytheiressentialhumancharacteristics,whetherornotthey experiencethatlackofself-realisationasaloss.Marxseemsto allowthatthesetwoformsofalienationareconceptuallydistinct, butassumesthatincapitalistsocietiestheyaretypicallyfound together.Indeed,heoftenappearstothinkofsubjectivealienation astrackingtheobjectivevariant.Thatsaid,Marxdoesallowthat theycancomeapartsociologically.Atleast,thatisonewayof readingapassageinTheHolyFamilywhereherecognisesthat capitalistsdonotgettoengageinself-realisingactivitiesofthe rightkind(andhenceareobjectivelyalienated),but that—unliketheproletariat—theyarecontentin theirestrangement(andhencearelackingsubjectivealienation), feeling“atease”in,andeven“strengthened” by,it(MECW4:36). 3.TheoryofHistory 3.1Sources Marxdidnotsetouthistheoryofhistoryingreatdetail. Accordingly,ithastobeconstructedfromavarietyoftexts,both thosewhereheattemptstoapplyatheoreticalanalysistopastand futurehistoricalevents,andthoseofamorepurelytheoretical nature.Ofthelatter,the“1859Preface”toA CritiqueofPoliticalEconomyhasachievedcanonicalstatus. However,themanuscriptscollectedtogetherasTheGerman Ideology,co-writtenwithEngelsin1845-46,arealsoamuchused earlysource.Weshallbrieflyoutlinebothtexts,andthenlookat thereconstructionofMarx’stheoryofhistoryinthehandsof hisphilosophicallymostinfluentialrecentexponent,G.A.Cohen (Cohen1978[2001],1988),whobuildsontheinterpretationofthe earlyRussianMarxistGeorgiPlekhanov(1856–1918) (Plekhanov1895[1947]). Weshould,however,beawarethatCohen’sinterpretationisfar fromuniversallyaccepted.CohenprovidedhisreconstructionofMarx partlybecausehewasfrustratedwithexistingHegelian-inspired “dialectical”interpretationsofMarx,andwhathe consideredtobethevaguenessoftheinfluentialworksofLouis Althusser(1918–1990),neitherofwhich,hefelt,provideda rigorousaccountofMarx’sviews.However,somescholarsbelieve thattheinterpretationthatweshallfocusonisfaultypreciselyfor itsinsistenceonamechanicalmodelanditslackofattentiontothe dialectic.OneaspectofthiscriticismisthatCohen’s understandinghasasurprisinglysmallrolefortheconceptofclass struggle,whichisoftenfelttobecentraltoMarx’stheoryof history.Cohen’sexplanationforthisisthatthe“1859 Preface”,onwhichhisinterpretationisbased,doesnotgivea prominentroletoclassstruggle,andindeeditisnotexplicitly mentioned.Yetthisreasoningisproblematicforitispossiblethat Marxdidnotwanttowriteinamannerthatwouldengagetheconcerns ofthepolicecensor,and,indeed,areaderawareofthecontextmay beabletodetectanimplicitreferencetoclassstrugglethroughthe inclusionofsuchphrasesas“thenbeginsaneraofsocial revolution,”and“theideologicalformsinwhichmen becomeconsciousofthisconflictandfightitout”.Henceit doesnotfollowthatMarxhimselfthoughtthattheconceptofclass strugglewasrelativelyunimportant.Furthermore,whenACritique ofPoliticalEconomywasreplacedbyCapital,Marxmade noattempttokeepthe1859Prefaceinprint,anditscontent isreproducedjustasaverymuchabridgedfootnotein Capital.Nevertheless,weshallconcentratehereon Cohen’sinterpretationasnootheraccounthasbeensetoutwith comparablerigour,precisionanddetail. 3.2EarlyFormulations Inhis“ThesesonFeuerbach”(1845)Marxprovides abackgroundtowhatwouldbecomehistheoryofhistorybystatinghis objectionsto“allhithertoexisting”materialismand idealism,understoodastypesofphilosophicaltheories.Materialism iscomplimentedforunderstandingthephysicalrealityoftheworld, butiscriticisedforignoringtheactiveroleofthehumansubjectin creatingtheworldweperceive.Idealism,atleastasdevelopedby Hegel,understandstheactivenatureofthehumansubject,but confinesittothoughtorcontemplation:theworldiscreatedthrough thecategoriesweimposeuponit.Marxcombinestheinsightsofboth traditionstoproposeaviewinwhichhumanbeingsdoindeedcreate —oratleasttransform—theworldtheyfindthemselvesin, butthistransformationhappensnotinthoughtbutthroughactual materialactivity;notthroughtheimpositionofsublimeconceptsbut throughthesweatoftheirbrow,withpicksandshovels.This historicalversionofmaterialism,which,accordingtoMarx, transcendsandthusrejectsallexistingphilosophicalthought,isthe foundationofMarx’slatertheoryofhistory.AsMarxputsitin the“1844Manuscripts”,“Industryistheactual historicalrelationshipofnature…toman” (MECW3:303).Thisthought,derivedfromreflectiononthe historyofphilosophy,togetherwithhisexperienceofsocialand economicrealities,asajournalist,setstheagendaforall Marx’sfuturework. InTheGermanIdeologymanuscripts,MarxandEngelscontrast theirnewmaterialistmethodwiththeidealismthathadcharacterised previousGermanthought.Accordingly,theytakepainstosetoutthe “premisesofthematerialistmethod”.Theystart,they say,from“realhumanbeings”,emphasisingthathuman beingsareessentiallyproductive,inthattheymustproducetheir meansofsubsistenceinordertosatisfytheirmaterialneeds.The satisfactionofneedsengendersnewneedsofbothamaterialand socialkind,andformsofsocietyarisecorrespondingtothestateof developmentofhumanproductiveforces.Materiallifedetermines,or atleast“conditions”sociallife,andsotheprimary directionofsocialexplanationisfrommaterialproductiontosocial forms,andthencetoformsofconsciousness.Asthematerialmeansof productiondevelop,“modesofco-operation”oreconomic structuresriseandfall,andeventuallycommunismwillbecomeareal possibilityoncetheplightoftheworkersandtheirawarenessofan alternativemotivatesthemsufficientlytobecomerevolutionaries. 3.31859Preface InthesketchofTheGermanIdeology,manyofthekey elementsofhistoricalmaterialismarepresent,evenifthe terminologyisnotyetthatofMarx’smorematurewritings. Marx’sstatementinthe“1859Preface”renders somethingofthesameviewinsharperform.Cohen’s reconstructionofMarx’sviewinthePrefacebeginsfromwhat CohencallstheDevelopmentThesis,whichispre-supposed,ratherthan explicitlystatedinthePreface(Cohen1978[2001]:134–174). Thisisthethesisthattheproductiveforcestendtodevelop,inthe senseofbecomingmorepowerful,overtime.Theproductiveforcesare themeansofproduction,togetherwithproductivelyapplicable knowledge:technology,inotherwords.Thedevelopmentthesisstates notthattheproductiveforcesalwaysdodevelop,butthatthereisa tendencyforthemtodoso.Thenextthesisistheprimacythesis, whichhastwoaspects.Thefirststatesthatthenatureofa society’seconomicstructureisexplainedbythelevelof developmentofitsproductiveforces,andthesecondthatthenature ofthesuperstructure—thepoliticalandlegalinstitutionsof society—isexplainedbythenatureoftheeconomicstructure. Thenatureofasociety’sideology,whichistosaycertain religious,artistic,moralandphilosophicalbeliefscontainedwithin society,isalsoexplainedintermsofitseconomicstructure, althoughthisreceiveslessemphasisinCohen’sinterpretation. Indeed,manyactivitiesmaywellcombineaspectsofboththe superstructureandideology:areligionisconstitutedbyboth institutionsandasetofbeliefs. Revolutionandepochchangeisunderstoodastheconsequenceofan economicstructurenolongerbeingabletocontinuetodevelopthe forcesofproduction.Atthispointthedevelopmentoftheproductive forcesissaidtobefettered,and,accordingtothetheory,oncean economicstructurefettersdevelopmentitwillbe revolutionised—“burstasunder”(MECW6: 489)—andeventuallyreplacedwithaneconomicstructurebetter suitedtopresideoverthecontinueddevelopmentoftheforcesof production. Inoutline,then,thetheoryhasapleasingsimplicityandpower.It seemsplausiblethathumanproductivepowerdevelopsovertime,and plausibletoothateconomicstructuresexistforaslongasthey developtheproductiveforces,butwillbereplacedwhentheyareno longercapableofdoingthis.Yetsevereproblemsemergewhenwe attempttoputmorefleshonthesebones. 3.4FunctionalExplanation PriortoCohen’swork,historicalmaterialismhadnotbeen regardedasacoherentviewwithinEnglish-languagepolitical philosophy.Theantipathyiswellsummedupwiththeclosingwordsof H.B.Acton’sTheIllusionoftheEpoch:“Marxism isaphilosophicalfarrago”(1955:271).Onedifficultytaken particularlyseriouslybyCohenisanallegedinconsistencybetween theexplanatoryprimacyoftheforcesofproduction,andcertain claimsmadeelsewherebyMarxwhichappeartogivetheeconomic structureprimacyinexplainingthedevelopmentoftheproductive forces.Forexample,inTheCommunistManifestoMarxand Engelsstatethat:“Thebourgeoisiecannotexistwithout constantlyrevolutionisingtheinstrumentsofproduction” (MECW6:487).Thisappearstogivecausalandexplanatory primacytotheeconomicstructure—capitalism—whichbrings aboutthedevelopmentoftheforcesofproduction.Cohenacceptsthat, onthesurfaceatleast,thisgeneratesacontradiction.Boththe economicstructureandthedevelopmentoftheproductiveforcesseem tohaveexplanatorypriorityovereachother.Unsatisfiedbysuch vagueresolutionsas“determinationinthelastinstance”, ortheideaof“dialectical”connections,Cohen self-consciouslyattemptstoapplythestandardsofclarityandrigour ofanalyticphilosophytoprovideareconstructedversionof historicalmaterialism. Thekeytheoreticalinnovationistoappealtothenotionof functionalexplanation,alsosometimescalled“consequence