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In the instant article I examine whether international law is constitutionally capable of establishing uniform universal rules that might be necessary to ... Skiptomaincontent Accessibilityhelp Weusecookiestodistinguishyoufromotherusersandtoprovideyouwithabetterexperienceonourwebsites.Closethismessagetoacceptcookiesorfindouthowtomanageyourcookiesettings. Cancel Login × × Home OnlysearchcontentIhaveaccessto Hostname:page-component-97c68d4fb-lmkhd Totalloadingtime:0.459 Renderdate:2022-04-17T00:36:11.094Z Hasdataissue:true FeatureFlags:{ "shouldUseShareProductTool":true, "shouldUseHypothesis":true, "isUnsiloEnabled":true, "useRatesEcommerce":false, "useNewApi":true } Home>Journals>AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw>Volume87Issue4>UniversalInternationalLawEnglish Français AmericanJournalofInternationalLawArticlecontentsExtractReferencesUniversalInternationalLaw PublishedonlinebyCambridgeUniversityPress:  27February2017JonathanI.CharneyArticle Metrics ArticlecontentsExtractReferencesGetaccessShareCiteRights&Permissions[Opensinanewwindow]Extract Inthisshrinkingworld,statesareincreasinglyinterdependentandinterconnected,adevelopmentthathasaffectedinternationallaw.Earlyinternationallawdealtwithbilateralrelationsbetweenautonomousstates.Theprincipalsubjectsuntilwellintothiscenturywerediplomaticrelations,war,treatiesandthelawofthesea.Oneofthemostsignificantdevelopmentsininternationallawduringthetwentiethcenturyhasbeentheexpandedroleplayedbymultilateraltreatiesaddressedtothecommonconcernsofstates.Oftentheyclarifyandimproverulesofinternationallawthroughtheprocessofrenderingtheminbindingwrittenagreements.Thesetreatiesalsopromotethecoordinationofuniformstatebehaviorinavarietyofareas.Internationalorganizations,themselvesthecreaturesofmultilateraltreaties,havealsoassumedincreasingprominenceinthelasthalfofthiscentury.Theycontributetothecoordinationandfacilitationofcontemporaryinternationalrelationsonthebasisoflegalprinciples. Type ResearchArticle Information AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw , Volume87 , Issue4,October1993,pp.529-551DOI:https://doi.org/10.2307/2203615[Opensinanewwindow] Copyright Copyright©AmericanSocietyofInternationalLaw1993 AccessoptionsGetaccesstothefullversionofthiscontentbyusingoneoftheaccessoptionsbelow.(Loginoptionswillcheckforinstitutionalorpersonalaccess.Contentmayrequirepurchaseifyoudonothaveaccess.)References 1 1 Thereistodayawiderangeofviewsonhowrealthesethreatsareandwhatactionsshouldbetakentocombatthem.SeeChristopherD.Stone,BeyondRio:“Insuring”againstGlobalWarming,86AJIL445,446,447(1992).IntheinstantarticleIexaminewhetherinternationallawisconstitutionallycapableofestablishinguniformuniversalrulesthatmightbenecessarytodealwiththesethreats.Stone,forexample,assumesthatitcannotdoso.Id.at469.Iarguethathisassumptionisincorrect. 2 2 SeegenerallyTheNewNationalismandtheuseofCommonSpaces:IssuesinMarinePollutionandtheExploitationofAntarctica(JonathanI.Charneyed.,1982)[hereinafterTheNewNationalism]. 3 3 LouisHenkin,InternationalLaw:Politics,ValuesandFunctions,216RecueilDesCours9,45,46,130(1989IV)[hereinafterInternationalLaw];OscarSchachter,InternationalLawinTheoryandPractice,178RecueildesCours9,32(1982V);MichaelAkehurst,AModernIntroductiontoInternationalLAW21–23(BrianChapmaned.,3ded.1977);J.L.Brierly,TheLawofNations45–49(HumphreyWaldocked.,6thed.1963).Henkinrecentlyarguedthatsovereigntyisinappositetointernationallaw.SeeLouisHenkin,TheMythologyofSovereignty,ASILNewsletter,Mar.-May1993,at1. 4 4 Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at45,66,72,130;Akehurst,supranote3,at22;Brierly,supranote3,at47;seealsoGennadyM.Danilenko,TheTheoryofInternationalCustomaryLaw,31Ger.Y.B.Int’lL.9,44(1988);DavidKennedy,ANewStreamofInternationalLawScholarship,7Wis.Int’lL.J.1,30–32(1988);Schachter,supranote3,at37n.26,43;AnthonyA.D’amato,TheConceptofCustominInternationalLaw187,193,197(1972). 5 5 SeeHenkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at50,57,59,62;Danilenko,supranote4,at43;Schachter,supranote3,at36–38;TedL.Stein,TheApproachofaDifferentDrummer:ThePrincipleofthePersistentObjectorinInternationalLaw,26Harv.Int’lL.J.457(1985);ProsperWeil,TowardsRelativeNormativityinInternationalLaw?,77AJIL413,434,437(1983).ContraJonathanI.Charney,ThePersistentObjectorRuleandtheDevelopmentofCustomaryInternationalLaw,56Brit.Y.B.Int’lL.1(1985). 