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THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, SECOND EDITION ROBERT AUDI CAMBRIDGE ... desirable attributes (e.g. filial piety) within familial, social, ... Skiptomaincontent DuetoaplannedpoweroutageonFriday,1/14,between8am-1pmPST,someservicesmaybeimpacted. Fulltextof"Robert.Audi_The.Cambridge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy" Seeotherformats THECAMBRIDGE DICTIONARYOF PHILOSOPHY, SECONDEDITION ROBERTAUDI CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESS THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY SECONDEDITION Widelyacclaimedasthemostauthoritativeandaccessibleone-volume dictionaryofphilosophyavailableinEnglish(andnowwithtranslations intoChinese,Italian,Korean,Russian,andSpanishforthcoming),this workisnowinasecondeditionofferinganevenricher,morecompre- hensive,andmoreup-to-datesurveyofideasandthinkers,writtenbyan internationalteamof440contributors. Keyfeaturesofthissecondedition: •Themostcomprehensiveentriesonmajorphilosophers •400newentriesincluding50onpreeminentcontemporaryphiloso- phers •Extensivecoverageofrapidlydevelopingfieldssuchasthephiloso- phyofmindandappliedethics(bioethicsandenvironmental,med- ical,andprofessionalethics) •Moreentriesonnon-Westernandnon-Europeanphilosophythan anycomparablevolume,includingAfrican,Arabic,Islamic,Japa- nese,Jewish,Korean,andLatinAmericanphilosophy •BroadcoverageofContinentalphilosophy RobertAudiisCharlesJ.MachDistinguishedProfessorofPhilosophyat theUniversityofNebraska,Lincoln. BOARDOFEDITORIALADVISORS WilliamP.Alston,SyracuseUniversity D.M.Armstrong,UniversityofSydney ArthurW.Burks,UniversityofMichigan Hector-NeriCastaneda,IndianaUniversity(deceased) RoderickM.Chisholm,BrownUniversity(deceased) PatriciaSmithChurchland,UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego ArthurC.Danto,ColumbiaUniversity FredDretske,StanfordUniversity DagfinnF0llesdal,UniversityofOslo DanielGarber,UniversityofChicago AlanGewirth,UniversityofChicago RussellHardin,NewYorkUniversity WilliamL.Harper,UniversityofWesternOntario T.H.Irwin,ComellUniversity DavidKaplan,UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles NormanKretzmann,ComellUniversity(deceased) J.R.Lucas,MertonCollege,UniversityofOxford SallyMcConnell-Ginet,ComellUniversity MichaelS.Moore,UniversityofPennsylvania AlexanderNehamas,PrincetonUniversity MarthaC.Nussbaum,UniversityofChicago Onora0'Neill,UniversityofCambridge JohnPerry,StanfordUniversity RichardRorty,StanfordUniversity JohnR.Searle,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley RaimoTuomela,UniversityofHelsinki BasvanFraassen,PrincetonUniversity AllénW.Wood,YaleUniversity THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY SECONDEDITION GeneralEditor ROBERTAUDI wm Cambridge UNIVERSITYPRESS CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESS Cambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore,SaoPaulo CambridgeUniversityPress TheEdinburghBuilding,CambridgeCB22RU,UnitedKingdom PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyCambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9780521631365 ©CambridgeUniversityPress1995,1999 Thisbookisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisionof relevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplace withoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublishedinprintformat1999 iSBN-13978-0-511-07417-2eBook(Gale) iSBN-io0511-07417-4eBook(Gale) ISBN-13978-0-521-63136-5hardback ISBN-io0-521-63136-xhardback ISBN-13978-0-521-63722-0paperback ISBN-io0-521-63722-8paperback CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof urlsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhisbook,anddoesnot guaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain,accurateorappropriate. CONTENTS Contributorspageix PrefacetotheFirstEditionxxvii PrefacetotheSecondEditionxxxiii Dictionary1 AppendixofSpecialSymbolsandLogical Notation991 IndexofSelectedNames995 CONTRIBUTORS MitchellAboulafia(M.Ab.),UniversityofHouston,ClearLake:Mead FrederickAdams(RA.),CentralMichiganUniversity:algorithm,bit,cybernetics, Dretske,informationtheory,mathematicalfunction,non-monotoniclogic MarilynMcCordAdams(M.M.A.),YaleUniversity:Anselm,Ockham,Ockham's razor RobertM.Adams(R.M.A.),YaleUniversity:agape,possibleworlds,theodicy, transcendence LairdAddis(L.A.),Universityoflowa:holism,Mannheim,methodological holism JamesW.Allard(J.W.A.),MontanaStateUniversity:absolute;Alexander; Bosanquet;Bradley;Caird;Ferguson;Glanvil;Green;McCosh;McTaggart; Mansel;Martineau;More,Thomas;Price;Rashdall;Wilson DavidAllison(D.A1.),StateUniversityofNewYork,StonyBrook:Saussure, structuralism,TeilharddeChardin ClaudiodeAlmeida(Cd.A.),PontificaUniversidadeCatolicadoRioGrandedoSol: Moore'sparadox WilliamP.Alston(W.P.A.),SyracuseUniversity:theoryofappearing KarlAmeriks(K.A.),UniversityofNotreDame:Kant C.AnthonyAnderson(C.A.A.),UniversityofCalifornia,SantaBarbara:degree, intensionallogic,substitutivitysalvaveritate,variable DavidLeechAnderson(D.L.A.),IllinoisStateUniversity:Putnam RogerAriew(R.Ar.),VirginiaPolytechnicInstituteandStateUniversity:crucial experiment,Duhem,Kuhn DavidArmstrong(D.Ar.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:Longinus,Lucretius, MarcusAurelius E.J.Ashworth(E.J.A.),UniversityofWaterloo:Bruno,Campanella,Ficino, Fonseca,Gerson,Paracelsus,PicodellaMirandola MargaretAtherton(M.At.),UniversityofWisconsin,Milwaukee:Astell;Cavendish; Cudworth,Damaris;ElizabethofBohemia;Shepherd;Wollstonecraft BruceAune(B.A.),UniversityofMassachusetts,Amherst:fallibilism,problemof otherminds EdwardWilsonAverill(E.W.A.),TexasTechUniversity:qualities KentBach(K.B.),SanFranciscoStateUniversity:actionverb,criterion, metalanguage,speechacttheory,type-tokendistinction LynneRudderBaker(L.R.B.),UniversityofMassachusetts,Amherst:functionalism CONTRIBUTORS ThomasR.Baldwin(T.R.B.),UniversityofYork:Anscombe,Strawson JonBarwise(J.Ba.),IndianaUniversity:compactnesstheorem,infinitarylogic GeorgeBealer(G.B.),UniversityofColorado:property WilliamBechtel(W.B.),WashingtonUniversity:cognitivescience,connectionism LawrenceC.Becker(L.C.B.),CollegeofWilliamandMary:meritarian, meritocracyprisoner'sdilemma,situationethics MarkA.Bedau(M.A.B.),ReedCollege:artificiallife ErnstBehler(E.Beh.),UniversityofWashington:Novalis,Schlegel JoséA.Benardete(J.A.B.),SyracuseUniversity:infinity ErmannoBencivenga(E.Ben.),UniversityofCalifornia,Irvine:existential