Exit, voice, persistence neglectIn her gift: activism and altruism in Australian women's …Lemon • 被引用 3 次Compare and contrast the four ways that employees can express job dissatisfactionCategorize and explain the responses the employees have to dissatisfaction based on the ReadingImpact of job dissatisfaction in an organizationThe exit, voice, loyalty, neglect modelWhat are the consequences of satisfaction and dissatisfaction at workplaceMain reasons for employee dissatisfactionJob attitudeExpectancy theory of motivationJob satisfactionOrganizational citizenship behaviorHigher job satisfactionExit, Voice, and Loyalty Model - Wikipedia
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The Exit, Voice, Loyalty (EVL) model or Exit, Voice, Loyalty, Neglect (EVLN) is used in the fields of comparative politics and organizational behavior.
Exit,Voice,andLoyaltyModel
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Frameworkformodellingpoliticalandeconomicbehavior
TheEVLModelwiththeCitizenasplayer1andtheGovernmentasplayer2.Eisthevaluethecitizengetsfromexiting,ListhevaluetheGovernmentgetsfromtheCitizen'sloyalty,andcisthecosttheCitizenusingtheirvoice.Inthismodel,thebenefitupforgrabsbetweentheCitizenandtheGovernmentisworth1.
TheExit,Voice,Loyalty(EVL)model[1]orExit,Voice,Loyalty,Neglect(EVLN)isusedinthefieldsofcomparativepoliticsandorganizationalbehavior.Itisanextensiveformgameusedtomodelinteractionstypicallyinvolvingnegativechangestooneplayer'senvironmentbyanotherplayer.[1]TheseconceptsfirstappearedinAlbertHirschman'smorebroadlyfocused1970book,Exit,Voice,andLoyalty:ResponsestoDeclineinFirms,Organizations,andStates.[2]Acommonuseinpoliticalscienceisbetweencitizensandtheirgovernment.UsuallyinthisusetheCitizenplayerisanygroupwithinasocietyrangingfromasingleindividualtothecitizenryasawhole.[3]
Contents
1Model
1.1FormalDefinition
1.2TheoreticalDefinition
1.3Dependent/AutonomousGovernmentsandCredibleExitThreats
2DifferentOutcomes
3Applications
3.1DependentGovernment
3.2Protests
4Exit,Voice,Loyalty,NeglectModel
4.1Exit
4.2Voice
4.3Loyalty
4.4Neglect
5References
Model[edit]
TheEVLModelinvolvestwoagentsandtheirresponsestoachangeinitiatedbeforethegamebegan.ThefirstagentiscommonlyreferredtoastheCitizenandthesecondiscommonlyreferredtoastheGovernment.EVLassumesthatthechangeimplementedbeforethegamebeganwasperformedbytheGovernmentandnegativelyharmstheCitizen.
FormalDefinition[edit]
TheformaldefinitionofEVListhefollowing:[3]
Therearetwoplayers:
N
=
{
Citizen
,
Government
}
{\displaystyleN=\{{\text{Citizen}},{\text{Government}}\}}
.The
Citizen
{\displaystyle{\text{Citizen}}}
movesfirst,andchoosesamongthreeactions
{
exit
,
voice
,
loyalty
}
{\displaystyle\{{\text{exit}},{\text{voice}},{\text{loyalty}}\}}
.Ifthe
Citizen
{\displaystyle{\text{Citizen}}}
chooses
voice
{\displaystyle{\text{voice}}}
,then
Government
{\displaystyle{\text{Government}}}
caneither
respond
{\displaystyle{\text{respond}}}
or
ignore
{\displaystyle{\text{ignore}}}
.Ifthe
Government
{\displaystyle{\text{Government}}}
choosesto
ignore
{\displaystyle{\text{ignore}}}
,the
Citizen
{\displaystyle{\text{Citizen}}}
thenchoosesbetween
exit
{\displaystyle{\text{exit}}}
or
ignore
{\displaystyle{\text{ignore}}}
.Subsequenttothis(andanyotheractionchoices),thegameterminates.
Formally,thisisrepresentedbythesetofhistories
H
=
{
∅
,
(
exit
)
,
(
voice
)
,
(
loyalty
)
,
(
voice
,
respond
)
,
(
voice
,
ignore
)
,
(
voice
,
ignore
,
exit
)
,
(
voice
,
ignore
,
loyalty
)
}
.
{\displaystyleH=\{\emptyset,({\text{exit}}),({\text{voice}}),({\text{loyalty}}),({\text{voice}},{\text{respond}}),({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}}),({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}},{\text{exit}}),({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}},{\text{loyalty}})\}.}
Theterminalhistories,uponreachingwhichthegameterminates,isgivenby
Z
=
{
(
exit
)
,
(
loyalty
)
,
(
voice
,
respond
)
,
(
voice
,
ignore
,
exit
)
,
(
voice
,
ignore
,
loyalty
)
}
.
{\displaystyleZ=\{({\text{exit}}),({\text{loyalty}}),({\text{voice}},{\text{respond}}),({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}},{\text{exit}}),({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}},{\text{loyalty}})\}.}
Forallotherhistories,oneofthetwoplayersmakesamove,andthisisgivenbytheplayerfunction
P
(
∅
)
=
Citizen
,
P
(
voice
)
=
Government
,
P
(
voice
,
ignore
)
=
Citizen
.
