Francis Fukuyama Plays Defense | The New Yorker

The political theorist's latest undertaking is to make the case for liberalism amid various accounts of its decline. ... A picture of Yoshihiro ... SkiptomaincontentIfaneoconservative,asIrvingKristoloncequipped,isaliberalmuggedbyreality,whatshouldwemakeofFrancisFukuyama?In1989,whenFukuyamapublishedhislandmarkessay,“TheEndofHistory?,”hewasathirty-six-year-oldpolitical-sciencePh.D.withapristineneoconrésumé:hehadbeenAllanBloom’sprotégéatCornell;ananalystfortheRANDCorporation,themilitary-orientedthinktank;andanofficialinbothRonaldReagan’sandGeorgeH. W.Bush’sStateDepartments.Theessay,whichFukuyamalaterexpandedintoabookcalled“TheEndofHistoryandtheLastMan,”characterizedtheimpendingcollapseoftheSovietUnionaspartof“theendpointofmankind’sideologicalevolution”anddeclaredliberaldemocracytobethe“finalformofhumangovernment.”Anditlaunchedhim,practicallyovernight,asapublicintellectualofunusualprominence.Inthethirty-threeyearssincethepublicationof“TheEndofHistory?,”Fukuyamahaslightlyrevisedhisthesistoaccommodatenewdevelopments,liketheriseofanundemocraticChina;explicitlyrebukedneoconservatismaftertheIraqWar;andwrittenmorethanadozenmorebooks,bringingthesamevastgeographicalandhistoricalsweeptobearonsubjectsrangingfrombiotechnologytotheoriginsofpoliticalorder.HealsosupportedBarackObamain2008and,inrecentyears,hasendorsedsomeredistributionofwealth.Fukuyamahas,onemightsay,beencorneredbyreality,manytimesover.But,eachtime,hecomesbackfundamentallyunscathed.“Whilebulliescanstillthrowtheirweightaround,democracyandcapitalismstillhavenorealcompetitors,”hewrotecheerfullyintheWashingtonPost,in2008.In2018,hetoldTheNewStatesmanthat“peopleshouldcalmdownalittlebit”abouttheriseofilliberalgovernments.Forallhisconcessionstocurrenteventsandminorshiftsinallegiance,Fukuyamahasneverreallygivenuponhisbigidea.AsLouisMenandhasrecountedinthismagazine,Fukuyamaisaheterodoxthinkerwithinanyfield,beitpoliticaltheoryorforeignpolicy.“TheEndofHistoryandtheLastMan”reliesonanidiosyncraticreadingoftheGermanidealistphilosopherHegel,withasprinklingofNietzsche.Theyarenot,andwerenot,exactlypartofmainstreamAmericanpoliticalthought.Nevertheless,Fukuyama’svisionofliberalism—asinthepoliticaldoctrinethatfocussesontherightsofindividualsratherthananyspecificpoliticalorientationsinAmericaorEurope—hasbeenalwaysentertainingandoftenseductive,eventoskeptics.Libertyandequality,hewrote,withcharacteristicbravado,in“TheEndofHistoryandtheLastMan,”“arenotaccidentsortheresultsofethnocentricprejudice,butareinfactdiscoveriesaboutthenatureofmanasman.”Suchsweeping,affectiveobservationsarekeytoFukuyama’sstyle,whichspurnsdata-heavyeconomicsinfavorofloftyargumentsontheplaneofideas.Hislatestundertakingistomakethecaseforliberalismitselfamidvariousaccountsofitsdecline.Thesedays,proponentsofAmericanliberalismareparticularlyintrospective,sincetheworld’srichestandmostpowerfuldemocracyhasbeendentedbysuccessiveilliberalblows,fromreligiouslymotivatedlawstoaviolentlydisputedelection.LiberalismcouldscarcelyimagineabettercheerleaderinthisbleaklandscapethanFukuyama,whohasauniqueskillforimbuingasometimesponderousideologywithanarrativethrust.Hemountshisdefensein“LiberalismandItsDiscontents,”publishedthismonth.Whynow?It’snotjustbecause,astheircriticsallege,liberaldemocracieshavefailedtoliveuptotheirownidealsbutalsobecause“manyimpatientyoungGenZactivistsinAmericaandEuroperegardliberalismasanoutmodedbabyboomerperspective.”