Taiwan's democracy and the China challenge

Taiwan has gotten high marks when it comes to holding clean elections and protecting political rights. The public strongly supports democracy in ... Skiptomaincontent FacebookTwitterLinkedInPrintSMSEmailMoreReddit ExecutiveSummary Taiwanhasgottenhighmarkswhenitcomestoholdingcleanelectionsandprotectingpoliticalrights.Thepublicstronglysupportsdemocracyinprincipleandbyandlargeapprovestheisland’ssysteminpractice.Whenitcomestoperformance,however,thepoliticalsystemdoesnotdosowell.Thisispartlybecauseofasetofstructuralfactors.Selectingthepresidentandlegislatureonamajoritarianbasisfostersadegreeofpolarizationandcomplicatesthecraftingofpolicycompromises.Periodically,socialandpoliticalforcesseektocircumventtheinstitutionsofrepresentativegovernment(viamassprotests,forexample).Theycanblockwhattheyopposebutareunabletosolvetheproblemsthatprovokedtheiractioninthefirstplace.Anotherreasonisthattheissuestobeaddressedarenoteasy.Taiwan’seconomyismaturing;youngpeoplelackemploymentopportunities;thepopulationisaging;andthebirthrateisverylow.ThemostchallengingissueisChinaanditsambitionsregardingTaiwan.So,thestakesforTaiwan’sdemocracyarehigh.Afailuretoperformwellwouldbeatragedy. RichardC.Bush NonresidentSeniorFellow-ForeignPolicy,CenterforEastAsiaPolicyStudies,JohnL.ThorntonChinaCenter Introduction Generally,Taiwangetshighmarksforitsdemocracy.Itwasaposterchildfortheglobal“thirdwave”ofdemocratizationthatoccurredinthe1980sand1990s.Itstransitionfromauthoritarianruletoarepresentative,electoralsystemwasgradualandpeaceful.1Today,U.S.governmentofficialsregularlypraisetheisland’spoliticalprogress.TheStateDepartment’sannualreportofhumanrightspracticessaysthatcivilandpoliticalrightsandtheruleoflawarewellprotected. Thesepositiveratingsdohaveabasis.Electionsarefree,fair,andhighlycompetitive.Inpresidentialraces,turnoutusuallyexceeds70%.Therehavebeenthreepresidentialtransfersofpower,anindicatorofdemocraticconsolidation.Thepartysystemisinstitutionalized,withtwolarge,distinctiveparties—theKuomintang(KMT)andtheDemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP).2Eachissupportedbysmallpartiesandgroupings,producingtwopoliticalcamps.TheKMTleadstheBluecampandtheDPPtheGreencamp(namedforthecolorsoftheirpartyflags).Civilsocietyorganizationshaveproliferatedandpursuetheirobjectivesseriously.Pollingorganizationsfacilitateapermanentplebisciteonleadersandgovernmentpolicies. Publicviewsconcerningthepoliticalsystem Despiteallthesefavorableattributes,theisland’spublichasdecidedlymixedviewsabouttheirdemocraticsystem.IntheWorldValuesSurveyin2012,40to60%ofTaiwanexpressedconfidenceinthecentralgovernment,civilservice,armedforces,andthecourts,butratedthepressat28.4%,theLegislativeYuan(LY,theparliament)at27.6%,andpoliticalpartiesat22.4%.3 TheAsianBarometerSurveyhasconductedseveralsurveysofpublicattitudesthatprobethedegreeofsatisfactionaboutTaiwan’sdemocracyinvariousways.Thefollowingisthesetofresponsesinthe2014“wave,”thelastonetobedone,indeclininglevelsofpositivity: 88%supportedtheideathatdemocracyisstillthebestformofgovernment,whateveritsproblems. 84%thoughtthat“democracyissuitableforourcountry.” 