{\displaystyleP(\emptyset)={\text{Citizen}},\P({\text{voice}})={\text{Government}},\P({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}})={\text{Citizen}}.}
Theutilityfunctionofthe
Citizen
{\displaystyle{\text{Citizen}}}
isdefinedas
u
C
(
exit
)
=
E
,
u
C
(
loyalty
)
=
0
,
u
C
(
voice
,
respond
)
=
1
−
c
,
{\displaystyle\u_{C}({\text{exit}})=E,\u_{C}({\text{loyalty}})=0,\u_{C}({\text{voice}},{\text{respond}})=1-c,}
u
C
(
voice
,
ignore
,
exit
)
=
E
−
c
,
u
C
(
voice
,
ignore
,
loyalty
)
=
0
−
c
.
{\displaystyle\u_{C}({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}},{\text{exit}})=E-c,\u_{C}({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}},{\text{loyalty}})=0-c.}
Inwords,the
Citizen
{\displaystyle{\text{Citizen}}}
incursacostof
c
{\displaystylec}
whenevertheychoosetoraisetheir
voice
{\displaystyle{\text{voice}}}
,andifthe
Government
responds
{\displaystyle{\text{Government}}\{\text{responds}}}
,theygetapayoffof
1
{\displaystyle1}
.Irrespectiveofthischoice,theycanchooseto
exit
{\displaystyle{\text{exit}}}
forapayoffof
E
{\displaystyleE}
orremain
loyal
{\displaystyle{\text{loyal}}}
forpayoffofzero.
Similarly,thepayofffunctionofthe
Government
{\displaystyle{\text{Government}}}
isdefinedas
u
G
(
exit
)
=
1
,
u
G
(
loyalty
)
=
1
+
L
,
u
G
(
voice
,
respond
)
=
L
,
u
G
(
voice
,
ignore
,
exit
)
=
1
,
u
G
(
voice
,
ignore
,
loyalty
)
=
1
+
L
.
{\displaystyle\u_{G}({\text{exit}})=1,\u_{G}({\text{loyalty}})=1+L,\u_{G}({\text{voice}},{\text{respond}})=L,\u_{G}({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}},{\text{exit}})=1,\u_{G}({\text{voice}},{\text{ignore}},{\text{loyalty}})=1+L.}
Inwords,the
Government
{\displaystyle{\text{Government}}}
incursacostofonefor
responding
{\displaystyle{\text{responding}}}
tothe
Citizen'svoiced
{\displaystyle{\text{Citizen'svoiced}}}
concerns,andgainsapayoffof
L
{\displaystyleL}
ifthe
Citizen
{\displaystyle{\text{Citizen}}}
doesnot
exit
{\displaystyle{\text{exit}}}
.
TheoreticalDefinition[edit]
TheprecursorypolicythattheGovernmenthasimplementedhastheeffectofremovingabenefitwiththevalueof1fromtheCitizenandgivingittotheGovernment.Thevaluewaschosentobe1sothatallcomparisonswithinthegamecaneasilybeconvertedtoratiosandthenadaptedtoothersituationswherethetruevalueofthebenefitisknown.
InEVL,allpossibleactionsthatcanbetakenbytheCitizenaregroupedintooneofthreeoptions.ExitoptionsarethoseinwhichtheCitizenacceptsthelossofthebenefitandinsteadalterstheirbehaviortogetthebestpossiblealternative.Examplescouldincluderelocatingassetstoavoidanewtax,reincorporatingabusinesstoavoidnewregulations,buyinggoodsfromadifferentstorewhenthequalityoftheoriginaldiminishes,votingouttheincumbent,etc.[1]ThepayoffofanExitoptionfortheCitizenisthevariableEandtheGovernmentgetstokeepthe1ittookinitially.[1][3]
LoyaltyoptionsareoneswheretheCitizenchoosestoputupwiththenewpolicyandnotaltertheirbehavior.ThepayofffortheCitizenis0astheydecidetotakethelossandtheGovernmentreceivesthe1ittookplusthevalueoftheCitizen'sLoyalty.ThevalueoftheCitizen'sLoyaltyisthevariableL.[1][3]
VoiceoptionsarewheretheCitizenmakesanactiveefforttoshowtheirdissatisfactionwiththenewpolicyandtriestogettheGovernmenttochangeitsmind.Examplescouldbelobbying,protesting,petitioning,etc.[1]VoiceoptionsdonothaveimmediatepayoffsbutareintendedtogivetheGovernmentachancetoRespondtotheCitizenandrevertthepolicy.IntheeventtheGovernmentdoesRespond,thepayofffortheCitizenisthe1theGovernmentinitiallytookminusthecostofusingVoice.Thiscostisthevariablec.IftheGovernmentchoosestoIgnorethentheCitizencanstillExitorremainLoyal.NomatterwhattheCitizenchooses,theystillhavetobearthecostofusingtheirVoiceandsothepayoffforExitwouldbeE-cand0-cforremainingLoyal.TheGovernmentwouldreceivethepayoffofL(thevalueoftheCitizen'sLoyalty)iftheychosetoRespondandrevertthepolicy,1iftheychosetoIgnoreandtheCitizenExits,and1+LiftheyIgnoreandtheCitizenchoosestoremainLoyal.[1][3]
Dependent/AutonomousGovernmentsandCredibleExitThreats[edit]
NashEquilibriaforaDependentGovernment(L>1)andaCitizenwithaCredibleExitThreat(0
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