(Thetypicallyhigh-mindedFukuyama,itappears,isnotimmunetothecruderdiscoursesoftheInternet.)Thisisnothisusualmacro-historybutaslimvolume,fewerthantwohundredpages,outliningboththevirtuesandthemajorcritiquesofliberalism,andsuggestingprinciplesforitspreservation.Rightoutofthegate,however,Fukuyamasoundsdefeated.Heopenswiththedefensiveassertionthatliberalismisnotan“ ‘obsolete’doctrine,butonethatcontinuestobenecessaryinourpresentdiverseandinterconnectedworld.”Insubsequentchapters,hefieldsapainstakingarrayofargumentsagainstliberalism.Atonepointheliststencritiquesinquicksuccession,amongthemthatitis“self-indulgentlyconsumerist,”“toolackadaisicalaboutachievinggenuinesocialjustice,”and“dominatedbymanipulativeelites.”Aftersuchathoroughexcavation,Fukuyama’svisionforrevivingliberalismsoundsbothlaboriousanduninspiring.Hesuggeststhatliberalsrestoretheideology’s“normativeframework,includingitsapproachtorationalityandcognition,”“takefederalismseriously,”and“respectazoneofprivacysurroundingeachindividual”inordertopromote“democraticdeliberationandcompromise.”Hisfinalrecommendationisformoderation,andhere’showhesellsit:“Moderationisnotabadpoliticalprincipleingeneral,andespeciallyforaliberalorderthatwasmeanttocalmpoliticalpassionsfromthestart.”Fukuyamahimselfadmitsthatmostofthisisno“rousingendorsement.”Anditisevenlesssocomingfromtheonetimeprophetofliberalism’striumph.Infact,themostinterestingnarrativethatemergesfromthisbookmaybetheevolutionofitsauthor’stone,fromevangelismtodamagecontrol.ForFukuyama,thebigsurpriseofliberalism’strajectoryaftertheColdWarhasbeenthescopeandimpactofneoliberalism—thefree-marketreformsofderegulation,privatization,andausteritythatbeganinearnestinthenineteen-seventies.Hebelievesthatneoliberalism,asopposedtoclassicalliberalism,hastankedliberalism’sreputationamongyoungpeopletoday.Althoughmanyneoliberalpoliciesstartedhalfacenturyago,theireffects,likeexcessiveinequalityandfinancialinstability,aremoreplainlyvisibletohimnow.Neoliberalismisnotacompletetheoryofjustice,morals,orthegoodlifebutanarrowersetofideasaboutpoliticalandeconomicinstitutions,andhowtheyshouldworkintheserviceoffreemarkets.Itemerged,inFukuyama’saccount,asavalidreactiontobloatedmid-centurywelfarestatesintheU.S.andEurope,butwasthen“pushedtoacounterproductiveextreme.”Internationally,institutionsliketheInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorldBanksoughttoundocapitalcontrolsinmanyothercountries,triggeringfinancialcriseswith“alarmingregularity.”SomeneoliberalreformersintheU.S.andabroadalsorolledbackthesocial-welfarepoliciesthathadimprovedtheirfellow-citizens’qualityoflife.Fukuyamawritesallthisoffasananomaloushijackingofliberalprinciples:“Liberalismproperlyunderstoodiscompatiblewithawiderangeofsocialprotectionsprovidedbythestate.”ButisneoliberalismreallyseparablefromwhatFukuyamadubsclassicalliberalism?Thedistinctionhaslongbeenfuzzy;thetwentieth-centuryAustrianeconomistFriedrichHayek,forone,wasbothavocaldefenderofclassicalliberalismandaco-founderoftheMontPelerinSociety,theinternationalneoliberalforum,in1947.AndFukuyamastumblesincharacterizingneoliberalismasliberalindividualismpushedtoright-wingextremes.AsthehistorianQuinnSlobodianhasargued,thepioneersofneoliberalismwerenotfocussedonindividuals’rights;theywereconcerned,primarily,withtheinstitutionsofmarkets.Neoliberalismhasnotonlybeenabouttearingdownregulationssothatpeoplecanbuythingsmorefreelybutaboutactivelybuildingandreinforcinginstitutions,liketheWorldTradeOrganization,thatinsulatemarketsaroundtheworldfromthevagariesofnation-statesanddemocracies.Afterfivedecadesofprivatizationandausterityaroundtheworld,itisnearlyimpossibletopictureanyliberaldemocracytodaywithoutitsneoliberalinstitutions.AndFukuyamadoesn'treallytry,offeringonlyatepidsuggestiontoredistributesomewealthinordertooffsetinequality“atasustainablelevel,where[socialprotections]donotundercutincentivesandcanbesupportedbypublicfinanceonalong-termbasis.”(AcolleagueofKristol’sriffedthataneoliberalis“aliberalwhogotmuggedbyreality,buthasrefusedtopresscharges.”)AfterreadingFukuyama’schapteronneoliberalism,itbecomesclearthatthetaskaheadforliberalsisn’tmoreabstractargumentationbut,rather,devisingpracticalwaystocurbtheregulationsandbodiesthatpushdemocraciestoservemarketsinsteadoftheircitizens.ButFukuyamahasbeenanticipatingcertainotherproblemswithliberalismfordecades.In“TheEndofHistoryandtheLastMan,”hewonderedwhether,evenafterthecollapseofrivalideologieslikecommunism,liberalismmightcontaintheseedsofitsowndecline.