76%believedthatdemocracyiscapableofsolvingproblemsinsociety. 68%thoughtthatTaiwanwasademocracy,thoughsomethoughtithad“minorproblems.” 63%weresatisfiedwiththewaydemocracyworkedinTaiwan. 63%believedthat“democracywasalwayspreferable.” Unfortunately,thesearethelastiterationsoftheWorldValuesSurveyandtheAsianBarometerSurvey.Hence,itisimpossibletoknowwhetherpeopleinTaiwanhaverevisedtheirviewsintheinterim,forbetterorforworse.Mybestguessisthatifopinionhaschanged,itwouldbeinanegativedirection,aspoliticsonissueslikeChina,pensions,same-sexmarriage,andsoon,becamemorecontentious. Performance Thattwooutofthreerespondentsweregenerallysatisfiedwiththeirpoliticalsystemisnotabadapprovalrate.Yetmostintriguingweretheseresponsestotwootherquestions: Only23%thoughtthatdemocracywasmoreimportantthaneconomicdevelopment. 16%believedthatprotectingpoliticalfreedomwasmoreimportantthanreducingeconomicinequality. Thatis,performanceismoreimportantthanprocess.Democracyisnotvaluedforitsownsake,butratherwhetheritsoutcomessatisfywhatpeoplevalue. Thereisnodenyingthatonarangeofissues,theTaiwanpoliticalsystem’sresponsetopolicyproblemshasbeensuboptimal. Thatthesesurveyquestionsimposedaforcedchoiceonrespondentsmayhavebiasedtheresultsagainstdemocraticprocess.Butthereisnodenyingthatonarangeofissues,theTaiwanpoliticalsystem’sresponsetopolicyproblemshasbeensuboptimal.Theseincludethegovernmentbudget;maintainingeconomiccompetitiveness;ensuringgoodjobsforyoungpeople;energysecurity,preservingtheenvironment,andfoodsafety;thegenerosityofretireepensions;marriageequality;transitionaljustice(howfartogoinholdingaccountabletheauthoritarianKMTregimeofthepast);judicialreform;and,lastbutdefinitelynotleast,China.Oneachoftheseissues,theplayers—thepoliticalleadership,centralandlocalgovernmentagencies,politicalparties,thebusinesscommunity,civilsociety,andthepublic—andhowtheyinteractvaries,dependingonthenatureoftheproblemtobeaddressed.Buttheresultsareoftenpolicyswings,chroniccontention,orevengridlock. Structuralfactors Theseissuesoftenyieldlessthansatisfactoryoutcomesbecausetheyareverydifficulttosolve.Afterall,asTaiwan’sexport-ledeconomymatured,thegrowthratehasdeclined.Asthepopulationhasagedandthebirthratedropped,theworkingpopulationisshrinkinginsizerelativetothenumberofchildrenandretireesthatdependonthem.CompaniesdidsustainprofitsbymovingproductiontoChina,butchangesintheChinesebusinessenvironment(e.g.increasingwagedemands)haveposednewbusinesschallenges.Moreover,Beijingseekstochangethestatusquoinitsfavor. Majoritarianismanditsconsequences Notonlyarepolicyissuessubstantivelycomplex,certainstructuralfeaturesofTaiwan’sdemocraticsystemaffecttheconductofpoliticsandcomplicatepolicyformulation.Akeyoneisthemajoritariancharacterofthelegislature.Beginningwiththe2008election,membersoftheLYhavebeenelectedintwoways(eachvotercaststwoballots).64.6%ofthe113membersareelectedfromsingle-memberdistrictsona“first-past-the-post”basis(thesamesystemasintheUnitedStates).Theremaining35.4%areselectedonapartybasis.4 