Illocutionary speech actAssignment on speech act theorySpeech acts and discourseTypes of speech act theorySpeech acts examplesSpeech act theory PDFSpeech act analysis

Speech Acts - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

文章推薦指數： 80 %
投票人數：10人

As a first approximation, speech acts are those acts that can (though need not) be performed by saying that one is doing so. On this conception, ... StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop SpeechActsFirstpublishedTueJul3,2007;substantiverevisionThuSep24,2020 Weareattunedineverydayconversationnotprimarilytothesentences weuttertooneanother,buttothespeechactsthatthoseutterances areusedtoperform:requests,warnings,invitations,promises, apologies,predictions,andthelike.Suchactsarestaplesof communicativelife,butonlybecameatopicofsustained investigation,atleastintheEnglish-speakingworld,inthemiddle ofthetwentieth century.[1] Sincethattime“speechacttheory”hasbecomeinfluential notonlywithinphilosophy,butalsoinlinguistics,psychology,legal theory,artificialintelligence,literarytheory,andfeministthought amongotherscholarly disciplines.[2] Recognitionofthesignificanceofspeech actshasilluminatedtheabilityoflanguagetodootherthingsthan describereality.Intheprocesstheboundariesamongthephilosophy oflanguage,thephilosophyofaction,aesthetics,thephilosophyof mind,politicalphilosophy,andethicshavebecomelesssharp.In addition,anappreciationofspeechactshashelpedlaybarea normativestructureimplicitinlinguisticpractice,includingeven thatpartofthispracticeconcernedwithdescribingreality.Much recentresearchaimsatanaccuratecharacterizationofthisnormative structureunderlyinglinguisticpractice. 1.Introduction 2.Content,Force,andHowSayingCanMakeItSo 2.1TheIndependenceofForceandContent 2.2CanSayingMakeitSo? 2.3TheoriesofPerformativity 3.AspectsofIllocutionaryForce 3.1DirectionofFit 3.2ConditionsofSatisfaction 3.3SevenComponentsofIllocutionaryForce 3.4DirectandIndirectForce 4.Mood,ForceandConvention 4.1ForceConventionalism 4.2ABiosemanticSpeciesofForceConventionalism 4.3AnIntentionalistAlternativetoForceConventionalism 5.Speaker-MeaningandForce 5.1Grice’sAccountofSpeakerMeaning 5.2ObjectionstoGrice’sAccount 5.3ForceasanAspectofSpeakerMeaning 6.Force,Norms,andConversation 6.1SpeechActsandConversations 6.2SpeechActsandScorekeeping 7.Force-IndicatorsandtheLogicallyPerfectLanguage 8.DoSpeechActsHaveaLogic? 9.SpeechActsandSocialIssues Bibliography FurtherReading AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.Introduction BertrandRussell’sTheoryofDescriptions wasaparadigmformanyphilosophersinthetwentiethcentury.One reasonforthisisthatitsuggestedawaytorespondtolongstanding philosophicalproblemsbyshowingthemtobespecious.Russellargued thatsuchsentencesas‘ThepresentKingofSingaporeis bald,’and,‘Theroundsquareisimpossible,’ possesssuperficialgrammaticalformsthataremisleadingastotheir underlyinglogicalstructure.Insodoingheshowedhowsuchsentences canbemeaningfulwithoutthisfactobligingustopositcurrent Singaporeanmonarchsorroundsquares.Manyphilosophersinwhatcame tobeknownastheOrdinaryLanguagemovementwereinspiredbythis achievementtoarguethatclassicphilosophicalproblems(e.g.,of freewill,therelationofmindtobody,truth,thenatureof knowledge,andofrightandwrong)likewiserestedona misunderstandingofthelanguageinwhichtheseproblemare couched.InHowtoDoThingswithWords, J.L.Austinforinstancewrites, …inrecentyears,manythingswhichwouldoncehavebeen acceptedwithoutquestionas‘statements’byboth philosophersandgrammarianshavebeenscrutinizedwithnew care…Ithascometobecommonlyheldthatmanyutterances whichlooklikestatementsareeithernotintendedatall,oronly intendedinpart,torecordorimpartstraightforwardinformation aboutthefacts…Alongtheselinesithasbynowbeenshown piecemeal,oratleastmadetolooklikely,thatmanytraditional philosophicalperplexitieshavearisenthroughamistake-themistake oftakingasstraightforwardstatementsoffactutteranceswhichare either(ininterestingnon-grammaticalways) nonsensicalorelseintendedassomethingquitedifferent.Whateverwe maythinkofanyparticularoneoftheseviewsand suggestions…itcannotbedoubtedthattheyareproducinga revolutioninphilosophy.(Austin1962,pp.1–2) TheOrdinaryLanguagemovement,withitsbroadclaimthatthemeaning ofanexpressionshouldbeequatedwithitsuse,anditsdesireto transcendtraditionalphilosophicalperplexities,didnotachievethe revolutionofwhichAustinspeaks.Nonethelessoneofitsenduring legaciesisthenotionofaspeechact. Onewayofappreciatingthedistinctivefeaturesofspeechactsisin contrastwithotherwell-establishedphenomenawithinthephilosophy oflanguageandlinguistics.Accordinglyinthisentrywewill considertherelationsamongspeechactsand:semanticcontent, grammaticalmood,speaker-meaning,logicallyperfectlanguages, perlocutions, performatives,presuppositions, andimplicature.Thiswillenableusto situatespeechactswithintheirecologicalniche. 2.Content,Force,andHowSayingCanMakeItSo Whereasanactofspeechisanyactof uttering[3] meaningfulwords,‘speechact’isatermof art.Asafirstapproximation,speechactsarethoseactsthatcan(thoughneed not)beperformedbysayingthatoneisdoingso.Onthisconception, resigning,promising,assertingandaskingareallspeechacts,while convincing,insultingandgrowingsixinchesarenot.Onecan,for instance,resignbysaying,“Iresign…”,althoughone canalsoresignfromapositionwithoutdescribingoneselfasdoing so.However,thisconceptionistooinclusive,sinceitalso countswhisperingasaspeechacteventhoughonecanwhisperastring ofnonsensewordswithoutmeaninganything.Insteadamoreaccurate characterizationofspeechactsbuildsonGrice’snotionof speakermeaning.ThisnotionisdiscussedfurtherinSection5below, butfornowitisenoughtonotethatinlookingatmywatch,Imight betryingtotellthetime;orImightbetryingtoindicatetoyou thatit’stimeforustoleave.Thelatter(butnottheformer) isacaseofspeakermeaning. Accordingly,aspeechactisatypeofactthatcanbe performedbyspeakermeaningthatoneisdoingso.Thisconception stillcountsresigning,promising,assertingandaskingasspeech acts,whilerulingoutconvincing,insultingandwhispering.This definitionleavesopenthepossibilityofspeechactsbeingperformed wordlessly,aswellasspeechactsbeingperformedwithoutsayingthat youaredoingso.Ourcharacterizationofspeechactscapturesthis factinemphasizingspeakermeaningratherthantheutteringofany words. Speechactsarethusalsotobedistinguishedfrom performatives.‘Performative’isanothertechnicalterm, andasusedhereitrefersinthefirstinstancetoakindof sentence.Aperformativesentenceisinthefirstperson, presenttense,indicativemood,activevoice,thatdescribesits speakerasperformingaspeechact.‘IassertthatGeorgeisthe culprit,’isaperformativesentencebythistest.Aswehave seen,onecanperformaspeechactwithoututteringa performative.Further,sinceitismerelyatypeofsentence,onecan utteraperformativewithoutperformingaspeechact.Forinstance, whiletalkinginmysleepImightsay,“Iherebypromiseto climbtheEiffelTower,”withouttherebymakinganypromise.We mayalsodefineaperformativeutteranceasanutteranceof aperformativesentencethatisalsoaspeech act.[4] Morenomenclature:‘Speechact’and ‘illocution’willherebeusedsynonymously.Thelatter termisduetoAustin,whoused‘illocutionaryforce’to refertoadimensionofcommunicativeacts.(Itisnowadayscommon alsotouse‘illocute’asaverbmeaning‘toperform aspeechact.’)Austin’sreasonforusing ‘force’beginswiththeobservationthat,construedasa bitofobservablebehavior,thecommunicativesignificanceofanact maybeunderdeterminedbywhathasbeensaidorobservablydone.Ibow deeplybeforeyou.SofaryoumaynotknowwhetherIampaying obeisance,respondingtoindigestion,orlookingforawaywardcontact lens.Sotoo,anutteranceofameaningfulsentence(whichAustin callsalocutionaryact)suchas‘You’llbemore punctualinthefuture,’mayleaveyouwonderingwhetherIam makingapredictionorissuingacommandorevenathreat.The colloquialquestion,“Whatistheforceofthosewords?” isoftenusedtoelicitananswer.Inaskingsuchaquestionwe acknowledgeagraspofthosewords’meaningbutseektoknowhow thatmeaningistobetaken–asathreat,asaprediction,oras acommand. Orsoitseems.InanearlychallengetoAustin,Cohen(1964)argues thatthenotionofillocutionaryforceisotioseprovidedwealready haveinplacethenotionofasentence’smeaning(Austin’slocutionary meaning).Cohencontendsthatforaperformativesentencesuchas ‘Ipromisetoreadthatnovel,’itsmeaningalready guaranteesthatitisapromise.Ontheotherhand,forasentence thatisnotaperformative,suchas‘Iwillreadthat novel,’ifitisunderstoodasbeingusedtomakeapromise,the promiseisstillimplicitinthesentence’smeaning.Ineithercase, Cohenconcludes,meaningalreadyguaranteesforceandsowedonot requireanextra-semanticnotiontodoso. Cohen’sreasoningassumesthatanyutteranceof‘Ipromise toreadthatnovel’isapromise.Butaswehaveseenwiththe caseofthesomniloquist,neitherasentence,noreventheutterance ofasentence,issufficientonitsownfortheperformanceofa speechact,beitapromiseorsomeother.Inasimilarspirittothat ofCohen,Searle(1968,p.407)observesthataseriousandliteral utteranceof‘Ipromisetoreadthatnovel,’madeunder whatheterms“conditionsofsuccessfulutterance”,also countsasapromise.Searleconcludesfromthisthatsomelocutionary actsarealsoillocutionaryacts,andinfersfromthisinturnthat forsomesentences,theirlocutionarymeaningdeterminestheir illocutionaryforce.Thislastinferenceis,however,anon sequitur.Aswehaveseen,theaforementionedsentence’s meaningdoesnotdeterminetheillocutionaryforcewithwhichitis uttered.Rather,whenthatsentenceisutteredinsuchawayasto constituteapromise,whatdeterminesthatforceisthemeaningofthe sentencetogetherwithsuchfactorsasthespeaker’s beingseriousandothercontextualconditionsbeingmet. WemaythusagreewithSearlethatsomelocutionaryactsarealso illocutionaryacts,withoutlosingsightofourearlierobservation thatlocutionarymeaningunderdeterminesillocutionaryforce.This factaboutunderdeterminationisimpliedbyDavidson’sThesisofthe AutonomyofLinguisticMeaning,accordingtowhichonceabitof languagehasacquiredaconventionalmeaning,itcanbeusedforany ofavarietyofextra-linguisticpurposes(Davidson,1979).Green1997 arguesforaqualificationofDavidson’sAutonomyThesistorecognize sentenceshavingthefeaturethatiftheyareusedinaspeechact all,thenthereisatleastoneotherillocutionaryforcethattheir utterancemusthave.Eveninlightofthisqualifiedversionofthe AutonomyThesis,themostthatcanbesaidof,‘Ipromiseto climbtheEiffelTower,’isthatitisdesignedtobeusedto makepromises,justascommonnounsaredesignedtobeusedtorefer tothingsandpredicatesaredesignedtocharacterizethingsreferred to.Below(Section6.3)weshallconsidertheviewthatforceisa componentofmeaning,albeitnotofasentence’s meaning.[5] 2.1TheIndependenceofForceandContent Letusreturn,then,toanelucidationofourdistinctionbetweenwhat aspeakersaysandtheforceofherutterance.Agrammaticalsentence composedofmeaningfulwordsiscommonlythoughttoexpressa “content,”whichisdeterminedbywhatthatsentence literallymeanstogetherwithfeaturesofthecontextof utterance.SupposeIsaytosomeoneinacrowdedsubway,“You’re standingonmyfoot.”Iammostlikelytryingtoconveythe messagethatheshouldmove.However,whatIliterallysayisonly thattheaddresseeinquestionisstandingonmyfoot.Thisisthe contentofmyutterance.Manyifnotmostutterancesofgrammatical sentencescomposedofmeaningfulwordsexpressmorethanthose sentences’contents.Pragmaticians,however,commonlydistinguish contentfromotheraspectsofmeaningconveyedbyanutterance.On thiswayofthinking,twointertranslatablesentencesofdifferent languageswillexpressthesamecontent,andcertaintransformations ofasentencewithinalanguagearecommonlythoughttoexpressthe samecontent.Thus,‘MarysawJohn,’and‘Johnwas seenbyMary,’willexpressthesamecontentevenifaspeaker’s useofoneratherthananotherofthesewillcarryadistinctive suggestion.Forindicativesentences,suchcontentsaretypically calledPropositions.