6 6 MyresS.McDougal,LawandPeace,18DenverJ.Int’lL.1,8–10(1989);AnthonyD’Amato,IsInternationalLawReally“Law”?,79Nw.U.L.Rev.1293(1985);JuliusStone,VisionsofWorldOrder10–14(1984);IanBrownlie,TheRealityandEfficacyofInternationalLaw,52Brit.Y.B.Int’lL.1(1981);LouisHenkin,HowNationsBehave25–27,88–98(1979);MyresS.McDougal,HaroldD.Lasswell&W.MichaelReisman,TheoriesAboutInternationalLaw:ProloguetoaConfigurativeJurisprudence,8Va.J.Int’lL.188,188–89(1968);HansKelsen,PureTheoryofLaw214–17(2drev.ed.1960,MaxKnighttrans.1967)(1934);WolfgangFriedmann,TheChangingStructureofInternationalLaw79–95(1964);H.L.A.Hart,TheConceptofLaw222–25(1961);HerschLauterpacht,TheGrotianTraditioninInternationalLaw,23Brit.Y.B.Int’lL.1(1946). Othersdenythattheinternationallegalsystemisasystemoflaw.ChristianWolff,Jusgentiummethodoscientificapertractatum(JosephH.Draketrans.,Carnegieed.1934)(1764);TheAustinianTheoryofLaw155(W.JethroBrowned.,1906);JohnAustin,TheProvinceofJurisprudenceDetermined1–31,138–39,201(Weidenfeld&Nicolson1954)(1832).Forageneraldiscussionoftheargumentsforandagainstrecognizingthatpublicinternationallawistheproductofalegalsystem,seeMcDougal,supra,at10. Kantappearstobeonbothsidesoftheissue.Ontheonehand,hewritesthatastateofnatureexistsamongnationsthatcannotbereplacedbyuniversallawthatwouldendure.ImmanuelKant,TheMetaphysicsofMorals,§61,at156–57(MaryGregortrans.,1991)(1797).Ontheotherhand,hedoesdescribevariousrightsofnations(orstates)inregardtoneutralityandretaliation,andrulesfortheconductofwar,peacetreatiesandtreatiesofalliance.Id.§§53–60,at150–57. 7 7 KentGreenawalt,ConflictsofLawandMorality64,69(1989);ThomasM.Franck&StevenW.Hawkins,JusticeintheInternationalSystem,10Mich.J.Int’lL.127,129(1989);A.JohnSimmons,MoralPrinciplesandPoliticalObligations57–100(1979);JohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice11,17,333–49(1971);JohnLocke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment287–96,342,348–67(PeterLasletted.,2ded.1967)(1690). Brierlyanalyzestheclassicaltheoriesadvancedforthemoralobligationtoabidebylawindiscussingtheobligationofstatestoabidebypublicinternationallaw.JamesLeslieBrierly,TheBasisofObligationinInternationalLawandOtherPapers1–67(HerschLauterpacht&C.H.M.Waldockeds.,1958)[hereinafterObligation].ThisessaywasoriginallypublishedinFrench.J.L.Brierly,LeFondementducaracteredudroitinternational,23RecueildesCours463(1928III).Hearguesthatthebasisofindividuals’obligationtoabidebydomesticlawisthesameasstates’obligationtoabidebyinternationallaw.Brierly,Obligation,supra,at56–65.Forhisreviewoftheconsenttheory,seeid.at9–18. 8 8 Greenawalt,supranote7,at159–73,194;StevenJ.Burton,ReviewEssay:Law,Obligation,andaGoodFaithClaimofJustice,73Cal.L.Rev.1956,1964(1985);JosephRaz,AuthorityandConsent,67Va.L.Rev.103,237–42,245(1981);TonyHonoré,MustWeObey?NecessityasaGroundforObligation,67Va.L.Rev.39,44–50(1981);JohnFinnis,NaturalLawandNaturalRights14–15(1980);Simmons,supranote7,at147–56;J.C.Smith,LegalObligation140–49(1976);Rawls,supranote7,at334;Brierly,Obligation,supranote7,at3–9.Kantarguesthatthedutytoobeyexistsevenifitisnotjust.Kant,supranote6,§46,at125. 9 9 Greenawalt,supranote7,at121–49;Simmons,supranote7,at104–44. 10 10 Greenawalt,supranote7,at94–111;Simmons,supranote7,at47–53;JeremyBentham,AnIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation3(ClarendonPress1907)(1789);JeremyBentham,AFragmentonGovernment,ch.I,sec.43,at56(J.H.Burns&H.L.A.Harteds.,1988)(1891).Seealsoargumentsofethicalegoists(hedonists):DavidP.Gauthier,MoralDealing4(1990);DavidP.Gauthier,MoralsbyAgreement349–50(1986).SeefurtherOscarSchachter,TowardsaTheoryofInternationalObligation,8Va.J.Int’lL.300(1968)(identifying13theoriesputforwardaspotentialbasesofobligationininternationallaw). 11 11 Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at85;ElisabethZoller,PeacetimeUnilateralRemedies:AnAnalysisofCountermeasures4–44(1984);Henkin,supranote6,at25–26,49–68,320–21;D’Amato,supranote4,at172;Friedmann,supranote6,at88–93;OliverLissitzyn,TheInternationalCourtofJustice5–6(1951). 12 12 SeeHenkin,supranote6,at92–99;Brierly,supranote3,at55–56;HenryManning,TheNatureofInternationalSociety106–07(1962);Brierly,Obligation,supranote7,at56–67.SeegenerallyRosalynHiggins,ConflictofInterests:InternationalLawinaDividedWorld(1965);PhilipCJessup,DiversityandUniformityintheLawofNations,58AJIL341(1964);OliverLissitzyn,InternationalLawinaDividedWorld,Int’lConciliation,No.542,March1963;C.WilfredJenks,TheCommonLawofMankind(1958).Brierlyarguesthatstatesovereigntyisarhetoricalconcept.Statesexistasjuridicalpersonsonlybecausethereisaninternationalcommunitythatimposesobligationsonitsmembers.Sincestatehoodexistsonlyinthecontextofacommunityofstates,theabsoluteindependenceandsovereigntyofstatesisimpossible.Brierly,supra,at19–36. 13 13 SeeAkehurst,supranote3,at15. 14 14 Henkin,supranote6,at47–49;seealsoBrierly,Obligation,supranote7,at54. Arecurringthemeinmultilateraltreatiesandtheresolutionsofintergovernmentalorganizationsisthecommitmentofstatestotherulesofinternationallaw.See,e.g.,UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea,openedforsignatureDec.10,1982,Preamble,UNDoc.A/CONF.62/122,reprintedinUnitedNations,OfficialTextoftheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSeawithAnnexesandIndex,UNSalesNo.E.83.V.5(1983);ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,openedforsignatureMay23,1969,Preamble,Arts.31,43,53,1155UNTS331,reprintedin8ILM679(1969);ConferenceonSecurityandCo-operationinEurope[CSCE],FinalAct,Aug.1,1975,sees.1(a)(1),l(a)(10),73Dep’tSt.Bull.323(1975),reprintedin14ILM1292,1296(1975)[hereinafterHelsinkiFinalAct];DraftDeclarationoftheRightsandDutiesofStates,Preamble,Arts.2,9,13,14,inReportoftheInternationalLawCommissiontotheGeneralAssembly,1949Y.B.Int’lL.Comm’n286,286–89;DeclarationontheEstablishmentofaNewInternationalEconomicOrder,GARes.3201,UNGAOR,6thSpec.Sess.,Supp.No.1,at3,UNDoc.A/9559(1974).TheUNGeneralAssemblyandCommissiononHumanRightshavepromotedinternationalruleswithrespecttohumanrightsviolations.See,e.g.,InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,Dec.16,1966,999UNTS171,reprintedin6ILM368(1967)(humanrighttocivilandpoliticalliberty);UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,GARes.217,UNDoc.A/810,at71(1948)(recognitionofequalandinalienablerightsofallindividuals).SeegenerallyHowardTolley,Jr.,TheU.N.CommissiononHumanRights(1987). Schachter,supranote3,at34,alsoarguesthatstateshaveacceptedthesystem.Thus,theUnitedNationsCharter,whichenjoysvirtuallyuniversalparticipation,acknowledgesthiscommitment.UNCharter,Preamble,Arts.1(1),13(1)(a).Thereisprobablynostatethathasfailedtoissueastatementortojoininadocumentcommittingitselftobeboundbyinternationallaw. 15 15 Henkin,supranote6,at46,70,86;Friedmann,supranote6,at86. 16 16 Hart,supranote6,at89–96;HansKelsen,GeneralTheoryofLawandState366–68(1946). 17 17 ThomasM.Franck,LegitimacyintheInternationalSystem,82AJIL705,758(1988);Burton,supranote8,at1958;Schachter,supranote3,at25–26;D’Amato,supranote4,at41,191;Kelsen,supranote6,at214-17;Kelsen, supranote16,at369–70.H.L.A.Hart,supranote6,at230,doesnotbelievethatthereisaruleofrecognitioninpublicinternationallaw. 18 18 InternationalCourtofJustice,StatuteArt.36(2);Restatement(Third)oftheForeignRelationsLawoftheUnitedStates§102(1987)[hereinafterRestatement]. 19 19 ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,supranote14,Arts.34–38.SeeJonathanI.Charney,TheAntarcticSystemandCustomaryInternationalLaw,inInternationalLawforAntarctica55,63–68(FrancescoFrancioni&TullioScovazzieds.,1987). 20 20 ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,supranote14,Arts.53,64,71. 21 21 ThomasM.Franck,ThePowerofLegitimacyAmongNations202,187–88(1990);Franck,supranote17,at705,756;Brierly,Obligation,supranote7,at21.Pactasuntservandamaybearequireddoctrineofeverylegalsystem.MauriceMendelson,AreTreatiesMerelyaSourceofObligation?,inPerestroikaandInternationalLaw81,81(W.E.Butlered.,1990);Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at51;Brierly,supranote3,at53. 22 22 GennadyM.Danilenko,InternationalJusCogens:IssuesofLaw-Making,Eur.J.Int’lL.,No.1,1991,at42,48–57;Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at59–61;R.A.Mullerson,SourcesofInternationalLaw:NewTendenciesinSovietThinking,83AJIL494,504(1989);MustaphaKamilYaśseen,Réflexionssurladéterminationdu“juscogens,”inL’Elaborationdudroitinternationalpublic204(1975);StatementbyM.K.Yasseen,ChairmanoftheDraftingCommittee,UnitedNationsConferenceontheLawofTreaties,OfficialRecords,FirstSession471,472,UNDoc.A/CONF.39/11,UNSalesNo.E.68.V.7(1969)[hereinafterOfficialRecords].ContraAntonioCassese,InternationalLawinaDividedWorld178(1986);StatementoftherepresentativeofFrance,OfficialRecords,supra.SecondSession93,94–95,UNDoc.A/CONF.39/11/Add.1,UNSalesNo.E.70.V.6(1970);StatementoftheSwissdelegation,id.at123;StatementoftherepresentativeofVenezuela,OfficialRecords,supra,FirstSession444. 23 23 Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at61–62;Cassese,supranote22,at170–71;Schachter,supranote3,at74–82;MichelVirally,TheSourcesofInternationalLaw,inManualofPublicInternationalLaw116,143–48(MaxSørensened.,1968);GrigoriiIvanovichTunkin,TheoryofInternationalLaw190(1974). 24 24 SeeSouthWestAfrica(Eth.v.S.Afr.;Liber,v.S.Afr.),SecondPhase,1966ICJRep.6,296(July18)(Tanaka,J.,diss,op.);Schachter,supranote3,at79–82;Virally,supranote23,at144–46;BinCheng,GeneralPrinciplesofLawAppliedbyInternationalCourtsandTribunals390(1953);DanielPatrickO’Connell,InternationalLaw12–13(2ded.1970);AlfredvonVerdross,LesPrincipesgénérauxdudroitdanslajurisprudenceinternationale,52RecueildesCours191,204–06(1935II). 25 25 Seetextatnotes7–10supra. 26 26 SeeHenkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at61–62;Restatement,supranote18,§102reporters’note7;Schachter,supranote3,at77;Virally,supranote23,at146–48;HumphreyWaldock,GeneralCourseonPublicInternationalLaw,106RecueildesCours1,50,57(1962II).Cf.V.S.Vereshchetin&G.M.Danilenko,CulturalandIdeologicalPluralismandInternationalLaw,29Ger.Y.B.Int’lL.56,64–65(1986). 27 27 Seesourcescitedsupranote26;Cassese,supranote22,at174. 28 28 Tunkin,supranote23,at195–203. 29 29 SeeFactoryatChorzów(Ger.v.Pol.),1928PCIJ(ser.A)No.17,at27–29,61(Sept.13);EffectofawardsofcompensationmadebytheU.N.AdministrativeTribunal,1954ICJRep.47,53(AdvisoryOpinionofJuly13).SeealsoRestatement,supranote18,§102reporters’note7;Cassese,supranote22,at171;Schachter,supranote3,at77;Virally,supranote23,at148;Waldock,supranote26,at58–60. 30 30 NorthSeaContinentalShelf(FRG/Den.;FRG/Neth.),1969ICJRep.3(Feb.20);TheS.S.“Lotus”(Fr.v.Turk.),1927PCIJ(ser.A)No.10(Sept.7);ThePaqueteHabana,175U.S.677(1900);Danilenko,supranote4;Restatement,supranote18,§102;Schachter,supranote3,at35–36. 