Theresulthasbeenamajoritariansystem,whichhassomebuilt-inadvantages.Thewinner-take-allprincipletendstoproducefewerlargeparties.Fewerpartiesmeanfewerpolicyprogramsfromwhichvotersmustchoose,whiletoomanyproposalscanproduceconfusionandgridlock.Legislatorschosenfromsingle-memberterritorialdistrictsaremorelikelytoberesponsiveandaccountabletotheirconstituentsthanlegislatorswhoarepickedinmulti-memberdistricts. Yetanelectoralsystemthatcombinessingle-memberdistrictsandafirst-past-the-postruleisactuallylessrepresentativeofvoters’preferencesthansomealternatives.Italmostguaranteesthatcandidatesoftwomajorpartieswillwinmostofthelegislativeseats,andthatthewinningpartywillgetmoreseatsthanitsshareofthevote.Thusin2016,theKMTandtheDPPwon91%ofthetotalLYseats.Inthesingle-memberraces,DPPcandidatesgot44.6%ofthevote,butwon68.5%ofthoseseats.KMTcandidatesreceived38.9%ofthisvoteand30.8%oftheseats.Thesamedistortionoccurstoalesserdegreeinthepartyvote.In2016,theDPPwon44.1%ofthepartyvoteandgot52.9%ofthoseseats.Inthiscontest,theKMTsecured26.9%ofthevotesand32.3%oftheseats.Thepresidentialelection,whichisheldonthesamedayastheballotingfortheLY,isalsoonawinner-take-allbasis,whichreinforcesthemajoritariannatureofthesystem.5Thus,theKMTcontrolledthepresidencyandthelegislaturefrom2008to2016,andtheDPPwilldosofrom2016to2024.6 WhenoneTaiwanpartydominatesthegovernmentforoneortwopresidentialterms,itcreatesanumberofincentivesforpoliticalpolarization,fosteringphenomenathatdonotnecessarilycontributetogood,representativegovernment: Themajoritypartyistemptedtotrytopushthroughasmuchofitspreferredpolicyagendaaspossibleandtoeschewcompromisewiththeminority. AspowershiftsfromtheKMTtoDPPandbackagain,therearefairlywideswingsinpolicyonatleastsomeissues,witheachnewadministrationtryingtoreversetheagendaofitspredecessor,ratherthanmakingadjustmentstoasharedconsensusposition. Politicsisadversarial,aspoliticiansineachpartyadopta“youlive,Idie”(nihuo,wosi)attitudetowardspeopleintheotherparty. Becausetheparliamentaryminoritygrowsfrustratedatitsabilitytoaccomplishmuchofitsprogram,itadoptstacticsdesignedtodisruptregularlegislativeorderandtocreateafightingimageinthemedia.Seizingcontrolofthespeaker’sdaisisafavoredtactic. Anothercountermeasureiscreationofadditional,smallpartiesthatputforwardalternativeagendasandseektogainenoughparliamentaryseatstogainbargainingpoweroverpolicy.Taiwanhashadaseriesofthirdpartiessince1993.Manyarecreatedasvehiclesfortheambitionsofanambitiouspolitician.7(Thesepartieshaveoftenbegunwell,butovertimetheirinfluencesubsides.) Amajoritypartythatfearsitisabouttolosethenextelectionmaypasslawswhileitisstillinpowerinordertomakeitharderfortheopposingpowertoeffectivelygovernshoulditwin. Inaddition,majoritarianrulefostersfrustrationsamonggroupsoutsidetheLY,inthebroaderpoliticalsystematlarge.Theconsequencescancomplicatetheoperationofrepresentativegovernment. First,whenactivistelementsinthepublicopposethepoliciesofthemajoritypartybutseelittlehopeofendingitsdominancethroughelectoralmeans,theyhavemountedlargepublicprotestsinthenameofthehighergood.Inthesecampaigns,theysometimeshavethesupportoftheoppositionparty. RelatedBooks UnchartedStrait ByRichardC.Bush 2013 UntyingtheKnot ByRichardC.Bush 2005 FiveRisingDemocracies ByTedPiccone 2016 