But CAN the United States defend Taiwan? - Brookings

Modeling suggests that the outcome of a conflict over Taiwan is ... A Taiwanese military corvette sails as a Navy soldier stands guard on a ... Skiptomaincontent FacebookTwitterLinkedInPrintSMSEmailMoreReddit PresidentJoeBidenhasyetagainstatedthatifChinaattackedTaiwantoreunifywhatBeijingseesasarenegadeprovincewiththemainland,theUnitedStateswouldcometoTaiwan’smilitarydefense.WhiteHousestaffhasagainfolloweduptheseoff-the-cuffpresidentialcommentswitha“clarification”thatinfact,strategicambiguityremainsAmericanpolicy. Somewhatoxymoronically,theUnitedStatesseekstobecrystalclearaboutbeingintentionallyunclearaboutwhatwewoulddo(evocativeofBritishpolicyjustbeforeWorldWarIonwhetherLondonwouldcometoParis’said,shouldFrancebeattacked). ThegoalistoavoidemboldeningTaiwantoprovokeChinaevenaswetrytodeterChinaintheeventitdoesfeelprovoked. Quitethebalancingact. MichaelE.O’Hanlon DirectorofResearch-ForeignPolicy Co-Director-CenterforSecurity,Strategy,andTechnology,AfricaSecurityInitiative SeniorFellow-ForeignPolicy,CenterforSecurity,Strategy,andTechnology TheSydneyStein,Jr.Chair Twitter MichaelEOHanlon Buthere’stherealrub:SayingweWOULDdefendTaiwanmilitarilydoesnotmeanweCOULDdososuccessfully.Thesedoctrinaldebatesoverstrategicambiguityversusstrategicclarityseemstrangelydisconnectedfrommilitaryreality. America’spolicyofstrategicambiguitywasbornduringtheColdWar,whenitwasasimplefactthattheUnitedStatesenjoyedoverwhelmingmilitarydominanceagainstChinainthewatersandairwaysofthewesternPacific. EventhoughTaiwanwas100milesfromChinaandthousandsofmilesfromtheUnitedStates,U.S.dominanceinadvancedairandnavalweaponrymeantthatwealmostsurelycouldhavecometoTaiwan’sdefenseandprevailed.GivenChina’sdramaticmilitarymodernizationsofrecenttimes,thesituationisnowmuchmorecomplex. RecentanalysisthatIhavedoneatBrookingsindicatesthatespeciallyforcertaintypesofblockadescenariosbywhichChinamightseektosqueezeTaiwanintosubmission,theUnitedStatesanditsalliesmightstillwinawarinwhichtheysoughttobreaktheblockade.Butwealsomightloseit. Ingeneralterms,apossiblenavalblockadeofTaiwanoffersadvantagestoChina. Forthisscenario,unlikethatofanattemptedinvasion,trendsintechnologyfavorratherthanhurtChina,sinceitwouldbetheactorthreateninglargemilitaryobjectslikeshipsandairfieldsandports. TominimizeChina’sownvulnerabilities,People’sLiberationArmyNavyattacksubmarinesmightbetheprincipalassetsemployed,ratherthansurfaceshipsoraircraft. Cyberattackswouldlikelysupportthephysicaloperation.Beijingmightescalatetotheuseofland-basedmissilesandaircraftlaterinabattle,dependingoninitialresults.Andalloftheseoperations,andtheeffectivenessoftheircounters,wouldsurelyfluctuateovertime.Theopposingsideswouldseekthebestplacestooperate(givensonarconditionsandotherconsiderations)andwouldvarytheintensityoftheireffortsasafunctionoftheireffectiveness,andoftheinterplaybetweenmilitaryoperationsandbroaderpoliticaldynamicsinBeijing,Taipei,Washington,Tokyo,andbeyond. RelatedBooks TheArtofWarinanAgeofPeace:U.S.GrandStrategyandResoluteRestraint ByMichaelE.O’Hanlon 2021 TheSenkakuParadox ByMichaelE.O’Hanlon 2019 GlobalChina EditedbyTarunChhabra,RushDoshi,RyanHass,andEmilieKimball 2021 MymodelingstronglysuggeststhattheoutcomeofsuchaconflictoverTaiwanis inherently