generalization,existentialinstantiation,freelogic JanBerg(J.Be.),TechnischeUniversitätMunchen:Bolzano RobertL.Bernasconi(R.L.B.),UniversityofMemphis:Gadamer BernardBerofsky(B.B.),ColumbiaUniversity:determinism, necessitarianism RodBertolet(R.B.),PurdueUniversity:presupposition,privatelanguage argument,theoryofdescriptions,token-reflexive,trope CharlesJ.Beyer(C.J.B.),StateUniversityofNewYork,Buffalo:Montesquieu JosephBien(J.Bi.),UniversityofMissouri,Columbia:Frenchpersonalism,Lukåcs, Ricoeur,Rousseau,Sorel JosephBien(J.Bi.),UniversityofMissouri,Columbia;andHeinzPaetzold(H.P.), UniversityofHamburg:Praxisschool PegBirmingham(P.Bi.),DePaulUniversity:Irigaray IvanBoh(I.Bo.),OhioStateUniversity:conditiosinequanon,enthymeme, epicheirema,eristic,imposition,logicalnotation,obversion,PaulofVenice, PeterofSpain,polysyllogism,ponsasinorum,Shefferstroke,Sherwood,square ofopposition,syllogism JamesBohman(J.Bo.),St.LouisUniversity:Adorno,criticaltheory,Erlebnis, FrankfurtSchool,Habermas,hermeneutics,Horkheimer,Marcuse,Scheler, socialaction,Verstehen,Weber DanielBonevac(D.Bo.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:philosophyoflogic LaurenceBonjour(L.B.),UniversityofWashington:apriori,Broad,coherence theoryoftruth WilliamJ.Bouwsma(W.J.B.),UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley:Calvin RaymondD.Bradley(R.D.B.),SimonFraserUniversity:contingent,infinite regressargument,necessity MylesBrand(M.B.),IndianaUniversity:volition,waywardcausalchain RichardB.Brandt(R.B.B.),UniversityofMichigan:Bentham,Ross MichaelE.Bratman(M.E.B.),StanfordUniversity:intention StephenE.Braude(S.E.B.),UniversityofMaryland,Baltimore: parapsychology DanielBreazeale(D.Br.),UniversityofKentucky:Fichte,Hölderlin,Jacobi, Reinhold,Schelling,Schiller CONTRIBUTORS DavidO.Brink(D.O.B.),UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego:emotivism,ethical constructivism,moralrealism GordonG.Brittan,Jr.(G.G.B.),MontanaStateUniversity:Enlightenment DanW.Broek(D.W.B.),BrownUniversity:bioethics,utilitarianism AnthonyBrueckner(A.B.),UniversityofCalifornia,SantaBarbara:lottery paradox,transcendentalargument JeffreyBub(J.Bub),UniversityofMaryland,CollegePark:quantumlogic AnnE.Bumpus(A.E.B.),DartmouthCollege:Thomson RobertW.Burch(R.W.B.),TexasA&MUniversity:antilogism,biconditional, conjunction,contraposition,contraries,contravalid,converse,disjunctive proposition,iff,inconsistenttriad,logicalproduet,negation,partition,sorites, truthtable,truth-value JohnBurgess(J.Bur.),PrincetonUniversity:forcing,independenceresults,tense logic ArthurW.Burks(A.W.B.),UniversityofMichigan:Babbage,computertheory, self-reproducingautomaton,Turingmachine,vonNeumann PanayotButchvarov(PBu.),UniversityofIowa:conceptualism;firstphilosophy; Hartmann,N.;metaphysicalrealism;metaphysics;naturalphilosophy; substance;substantialism RobertE.Butts(R.E.B.),UniversityofWesternOntario:Bacon,Francis;Campbell; EudoxusofCnidus;functionaldependence;Galileo;hypothetico-deduetive method;incommensurability;Jevons;lawlikegeneralization;Priestley; Spencer;testability;theory-laden;Whewell DavidCarr(D.C.),EmoryUniversity:philosophyofhistory NoélCarroll(N.C.),UniversityofWisconsin,Madison:Carlyle,Danto EdwardS.Casey(E.S.C.),StateUniversityofNewYork,StonyBrook:Jung VictorCaston(V.C.),BrownUniversity:AlexanderofAphrodisias,energeia,lekton, phantasia VictorCaston(V.C.),BrownUniversity;andStephenA.White(S.A.W.), UniversityofTexas,Austin:AndronicusofRhodes,AntiochusofAscalon AlbertCasullo(A.C),UniversityofNebraska,Lincoln:bundletheory, compresence,identityofindiscernibles RobertL.Causey(R.L.C.