(InwhatfollowsIwillcapitalizethis termtosignifythatitisinparttechnical.)Propositions,then,are thecontentsofindicativesentences,arewhatsuchsentencesexpress, and,further,areoftenthoughttobetheprimarybearersoftruth value. Illocutionaryforceandsemanticcontentareoftentakentobe distinctfromoneanother,notjustinthewaythatyourleftand righthandaredistinct,butratherbyvirtueoffallinginto differentcategories.Stenius1967elucidatesthisdistinction,noting thatinchemicalparlancearadicalisagroupofatoms normallyincapableofindependentexistence,whereasafunctional groupisthegroupingofthoseatomsinacompoundthatis responsibleforcertainofthatcompound’sproperties.Analogously,a Propositionisitselfcommunicativelyinert.Forinstance,merely expressingthePropositionthatitissnowingisnottomakeamovein a“languagegame”.Rather,suchamoveisonlymadeby puttingforthaPropositionwithanillocutionaryforcesuchas assertion,conjecture,command,etc.Thechemicalanalogygains furthersupportfromthefactthatjustasachemistmightisolate radicalsheldincommonamongvariouscompounds,thestudentof languagemayisolateacommonelementheldamong‘Isthedoor shut?’,‘Shutthedoor!’,and‘Thedooris shut’.ThiscommonelementisthePropositionthatthedooris shut,queriedinthefirstsentence,commandedtobemadetrueinthe second,andassertedinthethird.Accordingtothechemicalanalogy, then: Illocutionaryforce:Propositionalcontent::functionalgroup: radical Inlightofthisanalogywemaysee,followingStenius,thatjust asthegroupingofasetofatomsisnotitselfanotheratomorsetof atoms,sotootheforwardingofaPropositionwithaparticular illocutionaryforceisnotitselfafurthercomponentofPropositional content. Encouragedbythechemicalanalogy,acentraltenetinthestudyof speechactsisthatcontentmayremainfixedwhileforce varies.Theforceof anutterancealsounderdeterminesitscontent:Justfromthefactthat aspeakerhasmadeapromise,wecannotdeducewhatshehaspromised todo.Forthesereasons,studentsofspeechactscontendthatagiven communicativeactmaybeanalyzedintotwocomponents:forceand content.Whilesemanticsstudiesthecontentsofcommunicativeacts, pragmaticsstudiestheirforce. Theforce/contentdistinctionalsofindsparallelsinour understandingofmentality.Speechactsarenotonlymovesina “languagegame.”Theyalsooftenpurporttoexpressof statesofmindwithanalogousstructuralproperties.Anassertionthat itissnowingpurportstoexpressthespeaker’sbeliefthatitis snowing.ApromisetoreadMiddlemarchpurportstoexpress thespeaker’sintentiontoreadMiddlemarch.Wefindevidence fortheserelationshipsinthefactthatitisinsomesenseabsurdto say,‘It’ssnowing,butIdon’tbelievethatitis,’and ‘IpromisetoreadMiddlemarch,butIhavenointention ofdoing so.’[6] Further,justaswemaydistinguishbetween anassertingandwhatisasserted(theso-called “ing/edambiguity”forverbssuchas ‘assert’),andapromisingfromwhatis promised,wemayalsodistinguishbetweenastateof believingandwhatisbelieved,andastateoractofintendingand whatisintended.Searle1983delineatesstructuralanalogiesbetween speechactsandthementalstatestheyexpress.Pendlebury1986 succinctlyexplainsthemeritsofthisapproach. Inspiteofthesestructuralanalogies,wemaystillwonderwhyan elucidationofthenotionofforceisimportantforatheoryof communication.ThatAisanimportantcomponentof communication,andthatAunderdeterminesB,donot justifytheconclusionthatBisanimportantcomponentof communication.Contentalsounderdeterminesthedecibellevelatwhich wespeakbutthisfactdoesnotjustifyaddingdecibelleveltoour repertoireofcoreconceptsforpragmaticsorthephilosophyof language.Whyshouldforcebethoughtanymoreworthyofadmissionto thissetofcoreconceptsthandecibellevel?Onereasonforan asymmetryinourtreatmentofforceanddecibellevelisthatthe former,butnotthelatter,seemstobeacomponentofspeaker meaning:Forceisafeaturenotofwhatissaidbutofhowwhat issaidismeant;decibellevel,bycontrast,isafeatureatmostof thewayinwhichsomethingissaid.ThispointisdevelopedinSection 5below. Wehavespokenthusfarasifthecontentsofspeechactsmustbe Propositions,andindeedSearleroutinelyanalyzesspeechactsas havingtheformF(p)(e.g.,1975,p.344),where ‘F’istheforcecomponentand ‘p’thePropositionalcontentcomponent.However, inthelasttwodecadeslinguisticsemanticshasdevelopedformal representationsofcontentsforthetwoothermajorgrammaticalmoods besidestheindicative,namelytheinterrogativeandthe imperative.OnthestrengthoftheanalysesofHamblin(1958),Bell (1975),Pendlebury(1986)andothers,onestrategyforthesemantics ofinterrogativesistoconstruethemasexpressingsetsof propositionsratherthanasingleproposition,whereeachelementof theputativesetisacompleteanswertothequestionatissue.Thus thecontentexpressedby‘Howmanydoorsareshut?’will be{,,…} wheretheellipsiswillbefilledbyasmanyotherPropositionsasit isreasonabletointerpretthequestionerasaskingafter.Callsucha setanInterrogative.AcompleteanswertoanInterrogative isanelementofthesetbywhichitisdefined;apartialanswerisa subsetofthatsetcontainingtwoormoremembers,aswouldnaturally beexpressedbythesentence‘Betweentwoandfourdoorsare shut.’Onthepresentconceptualization,justaswemay distinguishbetweenexpressingandassertingaPropositionalcontent, wemayalsodistinguishbetweenexpressinganInterrogativeandasking aquestion.OnemerelyexpressesanInterrogativeinsuchanutterance as,‘Johnwondershowmanydoorsareshut.’Infact,a singleutterancemayexpresstwoInterrogativeswhileaskingneither, asin‘Howmanydoorsareshutwilldependonhowmanycustomers aretryingonclothes.’Askingaquestionisnolesssubstantial aconversationalmovethanismakinganassertion. Similarly,workbyHamblin(1987),Belnap(1990),Portner(2004)and otherssuggestssemanticanalysesforsentencesintheimperative mood:ononeapproachanimperativeexpressesaproperty,andwhenone speakerissuesanimperativethatheraddresseeaccepts,thatproperty isaddedtoher“todolist”,itselfaparameterofwhat wewilllaterdescribeasconversationalscore(Section7). Inlightoftheaboveliberalizationofthenotionofsentential contenttoaccommodatethecontentsofnon-indicativesentences,we mayrephraseStenius’schemicalanalogyasfollows: Illocutionaryforce:sententialcontent::functionalgroup: radical withtheunderstandingthatdifferenttypesofsententialcontentwill correspondtothedifferentgrammaticalmoods.Thisrefinedanalogy wouldinturnrequiretheretobedifferenttypesof radical.[7] 2.2CanSayingMakeitSo? Insomecaseswecanmakesomethingthecasebysayingthatit is.Alas,IcannotlosetenpoundsbysayingthatIamdoingso,nor canIpersuadeyouofaclaimbysayingthatIamdoingso.Onthe otherhandIcanpromisetomeetyoutomorrowbyutteringthewords, “Ipromisetomeetyoutomorrow,”andifIhavethe authoritytodoso,Icanevenappointyoutoanofficebysaying, “Iherebyappointyou.”(Icanalsoappointyouwithout makingtheforceofmyactexplicit:Imightjustsay,“Youare nowTreasureroftheCorporation.”)Onlyanappropriate authority,speakingattheappropriatetimeandplace,can:christena ship,pronounceacouplemarried,appointsomeonetoanadministrative post,declaretheproceedingsopen,orrescindanoffer.Austin, inHowToDoThingsWithWords,detailstheconditionsthat mustbemetforagivenspeechacttobe performedfelicitously. Failuresoffelicityfallintotwoclasses:misfires andabuses.Theformerarecasesinwhichtheputativespeech actfailstobeperformedatall.IfIutter,beforetheQEII, “IdeclarethisshiptheNoamChomsky,”Ihavenot succeededinnaminganythingbecauseIlacktheauthoritytodo so.MyactthusmisfiresinthatI’veperformedanactofspeechbut nospeechact.Otherattemptsatspeechactsmightmisfirebecause theiraddresseefailstorespondwithanappropriateuptake: Icannotbetyou$100onwhowillwintheelectionunlessyouaccept thatbet.Ifyoudonotacceptthatbet,thenIhavetriedtobetbut havenotsucceededinbetting.AswewillseeinSection9,a systematicunwillingnessonthepartofaspeaker’sinterlocutorsto respondwiththerequisiteuptakemaycompromisethatspeaker’s freedomofspeech. Somespeechactscanbeperformed–thatis,not misfire—whilestillbeinglessthanfelicitous.Ipromiseto meetyouforlunchtomorrow,buthaven’ttheleastintentionofmaking good.HereIhavepromisedallright,buttheactisnotfelicitous becauseitisnotsincere.Myactis,moreprecisely, anabusebecausealthoughitisaspeechact,itfailsto liveuptoastandardappropriateforspeechactsofits kind.Sincerityisaparadigmconditionforthefelicityofspeech acts.Austinforesawaprogramofresearchinwhichthousandsoftypes ofspeechactwouldbestudiedindetail,withfelicityconditions elucidatedforeach.[8] AsobservedbySbisà2007,notonlycanIperformaspeechact byspeakermeaningthatIamdoingso,Icanalso subsequentlyrescindthatact.Icannot,itwouldseem, changethepast,andsonothingIcandoonWednesdaycanchangethe factthatImadeapromiseorassertiononMonday.However,on WednesdayImaybeabletoretractaclaimImadeon Monday.Ican’ttakebackapunchoraburp;themostIcandois apologizeforoneoftheseinfractions,andperhapsmakeamends.By contrast,notonlycanIapologizeormakeamendsforaclaimInow regret;Icanalsowithdrawit.Likewise,youmayallowmeon WednesdaytoretractthepromiseImadetoyouonMonday.Inboth thesecasesofassertionandpromise,Iamnownolongerbeholdento thecommitmentsthatthespeechactsengenderinspiteofthefact thatthepastisfixed.Justasonecan,underappropriateconditions, performaspeechactbyspeakermeaningthatoneisdoingso,sotoo onecan,undertherightconditions,retractthatveryspeechact. 2.3TheoriesofPerformativity Austinfamouslydeniedthatperformativesarestatements(1962, p.6).Thismaybetakeneitherasthedenialthatperformative sentences,eventhoseintheindicativegrammaticalmood,havetruth value;orinsteadasthedenialthatutterancesofperformative sentences,evenwhensuchsentenceshavetruthvalue,are assertions.Onecanconsistentlyholdthatanindicativesentencehas truthvalue,andeventhatitmaybeutteredinsuchawayastosay somethingtrue,whiledenyingthatitsutteranceisan assertion.(Testingamicrophoneinawindowlessroom,Iutter, “It’sraining,”andithappenstoberainingoutside.Here Ihavesaidsomethingtruebuthavemadenoassertion.) Lemmon1962arguesthatperformativeutterancesaretrueontheground thattheyareinstancesofawiderclassofsentenceswhoseutterance guaranteestheirtruth.Ifsound,thisargumentwouldshowthat performativeshavetruthvalue,butnotthattheyareassertions.It alsoleavesunansweredthequestionwhysomeverbphrasessuchas ‘Ipromise’maybeusedperformativelywhileotherscannot besoused.Sinnott-Armstrong1994alsoarguesthatperformativescan havetruthvaluewithoutaddressingthequestionwhethertheyarealso usedtomakeassertions.Reimer1995arguesthatwhileperformatives havetruthvalues,theyarenotalsoassertions.Adoptingasimilar strategy,Jary2007aimstoexplainhowutterancesofsuchsentences as“Iorderyoutocleanthekitchen,”cansucceedin beingorders.InsodoinghedrawsonGreen’s2007analysisof showingtoarguethatsuchutterancesshow(ratherthanmerely describe)theforceofthespeaker’sutterance.Because ‘show’isfactive,ifsuchanutteranceshowsitsforce, thenitmusthavethatforce. MostchallengestoAustin,however,construeperformativesas assertionsandattempttoexplaintheirpropertiesinthat light.Ginet1979arguesthatperformativeverbs (‘promise,’‘appoint’,etc.)namethekindsof actsthatonecanperformbyassertingthatoneisdoingso,and elaboratesonwhythisisso.Inthiswayheoffersanaccountofhow performativesworkthatdependsontheassumptionthatperformative utterancesareassertions.Startingfromthatsameassumption,Bach 1975contendsthat‘Iorderyoutocleanthekitchen’is anassertion,andproceedstoexplainonthisbasishowthespeakeris indirectlyalsoissuinganorder.Thisexplanationdependsonthe speaker’sbeingabletocountontheaddressee’sability todiscernthespeaker’scommunicativeintention.Inlaterwork, suchasBachandHarnish1978,and1992,thisviewisrefinedwitha notionofstandardization,sothatasufficientlycommonpracticeof issuingassertionswithperformativeeffectenablesspeakersand hearerstobypasscomplexinferentialreasoningandjumpbydefaultto aconclusionabouttheillocutionbeingperformed.Reimer1995 challengesBachandHarnishonthegroundthathearersdonotseemto imputeassertoricforcetotheindicativesentencesspeakersutter withperformativeeffect;hercriticismwouldevidentlycarryoverto Ginet’sproposal.InsteadReimercontendsthat performativeutterancesrestonsystemsofwhatsheterms illocutionaryconventionstoachievetheirperformativeeffects. Searle1969,p.62–4,hadarguedthataperformativeformulasuchas “Ipromiseto…”isan“illocutionaryforce indicator”inthesensethatitisadevicewhoseroleisto makeexplicittheforceofthespeaker’sutterance.Makingsomething explicit,however,wouldseemtoinvolvecharacterizinganindependent eventorstateofaffairs,andasaresultSearle’saccount presupposesthatspeakerscanimbuetheirutteranceswiththeforceof demotionsandexcommunications;yetthisiswhatwastobe explained.Realizingthis,SearleandVanderveken(1985)characterize performativesasspeechactshavingtheforceof declarations.Uncontroversialexamplesofthisspeechactare declaringwaroradjourningameeting.Searle1989thenacknowledges thatthisaccountpushesusbacktothequestionhowcertain expressionscometohavethepowertomakedeclarations.Inthatsame workheoffersananswerthatdependsontheviewthatinutteringa sentencewithaperformativeprefix,aspeakermanifestsanintention toperformanactofacertainkind:inutteringthewords,‘I orderyoutoclosethedoor’,Imanifestanintentiontoorder youtoclosethedoor,etc.Searlealsotakesitthatmanifestingan intentiontoperformaspeechactissufficientfortheperformanceof thatact.Onthisbasis,Searlegoesontoattempttoderivethe assertoricnatureofperformatives,holdingthatwhenutteredinsuch awayastosaysomethingtrue,theyarealsoassertions. 