31 31 Thus,theRestatement,supranote18,§102(1),describesinternationallawas“accepted…bytheinternationalcommunityofstates.”Thisformulationsupportstheviewthattherelevantacceptanceisthatofthecommunityofstates,notstatesindividually.SeealsoBrierly,Obligation,supranote7,at13. 32 32 Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at59;Danilenko,supranote4,at29,33;Restatement,supranote18,§102commentd;Charney,supranote5,at1–2nn.2&3;Schachter,supranote3,at36;Brierly,Obligation,supranote7,at11. 33 33 Greenawalt,supranote7,at66;Simmons,supranote7,at64,77,80. 34 34 Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at60–61;Schachter,supranote3,at35–36;D’Amato,supranote4,at271. 35 35 See,e.g.,Fisheriescase(UKv.Nor.),1951ICJRep.116(Dec.18).TheICJnotonlyfoundthatasystemofstraightbaselinesispermittedininternationallaw,butalsodeclaredthatthelawplacedlimitsonthediscretionofthecoastalstatetoestablishsuchbaselines.Theyincludedtherequirements(1)thatthewaterssoenclosedhaveaclosedependenceonthelanddomain,(2)thatthelinesnotdeparttoanyappreciableextentfromthegeneraldirectionofthecoast,(3)thatthecoastalpopulationbelinkedeconomicallytothewaterareas,and(4)thattheendpointsofthebaselinesnotbelocatedonsubmergedrocks.NoneoftheserequirementswasclearlyarticulatedandknowntotheinternationalcommunitypriortotheCourt’sdeclaration.Nevertheless,theseruleswerefoundtobepublicinternationallaw. 36 36 MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicar.v.U.S.),Merits,1986ICJRep.14(June27);TheS.S.“Lotus”(Fr.v.Turk.),1927PCIJ(ser.A)No.10(Sept.7);ThePaqueteHabana,175U.S.677(1900);MauriceH.Mendelson,Practice,PropagandaandPrincipleinInternationalLaw,42CurrentLegalProbs.1,11–12(1989);OscarSchachter,EntangledTreatyandCustom,inInternationalLawataTimeofPerplexity717,730,731(YoramDinsteined.,1988);Danilenko,supranote4,at29;W.MichaelReisman,TheCultofCustomintheLate20thCentury,17Cal.W.Int’lL.J.133(1987);Schachter,supranote3,at63;AnthonyD’Amato,TheConceptofHumanRightsinInternationalLaw,82Colum.L.Rev.1110,1131(1982). 37 37 MarttiKoskenniemi,ThePoliticsofInternationalLaw,Eur.J.Int’lL.,No.1/2,1990,at4,27;TheodorMeron,HumanRightsandHumanitarianNormsasCustomaryLaw108(1989);Mendelson,supranote36,at13;JonathanI.Charney,CustomaryInternationalLawintheNicaraguaCaseJudgmentontheMerits,1HagueY.B.Int’lL.16(1988);PeterHaggenmacher,LaDoctrinedesdeuxélémentsdudroitcoutumierdanslapratiquedelaCourinternationale,90RevueGénéraledeDroitInternationalPublique5(1986);Schachter,supranote3,at64. BrierlyarguesthattheauthorityoftheInternationalCourttofindthelawisanonconsensualsourceofinternationallaw.Personswhoputforwardargumentsbaseduponstateconsenttothejudicialprocessare“playingwithwords”tohidethereality.Brierly,Obligation,supranote7,at17–18. 38 38 DavidColson,HowPersistentMustthePersistentObjectorBe?,61Wash.L.Rev.957(1986);Charney,supranote5;Stein,supranote5;seealsoDanilenko,supranote4,at43;Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at50,57,59,62;Schachter,supranote3,at36–38. 39 39 Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at57;Charney,supranote5,at3;Schachter,supranote3,at36. 40 40 InThePaqueteHabanaopinion,forexample,itisfarfromclearwhentheruleinquestionbecameinternationallaw. 41 41 SeeRestatement,supranote18,§102commentd&reporters’note2,§206commenta;Charney,supranote5,at6;R.P.Anand,NewStatesandInternationalLaw62(1972);Virally,supranote23,at137–39;GeorgesM.Abi-Saab,TheNewly-IndependentStatesandtheRulesofInternationalLaw:AnOutline,8How.L.J.95(1962);JorgeCastañeda,TheUnderdevelopedNationsandtheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw,15Int’lOrg.38(1961);Waldock,supranote26,at52;StatementoftherepresentativeofItaly,1UnitedNationsConferenceonSuccessionofStatesinRespectofTreaties,OfficialRecords,FirstSession39,UNDoc.A/CONF.80/16,UNSalesNo.E.78.V.8(1978).SeegenerallyYilmaMakonnen,InternationalLawandtheNewStatesofAfrica(1983);F.V.García-Amador,CurrentAttemptstoReviseInternationalLaw—AComparativeAnalysis,77AJIL286(1983);T.O.Elias,NewHorizonsinInternationalLaw(1980);EduardoJiménezdeAréchaga,InternationalLawinthePastThirdofaCentury,159RecueildesCours1(1978I);S.PrakashSinha,NewNationsandtheLawofNations(1967);J.J.G.Syatauw,SomeNewlyEstablishedAsianStatesandtheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw(1961). 42 42 SeeDanilenko,supranote4,at43–65;Restatement,supranote18,§102reporters’note7;MarkE.Villiger,CustomaryInternationalLawandTreaties16(1985);G.J.H.VanHoof,RethinkingtheSourcesofInternationalLaw77–78(1983);Schachter,supranote3,at34–35;Virally,supranote23,at148;andWaldock,supranote26,at58–60. 43 43 Restatement,supranote18,§102commentd;Charney,supranote5,at2;Schachter,supranote3,at32,34–35.Seealsosourcescitedsupranote41. 44 44 Animplicitassumptionofthepersistentobjectorruleisthatnonparticipatingstates,regardlessofthereason,arebound.LuigiCondorelli,Custom,inInternationalLaw:AchievementsandProspects205(MohammedBedjaouied.,1991). 