explanation”(Cohen1978[2001]:249–296).The essentialmoveischeerfullytoadmitthattheeconomicstructure, suchascapitalism,doesindeeddeveloptheproductiveforces,butto addthatthis,accordingtothetheory,ispreciselywhywehave capitalism(whenwedo).Thatis,ifcapitalismfailedtodevelopthe productiveforcesitwoulddisappear.And,indeed,thisfits beautifullywithhistoricalmaterialism.ForMarxassertsthatwhenan economicstructurefailstodeveloptheproductiveforces—when it“fetters”theproductiveforces—itwillbe revolutionisedandtheepochwillchange.Sotheideaof “fettering”becomesthecounterparttothetheoryof functionalexplanation.Essentiallyfetteringiswhathappenswhenthe economicstructurebecomesdysfunctional. Nowitisapparentthatthisrendershistoricalmaterialism consistent.Yetthereisaquestionastowhetheritisattoohigha price.Forwemustaskwhetherfunctionalexplanationisacoherent methodologicaldevice.Theproblemisthatwecanaskwhatitisthat makesitthecasethataneconomicstructurewillonlypersistforas longasitdevelopstheproductiveforces.JonElsterhaspressedthis criticismagainstCohenveryhard(Elster1985:27–35).Ifwewere toarguethatthereisanagentguidinghistorywhohasthepurpose thattheproductiveforcesshouldbedevelopedasmuchaspossible thenitwouldmakesensethatsuchanagentwouldinterveneinhistory tocarryoutthispurposebyselectingtheeconomicstructureswhich dothebestjob.However,itisclearthatMarxmakesnosuch metaphysicalassumptions.Elsterisverycritical—sometimesof Marx,sometimesofCohen—oftheideaofappealingto “purposes”inhistorywithoutthosebeingthepurposesof anyone. IndeedElster’scriticismwasanticipatedinfascinatingterms bySimoneWeil(1909–1943),wholinksMarx’sappealto history’spurposestotheinfluenceofHegelonhisthought: WemustremembertheHegelianoriginsofMarxistthought.Hegel believedinahiddenmindatworkintheuniverse,andthatthe historyoftheworldissimplythehistoryofthisworldmind,which, asinthecaseofeverythingspiritual,tendsindefinitelytowards perfection.Marxclaimedto“putbackonitsfeet”the Hegeliandialectic,whichheaccusedofbeing“upside down”,bysubstitutingmatterformindasthemotivepowerof history;butbyanextraordinaryparadox,heconceivedhistory, startingfromthisrectification,asthoughheattributedtomatter whatistheveryessenceofmind—anunceasingaspirationtowards thebest.(Weil1955[1958:43]) Coheniswellawareofthedifficultyofappealingtopurposesin history,butdefendstheuseoffunctionalexplanationbycomparing itsuseinhistoricalmaterialismwithitsuseinevolutionary biology.Incontemporarybiologyitiscommonplacetoexplainthe existenceofthestripesofatiger,orthehollowbonesofabird,by pointingtothefunctionofthesefeatures.Herewehaveapparent purposeswhicharenotthepurposesofanyone.Theobviouscounter, however,isthatinevolutionarybiologywecanprovideacausalstory tounderpinthesefunctionalexplanations;astoryinvolvingchance variationandsurvivalofthefittest.Thereforethesefunctional explanationsaresustainedbyacomplexcausalfeedbackloopinwhich dysfunctionalelementstendtobefilteredoutincompetitionwith betterfunctioningelements.Cohencallssuchbackgroundaccounts “elaborations”andheconcedesthatfunctional explanationsareinneedofelaborations.Buthepointsoutthat standardcausalexplanationsareequallyinneedofelaborations.We might,forexample,besatisfiedwiththeexplanationthatthevase brokebecauseitwasdroppedonthefloor,butagreatdealoffurther informationisneededtoexplainwhythisexplanationworks. Consequently,Cohenclaimsthatwecanbejustifiedinofferinga functionalexplanationevenwhenweareinignoranceofits elaboration.Indeed,eveninbiologydetailedcausalelaborationsof functionalexplanationshavebeenavailableonlyrelativelyrecently. PriortoCharlesDarwin(1809–1882),orarguablyJean-Baptiste Lamarck(1744–1829),theonlycandidatecausalelaborationwas toappealtoGod’spurposes.Darwinoutlinedaveryplausible mechanism,buthavingnogenetictheorywasnotabletoelaborateit intoadetailedaccount.Ourknowledgeremainsincompleteinsome respectstothisday.Nevertheless,itseemsperfectlyreasonableto saythatbirdshavehollowbonesinordertofacilitateflight. Cohen’spointisthattheweightofevidencethatorganismsare adaptedtotheirenvironmentwouldpermitevenapre-Darwinianatheist toassertthisfunctionalexplanationwithjustification.Henceone canbejustifiedinofferingafunctionalexplanationeveninthe absenceofacandidateelaboration:ifthereissufficientweightof inductiveevidence. Atthispointtheissue,then,dividesintoatheoreticalquestionand anempiricalone.Theempiricalquestioniswhetherornotthereis evidencethatformsofsocietyexistonlyforaslongastheyadvance productivepower,andarereplacedbyrevolutionwhentheyfail.Here, onemustadmit,theempiricalrecordispatchyatbest,andthere appeartohavebeenlongperiodsofstagnation,evenregression,when dysfunctionaleconomicstructureswerenotrevolutionised. Thetheoreticalissueiswhetheraplausibleelaboratingexplanation isavailabletounderpinMarxistfunctionalexplanations.Herethere issomethingofadilemma.Inthefirstinstanceitistemptingtotry tomimictheelaborationgivenintheDarwinianstory,andappealto chancevariationsandsurvivalofthefittest.Inthiscase “fittest”wouldmean“mostabletopresideoverthe developmentoftheproductiveforces”.Chancevariationwouldbe amatterofpeopletryingoutnewtypesofeconomicrelations.Onthis accountneweconomicstructuresbeginthroughexperiment,butthrive andpersistthroughtheirsuccessindevelopingtheproductiveforces. Howevertheproblemisthatsuchanaccountwouldseemtointroducea largerelementofcontingencythanMarxseeks,foritisessentialto Marx’sthoughtthatoneshouldbeabletopredicttheeventual arrivalofcommunism.WithinDarwiniantheorythereisnowarrantfor long-termpredictions,foreverythingdependsonthecontingenciesof particularsituations.Asimilarheavyelementofcontingencywouldbe inheritedbyaformofhistoricalmaterialismdevelopedbyanalogy withevolutionarybiology.Thedilemma,then,isthatthebestmodel fordevelopingthetheorymakespredictionsbasedonthetheory unsound,yetthewholepointofthetheoryispredictive.Henceone musteitherlookforanalternativemeansofproducingelaborating explanation,orgiveupthepredictiveambitionsofthetheory. 3.5Rationality Thedrivingforceofhistory,inCohen’sreconstructionofMarx, isthedevelopmentoftheproductiveforces,themostimportantof whichistechnology.Butwhatisitthatdrivessuchdevelopment? Ultimately,inCohen’saccount,itishumanrationality.Human beingshavetheingenuitytoapplythemselvestodevelopmeansto addressthescarcitytheyfind.Thisonthefaceofitseemsvery reasonable.Yettherearedifficulties.AsCohenhimselfacknowledges, societiesdonotalwaysdowhatwouldberationalforanindividualto do.Co-ordinationproblemsmaystandinourway,andtheremaybe structuralbarriers.Furthermore,itisrelativelyrareforthosewho introducenewtechnologiestobemotivatedbytheneedtoaddress scarcity.Rather,undercapitalism,theprofitmotiveisthekey.Of courseitmightbearguedthatthisisthesocialformthatthe materialneedtoaddressscarcitytakesundercapitalism.Butstill onemayraisethequestionwhethertheneedtoaddressscarcityalways hastheinfluencethatitappearstohavetakenoninmoderntimes. Forexample,arulingclass’sabsolutedeterminationtoholdon topowermayhaveledtoeconomicallystagnantsocieties. Alternatively,itmightbethoughtthatasocietymayputreligionor theprotectionoftraditionalwaysoflifeaheadofeconomicneeds. ThisgoestotheheartofMarx’stheorythatmanisan essentiallyproductivebeingandthatthelocusofinteractionwith theworldisindustry.AsCohenhimselflaterarguedinessayssuchas “ReconsideringHistoricalMaterialism”(1988),the emphasisonproductionmayappearone-sided,andignoreotherpowerful elementsinhumannature.Suchacriticismchimeswithacriticism fromtheprevioussection;thatthehistoricalrecordmaynot,in fact,displaythetendencytogrowthintheproductiveforcesassumed bythetheory. 3.6AlternativeInterpretations ManydefendersofMarxwillarguethattheproblemsstatedare problemsforCohen’sinterpretationofMarx,ratherthanfor Marxhimself.Itispossibletoargue,forexample,thatMarxdidnot haveageneraltheoryofhistory,butratherwasasocialscientist observingandencouragingthetransformationofcapitalisminto communismasasingularevent.AnditiscertainlytruethatwhenMarx analysesaparticularhistoricalepisode,ashedoesinthe18th BrumaireofLouisNapoleon(1852),anyideaoffittingevents intoafixedpatternofhistoryseemsveryfarfromMarx’smind. OnotherviewsMarxdidhaveageneraltheoryofhistorybutitisfar moreflexibleandlessdeterminatethanCoheninsists(Miller1984). Andfinally,asnoted,therearecriticswhobelievethat Cohen’sinterpretationisentirelywrong-headedowingtoits dismissiveattitudetodialecticalreasoning(Sayers1984[1990]). 