Transitional Justice - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The term “Transitional Justice” has come, in recent years, to designate a field of academic inquiry, as well as political practice, ... StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop TransitionalJusticeFirstpublishedMonJan26,2009;substantiverevisionFriApr4,2014 Onceviolentconflictbetweentwogroupshassubsided,whatisthe bestwaytotransitiontoacivilsociety?Doformerenemiesneedto “cometotermswiththeirpast”iftheyaretolive peacefully?Ifsuchareckoningisrequired,whatarethestrategies oftransitionavailabletotheparties? Thefieldoftransitionaljustice,whichinvestigatessuchquestions, involvesthephilosophical,legal,andpoliticalinvestigationofthe aftermathofwar.Thisentrywillprovideanintroductiontothe centralproblemsanimatingthisrelativelynewfield.Itwilldosoby examiningthehistoryanddifficultiesassociatedwiththeoperation ofthreeimportanttransitionalpolicies:warcrimetribunals,truth commissions,andlustration policies.[1] Wewillconsider,amongothersquestions, tensionsbetweenthedesireforpeaceandstabilityafterwarandthe importanceofputtinghumanrightsviolatorsontrial,theneed,as partofapoliticaltransition,tocreateareliablehistoricalrecord ofpastabuses,thepromiseandlimitationsofinternationalcriminal law,andthecoherenceofforgivenessinpolitics. Part1providesatheoreticalintroductiontothenatureof transitionaljusticebyhighlightingthetensionsbetweenpeaceand justicetypicaloftransitionalsettings.Part2examinesthe difficultiesassociatedwithwarcrimetribunals.Part3concentrates onthedilemmasinvolvedintheoperationoftruthcommissions.Part4 focusesonadministrativepurgesorlustrationpolicies.Thefinal sectionconsidersthepossibilityofforgettingasaresponseto mass atrocity.[2] 1.IntroductiontoTransitionalJustice 1.1TheContradictionsofTransitionalJustice 1.2PeaceversusJustice 2.WarCrimeTribunals 2.1HistoricalBackground 2.2Criticismsofwarcrimetribunals 2.2.1Victor'sJustice 2.2.2Retroactivity 2.2.3Selectivity 3.TruthCommissions 3.1HistoricalBackground 3.2JustifyingTruthCommissions 3.2.1Deliberativedemocracy 3.2.2JusticeasRecognition 3.2.3Moretruth 3.2.4Forgiveness 4.Lustration 4.1HistoricalBackground 4.2CriticismsofLustration 5.Forgetting Bibliography AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.IntroductiontoTransitionalJustice Theterm“TransitionalJustice”hascome,inrecent years,todesignateafieldofacademicinquiry,aswellaspolitical practice,concernedwiththeaftermathofconflictandlarge-scale humanrightsabuses.Theoristsandpractitionersoftransitional justicefocusonthemosteffectiveandlegitimatewaysofaddressing pastwrongsandmovingtowardsthe(re)establishmentofadecentcivil order.Inthisintroduction,Idescribethepoliticalandmoralgoals officialstendtopursueintransitionalsettingsandmapoutsomeof thetensionsbetweenthesegoals.Iarguethatsuchstrainsarethe resultofanendemicfrictionbetweenthedemandsofstabilityand justiceafterwar(theintroductiondrawsonEisikovits2013). 1.1TheContradictionsofTransitionalJustice Inmakingthetransitionfromaviolentpastintosettled,legitimate governance,officialstypicallypursuemultiplegoals.Whilesomeof thesearemutuallyreinforcing,otherscomeintoconflictwitheach other.Asaresultitisdifficulttofullypursuealltransitional goalsatthesametime.InwhatfollowsIdescribethemostimportant transitionalgoalsandelaborateabouttherelationshipsbetween them. Creatingareliablerecordofpasthumanrights abuses.Sucharecordisobviouslyimportant,foritsownsake, aspartoftheveryhumanprojectofkeepingourhistoryasaccurately as possible.[3] It isalsohelpfulinrebuffingspuriousrevisionistclaims(thus,for example,therecordcreatedbytheNurembergtrialshasbeenhelpful inrejectingtheclaimsofvariousHolocaustdeniers)and,more broadly,inendingthedisplaysofimpunitysotypicalof authoritariangovernments.Oncesucharecordisestablishedit becomesimpossibleforthosewhocolludedwithanoppressiveregimeto denyresponsibilityandinvolvementinpast crimes.[4] Perhapsmost importantly,thecreationofanaccurate,comprehensive,andpublic historicalrecordmattersforthepsychologicalhealingofvictimswho report,timeandagain,benefittingfromofficialandpublic acknowledgementoftheirsuffering(see,e.g.,Minow2000). Settingupafunctional,professionalbureaucracyandcivil service,toefficientlyservetheneedsofthepopulation.As withthecementingoftheruleoflaw,partoftheideaisto establish(orreestablish)citizens'trustintheirgovernment;once basicservicesarerenderedinareliable,non-arbitrary,fashion ordinarycitizensmaygain(orregain)thebeliefthatgovernment's jobistoserveratherthanoppressthem. Helpingvictimsrestructureandrepairtheirlives,by attendingtotheirphysicalandpsychologicalafflictions,restituting lostproperty,compensatingthemfortheirlosses,andfixing historicalinjusticesthatsystematicallydisadvantagedthem.Needless tosay,thisprojectoverlapswiththesecondandthirdgoals;after all,toaddressthepsychologicaldistressofvictimsitishelpfulto punishthosewhohurtthemandtoproviderespectfulforumsinwhich thestoriesofsuchvictimscanbeheard. Stoppingviolenceandconsolidatingstability,soasto allowthecreationofanormalcivicandcommerciallife,cementtrust ingovernment,anddrawoutsideinvestments. Whileallofthesegoalsarepoliticallyimportant,itiseasyto seehowtheycancomeintoconflict.Prosecutingtheguiltycanharm politicalstability,astheprosecutedandtheir(oftenarmed) followersbecomeresentfulaboutwhattheyperceiveasapolitically motivatedwitch-hunt.Post-warprosecutionsmayalsocomeinto conflictwiththeneedtocementtheruleoflaw,assuchprosecutions oftenrequiredeparturesfromtherulesofproceduraljustice.Such wasthecasewiththeretroactivecriminalizationthatlayatthe heartoftheNurembergTrials.Thedoctrineof“Command Responsibility”firstdevelopedatNurembergandusedlaterby theInternationalCriminalTribunalforYugoslaviaalsodepartsfrom basicprinciplesoflegalism,bybasingconvictionsonthestatusof defendantsratherthanondirectandspecificevidenceconcerning theiractions(onthis,seeDrumbl2005). Evenwhenprosecutionsdonotthreatenpoliticalstabilityandmanage tostaytruetotheprinciplesoftheruleoflaw,theycanstillcome intoconflictwiththedesiretocreatearobust,comprehensive historicalrecord.Whentrialsareusedastheprimarymechanismof transitionaljustice,theirverysubjectiontotherulesofevidence meansthatsomeimportantinformation(namelytestimonythatdoesnot pertaintospecificindictments,orevidenceobtainedwithoutfulldue processetc.)willbeexcludedfromtherecord.Thislimitationhas promptedsomescholarstoarguethattruthcommissionsarepreferable towarcrimetrialsinthisrespect:sincesuchcommissionsarenot subjecttotherulesofevidence,theyareabletocollectmore information,exposeamorecomprehensivepictureofpastinjustices andtoincludeagreateremphasisontheroleofinstitutionaland commercialactorsindirectlyinvolvedin supporting injustices.[5] Theneedtoprovidevictimswithmeaningful,respectfulpublicforums inwhichtheycantelltheirstoriesandreceiveadegreeof acknowledgment,centraltothefifthaim,alsocomesintoconflict withsomeofthebasiccommitmentsoflegalism.Criminaltrials usuallyfocusontheinterestsofthedefendants.Arespectable criminaltrialcannotbeaplatformforvictimstotelltheirstories inanuninterruptedfashion.Sincethetestimonyofvictimsis instrumentalforprovingindictments,itismostoftensubjectto interruptionsandvigorouscross-examination.Asaresult,atypical criminalprocedurecanbequiteanadversarialexperiencefor victims.Thisistrueinspiteofarecentexpansionoftheroleof victimsininternationalcriminallaw.Infact,anundueexpansionof thatrolecreatesthegroundsforcriticizinginternationalcriminal lawforabandoningsomeofitslegalistunderpinnings(see,for example,RauschenbachandScalia2008). Finally,theneedtosetupafunctioningbureaucracy,soimportant forthecreationofpublictrustandtherestorationofpolitical normalcy,canclashwiththedesireforaccountabilityinherentinthe firsttwogoals.Whenmostofficialsimplicatedinpastcrimesare purgedor“lustrated”,fewcompetentadministratorsremain todotheworkofgovernment.Suchacompetencegapmay,inturn, underminepoliticalstability,economicviability,andpublic trust—allcrucialfactorsinasuccessfultransition.Indeed, worriesaboutthetradeoffbetweenaccountabilityandthe functionalityofgovernmenthaveledmanypolitiestoeitherhedgeor giveuptheirlustrationpolicies mid-stream.[6] AlmosteverytransitionsinceWorldWarIIdisplaysthesetensions. TheNurembergtrials,oftenviewedasthepinnacleoflegalism,were, nevertheless,basedonexpostfactocharges(seeBass2002: Ch.5).TheSpanishtransitiontodemocracywassofragilethatit hadtocommititselftoa“pactofforgetting”—more thanthreedecadesofsilenceaboutabusescommittedduringthecivil warandunderFranco.Historicaljusticeandtheneedtopreservethe peacecameintoconflict,withthelatterreceivingprecedenceuntil the2008LawofHistoricalMemoryreversedthetrend(seeTremlett 2006).InSouthAfrica,deKlerk'sNationalPartythreatenedcivil wariftheAfricanNationalCongressinsistedonwarcrimetrials againstapartheidofficials.ThecelebratedTruthandReconciliation Commission,withitsamnesty-for-trutharrangement,wastheresulting politicalcompromisemeanttoavoidbothpunishmentandimpunity.The ANC'sdemandforretributivejusticewentunheeded(totheoutrageof many,includingthefamilyofStephenBiko,whounsuccessfullysued theTruthCommissionintheSouthAfricanConstitutionalCourt) becauseheedingitwouldhaveeliminatedthechanceforademocratic SouthAfrica(foranoverviewseeMeredith1999).TheInternational CriminalTribunalforRwanda,operatinginTanzania,nettedsomeof theGenocide'sringleaders.ButRwandawasnotabletoapplyrigorous criminalresponsibilitytoallthosewhoparticipatedinthemurders. Doingsowouldhavetakenseveralcenturies.Thusasystemof traditionaljustice,Gacaca,wasdevised.Thesemakeshift “GrassCourts”failedtoliveuptowesternstandardsof legalism(thejudgeswerenotprofessionals,rulesofevidencewere notfollowed)anditfailedtoproducesatisfyingpunishments.Butit didprovideaplatformfromwhichatleastsomeofthecrimeswere admittedandacknowledged,anditdidmanagetoemptytheRwandan jailswhichcontainedhundredofthousandsofprisoners.Inthe tensionbetweenpracticalfunctionalityandretributivejustice, Rwandanoddedtothelatter,buteventuallyfocusedontheformer. Thepolicyofde-Baathificationcarriedoutnegligentlyinthe aftermathofthesecondGulfWar,combinedwiththethoughtless disbandingoftheIraqiarmyendedupfuelingtheanti-American insurgencythere,inadditiontodrainingIraqofmanyofthosewho hadcrucialadministrateskillsandexperience.Heretoo,the commitmenttoretributionandthedesiretocreatetrustby “cleaningout”thoseassociatedwiththepreviousregime actuallyendedupbringingabouttheoppositeeffectsbyfurther destabilizingthecountryandharmingitsbureaucraticcompetenceata verysensitivetime(seePfiffner2010). 1.2PeaceversusJustice Postwartransitionsarecharacterizedbytheco-existenceof potentiallyconflicting,yetpoliticallyandmorallyimportant, goals.Aswehaveseen,someoftheseareaboutdoingjusticeforpast abuses,whileothersareconcernedwithconsolidatingstabilityand creatingfunctioning,competentinstitutions.Theuneasyco-existence oftheseaims-thefactthattheyarealldearlyheld,andyetcannot quitebefullyrealizedtogether—pointstoasignificanttension betweenconsiderationsofjusticeandsocialutilityafter war.Needlesstosay,thistensionexistsinordinarypoliticallife aswell.Thefrictionbetweenwhatismorallycalledforandtheway inwhichleadersmustsometimesactfortheoverallbenefitoftheir subjectshasalwaysbeenimportanttoourunderstandingof politics.Machiavelliarticulatesitmostfamouslywhenhearguesthat aPrincemighthavetolearnhow“nottobegood”inorder toactinthebestinterestofhispolity(Machiavelli,The Prince,Ch.15).Sartreprovidesthedramaticdepictionand givestheproblemitsmostfamiliarnameinhisplayDirtyHands.One ofhisprotagonistsputsitstarkly:“Well,Ihavedirty hands.Rightuptotheelbows.I'veplungedtheminfilthand blood.Butwhatdoyouhope?Doyouthinkyoucangovern innocently?”