“Couldweassumethatsuccessfuldemocraticsocietiescouldremainthatwayindefinitely?Orisliberaldemocracypreytoseriousinternalcontradictions,contradictionssoseriousthattheywilleventuallyundermineitasapoliticalsystem?”Fukuyamawrote,presciently,in1992.Atthetime,heconcludedthatitdidnot—buthedidaccuratelyidentifyseveralsorespots:liberalsocietiestendedto“atomizeandseparatepeople,”weredeleterioustocommunitylife,andwouldcontinuetoharborinequality.Whathehadunderestimatedwastheextenttowhichliberalsocietiescouldbreedhyper-individualisticconsumers,obsessedwith“self-actualization”andidentityattheexpenseofpoliticsandpublic-spiritedness.Fukuyamaisclearlyflummoxedbythescaleatwhichthesethreatshaveescalated.Andhetriestomakesenseofitbybrieflyturningthefloorovertocommunitariancriticsofliberalism,whograspedsuchissuesmuchearlier.Indoingso,heretracesamajordebateofthenineteen-eighties,whichfollowedJohnRawls’sseminalliberaltreatise,“ATheoryofJustice,”from1971.WhileRawlsianliberalismpositsthathumansarefundamentallyautonomous,communitarianslikeMichaelSandel,AlasdairMacIntyre,andMichaelWalzerarguethattheyarefundamentallyshapedbytheircommunities.Andwhereasliberalismprotectsindividuals’rightstochoosetheirownversionsofthegoodlife,thecommunitarianscounteredthatstatesorothercommunitiesshouldtakeanactiveroleinshapingacommongood.Suchargumentshaverecentlyreturnedtothepublicsphere,fromboththeleftandright.TheytouchanerveformanyintheU.S.,who,despitelivingintheworld’srichestcountry,maystillfeeltheylackcommunity,sharedvalues,orhopefulfuture.Fukuyamascrupulouslyentertainsseveralcommunitariancritiques,andevenrepudiatesRawlsforhis“elevationofchoiceoverallotherhumangoods.”Butheneverconvincinglyaccountsforthesocialandmoralvoidsthatplaguetoday’sliberalsocieties.Heturnsinsteadtoataxonomyof“thick”and“thin”politicalvisions.(Thesetermswerealsotrottedoutinearlierliberal-communitariandebates;Walzerwroteabooktitled“ThickandThin,”in1994.)“Successfulliberalsocietieshavetheirowncultureandunderstandingofthegoodlife,evenifthatvisionmaybethinnerthanthoseofferedbysocietiesboundbyasinglereligiousdoctrine,”Fukuyamawrites.Hefindstheconservativecritiquethatliberalsocieties“providenostrongcommonmoralhorizonaroundwhichcommunitycanbebuilt”tobe“trueenough,”butstrugglestocomeupwithwaysto“reimposeathickermoralorder.”Wearily,heconcludesthatthis“thinness”isa“featureandnotabug”oflifeunderliberalism.WereFukuyamareallyhopingtoconvincetheskeptics,hecouldhaveeasilyreachedwithinliberalism’sownhistoryforexamplesofhowitcanenrich,ratherthanerode,thesocialfabric.Inlate-nineteenth-andearly-twentieth-centuryEngland,theliberalismsexpoundedbyreformisteconomistslikeWilliamBeveridgeandJ.A.Hobsonhelpedestablishthemodernwelfarestate,astheOxfordscholarMichaelFreedenhasshown.Forthem,liberalismwasnotjustaboutprotectingfreechoicebutalsoaboutactivelygeneratingtheconditionsforindividualstoflourish.IntheU.S.,Progressive-eraliberalslikeHerbertCroly,whoco-foundedTheNewRepublic,in1914.sawliberalismasaboutmorethanabstractequalrights;itwasalsoaboutconcretethingslikehigherwagesandasocialsafetynet.Ratherthanshowinghowsuchvisionsofwelfarehavebeenpartandparcelofliberaldemocracies,Fukuyamaaversonlythatliberaldemocracies“remainsuperiortotheilliberalalternatives.”Alternativesfromtheleftarelargelyreducedtocaricature;Fukuyama’sbogeymenofa“progressivepost-liberalsociety”includetheevaporationofnationalborders,“essentiallymeaningless”citizenship,and“anarchist”rulealongthelinesoftheshort-livedautonomouszonesthataroseinSeattleandPortlandinthesummerof2020.Havingsummonedsuchstand-insfortheleftononeend,andthemoreobviouslyundesirablespectreofright-wingilliberalismontheother,Fukuyamaabsolveshimselffromhavingtotrulyconfrontthesocialandmaterialdeprivationofliberalism’ssubjects.It’sanoddlylow-effortpitchfromanotablystylishtheorist.Fukuyama’sfirstbookmaycontainaclueastowhy.