Second,theDPPhaslongadvocatedtheuseofreferendumstoregisterthepublicwill.Itsinitialassumption,nodoubt,wasthatelectionstothepresidencyandtheLYwerestackedintheKMT’sfavor.Legislationwaspassedin2003toauthorizetheuseofreferendums,butthetwopartieshavearguedoverthevalueandrulesforthismechanismeversince.WhentheDPPwontheLYin2016,itsoonpassedlegislationmakingiteasiertoputpolicyideastoareferendumvote.In2018,however,theKMThoistedtheDPPonitsownpetardbyproposingandwinningreferendumsthatunderminedtheTsaiadministration’spolicies. Third,from2018to2020,Taiwanalsosawaburstofpopulism,mainlyintheformofaKMTpoliticiannamedHanKuo-yu.HanranformayorinKaohsiungMunicipality,pittinghimselfasthechampionofthecommonpeopleagainstTaiwan’spoliticalandeconomicelites.Hewonthemayor’sraceeasilyandthenwaspickedastheKMT’scandidateinthe2020presidentialrace,wherePresidentTsaiIng-wendefeatedhimhandily. Eachofthesegambitsreflectsadissatisfactionwiththeperformanceofrepresentativegovernmentundertwo-partydominanceandattemptstocircumventthenormaloperationofgovernment. Factorsreducingpolarization YetTaiwanpoliticsisnotasociety-widebattlebetweentwosharplydividedcamps.Thepublicisnotaspolarizedaspoliticiansare.Onsocialvalues,thereisbroaduniformity.Thereisstrongagreementthat,inprinciple,democracyisthebestpoliticalsystem.TheWorldValuesSurveyin2012foundthatbyandlargerespondentstendedtotakeacentristpositiononissuessuchasincomeinequality,privateversusgovernmentownershipofbusiness,andwhetherthegovernmentorthepeoplethemselvesshouldberesponsibleforpeople’swelfare.8Peoplegenerallyagreethateconomicdevelopment,education,andcross-Straitrelationsaretheissuesonwhichthegovernmentshouldfocus. Mostsignificantly,onsomeissuestherearedivisionswithinthemajorpartieswhichimpedethemfromoperatingasaunified,disciplinedbloc,atleastonthoseissues.TheBlueandGreencampsaredividedintosubcamps,withtheoverallspectrumrunningfromtheDeepBlues,throughtheLightBluesandLightGreens,andthentotheDeepGreens.TheDeepfactionstendtotheextremewhiletheLightonesaremoremoderate.Withineachcamp,therehavebeenstrugglesforpowerbetween“Deep”and“Light,”andtheresultsofthosestrugglescanaffectpoliticsatlarge.IftheLightfactionsineachmajorpartyaredominant,theninter-partycooperationbecomespossible.IftheDeepfactionsaredominant,thenzero-sumconfrontationismorelikely.9 TheDeep-LightdifferenceswithintheGreenandBluecamparenotalwayssignificant.Generally,thepolicyissuesunderdebatedefinewhichactorsareinvolvedandhowpoliticsareconducted.Somemattersarenegotiatedwithinthelegislatureandbetweenitandtheexecutive,outsideofthepubliceye.Othersmattersevokepolarizationbetweenthemajorparties.StillotherscreateLight-Deepsplits.ButtheissuethatismostdivisivewithinandbetweenpartiesandatelectiontimeishowtoaddressthechallengeChinaposestoTaiwan.Itisanissuethatissubstantivelydifficultandtheonewherethestakesarethehighest. TheChinaissue