(Sartre,“DirtyHands,”ActV).The mostimportantcontemporaryphilosophicaltreatmentappears,of course,inMichaelWalzer'sfamousarticle“PoliticalAction: TheProblemofDirtyHands”(Walzer1973).Intransitional contextsthistensionisusuallylabeledthe“peaceversus justice”dilemma(see,forexample,Freeman2010andMihai 2010)—denotingthatthedemandsofquietandstabilitymaywell requirecompromisingthemorallyimportantdemandsofretributive justiceandaccountability.Thus,forexample,itwaswrongtoallow apartheidmurdererstogetawaywithmurderduringSouthAfrica's transition.Butiftheyhadbeentriedaswarcriminals,SouthAfrica wouldhavemostlikelyeruptedintocivilwar.Similarly,itwaswrong toburySpain'shistoryofviolenceformorethanthirtyyearsafter theendofFranco'sdictatorship.But,hadthishistorybeenexcavated earlier,Spainmaywellhavefailedtodevelopintotheliberal democracyitistoday. Viewingthepeacevs.justicedilemmaasavariationofthe problemofdirtyhandshelpsusbetterunderstandthenatureofthe tensionsatplayafterwar.Properlydescribed,peacevs.justiceis notadebatebetweenproponentsofaKantiancommitmenttofull retributivejusticeandcynicalrealistswhoarewilling,inthe infamouswordsoftheCambodianPrimeMinisterHunSen,to“dig aholeandburythepast”(quotedinMydans2010).Rather,the tensionismoreproperlyviewed,liketheproblemofdirtyhands,asa paradox:officialsaswellascitizensintransitionalcountries concurrentlyholdtwopowerfulyetoftencontradictorymoral intuitions:thatinordertoestablishalegitimate,functioningcivil societyonemustdojusticeforthecrimesofthepastandthatto securequiet,stabilityandafunctioninggovernmentitissometimes necessaryandmorallyacceptabletoleavepastcrimesandpast criminalsalone.Ananalogytoanothersuchparadoxmaybehelpfulin illustratingthedifferencebetweenaparadoxandadebate.The problemofmoralluckfamouslydelineatedbyThomasNagelandBernard Williamsdenotesaparadoxabouthowwemakejudgmentsaboutpraise andblame:wetendtothinkthatpeopleshouldbepraisedorblamed onlyonthebasisofwhattheycancontrol,andyetweregularly praiseandblamepeopleonthebasisoftheresultsoftheir actions—evenifthesearebeyondthecontroloftheagents involved(Nagel1979andWilliams1981).Adrunkdriverwhogothome safelyandadrunkdriverwhohitachildonthewayhometookthe sameriskgettingintotheircars.Thefirstintuitionwouldrequire treatingthemsimilarly.Thesecondrecommendsmoreseverepunishment tothedriveractuallyinvolvedinanaccident. Amoraldebatecan,inprinciple,besettledbyasuperiorsetof arguments.Aparadoxcanonlybedescribed.Caughtintheparadox betweenpeaceandjusticewemightendupemphasizingonekindof intuitionovertheotherafterwar.Butthisisnotthesameas winningamoralargumentanddoingawaywithadiscredited position.TheSpaniardsemphasizedtheneedforstabilityoverthe needforaccountabilityforaperiodofthirtyyears.Then,whenthey wereconfidentenoughthatstabilityhadbeenconsolidated,they shiftedtheiremphasis.TheRwandans,afterconductingnominal criminaltrialsinTanzania,madeasimilardecisionandclearedthe docketsbymeansoftheirGacacacourts.Rwandaisnowmore quietandstable.Butsuchquiet,ascommentatorslikePhilip Gourevitchhavenoted(see,mostrecently,Gourevitch2009),isan uneasyoneaslongassurvivorsareresentfulaboutfailuretobring perpetratorstojustice.Stateddifferently,thereisnoreal “debate”betweenpeaceandjusticeafterwar,assome scholarsandNGOsclaim,onlyacontinuingnegotiationthat,atany givenpoint,willleantowardsoneoftheseintuitions.Thebestwe candoisunderstandtheirco-equalstatus,settleonapolicythat liesonthecontinuumbetweenthem,andconstantlyreevaluate. Inspiteofthefactthatthepeaceversusjusticetensionismerelya specificmanifestationoftheproblemofdirtyhands,thereisan importantdistinctionthatmustbeobserved:whilethetensionbetween justiceandsocialutilityispartofthepoliticallifeofany consolidateddemocracy,itiscentralanddefinitiveofpoliticallife duringtransitions.Inconsolidateddemocracies,suchtensionscanbe alleviatedbylegalinstitutionsandtraditionsthatembody conclusionsabouthowtomanagetherequisitetradeoffsbetween justiceandsocialutility(theseincludeaconstitution,abodyof acceptedconstitutionaljurisprudence,arespectedhighcourtwith powersofjudicialreview,etc.).Partoftheroleofsuch institutionsandtraditionsistoprovideguidanceaboutwhich tradeoffswouldseemmostjustifiablegivenacomprehensive interpretationofthestate'slegalandpoliticalhistory.But transitionaltimesareexactlytheperiodsinwhichsuchinstitutions, traditions,andinterpretiveprinciplesarefirstbeingsetout.When theargumentaroseaboutabusesofexecutivepowerintheUnites StatesfollowingtheSeptember11,2001attacks,thatdebatecould takeplaceonthebackgroundofahistoryofexecutivepowergrabsand theresponsestothem(Jefferson'srequisitioningoffundsforthe militarywithoutcongressionalapprovalandLincoln'ssuspensionof habeascorpusduringthecivilwarcometomind).Ina transitionalcontext,thatlongandimportantpoliticaldiscussionis missing.Moreprecisely,theverypointofthetransitionalperiodis tosetuptheinstitutionsandmethodsresponsibleforhavingthat debate.Theupshotofthispredicamentistwofold:itisharderfor transitionalsocietiestoresolvepeaceversusjusticedecisions becausethetraditionsandinstitutionssoimportantfornavigating thesequestionsarenotyetpresent.Atthesametime,theveryactof creatingofsuchinstitutionsinevitablycreatessituationswhere peaceandjusticemustclash:theneedtoquicklysetupacompetent courtandpolicesystemstoallowforstablegovernmentmaywell requirehiringadministratorstaintedduringthetenureofthe previousregime;theneedtoattractforeigninvestorsandmaintain peaceinthestreetsmayrequiresomecompromisesontheextentand lengthofcriminalproceedingsagainstpastperpetrators,andso forth. Torecap,thetensionbetweenpeaceandjusticeisespecially pronouncedintransitionalsettingsbecausecreatingthebasic institutionsofgovernanceismorelikelytoraiseit,andbecausethe guidanceavailableinsettledcontextfromtheexistenceofsuch institutionsismissing.Tothisdualexplanationweshouldaddthat theconflictbetweenpeaceandjusticeisfurtherheightenedin transitionalsituationsbecausethepoliticalstakesareuniquelyhigh duringsuchmoments.Ifatransitionalsocietycannotconsolidate peaceandfunctioninggovernment,theveryefforttocreateadecent newstatesuffersshipwreck.Thiskindoffragility,wheretheentire politicalprojectisatstake,ismorelikelytofloatpeaceversus justicedilemmasthanaspecificcrisisinaconsolidateddemocracy. Suchlocalizedcrisestypicallyimplicatelocalizedendeavors,notthe existenceofthepoliticalsystemitself. 2.WarCrimeTribunals 2.1HistoricalBackground The20thcentury'smostfamousandprobablymost significantwarcrimetrialswereheldinNuremberg,Germanyafterthe endofWorldWar II.[7] Between1945–1949theUnitedStates anditsalliesheldaseriesof13trials.Thefirst,andmostfamous ofthese,involvedtheprosecutionofseniorsurvivingNaziofficials includingHermannGöring,JoachimvonRibbentrop,JuliusStreicher, RudolfHessandAlbertSpeer.Defendantsintheother12trials,which tookplacebetween1946–1949,includeddoctors,jurists, industrialists,andotherkeystakeholdersintheNazistate. Initially,itwasnotclearthattheallieswouldputtheir defeatedenemiesontrialatall.ThecreationofthefirstNuremberg Tribunalwasprecededbyalongdebate,especiallyfierceinthe UnitedStates.Hardliners,representedmostvocallybyAmerican SecretaryoftheTreasuryHenryMorgenthauJr.,advocatedthesummary executionorforcedremovaloftheentireNazichainofcommandand thedestructionofGermany'sindustrialcapacities.Ontheotherhand, Legalists,ledbySecretaryofWarHenryStimson,insistedon affordingtheNazisfairtrialsthatwouldhonorAmericanprocedural protections.TheUnitedStatesfoughtthewarindefenseofpolitical freedom,theLegalistsinsisted.Suchfreedomdependsonupholdingthe idealsoftheruleoflaw.Theseideals,inturn,requirethe individualizationofguiltandgivingdefendantsafairchanceto answerthechargesagainstthem.Germany,Stimsonwarned,mustnotbe punisheden-masse;suchcollectivepunishmentwouldonlyserveto increaseresentmentandmaywellplanttheseedsforanother war.Instead,thecarefulandfairemploymentofthecourtswould allowtheGermansto“internalize”theirguilt.AsStimson putit: …punishmentisforthepurposeofprevention andnotforvengeance.Anelementinpreventionistosecureinthe personpunishedtheconvictionofguilt”(forasummaryofthis debateseeBass2002:152–161). OnNovember21,1945RobertH.Jackson,ChiefofCounselforthe UnitedStatesatNuremberg,beganthecasefortheprosecutionwith thefollowing,nowiconicwords: Theprivilegeofopeningthefirsttrialinhistory forcrimesagainstthepeaceoftheworldimposesagrave responsibility.Thewrongswhichweseektocondemnandpunishhave beensocalculated,somalignant,andsodevastating,that civilizationcannottoleratetheirbeingignored,becauseitcannot survivetheirbeingrepeated.Thatfourgreatnations,flushedwith victoryandstungwithinjurystaythehandofvengeanceand voluntarilysubmittheircaptiveenemiestothejudgmentofthelawis oneofthemostsignificanttributesthatPowerhaseverpaidto Reason.(Jackson1945) TheprosecutionteamatNuremberghadoriginallyplannedto concentrateonchargesofaggressivewarratherthanonGermany's wholesaledestructionofEurope'sJews.Muchoftheinitiallegalwork revolvedaroundthecreationofajurisprudenceofconspiracythat wouldallowtheconvictionoftheentireNazileadership.Butthe liberationoftheDachauandBergen-Belsenconcentrationcamps,and thehorrificevidencediscoveredthere,lefttheallieswithlittle choicebuttoincorporatechargesofcrimesagainsthumanityinto theirtrialstrategy(Bass2002:180). Thedefendants'complaintsabout“victors'justice” andtheretroactivityofthechargesnotwithstanding(moreonthisto follow),theNurembergtrialsstillstandoutas“legalism's greatestmomentofglory”(Bass2002:203).Inspiteofintense politicalpressurebyStalin,Churchill,andpowerfulfiguresinside theUnitedStatestodispensewithtrialsalltogether,andinspite oftheunprecedentednatureandmagnitudeofthecrimes,thejudgesat Nurembergpresidedoveraremarkablycoolandorderlyprocedure.For thefirsttimeinhistory,seniorpoliticalleaderswereindictedand triedfor“crimesagainsthumanity.” Thetribunalsalsoestablishedimportantprinciplesofinternational justice,suchastheresponsibilityofheadsofstate,therejection oftheinfamous“Iwasjustfollowingorders”excuse,the weakeningofretroactivityasadefenseagainstcrimesofmass atrocity,andtherightofwarcriminalstoafair trial.[8] Inadditiontothese importantlegalachievements,Nurembergalsoestablishedthetrialas aninvaluableinstrumentforcreatingacredible,lastinghistorical recordofhumanrightsabuses. TheNurembergtrialsweresucceeded,inthespringof1946,bythe MilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast,heldinTokyo.Twenty-eight membersofJapan'smilitaryandpoliticalleadership,includingformer PrimeMinisters,WarandNavySecretaries,generals,diplomats,and someeconomicluminarieswereindictedforcrimesagainstthepeace. Twenty-fiveofthedefendantswereconvicted.Sevenwereexecuted,and theremaining18receivedprisonsentencesrangingbetween7yearsand alifesentence. TheTokyoproceedingsneverachievedtheprominenceoftheNuremberg tribunals.Explanationsfortheirrelativeobscurityincludethe unavailabilityofsomeofthetrialrecords,thefactthatthe perpetratorswerenothouseholdnamesinthewest,andtheallies' embarrassmentaboutdisagreementsbetweenthejudgesonusingthe deathsentence,andonthefairnessoftheproceedings(formore detailseeFutamura2008andTotani2008). Inspiteoftheambitiousstandardsofaccountabilityformass atrocitysetatNurembergandTokyo,theactualpracticeof internationalcriminaljusticewentintoaprolongedlulloncethe ColdWarbegan.Thesharpideologicaldifferencesbetweenthe superpowersmadethecosmopolitanidealsunderlyingsuchtrialsless persuasive.Concernedthatwarcrimeprosecutionswouldbecomeone morearenaforpoliticalconflict,neithertheAmericansnorthe Russianspursuedthem.ThelullendedwiththecollapseoftheSoviet UnionandtheendoftheColdWar,andthefirstsignificantwar tribunalsthereafterwereestablishedbytheUnitedNationsinthe 1990s—theadhocInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformer YugoslaviaatTheHague(ICTY),in1993,andtheadhocInternational CriminalTribunalforRwandainTanzania(ICTR),in1995. TheICTYgotofftoarockystart.TribunalpresidentTheodor Merondescribeditas“littlemorethananideal”atits inceptionin1993.Thetrial,asymbolic“expressionof outrage”,servedmoreasasalveforinternationalguiltthan instrumentofinternationaljustice.Financialresourceswere initiallysomeagerthatthecourtcouldnotaffordtopaymorethana fewmonthsworthofrentandsalaries(Bass2002:Ch.6).Butin recentyears,thetribunalhascomeintoitsown.Whilethehistoric trialofSlobodanMiloševićcouldnotbecompletedbecauseofthe defendant'sdeath,theICTYindictedthefirstPresidentofRepublika Srpska(BosniaandHerzogovina),RadovanKaradžić,inJuly2008.Heis currentlyconductinghisdefense.Additionally,RatkoMladić,the militarymastermindofthesiegeSarajevoandthemassacreof Srebenica,wasarrestedinnorthernSerbiaon26May2011andis