3.AspectsofIllocutionaryForce Austindistinguishesillocutionaryactsintofivecategories: verdictives(inwhichaspeakergivesaverdict,e.g.acquittingand diagnosing),exercitives(inwhichspeakersexercisepowers,rightsor influence,e.g.excommunicatingandresigning),commissives(inwhich speakerscommitthemselvestocausesorcoursesofaction, e.g.promisingandbetting),behabitives(concerningattitudesand socialbehavior,e.g.apologizingandtoasting),andexpositives(in whichspeakersclarifyhowtheirutterancesfitintolinesof reasoning,e.g.,postulatinganddefining). Searle(1975)criticizesAustin’staxonomyontwocentral grounds.First,Austin’smethodologyisundulylexicographic, assumingthatwecanlearnabouttherangeandlimitsofillocutionary actsbystudyingillocutionaryverbsinEnglishorothernatural languages.However,Searleobserves,nothingrulesoutthepossibility oftherebeingillocutionaryactsthatarenotnamedbyaverbeither inaparticularlanguagesuchasSwahiliorBengali,orindeedinany languageatall;similarly,twonon-synonymousillocutionaryverbsmay yetnameoneandthesameillocutionaryact. Second,Searlearguesthattheprinciplesofdistinctionamong Austin’scategoriesareunclear.Forinstance,behavitivesseem tobeaheterogeneousgroupwithlittleunifyingprinciple.Similarly, ‘describe’appearsbothasaverdictiveandasan expositivewhereasonewouldexpecttaxonomiccategoriestobe mutuallyexclusive.Moregenerally,Austin’sbriefaccountof eachcategorygivesnodirectionastowhythiswayofdelineating themdoessoalongtheirmostfundamentalfeatures.Searleoffersa newcategorizationofspeechactsbasedonrelativelyclearprinciples ofdistinction.Toappreciatethisitwillhelptoexplainsomeofthe basicconceptsheusesforthispurpose. 3.1DirectionofFit ConsideranexamplederivedfromAnscombe(1963):awomansendsher husbandtothegrocerystorewithalistofthingstoprocure; unbeknownsttohimheisalsobeingtrailedbyadetectiveconcerned tomakealistofwhatthemanbuys.Bythetimethehusbandand detectiveareinthecheckoutline,theirtwolistscontainexactly thesameitems.Thecontentsofthetwolistsdiffer,however,along anotherdimension.Forthecontentsofthehusband’slistguidewhat heputsinhisshoppingcart.Insofar,hislistexhibits world-to-worddirectionoffit:Itis,sotospeak,thejob oftheitemsinhiscarttoconformtowhatisonhislist.By contrast,itisthejobofthedetective’slisttoconformwiththe world,inparticulartowhatisinthehusband’scart.Assuch,the detective’slisthasword-to-worlddirectionoffit:Theonus isonthosewordstoconformtohowthingsare.Speechactssuchas assertionsandpredictionshaveword-to-worlddirectionoffit,while speechactssuchascommandshaveworld-to-worddirectionoffit. Notallspeechactsappeartohavedirectionoffit.Icanthankyou bysaying“Thankyou,”anditiswidelyagreedthat thankingisaspeechact.However,thankingseemstohaveneitherof thedirectionsoffitwehavediscussedthusfar.Similarly,asking whoisatthedoorisaspeechact,butitdoesnotseemtohave eitherofthedirectionsoffitwehavethusfarmentioned.Somewould respondbyconstruingquestionsasaformofimperative(e.g., “Tellmewhoisatthedoor!”),andthenascribingthe directionoffitcharacteristicofimperativestoquestions.This leavesuntouched,however,banalcasessuchasthankingoreven, “HoorayforArsenal!”Someauthors,suchasSearleand Vanderveken1985,describesuchcasesashaving“null” directionoffit.Thatcharacterizationisevidentlydistinctfrom sayingsuchspeechactshavenodirectionoffitat all.[9] Directionoffitisalsonotsofine-grainedastoenableusto distinguishspeechactsmeritingdifferenttreatment.Consider assertingthatthecenteroftheMilkyWayisinhabitedbyablack hole,asopposedtoconjecturingthatthecenteroftheMilkyWayis soinhabited.Thesetwoactsaresubjecttodifferentnorms:The formerpurportstobeamanifestationofknowledge,whilethelatter doesnot.Thisissuggestedbythefactthatitisappropriateto replytotheassertionwith,“Howdoyouknow?” (Williamson1996),whilethatisnotanappropriateresponsetothe conjecture(Green2017).Nevertheless,boththeassertionand conjecturehaveword-to-worlddirectionoffit.Mighttherebeother notionsenablingustomarkdifferencesbetweenspeechactswiththe samedirectionoffit? 3.2ConditionsofSatisfaction Onesuggestionmightcomefromtherelatednotionofconditionsof satisfaction.Thisnotiongeneralizesthatoftruth.Aswesawin 2.3,itisinternaltotheactivityofassertionthatitaimsto capturehowthingsare.Whenanassertiondoesso,notonlyisit true,ithashititstarget;theaimoftheassertionhasbeenmet.A similarpointmaybemadeofimperatives:itisinternaltothe activityofissuinganimperativethattheworldisenjoinedto conformtoit.Theimperativeissatisfiedjustincaseitis fulfilled.Assertionsandimperativesbothhaveconditionsof satisfaction—truthinthefirstplace,andconformityinthe second.Inaddition,itmightbeheldthatquestionshaveanswerhood astheirconditionsofsatisfaction:Aquestionhitsitstargetjust incaseitfindsananswer,ofteninaspeechact,suchasan assertion,thatanswersthequestionposed.Likethenotionof directionoffit,however,thenotionofconditionsofsatisfactionis toocoarse-grainedtoenableustomakesomevaluabledistinctions amongspeechacts.Justtouseourearliercaseagain:anassertion andaconjecturethatPhaveidenticalconditionsof satisfaction,namelythatPbethecase.Maywediscern featuresdistinguishingthesetwospeechacts,inawayenablingusto makefiner-graineddistinctionsamongotherspeechactsaswell?I shallreturntothisquestioninSections6–7. 3.3SevenComponentsofIllocutionaryForce InanattempttosystematizeanddeepenAustin’sapproach,Searleand Vanderveken1985distinguishbetweenthoseillocutionaryforces employedbyspeakerswithinagivenlinguisticcommunity,andtheset ofallpossibleillocutionaryforces.Whileacertainlinguistic communitymaymakenouseofforcessuchasconjecturingor appointing,thesetwoareamongthesetofallpossibleforces.(These authorsappeartoassumethatwhilethesetofpossibleforcesmaybe infinite,ithasadefinitecardinality.)SearleandVandervekengoon todefineillocutionaryforceintermsofsevenfeatures,namely: Illocutionarypoint:Thisisthecharacteristicaimof eachtypeofspeechact.Forinstance,thecharacteristicaimofan assertionistodescribehowthingsare,andperhapsalsotobring aboutbeliefinanaddressee;thecharacteristicaimofapromiseis tocommitoneselftoafuturecourseofaction. Degreeofstrengthoftheillocutionarypoint:Two illocutionscanhavethesamepointbutdifferalongthedimensionof strength.Forinstance,requestingandinsistingthattheaddresseedo somethingbothhavethepointofattemptingtogettheaddresseetodo thatthing;however,thelatterisstrongerthantheformer. Modeofachievement:Thisisthespecialway,ifany,in whichtheillocutionarypointofaspeechactmustbe achieved.Testifyingandassertingbothhavethepointofdescribing howthingsare;however,theformeralsoinvolvesinvokingone’s authorityasawitnesswhilethelatterdoesnot.Totestifyisto assertinone’scapacityasawitness.Commandingand requestingbothaimtogettheaddresseetodosomething;yetonly someoneissuingacommanddoessoinhercapacityasaperson inapositionofauthority. Contentconditions:Someillocutionscanonlybeachieved withanappropriatepropositionalcontent.Forinstance,Icanonly promisewhatisinthefutureandundermycontrol;or,atleast,I cannotpromisetodoanythingthatitisobvioustomyselfandmy promisseethatIcannotdo.Sotoo,Icanonlyapologizeforwhatis insomesenseundermycontrolandalreadythecase.(Inlightofour discussionaboveofsemanticsfornon-indicativecontents,this conditioncouldberecastintermsofimperatival,interrogative,and propositionalcontentconditions.) Preparatoryconditions:Theseareallotherconditions thatmustbemetforthespeechactnottomisfire.Suchconditions oftenconcernthesocialstatusofinterlocutors.Forinstance,a personcannotbequeathanobjectunlessshealreadyownsitorhas powerofattorney;apersoncannotmarryacoupleunlesssheis legallyinvestedwiththeauthoritytodoso. Sincerityconditions:Manyspeechactsinvolvethe expressionofapsychologicalstate.Assertionexpressesbelief; apologyexpressesregret,apromiseexpressesanintention,andso on.Aspeechactissincereonlyifthespeakerisinthe psychologicalstatethatherspeechactexpresses. Degreeofstrengthofthesincerityconditions:Two speechactsmightbethesamealongotherdimensions,butexpress psychologicalstatesthatdifferfromoneanotherinthedimensionof strength.Requestingandimploringbothexpressdesires,andare identicalalongtheothersixdimensionsabove;however,thelatter expressesastrongerdesirethantheformer. SearleandVanderveken(1985)suggest,inlightoftheseseven characteristics,thateachillocutionaryforcemaybedefinedasa septupleofvalues,eachofwhichisa“setting”ofa valuewithinoneofthesevencharacteristics.Itfollows,according tothissuggestion,thattwoillocutionaryforces F1andF2areidenticaljust incasetheycorrespondtothesameseptuple. 3.4DirectandIndirectForce Icannotslowtheexpansionoftheuniverseorconvinceyouofthe truthofaclaimbysayingthatIamdoingso.However,thesetwo casesdifferinthatthelatter,butnottheformer,isa characteristicaimofaspeechact.Onecharacteristicaimof assertionistheproductionofbeliefinanaddressee,whereasthere isnospeechactoneofwhosecharacteristicaimsistheslowingof theuniverse’sexpansion.Atypeofspeechactcanhavea characteristicaimwithouteachspeechactofthattypebeingissued withthataim:Speakerssometimesmakeassertionswithoutaimingto producebeliefinanyone,eventhemselves.Instead,theviewthata speechact-typehasacharacteristicaimisakintotheviewthata biologicaltraithasafunction.Thecharacteristicroleofwingsis toaidinflighteventhoughsomeflightlesscreaturesarewinged. Austincalledthesecharacteristicaimsofspeech actsperlocutions(1962,p.101).Icanbothurgeand persuadeyoutoshutthedoor,yettheformerisanillocutionwhile thelatterisaperlocution.Howcanwetellthedifference?Wecando sobynotingthatundertherightconditions,onecanurgejustby sayingandspeakermeaning,“Iherebyurgeyoutoshutthedoor,”whilethere arenocircumstancesinwhichIcanpersuadeyoujustbysaying, “Iherebypersuadeyoutoshutthedoor.”Acharacteristic aimofurgingis,nevertheless,theproductionofaresolutiontoact (1962,p.107).Cohen(1973)developstheideaofperlocutionsas characteristicaimsofspeechacts. Perlocutionsarecharacteristicaimsofoneormoreillocution,but arenotthemselvesillocutions.Nevertheless,onespeechactcanbe performedbymeansoftheperformanceofanother.Forinstance,my remarkthatyouarestandingonmyfootisnormallytakenas,in addition,ademandthatyoumove;myquestionwhetheryoucanpassthe saltisnormallytakenasarequestthatyoudoso.Theseareexamples ofso-calledindirectspeechacts(Searle1979).Phrasesthat arecommonlyusedinserviceofindirectspeechactsare,‘Would youmindterriblyifI…,’‘MightI suggest…,’and‘Itseemstomethat…’, orsimply‘please’,asin‘Canyoupassthesalt, please?’Observethatthislastsentence,withitsappended