4.Economics 4.1ReadingCapital HowtoreadMarx’seconomicwritings,andespeciallyhis masterpieceCapitalVolume1,remainsamatterof controversy.AnorthodoxreadingisthatMarx’sessentialtask istocontributetoeconomictheory,basedonamodifiedformofthe labourtheoryofvalue.Otherswarnagainstsuchanarrow interpretation,pointingoutthatthecharacterofMarx’s writingandpresentationisveryfarfromwhatonewouldexpectina standardeconomictext.HenceWilliamClareRoberts(2017),for example,arguesthatCapitalVolume1isfundamentallyawork ofpoliticaltheory,ratherthaneconomics.Bethatasitmay, nevertheless,theworkdoescontainsubstantialpresentationofan economicanalysisofcapitalism,anditisonthisthatwewillfocus here. 4.2LabourTheoryofValue CapitalVolume1beginswithananalysisoftheideaof commodityproduction.Acommodityisdefinedasausefulexternal object,producedforexchangeonamarket.Thus,twonecessary conditionsforcommodityproductionare:theexistenceofamarket,in whichexchangecantakeplace;andasocialdivisionoflabour,in whichdifferentpeopleproducedifferentproducts,withoutwhichthere wouldbenomotivationforexchange.Marxsuggeststhatcommodities havebothuse-value—ause,inotherwords—andan exchange-value—initiallytobeunderstoodastheirprice.Use valuecaneasilybeunderstood,soMarxsays,butheinsiststhat exchangevalueisapuzzlingphenomenon,andrelativeexchangevalues needtobeexplained.Whydoesaquantityofonecommodityexchange foragivenquantityofanothercommodity?Hisexplanationisinterms ofthelabourinputrequiredtoproducethecommodity,orrather,the sociallynecessarylabour,whichislabourexertedattheaverage levelofintensityandproductivityforthatbranchofactivitywithin theeconomy.Thusthelabourtheoryofvalueassertsthatthevalueof acommodityisdeterminedbythequantityofsociallynecessarylabour timerequiredtoproduceit. Marxprovidesatwo-stageargumentforthelabourtheoryofvalue.The firststageistoarguethatiftwoobjectscanbecomparedinthe senseofbeingputoneithersideofanequalssign,thentheremust bea“thirdthingofidenticalmagnitudeinbothofthem” towhichtheyarebothreducible.Ascommoditiescanbeexchanged againsteachother,theremust,Marxargues,beathirdthingthat theyhaveincommon.Thisthenmotivatesthesecondstage,whichisa searchfortheappropriate“thirdthing”,whichislabour inMarx’sview,astheonlyplausiblecommonelement.Bothsteps oftheargumentare,ofcourse,highlycontestable. Capitalismcanbedistinguishedfromotherformsofcommodity exchange,Marxargues,inthatitinvolvesnotmerelytheexchangeof commodities,buttheadvancementofcapital,intheformofmoney, withthepurposeofgeneratingprofitthroughthepurchaseof commoditiesandtheirtransformationintoothercommoditieswhichcan commandahigherprice,andthusyieldaprofit.Marxclaimsthatno previoustheoristhasbeenableadequatelytoexplainhowcapitalism asawholecanmakeaprofit.Marx’sownsolutionreliesonthe ideaofexploitationoftheworker.Insettingupconditionsof productionthecapitalistpurchasestheworker’slabour power—hisorherabilitytolabour—fortheday.Thecost ofthiscommodityisdeterminedinthesamewayasthecostofevery other;thatis,intermsoftheamountofsociallynecessarylabour powerrequiredtoproduceit.Inthiscasethevalueofaday’s labourpoweristhevalueofthecommoditiesnecessarytokeepthe workeraliveforaday.Supposethatsuchcommoditiestakefourhours toproduce.Accordinglythefirstfourhoursoftheworkingdayis spentonproducingvalueequivalenttothevalueofthewagesthe workerwillbepaid.Thisisknownasnecessarylabour.Anyworkthe workerdoesabovethisisknownassurpluslabour,producingsurplus valueforthecapitalist.Surplusvalue,accordingtoMarx,isthe sourceofallprofit.InMarx’sanalysislabourpoweristhe onlycommoditywhichcanproducemorevaluethanitisworth,andfor thisreasonitisknownasvariablecapital.Othercommoditiessimply passtheirvalueontothefinishedcommodities,butdonotcreateany extravalue.Theyareknownasconstantcapital.Profit,then,isthe resultofthelabourperformedbytheworkerbeyondthatnecessaryto createthevalueofhisorherwages.Thisisthesurplusvaluetheory ofprofit. Itappearstofollowfromthisanalysisthatasindustrybecomesmore mechanised,usingmoreconstantcapitalandlessvariablecapital,the rateofprofitoughttofall.Forasaproportionlesscapitalwillbe advancedonlabour,andonlylabourcancreatevalue.In CapitalVolume3Marxdoesindeedmakethepredictionthat therateofprofitwillfallovertime,andthisisoneofthefactors whichleadstothedownfallofcapitalism.(However,aspointedoutby PaulSweezyinTheTheoryofCapitalistDevelopment(1942), theanalysisisproblematic.)Afurtherconsequenceofthisanalysis isadifficultyforthetheorythatMarxdidrecognise,andtried, albeitunsuccessfully,tomeetalsointhemanuscriptsthatmakeup CapitalVolume3.Itfollowsfromtheanalysissofarthat labour-intensiveindustriesoughttohaveahigherrateofprofitthan thosewhichuselesslabour.Notonlyisthisempiricallyfalse,itis theoreticallyunacceptable.Accordingly,Marxarguedthatinreal economiclifepricesvaryinasystematicwayfromvalues.Providing themathematicstoexplainthisisknownasthetransformation problem,andMarx’sownattemptsuffersfromtechnical difficulties.Althoughtherearesophisticatedknowntechniquesfor solvingthisproblemnowthereisaquestionaboutthedegreetowhich theydorescueMarx’sproject.Ifitisthoughtthatthelabour theoryofvaluewasinitiallymotivatedasanintuitivelyplausible theoryofpricethenwhentheconnectionbetweenpriceandvalueis renderedasindirectasitisinthefinaltheory,theintuitive motivationofthetheorydrainsaway.Othersconsiderthistobea superficialreadingofMarx,andthathisgeneralapproachallowsus toseethroughtheappearancesofcapitalismtounderstandits underlyingbasis,whichneednotcoincidewithappearances.How Marx’stheoryofcapitalismshouldbereadremainsanactive areaofscholarlydebate(Heinrich2012). AfurtherobjectionisthatMarx’sassertionthatonlylabour cancreatesurplusvalueisunsupportedbyanyargumentoranalysis, andcanbearguedtobemerelyanartefactofthenatureofhis presentation.Anycommoditycanbepickedtoplayasimilarrole. Consequently,withequaljustificationonecouldsetoutacorntheory ofvalue,arguingthatcornhastheuniquepowerofcreatingmore valuethanitcosts.Formallythiswouldbeidenticaltothelabour theoryofvalue(Roemer1982).Nevertheless,theclaimsthatsomehow labourisresponsibleforthecreationofvalue,andthatprofitis theconsequenceofexploitation,remainintuitivelypowerful,evenif theyaredifficulttoestablishindetail. However,evenifthelabourtheoryofvalueisconsidereddiscredited, thereareelementsofhistheorythatremainofworth.TheCambridge economistJoanRobinson,inAnEssayonMarxianEconomics (1942),pickedouttwoaspectsofparticularnote.First,Marx’s refusaltoacceptthatcapitalisminvolvesaharmonyofinterests betweenworkerandcapitalist,replacingthiswithaclass-based analysisoftheworker’sstruggleforbetterwagesand conditionsofwork,versusthecapitalist’sdriveforever greaterprofits.Second,Marx’sdenialthatthereisany long-runtendencytoequilibriuminthemarket,andhisdescriptions ofmechanismswhichunderliethetrade-cycleofboomandbust.Both provideasalutarycorrectivetoaspectsoforthodoxeconomic theory. 4.3Exploitation Asnoted,traditionallyMarx’sdefinitionofexploitationis givenintermsofthetheoryofsurplusvalue,whichinturnistaken todependonthelabourtheoryofvalue:thetheorythatthevalueof anycommodityisproportionaltotheamountof“socially necessary”labourembodiedinit.However,thequestionarises ofwhetherthebasicideaofexploitationshouldbesodependentona particulartheoryofvalue.Forifitis,thenotionofexploitation becomesvulnerabletoRobertNozick’sobjection:thatifthe labourtheoryofvaluecanbeshowntobefaulty,theMarxisttheory ofexploitationcollapsestoo(Nozick1974). Othershavefeltthatitispossibletorestoretheintuitivecoreof aMarxisttheoryofexploitationindependentofthelabourtheoryof value(cf.Cohen1979,Wolff1999,Vrousalis2013).JohnRoemer,to takeoneleadingcase,states: Marxianexploitationisdefinedastheunequalexchangeoflaborfor goods:theexchangeisunequalwhentheamountoflaborembodiedin thegoodswhichtheworkercanpurchasewithhisincome…is lessthantheamountoflaborheexpendedtoearnthatincome.(Roemer 1985:30) SupposeIworkeighthourstoearnmywages.Withthisperhapsthe bestthingIcanbuyisacoat.Butimaginethatthecoattookonlya totaloffourhourstomake.ThereforeIhaveexchangedmyeighthours workforonlyfourhoursofotherpeople’swork,andthereby,on thisview,Iamexploited. Thedefinitionrequiressomerefinement.Forexample,ifIamtaxed forthebenefitofthoseunabletowork,Iwillbeexploitedbythe abovedefinition,butthisisnotwhatthedefinitionofexploitation wasintendedtocapture.Worsestill,ifthereisonepersonexploited muchmoregravelythananyoneelseintheeconomy,thenitmayturn outthatno-oneelseisexploited.Nevertheless,itshouldnotbe difficulttoadjustthedefinitiontotakeaccountofthese difficulties,andasnotedseveralotheraccountsofMarx-inspired accountsofexploitationhavebeenofferedthatareindependentofthe labourtheoryofvalue. Manyofthesealternativedefinitionsaddanotionofunfreedomor dominationtounequalexchangeoflabourandgoods(Vrousalis2013). Theexploitedpersonisforcedtoacceptasituationinwhichheor shejustnevergetsbackwhattheyputintothelabourprocess.Now theremaybe,inparticularcases,agreatdealtobesaidaboutwhy thisisperfectlyacceptablefromamoralpointofview.However,on thefaceofitsuchexploitationappearstobeunjust.Nevertheless, wewillseeinthenextsectionwhyattributingsuchapositionto Marxhimselfisfraughtwithdifficulty. 