currentlyontrialintheHague.BiljanaPlavšić,anotherformer PresidentofRepublikaSrpska,wasconvictedofwarcrimesin 2002. ThefinaltrialfortheICTYhasrecentlycommenced.GoranHadžić, whowentfromwarehouseworkertorebelSerbianpresident,was arrestedinnorthernSerbiaonJuly20,2011aftersevenyearsasa fugitive.Hehasplednotguiltyto“involvementinthemurder ofhundredsofCroats”aswellaslargescaleexpulsions.Heis thelastofthe161suspectsindictedbyICTYtofacetrial.Hadžić, Karadžić,andMladićwereallarrestedinSerbiaafteryearsonthe runfrominternationaljustice.Theimpendingterminusofthecourt's activitiesunderscoresthetransitorynatureofsuchadhocwarcrimes tribunals.Thecourt'sannualbudgetisnowupwardsof$310millionand itemploysmorethan1,100peoplefrom82countries.TheICTYhas convicted64,acquitted13,sent13fortrialindomesticcourts,and withdrawnindictmentsagainst36,including16whodiedafterbeing charged.Eighteensuspectsarecurrentlybeingtried,while17are appealingtheirconvictions. Thetribunaloftenfaced,andtosomeextentstillfaces,accusations ofinefficacy.Adhoctribunalslacktheirowncoercivepowerandrely onthesupportofindividualnation-states.Littleprogresswas initiallymadeinthe1990stowardsthecaptureofimportantwar criminalsintheformerYugoslavia.Yugoslaviawasnottheninatruly transitionalstatesuchasfoundinGermanyorJapanattheendof WWII,astheSerbiangovernmentofSlobodanMilošević,whohad supportedtheBosnianSerbcommanders,remainedinpower.Therewas, asinotherregionsinwhichwarcrimeshaveoccurred,hostilityto outsidemonitoringandextranationaljustice.Thiswasalsoseentoa lesserextentinCroatia.However,national(ordomestic)justice proveditselftobeoverwhelminglycorrupt,biased,incompetent,and inadequate. OnlyafterMilošević'sfallfrompowerdidthenewSerbiangovernment becomemoreamenabletocooperatingwithdemandsforinternational justice.TherebelSerbianleadersdidandstilldoretainthe sympathiesofmuchoftheSerbianpopulation.Externalpressurepoints provedtobeeffective,asSerbia'sgovernmentrespondedpositivelyto acarrotandstickapproachknownasthepolicyof conditionality.Serbia'sEuropeanUnion(EU)membershipapplication wasblockeduntilSerbiacompliedandarrestedthetrioofMladić, Karadžić,andHadžić.Theprinciplebehindconditionalitydoesnot differsignificantlyfromtherationalebehindsanctionsregimes,such asthoseemployedagainstapartheidSouthAfrica,Rhodesia,and (currently)Iran. TheICTR,locatedinArusha,Tanzania,canalsoboastsubstantial achievements.Thecourthasissuedthefirstevergenocideconviction byaninternationaltribunal,aswellasthefirstconvictioninwhich rapewasconsideredacrimeofwar.Giventhemassivedomestic prosecutionofgénocidairesbytheRwandanauthorities,the ICTRhasprimarilyfocusedontheindictmentof“big fish”—seniorlevelsuspectsinvolvedinthedesignand planningofthegenocide.Theseindictmentshaveresultedingenocide convictionsofRwanda'sformerPrimeMinister,JeanKambanda,and quiteafewcabinetmembers. Inadditiontosecuringsignificantconvictionsandsettinglegal precedentsforthepracticeofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,the ICTYandICTRwerealsosuccessfulincreatingdetailedrecordsof atrocities.Inthis,bothtribunalscontinuedthelegacyofthe NurembergTribunals,which,asmentionedearlier,aimednotmerelyat theconvictionoftheguiltybutalsoatreliablydocumentingthe horrorsfor posterity.[9] AcomplaintconsistentlymadeagainsttheICTYandtheICTRhasbeen thatthesetribunalsdonotoperateonthesiteswherethecrimes beinginvestigatedtookplace.Thisfact,sothecriticismgoes, createsadisconnectbetweenthepeoplewhosufferedthroughoutthe warandtheprocessinwhichtheirsufferingisaddressed.Theattempt toaddresssuchcriticismshasresultedinthecreationofarather innovativeformofinternationaljustice—theInternationalized orHybridCourts.Thesebodies,whichhavebeenoperatinginBosnia Herzegovina(since2005),Kosovo(since2000),Cambodia(since2003), SierraLeone(since2002),EastTimor(between1999–2005),and Lebanon(since2007),employbothinternationalandlocaljuristsand adjudicateonthebasisofamixtureofnationaland international law.[10] Unlike theNurembergandTokyotribunalsnoneoftheadhoctribunalssuchas theITCYandITCRareempoweredtoimposethedeathpenalty,thoughno centralizedprisonexiststohousethoseconvicted. Amongthecriticismsleviedagainstthetribunalsistheiralleged Westernbias.TheSpecialCourtforSierraLeone,whichinAprilof 2012convictedformerLiberianleaderCharlesTaylorofaidingand abettingwarcrimes,wasfundedalmostexclusivelybytheUnited States,UnitedKingdom,Canada,andtheNetherlands.Theinternational courtsandthehumanrightswhichtheyembodyareWesternliberal conceptswithfarlessresonanceinotherpartsoftheworld.Some havequestionedthetribunalsaretoofocusedonAfrica,asall pendingcasescurrentlyareAfrica-related.TheAfricaUnionhas accusedtheICCofbeinganEuro-Americanneo-colonialenterprise, thoughthismaybetakenwithacertainpinchofsalt,asmanyofthe leaderswithintheAfricanUnionhavegoodreasontobelievethatthey mayonedaybecalledtothedefendant'sdocket. Perhapsthemostsignificantdevelopmentininternationalcriminal justicesincetheNurembergtrialshasbeentheestablishment,bythe Rometreatyin1998,ofthepermanentInternationalCriminalCourt (ICC)inTheHague.By2011,114nationshadratifiedtheRome Statute.Thecourthasjurisdictionoverseriouscrimes(genocide, crimesagainsthumanity,aggression)committedafterJuly1,2002 (whenthestatutetookeffect),byanationalofoneofthestates thatarepartytotheRometreaty.Italsohasjurisdictionover crimescommittedontheterritoryofsuchstateparties,orwhenthe UNSecurityCouncilrefersaspecificcasetoit.TheUNSecurity Councilisauthorizednotonlytorefercasestothecourtbutalsoto askitsprosecutortosuspendproceedings.Nevertheless,Security CouncilmembersRussia,China,andtheUnitedStateshavenotratified thestatute.Thispositionissharedbyseveralothermajorcountries suchasIndia,Indonesia,andIsrael.Withinthenextseveralyears, tribunalsforSierraLeone,Rwanda,theformerYugoslavia,Lebanon, andCambodiawillclose,leavingtheICCasthesoleinstitutionof internationalcriminaljustice. Importantly,thecourt'sauthorityisresiduary:itactsonlyif membernationscannotorwillnot. MostofthecasesbeforetheICCinvolveongoingconflicts.Thishas requiredtheestablishmentoffieldofficesinordertoassistin investigationsandthecollectionofevidence,aswellastoconduct outreachoperationstolocalpopulations.Whilethereareimmense practicaldifficultiesingatheringevidenceandenforcingarrest warrantsinactivewarzones,seniorICCofficialshaveclaimedthat theirrealtimeinvolvementhasincreaseddeterrence. [11] SofartheICChastakenupcasesofwarcrimescommittedinUganda, theCongo,andtheCentralAfricanRepublic.Allthreecountrieshave referredthesecasesthemselves.Inaddition,theUNSecurityCouncil hasreferredthecaseofSudan,whichisnotapartytotheRome treaty.Afterconductinganinvestigationintothereferral,the court'sprosecutorhasrecentlyissuedanindictmentagainstSudan's President,Omar al-Bashir.[12] Adecadeafterthecourtscreation,22 arrestwarrantshavebeenissued,andfivesuspectscurrentlyarein custody.Recently(asofJuly2012),theUnitedStateshasstartedto applypressureonPresidentPaulKagameofRwandatoendhis assistancetorebelfactionsinCongorenownedfortheiregregiouswar crimes.TheUnitedStatesindicatedthattheremightbeareductionin militaryaidtoRwanda,butalsothatKagamepersonallymayface indictmentand(ultimately)prosecutionattheICC. OneofthemostinnovativefeaturesoftheICCisthefactthatit givesasignificantroletovictimsinitsproceedings.Victimscan sendinformationdirectlytothecourt'sprosecutor,theycanrequest theopeningofapreliminaryinvestigation,theycanappearbeforethe court'spre-trialchamberwhenitdeliberatesonwhethertoopena fullblowninvestigationintoacase,and,mostsignificantly,they canasktopresenttheirpositionduringthetrialitself.Article68 (3)oftheICCStatutereads: wherethepersonalinterestsofthevictimsare affected,theCourtshallpermittheirviewsandconcernstobe presentedandconsideredatstagesoftheproceedingsdeterminedtobe appropriatebytheCourtandinamannerwhichisnotprejudicialto orinconsistentwiththerightsoftheaccusedtoafairandimpartial trial.Suchviewsandconcernsmaybepresentedbythelegal representativesofthevictimswheretheCourtconsidersit appropriate,inaccordancewiththeRulesofProcedureandEvidence. (seeOtherInternetResourcesforlinktothefull textoftheRomeStatute) Theexactjurisprudenceregulatingvictims'involvementisstill beingdeveloped.Yet,itisalreadyclearthattheRomestatute givesthemafargreaterroleintheinternationalcriminalprocess thantheyhavehadundertraditionaltribunals. DespitethefactthattheUnitedStatesplayedamajorroleinthe negotiationssurroundingthecreationoftheICC,theU.S.initially votedagainsttheRomeStatutein1998,beforeeventuallysigningin December 2000.[13] PresidentGeorgeW.Bushrevokedthe UnitedStates'signaturetotheRomeStatute,citingconcernsthatthe courtcouldbeusedforpoliticalprosecutionofAmericancitizens, particularlyAmericanservicememberswhowereservingabroad.The U.S.CongresspassedseveralbillsduringtheBushAdministration designedtoshieldAmericancitizensfromprosecutionbytheICC.The UnitedStateshasalsothreatenedtocutoffforeignaidtocountries thathavefailedtosignBilateralImmunityAgreementswiththe U.S. AlthoughtheObamaadministrationhasbeenmuchlesshostiletowards theICC,goingsofarastoco-sponsoraUNSecurityCouncil resolutionwhichcalledfortheICCtoinvestigateallegedcrimes againsthumanitycommittedbyMuammarGadaffi,theUnitedStateshas yettojointhe ICC.[14] TheUnitedStatescontinuestomake immunityforU.S.citizensaprerequisitetotheirascensiontothe ICC. 2.2Criticismsofwarcrimetribunals Theemploymentofwarcrimetribunalshasalwaysbeen controversial.Inwhatfollowssomeofthecentralcriticismsofsuch trialsareexamined.Wewillfocusonsubstantiveratherthan technicalconcerns.“Technicalconcerns”isunderstoodas thelackofresources,thereluctanceoftheinternationalcommunity toprovidematerialassistance(indirectfundsorinapprehensionof suspects),theabilityofdefendantstodestroyevidence,the deplorableconditionofthelegalclassinwartorncountries,and problemsoftranslationandcommonlanguage.Whilethesecertainlyare significantobstacles(asitwaspointedoutearlier,theoperationof theICTYwasalmostunderminedbysuchdifficulties),theydonot challengetherationaleforusingtrials.Theobjectionstakenup here,ontheotherhand,representconcernsthatcallintoquestion thecoherenceandfairnessofthecriminalcourtsasinstrumentsof politicaltransition. 2.2.1Victor'sJustice Accordingtosomecritics,postwartribunals,farfromexpressinga commitmenttotheruleoflaw,aremerelyacharadeinwhichwinners punishlosersforthedamageandsufferingthewarbroughtabout.This kindofcynicismaboutdoingjusticeafterwar(andabouttheroleof justiceinpoliticsmoregenerally)hasancientroots.Inhis HistoryofthePeloponnesianWar,Thucydides(B.5Ch.17) imaginesoneoftheAtheniangeneralsofferingasoberingreality checktoaMelianpoliticianwhodoesnotunderstandwhyAthensmust conquerhistiny,politicallyneutralisland: webothalikeknowthatinthediscussionofhuman affairsthequestionofjusticeonlyenterswherethereisequalpower toenforceit,andthatthepowerfulexactwhattheycan,andtheweak grantwhattheymust. HermannGöringmadeasimilarobservationinaconversationwith Nuremberg'sprisonpsychiatrist:“thevictorwillalwaysbethe judge,andthevanquishedtheaccused”(Bass2002:8). Theclaimofvictor'sjusticeisdifficultto dismiss.[15] Afterall,hadthe Allieslostthewar,manyoftheirseniormilitaryandpolitical leaderswouldhavegoneontrialforthefirebombingofJapaneseand Germancities.CurtisLeMayandRobertMcNamarahavepubliclyadmitted as much.[16] And yetitisworthwhilenoting,withGaryBass,thatthereisa distinctionbetweenthecircumstancesunderwhichatribunalis createdandhowdecentlyandfairlyitoperates.Inotherwords,a tribunalthatwassetupaftervictoryinordertopunishtheside thatlost,mightstilleithersucceedorfailtofollowfair procedures.Andinsofarasthisistrue,theretributionofsome victorsmaybepreferabletothatofothers.AsBasswrites:“it isvictorythatmakesjusticepossiblebutthefairnessoftheprocess iswhatmakesitjustice”(Bass2002:329).And,headds,even thoughwemaybecynicalaboutthefactthatAmericansareputting Germansontrialaftertheyhavedefeatedthem,mostofus,ifgivena hypotheticalchoice,wouldstillprefertobetriedbyanAmerican ratherthanaNazicourt,becauseweassumeitwouldbefairer(fora usefulseriesofessaysontheRwandantransitionseeStraussand Waldorf2011).SimplyimaginethekindofchargestheNaziswould bringagainsttheirdefeatedenemies:mostlikely,theywouldhavenot sufficedwithindictingthealliesforthefirebombingofGermanand Japanesecities;theymightalsohavechargedthenwithprotecting Jewsorwithmiscegenation,andperhapspunishedthemseverelyfor thesecharges.Whileanindictmentforfirebombingwouldhavebeen substantiallysound,thelatteraccusationswouldhavebeenbased, exclusively,ontheNaziswarpedracialtheories.Inotherwords,some victors'justicecanbesubstantivelyflawed.Here,then,isthemain advantageofalliedoverNazivictor'sjustice:theAmericansand theirpartnersprosecutedtheirdefeatedenemiesforcrimesthat reallywerecrimes(forfurtherdiscussionsofvictors'justicesee Minow1998;ChangandBarker2001;Peskin2005). 