45 45 See,forexample,argumentsthattheUnitedStateshasnotbeensufficientlycarefultomaintainitspersistentobjectorstatuswithrespecttoprohibitionsontheuseofthedeathpenalty.ViktorMayer-Schönberger,CrossingtheRiverofNoReturn:InternationalRestrictionsontheDeathPenaltyandtheExecutionofCharlesColeman,43Okla.L.Rev.677,683(1990);LisaKlineArnett,DeathatanEarlyAge:InternationalLawArgumentsAgainsttheDeathPenaltyforJuveniles,57U.Cin.L.Rev.245,260n.113(1988). 46 46 Charney,supranote5,at11–16. 47 47 Id.at11–14,andreferencestherein. 48 48 Id.at15,andreferencestherein.Schachter,supranote3,at119,130–31,arguesthatSouthAfricawasnotapersistentobjectortotheinternationallawagainstapartheidbecause,asapartytotheUnitedNationsCharter,itacceptedtherightofpersonstoequaltreatmentunderlaw.SeealsoCassese,supranote22,at179.Ontheotherhand,verysubstantialdenialsofcivilandpoliticalrightstononwhitepersonsunderthelawsoftheGovernmentofSouthAfricaanditspredecessorshavealongandcontinuoushistorypredatingtheUNCharterandcontinuingafteritsadoption.JohnDugard,HumanRightsandtheSouthAfricanLegalOrder14–29(1978).WhenthehumanrightsimplicationsoftheCharterwereenunciatedinthe1948UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,supranote14,SouthAfricarefusedtoendorsethemandproceededtostrengthenitsdiscriminatorylaws.Dugard,supra,at46,53.Underthesecircumstances,itisdifficulttosustaintheargumentthattheGovernmentofSouthAfricaeverknowinglyconsentedtotheestablishmentoflegalobligationsundertheCharterorgeneralinternationallawmakingitsdiscriminatorylawsillegal.Onlyveryrecently,aftertheapplicationofaconsiderablenumberofinternationallegalandpoliticalsanctions,didSouthAfricaaccepttheseobligationsandbegintodismantleitsapartheidsystem. TheSovietUnionpersistentlyobjectedtothechangeintheinternationallawofsovereignimmunityfromabsoluteimmunitytotherestrictiverule.Nevertheless,itsobjectionsdidnotprotectitfromtheapplicationofthenewlaw.SeeJoniF.Charme,TheInterimObligationofArticle18oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties:MakingSenseofanEnigma,25Geo.Wash.J.Int’lL.&Econ.71,76n.17(1991),andreferencestherein. 49 49 Fisheriescase(UKv.Nor.),1951ICJRep.116,131(Dec.18);Asylumcase(Colom./Peru),1950ICJRep.266,277–78(Nov.20)(regionallaw).SeeCharney,supranote5,at9–11. 50 50 Weil,supranote5,at433–34;Stein,supranote5,at459. 51 51 Stein,supranote5,at467–68. 52 52 Charney,supranote5,at22–23. 53 53 Seetextatandnote41supra.Contranote42supra. 54 54 Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at52–59;Schachter,supranote3,at34–39,336.SeealsoMayer-Schönberger,supranote45,at683(peremptorynormsexempted);Franck,supranote17,at705,756. JiménezdeAréchagawoulddenytheuseofthepersistentobjectorruletoveryessentialnorms,butinexchangewouldpermitgroupsofstatestoblocktheirentryintointernationallaw.EduardoJiménezdeAréchaga,Intervention,inChangeandStabilityinInternationalLaw-Making27(AntonioCassese&JosephH.H.Weilereds.,1988). WhileHenkin,supranote3,at46–47,stronglyendorsesthegeneralrulethatstateconsentisatthefoundationofpublicinternationallaw,hecarvesoutthreemajorexceptionstothegeneralrule.Internationallawthatheclassifiesasconstitutionallaw(e.g.,territorialintegrity,pactasuntservanda)orbasiclaw(e.g.,principlesofproperty,tortandcontract)waspartoftheinternationallegalsystematitsoriginandnotsubjecttostateacceptanceorrejection.Id.at51–53.Juscogensnormsareanotherclassofsupremeinternationallawnotopentoexception(e.g.,SouthAfricacouldnotobjecttotheprohibitiononapartheid).Id.at59–61.Henkindoesnotexpressanopinionabouthavijuscogensnormsbecomeinternationallaw.Nevertheless,byestablishingcategoriesofexceptionstothegeneralrule,hemustnecessarilyacceptthepropositionthattheinternationalcommunitycanlegislateforall,consenteranddissenteralike. 55 55 Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at60,62;Danilenko,supranote4,at44;Schachter,EntangledTreatyandCustom,supranote36,at717,734.Cassesewouldapplythepersistentobjectorruleeveninthecaseofjuscogensnorms.Cassese,supranote22,at178. 56 56 ConventionontheLawoftheSea,supranote14,Art.137(3);LetterfromtheGroupofLegalExpertsontheQuestionofUnilateralLegislationtotheChairmanoftheGroupof77,inUNDoc.A/CONF.62/77(1979),11UnitedNationsConferenceontheLawoftheSea,OfficialRecords80–82,UNSalesNo.E.80.V.6(1980);StatementofMr.Nandan(Fiji)asChairmanoftheGroupof77,inUNDoc.A/CONF.62/SR.109(1978),9id.at103,UNSalesNo.E.79.V.3(1980);MohammedBedjaoui,TowardsaNewInternationalEconomicOrder233–36(1979).SeeMartinA.Harry,TheDeepSeabed:TheCommonHeritageofMankindorArenaforUnilateralExploitation?,40NavalL.Rev.207(1992);LukeT.Lee,TheLawoftheSeaConventionandThirdStates,77AJIL541(1983). AcommentaryoftheInternationalLawCommissiontakesthepositionthatthedoctrineofthecommonheritageofmankindmadeapplicabletothedeepseabedgivesallstatesacollectiveinterest.Asaconsequence,aviolationwouldinjureallstatesandthusgivethemstandingtoseekremediesunderinternationallaw.ReportoftheInternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofitsThirty-seventhSession,UNGAOR,40thSess.,Supp.No.10,UNDoc.A/40/10,reprintedin[1985]2Y.B.Int’lL.Comm’n27,para.23,UNDoc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1(Part2). 