tag-question,cannotbeinterpretedasarequestforinformation (abouttheaddressee’ssalt-passingabilities),butcanonlybe understoodasarequest.AsherandLascarides(2001)provideaformal modelofindirectspeechactsonwhichsomeareconventionalizedwhile othersrequireGriceanreasoningfortheirinterpretation. Whileindirectcommunicationisubiquitous,indirectspeechactsare lesscommonthanmightfirstappear.Inaskingwhetheryouintendto quitsmoking,Imightbetakenaswelltobesuggestingthatyou quit.However,whiletheembattledsmokermightjumptothis interpretation,wedowelltoconsiderwhatevidencewouldmandate it.Afterall,whileIprobablywouldnothaveaskedwhetheryou intendedtoquitsmokingunlessIhopedyouwouldquit,Icanevince suchahopewithoutperformingthespeechactofsuggesting.Evincing apsychologicalstate,evenifdoneintentionally,arguablydoesnot constituteaspeechact.Instead,intentionallyevincinga psychologicalstatemaybeunderstoodassimplyexpressingthat state(SeeGreen2020,ch.2). Whether,inadditiontoagivenspeechact,Iamalsoperformingan indirectspeechactwouldseemtodependonmyintentions.Myquestion whetheryoucanpassthesaltisalsoarequestthatyoudosoonlyif Iintendtobesounderstood.Whatismore,thisintentionmustbe feasiblydiscernibleonthepartofone’saudience.Evenif,in remarkingonthefineweather,Iintendaswelltorequestthatyou passthesalt,IwillnothaveissuedarequestunlessIhavemade thatintentionmanifestinsomeway. HowmightIdothis?Onewayisbymakinganinferencetothebest explanation.Perhapsthebestexplanationofmyaskingwhetheryoucan passthesaltisthatImeantoberequestingthatyoudoso,and perhapsthebestexplanationofmyremarkingthatyouarestandingon myfoot,particularlyifIuseastentoriantoneofvoice,isthatI meantobedemandingthatyoudesist.Bycontrast,itisdoubtfulthat thebestexplanationofmyaskingwhetheryouintendtoquitsmoking isthatIintendtosuggestthatyoudoso.Anotherexplanationat leastasplausibleismyhope,orexpressionofhope,thatyoudo so.Bertolet1994developsamoreskepticalpositionthanthat suggestedhere,arguingthatanyallegedcaseofanindirectspeech actcanbeconstruedjustasanindication,bymeansofcontextual clues,ofthespeaker’sintentionalstate—hope,desire,etc.,as thecasemaybe.Postulationofafurtherspeechactbeyondwhathas been(relatively)explicitlyperformedis,hecontends,explanatorily unmotivated.McGowanetal.(2009)replybyofferingthree conditionstheytaketobesufficientforacaseofwhattheyterm linguisticcommunication.Theywouldalsoarguethatin,forinstance, thesmokingcase,thespeakermeetsthosethreeconditions,andthus countsassuggestingthattheaddresseequitsmoking.Bertolet(2017) repliesthatthesethreeconditionsarenotsufficientforaninstance ofspeakermeaning,andgiventhat(aswehaveseen)speakermeaning isanecessaryconditionfor(non-conventional)speechacts,concludes thatMcGowanetal.havenotestablishedthatthecasesthat concernthemareindirectspeechacts. Theseconsiderationssuggestthatindirectspeechacts,iftheydo occuratall,canbeexplainedwithintheframeworkofconversational implicature–thatprocessbywhichwemeanmore(andonsome occasionsless)thanwesay,butinawaynotdueexclusivelytothe conventionalmeaningsofourwords.Conversationalimplicature,too, dependsbothuponcommunicativeintentionsandtheavailabilityof inferencetothebestexplanation(Grice,1989).Infact, Searle’s1979influentialaccountofindirectspeechactsis couchedintermsofconversationalimplicature(althoughhedoesnot usethisphrase).Thestudyofspeechactsisinthisrespect intertwinedwiththestudyofconversations;wereturntothistheme inSection 6.[10] 4.Mood,ForceandConvention Notonlydoescontentunderdetermineforce;contenttogetherwith grammaticalmooddoessoaswell.‘You’llbemorepunctualin thefuture’isintheindicativegrammaticalmood,butaswe haveseen,thatfactdoesnotdetermineitsforce.Thesamemaybe saidofothergrammaticalmoods.AlthoughIoverhearyouutterthe words,‘shutthedoor’,Icannotinferyetthatyouare issuingacommand.Perhapsinsteadyouaresimplydescribingyourown intention,inthecourseofsaying,“Iintendtoshutthe door.”Ifso,you’veusedtheimperativemoodwithoutissuinga command.Sotoowiththeinterrogativemood:Ioverhearyourwords, ‘whoisonthephone.’ThusfarIdon’tknowwhether you’veaskedaquestion,sinceyoumayhavesospokeninthecourseof stating,“Johnwonderswhoisonthephone.”Mighteither orbothofinitialcapitalizationorfinalpunctuationsettlethe issue?Apparentlynot:WhatpuzzlesMeredithisthefollowing question:Whoisonthephone? Moodtogetherwithcontentunderdetermineforce.Ontheotherhandit isaplausiblehypothesisthatgrammaticalmoodisoneofthedevices weuse(togetherwithcontextualclues,intonation,andthelike)to indicatetheforcewithwhichweareexpressingacontent.Understood inthisweakway,itisunexceptionabletoconstruetheinterrogative moodasusedforaskingquestions,theimperativalmoodasusedfor issuingcommands,andsoon.Sounderstood,wemightgoontoaskhow speakersindicatetheforceoftheirspeechactsgiventhat grammaticalmoodandcontentcannotbereliedonalonetodoso. 4.1ForceConventionalism Onewellknownanswerwemaytermforce conventionalism.Accordingtoastrongversionofthisview,for everyspeechactthatisperformed,thereissomeconventionthatwill havebeeninvokedinordertomakethatspeechactoccur.This conventiontranscendsthoseimbuingwordswiththeirliteral meaning.Thus,forceconventionalismimpliesthatinorderforuseof ‘Ipromisetomeetyoutomorrowatnoon,’toconstitutea promise,notonlymustthewordsusedpossesstheirstandard conventionalmeanings,theremustalsoexistaconventiontothe effectthattheuse,undertherightconditions,ofsomesuchwordsas theseconstitutesapromise.Austinseemstohaveheldthis view.Forinstanceinhischaracterizationof“felicity conditions”forspeechacts,Austinholdsthatforeachspeech act Theremustexistanacceptedconventionalprocedurehavingacertain conventionaleffect,thatproceduretoincludetheutteringofcertain wordsbycertainpersonsincertaincircumstances…(1962, p.14). Austin’sstudentSearlefollowshiminthis,writing …utteranceactsstandtopropositionalandillocutionaryacts inthewayinwhich,e.g.,makinganXonaballotpaper standstovoting.(1969,p.24) Searlegoesontoclarifythiscommitmentinaverring, …thesemanticstructureofalanguagemayberegardedasa conventionalrealizationofaseriesofsetsofunderlying constitutiverules,and…speechactsareacts characteristicallyperformedbyutteringsentencesinaccordancewith thesesetsofconstitutiverules.(1969,p.37) Searleespousesaweakerformofforceconventionalismthandoes Austininleavingopenthepossibilitythatsomespeechactscanbe performedwithoutconstitutiverules;Searleconsidersthecaseofa dogrequestingtobeletoutside(1969,p.39).NeverthelessSearle doescontendthatspeechactsarecharacteristicallyperformedby invokingconstitutiverules. 4.2ABiosemanticSpeciesofForceConventionalism Millikan(1998)espousesaparsimoniousconceptionofconventionsthat sheterms‘naturalconventions,’andontheassumption thatnaturalconventionsareatypeofconvention,onewouldexpect thisstrategytomakeiteasiertodefendtheviewthatspeechacts areinherentlyconventional.ForMillikan,anatural conventionisconstitutedbypatternsthatarereproducedby virtueoftheweightof precedent.[11] Apatternisreproducedjustin caseithasaformthatderivesfromapreviousentityhaving,in certainrespects,thesameform,andinsuchawaythathadthe previousformbeendifferentinthoserespects,thecurrentformwould bedifferentinthoserespectsaswell(1998,p.163).Photocopying isoneformofreproductionmeetingthesecriteria;theretinotopic mappingfrompatternsofstimulationontheretinatopatternsof stimulationinthevisualcortexisevidentlyanother.Millikanwould nottreatretinotopicmappingasatypeofconvention,however,since itwouldnotseemtobeperpetuatedbyvirtueoftheweightof precedent.Thepointisdifficulttodiscern,however,sinceinher discussionofthematterMillikandiscussestheconditionsunderwhich apatternistakentobeconventional,ratherthanforitto beconventional,writing Tobethoughtofasconventional,areproducedpatternmustbe perceivedasproliferateddue,inimportantpart,toweightof precedent,nottoitsintrinsicallysuperiorcapacitytoproducea desiredresult,ordue,say,toignoranceofalternatives(ibid, p.166). Millikanthusseemstocharacterizewhatitisforapatternto haveweightofprecedentintermsofthatpattern’sbeingperceivedto havesuchweight.Thisnotionisnotitselfelucidated,andasa resultthenotionofweightofprecedentisleftobscureinher account.Nonetheless,shetellsusthatjustastheconventionsof chessdictatethatwhenone’skingisincheck,onedoeswhatonecan togethimoutofcheck;sotootheconventionsoflanguagedictate thatwhenAtellsBthatp,Brespondsby believingthatp.Millikandescribesthehearer’sresponseasa hidden,inneractthatisnotunderB’svoluntarycontrol.Millikan alsodescribesthisresponseasbeinglearnedinthewaythatwelearn whatshecalls“naturalsignpatterns,”suchasour learningthatthesoundofcrashingwavesisanindicationofanearby coastline. OnMillikan’sview,then,A’sassertionofpbeing followedbyB’sbeliefthatpisaprocessthatisnot intrinsicallysuperiortoothersthatmighthavebeenfollowed.This maybedoubted,however.What,after,allwouldbeviablealternative responses?Disbelievingp?Remainingneutralonthequestion ofp?Scratchingone’sleftearlobe?Anyoftheseresponses wouldtendtounderminetheuseoflanguageasameansfortransmissionof information.Whatismore,ifbeliefformationisnotunderthe voluntarycontrolofaddressees,itisobscurehowthisaspectof communicationcouldbeconventional,anymorethanthepatternof stimulationofourvisualcortexisconventionalwhenthatpattern resultsfromanisomorphicpatternontheretina. 4.3.AnIntentionalistAlternativetoForceConventionalism Force-conventionalismasespousedbyAustinandlaterSearlehasbeen challengedbyStrawson,whowrites, Idonotwanttodenythattheremaybeconventionalposturesor proceduresforentreating:onecan,forexample,kneeldown,raise one’sarms,andsay,“Ientreatyou.”ButIdowantto denythatanactofentreatycanbeperformedonlyasconformingto suchconventions….[T]osupposethatthereisalwaysandnecessarily aconventionconformedtowouldbelikesupposingthattherecouldbe noloveaffairswhichdidnotproceedonlineslaiddownin theRomandelaRoseorthateverydisputebetweenmenmust followthepatternspecifiedinTouchstone’sspeechaboutthe countercheckquarrelsomeandtheliedirect.(1964,p.444) Strawsoncontendsthatratherthanappealingtoaseriesof extra-semanticconventionstoaccountforthepossibilityofspeech acts,weexplainthatpossibilityintermsofourabilitytodiscern oneanother’scommunicativeintentions.Whatmakesanutterance ofasentenceintheindicativemoodapredictionratherthana command,forinstance,isthatitmanifestsanintentiontobeso taken;likewiseforpromisesratherthanpredictions.Thispositionis compatiblewithholdingthatinspecialcaseslinguisticcommunities haveinstitutedconventionsforparticularspeechactssuchas appointingandexcommunicating.Sotoo,asSkinner(1970)observes, understandingtheutterancesofanhistoricalfigurecruciallydepends onsensitivitytoconventionsofthesocietyinwhichtheyare made. Intendingtomakeanassertion,promise,orrequest,however,isnot enoughtoperformoneoftheseacts.Thoseintentionsmustbe efficacious.Thesamepointappliestocasesoftryingtoperforma speechact,evenwhenwhatoneistryingtodoisclearto others.Thisfactemergesfromreflectingonanoft-quotedpassage fromSearle: Humancommunicationhassomeextraordinaryproperties,notsharedby mostotherkindsofhumanbehavior.Oneofthemostextraordinaryis this:IfIamtryingtotellsomeonesomething,then(assumingcertain conditionsaresatisfied)assoonasherecognizesthatIamtryingto tellhimsomethingandexactlywhatitisIamtryingtotellhim,I havesucceededintellingittohim.(1969,p.47.) AsGreen2013observes,thepointmaybedoubted.SupposeIam tryingtoworkupthecouragetoaskSidney’shandin marriage.Sidneyrecognizesthisfactonthebasisofbackground knowledge,myvisibleembarrassment,andmyfumblinginmypocketfor anengagementring.HerewecannotinferthatIhavesucceededin askingSidneyanything.Nothingshortofcomingoutandsayingitwill do.Similarly,itmightbecommonknowledgethatmymoribunduncleis trying,ashebreatheshislast,tobequeathmehisfortune;still,I won’tinheritapennyifheexpiresbeforesayingwhathewastrying to.