2.2.2Retroactivity Asecondimportantcriticismofpostwartrialsisthattheyhold defendantsresponsibleforactsthatwerenotprohibitedatthetime theywerecommitted. ManyoftheNazidefendantsatNurembergarguedthatnoexistinglaws orinternationalstandardsbannedtheirconductduringthewar. Consequently,theyargued,therecanbenolegalbasisforprosecuting them.Suchclaimsarebasedonafundamentalpreceptoftheruleof law:NullumCrimen,NullaPoenaSineLege(nocrime,no punishmentwithoutalegalprohibition).Themainstrategyusedto countertheseargumentsatNurembergwas“positivistic”: prosecutorsstrainedtofindsourcesinexistinginternationallaw thatdidforbidaggressivewar,andthenmovedtoassociatemanyof theothercrimesforwhichtheNaziswereaccusedwiththewagingof suchwar(Minow1998:33).Arelateddifficultyarosewhenthe prosecutionlookedforalegaldoctrinethatwouldallowthemto convictalargegroupofpeopleforbelongingtotheNaziwar machine.Here,too,acreativepositivisticsolutionwasfound:Oneof Stimson'saids,colonelMurrayBernays,devisedtheideathatthe Naziswouldbetriedaspartofacriminalconspiracy.Theadvantage ofsuchastrategywasthatitrequirednothingmorethanthe convictionofspecificorganizationsofthecharges(theSA,SS, Gestapoamongothers)inordertoholdalltheirmembers responsible.AsBassputsit: oncetheseorganizationshadbeenconvicted,any memberofthemcouldbeswiftlypunished:insteadofproving individualguilt…[prosecutors]wouldonlyhavetoprovidethat thedefendanthadbeenamemberofacriminalgroupactivities.(Bass 2002:171;IamgratefultoThomasPoggeforthis point) Theseverityoftheproblemofretroactivitydecreasedafterthe Nurembergtribunalestablishedtheprecedentthattherewasnoneed forahighlyspecificprohibitioninordertobeheldresponsible beforeaninternationalcriminalcourt.Andyet,thetribunalsfor YugoslaviaandRwandastillfacedsomeproblemsofretroactivitywhen itcametodecidingwhetherethniccleansingconstitutedgenocideand whatkindofintentwasrequiredforagenocideconviction(Minow 1998:34–35). WhileprosecutorsinNurembergsettledonapositivisticstrategy forcounteringtheclaimsofretroactivitymadebythedefendants, anotherpossibilityforrejectingsuchargumentsshouldbementioned. Thisalternativeisbasedinthe“naturallaw”tradition. Onthisview,theresponsetheNazidefendantsshouldhavebeengiven is,quitesimply,thattherearethingsthatonedoesnotdo,orcan expectseverepunishmentfordoing,whethertheyareexplicitly forbiddenornot.Whethersuchsevereactionsdefy“themoral law”tousethesomewhatantiquatedlanguageoftheclassical naturallawyers,orwhethertheysimplyoffendfundamental sensibilitiesofanycivilizedhumanbeing,theupshotisthesame:at theextremereachesofhumanbehaviorillegalitydoesnotnecessarily dependonapriorlegalprohibition.Itwasthiskindofargumentthat theleadBritishprosecutorinNuremberg,HartleyShawcross,hadin mindwhenheexclaimedinresponsetooneoftheiterationsofthe retroactivitycomplaint: Isupposethefirstpersoneverchargedwithmurder mighthavesaid:“nowseehere.Youcan'tdothat.Murder hasn'tbeenmadeacrimeyet”.(Persico1994: 138) 2.2.3Selectivity Athirdimportantcomplaintagainstwarcrimetribunalsmaintains thattheyfrequentlyfailtoindictallofthosewhowereinvolvedin committingatrocities.Accordingtothischarge,courtsfinditeasier toprosecutelowerlevelofficialsandmilitarypersonnel,often leavingthemoreseniorfigureswhodevisedtheviolentpolicies(but donothaveactual“bloodontheirhands”)untouched (Minow1998:40–41).Totheextentthatthiscomplaintiswell foundeditisdevastating,asitsuggeststhatwarcrimetribunalsdo notresultinafullorcoherentexerciseofretributivejustice(for acomprehensiveaccountseeCryer2005).Theprincipleof “CommandResponsibility”(CR)originallydevisedat Nuremberg,andusedextensivelybytheICTY,hasbeenemployed,quite effectively,inordertocountercomplaintsofselectivity.CRallows prosecutorstoindictseniorofficialsexclusivelyonthebasisof theirmilitaryorpoliticalleadershiprole(giventhedutiesof supervisionandcontrolattachedtothatrole). Thus,theICTYhasbeenabletoconvictSerbianofficersforwar crimesbecausetheydidnotpreventorcurtailactivitiesinwhich theirtroopswereengaged.InanespeciallystrikingexpansionofCR, aBosnianCroatregionalcommander,TihomirBlaskic,wasconvictedby thetrialchamberoftheICTYofmurderandothercrimesagainst humanity,foratrocitiesthattookplaceinthevillageof Ahmichi.Thechargesdidnotallegedirectinvolvementoreventurning ablindeyetotheactivitiesofsubordinates,but,rather,focusedon Blaskic'sfailuretoinvestigateafterthemassacrewasbroughttohis attention.Hisunwillingnesstolookintotheeventswasequatedby thecourtwithresponsibilityfordirectkilling.In2004theappeals chamberoftheICTYrejectedthisinterpretationofCRandoverturned therelevantpartoftheconviction. WhileCRcanbeinstrumentalformovingupthechainofcommand,it alsocomesintoconflictwiththelegalisticpremiseunderlyingwar crimetribunals.Acriminaltrialtraditionallyestablishesindividual responsibilitybypresentingdirectevidenceagainstthedefendant.CR allowsconvictionandpunishmentbasedonaphilosophicalconstruct ratherthanonthegarneringofsuchevidence.Theconstruct,roughly speaking,isthatcertainrolescomewithbuiltinaccountabilityfor theactionsofothers,whetherornottheindividualwhoholdsthe rolewasawareoftheseactions.Criminallawdoctrineis,tosaythe least,suspiciousofsuchaseparationbetweenintentandculpability, especiallywhenitcomestoveryseriousoffenses(lesseroffensescan beestablishedbyprovingthedefendantwasrecklessorindifferent). Thistensionpointstoaproblemattheheartofinternational criminallaw:doestheuniquenatureofmassatrocity,wherein numerouspeopleharmotherswithdifferingdegreesofacquiescenceand directionfromalargebureaucraticclass,reallylenditselftothe legalisticcommitmenttoindividualizingguiltonthebasisofdirect evidence?Ordothedistinctfeaturesofsuchcrimesrequirerelaxing ourstandardsofindividualresponsibilitysoastoimplicatethe entirestatestructurethatmadetheatrocities possible?[17] Ifthelatter,it maybedifficulttoholdfasttothejustificationofsuchtrialsas expressingafirmcommitmenttolegalismandtheideaoftherule of law.[18] Othersignificant(iflessconceptuallyinteresting)criticismsofthe internationalcriminalcourtsholdthattheydonotfocussufficiently onthesufferingofvictims,concentrating,instead,onestablishing theguiltof perpetrators),[19] thattheproceedingtendtobecome technicalandtedious,thustrivializingthehorrors being discussed,[20] thattherecanbeadiscrepancybetweenthe(Western)culturalnorms centraltolegalismandthelocaltraditionsofthesocietyinwhich atrocitiestool place,[21] andthat,inlightoftherepeated occurrenceofgenocideinthe20thcentury,thepracticeof internationalcriminallawdoesnotshowgreatpromise of deterrence.[22] Leaders,suchasBasharal-AssadandOmar al-Bashir,whohavethebackingofmajorpowers,havevirtual impunity.Ofcourseitisimportanttoprosecuteformerheadsof state,soastodemonstratethatpoliticalseniorityisnoguarantee ofimmunityfromjustice.Theinternationaltribunalsservea pedagogicalpurpose,drawingattentiontopertinentissuessuchas childconscription. 3.TruthCommissions 3.1HistoricalBackground Thestructuralandpoliticalshortcomingsofwarcrimetrials,as outlinedintheprevioussection,haveledpolicymakersinwartorn countriestoturntoothermeasuresoftransitionaljustice.Themost importantamongtheseisthenon-judicialtruthcommission. PriscillaHayner(2002),inherlandmarkbookontruthcommissions, enumeratesfourcharacteristicstypicalofthesebodies: Theydealwiththepast Theyinvestigatecontinuedpatternsofabusesandnotspecificcases Theyoperateforuptotwoyearsandthensubmitreports summarizingtheirfindingsand, Theyareusuallyofficialbodiessanctionedbythestate. Thesecommissions,Haynercontinues,mostoftenhavesomeorall ofthefollowinggoals:unearthing,clarifyingandformally acknowledgingpastabuses,respondingtotheneedsofvictims,helping createacultureofaccountability,outlininginstitutional responsibilityandpossiblereforms,advancingtheprospectsof reconciliationandreducingconflictoverthepast(Hayner2002: 24). Whiletruthcommissionshavefewercoercivepowersthancourts(they cannotcompelgovernmentstocarryouttheirrecommendations,they havenoauthoritytopunishetc.),theirmandateforinvestigatingthe broaderpatternofabuses,andtheirtendencytoputthevictimsat thecenteroftheirproceeding,givesthesebodiesagreatdegreeof moralcredibilityandlegitimacy. TheworkofSouthAfrica'sTruthandReconciliationCommission (hereafterTRC)hassparkedagreatdealofinterestintheuseof truthcommissionsafterwar.Thecelebrityofitschair,DesmondTutu, themassivescaleofthepublichearingsitheld,theintensivemedia coverage,anditscontroversialamnesty-for-truthmechanism,generated agreatdealofinternationalcuriosity.EversincetheTRCcompleted itshearingsandpublisheditsreport,nationsfacingatransitionto democracyhaveconsistentlyaskedthemselveswhethertheytooshould usetruthcommissionstoconfrontpastabuses.Somescholarsevengo sofarastosaythatthetruthcommissionhasnowreplacedcriminal prosecutionasthemostimportantnormofinternationaljustice(see, forexample,Ben-JosefHirsch2007). WhiletheTRChasbecomeparadigmaticoftruthcommissions,itis worthwhilenotingthatitwasnotthefirstsuchbody.Argentina, Chile,andElSalvadorallemployedrelativelyeffectivetruth commissionsduringthe1980'sandearly 1990's.[23] Theseeffortsprovidedbothinspirationandvaluablelessonsforthe designersoftheSouthAfrican body.[24] InArgentina,atruthcommissionwassetuptoinvestigatetheabuses committedbythemilitaryjuntaduringthecountry's“dirty war”(1976–1983).Itisestimatedthatupto30,000 suspected“subversives”were “disappeared”—abducted,torturedanddisposedof secretly—bysecurityforcesduringthoseyears.UnliketheSouth AfricanTRC,theArgentineanbody,officiallynamed“National CommissionontheDisappearanceofPersons”,didnotholdpublic hearings.Thecommissionalsolackedtheauthorityandincentive structuretocompelcooperationfromthemilitary.Andyet,itwas abletoproduceasubstantivereport.Morethan7000statementswere taken,1500ofwhichweregivenbysurvivorsofmilitarydetention camps.Thecommissionfocusedonlocatingandexposingmilitary detentionandtorturecenters.Muchoftheevidenceitgatheredwas handedovertoprosecutors,eventuallyaidingintheconvictionsof severalhigh-rankingofficers.Thetruthcommission'sreport,titled NeverAgain(NuncaMás),waspublishedin1984and hasbecomeoneofthebest-sellingbooksinArgentineanhistory. Sevenyearslater,Chile'sNationalCommissiononTruthand Reconciliationpublishedareportdocumentinghumanrightsabuses committedbytheChileanarmyduringGeneralAugustoPinochet's 17-yearreign.AsinArgentina,Chile'ssecurityforcespracticed routinetorture,abductionsandextrajudicialexecutions.Theabuses wereespeciallysevereinthefirstfewyearsofthedictatorship.In 1978Pinochetissuedasweepingamnestyorder,protectingallmembers ofthesecurityforces.Thisamnestycreatedacomplexconstitutional environmentforthetruthcommission.Thecommission,chairedby formersenatorRaulRetting,consistedofanequalnumberofPinochet supportersandcritics.Itsmandatewasdefinedinrelativelynarrow terms,focusingonexecutions,disappearancesandcasesoftorture thatresultedindeath(leavingoutalargenumberoftorture survivors).LikeitsArgentineancounterpart,thecommissionhadno waytocompelmembersofthesecurityforcestotestify.The Commissionerslookedinto3400casesandissuedan1800pagereportin Februaryof1991strongly(and,significantly,unanimously)condemning Pinochetandhisgenerals.Theimpactofthereportwasweakenedbya seriesofarmedattackscarriedoutbyleftleaningmilitantsshortly afteritspublication.Inspiteofthelimitedpublicattentionit receivedatthetime,thereportwasinstrumentalincreatinga reparationsprogramfortherelativesofPinochet'svictims.The commission'sworkwasalsousefulinprovidingevidencetosupportthe SpanishextraditionrequestthateventuallyledtoPinochet'sarrest inBritain.PinochetwaslaterreturnedtoChile,anddiedbeforehe