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:magnitude,unityof science AlanK.L.Chan(A.K.L.C.),NationalUniversityofSingapore:Ch'ien-fuLun, HoYen,hsien,HsiK'ang,hsing-ming,JuanChi,KoHung,Neo-Taoism,Po-hu tung DeenK.Chatterjee(D.K.C.),UniversityofUtah:abhinivesha,ahantä,åkåsa, anattäväda,arädhya,avidya,dharma,samådhi,Vijnänaväda RoderickM.Chisholm(R.M.C.),BrownUniversity:Ducasse BrianP.Copenhaver(B.P.C.),UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside:hermetism JohnCorcoran(J.Cor.),StateUniversityofNewYork,Buffalo:axiomaticmethod; borderlinecase;categoricity;Church;conditional;conventionT;converse, outerandinner;correspondingconditional;degeneratecase;DeMorgan; CONTRIBUTORS domarn;ellipsis;lawsofthought;limitingcase;logicalform;logicalsubject; materialadequacy;mathematicalanalysis;omega;proofbyrecursion; recursivefunction;scheme;scope;Tarski;tautology;universeofdiscourse JohnCottingham(J.Cot.),UniversityofReading:Cogitoergosum,Descartes RogerCrisp(R.C.),St.Anne'sCollege,UniversityofOxford:agathon,Anniceris, aporia,ArcesilausofPitane,epagogé,Bros,form,logos,poiésis,rigorism FrederickJ.Crosson(F.J.C.),UniversityofNotreDame:Newman,noetic, preexistence AntonioS.Cua(A.S.C.),TheCatholicUniversityofAmerica:chih1;chih-hsingho-i; ch'tian;chtin-tzu;HsiinTzu;jung,ju;kung,szu;liang-chih;LiChi;li-ch'i;Lu Hsiang-shan;pi;pien;sheng;fien-jenho-i;WangYang-ming PhillipD.Cummins(P.D.C.),UniversityofIowa:Bayle MartinCurd(M.C.),PurdueUniversity:Boltzmann,energeticism,Maxwell, Schrödinger StephenL.Darwall(S.L.D.),UniversityofMichigan:Butler,Frankena WayneA.Davis(W.A.D.),GeorgetownUniversity:analytic-syntheticdistinction; counterfactuals;inferentialknowledge;Lewis,D.K. TimothyJosephDay(T.J.D.),UniversityofAlabama,Birmingham:logical indicator,operatortheoryofadverbs JohnDeigh(J.D.),NorthwesternUniversity:ethics,motivationalinternalism C.F.Delaney(C.F.D.),UniversityofNotreDame:CriticalRealism,Dewey, hypostasis,instrumentalism,NewRealism,personalism,wisdom DanielC.Dennett(D.C.D.),TuftsUniversity:homunculus,intentionality, Mentalese,mentalism,topic-neutral MichaelR.DePaul(M.R.D.),UniversityofNotreDame:coherentism,reflective equilibrium MichaelDetlefsen(M.D.),UniversityofNotreDame:Brouwer,Gödel's incompletenesstheorems,Hilbert,HilberfsProgram,metamathematics DanielTrentDevereux(D.T.D.),UniversityofVirginia:eudaimonism,Socratic intellectualism PhilipE.Devine(P.E.D.),ProvidenceCollege:euthanasia,principleofdouble effect JohnM.Dillon(J.M.D.),TrinityCollege,Dublin:AlexandrianSchool,Ammonius Saccas,commentariesonAristotle,commentariesonPlato,Damascius, JohannesPhiloponus,MiddlePlatonism,Neoplatonism,Numeniusof Apamea,Plotinus MartinC.Dillon(M.C.D.),BinghamtonUniversity:Derrida,différance RobertDiSalle(R.D.),UniversityofWesternOntario:Helmholtz,relativity,space, space-time AlanDonagan(A.D.),CaliforniaInstituteofTechnology:Collingwood