[12]Closer toSearle’sexample,evenifyouweretofind,onthebasisof fMRIanalysisofmyneuralactivity,thatIwastryingtotellyou thatit’sgoingtoraintomorrow,Istillhavenotasserted anythingabouttomorrow’sweather.(IfIwerecompletely paralyzedasaresultofLocked-InSyndrome,thenmakingsuchaneural effortmightbethemostIcanhopetodo;inthatcase,yourfMRI informationmightbeenoughtojustifyyouintakingmetohave performedaspeechact.) Thegistoftheseexamplesisnottherequirementthatwordsbe utteredineveryspeechact—wehavealreadyobservedthatspeech actscanbeperformedsilently.Rather,theirgististhatspeechacts involveintentionalundertakingofapubliclyaccessiblecommitment; further,thatcommitmentisnotundertakensimplybyvirtueofmy intendingtoundertakeit,evenwhenitiscommonknowledgethatthis iswhatIamtryingtodo.Canwe,however,giveamoreilluminating characterizationoftherelevantintentionsthanmerelysayingthat, forinstance,toassertPonemustintentionallyput forthPasanassertion?Strawson(1964)proposesthatwecan dosowithaidofthenotionofspeakermeaning—towhichwenow turn. 5.Speaker-MeaningandForce Aswehaveseen,thatAisanimportantcomponentof communication,andthatAunderdeterminesB,donot justifytheconclusionthatBisanimportantcomponentof communication.Onereasonforanasymmetryinourtreatmentofforce anddecibellevelisthattheformer,butnotthelatter,seems crucialtohowImeanwhatIsay.Iintendtospeakatacertain volume,andsometimessucceed,butinmostcasesitisnopartofhow ImeanwhatIsaythatIhappentobespeakingatthatvolume.Onthe otherhand,theforceofmyutteranceisanaspectofwhatImean.It isnot,aswehaveseen,anyaspectofwhatIsay—thatnotion beingcloselyassociatedwithcontent.However,whetherImeanwhatI sayasanassertion,aconjecture,apromiseorsomethingelsewillbe crucialtohowImeanwhatIdo. 5.1Grice’sAccountofSpeakerMeaning Inhisinfluential1957article,Grice distinguishedbetweentwousesof‘mean’.Oneuseis exemplifiedbyremarkssuchas‘Thosecloudsmeanrain,’ and‘Thosespotsmeanmeasles.’Thenotionofmeaningin playinsuchcasesGricedubs‘naturalmeaning’.Grice suggeststhatwemaydistinguishthisuseof‘mean’from anotheruseofthewordmorerelevanttocommunication,exemplified insuchutterancesas Insaying“Youmakeabetterdoorthanawindow”,George meantthatyoushouldmove, and Ingesticulatingthatway,Salvatoremeansthatthere’squicksandover there, Griceusedtheterm‘non-naturalmeaning’forthis useof‘mean’,andinmorerecentliteraturethisjargon hasbeenreplacedwiththeterm‘speaker meaning’.[13] Afterdistinguishingbetweennaturaland (whatweshallhereaftercall)speakermeaning,Griceattemptsto characterizethelatter.ItisnotenoughthatIdosomethingthat influencesthebeliefsofanobserver:InputtingonacoatImight leadanobservertoconcludethatIamgoingforawalk.Yetinsucha caseitisnotplausiblethatImeanthatIamgoingforawalkinthe sensegermanetospeakermeaning.Mightperforminganactionwithan intentionofinfluencingsomeone’sbeliefsbesufficientforspeaker meaning?No:ImightsecretlyleaveSmith’shandkerchiefatthecrimesceneto makethepolicethinkthatSmithistheculprit.However,whetheror notIamsuccessfulingettingtheauthoritiestothinkthatSmithis theculprit,inthiscaseitisnotplausiblethatImeanthatSmith istheculprit. Whatismissinginthehandkerchiefexampleistheelementof overtness.Thissuggestsanothercriterion:Performinganactionwith the,oran,intentionofinfluencingsomeone’sbeliefs,while intendingthatthisveryintentionberecognized.Gricecontendsthat evenherewedonothaveenoughforspeakermeaning.Herodpresents SalomewithSt.John’sseveredheadonacharger,intendingthatshe discernthatSt.Johnisdeadandintendingthatthisveryintention ofhisberecognized.GriceobservesthatinsodoingHerodis nottellingSalomeanything,butisinsteaddeliberatelyand openlylettingherknowsomething.GriceconcludesthatHerod’saction isnotacaseofspeakermeaningeither.TheproblemisnotthatHerod isnotusingwords;wehavealreadyconsideredcommunicatorswhomeanthings wordlessly.TheproblemseemstobethattoinferwhatHerodintends herto,Salomedoesnothavetotakehiswordforanything.Shecan seetheseveredheadforherselfifshecanbringherselftolook.By contrast,initscentraluses,tellingrequiresaspeakertointendto conveyinformation(orallegedinformation)inawaythatrelies cruciallyupontakingheratherword.Griceappearstoassumethatat leastforthecaseinwhichwhatismeantisaproposition(rather thanaquestionoranimperative),speakermeaningrequiresatelling inthiscentralsense.Whatismore,thislastexampleisacaseof performinganactionwithanintentionofinfluencingsomeone’s beliefs,evenwhileintendingthatthisveryintentionberecognized; yetitisnotacaseoftelling.Griceinfersthatitisnotacaseof speakermeaningeither. Griceholdsthatforspeakermeaningtooccur,notonlymustone(a) intendtoproduceaneffectonanaudience,and(b)intendthatthis veryintentionberecognizedbythataudience,butalso(c)intendthiseffectontheaudiencetobeproducedatleastin partbytheirrecognitionofthespeaker’sintention.Theintentionto produceabelieforotherattitudebymeans(atleastinpart)of recognitionofthisveryintention,hascometobecalled areflexivecommunicativeintention. 5.2ObjectionstoGrice’sAccount Itmaybedoubtedthatspeakermeaningrequiresreflexivecommunicativeintentions.Afterall,amathematicsteacherwhoprovesatheoremTforherclasslikelywantsherpupilstobelieveTonthestrengthofherproofratherthantheirrecognitionofherintentionthattheycometobelieveT.(Vlach1981)Itmayevenbedoubtedthatspeakermeaningrequiresintentionstoproducecognitiveeffectsonaddresseesatall:Davis(1992)providesarangeofcasessuchasspeakingtopre-linguisticinfants,uncooperativephotocopymachines,andphotosofdeceasedlovedones.[14],[15]Insteadofintentionstoproducepsychologicaleffectsinanaddressee,someauthorshaveadvocatedaconstrualofspeakermeaningasovertlymanifestinganaspectofone’scommitmentsorstateofmind(Green2019).Comparemygoingtotheclosettotakeoutmyovercoat(nota caseofspeakermeaning),withthefollowingcase:Afterheatedly arguingabouttheweather,Imarchtotheclosetwhilebeadilymeeting yourstare,thenstormoutthefrontdoorwhileostentatiouslydonning thecoat.HereitismoreplausiblethatImeanthatitisraining outside,andthereasonseemstobethatIammakingsomeattitudeof mineovert:Iamnotonlyshowingit,Iammakingclearmyintention todojustthat. 5.3ForceasanAspectofSpeakerMeaning Howdoesthisdetourthroughspeakermeaninghelptoelucidatethe notionofforce?OnewayofassertingthatP,itseems,is overtlytomanifestmycommitmenttoP,andindeedcommitment ofaparticularkind:commitmenttodefendPinresponseto challengesoftheform,“Howdoyouknowthat?”Imust alsoovertlymanifestmyliabilitytobeeitherrightorwrongonthe issueofPdependingonwhetherPisthecase.By contrast,IconjecturePbyovertlymanifestingmycommitment toPinthissame“liabilitytoerror”way,butI amnotcommittedtorespondingtochallengesdemandingfull justification.Imust,however,givesomereasonfor believingP;thismuchcannot,however,besaidofa guess. Weperformaspeechact,then,whenweovertlycommitourselvesina certainwaytoacontent—wherethatwayisanaspectofhowwe speaker-meanthatcontent.Onewaytodothatistoinvokea conventionforundertakingcommitment;anotherwayisovertlyto manifestone’sintentiontobesocommitted.Wemayelucidatethe relevantformsofcommitmentbyspellingoutthenormsunderlying them.Wehavealreadyadumbratedsuchanapproachinourdiscussionof thedifferencesamongassertingandconjecturing.Developingthat discussionabitfurther,compare asserting conjecturing guessing Allthreeoftheseactshaveword-to-worlddirectionoffit,andall threehaveconditionsofsatisfactionmandatingthattheyare satisfiedjustincasetheworldisastheircontentsaysit is.Further,onewhoasserts,conjectures,orguessesthatP isrightorwrongontheissueofPdependingon whetherPisinfactso.However,aswemovedownthelistwe findadecreasingorderofstringencyincommitment.Onewho assertsPlaysherselfopentothechallenge,“Howdo youknowthat?”,andsheisobligedtoretractPifshe isunabletorespondtothatchallengeadequately.Bycontrast,this challengeisinappropriateforeitheraconjectureoraguess.Onthe otherhand,wemayjustifiablydemandoftheconjecturerthatshegive somereasonforherconjecture;yetnoteventhismuchmaybesaidof onewhomakesaguess.(The“educatedguess”is intermediatebetweenthesetwocases.) Thisillocutionarydimensionofspeakermeaning characterizesnotwhatismeant,butratherhowitismeant.Justas wemayconsideryourremark,directedtowardme,“You’re tired,”andmyremark,“I’mtired,”ashavingsaid thesamethingbutindifferentways;sotoowemayconsidermy assertionofP,followedbyaretractionandthenfollowedby aconjectureofP,astwoconsecutivecasesinwhichI speaker-meanthatPbutdosoindifferentways.Thisidea willbedevelopedfurtherinSection8undertherubricof “mode”ofillocutionary commitment.[16] Speakermeaning,then,encompassesnotjustcontentbutalsoforce, andwemayelucidatethisinlightofthenormativestructure characteristicofeachspeechact:Whenyouovertlydisplaya commitmentcharacteristicofthatspeechact,youhaveperformedthat speechact.Isthisanecessaryconditionaswell?Thatdependson whetherIcanperformaspeechactwithoutintendingtodoso—a topicforSection9below.Fornow,however,comparetheviewatwhich wehavearrivedwithSearle’sviewthatoneperformsaspeechactwhen othersbecomeawareofone’sintentiontoperformthatact.Whatis missingfromSearle’scharacterizationisthenotionofovertness:The agentinquestionmustnotonlymakeherintentiontoundertakea certaincommitmentmanifest;shemustalsointendthatthatvery intentionbemanifest.Thereismoretoovertnessthanwearingone’s heart(ormind)onone’ssleeve. 6.Force,Norms,andConversation Inelucidatingthisnormativedimensionofforce,wehavesoughtto characterizespeechactsintermsoftheirconversationalroles.That isnottosaythatspeechactscanonlybeperformedinthesettingof aconversation:Icanapproachyou,pointoutthatyourvehicleis blockingmine,andstormoff.HereIhavemadeanassertionbuthave notengagedinaconversation.PerhapsIcanaskmyselfaquestionin theprivacyofmystudyandleaveitatthat–notcontinuinginto aconversationwithmyself.However,aspeechact’s“ecological niche”mayneverthelessbetheconversation.Inthatspirit, whilewemaybeabletoremoveaspeechacttypefromitsenvironment andscrutinizeitinisolatedcaptivity,doingsomayblindustosome ofitsdistinctivefeatures. 6.1SpeechActsandConversations Thisecologicalanalogyshedslightonadisputeoverthequestion whetherspeechactscanprofitablybestudiedinisolationfromthe conversationsinwhichtheyoccur.Anempiricistframework, exemplifiedinJohnStuartMill’sASystem ofLogic,suggestsattemptingtodiscernthemeaningofaword, forinstanceapropername,inisolation.By contrast,GottlobFrege(1884)enjoinsusto understandaword’smeaningintermsofthecontributionitmakesto anentiresentence.Suchamethodisindispensableforaproper treatmentofsuchexpressionsasquantifiers,andrepresentsamajor advanceoverempiricistapproaches.Yetstudentsofspeechactshave espousedgoingevenfurther,insistingthattheunitofsignificance isnotthepropositionbutthespeechact.Vandervekenwrites, Illocutionaryactsareimportantforthepurposeofphilosophical semanticsbecausetheyaretheprimaryunitsofmeaningintheuseand comprehensionofnaturallanguage.(Vanderveken,1990,p.1.) Whynotgoevenfurther,sincespeechactscharacteristicallyoccur inconversations?Istheunitofsignificancereallythedebate,the colloquy,theinterrogation? Studentsofconversationanalysishavecontendedprecisely this,remarkingthatmanyspeechactsfallnaturallyinto pairs.[17]For instance,questionspairnaturallywithassertionswhenthelatter purporttobeanswerstothosequestions.Likewise,offerspair naturallywithacceptancesorrejections,anditiseasytomultiply examples.Searle,whofavorsstudyingspeechactsinisolation,has repliedtotheseconsiderations(Searle1992).Thereheissuesa challengetostudentsofconversationtoprovideanaccountof conversationsparalleltothatofspeechacts,arguingaswellthat theprospectsforsuchanaccountaredim.Oneofhisreasonsisthat unlikespeechactsconversationsdonotassuchhaveapointor purpose.Green1999rejoinsthatmanyconversationsmayindeedbe construedinteleologicalterms.Forinstance,manyconversationsmay beconstruedasaimedatansweringaquestion,evenwhenthatquestion concernssomethingasbanalastheafternoon’sweatherorthe locationofthenearestsubwaystation.AsherandLascardes(2003) developasystematictreatmentofspeechactsintheirconversational settingthatalsorespondstoSearle’schallenge.Additionally, Roberts(2004,2012)developsamodelofconversationalkinematics accordingtowhichconversationsareinvariablyaimedatanswering whatshetermsaquestionunderdiscussion(QUD).Thisview isbestappreciatedwithintheframeworkofthe“scorekeeping model”ofconversation,towhichwenowturn. 