5.Morality 5.1UnpackingIssues TheissueofMarxandmoralityposesaconundrum.Onreading Marx’sworksatallperiodsofhislife,thereappearstobethe strongestpossibledistastetowardsbourgeoiscapitalistsociety,and anundoubtedendorsementoffuturecommunistsociety.Yetthetermsof thisantipathyandendorsementarefarfromclear.Despite expectations,Marxneverdirectlysaysthatcapitalismisunjust. Neitherdoeshedirectlysaythatcommunismwouldbeajustformof society.Infacthefrequentlytakespainstodistancehimselffrom thosewhoengageinadiscourseofjustice,andmakesaconscious attempttoexcludedirectmoralcommentaryinhisownworks.The puzzleiswhythisshouldbe,giventheweightofindirectmoral commentaryonealsofindsinhiswritings. Thereare,initially,separatequestionsconcerningMarx’s attitudetocapitalismandtocommunism.Therearealsoseparate questionsconcerninghisattitudetoideasofjustice,andtoideasof moralitymorebroadlyconcerned.This,then,generatesfourquestions: (a)DidMarxthinkcapitalismunjust?;(b)didhethinkthat capitalismcouldbemorallycriticisedonothergrounds?;(c)didhe thinkthatcommunismwouldbejust?(d)didhethinkitcouldbe morallyapprovedofonothergrounds?Thesearesomeofthequestions weconsiderinthissection. 5.2The“Injustice”ofCapitalism TheinitialargumentthatMarxmusthavethoughtthatcapitalismis unjustisbasedontheobservationthatMarxarguedthatall capitalistprofitisultimatelyderivedfromtheexploitationofthe worker.Capitalism’sdirtysecretisthatitisnotarealmof harmonyandmutualbenefitbutasysteminwhichoneclass systematicallyextractsprofitfromanother.Howcouldthisfailtobe unjust?YetitisnotablethatMarxneverexplicitlydrawssucha conclusion,andinCapitalhegoesasfarastosaythatsuch exchangeis“bynomeansaninjurytotheseller”(MECW 35:204),whichsomecommentatorshavetakenasevidencethatMarxdid notthinkthatcapitalismwasunjust,althoughotherreadingsare possible. AllenWood(1972)isperhapstheleadingadvocateoftheviewthat Marxdidnotbelievethatcapitalismisunjust.WoodarguesthatMarx takesthisapproachbecausehisgeneraltheoreticalapproachexcludes anytrans-epochalstandpointfromwhichonecancommentonthejustice ofaneconomicsystem.Eventhoughitisacceptabletocriticise particularbehaviourfromwithinaneconomicstructureasunjust(and theftundercapitalismwouldbeanexample)itisnotpossibleto criticisecapitalismasawhole.ThisisaconsequenceofMarx’s analysisoftheroleofideasofjusticefromwithinhistorical materialism.Marxclaimsthatjuridicalinstitutionsarepartofthe superstructure,andthatideasofjusticeare ideological.Accordingly,theroleofboththesuperstructureand ideology,inthefunctionalistreadingofhistoricalmaterialism adoptedhere,istostabilisetheeconomicstructure.Consequently,to statethatsomethingisjustundercapitalismissimplyajudgement thatitwilltendtohavetheeffectofadvancingcapitalism. AccordingtoMarx,inanysocietytherulingideasarethoseofthe rulingclass;thecoreofthetheoryofideology. ZiyadHusami(1978)however,arguesthatWoodismistaken, ignoringthefactthatforMarxideasundergoadoubledetermination. Weneedtodifferentiatenotjustbyeconomicsystem,butalsoby economicclasswithinthesystem.Thereforetheideasofthe non-rulingclassmaybeverydifferentfromthoseoftherulingclass. Ofcourse,itistheideasoftherulingclassthatreceiveattention andimplementation,butthisdoesnotmeanthatotherideasdonot exist.Husamigoesasfarastoarguethatmembersoftheproletariat undercapitalismhaveanaccountofjusticethatmatchescommunism. Fromthisprivilegedstandpointoftheproletariat,whichisalso Marx’sstandpoint,capitalismisunjust,andsoitfollowsthat Marxthoughtcapitalismunjust. Plausiblethoughitmaysound,Husami’sargumentfailsto accountfortworelatedpoints.First,itcannotexplainwhyMarx neverexplicitlydescribedcapitalismasunjust,andsecond,it overlooksthedistanceMarxwantedtoplacebetweenhisownscientific socialism,andthatofothersocialistswhoarguedfortheinjustice ofcapitalism.Henceonecannotavoidtheconclusionthatthe “official”viewofMarxisthatcapitalismisnot unjust. Nevertheless,thisleavesuswithapuzzle.MuchofMarx’s descriptionofcapitalism—hisuseofthewords “embezzlement”,“robbery”and “exploitation”—belietheofficialaccount.Arguably, theonlysatisfactorywayofunderstandingthisissueis,oncemore, fromG.A.Cohen,whoproposesthatMarxbelievedthatcapitalismwas unjust,butdidnotbelievethathebelieveditwasunjust(Cohen 1983).Inotherwords,Marx,likesomanyofus,didnothaveperfect knowledgeofhisownmind.Inhisexplicitreflectionsonthejustice ofcapitalismhewasabletomaintainhisofficialview.Butinless guardedmomentshisrealviewslipsout,evenifneverinexplicit language.Suchaninterpretationisboundtobecontroversial,butit makesgoodsenseofthetexts. WhateveroneconcludesonthequestionofwhetherMarxthought capitalismunjust,itis,nevertheless,obviousthatMarxthoughtthat capitalismwasnotthebestwayforhumanbeingstolive.Pointsmade inhisearlywritingsremainpresentthroughouthiswritings,ifno longerconnectedtoanexplicittheoryofalienation.Theworkerfinds workatorment,sufferspoverty,overworkandlackoffulfilmentand freedom.Peopledonotrelatetoeachotherashumansshould.Does thisamounttoamoralcriticismofcapitalismornot?Intheabsence ofanyspecialreasontoargueotherwise,itsimplyseemsobviousthat Marx’scritiqueisamoralone.Capitalismimpedeshuman flourishing.ItishardtodisagreewiththejudgementthatMarx thinksthatthecapitalistexploitationoflaborpowerisawrongthat hashorrendousconsequencesforthelaborers.(Roberts2017:129) Marx,though,oncemorerefrainedfrommakingthisexplicit;heseemed toshownointerestinlocatinghiscriticismofcapitalisminanyof thetraditionsofmoralphilosophy,orexplaininghowhewas generatinganewtradition.Theremayhavebeentworeasonsforhis caution.Thefirstwasthatwhiletherewerebadthingsabout capitalism,thereis,fromaworldhistoricalpointofview,muchgood aboutittoo.Forwithoutcapitalism,communismwouldnotbepossible. Capitalismistobetranscended,notabolished,andthismaybe difficulttoconveyinthetermsofmoralphilosophy. Second,andperhapsmoreimportantly,weneedtoreturntothe contrastbetweenMarxianandotherformsofsocialism.Many non-Marxiansocialistsappealedtouniversalideasoftruthand justicetodefendtheirproposedschemes,andtheirtheoryof transitionwasbasedontheideathatappealingtomoralsensibilities wouldbethebest,perhapsonly,wayofbringingaboutthenewchosen society.Marxwantedtodistancehimselffromtheseothersocialist traditions,andakeypointofdistinctionwastoarguethattheroute tounderstandingthepossibilitiesofhumanemancipationlayinthe analysisofhistoricalandsocialforces,notinmorality.Hence,for Marx,anyappealtomoralitywastheoreticallyabackwardstep. 5.3Communismand“Justice” ThisleadsusnowtoMarx’sassessmentofcommunism.Would communismbeajustsociety?InconsideringMarx’sattitudeto communismandjusticetherearereallyonlytwoviablepossibilities: eitherhethoughtthatcommunismwouldbeajustsocietyorhethought thattheconceptofjusticewouldnotapply:thatcommunismwould transcendjustice. CommunismisdescribedbyMarx,intheCritiqueoftheGotha Programme,asasocietyinwhicheachpersonshouldcontribute accordingtotheirabilityandreceiveaccordingtotheirneed.This certainlysoundslikeatheoryofjustice,andcouldbeadoptedas such(Gilabert2015).However,manywillholdthatitistruerto Marx’sthoughttosaythatthisispartofanaccountinwhich communismtranscendsjustice,asLukeshasargued(Lukes1987). Ifwestartwiththeideathatthepointofideasofjusticeisto resolvedisputes,thenasocietywithoutdisputeswouldhavenoneed orplaceforjustice.Wecanseethisbyreflectingupontheideaof thecircumstancesofjusticeintheworkofDavidHume (1711–1776).Humearguedthatiftherewasenormousmaterial abundance—ifeveryonecouldhavewhatevertheywantedwithout invadinganother’sshare—wewouldneverhavedevisedrules ofjustice.And,ofcourse,therearesuggestionsinMarx’s writingsthatcommunismwouldbeasocietyofsuchabundance.ButHume alsosuggestedthatjusticewouldnotbeneededinother circumstances;iftherewerecompletefellow-feelingbetweenallhuman beings,therewouldbenoconflictandnoneedforjustice.Ofcourse, onecanarguewhethereithermaterialabundanceorhuman fellow-feelingtothisdegreewouldbepossible,butthepointisthat bothargumentsgiveaclearsenseinwhichcommunismtranscends justice. Nevertheless,weremainwiththequestionofwhetherMarxthoughtthat communismcouldbecommendedonothermoralgrounds.Onabroad understanding,inwhichmorality,orperhapsbettertosayethics,is concernedwiththeideaoflivingwell,itseemsthatcommunismcanbe assessedfavourablyinthislight.Onecompellingargumentisthat Marx’scareersimplymakesnosenseunlesswecanattributesuch abelieftohim.Butbeyondthiswecanbebriefinthatthe considerationsadducedin Section2 aboveapplyagain.Communismclearlyadvanceshumanflourishing,in Marx’sview.Theonlyreasonfordenyingthat,inMarx’s vision,itwouldamounttoagoodsocietyisatheoreticalantipathy totheword“good”.Andherethemainpointisthat,in Marx’sview,communismwouldnotbebroughtaboutbyhigh-minded benefactorsofhumanity.Quitepossiblyhisdeterminationtoretain thispointofdifferencebetweenhimselfandothersocialistsledhim todisparagetheimportanceofmoralitytoadegreethatgoesbeyond thecalloftheoreticalnecessity. 