couldbeconvictedofanycrimes. ElSalvador'struthcommissionwasprobablytheleastsuccessful ofthethree.Thecommissionwascreatedtoinvestigateabusescarried outinthecourseofthecivilwarbetweengovernmentforcesandFMLN guerrillas.Accordingtosomeestimates,the12-yearwar (1980–1992)claimedthelivesof75,000citizens.Asin ArgentinaandChile,themilitaryengagedinexecutions,torture,and abductions,inadditiontolarge-scalemassacres.TheElSalvadorian commissionoperatedfor8months.AppointedbytheSecretaryGeneral oftheUnitedNations,itsmembersincludedformerColombianPresident BelisarioBetancur,formerPresidentoftheInterAmericanCourtof HumanRightsThomasBuergenthal,andformerMinisterofForeign AffairsofVenezuelaReinaldoFigueredoPlanchart.Theanimosityand diffidencebetweentheformercombatantswassuchthatnoSalvadorians wereallowedtoserveascommissioners. Thecommissiongatheredtestimonyonmorethan7000casesof severehumanrightsviolations.Itsfinalreport,titled“From MadnesstoHope”,outlinedasetofharshconclusionsagainst40 governmentandmilitaryofficialsandstatedthatthevastmajorityof atrocitieshadbeencommittedbygovernmentbackedsecurityforces (ratherthanbyFMLNfighters).Veryshortlyafterthereport's publication,anationalamnestylawwaspassed,renderingmanyofthe commission'srecommendationsirrelevant.However,thereportwas helpfulinshamingandeventuallyremovingfromservicesomeofthe militaryofficialsaccusedofespeciallyegregiousabuses. ThreeyearsafterthereleaseofElSalvador'sreport,OnApril15, 1996,ArchbishopDesmondTutu,theheadofSouthAfrica'sAnglican Church,addressedacrowdgatheredatEastLondon'scityhall. Wearechargedtounearththetruthaboutourdarkpast, hetoldhislisteners, andtolaytheghostsofthatpasttorestsothat theywillnotreturntohauntus;andthatwewilltherebycontribute tothehealingofthetraumatizedandthewounded—forallofus inSouthAfricaarewoundedpeople.(Meredith1999: 3) ThusbeganSouthAfrica'scontroversialexperimentintransitional justice.[25] Astheydebatedhowtomanagethetransitionfromapartheid, negotiatorsonbehalfoftheAfricanNationalCongress(hereafterANC) andtheoutgoingNationalPartyclashedrepeatedlyonthequestionof howtoaddresshumanrightsabusescommittedduringtheapartheidera. Inthenegotiationsleadinguptothe1993interimconstitution,which laiddownthetermsofthetransition,themostcontentiousissue concernedthequestionofamnesty.Afteragreatdealofwrangling, thetwosidesagreedtoaddapostambletotheconstitutioncontaining thefollowinglanguage: inordertoadvance…reconciliationand reconstruction,amnestyshallbegrantedinrespectofacts, omissions,andoffensesassociatedwithpoliticalobjectivesand committedinthecourseoftheconflictsofthepast.” (PostambletoSouthAfrica'sInterimConstitutionof1993asquotedin Meredith1999:20–21) ManyANCsupporters,whowantedtoseeapartheidofficialsbrought beforeNurembergstylewarcrimetribunals,wereunderstandablyupset bythearrangement.NelsonMandela,whoinsistedontheimportanceof steeringclearof“victors'justice”,remainedadamant abouttheneedforsomekindofaccountabilityforapartheid's crimes.Withoutsuchreckoning,hethreatened,theunaddressed atrocitiesofthepastwouldlivewithSouthAfricanslikea “festeringsore”(Meredith1999:18). Theconvergencebetweenthesetwocommitments—toamnestyon theonehandandtoaccountabilityontheother—wastoresultin theestablishmentoftheTRC. Theprocessthatledtothecommission'screationwascharacterizedby anunprecedenteddegreeoftransparencyandpublicparticipation. During1994,twomajorconferenceswereheldtolaythegroundworkfor theTRC'swork.BothwereorganizedbyAlexBoraine,anAnti-Apartheid activistwhoservedaspresidentoftheSouthAfricanMethodist Church,MPfortheprogressiveparty,andthedirectorofimportant civilsocietyNGOs.Thefirstoftheseconferencesfocusedonthe lessonsofpoliticaltransitionsinLatinAmericaandEasternEurope (ProceedingswerepublishedinBoraineetal.1994).Thesecond solicitedinputfromstakeholdersinsideSouthAfrica(Proceedings werepublishedinBoraineetal.1995).Aftertheconferences,South Africa'sparliamentbegandeliberatingontheNationalUnityand ReconciliationAct,whichwouldsetupthecommission.The ParliamentaryStandingCommitteeonJusticeheldextendedpublic hearingsaskingindividuals,politicalpartiesandNGOsfortheir adviceonthedesignoftheTRC.Thelawwasfinallypassed,aftera greatdealofbickeringanddebate,inMayof1995,ayearorsoafter itwasfirstpresented.TheTRCthusbecamethefirstcommissionof itskindtobecreatedthroughaparliamentaryprocessratherthan executive decree.[26] Whetherbydesignorinertia,thisopen, deliberativeapproachwasalsoappliedtotheselectionofcommission members.NomineesweresuggestedbyNGOs,churches,andpolitical parties,andweretheninterviewedinpublicbytheselection committee.Finally,thecabinetandpresidentchosethecommissioners fromashortlist. ThePromotionofNationalUnityandReconciliationActsetthe followingthreegoalsforthecommission: todevelopacompletepictureofthegrossviolations ofhumanrightsthattookplaceinandcamethroughtheconflictsof thepast;torestoretovictimstheirhumanandcivildignityby lettingthemtelltheirstoriesandrecommendinghowtheycouldbe assisted;andtoconsidergrantingamnestytothoseperpetratorswho carriedouttheirabusesforpoliticalreasonsandwhogavefull accountingstotheiractionstothecommission.(Graybill2002: 6). ThecommissionwouldrespecttheANC'spromisetoofferamnesties,but thereprievewouldnotbegrantedautomatically.Itwould,rather,be linkedtoademandforfulldisclosurefromperpetrators.Those seekingamnestywouldhavetoapplyforit,providefulldetailsabout whattheyhaddone,andestablishthattheiractivitieswere politicallymotivated(ratherthantheresultofgreed, sadism etc.).[27] Applicantswouldnot,however,berequiredtoapologizeorotherwise expressregret.Furthermore,thearrangementwouldeliminatenotonly criminalresponsibilitybutalsocivil liability.[28] Successful applicantscouldbeneitherchargednorsuedfortheirconductduring theapartheidyears.Thecommissionwouldbechargedwith investigatingabusesthattookplacebetweenMarch1,1960andMay10, 1994. Thecommissionwasdividedintothreecommitteesinordertorealize theaimssetoutbythelaw:thecommitteeonhumanrightsviolations, thecommitteeonamnesty,andthecommitteeonreparationand rehabilitation.Thefirstwouldcollecttestimonyandconductpublic hearingsregardingtheabuses.Thesecondwouldconsiderapplications foramnestyfrommembersofthesecurityforcesandANC,anddetermine whethertheactsinquestionwerecommittedinapoliticalcontextand whetherapplicantshadprovidedfulldisclosureaboutthem.Thethird wouldcomeupwithrecommendationsandcriteriaforwhomtocompensate andhow. TheTRC'sauthorityandresourceswereunprecedentedinthehistoryof truthcommissions.Ithadthepowertosubpoenawitnessesandthe authoritytoordersearchesandseizures.Ithadawitnessprotection program,300staffmembers,andanannualbudgetof18million dollars.Itsproceedingswerebroadcastonadailybasisonboth radioandtelevision,andwerewidelycoveredbytheprinted press.Duringthecourseofitstenure,thecommissiontooktestimony frommorethan22,000victimsandwitnesses,hearingupwardsof2,000 oftheminpublic. Unsurprisingly,themaincontroversysurroundingthecommission'swork concerneditsamnesty-grantingpowers.Theopportunityaffordedto perpetratorsofegregioushumanrightsabusestowalkawayfrom prosecutionenragedmanyblackSouthAfricanswhowantedtoseethose whohadtormentedthemandtheirfamiliesputbehindbars.Asfaras manyblackswereconcerned,theTRCallowedsomeofapartheid'sworst offendersto“getawaywith murder.”[29] AsMartinMeredith (1999:315)putsitinhissuperbsurveyofthecommission's tenure: …theworkoftheTRCprovoked…angerin partsoftheblackcommunity…particularlyoverthewaysecurity forceoperativesresponsibleforheinouscrimesweregivenfreedomin exchangeforabitoftruthtelling,whilevictimsandtheirfamilies weredeniedaccesstothecourts.Whatmanywantedmorethantruthwas justice—prosecutioninthecourtsandprison sentences. ManyacademicobserversofSouthAfrica'stransitionweredismayedas well,remarkingthatneitherpoliticalnecessitynortheattemptto createsocialsolidaritycanjustifythekindofsacrificesof retributivejusticetheTRC'sworkentailed. Theoutrageismorethanunderstandable,whenoneconsiderscaseslike thatofVlakplasscommanderDirkCoetzeewhotestifiedtokillingANC activistSizweKondileandburninghisbodyonanopenbonfire. Coetzeeandhismenstoodby,drinkingbeersandsmokingformorethan sevenhours,untilnothingremainedofKondile.Thesightofsucha manwalkingawayfromhistestimonycannotbutturnone'sstomach. Theinternationalcommunityhascontinuedtoexperimentwithtruth commissionsasameanstoachievetransitionaljustice.OnJuly13, 2001,theUnitedNationsTransitionalAdministrationinEastTimor (UNTAET)establishedtheCommissionforReception,Truth,and Reconciliation(CRTR).Thepurposeofthiscommissionistopromote “nationalreconciliationandhealing”afterdecadesof politicalconflictfollowingthe1975invasionandsubsequent occupationofEastTimorbyIndonesia. FollowingafailedattempttoannexEastTimorin1999, Indonesia-supportedmilitantsaresuspectedofkillingover1,000 supportersofanindependentEastTimorandcausedhundredsof thousandsofcivilianstofleetheirhomes(Stahn2001). In2011,Brazilalsocreatedatruthcommissiontoinvestigateand publicizehumanrightsabusesthatoccurredduringtheruleof Brazil'smilitarydictatorshipfrom1964–1985.Theseven-person commissionwasprovidedwithatwo-yearmandatetoinvestigatehuman rightsabusesandtocompileafilereporttobereleasedpublicly. However,doubtsregardingthetruthcommissionremainasaresultofa 1979lawthatprovidedamnestytomanyofthoseresponsibleforcrimes committedduringthemilitaryregime's rule.[30] MuchofthescholarlyliteratureontheTRCinSouthAfrica centersonthequestionofjustification,ontheattempttolocatea rationalewhichmightmakesenseofanarrangementthatgoesagainsta greatdealofouruntrainedintuitionsaboutjustice.“If justicerequirestheprosecutionandpunishmentofthosewhocommit grosshumanrightsviolations”,writesElizabethKiss(2000: 68),“thentheamnestyofferedbytheTRCviolatesjustice.Can theTRCbedefendedagainst,orinspiteof,thiscriticism?” Similarly,AmyGutmannandDennisThompson(2000:22)pointout that: Inademocraticsociety,andespeciallyinasociety thatistryingtoovercomeinjusticesofthepast,tradingcriminal justiceforageneralsocialbenefitsuchassocialreconciliation requiresamoraldefenseifitistobedefensible. KentGreenwalt(2000:191)echoesthesameconcernwhenheremindsus that, thosewhodecidewhethertoincludeamnestyasan adjuncttoatruthcommissionmustfacetwobasicissues.Does grantingamnestytomurderersandtorturersinvolvedoinginjustice? Whatmightjustifythestate'sdoingsuchan injustice? Inwhatfollows,weofferacriticalsurveyofsomeofthemost importantphilosophicaljustificationsoftheTRC.Thediscussion appliestoanytruthcommissionwithcomparablepowers(this discussionisbasedonEisikovits2004,2006). 3.2JustifyingTruthCommissions 3.2.1Deliberativedemocracy GutmannandThompson(2000)arguethatajustificationofatruth commissionneedstomeetthreecriteriarelevantforthejustification ofalldemocraticinstitutions:itmustbemoralinprinciple, inclusive,andmoralinpractice.Thefirstconditionrulesoutwhat theauthorscalltherealistjustification—theclaim thatthecompromiseembodiedintheTRCwasnecessaryinorderto avoidacivilwar.Theseconddemandsthatthejustificationemploy reasonsthatare“broadlyaccessibleandthereforeinclusiveof asmanypeopleaspossible”(2000:23).Thelastrequiresthat thejustificationbebasedonreasonsthat“aretotheextent possibleembodiedorexemplifiedbythecommission'sown proceedings”(2000:23).Thejustificationthatmostfullymeets thesethreerequirements,arguetheauthors,isonerootedinthe conceptsofdeliberativedemocracyandreciprocity.Centralto deliberativedemocracyis theideathatcitizensandofficialsmustjustifyany demandsforcollectiveactionbygivingreasonsthatcanbeaccepted bythosewhoareboundbytheaction….(2000: 35–36) This,inturn,presupposesthenotionofreciprocity whichaskscitizenstotrytojustifytheirpolitical viewstooneanother,andtotreatwithrespectthosewho make…effortstoengageinthismutualenterpriseevenwhenthey cannotresolvetheirdisagreements”(2000:36). Totheextentthatatruthcommissionpromotessuchreciprocal exchangesitismorallyjustifiable,becausesuchanexchangeis,in itself,amoralgood.Thefirstconditionisthusmet.Acommission basedinaconceptionofdeliberativedemocracyisalsoinclusive sincetheprincipleofreciprocityinvolvesappealstoreasonsthat makesensetoalargenumberofparticipantsinthepolitical process: thestandardofreciprocityalsosatisfiesthesecond requirementofjustificationbyprovidinganinclusiveperspective.A reciprocalperspectiveisonethatcannotbereasonablyrejectedby anycitizencommittedtodemocracybecauseitrequiresonlythateach personseektermsofcooperationthatrespectallasfreeandequal citizens.