57 57 Restatement,supranote18,§§102,103;Brierly,supranote3,at59–62. 58 58 NorthSeaContinentalShelf(FRG/Den.;FRG/Neth.),1969ICJRep.3(Feb.20);TheS.S.“Lotus”(Fr.v.Turk.),1927PCIJ(ser.A)No.10(Sept.7);ThePaqueteHabana,175U.S.677(1900). 59 59 AnimportantroleoftheUNGeneralAssemblyistocontributetothedevelopmentofgeneralinternationallawthroughplenarysessionsandmeetingsofitscommittees,otherorgansandorganizationsassociatedwithit.SeeCondorelli,supranote44,at179,189–94. 60 60 Moretechnicalandlessfundamentalnormsstillevolvethroughthetraditionalprocess,althoughtheseareoftendevelopedthroughtheactionsoflower-levelrepresentativesortechnicalexpertsatstandinginternationalinstitutions. 61 61 Internationallawdoesnotrequirethespecificconsentoractualacquiescenceofallaffectedstatesfortheestablishmentoflegalobligations.Statesarecertainlyabletobecomepartiestointernationalagreementswithmechanismsthatenableotherstomakebindingdecisions.Iftheycanestablishsuchproceduresininternationalagreements,theymustbeabletoadoptsimilardecision-makingsystemsforinternationallawingeneral.Thecommunity’swillingnesstodelegateimportantdecisionmakingauthorityisstrikinglyillustratedbytheauthorityoftheUNSecurityCouncil.TheSecurityCouncilmaytakeenforcementdecisionsunderchapterVIIoftheUNCharterincasesofthreatstothepeace,breachesofthepeaceandactsofaggression.Decisionsbyaqualifiedmajorityofthe15membersoftheSecurityCouncilarelegallybindingonallUNmembersandtheyareobligedtoencouragenonmembersalsotoconformtosuchdecisions.UNCharterArts.2(4),2(5),25,27,39–42. TheConventiononInternationalCivilAviation,Dec.7,1944,61Stat.1180,15UNTS295,permitscertaintechnicaldecisionstobemadethatarebindingonallstatepartiesexceptthoseforwhichtheyexpresslyoptout.Butotherrulesandregulationsarebindingonthestatepartiesanddonotincludetherighttooptout.Id.,Arts.12,37,38,54,90.SeeLouisB.Sohn,“GenerallyAccepted”InternationalRules,61Wash.L.Rev.1073,1074,1075(1986);ThomasBuergenthal,Law-MakingattheInternationalCivilAviationOrganization76–85(1969).Foradiscussionofasimilardecision-makingprocessattheWorldHealthOrganization,seeF.Gutteridge,NotesonDecisionsoftheWorldHealthOrganization,inEffectivenessofInternationalDecisions277(StephenM.Schwebeled.,1971). 62 62 ForsuchananalysisoftheGenevaProtocols,seeAntonioCassese,TheGenevaProtocolsof1977ontheHumanitarianLawofArmedConflictandCustomaryInternationalLaw,3UCLAPacificBasinL.J.55(1984). Reisman,supranote36,iscorrectinhisobservationthatdecisionmakinginmultilateralforumscanbeabusedandtheresultsmayfailtoreflectpolitical,economicormilitaryrealities.Sensitiveanalysesoftheresultsproducedbysuchforumsarenecessary.Thus,votingmajoritiesthatexcludecertaingroupsofstates,orfailtoreflectgeopoliticalpowerortheviewsofthemostinterestedstates,arehighlysuspect.Itappearstomethat,ascomparedtothe1970sandearly1980s,thebehaviorofmanysuchforumsinthe1990shasbeendrivenbyanincreaseddesiretoreachtrueconsensusamonginterestedstates. 63 63 Cassese,supranote62,makesadetailedanalysisofthevotes,thenatureoftheobjectionsstated,thesubstanceofthenorms,andtheirhistoryinordertoreachhisopiniononwhetheranormhasbecomegeneralinternationallaw. TheCSCEprocessgenerallyrequiresaconsensusfortakingdecisions.Recently,however,theCSCEstatesadoptedaprocedurethatallowscertaindecisionstobetakenbyaconsensusminusone.ThisoptionisavailablewhentherehavebeengrossanduncorrectedviolationsofCSCEcommitments.InsuchcasestheobjectionoftheaccusedviolatingstatewillnotblocktheCSCEdecision.ThisrulewasappliedforthefirsttimeintheCSCEDeclarationonBosnia-Hercegovina(Helsinki,May12,1992).SeePragueDocumentonFurtherDevelopmentofCSCEInstitutionsandStructures(Jan.31,1992),reprintedin31ILM987(1992);MarcWeller,TheInternationalResponsetotheDissolutionoftheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,86AJIL569,599(1992). 64 64 Danilenko,supranote4,at37,38;RosalynHiggins,TheRoleofResolutionsofInternationalOrganizationsintheProcessofCreatingNormsintheInternationalSystem,inInternationalLawandtheInternationalSystem21,21(W.E.Butlered.,1987);G.I.Tunkin,TheRoleofResolutionsofInternationalOrganisationsinCreatingNormsofInternationalLaw,inid.at5,12,14,17;D’Amato,supranote4,at104,162,165,271. 65 65 Sohn,supranote61,at1079,1080. 66 66 SeeHaggenmacher,supranote37. 67 67 SeeHiramE.Chodosh,NeitherTreatyNorCustom:TheEmergenceofDeclarativeInternationalLaw,26Tex.Int’lL.J.87,100–05(1991),andreferencestherein. 68 68 SeeSohn,supranote61. 69 69 SeegenerallyFredericL.Kirgis,Jr.,CustomonaSlidingScale,81AJIL146(1987). 70 70 SeeSohn,supranote61;Condorelli,supranote44;Cassese,supranote62.Thelattertwoauthorsdonotappeartobewillingtodispensewithproofofstatepracticeinanycase.Sohnappearswillingtodoso. 