InaNovember2019reportforBrookings’sGlobalChinaproject,IdetailedBeijing’spolicytowardsTaiwan.Tosummarize,BeijingseekstotransformtheislandintoaspecialadministrativeregionofthePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC),usingthesameformulathatitemployedforHongKong—“onecountry,twosystems”(1C2S)—whichwouldterminatetheRepublicofChinagovernment.Ithashopedtoachievethisendthroughpersuasionbuthasnotruledouttheuseofforce.Simultaneously,ithasopposedwhatitperceived(ormisperceived)asattemptsbyTaiwanleaderstocreateanindependentcountry. BeijingbelievedtheelectionofMaYing-jeouasTaiwan’spresidentin2008offeredthebestopportunitytobeginmovementtounification.IthopedtobuildondeepenedeconomicinterdependencetoreachpoliticalunderstandingsthateliminatedambiguitiesaboutTaiwan’slegalstatusandthedirectionofcross-Straitrelations.MadeflectedPRCrequestsforpoliticaltalks,yethiseconomicpoliciesstimulatedconcernsamongTaiwancitizensaboutadangerousslipperyslope.Consequently,economicrelationsstalled.Then,in2016,theDPP,ledbyTsai,wonthepresidencyandcontroloftheLY,asignificantsetbackforBeijing.Chinarespondedwithneitheraccommodationnormilitaryaction,butbymountingacampaignofintimidation,pressure,marginalization,andpenetrationofTaiwanpoliticsbyprovidingsupportforpoliticalorganizationsandtraditionalmediaandmanipulatingsocialmedia.ThegoalmayhavebeentosecureTsai’sdefeatinthe2020election,butthatdidn’thappen.Sofar,therefore,Beijinghasfailedtoadvanceitspolicyobjective. Unquestionably,howTaiwanleadersformulateastrategyforpreservingTaiwanequitiesinthefaceofBeijing’sgoalsandtacticsisnoteasy.Shoulditbeacombinationofaccommodation,cooperation,andoppositiontoindependence?Orshoulditbeamixofeconomicdiversification(lessdependenceonthePRCmarket),closerrelianceontheUnitedStates,improvementofTaiwan’smilitarycapabilities,andanemphasisondemocracytodemonstratethepublic’soppositiontounification?Thesearetoughcalls.Iftherewereaneasysolution,itwouldhaveemergedlongago.The2019-2020crackdownonHongKong’sprotestmovementshasonlyincreasedoppositiontoany1C2Sarrangements. MeetingtheChinachallengeismadeallthemoredifficultbecausedecisionsmustbeprocessedthroughTaiwan’sdemocraticsystem…Yetdivisionsbetweenandwithincampsconstrainanyefforttoforgeacoherentpolicy. YetmeetingtheChinachallengeismadeallthemoredifficultbecausedecisionsmustbeprocessedthroughTaiwan’sdemocraticsystem.Fundamentally,thatisagoodthingbecauseitguaranteesthatanymajorchangeinthestatusquowillrequirepublicconsent.10Yetdivisionsbetweenandwithincampsconstrainanyefforttoforgeacoherentpolicy.TheBluecamphasmoreconfidenceinitsabilitytomanagetheChinarisk,whiletheGreenshaveadarkerviewofPRCintentions(andofthecommitmentoftheBluestoTaiwan’sinterests).Thentherearedivisionswithinthecamps.The“DeepBlue”tendtoadheretotheKMT’slong-timeanti-independencestanceandfavorsunificationofsomesort,whilethe“LightBlue”aremorecomfortablewithTaiwan’smaintainingpoliticaldistancefromChina,evenasitsecuresbenefitsfromeconomictieswiththemainland.The“DeepGreen”favoramoreradicalapproachtosecuringautonomythroughmeasuresthatcallforTaiwaneseindependence,whilethe“LightGreen”areconsciousaboutboththepotentialforconflictandtheneedtosustainthebenefitsofcross-Straiteconomicrelations.TheonlythingthetwocampsgenerallyagreeisthattheymustrelyontheUnitedStatestodeterBeijingandkeepTaiwansafe.11 PolarizationandinitiativestocircumventrepresentativegovernmenthaveaffectedpolicytowardsChinaandcomplicatedtheformulationofeffectivepolicy.Considertheseexamples: Generally,publicdiscussionofChinapolicyhasbeenconductedonasimplisticbasis,reducingittoargumentsoveridentity(Chinesevs.Taiwanesevs.both)andoverlong-termoutcomes(unificationvs.independencevs.thestatusquo),withoutineithercasedefiningthetermsused.AkeyissueofdebatewithinthetwopartiesiswhetherthegovernmentshouldaccommodateBeijing’sdemandthatitacceptthe1992Consensus,anambiguousformulaconcerningcross-Straitrelations.