6.Ideology 6.1ACriticalAccount TheaccountofideologycontainedinMarx’swritingsis regularlyportrayedasacrucialelementofhisintellectuallegacy. Ithasbeenidentifiedasamonghis“mostinfluential” ideas(Elster1986:168),andacclaimedas“themost fertile”partofhissocialandpoliticaltheory(Leiter2004: 84).Notleast,theseviewsonideologyaresaidtoconstitute Marx’sclaimtoaplace—alongsideFriedrichNietzsche (1844–1900)andSigmundFreud(1856–1939)—asoneof the“mastersofsuspicion”;thatis,asanauthorwhose workcastsdoubtonthetransparencyofoureverydayunderstandingsof bothourownidentityandthesocialworldweinhabit(Ricouer1970: 32–33). Giventhisenthusiasticreception,itcancomeassomethingofa surprisetoturntoMarx’swritingsanddiscoverhowlittlethey containaboutideology,andhowinchoateandopaquethoseinfrequent andpassingobservationsonthattopicare.Thereare,ofcourse,some famousquotations,notleastfromTheGermanIdeology manuscripts.Thereferencestheretoideologyasinvolvingan “inversion”oftherelationbetweenindividualsandtheir circumstances,perhapsanalogoustotheworkingsofa“camera obscura”—anopticaldevicewhichprojectedanimageofits surroundings,upsidedownbutpreservingperspective,ontoascreen inside—haveoftenmesmerisedcommentatorsbutnotalways generatedmuchgenuineillumination(MECW5:36).Thepoint shouldnotbeexaggerated,butthesestrikingimagesnotwithstanding, thereisnoclearandsustaineddiscussionofideologyintheMarxian corpus. Manycommentatorsmaintainthatthesearchforasinglemodelof ideologyinhisworkhastobegivenup.Indeed,thereissomethingof an“armsrace”intheliterature,ascommentatorsdiscover two,three,evenfive,competingmodelsofideologyinMarx’s writings(Mepham1979;Wood1981[2004];Rosen1996).Most surprisingly,itseemsthatsomelicencecanbefoundinMarx’s corpusforthreeverydifferentwaysofthinkingaboutwhatideology is.Thereistextualevidenceofhisvariouslyutilising:a “descriptive”accountofideologyinvolvingabroadly anthropologicalstudyofthebeliefsandritualscharacteristicof certaingroups;a“positive”accountofideologyasa “worldview”providingthemembersofagroupwithasense ofmeaningandidentity;anda“critical”accountseeking toliberateindividualsfromcertainfalseandmisleadingformsof understanding(Geuss1981:4–26). Itisthelastofthese—thecriticalaccountratherthaneither ofthetwo“non-critical”accounts—whichiscentral tohiswidersocialandpoliticaltheory,butthisaccountisitself subjecttosomeconsiderableinterpretativedisagreement.Marx’s theoryofideologyisusuallyportrayedasanelementinwhatmightbe calledMarx’ssociology,asdistinctfromhisphilosophical anthropologysay,orhistheoryofhistory(althoughcomplexlyrelated tothelatter). 6.2IdeologyandStability Marxdoesnotviewideologyasafeatureofallsocieties,and,in particular,suggeststhatitwillnotbeafeatureofafuture communistsociety.However,ideologyisportrayedasafeatureofall class-dividedsocieties,andnotonlyofcapitalist society—althoughmanyofMarx’scommentsonideologyare concernedwiththelatter.Thetheoryofideologyappearstoplaya roleinexplainingafeatureofclass-dividedsocietieswhichmight otherwiseappearpuzzling,namelywhatmightbecalledtheir “stability”;thatis,theabsenceofovertandserious conflictbetweensocialclasses.Thisstabilityisnotpermanent,but itcanlastforextendedhistoricalperiods.Thisstabilityappears puzzlingtoMarxbecauseclass-dividedsocietiesareflawedinways whichnotonlyfrustratehumanflourishing,butalsoworktothe materialadvantageoftherulingminority.Whydothesubordinate classes,whoformamajority,toleratetheseflaws,whenresistance andrebellionofvariouskindsmightbeintheirobjective interests? Marx’saccountofthesourcesofsocialstabilityin class-dividedsocietiesappealstobothrepressiveandnon-repressive mechanisms.Suchsocietiesmightofteninvolvethedirectrepression (orthethreatofit)ofonegroupbyanother,butMarxdoesnotthink thatthisisthewholestory.Therearealsonon-repressivesourcesof socialstability,andideologyisusually,andplausibly,considered oneofthese.Veryroughly,Marx’saccountofideologyclaims thatthedominantsocialideasinsuchsocietiesaretypicallyfalse ormisleadinginafashionthatworkstotheadvantageofthe economicallydominantclass. Weshouldnotethatideologywouldseemtobeapartandnotthewhole ofMarx’saccountofthenon-repressivesourcesofstabilityin classdividedsocieties.Otherfactorsmightinclude:dulleconomic pressure,includingthedailygrindofhavingtoearnaliving; doubts—justifiedorotherwise—aboutthefeasibilityof alternatives;sensitivitytothepossiblecostsofradicalsocial change;andcollectiveactionproblemsofvariouskindswhichface thosewhodowanttorebelandresist.Marxdoesnotthinkindividuals arepermanentlytrappedwithinideologicalmodesofthinking.Ideology mayhaveaninitialhold,butitisnotportrayedasimperviousto reasonandevidence,especiallyincircumstancesinwhichthe objectiveconditionsforsocialchangeobtain. 6.3Characteristics ForMarxideologicalbeliefsaresocialinthattheyarewidely shared,indeedsowidely-sharedthatforlongperiodstheyconstitute the“ruling”or“dominant”ideasinagiven class-dividedsociety(MECW5:59).Andtheyaresocialin thattheydirectlyconcern,orindirectlyimpactupon,the action-guidingunderstandingsofselfandsocietythatindividuals have.Theseaction-guidingunderstandingsincludethedominantlegal, political,religious,andphilosophicalviewswithinparticular class-dividedsocietiesinperiodsofstability(MECW29:263). NotallfalseormisleadingbeliefscountforMarxasideological. Honestscientificerror,forexamplecanbenon-ideological.And ideologicalbeliefcanbemisleadingwithoutbeingstrictlyfalse.For example,defendersofthecapitalisteconomyportraywhatMarxcalls the“wageform”,withitsexchangeofequivalents,asthe whole(ratherthanapart)ofthestoryabouttherelationbetween capitalandlabour,therebyignoringtheexploitationwhichoccursin thesphereofproduction.Indeed,thenotionofthe “falsity”ofideologyneedstobeexpandedbeyondthe contentofthe“ideas”inquestion,toincludecaseswhere theiroriginsareinsomewaycontaminated(Geuss1981:19–22). PerhapstheonlyreasonIbelievesomethingtobethecaseisthatthe beliefinquestionhasaconsolingeffectonme.Arguablysucha beliefisheldideologically,evenifithappenstobetrue. Neverthelessparadigmaticexamplesofideologyhaveafalsecontent. Forexample,ideologyoftenportraysinstitutions,policies,and decisionswhichareintheinterestsoftheeconomicallydominant class,asbeingintheinterestsofthesocietyasawhole (MECW5:60);andideologyoftenportrayssocialand politicalarrangementswhicharecontingent,orhistorical,or artificial,asbeingnecessary,oruniversal,ornatural (MECW35:605). Inadditiontofalseormisleadingcontent,ideologicalbeliefs typicallyhaveatleasttwoadditionalcharacteristics,relatingto theirsocialoriginandtheirclassfunction.Bythe“social origin”ofideologyismeantthatMarxthinksoftheseideasas oftenoriginatingwith,andbeingreinforcedby,thecomplexstructure ofclass-dividedsocieties—acomplexstructureinwhicha deceptivesurfaceappearanceisgovernedbyunderlyingessential relations(Geras1986:63–84).Capitalismisseenasespecially deceptiveinappearance;forexample,Marxoftencontraststhe relativetransparencyof“exploitation”underfeudalism, withthewayinwhichthe“wageform”obscurestheratio ofnecessaryandsurpluslabourincapitalistsocieties.Ideology stems,inpart,fromthisdeceptivesurfaceappearancewhichmakesit difficulttograsptheunderlyingsocialflawsthatbenefitthe economicallydominantclass.Marxportraysthestrivingtouncover essencesconcealedbymisleadingappearancesascharacteristicof scientificendeavour(MECW37,804).And,inthiscontext,he distinguishesbetweenclassicalpoliticaleconomy,which strove—albeitnotalwayssuccessfully—touncoverthe essentialrelationsoftenconcealedbehindmisleadingappearances,and whathecallsvulgareconomy,whichhappilyrestrictsitselftothe misleadingappearancesthemselves(MECW37,804). Bythe“classfunction”ofideologyismeantthatMarx holdsthatthepervasivenessofideologyisexplainedbythefactit helpsstabilisetheeconomicstructureofsocieties.Allsortsof ideasmightgetgeneratedforallsortsofreasons,buttheonesthat tendto“stick”(becomewidelyaccepted)inclass-divided societiesdoso,notbecauseoftheirtruth,butbecausetheyconceal ormisrepresentorjustifyflawsinthatsocietyinwayswhichredound tothebenefitoftheeconomicallydominantclass(Rosen&Wolff 1996:235–236). Inresponsecriticsoftenseethisasjustanotherexampleofsloppy functionalreasoning—purportedlywidespreadintheMarxist tradition—wherebyageneralpatternisassertedwithoutthe identificationofanyofthemechanismswhichmightgeneratethat pattern.Inthepresentcase,itissaidthatMarxneverproperly explainswhytherulingideasshouldbethoseoftherulingclass (Elster1985:473).Yetthereareobviouspossiblemechanismshere.To givetwoexamples.First,thereisthecontroloftherulingclass overthemeansofmentalproduction,andinparticulartheprintand broadcastmediawhichincapitalistsocietiesaretypicallyownedand controlledbytheverywealthy(MECW5,59).Asecond possiblemechanismappealstothepsychologicalneedofindividuals forinventednarrativesthatlegitimiseorjustifytheirsocial position;forinstance,Marxidentifiesawidespreadneed,inflawed societies,fortheconsolatoryeffectsofreligion(MECW3, 175). 