6.2SpeechActsandScorekeeping Muchliteratureconcernedwithspeechactsiscuriouslydisconnected fromresearchinthesemanticsofnaturallanguageemphasizing pragmaticfactors.Forinstance,Stalnaker(1972,1973,1974),Lewis (1979,1980),Thomason(1990)andothershavedevelopedmodelsofthe kinematicsofconversationsaimedatunderstandingtheroleof quantification,presupposition(bothsemanticandpragmatic), anaphora,deixis,andvaguenessindiscourse.Suchmodelstypically construeconversationsasinvolvinganever-developingsetof Propositionsthatcanbepresupposedbyinterlocutors.Thissetof Propositionsistheconversationalcommonground,definedas thatsetofPropositionsthatallinterlocutorstaketobetrue,while alsotakingitthatallotherinterlocutorstakethemtobetrue.Ifa Propositionpisinaconversation’scommonground,thenaspeakermay felicitouslypresupposep’struth.Supposethenthatthe PropositionthatSingaporehasauniqueKingisina conversation’scommongroundatgivenpoint;thenaspeakermay felicitouslyutterasentencesuchas‘ThepresentKingof Singaporeiswise,’or‘Singapore’skingis sleeping’.Otherparameterscharacterizingaconversationata givenpointincludethedomainofdiscourse,asetofsalient perceptibleobjects,standardsofprecision,time,worldorsituation, speaker,andaddressee.Thesetofallvaluesfortheseitemsata givenconversationalmomentisoftenreferredtoas “conversationalscore”. “Scorekeeping”approachestolanguageusetypically construeacontributiontoaconversationasaProposition:Ifthat “assertion”isaccepted,thenthescoreisupdatedby havingthePropositionenteredintocommonground.Inthisspirit, MacFarlane(2011)considersanaccountofthespeechactofassertion intermsanutterance’scapacitytoupdateconversationalscore.Such anapproachwill,however,faceadifficultyinexplaininghowtwo speechactswiththesamecontent,suchasanassertionthattheMilky Waycontainsablackhole,andaconjecturethatitdoes,willmake differentconversationalcontributions.Anenrichmentofthe scorekeepingmodelwouldincludesensitivitytodifferencessuchas these. Anotherdevelopmentinthescorekeepingmodelrefinestheteleological pictureadumbratedabovetoincorporateQuestions,construed(along thelinesofSection2.1)assetsofPropositions.Whenan interlocutorproffersanassertionthatisnotmetwithobjectionsby othersintheconversation,thePropositionalcontentofthat illocutionwillenterintocommonground.Whenaninterlocutorposesa questionthatisacceptedbyothers,wemayrepresentthechangeasan additiontoCommonGroundofthesetofpropositionsthatisthe Interrogativecontentofthatillocution.Thepresenceofthat Interrogativeobligesinterlocutorstoworktoruleallbutone PropositionthatisacompleteanswertotheInterrogative.Because Interrogativesstandininferentialrelationstooneanother(Q1 entailsQ2justincaseanyanswertoQ1isananswertoQ2),one strategyforansweringaquestionistodivideitintotractable questionsthatitentails:‘Howmanycoveredbridgesarethere inJapan?’canbeansweredbyansweringthatquestionforeach ofthatcountry’s47prefectures.Roberts(2004,2012)develops theQuestionUnderDiscussionmodelofconversationaldynamics accordingtowhichcommongroundcontainsapartiallyorderedsetof InterrogativesinadditiontoasetofPropositions.Thisteleological approachtoconversationbidsfairtoenrichourunderstandingofthe relationsofspeechactstoothercentraltopicswithinpragmatics suchaspresuppositionand implicature.[18] 7.Force-IndicatorsandtheLogicallyPerfectLanguage Frege’sBegriffsschrift(1879)constituteshistory’sfirst thoroughgoingattempttoformulatearigorousformalsysteminwhich tocarryoutdeductivereasoning.However,Fregedidnotseehis Begriffsschriftasmerelyatoolforassessingthevalidityof arguments.Rather,heappearstohaveseenitasanorganonforthe acquisitionofknowledgefromunquestionablefirstprinciples;in additionhewantedtouseitinordertohelpmakecleartheepistemic foundationsonwhichourknowledgerests.Tothisendhisformal systemcontainsnotonlysymbolsindicatingthecontentof propositions(includinglogicalconstants),butalsosymbols indicatingtheforcewithwhichtheyareputforth.Inparticular, Fregeinsiststhatwhenusinghisformalsystemtoacquirenew knowledgefrompropositionsalreadyknown,weuseanassertionsignto indicateouracknowledgmentofthetruthofthepropositionusedas axiomsorinferredtherefrom.Fregethusemployswhatwouldnowbe calledaforceindicator:anexpressionwhoseuseindicates theforcewithwhichanassociatedpropositionisbeingputforth (Green2002). ReichenbachexpandsuponFrege’sideainhis1947.Inadditionto usinganassertionsign,Reichenbachalsousesindicatorsof interrogativeandimperativalforce.Haresimilarlyintroducesforce indicatorstolaybarethewayinwhichethicalandcognateutterances aremade(Hare1970).Davidson(1979),however,challengesthevalue ofthisentireenterpriseofintroducingforce-indicatingdevicesinto languages,formalorotherwise.Davidson’sreasonisthatsince naturallanguagealreadycontainsmanydevicesforindicatingthe forceofone’sspeechact,theonlyinterestaforceindicatorcould havewouldbeifitcouldguaranteetheforceofone’sspeechact.But nothingcoulddothis:Anydevicepurportingtobe,say,aninfallible indicatorofassertoricforceisliabletobeingusedbyajokeror actortoheightentherealismoftheirperformance.Referringtothe putativeforce-indicatingdeviceasa‘strengthenedmood,’ hewrites, Itisapparentthatmerelyspeakingthesentenceinthestrengthened moodcannotbecountedontoresultinanassertion:everyjoker, storyteller,andactorwillimmediatelytakeadvantageofthe strengthenedmoodtosimulateassertion.Thereisnopoint,then,in thestrengthenedmood;theavailableindicativedoesaswellas languagecandointheserviceofassertion(Davidson1979,p.311). Hare1989repliesthattherecouldbeasocietywithaconventionthatutterance ofacertainexpressionconstitutedperformanceofacertain illocutionaryact,eventhoseutterancesthatoccuronstageoras usedbyjokersorstorytellers.Green1997questionstherelevanceofthisobservationtoasserting,whichaswehaveseen,whichaswehave seen,seemtorequireintentionsfortheirperformance.Justasno conventioncouldmakeitthecasethatIbelievethatP,so toonoconventioncouldmakeitthecasethatIintendtoputfortha certainsentenceasanassertion. Ontheotherhand,Green1997andGreen2000alsoobservethatevenif therecanbenoforceindicatorinthesenseDavidsoncriticizes, nothingpreventsnaturallanguagefromcontainingdevicesthat indicateforceconditionaluponone’sperformingaspeechact:sucha forceindicatorwouldnotshowwhetheroneisperforminga speechact,but,giventhatoneisdoingso,itwould showwhichspeechactoneisperforming.Forinstance, parentheticalexpressionssuchas,‘asisthecase’can occurintheantecedentofconditionals,asin:‘If,asisthe case,theglobeiswarming,thenAntarcticawillmelt.’Useof theparentheticalcannotguaranteethatthesentenceoranypartofit isbeingasserted,butiftheentiresentenceisbeingasserted,then, Greenclaims,useoftheparentheticalguaranteesthatthespeakeris alsocommittedtothecontentoftheantecedent.Ifthisclaimis correct,naturallanguagealreadycontainsforceindicatorsinthis qualifiedsense.Whetheritisworthintroducingsuchforceindicators intoalogicalnotationremainsanopenquestion. SubsequenttoAustin’sintroductionofthenotionofa performative,ithasalsobeensuggestedthatwhatwemightcall performativesententialframesbehavelikeforceindicators:‘I claimthatitissunny,’seemstobeaprolixwayofsayingthat itissunny,wherethe‘Iclaim’seemsonlytoindicate howwhatfollowsistobetaken.OntheapproachofUrmson(1952),for instance,suchasentenceshouldbeunderstoodonthemodelof ‘Itissunny,Iclaim.’Supportforsuchananalysismay befoundinthefactthatapotentialreplytothat utteranceis‘Noitisn’t;it’spouring outside!’,while‘Noyoudon’t’isnot.Again,ifthespeakerdoesnotbelieveitissunnyoutside,shecannotdodge,shecannotdodge theaccusationoflyingbyremarkingthatwhatshehadassertedwas thatsheclaimedthatitissunny,andnotanythingaboutthe weather. Nonetheless,drawingonCohen1964,Lycan2018objectstotheview thatsuchperformativeframesmakenocontributiontosentenceor utterancemeaning.IfMarissafelicitouslyutters,‘Iclaimthat itissunny,’whileAbdulfelicitouslyutters,‘I conjecturethatitissunny,’theviewimpliesthattheir utterancesmeanthesame.Thetwospeakershaveclearlysaiddifferent things,however.Ontheotherhand,ifweholdthattheperformative framedoescontributetothecontentofwhatMarissaandAbdulsaid, then,Lycanpointsout,itwillbedifficulttoexplainhowtheir utterancescommiteitherofthemtoanypositionabouttheweather.It evidentlywon’tdotopositinferencerulessuchas‘Istate thatp,‘ergo,‘p’.Wewill considerasolutiontowhatLycanterms“Cohen’sProblem” afterdevelopinganotionofillocutionaryinferenceinthenext section. 8.DoSpeechActsHaveaLogic? Studentsofspeechactscontend,aswehaveseen,thattheunitof communicativesignificanceistheIllocutionratherthanthe Proposition.Thisattitudepromptsthequestionwhetherlogicitself mightbeenrichedbyincorporatinginferentialrelationsamongspeech actsratherthanjustinferentialrelationsamongPropositions. Justastwoevent-typesE1andE2(suchasrunning quicklyandrunning)couldbelogicallyrelatedtooneanotherinthat itisnotpossibleforonetooccurwithouttheother;sotoospeech acttypesS1andS2couldbe inferentiallyrelatedtooneanotherifitisnotpossibletoperform onewithoutperformingtheother.Awarningthatthebullisaboutto chargeisalsoanassertionthatthebullisabouttochargebutthe converseisnottrue.Thisisinspiteofthefactthatthesetwo speechactshavethesamepropositionalcontent:Thatthebullis abouttocharge.If,therefore,warningimpliesassertingbutnotvice versa,thenthatinferentialrelationisnottobecaughtwithinthe netofinferentialrelationsamongpropositions. IntheirFoundationsofIllocutionaryLogic(1985),Searle andVandervekenattemptageneraltreatmentoflogicalrelationsamong speechacts.Theydescribetheircentralquestionintermsof commitment: Atheoryofillocutionarylogicofthesortwearedescribingis essentiallyatheoryofillocutionarycommitmentasdeterminedby illocutionaryforce.Thesinglemostimportantquestionitmustanswer isthis:Giventhataspeakerinacertaincontextofutterance performsasuccessfulillocutionaryactofacertainform,whatother illocutionsdoestheperformanceofthatactcommithimto?(1985, p.6) Toexplicatetheirnotionofillocutionarycommitment,these authorsinvoketheirdefinitionofillocutionaryforceintermsofthe sevenvaluesmentionedinSection2.3above.Onthebasisofthis definition,theydefinetwonotionspertinenttoentailmentrelations amongspeechacts,namelystrongillocutionarycommitment andweakillocutionarycommitment.Accordingtotheformer definition,anillocutionaryactS1commitsa speakertoanotherillocutionaryactS2iffitis notpossibletoperformS1without performingS2.Whetherthatrelationholdsbetween apairofillocutionaryactsdependsontheparticularseptupleswith whichtheyareidentified.ThussupposethatS1is identicalwith(correspondingtoillocutionarypoint, strength,modeofachievement,propositionalcontent,preparatory condition,sinceritycondition,andstrengthofsinceritycondition, respectively);andsupposethatS2isidentical with.SupposefurtherthatStr1and Str2differonlyinthat1isstrongerthan2.Thenitwill notbepossibletoperformS1without performingS2;whencetheformerstrongly illocutionarilyimpliesthelatter.