(LessdiscussediswhetheritisappropriateatallforthePRCtoimposeconditionsonTaipei.) Inthe2008electioncampaign,theDPPnotonlypromotedTaiwaneseidentity,astapleofelectioncontests,butbyproposingareferendumonmembershipforTaiwanintheUnitedNations,whichcreatedconcerninBeijingandWashingtonthatitwasmovingtoindependence. In2014,theSunflowerMovementmobilizedtoopposeadraftcross-StraitagreementontradeinservicesoutoffearitwouldultimatelyinduceTaiwan’spoliticalcapitulation.WiththeDPP’said,activiststookovertheseatofrepresentativegovernment,thechamberoftheLY,andcausedtheagreementtobesetaside.Toendtheoccupation,theLYleadershipagreedtopassabillsupervisingthenegotiationofanyeconomicagreementwiththemainland(asoflate2020,nolegislationwasenacted). In2018,theKMTpromotedareferendumrestrictingtheimportofJapanesefoodproductsproducedintheareaofthe2011Fukushimanuclearaccident,whileelementsintheDPPinitiatedonethatwoulduse“Taiwan”asthenameoftheisland’sOlympicteam,inviolationofaninternationalunderstanding.Thefirstpassedandthesecondfailed. In2019,theDPPbecameworriedthatitwasgoingtolosethe2020presidentialandLYelectionsandthataKMTgovernmentwouldmakeexcessiveconcessionstoBeijing.Ituseditsmajoritytopassalawthatmadeitalmostimpossibleforanygovernmenttonegotiatepoliticalagreements.12 Theseactionsaddressedimportantpolicymatters,buttheireffecthasmadepolicymakingmoredifficult.Whateverthesubstantiveproblemswiththeservicetradeagreement,effectivelysuspendingtheapprovalprocesswasapoorwaytosolvethem.TheKMT’s2018referendumdelayedfortwoyearsneweconomicagreementswithJapan,whichwouldhavehelpeddiversifytheTaiwaneconomy.AlthoughtheOlympicreferendumfailed,itcreatedunnecessaryalarmsinBeijingandaserious,albeittemporary,divisionwithintheDPP. Indifferentways,Taiwan’sexecutivebranchhasbeenconstrainedfromnegotiatingwithBeijing,evenifitmightbeinTaiwan’sintereststodosoandeveniftheissueofthe1992Consensusweredealtwith.Economictalksareunlikelyaslongasthebillpromisedin2014onsupervisionofeconomicagreementsispassedorabandoned(intra-DPPdisagreementshavekeptitinlimbo).The2019lawregulatingthenegotiationofpoliticalagreementscreatessuchahighbaritisdoubtfulonecouldevergetapproved.TheseobstaclescanonlyraiseconcernsinChinathatTaipeiisnotseriousaboutaddressingcross-Straitdifferences. Conclusion Asnoted,intra-andinter-partysplits,protests,referendums,andpopulismreflectdissatisfactionwiththeperformanceofTaiwan’ssystemofrepresentativedemocracy.ThisisnotuniquetoTaiwan,ofcourse.Otherdemocraciessharethisperformancedysfunction,includingtheUnitedStates.Taiwandoesfaceanarrayofpolicyproblems,somestemmingfromitsbeinganadvancedeconomyandagingsociety.Thegovernmentbudgetmustsomehowallocatescarceresourcesamongeconomiccompetitiveness,pensionsandhealthcare,anddefense.Onenergysecurity,debatesoverconflictingpriorities—ensuringsupplyformanufacturing,reducingenvironmentalpollution,findingtherightmixbetweenfossilfuelsandrenewables,limitingemissionofgreenhousegasses,andkeepingenergypriceslow—havestymiedformulationofasustainablepolicy. China’spolicyambitionsaddauniqueandweightylayerofdifficulty.DebatesfesteroverthedegreetowhichChinaconstitutesathreat;whatmixofaccommodation,self-assertion,deterrence,andalignmentwiththeUnitedStatesisappropriate;whatdefinitionofTaiwan’slegalstatusisappropriate;howtosustainacoherentpolicyovertime;andhowtoensuresufficientresourcesandpoliticalsupportforthestrategyadopted.Itisawelcomedevelopmentthataseriesofpresidentialelectionshavestrengthenedtheconsensussupportingacautious,status-quopolicy,yetthesimplisticapproachtopublicdiscussionoftheChinachallengelimitsseriousdiscussionofthedilemmasinvolved.Inshort,difficultproblemsdonoteasilyyieldeasysolutions,butanopenyetdividedpoliticalsystemmakesitmuchharder. DespitethehighmarksthatTaiwan’sdemocraticsystemoftenreceivesforitselectionsystemandprotectionofpoliticalrights,itmustbeassessedinlightofthepolicychallengesitfacesandwhatisatstake.Highstakesincreasetheneedforsuperiorperformance.Andwithoutquestion,thePRC’sambitionsforTaiwanimposesahigh-stakeschallengefortheisland’sleadersanditspeople.Theoutcomewilllikelydefinetheisland’slong-termfuture.Thatbeingthecase,doesTaiwan’sdemocraticsystemmitigatedifficultpolicydilemmasorexacerbatethem?Doesitfacilitateconsensusonhowtoapproachthechallengesofthefuture,ordoesitintensifythedisagreementsandcreategridlock? ThisanalysisofTaiwan’spolarizedandmajoritariansystemandthewaysinwhichthatatleastsomecitizenshaveexpressedtheirdissatisfactionwithrepresentativedemocracysuggeststhatonthetoughissues,thepubliccouldbebetterservedbyitselectedpoliticians.Thatstatementisnotmeanttoimpugntheircharacter,butrathertopointtofeaturesofthesystemthatmakeitharderforthemtotacklethetoughissues.Thatamajoritariansystemoverrepresentsthemajorityandunderrepresentstheminoritydoesnotfacilitatecompromise,particularlywhentheminoritypartyisweak.ThehistoryoftheKMT’spastauthoritarianrule,memoriesofwhichstillshapethepoliticalconsciousnessoftheoldergeneration,exacerbatespolarization.Thereisastructuralcharactertotheisland’spoliticaldysfunction. Thereare,however,timeswhenTaiwan’ssystemperformswell.Farandawaythebestexampleistheresponsetothespreadofthecoronavirus.Attheendof2020,Taiwan,withapopulationof23millionpeople,hadregisteredabout800casesandonly7deaths.Muchofthecreditgoestothepublichealthauthorities,whichsuccessfullyemployedbordercontrols,testing,contacttracing,andquarantinestokeepthenumberofcaseslow.TheyhadlearnedfromproblemsindealingwiththeSARSepidemicof2003.Inaddition,theleadershipoftheTsaiadministrationwasunited,serious,andtransparent.Membersofthepublic,whohadbeensocializedtousemaskswhentheygetacold,didnotneedofficialpersuasiontodothesamewhenitcametothecoronavirus.MembersoftheLYdidnotpoliticizetheissue,perhapsbecausetheyunderstoodthestakes.Inshort,thepoliticalleadership,thetechnocracy,politicians,andthepublicworkedtogethertocreateanexemplaryresult.Allconcernedunderstoodthestakesoffailure. Taiwan’sstructuralimpedimentstogoodpolicyperformancearenoteasilyfixed.Anyalternativetomajoritarianismwouldhaveitsowndefects,anditwouldrequireaconstitutionalamendmenttoinstitute(anon