(2000:37) Finally,acommissioncommittedtotheprincipleofreciprocityis likelytofunctioninawaythatembodiesthatprinciple. Suchacommissionpracticeswhatitpreachesaboutthe democraticsocietythatitistryingtohelpcreate.Reciprocity servesasaguide…forthecommissionitself,callingonthe commissionersandthetestifierstopracticesomeoftheskillsand thevirtuesofthedemocraticsocietytheyarestrivingto create…theopenlyparticipatoryprocessbywhichmembersand staffoftheTRCwereappointed,andthegenerallypublicprocessin whichitsproceedingswereconducted,demonstrateditsowncommitment todemocraticpractices.(2000:37) Reciprocity,arguetheauthors,impliesanother commitment—to“theeconomyofmoraldisagreement.” Citizensmustjustifytheirpositionsbyusingtheleastcontroversial rationaleavailable.Theprincipleofeconomyencouragesthose engagedindeliberationtolookforjustifyingreasonsthatoverlap withratherthancontradictbeliefsheldbyothers.Tobemorally justifiableunderaconceptionofdeliberativedemocracy,atruth commissionneedstoeconomizeondisagreement.Anexampleof economizingintheworkofSouthAfrica'sTRCisthedecisionnotto grantblanketamnestiesandtoinsistontheindictmentofsomeofthe worstperpetrators. Theproposedjustificationpresentsseveraldifficulties.First,it assumesthatajustificationoftruthcommissionsmustmeetthesame demandsthatjustificationsofexistingdemocraticinstitutionsneed tosatisfy.Butatruthcommissionisnotademocraticinstitution. Rather,itisaninstitutionthatismeanttofacilitatethe transitionofasocietytodemocracy.Moreoftenthannot,countries undergoingsuchtransitionslackademocratictradition,haveno historyofsignificantpublicdialogue,andhavenotsecuredthe minimaleconomicconditionsrequiredformeaningfulpolitical participation.Underthesecircumstances,expectingtruthcommissions toreflectandpromotetheidealsofdeliberativedemocracymightbe tooambitious. Second,thejustificationisnotspecificenough.Itisnotclearwhy deliberativedemocracy,anditsaccompanyingattributesofreciprocity andminimizingdisagreement,justifytruthcommissionsanymorethan othertransitionalinstruments.Thus,forexample,awarcrimes tribunalmaygenerateasmuchpublicdiscussionasatruthcommission, itmaybebasedonreasonsorprinciplesaswidelyaccessibleasthose underlyingatruthcommission,anditmayinsistontryingonlythe worstoffenders,thuseconomizingonmoraldisagreements.Itseems,in otherwords,thatthedeliberativedemocracy-basedargumentjustifies morethanonetransitionalpolicy. Finally,itisquestionablewhethertheTRCcanbejustifiedthrougha deliberativedemocracyrationaleatall.Thecommissiondidnotembody aparticularlyopen,deliberativestanceinitsoperation.Though manyofitshearingswerepublic,someoftheimportantprocedures associatedwiththemwereconfidentialbydefault.Thus,forexample, theproceedingsoftheamnestycommissionwerepublic,buttheamnesty applicationsthemselves,aswellasthesupportingdocumentation, remainedconfidentialuntildeclassifiedbythe commission.Furthermore,thecommissionwasexemptfromstandardrules oflegalprocedureandevidence.Perpetratorsnamedinthetestimony ofvictims,orinthetestimonyofotherperpetrators,werenotgiven anopportunitytodefendthemselves;second-handinformation,whicha traditionalcourtwouldhavedisqualifiedashearsay,wasadmitted, etc.Nowacommissionmakingthesesortsofexceptionstotheprecepts ofproceduraljusticecanstillbejustified(forexamplebyshowing thattheseexceptionswerenecessaryforestablishingthechainof responsibilityleadingtothehigherranksofgovernment).Butitis doubtfulwhetherthebestwaytojustifyitisbyinvokinga conceptionofdeliberativedemocracy.Forpublicdeliberationtobe meaningfulandsubstantial,strongprotectionsofproceduraljustice mustbeinplace.Asmentionedpreviously,thesewerelackinginthe caseoftheTRC. 3.2.2JusticeasRecognition Asecondjustificationholdsthattruthcommissions,byfocusingon victimsandprovidingthemwiththeopportunitytotelltheirstories toasympatheticforum,recognizevictimsasmoralagentswithstories worthtelling.AsKiss(2000:73)putsit, providingaplatformforvictimsisoneofthecore tasksoftruthcommissions,notmerelyasawayofobtaining informationbutalsofromthestandpointofjustice…Thosewhose liveswereshatteredareentitledtohavetheirsufferingacknowledged andtheirdignityaffirmed,toknowthattheir“painisrealand worthyofattention”…Weaffirmthedignityandagencyof thosewhohavebeenbrutalizedbyattendingtotheirvoicesandmaking theirstoriesapartofthehistoricalrecord. TheTRCdidnotadheretothestrict,skepticalapproachtowitnesses prevalentinlawcourts.Standardlawsofevidencewere relaxed.Commissionersofferedunusualgesturesofacknowledgement suchasrisingwhenthewitnessesenteredthecourtroom,visitingthe sitesofatrocities,andparticipatinginpublicreburials(formore detailseeKiss2000:73).Thesepracticeswereaimedatmakingthe processaboutthevictimsofapartheid;witnesseswere assumedtobespeakingthetruth,andweretreatedaspeoplewith valuabletalestotellandlessonstoteach. ThejustificationoftheTRCsketchedaboveisapowerfulone.A transitionfrommassatrocityintocivilsociety,ifitistobe stableandlasting,requiresthatthevalueoftheindividuallivesof anentireclass—theclassofvictims—beaffirmed.By allowingvictimstotestifyinanuninterruptedmanner,andby creatingasettinginwhichtheirtestimonieswerepresumedtobe true,thehearingsoftheTRCinSouthAfricawentbeyondestablishing thecrimesofthesecurityforces,orpresentingthehardshipsof everydaylifeunderapartheid.Theyalsopositedblacks,forthefirst time,aspersonswhosestoriesoughttobeheardwithcareand respect.Inotherwords,notonlythecontentofthetestimonies beforetheTRCwasofsignificance;themereactofblackstestifying wastransformativeaswell.Theclassofwhites,themajorityofwhom hadsupposedthatablackmanorwomancannotbethebearerof legitimate,significantinformation,wasmadetothinkagain. However,theargumentfromrecognitionraisesaseriousdifficulty. Somevictimsarguedthattherestorationoftheirdignityrequires thatthosewhohurtthembepunished;thatinordertofeelworthyof respect,theymustknowtheirinjuriesmeritthecriminallaw's protection.Forsuchvictims,dignityismanifestednotbythe capacitytotestify,butprimarilybythecommitmentofthestateto applyitscoercivepowerontheirbehalf.Forsomeofus,inother words,thecurrencyofrecognitionispunishmentratherthan storytelling;beingrecognizedasahumanbeingagaincanconsist, firstandforemost,inknowingthatoneispartofaciviczone protectedbylaw,wheretheuseofviolenceagainstherismetwith strictsanctions.Underthisunderstanding,thenewfoundcapacityto testify,evenifcombinedwithpromisesoffutureprotectionbythe law,simplydoesnotcutit. 3.2.3Moretruth Somedefendersoftruthcommissionsclaimthatthesebodiesare betterthantrialsatproducingcomprehensiveaccountsofpastabuses. Thissuperiority,theysay,justifiescompromisesinretributive justice.InthecaseoftheTRC,itwasnotonlythedismissalof regularrulesofevidencethatallowedcommissionerstounearthmore information.Thecommission'samnesty-for-truthmechanismcreatedan incentiveforperpetratorstocomeforward.Oncetheystartedtodo so,adominoeffectresulted:offenderswhowereexposedinthe testimonyoftheircolleaguesrushedtotestifylesttheybeindicted. Furthermore,sincethecommissionwasauthorizedtodenyamnestyto anyonewhohadnotprovided“fulldisclosure”,thosewho camebeforeittriedtogiveasmuchdetailastheycould. The“moretruth”justificationisastrongone.Two observationsare,however,inorder.First,assomecriticsoftheTRC havenoted,itschoicetofocusongrosshumanrights violations—ondramaticstoriesofsuffering,hasobscuredsome oftheinstitutionalaspectsofapartheid.Thus,theinterconnections betweenbusinessandthesecurityforces,thewildlydiscriminatory practicesofmanyworkplacesandthesupportthatmanywhitemedia outletslentauthoritiesinmaskingthepracticesofapartheidwere largelyoverlookedbythecommission'swork.Insofarasthese,too, areaspectsofthetruth,theywerenotrevealedbytheTRC. Second,thefactthattheTRCwastheresultofapoliticalcompromise meantthatthereweresomeareasinwhichittreadedcarefully.Some wormcansremainedclosed.Inarecentbookonthehistoryof apartheid,TerryBell(2003:4)mentionsoneremarkableexample:as FredrickdeKlerk,SouthAfrica'slastwhiteleader,washeadingfor OslotoreceivetheNobelpeaceprizein1993,heorderedastrikeon ahouseallegedlyhousingmilitantsfromthePanAfricanCongress liberationgroup.Apolicedeathsquadendedupkillingfiveteenagers sleepinginaprivatehomeinthetownofUmtata.Theincidentwas neverinvestigatedbytheTRC. 3.2.4Forgiveness Ithasbecomefashionableoflatetospeakabouttheimportanceof forgivenessinpolitics.Forgivenessissaidtobetheonly dispositionthatallowsustobreakfreeoftheendlesscycleofblow andcounterblowcharacteristicofethnicconflict.Wearetoldthat forgivingisouronlychancetoputtorestatortured,complicated historyofassaultsandrecriminations.Onecelebratedpractitionerof politicalforgiveness,theArchbishopDesmondTutu,calledhisbookon SouthAfrica'sTruthandReconciliationCommissionNoFuture withoutForgiveness.Asthetitlesuggests,Tutuarguesthatit isonlybyforgoingresentmentandlearningtoforgiveeachotherthat SouthAfricanscouldevercreateaviabledemocracy.Cantheprospects andbenefitsofforgivenessjustifythetradeoffbetweentruthand (retributive)justiceinvolvedintheTRC's work?[31] Themostprevalentargumentinfavorofpoliticalforgiveness concernsitspotentialtoreleasevictimsandwrongdoersfromthe effectsofvindictiveness.Adesireforrevengecangeneratea never-endingviolentcycle,trappingbothsidesinadynamicofblow andresponse,eventuallydestroyingallthoseinvolved.AsGandhi famouslyputit,“aneyeforaneyecanmakethewholeworld blind.” Butforgivenessisnottheonlywaytoquellthedesirefor revenge.Wecansteerclearofrevengewithoutforgiving.Victims mightseeklegalratherthanprivatejustice.Theymightagreeto institutionalizetheirvindictivepassionsthroughtheuseofthe courts.AsMarthaMinow(1998:11)putsit,itispossible“to transfertheresponsibilitiesforapportioningblameandpunishment fromvictimstopublicbodiesactingaccordingtotheruleof law.”Thisis,inessence,therationalebehindtheattemptsto expandtheauthorityandcentralityoftheinternationalcriminal courtsinrecentdecades. Victimscan(andveryoftendo)simplymoveawayfromthesceneofthe traumaratherthanseekrevengeorengageinforgiveness.Inrecent yearstherehasbeenaquietexodusofapproximately100,000 PalestiniansfromtheWestBankandGaza,toEuropeandNorth America.MostHolocaustsurvivors,uninterestedinrevengeor forgiveness,simplymovedthousandsofmilesawayfromthesitesof theirhorrificmemoriesandsworenevertosetfootinthecountries thathadpersecutedthem.Othersreplacerevengewithcommemoration, dedicatingthemselvestothecreationandmaintenanceofmonumentsand museums.Thus,forexample,manyofthosehandingouttheIDcardsat theHolocaustMuseuminWashingtonD.C.areholocaustsurvivors,as aremanyoftheguidesinJerusalem'sYadVashemmemorial. Thebasicpoint,toreiterate,isthis:vengeancecan,indeed,bea verydangerousthing.Butonedoesnothavetoadvocateforgivenessin ordertoavoidit.Thereareotherwaystocombatit,waysthatmight befreeofsomeofthecomplications(moreonthisbelow)associated withforgiveness. Manycommentatorsassumethatforgivingistheexclusiveprerogative ofvictims.Onthisview,itisproblematictodefineaprocessof politicalreconciliationintermsofforgiveness,becauseforgivingis averyprivatebusinessthatcannotbepromotedasapolicy.While thispositionisintuitivelypowerful,wewilltakeasomewhatmore nuancedstance.Letuscallitthe“fadingprerogative” view:Whileforgivingisnotexclusivelyuptovictims,itcertainly makeslesssensetotalkaboutforgivenessthefurtherawaywemove fromthepartlydirectlyinjured.IfXgetshurtinabus bombing,shemightforgivethepersonwhoplannedtheattack.Itcan makesenseforherparentstoforgivehimtoo,thoughitisnot obviousthattheywouldbeforgivingthesamething(thenatureofthe parents'injuryisdifferentfromX's:theextentofher physicalpainwasgreaterthantheirs;thedegreeoftheiremotional anguishmighthavewellbeenhigherthanhers).Itwouldbemore problematictospeakofX'sneighborsforgivingthebusbomber forX'sinjuries,andevenmoreproblematictospeakofpeople whomXhasnevermetforgivingthebomber.Forgiveness,then, mightnotbetheexclusiveprerogativeofvictims,buttheentitlement tograntitcertainlyseemstofadeaswemoveawayfromthem.There is,inotherwords,alimitedradiusinwhichitmakessensetospeak offorgiveness.Thisdoesnot,ofcourse,meanthatwecannotthinkof politicalreconciliationintermsofforgiveness.Itonlymeansthat suchanapproachwouldexcludea(potentially)significantpartofthe communityfromtheprocess. Thereareotherdifficultieswithmakingforgivenessintoapolitical goal.Apolicyencouragingvictimstoforgivethosewhohaveharmed themrisksaddinginsulttotheirinjuries;itcaninduceasenseof moralinadequacyontopofthedevastationalreadysuffered.A victim'sreactiontosuchapolicymightrunsomethinglikethis: isn'titenoughthatIhadtogothroughallthis?Now youareexpectingmetoforgivethepersonwhodidit?Nowyouare placingthemoralburdenonme? Suchareactionsuggeststhatdemandsforforgivenessmight exacerbateratherthanquellresentment—bothtowardsthe offender,towhomthevictimdoesnotwanttooweamoraldebt,and towardsthestatethatmakessuchdemands.Ironically,then,apolicy advocatingforgivenessmightundermineoneofitsownaims—the reductionofvindictiveandresentfulpassionsafterconflict. Finally,itisworthrememberingthatforgivenessisadeeply Christiannotion.AsJ.G.Williamsputsit:“forgivenessisat thereligious,theologicalandethicalcoreoftheChristian tradition”(Ryeetal.2000:31).Thetermdoeshavean importantroleinbothJudaismandIslam,butitsstatusinthese faithsismoreambivalent.Thus,forexample,whileJudaismdoes, undersomeconditions,imposeadutytoforgive,itisnotclear whetherthisdutymustbeexercisedtowardsnon-Jews.Furthermore, Judaism,unlikeChristianity,discouragesunconditional forgiveness.Islamicdoctrinedoesstatethatforgivenessissuperior torevenge,butpermitsretributivepractices,andevenfeudingunder somecircumstances.UnlikethefamousChristianteachingencouraging theturningoftheothercheek,theKoranrecommendsamiddleway betweenabsolutevindictivenessandabsoluteforgiving.Itreads: letharmberequitedbyanequalharm,thoughanyone whoforgivesandputsthingsrightwillhavehisrewardfromGod Himself--Hedoesnotlikethosewhodowrong.(al-Shura42:40) (Haleem,M.,2004)) TheKoranalsomakesadivisionbetweenforgivableandunforgivable sins,mentioningthetrespassofshirk—therecognition ofdivinitiesotherthanAllah—asaprimeexampleofthelatter category.Finally,bothJudaismandIslamallowforforgiveness withouttheresumptionofrelationsbetweenvictimandoffender, whileChristianityinsiststhatthepossibilityoffullrestoration ofpreviousrelationsbeleftopen. Sincethedemandsandcentralityofforgivenessvarybetweenthe differentfaiths,itmightbeproblematictoincludethetermaspart ofournotionofpoliticalreconciliation,especiallyincasesof inter-religiousconflict.Eveniftheemploymentofthetermwerenot offensivetoanyone,itislikelythatdifferentreligiousparties wouldbespeakingofdifferentthingswhentheyrefertoforgiveness. This,itstrikesme,cancreatemoreconfusionthanbenefit. 4.Lustration 4.1HistoricalBackground Lustrationistheprocessofregulatinghowformergovernment officialscanparticipateinpost-conflictgovernmentandsocial structures.Inparticular,lustrationinvolvesthescreening,barring, andremovalofpublicofficialsfrompublicpositionsinthenew democraticsystemasaformofadministrativejustice. TheconceptisbasedontheancientRomanlustrumrituals,a cleansingorpurificationofanindividualorcommunitythroughthe removalofpollution.Lustrationisoftenassociatedwiththe transitionfromanauthoritarianregimetodemocraticgovernance,and inparticularwithboththedenazificationofpost-WWIIGermanyand thepost-communisttransitiontodemocracyinEasternEuropefollowing thecollapseoftheSovietUnion.Lustrationwasoriginally implementedasapartoftheadministrativereformsimposedbythe Alliesinpost-WWIIGermanyandJapan,andbystatesinWesternEurope thatwereformerlyoccupiedbytheNaziregime. FollowingtheendofWWII,theAlliesassignedthemselvesthetask ofpurgingalltracesofNazismfrombothGermangovernmentand society,thefirstlarge-scaleattemptatlustrationinthemodern era.TheBigThreeAllies(theSovietUnion,UnitedKingdom,and UnitedStates)agreedonaplanofactiontodenazifyGermanyatthe TripartiteConferenceinPotsdam.ThePotsdamAgreement,releasedon August2,1945,setthegroundworkforAlliedeffortsatpurging NazismanditsadherentsfromGermany.ThePotsdamAgreementrequired theControlCouncil(comprisedofthefourAlliedMilitaryGovernors inoccupiedGermany)to destroytheNationalSocialistPartyandits affiliatedandsupervisedorganizations,todissolveallNazi institutions,toensurethattheyarenotrevivedinanyform,andto preventallNaziandmilitaryactivityor propaganda.(II.A.3.iii) Furthermore,thesubsequentControlCouncilLawNo.2declaredthat theNaziPartyandallaffiliates,totalingmorethan60specific organizations,weretobedismantledandoutlawed. Theprocessofdenazification,however,wasnotlimitedtothe destructionofNaziorganizations.ThePotsdamAgreementalso abolishedallpoliceorganizationsthatmonitoredandcontrolled politicalactivityfortheNaziPartyandrevokedallNazi-era legislationthatestablishedlegallysanctioned“discrimination onthegroundsofrace,creed,orpoliticalopinion” (II.A.4). Oneofthemostambitiousandwide-scaleactivitiesoftheControl CouncilwasthearrestofthoseinvolvedwiththeNationalSocialist Partyanditsaffiliates,andthosewhoactivelysupportedNazism duringthewar.TheAlliedarrestprogramscalledfortheautomatic detentionofanyoneassociatedwiththeNazipoliceandsecurity services,officersholdingtherankofmajororhigherinselect branchesofthearmedforces,high-rankingmembersoftheNaziParty, andhighrankingmembersoftheGerman government.[32] Controversially,thePotsdamAgreementalsocalledfortheremoval ofNazisfromboth“publicandsemi-publicoffice,andfrom positionsofresponsibilityinimportantprivateundertakings” (II.A.6).Althoughthispolicywasbothharshandambitious,itmeshed withtheAlliedgoalofbothdestroyingtheNationalSocialistParty andensuringthatitis“notrevivedinanyform” (II.A.3.iii).Theprocessofdenazificationalsoincludedthe confiscationofallwealthandpropertyassociatedwithNazi organizationsandhigh-rankingNaziofficials,andacompletepurging oftheeducationalsystemofallNazis,Nazimaterials,and objectionablecourses.TheAlliedmilitarygovernmentalsoprohibited thedisplayofNazi“uniformsandinsignia,salutes,medals, anthems,andmusic”(Plischke1947),apolicythatremainedin forceevenafterpoliticalcontrolwasreturnedtotheGermans. Despitetheenormousamountofresourcesandenergydevotedtothe denazificationofGermany,therewereseveralproblemsassociatedwith theprocess.Oneofthebiggestimpedimentstothecomplete denazificationofpost-WWIIGermanywasthelackofqualified anti-Nazistostaffthegovernment,andinparticularthecourtsystem responsiblefortryingex-Nazis.Theshortageofqualified professionalswith“cleanrecords”,combinedwith interferencefromGermanofficialsandindifferencefromAmerican officers,ledtodisappointmentamongmanyofthosetaskedwith ensuringthecompleteremovalofNazismanditsadherentsfrom German government.[33] FollowingthecollapseoftheSovietUnionandtheiremergenceas independentnation-states,thestatesthatmadeuptheformer Czechoslovakiapracticedlustrationasamethodoftransitional justice.In1991,theCzechandSlovakNationalAssemblypassedalaw prohibitingformerCommunistPartyofficials,membersofthePeople's Militia,andmembersoftheNationalSecurityCorpsfromholdinga widerangeofelectedandcivilservicepositionsinthenew governmentforfiveyears(untilJanuary30, 1996);[34] thebanwaslater extendedanadditionalfiveyears. InHungary,a1991lawattemptedtoresetthestatureof limitationsoncrimescommittedduringtheperiodofCommunistrule (1944–1990).Hungary'sConstitutionalCourtoverturnedthis law.TheCourtlaterapprovedanamendedbill,whichlabeledthe repressionof1956as“warcrimes”and“crimes againsthumanity”,bothofwhichcarrynofinitestatuteof limitations.On9March1994,duringtheimmediaterun-uptonational elections,theHungarianParliamentpassedalustrationordinancethat placedroughly12,000“officials”underreviewinan attempttodiscoverwhoamongthemhadcollaboratedwiththesecret policeduringtheCommunistperiod.Thislistcontained Parliamentarians,high-rankinggovernmentofficials,topofficialsat theHungarianNationalbank,ambassadors,generals,topmedia operatives,police,universityofficialsandprofessors,judges,state attorneys,editors,directorsofstateagenciesandbanks,and administratorsofothersundryfinancialandgovernmentalinstitutions (Ellis1996). Twopanelswerechargedwithscreeningsuspectsbyinvestigatingtheir secretfiles.Theinvestigativeperiodwastolastsixyearsand resultswillremainsecretforthirtyyears.Severalelementsofthis lawwerefoundunconstitutionalinMarch1994,andtheParliament passedanewlawonJuly3,1996,whichprovidesforthescreeningof allindividualsbornpriorto14February1972beforetheassumption ofhigheroffice.Formeragentsandofficialsoftheinternalsecurity serviceswerethetarget.Ifthelustratedofficialdidnotresign withinthirtydays,theresultsoftheinvestigationwouldbereleased publicly,bringingpublichumiliationintoplayasatoolof lustration. ThedemiseoftheformerGermanDemocraticRepublic(GDR)in1990,and itsannexationbyWestGermany,resultedinits “colonization”byadministrators,bureaucrats,andjurists fromWestGermany.Thiswaspartlyduetothemannerinwhich re-unificationtookplace(defactoannexation),butwasalso theresultofthecompleteinadequacyoftheexistingEastGerman civilserviceinthefaceofthenewdemandsofacapitalist society.This“colonization”andtheimpositionofthe politicalandlegaljudgmentofanothercountry,aformerfoe,sets theEastGermanlustrationapartfromothersuchprocessesin post-SocialistEurope. ItwasnecessarytosupplythenewWestGermangovernmentwith moralandpoliticallegitimacyintheformerstatesofEast Germany.Thisdemandedtheprosecutionofpastcrimesundertheprior regime,butalsoapurgeofCommunistsandStasicollaboratorsfrom thecivilservice.Nopost-Communistcountryhasyetdeviseda lustrationschemewiththegoldenbalanceaddressingthesetwo competingneeds.EastGermanywasnoexception,despite—or perhapsbecauseof—therigorwithwhichlustrationwas pursued. Theambiguitiesinthedefinitionofcollaboration(incasesof collaboration,forcedcollaboration,pseudo-compliance,clandestine resistance,etc.)resultedinsimilardifficultiesinthelustration purge,whosetermsweredefinedintheEinigVrt(theTreatyof Unification)(Blankenburg1995).WestGermancivilservantsand lawyerslargelyconductedthepurgeandtheconstructionofnew institutionsinEastGermany.EastGermanlawyerswerebothunfamiliar withthenewlegalsystemandsuspectintheeyesofthenew authorities.Thenon-indigenousnatureoftheprocesswasamajor problembothinfactandpublicperception.Thescopeofthe lustrationandthesystem'sabilitytodelineateindividual responsibilityfortheCommunistregime'srepressionwereboth criticized(Blankenburg1995). TheTreatyofUnificationdealtwiththeunionofbothlegaland politicalsystems.Publicemployeeswouldbescrutinizedtodetermine iftheywerepoliticallyandideologicallyfitfor reemployment.Forcedtoreapplyfortheirpositions,publicemployees facedrejectionifStasiorotheruntowardassociationswere discovered.Theyalsofacedcriminaltrialiftheiroffenseswere deemedprosecutablebythereconstitutedcourtsystem.Mosttrials werethereforeconductedbynewWestGerman—ormorerarely, pre-screenedEastGerman—judgesunderEastGermancriminal law.Thesetrialsweremeanttobringpublichumiliationtothe convicted. TheformerleadershipoftheDDRwastriedincourtsinWestBerlin. Areasofinvestigationbythenewauthoritiesincluded:commanders responsiblefortheDDR'sborderpolicy(“shoottokill”), electionfraudatvariouslevelsofgovernance,andchargesof corruption,embezzlement,and“misuseofpublicfunds” (Blankenburg1995).Theprosecutiontookonahybridform:the suspectshadtobetriedaccordingtothecriminallawofEastGermany (whichWestGermanjuristsconsideredanUnrechtsstaat)but withtheproceduresofWestGermancourts.Theintentwasto criminalizetheCommunistregimebytreatingandprosecutingits leadershipaccordingtotherulesofanordinaryWestGermancriminal trial. IntheaftermathoftheIraqWarof2003,theBushadministration pursuedapolicyof“de-Baathification”asameansof purgingthegovernmentofSaddamsupportersandcollaborators.In contrasttopreviouslustrationeffortsfollowingWWIIandthe collapseoftheSovietUnion,theU.S.governmentinitiallyindicated thatalargenumberofbureaucratsandofficialswouldberetainedin thepost-Saddamgovernment(deYoungandSlevin2003).However,the scopeoftheUnitedStates'de-Baathificationeffortswouldsoon expandwellbeyondthatinitiallylimitedscope TheU.S.