(Thisdefinitionofstrong illocutionarycommitmentgeneralizesinastraightforwardwaytothe caseinwhichasetofspeechactsS1, …,Sn−1impliesaspeech actSn.) SearleandVandervekenalsodefineanotionofweakillocutionary commitmentsuchthatS1weaklyillocutionarily impliesS2iffeveryperformance ofS1commitsanagenttomeetingtheconditions laiddownintheseptupleidenticaltoS2(1985, p.24).SearleandVandervekeninferthatthisimpliesthat ifPlogicallyentailsQ,andanagent assertsP,thensheiscommittedtobelieving thatQ.Theseauthorsstress,however,thatthisdoesnot meanthattheagentwhoassertsPiscommitted tocultivatingthebeliefQwhenP impliesQ.Inlieuofthatexplication,however,itis unclearjustwhatnotionofcommitmentisatissue.Itisunclear,for instance,whatitcouldmeantobecommittedtobelievingQ (ratherthanjustbeingcommittedtoQ)ifthisisnottobe explicatedasbeingcommittedtocultivatingthebelief thatQ. Otherapproachesattempttocircumventsuchproblemsbyreductively definingthenotionofcommitmentintermsofobligationstoaction andliabilitytoerrorand/orvindication.Performanceofaspeechact orsetofspeechactscancommitanagenttoadistinctcontent,and dosorelativetosomeforce.IfPandQjointly implyR,thenmyassertingbothPandQ commitsmetoR.ThatisnottosaythatIhavealso assertedR:ifassertionwereclosedunderdeductive consequenceIwouldassertinfinitelymanythingsjustbyvirtueof assertingone.Bycontrast,ifIconjecturePandQ, thenIamonceagaincommittedtoRbutnotinthewaythatI wouldhavebeenhadIassertedPandQ.For instance,intheassertioncase,oncemyfurthercommitmenttoRis madeclear,itiswithintherightsofmyaddresseetoaskhowIknow thatRholds;thiswouldnothavebeenanacceptablereplytomy merelyconjecturingPandQ.Developingthistheme, letSbeanarbitraryspeaker, asequenceofforce/contentpairs;then: isillocutionarilyvalidiffifspeakerSis committedtoeachAiundermode Δi,thenSiscommitted toBundermode Δ.[19] Becauseitconcernswhatforce/contentpairscommitanagentto whatothers,illocutionaryvalidityisanessentiallydeonticnotion: Itwillbecashedoutintermseitherofobligationtouseacontent inacertainwayconversationally,orliabilitytoerroror vindicationdependinguponhowtheworldis. Ourdiscussionofthepossibilityofanillocutionarylogicanswers onequestionposedattheendofSection6.3,namelywhetheritis possibletoperformaspeechactwithoutintendingtodoso.This seemslikelygivenSearleandVanderveken’sdefinitionofstrong illocutionarycommitment:Weneedonlyimagineanagentperforming somelargenumberofspeechacts,S1, …,Sn−1,which,unbeknownstto her,jointlyguaranteethatshefulfillsthesevenconditionsdefining anotherspeechactSn.Eveninsuchacaseshe performsSnonlybyvirtueofintentionally performingsomeothersetofspeechactsS1, …,Sn−1;itisdifficulttosee howonecanperformSnwhilehavingnointention ofperformingaspeechactatall. WearealsoinapositiontomakeheadwayonCohen’sProblemas formulatedbyLycan.AsarguedinGreen2000,inanassertionof ‘I(hereby)assertthatp’,aspeakercommits herselftopeventhoughherwordsdonotlogicallyentailthat Proposition;nordotheypresuppose,oreitherconversationallyor conventionallyimplyit.Theydo,however,illocutionarilyentailit: anyonecommittedto‘Iassertthatp’ assertoricallyistherebycommittedtopassertorically.By contrast,onecommittedto‘Iassertthatp’asa suppositionforthesakeofargumentisnottherebycommitted top.Accordingly,suchaphraseas‘Iassertthat’ issemanticallyopaque(makinganon-trivialcontributiontothetruth conditionsofthesentencesinwhichitoccurs)butpragmatically transparentinthesensethataspeakerwhoundertakesassertoric commitmenttoasentenceinwhichithaswidestscopeisalso assertoricallycommittedtoitscomplement.Analogousremarksapplyto ‘Iconjecturethat’andthelike. 9.SpeechActsandSocialIssues Inaparadigmaticillocutionaryevent,aspeakerhasachoiceofwhich ifanyspeechacttoperformandheraddresseewilldohercharitable besttodiscernthatspeaker’sintentionsand,wherenecessary,which conventionsshemaybeinvoking.Pratt(1986)observesthatthis paradigmisnottruetothefactsofmanyareasofcommunicative life,writing Anaccountoflinguisticinteractionbasedontheideaofexchange glossesovertheverybasicfactsthat,toputitcrudely,somepeople gettodomoretalkingthanothers,somearesupposedtodomore listening,andnoteverybody’swordsareworththesame.(1986,p.68) AlthoughPrattintendsthisremarkasacritiqueofspeechact theory,italsosuggestsawayinwhichthistheorymightshedlight onsubtleformsofoppression.WesawinSection2.2thataputative betcanmisfireifitisnotaccepted.Insuchacasethespeaker attemptstobetbutfailsinthateffortduetoalackofaudience uptake.Sotoo,apersonmaynotbeinthecorrectsocialpositionto,say,excommunicateorappoint,andherattemptstoperformsuchillocutionswillmisfire.Moremomentously,apatternofabuses ofspeechactinstitutionsmightdepriveapersonofanabilityto performspeechacts:theinveteratepromise-breakerwill,intime,leadothers inhiscommunitytobeunwillingtoacceptanypromiseshetriesto make.Hecanperformcountlesslocutionaryactsbutwillbeunableto performtheillocutionaryactofpromising,atleastinthis community. Apatternofculpablebehaviorcouldmakeaspeakerunabletoperformonespeechacttype.Couldapatternofculpable behavior–intentionalorinadvertent—onthepartofothers inaspeaker’scommunityachievethesameeffect?Thiscouldhappenifenoughsuchspeakersdecidenever toacceptoneperson’sbets,warnings,orpromises.Beyondsuch hypotheticalcases,ithasbeenarguedthatpatternsofsocial inequalitycanpreventmembersofcertaingroupsfromperformingthespeechactstheywouldchooseto.Buildingonandrefining McKinnon’s(1993)claimthatpornographysilenceswomen,Langton (1993),andHornsbyandLangton(1998)arguethattheindustryand consumptionofpornographydeprivewomenoftheabilitytoperformthe speechactofrefusingsexualadvances.Refusingisaspeechact,but iflargeenoughnumbersofmendenyuptake(withsuchthoughtsas, “By‘no’shereallymeans‘yes’,” etc.)then,theseauthorsargue,women’sattemptstorefusesexual advanceswillbecharacteristicallyinertwithrespecttothespeech actofrefusal.Womenwillstillbeabletoattempttorefusesexual advances,andcanstilltrytopreventthembyphysicalmeans,buta crucialillocutionaryformofprotectionwillbeclosedtothem.So too,apartheid,JimCrow,andevenpatternsofdiscriminationofwhich theperpetratorsarenotconsciouslyaware,candepriveracial, religious,andethnicminoritygroupsoftheabilitytoperform speech-acttypesrequiringuptake.Thesephenomenaaregenerally referredtoasillocutionarysilencing. Bird(2002)deniesthatthespeechactofrefusalrequires uptake.Suchanillocutionis,hecontends,likeinvitingand surrendering,whichcanoccurwhetherornottheirintendedaudiences grasporaccepttheprofferedillocutions.Similarlydenyingthatthe “silencing”argumentshouldbecastintermsofspeech acts,Maitra2009arguesthattheinstitutionofpornographyprevents speaker-meantinstancesofrefusalfrombeingunderstood.Onecan speaker-meanthatsherefuses,forinstance,butpatternsofcognitive andaffectiveresponsewillsystematicallypreventthatrefusalfrom beinggrasped.Broadeningthescopeofinvestigationsofthe interactionofinjusticeandillocutionaryphenomena,McGowan2009 arguesthatsomespeechactscannotonlycausebutalsoconstitute instancesofoppression.Anderson,HaslangerandLangton(2012)provideoverviewsofresearchonracial,gender andrelatedformsofoppressionastheyrelatetospeechacts. Althoughnotinherentlyculpable,thepracticeofdogwhistlinghas alsorecentlygainedtheinterestoftheoristsofspeechacts.As suggestedbythemetaphor,anagentdogwhistlesjustincaseoneor moredimensionsofaspeechactsheperformsisreadilyintelligible onlytoapropersubsetofheraddressees.Saul2018notesthatin contemporaryAmericanpolitics,statingone’soppositiontothe SupremeCourtcaseofDredScottseemstobeawayofsignalingone’s anti-abortionsympathies.Forthosenotintheknow,however,a speaker’soppositiontotheDredScottappearstobean uncontroversialactofrejectingracism.Thephenomenonof dogwhistlingprovidesanapparentchallengetoconceptionsofspeaker meaningintermsofovertness,sincethedogwhistlerwouldseemto speakermeanacontentthatiscryptictoallbutherinsider audience:isherutterancebothovertandcovert?Insteadofadopting suchaview,onewhoconstruesspeechactsintermsofovertnesscould refinethenotionofmanifestnessoccuringinheraccount.Whatis manifesttooneaddresseemaynotbemanifesttoanother,anda speakermayexploitthisfact.Accordingly,someonewhoavows,“I’m againstDredScott,”mayspeaker-meanthatsheisbothagainstDred Scottandpro-lifetoonepartofheraudience,butonlythatsheis againstDredScotttoanotherpart. Bibliography Alston,W.,2000.Illocutionaryactsandsentence meaning,Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress. –––,1994.‘Illocutionaryactsand linguisticmeaning,’inTsohatzidis(ed.),pp.29–49. Anderson,L,S.Haslanger,andR.Langton,2012.‘Language andrace,’inD.FaraandG.Russell(eds.),Routledge CompaniontothePhilosophyofLanguage(London:Routledge), pp.753–767. Anscombe,G.E.M.,1963.Intention,2nd Edition.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress. Armstrong,D.,1971.‘Meaningandcommunication,’ ThePhilosophicalReview,80:427–47. Asher,N.andA.Lascarides,2001.‘IndirectSpeech Acts,’Synthese,128:183–228. –––,2003.Logicsof conversation,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Austin,J.L.,1962.HowtodoThingswithWords, 2ndedition,J.O.Urmsonand M.Sbisá(eds.),Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. –––,1970.PhilosophicalPapers,Edited byJ.Urmson,andG.Warnock.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Avramides,A.,1989.MeaningandMind:AnExaminationofthe GriceanAccountofLanguage,Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Bach,K.,1975.‘Performativesarestatementstoo,’ PhilosophicalStudies,28:229–36. –––,1994.‘Conversational impliciture,’MindandLanguage,9:124–162. –––andR.Harnish,1979.Linguistic CommunicationandSpeechActs,Cambridge:M.I.T.Press. Bell,M.,1975.‘Questioning,’ThePhilosophical Quarterly,25:193–212. Belnap,N.,1990.‘Declarativesarenotenough,’ PhilosophicalStudies,59:1–30. Bennett,J.,1976.LinguisticBehaviour,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Bertolet,R.,1994.‘Arethereindirectspeechacts?’ ininS.Tsohatzidis(ed.)FoundationsofSpeechActTheory: PhilosophicalandLinguisticPerspectives(London:Routledge), pp.335–49. –––,2017.‘Ontheargumentsforindirectspeechats,’Philosophiavol.45,pp.533–40. Bird,A.,2002.‘Illocutionarysilencing,’Pacific PhilosophicalQuarterly,83:1–15. Brandom,R.,1983.‘Asserting,’Noûs 17:637–650. –––,1994.MakingItExplicit, Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Callon,M.,2006.‘Whatdoesitmeantosaythateconomics isperformative?’WorkingPaperSeries,Centrede SociologiedeL’Innovation,EcoledesMinesdeParis. Carston,R.,2003.ThoughtsandUtterances,Oxford: Blackwell. Clark,H.,1996.UsingLanguage,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. Cohen,L.J.,1964.‘Doillocutionaryforcesexist?’ ThePhilosophicalQuarterly,14:118–137. Cohen,P.,J.Morgan,andM.Pollack(eds.),1990.Intentions inCommunication,Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Cohen,T.,1973.‘Illocutionsandperlocutions,’ FoundationsofLanguage,9:492–503. Davidson,D.,1979.‘Moodsandperformances,’ reprintedinDavidson(1984)InquiriesintoTruthand Interpretation,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Davis,W.,1992.‘Speakermeaning,’Linguistics andPhilosophy,15:223–53. –––,2003.Meaning,Expressionand Thought,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Dummett,M.A.E.,1973.Frege:PhilosophyofLanguage. London:Duckworth. –––,1993.‘Mood,forceand convention,’inhisTheSeasofLanguage(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress),pp.202–23. Forguson,L.W.,1973.‘Locutionaryandillocutionary acts,’inG.Warnock(ed.),EssaysonJ.L.Austin, Oxford:ClarendonPress,160–185. Frege,G.,1879.BegriffsschriftinvanHeijenoort(ed.) FromFregetoGödel:ASourcebookinMathematicalLogic. Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1976,pp.1–82. Frege,G.,1884.TheFoundationsofArithmetic, trans.J.L.Austen.Oxford:BasilBlackwell. –––,PosthumousWritingsH.Hermes, F.KambartelandF.Kaulbach(eds.),Oxford:Blackwell,1979. –––,PhilosophicalandMathematical Correspondence,G.Gabriel,etal.(eds.),Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress,1980. –––,‘Thethought:alogical inquiry,’CollectedPapersonMathematicsLogicand Philosophy,editedbyB.McGuinness,trans.byM.Blacket al.,Oxford:Blackwell,1984. Frye,M.,1976.