7.StateandPolitics Thisbroadheading—thestateandpolitics—couldcoververy manydifferentissues.Tomakethepresentaccountmanageable,only twoareaddressedhere:Marx’saccountofthestatein capitalistsociety;andMarx’saccountofthefateofthestate incommunistsociety.(Consequently,manyotherimportantpolitical issues—thenatureofpre-capitaliststates,relationsbetween states,thepoliticaltransitiontocommunism,andsoon—arenot dealtwith.) 7.1TheStateinCapitalistSociety Marxoffersnounifiedtheoreticalaccountofthestateincapitalist society.Insteadhisremarksonthistopicarescatteredacrossthe courseofhisactivistlife,anddeeplyembeddedindiscussionsof contemporaryevents,eventswhichmostmodernreaderswillknowvery littleabout.Providingsomeinitialordertothatcomplexity,Jon ElsterhelpfullyidentifiesthreedifferentmodelsinMarx’s writingsoftherelationship,incapitalistsociety,betweenthe politicalstate,ontheonehand,andtheeconomicallydominantclass, ontheother.(ThenextthreeparagraphsdrawheavilyonElster1985: 409–437.) First,the“instrumental”modelportraysthestateas simplyatool,directlycontrolledbytheeconomicallydominantclass, initsowninterests,attheexpenseoftheinterestsbothofother classesandofthecommunityasawhole.Marxisusuallysaidto endorsetheinstrumentalaccountintheCommunistManifesto, whereheandEngelsinsistthat“theexecutiveofthemodern stateisbutacommitteeformanagingthecommonaffairsofthewhole bourgeoisie”(MECW6:486).Onthisaccount,thestate mightalsoactagainsttheshortterm,orthefactional,interestsof particularcapitalists.Thepicturehereisofthestateasan instrumentdirected—presumablybyasubsetofcapitalistsor theirrepresentatives—inwayswhichpromotethelongterm interestsofthebourgeoisieasawhole.Theprecisemechanismswhich mightfacilitatethatresultarenotclearinMarx’s writings. Second,the“classbalance”modelportraysthestateas havinginterestsofitsown,withcapitalistinterestsasmerelyone ofthestrategiclimitsonitspursuitofthese.Thismodelgetsits namefromtheexceptionalsocialcircumstancessaidtoexplainthe independenceofthestateinthiscase.Insituationswherethesocial powerofthetwowarringclassesofcontemporary society—capitalistsandworkers—areverynearlybalanced, thepoliticalstate(andespeciallytheexecutive)cangain independencefromboth,exploitingthatconflictinordertopromote itsowninterests(theinterestsofthepoliticalcaste).Something likethispictureappearsinMarx’sdiscussionsofthecontinued existenceofcertainabsolutiststatesaftertherevolutionsof1848, andoftheBonapartiststateestablishedinFrancebythecoupof NapoleonIIIinDecember1851.Thestatenowcompeteswithcapitalists andproletarians(andisnotmerelythetooloftheformer),andby “promisingeachofthemajorclassestoprotectitagainstthe other,thegovernmentcanruleautonomously”(Elster1985:425). Onthisaccount,thestatehasinterestsofitsown,butpresumably onlygetstopursuethemifthosepromisestoothersareplausible, findingsomereflectioninitspoliciesandbehaviour.Capitalist interestsaccordinglyremainapoliticalconstraint,buttheyarenow onlyoneofthefactorsconstrainingthestate’sactionsrather thanconstitutingitsprimarygoal. Third,the“abdication”modelpresentsthebourgeoisieas stayingawayfromthedirectexerciseofpoliticalpower,butdoing thisbecauseitisintheireconomicintereststodoso.AsElster notes,strictlyspeaking,“abdication”herecoverstwo slightlydifferentcases—first,wherethebourgeoisie abdicatefromthepoliticalpowerthattheyinitially controlled(relevanttoFrance);and,second,wherethebourgeoisie abstainfromtakingpoliticalpowerinthefirstplace (relevanttoBritainandGermany)—buttheycanbetreated together.Inbothcases,Marxidentifiesasituationwhere“in ordertosaveitspurse,[thebourgeoisie]mustforfeitthe crown”(MECW11:143).Wheretheinstrumentalpicture claimsthatthestateactsintheinterestsofthecapitalistclass becauseitisdirectlycontrolledbythelatter,the abdicationpictureadvancesanexplanatoryconnectionbetween thepromotionofbourgeoisinterestsandtheretreatfromthedirect exerciseofpower.Circumstancesobtainwhere“thepolitical ruleofthebourgeoisie”turnsouttobe “incompatible”withitscontinuedeconomicflourishing, andthebourgeoisieseeks“togetridofitsownpoliticalrule inordertogetridofthetroublesanddangersofruling” (MECW11:173).Thereareseveralpossibleexplanationsof whythebourgeoisiemightremainoutsideofpoliticsinorderto promotetheirowninterests.Togivethreeexamples:thebourgeoisie mightrecognisethattheirowncharacteristicshort-termismcouldbe fataltotheirowninterestsiftheyexerciseddirectpoliticalas wellaseconomicpower;thebourgeoisiemightfindpoliticalrule sufficientlytimeandeffortconsumingtowithdrawfromit, discoveringthattheeconomicbenefitskeptoncomingregardless;or thebourgeoisiemightappreciatethatabdicationweakenedtheirclass opponents,forcingtheproletariattofightontwofronts(against capitalandgovernment)andtherebymakingitlessabletowinthose struggles. Therearemanyquestionsonemighthaveaboutthesethreemodels. First,onemightwonderwhichofthesethreemodelsbestembodies Marx’sconsideredview?Theinstrumentalaccountistheearliest account,whichhelargelyabandonsfromtheearly1850s,presumably noticinghowpoorlyitcapturedcontemporarypolitical realities—inparticular,thestableexistenceofstateswhich werenotdirectlyrunbythecapitalistclass,butwhichstillinsome wayservedtheirinterests.Thatoutcomeispossibleundereitherof thetwootheraccounts.However,Marxseemstohavethoughtofthe classbalancemodelasatemporarysolutioninexceptional circumstances,andperhapsheldthatitfailedtoallowthestable explanatoryconnectionthathesoughtbetweentheextantpolitical arrangementsandthepromotionofdominanteconomicinterests.In short,forbetterorworse,Marx’sconsideredviewlookscloser totheabdicationaccount,reflectinghisconvictionthatthecentral featuresofpoliticallifeareexplainedbytheexistingeconomic structure. Second,onemightwonderwhichmodelallowsgreatest “autonomy”tothepoliticalstate?Aweakdefinitionof stateautonomymightportraythestateasautonomouswhenitis independentofdirectcontrolbytheeconomicallydominantclass.On thisdefinition,boththeclassbalanceandabdication models—butnottheinstrumentalaccount—seemtoprovide forautonomy.Astrongerdefinitionofstateautonomymightrequire whatElstercalls“explanatoryautonomy”,whichexists when(andtotheextentthat)itsstructureandpoliciescannotbe explainedbytheinterestofaneconomicallydominantclass.(Elster 1985:405) Onlytheclassbalanceviewseemstoallowsignificantexplanatory autonomy.Inhispreferredabdicationaccount,Marxallowsthatthe stateincapitalistsocietyisindependentofdirectcapitalist control,butgoesontoclaimthatitsmainstructures(includingthat veryindependence)andpoliciesareultimatelyexplainedbythe interestsofthecapitalistclass. 7.2.TheFateoftheStateinCommunistSociety Forreasonsdiscussedbelow(see Section8), Marxdeclinestosaymuchaboutthebasicstructureofafuture communistsociety.However,inthecaseofthefateofthestate,that reluctanceispartiallymitigatedbyhisviewthattheinstitutional arrangementsoftheParisCommuneprefiguredthepoliticaldimensions ofcommunistsociety. Marx’sviewsonthenatureandfateofthestateincommunist societyaretobedistinguishedfromhisinfrequent,andsubsequently notorious,useoftheterm“thedictatorshipofthe proletariat”.(Ontheinfrequency,context,andcontent,of theseusesseeDraper1986andHunt1974.)Theideaof “dictatorship”inthishistoricalcontexthasthe (ancient)connotationofemergencyruleratherthanthe(modern) connotationoftotalitarianism.Marx’susemakesitclearthat anysuchtemporarygovernmentshouldbedemocratic;forinstance,in havingmajoritysupport,andinpreservingdemocraticrights(of speech,association,andsoon).However,itisbydefinition “extra-legal”inthatitseekstoestablishanewregime andnottopreserveanoldone.Sounderstood,thedictatorshipofthe proletariatformspartofthepoliticaltransitiontocommunist society(atopicnotcoveredhere),ratherthanpartofthe institutionalstructureofcommunistsocietyitself.The “dictatorial”—thatis,thetemporaryand extra-legal—characterofthisregimeendswithestablishmentof anewandstablepolity,anditisthelatterwhichisdiscussedhere (Hunt1974:297). Thecharacterofthestateincommunistsocietyconsists,inpart,of itsform(itsinstitutionalarrangements)anditsfunction(thetasks thatitundertakes). Somesenseoftheformofthestateincommunistsocietycan begainedfromMarx’sengagementwiththeParisCommune.His preferredfuturepoliticalarrangementsinvolveahighdegreeof participation,andtheradical“de-professionalisation”of certainpublicoffices.First,Marxisenthusiasticaboutregular elections,universalsuffrage,mandatimpératif, recall,openexecutiveproceedings,decentralisation,andsoon. Second,heobjectstopublicoffices(inthelegislature,executive, andjudiciary)beingthespoilsofapoliticalcaste,andsoughtto makethemworkingpositions,remuneratedattheaverageworker’s wage,andregularlycirculating(throughelection).Thiscombination ofarrangementshasbeencharacterisedas“democracywithout professionals”(Hunt1974:365).Marxsawitasreflectinghis viewthat: Freedomconsistsinconvertingthestatefromanorgansuperimposed uponsocietyintoonecompletelysubordinatetoit.