-ledCoalitionProvisionalAuthority(CPA)ultimatelyrequired agovernmentalpurgeofallBaathpartymembers,althoughtherewere exemptionsprovidedtocertainlocalcoalitions.SeniorBaathparty officialswereforbiddenfromenteringtheentirepost-Saddam administration,whileordinarymemberswerepreventedfromentering thetoplevelsofgovernment,therebyensuringthatthetoplevelsof governmentremainedcompletelyBaath-free(David2006:366).In addition,Iraq'smilitaryandpoliceserviceswerecompletely disbanded(seeYaphe2004),leavinglargenumbersoftrainedmilitary personnelwithoutworkorpurpose. SeveralproblemsemergedfromtheU.S.policyoftotal de-Baathification.Byexcludingsomanycitizenswhohadformerlyheld powerfromgovernment,theCPAultimatelyexcludedandmarginalizeda largeswathoftheIraqipopulationfrombothgovernanceandthe economy;anestimated60–75percentofthosepurgedwere unemployedbylate2003(seeTheEconomist2003andDavid 2006).Tomakemattersworse,manyofthoseexcludedwereformer militaryandpolicepersonnelwhowereseasonedcombatveteransthat nowsoughttoturntheirmilitarytrainingagainsttheU.S.-ledforces overseeingthereconstructionanddemocratizationofIraq. AsaresultofthepurgeofBaathpartmembersthroughouttheentire Iraqigovernment,theCPAwasfacedwithashortageofqualified personneltostaffthenewadministration,military,andpoliceforces (David2006:367).Thislackofqualifiedpersonnel,combinedwith intensifyingattacksagainstbothcoalitionandadministrationtargets andthesubsequentdifficultyrecruitingworkers,deeplyimpactedthe abilityofthestill-forminggovernmenttofunction.Theseflaws, whichultimatelyobstructedeffortstostabilizeIraqandcontributed tothelargenumberofcausalitiescausedbyinsurgents,willbe discussedingreaterdetailbelow. 4.2CriticismsofLustration Lustrationpoliciesareoftenboggeddownbytheparadoxicalnature ofpublictrustduringapoliticaltransition.Astrongrationalefor engaginginadministrativepurgesistosignalthatapolitical transitionisrealandthattheauthoritarianpastisbeingputto rest.Officialsresponsibleforatransitionwanttosignalthatthe emergingdemocraticpolitywilloperatedifferentlyfromitscorrupt anddangerouspredecessor.Suchsignalingisachieved,inter alia,bydisplacingthosewhowereresponsibleforadministering thecorruptandviciouspoliciesofthepast.Andsurely,publictrust doesdependoncommunicatingtoordinarycitizensthatafresh politicalstarthasbeenmade—thatanewandlawfulpolityhas beenlaunched.Ontheotherhand,publictrustalsodependsonthe functionalityandcompetenceofgovernment.Thetrainsneedtorun, licensesneedtobeissuedorrenewed,roadsneedtobemaintained, andpublicorderhastobekept.Andifthebureaucraticclassthat knowshowtodothesethingsissubtractedfrompostwarpolitics becauseofhowitbehavedunderthepreviousregime,thedaily operationofgovernmentislikelytosuffer.Andpublictrustis likelytotumbleaccordingly(thisiswhenwebegintohearthat “atleastunderSaddamthetrainsranontime”,etc.)The firstdilemmaoflustration,then,concernsitsscope:howdoesone lustrateenoughsothatpublictrust(andretributivejustice)are served,withoutlustratingsomuchthattheorgansofgovernmentare undoneandpublictrustislostasa result?[35] Itgoeswithoutsayingthatdifferentcountriesfacedifferent politicalcircumstanceswhenitcomestohowmuchlustrationtheycan carryout:EastGermanycouldaffordtopurgeitscivilservicerather severely,duetotheavailabilityofreplacementsfromtheWest.Other nations,suchasPolandandCzechoslovakia,didnothavethisluxury andhadoftentoprioritizestabilityduetotheexigenciesand inherentdangersoftheinitialtransitionperiod. Anothercomplicationimpactingthescopeoflustrationarisesfrom thedifficultyinfixingdegreesofguiltundertotalitarianregimes. Heretheproblemisnotsomuchlustratinginawaythatmaintains publictrustbut,rather,figuringoutwhatcounts,philosophically, astheappropriatedegreeofguilttojustifylustrationinthefirst place.Mid-levelofficialsinarulingpartymechanismcannotbe automaticallylabeledasenthusiasticorevenwillingsupportersof themachineryofoppression.Somewere,somepassivelyfoundtheirway intotheirrolesandstillotherswerecoercedintothem.Amorally legitimatepolicyoflustrationmusttakeintoaccountsuchgradations of guilt.[36] Buttheabilitytodeterminedegreesofculpabilityrequires expensive,lengthyinvestigationswhichareoftenbeyondthemeansof thoseorchestratingatransition. Beyondtheseproblemsofscopeliesanepistemologicaldifficulty: Lustrationpurgesandexclusionsfrequently,thoughnotalways,rely ontestimonialsandsecurityservicefileswhichareoftenofdubious accuracy.Thefilesareoftenrifewithhumanerror,exaggerations, andomissions.ThemostvaluableCommunistinformantsand collaboratorswereoftenmissingfromsurvivingsecretpolicefiles (manyweredestroyedor“disappeared”,probablyintoKGB possession)orwereshieldedduringtheprocess(Minow 2000).[37] Ontheotherhand, employeesofthesecurityservicesoftenembellishedtheiraccounts andaddedfalseinformantsintheperiodbeforeanauditsothatthey couldmeetorexceedtheirprescribed quota.[38] 5.Forgetting Havingexamined,insomedetail,threeofthemostimportantwaysin whichnationscancometotermswiththeirpast,itisperhapsfitting toconcludethisentrybyconsideringthepossibilitythatnationsdo notattemptsuchareckoning.Isthereanythingtobesaidfor forgettingintheaftermathofwar?Isthereanargumenttorecommend amnesiaasthebasisofapoliticaltransition?(foradetailed treatmentseeRotondiandEisikovits,forthcoming). Mostoften,forgettingcannotserveasthebasisforpeacemaking.It isdestructiveonboththeindividualandcollectivelevels.It compoundsthesufferingofindividualsbyforcingthemtowatchtheir tormentorswalkaroundfreely,reenterpolitics,ormaintaintheir postsinpublicserviceandthemilitary.Allofthistakesplace whiletheirownpainfulmemoriesandtraumasremainunacknowledged. Furthermore,policiesadvocatingforgetfulnessdecreasethechances thatvictimswillbecompensatedfortheirsuffering.Themostcommon institutionalproductsofsuchpoliciesarelawsgrantingamnesty. Typically,undersuchamnesties,perpetratorsareprotectedfromboth criminalchargesandcivilliability.AmandaPike,areporterforPBS' Frontline,tellsastorywhichstarklydemonstratesthecostof forgetfulnessforindividualvictims.Duringatripthroughthe CambodianprovinceofPailin,PikecameacrossSamrithPhum,whose husbandwasexecutedbytheKhmerRouge.Phumknowsthemurdererwell. Heisherneighborandheoperatesanoodleshopacrossthestreet fromherhouse.Hewasneverarrestedandneverchargedwithher husband'smurder.Thereisnoprocedurethroughwhichhecanbesued fordamages.Phummustsimplygetusedtotheideathatherhusband's killerquietlymanageshisstorenextdoor(Pike2002). Onthenationallevel,agovernmentadvocatingforgetfulnesscommits thepoliticalcorrelateofsuicide:itunderminestheabilityofthe groupofpeopleitgovernstocallitselfanation.TheFrenchthinker ErnestRenan(1882)definedanationasconsistingof twothings,which,intruth,arereallyjust one…Oneisinthepast,theotherinthepresent.Oneisthe possessionincommonofarichlegacyofmemories;theotheris currentconsent,thedesiretolivetogether,thewillingnessto continuetomaintainthevalueoftheheritagethatonehasreceived asacommonpossession. Forgettingdestroysbothelements.Itunderminesthepossibilityofa commonhistorybyexcludinganentireclassofmemories.Atthesame time,itobliteratesthedesireofformerlyhostilepartiestolive together,orthepossibilityofsocialsolidarity,bycreatinga bubbling,poisonous,poolofresentmentamonganentiregroupof people.[39] NowRenanwasfarfromnaïve.Headmitsthat “forgetting”andperhapseven“historical error”areessentialinthecreationofnationalidentity.Later headdsthat“theessenceofanationisthatallindividuals havemanythingsincommonandalsothattheyhaveforgottenmany things.”Descriptively,heissurelyright.Heroic historiographyandintentionalforgettingwasinstrumentalincreating American,Israeli,Turkish,Spanish,andFrenchcontemporary identities,tomentionbutafew.Butidentitiesbasedonamnesiaare rarelystable.Israel'snewhistorians,thecountlessyoungArmenians lobbyingparliamentsallovertheworldtorecognizetheArmenian genocidealmostacenturyafterittookplace,andtherecentSpanish “HistoricalMemoryLaw”(2007)allattestthatitis difficulttosimplyburythepast.Ifthegroupsthathavebeen forgottenarenotannihilated,theirpainfulmemoriescontinueto festeruntiltheyeventuallyeruptinrenewedconflict. Butwhatifallpartiesinvolvedinaconflictreallywanttoforget? Whatifthereisatacitorexplicitagreementnottodwellonthe past?WhatarewetomakeofMozambique,forexample,whereinthe aftermathofalong,bloodycivilwar,thecombatantsactivelyelected nottoaddresspastatrocities?Inhersuperbbookontruth commissions,Hayner(2002)describesanelectionrallyinpost-war Mozambiqueinwhichacandidatewasliterallychasedoutofahallfor bringinguptheconflict.Canwereallymakeanormativeargumentfor rememberingifbothsidesfreelychosetoforget?Onepossiblewayto makesuchanargumentisbyanalogy.Itisquitecleartousthat,in thedomesticcontext,thefactthattwosidestoaconflictagreeto burythehatchetdoesnotprecludetheirprosecutionbythecriminal justiceauthorities.Thus,iftwoneighboringfamiliesbecome entangledinamassivebrawl,duringwhichpropertyonbothsidesis destroyed,andsomeinjuriesaresustained,theDistrictAttorney's officemaydecidetoissueindictments,evenifallofthosewhodid thefightingwouldliketoputthewholeincidentbehindthem.The criminallawisnotaprivatemattercompletelyatthediscretionof citizens.Thepublichasastakeinupholdingthecriminallaw,andis understoodtobeaninterestedpartywheneveritisbroken.Afterall, intheexampleprovidedabove,widerinterestswerecompromised: trafficmayhavebeendisturbedbythefighting,thesmallchildrenof otherneighborsmayhavebeenwatching,publiclyfundedhospitalsmay havebeencalledontotreattheinjured,reportsofthefightmay havemadetheirwayintothenewsmediabringingdownhouseprices, etc.Inshort,thefight,almostanyfight,hasrepercussionsfor thirdparties.Thatiswhy,inimportantways,suchfightsare everyone'sbusiness.Andthatiswhycriminalcasesaretypically titledCommonwealthvs.JonesratherthanSmithvs.Jones. Isthereananalogousargumenttobemadeabouttheaftermathof politicalconflict?Arethereanythirdpartyintereststhatmay justifysomekindofreckoningwithmassatrocity,evenifallof thoseinvolvedwouldfreelychoosetoputthepastbehindthem?Fully answeringthisquestionisbeyondthescopeofthisentry,soweshall simplygestureatsomeofthedifficultiesthatneedtobeaddressed inordertodojusticetoit. First,whoarethethirdpartieswhoseinterestsareimplicatedbya decisiononthepartoftwowarringpartiestoburythepast?Couldwe arguethat,giventheintensemediacoveragegiventopolitical conflicts,afailuretoaddressmassiveviolationsofhumanrightsin locationX(forwhateverreason)mayendangerhumanrightsin locationY(by,say,bolsteringtheconfidenceofwouldbe perpetrators)?Ifsothethirdpartycouldbedescribed,vaguely,as theinternationalcommunity,acommunitywithaseriousinterestin creatingarobustcultureofhumanrightswhereinviolationsare documentedandaddressedratherthansimplyignored. Second,evenifweagreethatthereareinterestedthirdpartiesin theinternationalcontext,howcouldsuchpartiesensurethattheir interestsareprotected?Whatsortofenforcementpowerdotheyhave? Heretheanswersarebothlegalandpolitical.Thenascent InternationalCriminalCourtmaybeusedincaseswhereitsauthority comesintoplay.Perhapsmoresignificantly,theinternational community(or,morespecifically,themostpowerfulinternational players)mayresorttopoliticalpressure.Afterall,countriessuch asMozambique,emergingfromprolongedwars,aredesperatelydependent oninternationalaid.Donorcountriescould,accordingly,makeaid contingentontheaddressingofpastatrocities. 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HumanRightsWatch StrategicChoicesintheDesignofTruthCommissions InternationalConflictResearchInstitute(INCORE),UniversityofUlster InternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice TheInternationalJournalofTransitionalJustice EssexTransitionalJusticeNetwork UnitedStateInstituteofPeace,an“independent,federally-fundednationalsecurityinstitutiondevotedtothenonviolentpreventionandmitigationofdeadlyconflictabroad”. BeyondIntractability,attheUniversityofColoradoConflictInformationConsortium RelatedEntries cosmopolitanism| nationalism| responsibility:collective| rights:human| torture| war| worldgovernment Acknowledgments IamgratefultoThomasPoggeandtoGregFriedfortheircomments andencouragement.Thanksarealsoduetomyresearchassistantsat SuffolkUniversity,MichaelMcDonough,JosefNothmannandMarcus Taylor. Copyright©2014by NirEisikovits OpenaccesstotheSEPismadepossiblebyaworld-widefundinginitiative. 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