71 71 Inthepast,Ihaveemphasizedtheneedforstatepracticesoastodeterminetherealinterestsofthestateactorsandtheircommitmenttothenorminquestion.JonathanI.Charney,InternationalAgreementsandtheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw,61Wash.L.Rev.971,990–96(1986)[hereinafterInternationalAgreements];Charney,supranote37.Inmanysituationsthedecisionstakenatinternationalforumswillbeambiguous,aswilltheviewsoftheparticipatingstates.Thepracticeofstatesmaythenbethebetterguide.Certainly,ifthestatepracticeisinconsistentwiththeprincipleadoptedattheinternationalforum,thatprinciplewouldbeopentoseriousquestion.Itispossible,ofcourse,thattheexpressedcommitmentofstatestoanormcanprevailoveractionsofstatesinconsistentwiththenormbutdefendedbytheactingstatesasconsistentwithitorexceptionstoit.MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicar.v.U.S.),Merits,1986ICJRep.14,98,108–09,paras.186,207,208(June27).Ontheotherhand,ifthearticulatednormhaslittleornoinfluenceonactualworldbehavior,itisnotlaw.KrystynaMarek,IdentityandContinuityofStatesinPublicInternationalLaw554(2ded.1968);Kelsen,supranote16,at120.SeegenerallyLonFuller,TheMoralityofLaw(1964);Hart,supranote6. 72 72 E.g.,ElettronicaSiculaS.p.A.(ELSI)(U.S.v.It.),1989ICJRep.15,66,para.111(July20);BorderandTransborderArmedActions(Nicar.v.Hond.),JurisdictionandAdmissibility,1988ICJRep.69,85,para.35(Dec.20);ContinentalShelf(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta),1985ICJRep.13,39,55,paras.46,76(June3);MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicar.v.U.S.),JurisdictionandAdmissibility,1984ICJRep.392,422–24,paras.69,71,73(Nov.26);DelimitationoftheMaritimeBoundaryintheGulfofMaineArea(Can./U.S.),1984ICJRep.246,293,294,297,299,302,303,339,paras.91,94,106,107,111,112,122,123,230(Oct.12);ContinentalShelf(Tunis./LibyanArabJamahiriya),1982ICJRep.18,38,47,74,paras.24,46,100(Feb.24);InterpretationoftheAgreementof25March1951betweentheWHOandEgypt,1980ICJRep.73,90,92,95,paras.37,41,48(AdvisoryOpinionofDec.20);UnitedStatesDiplomaticandConsularStaffinTehran(U.S.v.Iran),1980ICJRep.3,31,33,41,43,44,paras.62,69,90,94,95(May24);AegeanSeaContinentalShelf(Greecev.Turk.),1978ICJRep.3,32,paras.76,77(Dec.19);LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricainNamibia(SouthWestAfrica)notwithstandingSecurityCouncilResolution276(1970),1971ICJRep.16,47,55,paras.96,121(AdvisoryOpinionofJune21);BarcelonaTraction,LightandPowerCompany,Limited(NewApplication;1962)(Belg.v.Spain),1970ICJRep.3,32,38,46,paras.34,54,87,88(Feb.5);NorthSeaContinentalShelf(FRG/Den.;FRG/Neth.),1969ICJRep.3,28,38,42,paras.37,63,73(Feb.20).SeealsoGeorgesAbi-Saab,Discussion,inChangeandStabilityinInternationalLaw-Making,supranote54,at10. 73 73 InternationalCourtofJustice,StatuteArt.38. 74 74 SeegenerallyMilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicar.v.U.S.),Merits,1986ICJRep.14(June27);WesternSahara,1975ICJRep.12(AdvisoryOpinionofOct.16);TexacoOverseasPetroleumCo.&CaliforniaAsiaticOilCo.v.LibyanArabRepublic(Jan.19,1977),17ILM1(1978);Meron,supranote37,at86;Higgins,supranote64,at21–26;Cassese,supranote22,at193–94;Schachter,supranote3,at110–32;ChristopherC.Joyner,U.N.GeneralAssemblyResolutionsandInternationalLaw:RethinkingtheContemporaryDynamicsofNorm-Creation,11Cal.W.Int’lL.J.445(1981). 75 75 D’Amatomaintainsthattheydoautomaticallyestablishcustomarylaw.D’Amato,supranote36;D’Amato,supranote4,at104,110,164. 76 76 Variouswritershavemadesimilar,butnotasbroad,suggestions.E.g.,Meron,supranote37,at86,93,113;Schachter,supranote3,at127–30,133;Schachter,EntangledTreatyandCustom,supranote36,at717,722,732,734;Jim–nezdeAr–chaga,supranote54,at2;Higgins,supranote64,at21;LouisB.Sohn,TheLawoftheSea:CustomaryInternationalLawDevelopments,34Am.U.L.Rev.271(1985). 77 77 Forsupportoftheviewthatthefacilitationofcommunicationandexchangeofviewsonpotentialinternationallawnormsacceleratestheinternationallawmakingprocess,seeSouthWestAfrica(Eth.v.S.Afr.;Liber,v.S.Afr.),SecondPhase,1966ICJRep.6,291(July18)(Tanaka,J.,diss,op.);Condorelli,supranote44,at190,201. 78 78 Weil,supranote5,at438.Certainly,developmentssubsequentto1983showamarkeddeclineinthepoliticizationofinternationalforums.TheColdWarendedwiththedemiseoftheSovietUnionand,thus,thedemiseofthebipolarworld.TheThirdWorldnations,afterearlyoverenthusiasmforsovereigntyandattemptstocreateasinglepowerblocunderthebannerofthe“NewInternationalEconomicOrder,”aremorefocusedontheirindividualsituations.TheUnitedStates,albeittheremainingsuperpower,islessideologicalandrealizesitisconstrainedbyrealeconomic,militaryandpoliticallimits.Furthermore,thereisaworldwideconvergencetowarddemocraticidealsofgovernance,freemarketeconomicsandtheprotectionoffundamentalhumanrights,allofwhichtranslatesintoimprovedmultilateraldiplomacyattheUnitedNationsandelsewhere.TheeffectiveuseoftheSecurityCouncilafterIraq’sinvasionofKuwaitisthemostvisibleexample.Inaddition,theapparentreopeningofseriouseffortstoresolvetheproblemsconcerningthedeepseabedregimethatareanobstacletowidespreadadherencetothe1982ConventionontheLawoftheSeaisanexampleoftheprogressmadeoverthepast10years.StatementbyAmbassadorMadeleineK.Albright,UnitedStatesPermanentRepresentativetotheUnitedNations(Apr.27,1993),USUNPressRelease55-(93)(Apr.27,1993),reprintedinUSEntersSeabedNegotiations,OceansPol’yNews,Apr.1993,at2;JonathanI.Charney,TheUnitedStatesandtheRevisionofthe1982ConventionontheLawoftheSea,23OceanDev.