‘Onsaying,’American PhilosophicalQuarterly13:123–127. –––,1973.‘Forceandmeaning,’ JournalofPhilosophy,70:281–94. Geach,P.,1972.‘Assertion,’reprintedinhis LogicMatters,Oxford:Blackwell:pp.254–269. Ginet,C.,1979.‘Performativity,’Linguisticsand Philosophy,3:245–65. Gorman,D.,1999.‘Theuseandabuseofspeech-acttheoryin criticism,’PoeticsToday,20:93–119. Green,M.,1997.‘Ontheautonomyoflinguistic meaning,’Mind,106:217–244. –––,1999.‘Illocutions,implicata,and whataconversationrequires,’Pragmatics& Cognition,7:65–92. –––,2000.‘Illocutionaryforceand semanticcontent,’LinguisticsandPhilosophy,23: 435–473. –––,2002.‘Theinferentialsignificance ofFrege’sassertionsign,’FactaPhilosophica,4: 201–29. –––,2007.Self-Expression,Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress. –––,2017.‘Assertion,’ inOxfordHandbooksOnline,Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.8 –––,2019.‘Assertions,’in M.SbisàandK.Turner(eds.)HandbookofPragmatics, Vol.II:PragmaticsofSpeechActions(deGruyter-Mouton), 387–410. –––,2020,ThePhilosophyof Language,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Green,M.andJ.Williams,2007.‘Editor’s introduction,’inGreenandWilliams(eds.)Moore’s Paradox:NewEssaysonBelief,RationalityandtheFirstPerson (Oxford). Grice,H.P.,1957.‘Meaning,’ThePhilosophical Review66,No.3:377–88. –––,1989.StudiesintheWayofWords. Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Hamblin,C.L.,1987.Imperatives,Oxford:Basil Blackwell. –––,1973.‘QuestionsinMontague english,’FoundationsofLanguage,10: 41–53. –––,1958.‘Questions,’ AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,36:159–68. Hajdin,M.,1991.‘Istheremoretospeechactsthan illocutionaryforceandpropositionalcontent?’ Noûs,25:353–7. Hare,R.,1970.‘MeaningandSpeechActs,’The PhilosophicalReview,79:3–24. –––,1989.‘SomeSubatomicParticlesof Logic,’Mind,98:23–37. Harrah,D.,1980.‘Onspeechactsandtheirlogic,’ PacificPhilosophicalQuarterly,61:204–11. –––,1994.‘Onthevectoringofspeech acts,’inS.Tsohatzidis(ed.)FoundationsofSpeechAct Theory:PhilosophicalandLinguisticPerspectives(London: Routledge),pp.374–392. Holdcroft,D.,1994.‘Indirectspeechactsandpropositional content,’inS.Tsohatzidis(ed.)FoundationsofSpeechAct Theory:PhilosophicalandLinguisticPerspectives(London: Routledge),pp.350–64. Hornsby,J.andR.Langton,1998.‘Freespeechand illocution,’LegalTheory,4:21–37. Humberstone,L.,1992.‘Directionoffit,’ Mind,101:59–83. Katz,J.,1977.PropositionalStructureandIllocutionary Force,NewYork:Crowell. Kearns,J.,1997.‘Propositionallogicofsuppositionand assertion,’NotreDameJournalofFormalLogic,38: 325–349. –––,1999.‘Anillocutionarylogical explanationofthesurpriseexecution,’Historyand PhilosophyofLogic,20:195–214. –––,2006.‘Conditionalassertion,denial, andsuppositionasillocutionaryacts,’Linguisticsand Philosophy,29:455–85. König,E.andP.Seimund,2007.‘Speechact distinctionsingrammar,’inT.Shopen(ed.)Language TypologyandSemanticDescription,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,pp.276–324. Lakoff,G.,1972.‘Linguisticsandnaturallogic,’in DavidsonandHarman(eds.),SemanticsofNaturalLanguage, Dordrecht:Reidel. Langton,R.,1993.‘Speechactsandunspeakableacts,’ PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,22:293–330. Lewis,D.,1979.‘ScorekeepinginaLanguageGame,’ JournalofPhilosophicalLogic,8:339–59;reprintedin Lewis1983. –––,1980.‘Index,context,and content,’inStigKangerandSvenOhman(eds.),Philosophy andGrammar,Dordrecht:Reidel;reprintedinDavidLewis,1998, PapersinPhilosophicalLogic,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. –––,1983.PhilosophicalPapers(Volume I),Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Lycan,W.,2018.PhilosophyofLanguage:AContemporary Introduction,3rdedition,London:Routledge. Maitra,I.2009.‘Silencingspeech,’,Canadian JournalofPhilosophy,vol.39,pp.309–38. McDowell,J.,1980.‘Meaning,communication,and knowledge,’reprintedinMeaning,Knowledgeand Reality,Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. MacFarlane,J.,2011.‘Whatisassertion?’inBrown andCappelen(eds.)Assertion:NewPhilosophicalEssays, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.79–96. McKinnon,S.,1993.OnlyWords,Cambridge,MA:Harvard UniversityPress). McGowan,M.,Tam,S.,andHall,M.2009.‘Onindirectspeech andlinguisticcommunication:aresponsetoBertolet,’ Philosophyvol.84,pp.495–513. Miller,J.H.,2007.‘Performativityas Performance/Performativityasspeechact:Derrida’sspecialtheoryof performativity,’SouthAtlanticQuarterly,106: 219–35. Millikan,R.,1998.‘Languageconventionsmade simple,’JournalofPhilosophy,95:161–80. Mulligan,K.(ed.),1987.SpeechActandSachverhalt:Reinach andtheFoundationsofRealistPhenomenology,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhof. Parret,H.andJ.Verschueren(eds.),1991.(On)Searleon Conversation,Amsterdam:J.Benjamins. Pendlebury,M.,1986.‘Againstthepowerofforce: reflectionsonthemeaningofmood,’Mind,95: 361–372. Portner,P.,2004.‘Thesemanticsofimperativeswithina theoryofclausetypes,’inR.Young(ed.)SALTXIV: 232–52. Pratt,M.L.,1986.‘Ideologyandspeech-acttheory,’ PoeticsToday,7:59–72. Recanati,F.,1987.MeaningandForce:ThePragmaticsof PerformativeUtterances,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Reichenbach,H.,1947.ElementsofSymbolicLogic,New York:Macmillan. Reinach,A.,1913.‘DieapriorischenGrundlagendes bürgerlichenRechts,’JahrbuchfurPhilosophieund phänomenologischeForschung,2:685–847. Roberts,C.,2012.‘Informationstructureindiscourse: towardsanintegratedformaltheoryofpragmatics,’ SemanticsandPragmatics,5:1–69. –––,2004.‘Contextindynamic interpretation,’inHornandWard(eds.)TheHandbookof Pragmatics,London:Routledge:197–220. Sadock,J.,1974.TowardaTheoryofLinguisticSpeech Acts,NewYork:AcademicPress. Saul,J,2018.‘Dogwhistles,politicalmanipulation,andthephilosophyoflanguage,’inD.Fogal,D.Harris,andM.Moss(eds.) NewWorkonSpeechActs,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.360–83. Sbisà,M.,2007.‘HowtoreadAustin,’ Pragmatics,17:461–73. –––,1995.‘Speechacttheory,’in J.Verschueren,J.Östman,andJ.Blommaert(eds.)Handbook ofPragmatics,NewYork:JohnBenjamins,495–506. Schiffer,S.,1972.Meaning,Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press. Schuhmann,K.andSmith,B.,1990.‘Elementsofspeechact theoryinthephilosophyofThomasReid,’Historyof PhilosophyQuarterly,7:47–66. Searle,J.,1968.‘Austinonlocutionaryandillocutionary acts,’ThePhilosophicalReview,77: 405–424. –––,1969.Speechacts:anessayinthe philosophyoflanguage.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. –––,1975.‘Ataxonomyofillocutionary acts,’inK.Gunderson(ed.),Language,Mindand Knowledge,Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress, 344–369. –––,1979.‘Indirectspeechacts,’ inhisExpressionandMeaning:StudiesintheTheoryofSpeech Acts,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,1983.Intentionality:AnEssayinthe PhilosophyofMind,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. –––,1986a.‘Meaning,communication,and representation,’inR.GrandyandR.Warner(eds.), PhilosophicalGroundsofRationality:Intentions,Categories, Ends,Oxford:ClarendonPress,209–226. –––,1986b.‘Notesonconversation,’ inD.G.EllisandW.A.Donohue(eds.),ContemporaryIssuesin LanguageandDiscourseProcesses,Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaum Associates7–19. –––,1989.‘Howperformativeswork,’ LinguisticsandPhilosophy,12:535–558. –––,1992.‘Conversation,’in H.ParrettandJ.Verschueren(eds.),(On)Searleon Conversation,NewYork:Benjamins,7–30. –––,1999.Mind,Language,andSociety: DoingPhilosophyintheRealWorld,London:Weidenfeldand Nicolson. –––,andD.Vanderveken,1985.Foundations ofIllocutionaryLogic,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Shoham,Y.,1993.‘Agent-OrientedProgramming,’ ArtificialIntelligence,60:51–92. Skinner,Q.,1970.‘Conventionsandtheunderstandingof speechacts,’ThePhilosophicalQuarterly,20: 118–38. Smith,B.,1990.‘Towardahistoryofspeechact theory,’inA.Burkhardt(ed.),SpeechActs,Meaningand Intentions:CriticalApproachestothePhilosophyofJohnSearle, Berlin:WalterdeGruyter,29–61. –––(ed.),2003.JohnSearle, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Stalnaker,R.,1972.‘Pragmatics,’inD.Davidsonand G.Harman(eds.),SemanticsofNaturalLanguage,Dordrecht: D.Reidel,380–397. –––,1973.‘Presuppositions,’ JournalofPhilosophicalLogic,2:447–457. –––,1974.‘Pragmatic presuppositions,’inM.MunitzandP.Unger(eds.), SemanticsandPhilosophy,NewYork:NYUPress, 197–213. –––,1984.Inquiry,Cambridge,MA:MIT Press. Stenius,E.,1967.‘Moodandlanguage-game,’ Synthese,17:254–274. Strawson,P.,1950.‘Onreferring,’Mind, 59:320–44. –––,1964.‘Intentionandconventionin speechacts,’ThePhilosophicalReview,73: 439–60,reprintedinStrawson,Logico-Linguistic Papers,London:Methuen,1971. –––,1970.‘Meaningandtruth,’ reprintedinStrawson,Logico-LinguisticPapers,London: Methuen. –––,1973.‘Austinand“locutionary meaning”,’inG.Warnock(ed.),Essayson J.L.Austin,Oxford:ClarendonPress,46–68. Thomason,R.,1990.‘Accommodation,meaningandimplicature: interdisciplinaryfoundationsforpragmatics,’inCohen,Morgan andPollock(eds.),IntentionsinCommunication,Cambridge, MA:MITPress,pp.325–364. Tsohatzidis,S.L.(ed.),1994.FoundationsofSpeechAct Theory:PhilosophicalandLinguisticPerspectives,London: Routledge. Urmson,J.O.,1952.‘Parentheticalverbs,’ Mind,61(244):480–496. Vanderveken,D.,1990.MeaningandSpeechActs,VolsIand II,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Vendler,Z.,1972.ResCogitans,Ithaca:Cornell. Vlach,F.,1981.‘Speakermeaning,’LinguisticsandPhilosophy,vol.4,pp.359–91. Watson,G.,2004.‘Assertingandpromising,’ PhilosophicalStudies,117:57–77. Williamson,T.,1996.‘Knowingandasserting,’The PhilosophicalReview,105:489–523. FurtherReading Dummett,M.,1996.OriginsofAnalyticPhilosophy, Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Furberg,M.,1971.SayingandMeaning:AMainThemeinJ.L. Austin’sPhilosophy,Oxford:Blackwell. Grewendorf,G.andG.Meggle(eds.),2002.SpeechActs,Mind andSocialReality,Dordrecht:Kluwer. Holdcroft,D.,1978.WordsandDeeds:ProblemsintheTheoryof SpeechActs,Oxford:ClarendonPress. Lepore,E.andvanGulick,R.(eds.),1991.JohnSearleandhis Critics,Oxford:Blackwell. Tsohatzidis,S.(ed.),2007.JohnSearle’sPhilosophyof Language:Force,MeaningandMind,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. Warnock,G.(ed.),1973.EssaysonJ.L.Austin,Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress. –––,1989.J.L.Austin,NewYork: Routledge. AcademicTools Howtocitethisentry. PreviewthePDFversionofthisentryatthe FriendsoftheSEPSociety. Lookuptopicsandthinkersrelatedtothisentry attheInternetPhilosophyOntologyProject(InPhO). Enhancedbibliographyforthisentry atPhilPapers,withlinkstoitsdatabase. OtherInternetResources WorkingPapersinLinguistics, UniversityCollegeLondon. QuestionUnderDiscussion, collectingresearchgermanetothisapproachtoconversational kinematics. . ‘Towardahistoryofspeechacttheory,’ apaperbyBarrySmith(SUNY/Buffalo). ‘J.L.Austin,’ anannotatedbibliographybyGuyLongworth,Oxford BibliographiesOnline. ‘Pragmatics,’ anannotatedbibliographybyMitchellS.Green,Oxford BibliographiesOnline. RelatedEntries anaphora| assertion| Frege,Gottlob| Grice,Paul| implicature| meaning,theoriesof| pragmatics| presupposition| propositionalattitudereports| propositions| vagueness Copyright©2020by MitchellGreen OpenaccesstotheSEPismadepossiblebyaworld-widefundinginitiative. TheEncyclopediaNowNeedsYourSupport PleaseReadHowYouCanHelpKeeptheEncyclopediaFree Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries MirrorSites Viewthissitefromanotherserver: USA(MainSite) Philosophy,StanfordUniversity Infoaboutmirrorsites TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyiscopyright©2021byTheMetaphysicsResearchLab,DepartmentofPhilosophy,StanfordUniversity LibraryofCongressCatalogData:ISSN1095-5054

請為這篇文章評分？

延伸文章資訊