(MECW24: 94) Somesenseofthefunctionofthestateincommunistsociety canbegainedfromMarx’sdistinctionbetween “necessary”tasksthatastatewouldneedtoundertakein allsocieties(atleast,economicallydevelopedsocieties),and “unnecessary”tasksthatastatewouldonlyneedto undertakeinclass-dividedsocieties.Thedifficultyhereislessin allowingthisdistinction,thanindecidingwhatmightfallintoeach category.Onthenecessaryside,Marxappearstorequirethatthe stateincommunistsocietyprovideboth:democraticsolutionsto coordinationproblems(decidingwhichsideoftheroadtrafficshould driveon,forinstance);andthesupplyofpublicgoods(health, welfare,education,andsoon).Ontheunnecessaryside,Marxseemsto thinkthatacommunistsocietymighthugelyreduce,oreveneliminate, theelementoforganisedcoercionfoundinmoststates(intheformof standingarmies,policeforces,andsoon).Atleast,thisreduction mightbefeasibleoncecommunistsocietyhadreacheditshigherstage (wheredistributionisbasedon“theneedsprinciple”), andthereisnolongerathreatfromnon-communistsocieties. Again,therearemanyreservationsthatonemighthaveaboutthis account. First,manywillbescepticalaboutitsfeasibility,andperhaps especiallyofthepurportedreduction,stilllesselimination,of statecoercion.Thatscepticismmightbemotivatedbythethoughtthat thiswouldonlybepossibleifcommunistsocietywerecharacterisedby widespreadsocialandpoliticalconsensus,andthatsuchconsensusis, bothunlikely(atleast,inmodernsocieties),andundesirable (diversityanddisagreementhavingavalue).However,thereduction, orevenelimination,ofstatecoercionmightbecompatiblewith certainformsofcontinuingdisagreementabouttheendsandmeansof communistsociety.Imaginethatademocraticcommunistpolity introducesanewlawprohibitingsmokinginpublicplaces,andthata representativesmoker(callherAnne)obeysthatlawdespitebeing amongtheminoritywhowantedthispracticepermitted.Anne’s motivationforobedience,wecanstipulate,isgrounded,notinfear ofthelikelyresponseofbodiesofarmedpersonsenforcingthelaw, butratherinrespectforthedemocraticmajorityofthecommunityof whichsheisapart.Inshort,reasonablystrongassumptionsaboutthe democraticcommitmentsofindividualsmightallowthescalingdownof organisedcoercionwithouthavingtopresumeuniversalagreement amongstcitizensonallissues. Second,somemightobjecttothereference,throughoutthissection, tothe“state”incommunistsociety.Itmightbesaidthat apolitywhoseformandfunctionsaresoradically transformed—theformbydemocraticparticipationand de-professionalisation,thefunctionbyeliminatinghistorically unnecessarytasks—isinsufficiently“state-like”to becalledastate.Thatiscertainlypossible,buttheterminological claimwouldappeartoassumethatthereisgreaterclarityand agreementaboutjustwhatastateis,eitherthanispresupposedhere orthanexistsintheworld.Giventhatlackofconsensus, “state”seemsasuitablyprudentchoice.Aswellasbeing consistentwithsomeofMarx’susage,itavoidsprejudgingthis veryissue.However,anyoneunmovedbythoseconsiderationscansimply replace“state”,inthiscontext,withtheirownpreferred alternative. 8.Utopianism 8.1UtopianSocialism Itiswell-knownthatMarxneverprovidedadetailedaccountofthe basicstructureofthefuturecommunistsocietythathepredicted. Thiswasnotsimplyanomissiononhispart,butratherreflectshis deliberatecommitment,ashecolloquiallyhasit,torefrainfrom writing“recipes”forthe“restaurants”ofthe future(MECW35:17,translationamended). Thereasoningthatunderpinsthiscommitmentcanbereconstructedfrom Marx’sengagementwiththeradicalpoliticaltraditionthathe called“utopiansocialism”,andwhosefoundingtriumvirate wereCharlesFourier(1772–1837),HenriSaint-Simon (1760–1825),andRobertOwen(1771–1858).Notethatthe distinctionbetweenMarxiansocialismandutopiansocialismisnotan exhaustiveone.Marxhappilyallowsthattherearesocialistswhoare neitherMarxiannorUtopian;forexample,the“feudal socialists”discussedintheCommunistManifesto. Whatdistinguishesutopianfromothersocialistsis,inlargepart, theirviewthatprovidingpersuasiveconstructiveplansand blueprintsoffuturesocialistarrangementsisalegitimateand necessaryactivity.(Theexpression“plansandblueprints” isusedheretocapturethenecessarydetailofthese descriptions,andnottosuggestthatthesedesignshavetobethought ofas“stipulative”,ashavingtobefollowedtothe letter.)Ontheutopianaccount,thesocialistfutureneedstobe designedbeforeitcanbedelivered;theplansandblueprintsbeing intendedtoguideandmotivatesocialistsintheirtransformative ambitions.Ofcourse,thatMarxisnotinthissenseutopian doesnotruleoutthepossibilityofadditional(hereunspecified) sensesinwhichhemightaccuratelybesodescribed. Marx’saccountofutopiansocialismmightappearcontradictory. Itiscertainlyeasytofindnotonlypassagesfiercelycriticising utopianauthorsandtexts,butalsopassagesgenerouslypraisingthem. However,thatcriticismandthatpraiseturnouttoattachtoslightly differenttargets,revealinganunderlyingandconsistentstructureto hisaccount. Thatunderlyingstructurerestsontwomaindistinctions.Thefirst distinctionisachronologicalonerunningbetweenthe foundingtriumvirate,ontheonehand,andsecondandsubsequent generationsofutopiansocialists,ontheother.(Theselater generationsincludingbothloyalfollowersofthefounding triumvirate,andindependentlaterfiguressuchasÉtienne Cabet(1788–1856)).Theseconddistinctionisa substantiveonerunningbetweenthecriticalpartofutopian writings(theportrayaloffaultswithincontemporarycapitalist society),ontheonehand,andtheconstructivepartofutopian writings(thedetaileddescriptionoftheidealsocialistfuture),on theother. NotethatthesedistinctionsunderpintheasymmetryofMarx’s assessmentofutopiansocialism.Simplyput:heismoreenthusiastic andpositiveabouttheachievementsofthefirstgenerationof utopians,bycomparisonwiththoseofsecondandsubsequent generations;andheismoreenthusiasticandpositiveaboutthe utopians’criticismofcontemporarysociety,bycomparisonwith theutopians’constructiveendeavours. 8.2Marx’sUtopophobia TheremainderofthissectionwillfocusonMarx’sdisapproval oftheconstructiveendeavoursoftheutopians. IntryingtoorganiseandunderstandMarx’svariouscriticisms ofutopianism,itishelpfultodistinguishbetweenfoundationaland non-foundationalvariants.(Thisdistinctionisintendedtobe exhaustive,inthatallofhiscriticismsofutopianismwillfallinto oneofthesetwocategories.)Non-foundationalcriticismsof utopiansocialismarethosewhich,ifsound,wouldprovideuswitha reasontorejectviewswhichmightbeheldby,orevenbe characteristicof,utopiansocialists,butwhicharenotconstitutive oftheirutopianism.Thatis,theywouldgiveusareasontoabandon therelevantbeliefs,ortocriticisethose(includingutopians)who heldthem,buttheywouldnotgiveuscausetorejectutopianismas such.Incontrast,foundationalcriticismsofutopian socialismarethosewhich,ifsound,wouldprovideuswithareasonto rejectutopianismassuch;thatis,areasontorefrainfromengaging insocialistdesign,areasonnottodescribeinrelevantdetailthe socialistsocietyofthefuture.(Ofcourse,thatreasonmightnotbe decisive,allthingsconsidered,butitwouldstillcountagainst utopianismperse.) ManyofMarx’sbest-knowncriticismsofutopiansocialismare non-foundational.Forinstance,intheCommunistManifesto, hecomplainsthatutopiansocialistsholdamistaken “ahistorical”viewofsocialchange.Theutopians purportedlyfailtounderstandthattheachievementofsocialism dependsonconditionswhichcanonlyemergeatacertainstageof historicaldevelopment.Theymight,forinstance,recognisethatthere arestrategicpreconditionsforsocialism(forinstance,theright blueprintandsufficientwilltoputitintopractice),but (mistakenlyonMarx’saccount)imaginethatthosepreconditions couldhaveappearedatanypointintime.Thiscomplaintis non-foundationalinthatonecanacceptthattherearehistorical conditionsforestablishingasocialistsociety,andthattheutopian socialistsfailtounderstandthis,withouttherebyhavingareasonto abandonutopianismassuch.Acommitmenttothenecessityand desirabilityofsocialistdesigndoesnotrequireonetoholdan “ahistorical”viewofsocialchange. Assessingthesoundnessofnon-foundationalcriticisms,andtheir relevancetotheutopiansocialisttradition,isacomplicatedtask (seeLeopold2018).However,evenifsoundandrelevant,these criticismswouldprovidenoreasontoabandonutopianismas such.Consequently,theyarepursuednofurtherhere.Instead, thefocusisonthethreemainfoundationalargumentsagainst utopianismthatcanbelocatedinMarx’swritings;namely,that utopianplansandblueprintsarenecessarilyundemocratic, impossible,andredundant(seeLeopold2016). Marx’sfirstargumentinvolvesanormativeclaimthat utopianplansandblueprintsareundemocratic. (“Democracy”hereconnotingindividualandcollective self-determination,ratherthanpoliticalformsofgovernance.)The basicargumentruns:thatitisundemocratictolimitthe self-determinationofindividuals;thatprovidingaplanorblueprint forasocialistsocietylimitstheself-determinationofindividuals; andthatthereforetheprovisionofplansandblueprintsfora socialistsocietyisundemocratic.Ifweaddintheassumptionthat