-starter).Ifthereisawaytomitigatethecurrentdivision,itprobablywillrequiretheleadersofthetwopoliticalpartiestosetboundariesontheircompetition:inassessingthenatureofpolicyproblems,particularlywithrespecttoChina;inworkinghardertoforgecompromisestoaddressthoseproblems;andinsettingasidetheprevailingzero-sumpoliticalculture.Thiswayoutseemsunlikely,giventhechronic,interpartycontentionovertheChinaissue.Yetthestakesinvolvedareveryhighandthecostoffailurewouldbesevere.Ifchronicpoliticalstrifemakesaconsensuspolicydecisionimpossible,adecisionhasbeenmadeanyway. BringingaboutTaiwan’sdemocratictransitionthirtyyearsagowasfarfromeasy,butitgavecitizensasayontheirfuturethattheyhadneverhad.Difficultastoday’spolicychallengesare,itwouldbeatragedyifthesystemofrepresentativegovernmentwasunabletochartafavorablepathforwardforthepeoplethesystemissupposedtoserve. RelatedContent Interactive GlobalChina Monday,September30,2019 Footnotes LarryDiamond,TheSpiritofDemocracy:TheStruggletoBuildFreeSocietiesthroughouttheWorld(NewYork:TimesBooks,2008),88–112;LindaChaoandRamonMyers,TheFirstChineseDemocracy:PoliticalLifeintheRepublicofChinaonTaiwan(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1997). KharisTempleman,“ThePartySystemBeforeandAfterthe2016Election,”inDynamicsofDemocracyinTaiwan:TheMaYing-jeouYears,eds.KharisTempleman,Yun-hanChu,andLarryDiamond(Boulder,CO:LynneReinerPublishers,2020),125. Inlink,seedownload“WV6_Results_Taiwan2012_v20180912”under“Taiwan2012.” Before2008,Taiwanelectedmembersfrommulti-memberdistricts,whichcreatedthepossibilityofseveralmajorpartiesorgroupsthatreflectedtherangeofpolicyplatformsalongthepoliticalspectrum. LarryDiamond,DevelopingDemocracy:TowardConsolidation(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1999),100–101. Thepresidentmayservetwoconsecutiveterms. Forexample,KoWen-che,thecharismaticmayorofTaipeiCity,in2019createdtheTaiwanPeople’sParty. Inlink,seedownload“WV6_Results_Taiwan2012_v20180912”under“Taiwan2012.” Theseintra-partygroupingswerepartlytheresultofTaiwan’spostwarpoliticalhistory.Simplyput,today’sDeepBluepoliticiansaretheheirsofmainlanderauthoritarianrule,whiletheLightBluesbeganasnativeTaiwanesethattheKMTcooptedintoitsregime(eachadaptedtothedemocraticsystem).ThesplitintheDPPstemsfromdifferencesoverhowradicaltobeinconfrontingtheauthoritarianregime. Anysuchchange,andcertainlyanymovementtowardsunification,wouldlikelyrequirethepassageofconstitutionalamendments,whichisverydifficult.Passagerequiresathree-quartersmajorityintheLegislativeYuanandthenareferendumwhereamajorityofeligiblevotersapprove.TheneteffectisthatnoamendmentgetspassedunlesstheKMTandtheDPPagreethatitisagoodidea. Thesestrugglesoccurindifferentwaysineachmajorparty,butthemoremoderatewingineachhastoresistpressuresfromthemoreradicalwing. SeeRichardC.Bush,DifficultChoices:Taiwan’sQuestforSecurityandtheGoodLife(Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitutionPress,forthcominginspring2021),https://www.brookings.edu/book/difficult-choices/. Acknowledgments: TedReinerteditedthispaper.TheresearchonwhichitisbasedwassupportedbyagrantfromtheSmithRichardsonFoundation. 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