&Int’lL.279(1992);DavidE.Pitt,U.S.Seeksto‘Fix’MiningProvisionsofSeaTreaty,N.Y.Times,Aug.28,1993,atA3. 79 79 Thosewhoanalyzethedoctrineofsourcesofcustomaryinternationallawareoftenunabletoavoidthetwinpitfallsofdescribingasystemthateithermerelyreflectsthepresentpoliticalviewsofstatesonimportantdevelopmentsininternationallaworsoreflectsthewishesoftheindividualanalystthatitlacksaconnectiontoreality.SeeKoskenniemi,supranote37,at7–15;Kennedy,supranote4,at23,30–33;Haggenmacher,supranote37.Thegeneralinternationallawmakingprocessdescribedaboveappearstolessenthosepitfalls.Initsgreaterformality,itcloselyapproachesalegislativeprocessinhighlightingandclarifyingthenorms.Asamoreopenandpositiveprocessthancustomaryinternationallawmaking,itislikelytoreflectmoreaccuratelytheinterestsofstates. 80 80 SeeContinentalShelf(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta),1985ICJRep.13,29–30,32–34,paras.26–28,31–34(June3);DelimitationoftheMaritimeBoundaryintheGulfofMaineArea(Can./U.S.),1984ICJRep.246,294–95,paras.94–96(Oct.12);Restatement,supranote18,at5;JonathanI.Charney,TheUnitedStatesandtheLawoftheSeaafterUNCLOSIII–TheImpactofGeneralInternationalLaw,46Law&Contemp.Probs.38,44–48(1983).Incontrast,noprogresswasmadeonfixingthemaximumbreadthoftheterritorialseaduringandaftertheUNConferenceontheLawoftheSeaof1958andthesecondconferenceof1960,sincenoconsensuswasreachedbytheparticipatingstates. 81 81 LauraPineschi,TheAntarcticTreatySystemandGeneralRulesofInternationalEnvironmentalLaw,inInternationalLawforAntarctica,supranote19,at187;Restatement,supranote18,§601reporters’note1,§602reporters’note1;BoleslawAdamBoczek,TheProtectionoftheAntarcticEcosystem:AStudyinInternationalEnvironmentalLaw,13OceanDev.&Int’lL.347,389(1983);RichardB.Bilder,ThePresentLegalandPoliticalSituationinAntarctica,inTheNewNationalism,supranote2,at167,193–94;G–ntherHandl,TerritorialSovereigntyandtheProblemofTransnationalPollution,69AJIL50,67(1975);Co-operationintheFieldofEconomics,ofScienceandTechnologyandoftheEnvironment,pt.5,Environment,HelsinkiFinalAct,supranote14,14ILMat1307. 82 82 Filartigav.Pena-Irala,630F.2d876(2dCir.1980);Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at223–26;Meron,supranote37,at95–98;2Restatement,supranote18,IntroductoryNotetopt.VII,at144–49;Schachter,supranote3,at338. 83 83 MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicar.v.U.S.),JurisdictionandAdmissibility,1984ICJRep.392,421,para.66(Nov.26);FisheriesJurisdiction(UKv.Ice.),JurisdictionoftheCourt,1973ICJRep.3,14,18–20,21,paras.24,36–40,43,44(Feb.2);LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricainNamibia(SouthWestAfrica)notwithstandingSecurityCouncilResolution276(1970),1971ICJRep.16,46–47,paras.94,96(AdvisoryOpinionofJune21);2Restatement,supranote18,IntroductoryNotetopt.VII,at144–46;Charney,InternationalAgreements,supranote71,at975–76;IanSinclair,TheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(2ded.1984);HerbertW.Briggs,TheTravauxPréparatoiresoftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,65AJIL705(1971);ShabtaiRosenne,TheLawofTreaties:AGuidetotheLegislativeHistoryoftheViennaConvention(1970);RichardD.Kearny&RobertE.Dalton,TheTreatyonTreaties,64AJIL495(1970). 84 84 SeeCassese,supranote62. 85 85 Thesenormshavebeenfoundinnonbindingresolutionsofstandingoradhocintergovernmentalforumsandindrafttreatiesthathavenotenteredintoforce.TheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,the1982ConventionontheLawoftheSea,theHumanRightsCovenants,andtheGenevaProtocolsallgaverisetogeneralinternationallawpriortotheirentryintoforce.Seesupranotes60–65. Arguably,thelimitationsontheconductofwarcontainedinGenevaProtocolIconstrainedthetargetingchoicesbytheUnitedStatesduringtheaircampaignofthePersianGulfwareventhoughitwasnotapartytotheProtocol.SeeU.S.Dep'tofDefense,FinalReporttoCongress:ConductofthePersianGulfWar95–100(1992).“Targetingpolicies…avoideddamagetomosques,religiousshrines,andarcheologicalsites,aswellastocivilianfacilitiesandthecivilianpopulation….Whentargetingofficerscalculatedtheprobability,ofcollateraldamageastoohigh,thetargetwasnotattacked….”Id.at100. 86 86 SeegenerallyUnitedNationsConferenceonEnvironmentandDevelopment,31ILM814(1992),anddocumentsreprintedtherein;JamesBrooke,TheEarthSummit:FouroftheVariedFacesintheGlobalCrowdattheRioGathering,N.Y.Times,June11,1992,atA12;WilliamK.Stevens,EarthSummitFindstheYearsofOptimismareFadingMemory,N.Y.Times,June9,1992,atC4. 87 87 AlanRiding,RightsForumEndsinCallforGreaterRolebyU.N.,N.Y.Times,June26,1993,atA3. 88 88 SeeFranck,ThePowerofLegitimacyAmongNations,supranote21;Franck,supranote17. 89 89 Generally,theinternationalsystemfavorsalaissez-faireapproach,placingtheburdenonadvocatesofnewlawthatwouldrestrictthefreedomsofstates.TheS.S.“Lotus”(Fr.v.Turk.),1927PCIJ(ser.A)No.10(Sept.7);Henkin,InternationalLaw,supranote3,at131,136. 90 90 Althoughsomedomesticlawmakingsystemsaresimilarlyopaque,e.g.,theEnglishandAmericancommonlaw.61CitedbyCitedbyLoading... 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