The Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954–55 and 1958

Tensions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) in the 1950s resulted in armed conflict over strategic islands in the ... 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TheTaiwanStraitsCrises:1954–55and 1958 TensionsbetweenthePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC)and theRepublicofChina(ROC)inthe1950sresultedin armedconflictoverstrategicislandsintheTaiwan Strait.Ontwoseparateoccasionsduringthe1950s,thePRC bombedislandscontrolledbytheROC.TheUnitedStatesrespondedbyactively interveningonbehalfoftheROC. MapoftheTaiwanStrait TheimportanceoftheislandsintheTaiwanStraitwasrootedintheirgeographic proximitytoChinaandTaiwanandtheirroleintheChineseCivilWar.Jinmen (Quemoy),twomilesfromthemainlandChinesecityofXiamen,andMazu,ten milesfromthecityofFuzhou,arelocatedapproximatelyonehundredmileswest ofTaiwan.WhentheNationalistGovernmentoftheROCunderChiang Kai-shekrecognizedthatithadlostcontrolofmainlandChina duringtheChineseCivilWar,theofficialsandpartoftheNationalistArmy fledtotheislandofTaiwan,establishingtroopsonthesetwoislandsandthe DachenIslandsfurthernorth.Intheearly1950s,Chiang’sforceslaunchedminor attacksfromJinmenandMazuagainstthecoastofmainlandChina.Leadershipon bothsidesofthestraitcontinuedtoviewtheislandsasapotentiallaunching padforanROCinvasiontoretaketheChinesemainlandandhadaninterestin controllingtheislands. U.S.policytowardEastAsiaintheearlyColdWarcontributedtothetensionsin theTaiwanStrait.Inlate1949andearly1950,Americanofficialswereprepared toletPRCforcescrosstheStraitanddefeatChiang,butaftertheoutbreakof theKoreanWarinJune1950,theUnitedStatessentitsSeventhFleetintothe TaiwanStraittopreventtheKoreanconflictfromspreadingsouth.The appearanceoftheSeventhFleetangeredtheChineseCommunists,whotransferred theirtroopspoisedforaninvasionofTaiwantotheKoreanfront.Thisserved todelaymilitaryconflictintheStraituntiltheUnitedStateswithdrewits fleetaftertheKoreanWar. Overthenextfewyears,theU.S.Governmenttookstepsthatallieditmore firmlytotheROCGovernmentonTaiwan.In1954,theUnitedStatesledthe creationoftheSoutheastAsiaTreaty Organization,whichwasdesignedtounifytheregionagainstthe perceivedCommunistthreat.Moreover,U.S.officialsopenlydebatedthe possibilityofsigningaMutualDefenseTreatywithChiangKai-shek.ThePRC viewedthesedevelopmentsasthreatstoitsnationalsecurityandregional leadership.IntheinterestofbolsteringitsstrategicpositionintheTaiwan Strait,thePRCbegantobombardJinmeninSeptember1954,andsoonexpandedits targetstoincludeMazuandtheDachenIslands. U.S.policymakersconsideredsendingpartoftheU.S.fleetintotheStrait. DiscussionscenteredonwhetherthismaneuverwouldreopentheChineseCivilWar and,ifso,whateffectthatwouldhaveonU.S.securityconcernsintheregion. U.S.policymakersdidnotwanttobedrawnintotheconflict,butwantedtheROC tomaintaincontroloftheislands.ThelossofJinmenandMazutothePeople’s RepublicmightmeananirreparableblowtoNationalistArmymoraleandthe legitimacyoftheROCregimeonTaiwan.Toassertitscontinuedsupportofthat regime,theUnitedStatessignedtheMutualDefenseTreatywiththeROC. AlthoughthetreatydidnotcommittheUnitedStatestodefendingtheoff-shore islands,itpromisedsupportiftheROCengagedinabroaderconflictwiththe PRC. ZhouEnlai ThesituationintheStraitdeterioratedinlate1954andearly1955,prompting theU.S.Governmenttoact.InJanuary1955,theU.S.Congresspassedthe “FormosaResolution,”whichgavePresidentEisenhowertotalauthoritytodefend Taiwanandtheoff-shoreislands.TheU.S.Governmentthenannouncedits determinationtodefendTaiwanagainstcommunistattack,althoughitdidnot specifytheterritoryincludedwithinitsdefensiveperimeter.Inexchangefora privatepromisetodefendJinmenandMazu,however,Chiang Kai-shekagreedtowithdrawhistroopsfromDachen,whichwas strategicallyambiguousanddifficulttodefend. TheEisenhowerAdministrationconsideredmanyoptions,rangingfromconvincing ChiangKai-shektogiveuptheislandstoemployingnuclearweaponsagainstthe PRC.Beforeanyoftheseoptionsbecamenecessary,attheAfro-AsianConference inApril1955inBandungPRCForeignMinisterZhouEnlai announcedadesiretonegotiatewiththeUnitedStates.ThePRC’ssuddenshift couldhavestemmedfrompressurefromtheSovietUniontoeasetensions,concern abouttheveryrealpossibilityofwarwiththeUnitedStates,orchangesin internalpolitics.InSeptember,1955,thePRCandtheUnitedStatesbegantalks atGenevatoaddresstheissueofrepatriationofnationals,butalsotodiscuss preventingtheescalationoffutureconflicts. AlthoughthereweregoodreasonsforthePRCtostanddownin1955,itresumed itsbombardmentofJinmenandMazuin1958.Thistime,thePRCtookadvantageof thefactthatinternationalattentionwasfocusedonU.S.interventionin LebanonandbarredROCeffortstore-supplygarrisonsontheoff-shoreislands. ThePRCalsowantedtoprotestcontinuedU.S.supportoftheROCregime.Once again,PresidentEisenhowerwasconcernedthatthelossoftheislandswould hurtNationalistmoraleandmightbeaprecursortotheCommunistconquestof Taiwan.TheUnitedStatesthusarrangedtore-supplyROCgarrisonsonJinmenand Mazu.Thisbroughtanabruptendtothebombardmentandeasedthecrisis. Eventually,thePRCandROCcametoanarrangementinwhichtheyshelledeach other’sgarrisonsonalternatedays.Thiscontinuedfortwentyyearsuntilthe PRCandtheUnitedStatesnormalizedrelations. TableofContents 1953–1960:EntrenchmentofaBi-PolarForeign Policy DienBienPhu&theFallofFrenchIndochina,1954 TheEastGermanUprising,1953 SoutheastAsiaTreatyOrganization(SEATO),1954 TheTaiwanStraitsCrises:1954–55and 1958 U.S.-ChinaAmbassadorialTalks,1955–1970 TheWarsawTreatyOrganization,1955 BandungConference(Asian-AfricanConference),1955 KhrushchevandtheTwentiethCongressoftheCommunistParty,1956 TheSuezCrisis,1956 Sputnik,1957 TheEisenhowerDoctrine,1957 TheBerlinCrisis,1958–1961 U-2OverflightsandtheCaptureofFrancisGaryPowers,1960