undemocraticmeansareundesirable;thenwecanconcludethatitis undesirabletoprovideplansorblueprintsofafuturesocialist society.Onecentralreasonforresistingthisargumentisthatitis hardtoidentifyaplausibleaccountoftheconditionsfor self-determination,accordingtowhichitisnecessarilytruethat merelyprovidingasocialistplanorblueprintrestricts self-determination.Indeed,onemighthereticallythinkthatdetailed plansandblueprintsoftentendtopromoteself-determination,helping individualsthinkaboutwhereitistheywanttogo,andhowtheywant togetthere. Marx’ssecondargumentrestsonanepistemological claimthatthatutopianplansandblueprintsareimpossible, becausetheyrequireaccurateknowledgeofthefutureofakindwhich cannotbehad.Thebasicargumentstartsfromtheassumptionthatto beofanyuseablueprintmustfacilitatetheconstructionofafuture socialistsociety.Moreover,tofacilitatetheconstructionofa futuresocialistsocietyablueprintmustbecompletelyaccurate;and tobecompletelyaccurateablueprintmustpredictalltherelevant circumstancesofthatfuturesociety.However,sinceitisnot possible—giventhecomplexityofthesocialworldandthe limitationsofhumannature—topredictalltherelevant circumstancesofthatfuturesociety,wecanconcludethatsocialist blueprintsareofnouse.Onecentralreasonforresistingthis argumentisthat,whilstitishardtodenythatcompletelyaccurate plansareimpossible(giventhecomplexityoftheworldandthe limitationsofhumanunderstanding),theclaimthatonlycompletely accurateplansareusefulseemsdoubtful.Plansarenotsimply predictions,andprovidinglessthanwhollyaccurateplansfor ourselvesoftenformspartoftheprocesswherebywehelpdetermine thefutureforourselves(insofarasthatispossible). Marx’sthirdargumentdependsonanempiricalclaim thatutopianplansandblueprintsareunnecessary,because satisfactorysolutionstosocialproblemsemergeautomaticallyfrom theunfoldingofthehistoricalprocesswithoutthemselvesneedingto bedesigned.Thebasicargumentrunsasfollows:thatutopian blueprintsdescribethebasicstructureofthesocialistsocietyof thefuture;andthatsuchblueprintsarenecessaryifandonlyifthe basicstructureoffuturesocialistsocietyneedstobedesigned. However,giventhatthebasicstructureofthefuturesocialist societydevelopsautomatically(withoutdesignassistance)within capitalistsociety;andthattheroleofhumanagencyinthis unfoldinghistoricalprocessistodeliver(notdesign)thatbasic structure,Marxconcludesthatutopianblueprintsareredundant. Reasonsforresistingthisargumentincludescepticismaboutboth Marx’sreasoningandtheempiricalrecord.Marxiscertainthat humankinddoesnotneedtodesignthebasicstructureofthefuture socialistsociety,butitisnotreallymadeclearwhoorwhatdoes thatdesigninginitsplace.Moreover,thepathofhistorical developmentsinceMarx’sdaydoesnotobviouslyconfirmthe complexempiricalclaimthatthebasicstructureofsocialistsociety isdevelopingautomaticallywithinexistingcapitalism,needingonly tobedelivered(andnotdesigned)byhumanagency. Thisbriefdiscussionsuggeststhattherearecogentgroundsfor doubtingMarx’sclaimthatutopianplansandblueprintsare necessarilyundemocratic,impossible,andredundant. Finally,recallthatMarxislessenthusiasticaboutthesecondand subsequentgenerationsofutopians,thanheisabouttheoriginal triumvirate.Wemightreasonablywonderabouttherationalefor greatercriticismoflaterutopians.Itisimportanttorecognisethat itisnotthatsecondandsubsequentgenerationsmakemoreorgrosser errorsthantheoriginaltriumvirate.(Indeed,Marxappearstothink thatallthesedifferentgenerationslargelyheldthesameviews,and madethesamemistakes).Therelevantdifferenceisratherthat,by comparisonwiththeirsuccessors,thisfirstgenerationwerenotto blameforthoseerrors.Inshort,therationalebehindMarx’s preferenceforthefirstoverthesecondandsubsequentgenerationsof utopiansocialistsisbasedonanunderstandingofhistorical developmentandanassociatednotionofculpability. Marxheldthattheintellectualformationofthisfirstgeneration tookplaceinahistoricalcontext(thecuspoftheeighteenthand nineteenthcenturies)whichwassufficientlydevelopedtoprovoke socialistcriticism,butnotsufficientlydevelopedforthatsocialist criticismtoescapeseriousmisunderstandings(Cohen2000:51).Since neitherthematerialconditionsofmodernsociety,northehistorical agentcapableofbringingsocialismabout,weresufficiently developed,thisfirstgenerationwereboundtodevelopfaultyaccounts ofthenatureof,andtransitionto,socialism.However,that defence—thehistoricalunavoidabilityoferror—isnot availabletosubsequentgenerationswho,despitesignificantlychanged circumstances,holdfasttotheoriginalviewsoftheirintellectual forerunners.Marxmaintainsthatmorerecentutopians,unlikethe originaltriumvirate,reallyoughttoknowbetter. 9.Marx’sLegacy Atthispoint,wemightbeexpectedbrieflytosurveyMarx’s legacy. Thatlegacyisoftenelaboratedintermsofmovementsandthinkers. However,sounderstood,thecontroversyandscaleofthatlegacymake brevityimpossible,andthisentryisalreadylongenough.Allwecan dohereisgestureatthehistoryandmentionsomefurther reading. Thechronologyheremightprovisionallybedividedintothree historicalperiods:fromMarx’sdeathuntiltheRussia Revolution(1917);fromtheRussianRevolutiontothefallofthe BerlinWall(1989);andsince1989.Itseemshardtosaymuchthatis certainaboutthelastoftheseperiods,butsomegeneralisations aboutthefirsttwomightbehazarded. Thatfirstperiodof“ClassicalMarxism”canbethoughtof intwogenerationalwaves.Thefirstsmallergroupoftheoristswas associatedwiththeSecondInternational,andincludesKarlKautsky (1854–1938)andPlekhanov.Thesucceedingmoreactivist generationincludesRosaLuxemburg(1871–1919),V.I.Lenin (1870–1924)andLeonTrotsky(1879–1940). Thesecondperiodisperhapsdominatedby“SovietMarxism” andthecriticalreactionfromotherMarxiststhatitprovoked.The repressivebureaucraticregimeswhichsolidifiedintheSovietUnion andEasternEuroperepressedindependenttheoreticalwork,including scholarlyeditorialworkonthewritingsofMarxandEngels.However, theyalsoprovokedacriticalreactionintheformofabodyof thoughtoftencalled“WesternMarxism”,usuallysaidto includetheworkofAntonioGramsci(1891–1937),TheodorAdorno (1903–1969),andAlthusser.Thelaterpartsofthisperiodsaw thecontinuingdevelopmentof“CriticalTheory”,aswell asthebirthofcurrentssuchas“AnalyticalMarxism” whoselongertermimpactisuncertain. ThesefirsttwoperiodsarebothpartlycoveredbythePolish philosopherandhistorianofideas,LeszekKołakowski,inthe finaltwovolumesofhisencyclopaedicthreevolumeMainCurrents ofMarxism(1976[1978]).Asuccinctcriticalaccountofthe emergenceanddistinctivecharacterofWesternMarxismisprovidedby PerryAndersoninhisConsiderationsonWesternMarxism (1976).Andsomeofthemorephilosophicallyinterestingauthorsin thislattertraditionarealsocoveredelsewhereinthisEncyclopaedia (seethe RelatedEntries sectionbelow).Finally,andedgingalittleintothethirdofthese historicalperiods,ChristophHenningoffersanaccountofthe(mis) readingsofMarx—especiallythosereplacingsocialtheorywith moralphilosophy—inGermanphilosophyfromHeideggertoHabermas andbeyond,inhisPhilosophyAfterMarx(2014). However,wemightalsothinkofMarx’slegacy,lessintermsof thinkersandmovements,andmoreintermsofreasonsforwantingto studyMarx’sideas.Inthatcontext,wewouldstressthatthis isnotsimplyaquestionofthetruthofhisvarioussubstantive claims.Theworkofphilosophersis,ofcourse,alsovaluedforthe originality,insight,potential,andsoon,thatitmayalsocontain. And,sojudged,Marx’swritingshavemuchtooffer. ThevariousstrandsofMarx’sthoughtsurveyedhereincludehis philosophicalanthropology,histheoryofhistory,hiscritical engagementwiththeeconomicandpoliticaldimensionsofcapitalism, andafrustratinglyvagueoutlineofwhatmightreplaceit.Whatever theconnectionsbetweenthesethreads,itseemsimplausibletosuggest thatMarx’sideasformasystemwhichhastobeswallowedor rejectedinitsentirety.Itmight,forinstance,bethatMarx’s diagnosislooksmorepersuasivethanhisremedies.Readersmayhave littleconfidenceinhissolutions,butthatdoesnotmeanthatthe problemsheidentifiesarenotacute. 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Wolff,RobertPaul,1984,UnderstandingMarx,Princeton, NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress. Wood,AllenW.,1972,“TheMarxianCritiqueof Justice”,Philosophy&PublicAffairs,1(3): 244–282. –––,1981[2004],KarlMarx,London: Routledge;secondedition,2004. AcademicTools Howtocitethisentry. PreviewthePDFversionofthisentryatthe FriendsoftheSEPSociety. Lookuptopicsandthinkersrelatedtothisentry attheInternetPhilosophyOntologyProject(InPhO). Enhancedbibliographyforthisentry atPhilPapers,withlinkstoitsdatabase. OtherInternetResources [Pleasecontacttheauthorwithsuggestions.] RelatedEntries Adorno,TheodorW.| alienation| Althusser,Louis| criticaltheory| exploitation| Feuerbach,LudwigAndreas| Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich| Lukács,Georg[György]| revolution| socialism Copyright©2020by JonathanWolff DavidLeopold OpenaccesstotheSEPismadepossiblebyaworld-widefundinginitiative. 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