“Wewholiveinstable,long-standingliberaldemocracies . . .cannotpicturetoourselvesaworldthatisessentiallydifferentfromthepresentone,andatthesametimebetter,”hewrotein“TheEndofHistoryandtheLastMan.”Fukuyamawrotethiswithsomeplayfulself-awareness,butitneverthelesscontainsakerneloftruthabouttheauthor’ssubjective,emotional,andearnestattachmenttoliberalism.Whilehecanaccommodateanynumberofmarginalcritiques,theideology’sattractionsandultimatesuperiorityare,forhim—toquotethatkeytextofAmericanliberalism—self-evident.Formuchofthepostwartwentiethcentury,thebestadvertisementforliberaldemocracywasAmericaitself:itseemedtohavethebestcars,themostentertainingmovies,therichestpeople.Liberalism’sprestigewasdeeplytiedtotheAmericanexample,anditwasn’tjustFukuyamawhoseideascoastedonthecountry’sprosperityandworldwidepower.InRawls’s“ATheoryofJustice,”theidealpoliticalsystem,devisedbeneaththephilosopher’sproverbial“veilofignorance,”endeduplookingalmostexactlylikethatoftheUnitedStates.JustlikeFukuyama’searlywork,Rawls’slofty,universalistideaswerebolsteredbytheUnitedStates’fortunesandwouldhavebeenludicrouswithoutthem.Today,theexampleofAmericanliberaldemocracyevokes,instead,distinctlyAmericanproblems(withhealthcare,guns,studentdebt)anddistinctlyAmericandebates(oncancelculture,mask-wearing,abortion)thathaverisenfromourparadigmsofindividualismandchoice.JustlooktotheimminentrollbackofRoev.Wade,whichestablishedawoman’srighttochooseanabortionthroughacontroversialinterpretationoftherighttoprivacy,foranexampleofhowAmerican-styleliberalismprovidesincreasinglyshakygroundforbasicsocialservices.TheU.S.isnolongertheobviousexemplarofFukuyama’stheory,andwhat’smore,italsopresentsthemostpressingcomplicationstoit.Asaresult,hisviewfinderhasnarrowedinthisbook,fromthewholeworldtotheU.S.—or,rather,towhatafractionofAmericanstalkaboutonline.Manyexamplesofliberalism’sexcessesinthisbookaredeepcutslikethefiringoftheNewYorkTimesreporterDonaldMcNeil,whichgetsnearlytwopages,andreferencespassimtoSoulcycle,QAnon,andcriticalracetheory.Fukuyama’sshrunkenhorizons,givenhispreviousœuvretacklingtheentireworld’shistory,underscorejusthowmuchliberals’ambitionshavedimmedinthetwenty-firstcentury.Theabjectfailureoftheliberalnation-buildingprojectinAfghanistan,ortheinternationalgridlockinsupportingUkraine’sfledglingdemocracyagainstRussia’spugilism,arejustafewrecentreal-worldcheckstoliberaluniversalism.NolongercananyonesaywithastraightfacethatAnglo-Americanliberaldemocracyisatimelessgood,ortheinexorablegoalofallmodernnation-states.PerhapsFukuyama’sevolutionisacuetoinsteadhistoricizeliberalismasaregionalideologythathasshapedafewlargecountries,overafewrecentcenturies.Fukuyamahasbeenadmirablyopen-mindedthroughouthiscareer,stridingdownalleysofthetwenty-firstcenturywherehewassuretohavehispocketsemptiedbycurrentevents.Butthreedecadesisalongtimeforanyonetotheorizetheworld.And,ashehimselfoncepredicted,thosewhospendtoolonginliberaldemocracy’smildclimesriskbecomingwhatNietzschedubbed“menwithoutchests”:anti-strivers,contentwiththe“humblesortofrecognition”affordedbyliberalequality.Eventalentedcitizensofliberaldemocracies,hewrote,backin1992,canendupchasing“safe,sanctionedambitions,”withnotraceof“unfulfilledlongingsorirrationalpassionslurkingjustbeneaththesurface.”It’shardnottomisstheFukuyamawhowrotethoselines,whowasupforaskingoutrageousquestionsandproposinginventivesolutions.Butit’salsohardtotellifhisdefeatistpostureisafarsightedacknowledgmentofliberalism’sdeclineorananomalousmisstep.Ifsomethinghasshakenhimoutofcomplacencyinhisnextbook,we’l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