unknowable. Thatistrue,Ibelieve,evenifthebattleisassumedtoremainwithinreasonablyspecificboundariesofpossibleescalation. Icannotprovemyconclusionbeyondanyreasonabledoubtwithsimplemodelsthatdependonunclassifiedandpotentiallydatedinputdatatogeneratetheirresults.Butitisdoubtfulthatplannersoneithersidewithaccesstomorecomplexmodelsandmorecurrentdatacandomuchbetter.Therearesimplytoomanymajortechnicaluncertainties—abouttheperformanceofcommandandcontrolsystems,underseawarfare,andpossiblymissiledefenses,inadditiontoquestionsaboutresilienceandreparabilityofthein-theaterportsandrunwaysuponwhichU.S.operationswoulddepend—topermitreliableprognostication. Thepossibilityofescalationtowiderorevennuclearwarofcoursereinforcesthesespecificuncertaintiesaboutamoreconcretescenariocenteredonablockade. Thebestthatmodelingcandotohandlethesevariablesistocreatereasonableboundarieswithinwhichactualscenariosmightgeneratetheiractualresults. Solongasthoseboundariesaredifficulttodismiss,andincludecasesinwhichbothsideswin,anyoneenteringawarconfidentofknowingthewinnerinadvancehasahighanalyticalthresholdtoestablish.Thus,althoughitispossiblethatplannersononesideortheother(orboth)coulddevelopplausibletheories,andconcepts,ofvictory—perhapsakininsomewaystoGermany’swarplansagainstFranceandBritainof1914and1940—defeatmustbeconsideredanequallyplausibleoutcome. Thisconclusionshouldbesoberingforanyleaderwhomightconsiderriskingsuchaconflictintheyearstocome. Theimplicationsofaresponsibleapproachtomodelingandanalyzingwarfightingscenariosareimportantnotonlybecausetheyshouldaffectleaders’assessmentsoftheriskofwar,butalsoforpurposesofU.S.andpartnerforceplanning. Modelresultsmightforexamplesuggestcertainmodificationstoormodernizationsofkeyassetstoreducevulnerabilities,especiallyincommandandcontrol,butalsoinsupplyandmaintenance,inordnancesustainability,andintheadequacyofanti-submarinewarfareassetsincludingplanes,ships,andsubmarineswithintheU.S.militaryforcestructure.Butevenmore,theimplicationsshouldaffecthowallpartiesthinkaboutcrisismanagementandanyuseofforce. Chinashouldnotseesuchlimited-forcescenariosassomehowsafeorcontrollable;theUnitedStatesshouldnotnecessarilyrespondtoaChineseblockadewithapromptcounterblockadeoperation,ifitcandevisealternativeapproaches. TheUnitedStatesshouldrespondtoanyChineseattack,yes—inthatsense,thereshouldnotbestrategicambiguity—butratherthanpromisetorespondmilitarily,weshouldseektodevelopawiderrangeofresponseoptionsthatincludetheuseofeconomic,diplomatic,andothertools.ThisapproachhasthebenefitofbeingconsistentwiththeDefenseDepartment’sconceptof“integrateddeterrence,”andofnotpromisingthatwewouldeffectivelydefendTaiwanwheninfactitmaybebeyondourpowertodoso. RelatedContent Taiwan Taiwanandthedangerousillogicofdeterrencebydenial MelanieW.Sisson May2022 OrderfromChaos LearningtherightlessonsfromUkraineforTaiwan RyanHass Tuesday,February22,2022 OrderfromChaos HowshouldTaiwan,Japan,andtheUnitedStatescooperatebetterondefenseofTaiwan? YoichiKato Wednesday,October27,2021 OrderfromChaos Ahow-toguideformanagingtheendofthepost-ColdWarera.ReadalltheOrderfromChaoscontent » RelatedTopics Asia&thePacific China Defense&Security InternationalAffairs Taiwan U.S.Defense U.S.ForeignPolicy More OrderfromChaos Turkey’sthreattoderailSwedishandFinnishNATOaccessionreraisestheKurdishquestion RanjAlaaldin Friday,June3,2022 Mexico HowMexico’sCartelJaliscoNuevaGeneraciónrules VandaFelbab-Brown Sunday,May29,2022 DrugTrafficking&Counter-NarcoticsPolicy Thebattleagainstcaptagon VandaFelbab-Brown Friday,May27,2022 Trending Education Topics Climate AI Cities&Regions GlobalDev IntlAffairs U.S.Economy U.S.Politics&Govt More AboutUs PressRoom Experts Events BrookingsPress WashU@Brookings Careers Newsletters SupportBrookings Cart 0 GetdailyupdatesfromBrookings EnterEmail Close SendtoEmailAddress YourName YourEmailAddress Cancel Postwasnotsent-checkyouremailaddresses! Emailcheckfailed,pleasetryagain Sorry,yourblogcannotsharepostsbyemail.