FredDretske(F.D.),StanfordUniversity:perception,sensibilia WilhelmDupré(W.D.),TheCatholicUniversityoftheNetherlands:Jaspers GeraldDworkin(G.D.),UniversityofCalifornia,Davis:paternalism,positiveand negativefreedom CONTRIBUTORS JohnEarman(J.Ea.)andRichardM.Gale(R.M.Ga.),UniversityofPittsburgh: time ElleryEells(E.Ee.),UniversityofWisconsin,Madison:equiprobable,principleof indifference,probability,regressionanalysis CatherineZ.Elgin(C.Z.E.),HarvardUniversity:Goodman BerentEng(B.E.),UniversityofWisconsin,Madison:motivationalexplanation, paradigm,paradigmcaseargument,pluralityofcauses RonaldP.Endicott(R.P.E.),ArkansasStateUniversity:Churchland,Patricia; Churchland,Paul EdwardErwin(E.Er.),UniversityofMiami:philosophyofpsychology JohnEtchemendy(J.Et.),StanfordUniversity:logicalconsequence,paradox, satisfaction,semanticparadoxes,set-theoreticparadoxes C.StephenEvans(C.S.E.),CalvinCollege:Angst,Kierkegaard SusanL.Feagin(S.L.F.),UniversityofMissouri,KansasCity:aestheticattitude, aestheticproperty,aesthetics,beautyexpressiontheoryofart,institutional theoryofart,sublime SolomonFeferman(S.Fe.),StanfordUniversity:ordinallogic,reflectionprinciples RichardFeldman(R.Fe.),UniversityofRochester:epistemicprivacy,evidence, knowledgebyacquaintance,knowledgedere ArthurFine(A.F.),NorthwesternUniversity:Einstein,quantummechanics MauriceA.Finocchiaro(M.A.F.),UniversityofNevada,LasVegas:Gramsci,Mosca RichardE.Flathman(R.E.F.),JohnsHopkinsUniversity:Arendt,Oakeshott, politicaltheory GvozdenFlego(G.Fl.),UniversityofZagreb:Blondel,Fourier,Proudhon RichardFoley(R.Fo.),RutgersUniversity:analysis,pragmaticcontradiction, subjectivism,voluntarism GraemeForbes(G.Fo.),TulaneUniversity:modallogic,operator,order,ordering, reality MalcolmR.Forster(M.R.F.),UniversityofWisconsin,Madison:curve-fitting problem DanielFouke(D.F.),UniversityofDayton:Pascal PatrickFrancken(P.F.),IllinoisStateUniversity:timeslice SamuelFreeman(S.Fr.),UniversityofPennsylvania:Rawls ElizabethFricker(E.F.),MagdalenCollege,UniversityofOxford:testimony MirandaFricker(M.F.),HeythropCollege,UniversityofLondon:feminist epistemology MichaelFriedman(M.F.),IndianaUniversity:Hempel RichardA.Fumerton(R.A.F.),Universityoflowa:Ayer,logicalpositivism, phenomenalism,protocolstatement AlanGabbey(A.G.),BarnardCollege:Boyle;CambridgePlatonists;More,Henry PierannaGaravaso(P.Gar.),UniversityofMinnesota,Morris:Beccaria,Cajetan, Gentile,Gioberti,JoachimofFloris,Labriola,MarsiliusofPadua,Medina, Pomponazzi,Rosmini-Serbati,Telesio,Valla,Vanini,Zabarella CONTRIBUTORS DanielGarber(D.Garb.),UniversityofChicago:Cordemoy,Geulincx,Goclenius, LaForge,mode,rationalism JorgeL.A.Garcia(J.L.A.G.),RutgersUniversity:cardinalvirtues,racism,virtue ethics DonGarrett(D.Garr.),UniversityofNorthCarolina,ChapelHill:Spinoza PhilipGasper(P.Gas.),CollegeofNotreDame:anti-realism,socialconstructivism BerysGaut(B.Ga.),UniversityofSaintAndrews:consequentialism,depiction, fiction,intentionalfallacy BernardGert(B.Ge.),DartmouthCollege:appliedethics,Hobbes,morality rationality,supererogation RogerF.Gibson(R.F.G.),WashingtonUniversity:corners,indeterminacyof translation,obliquecontext,ontologicalcommitment,quantifyingin, Quine CarlGinet(C.G.),CornellUniversity:memory,paradoxofanalysis AlanH.Goldman(A.H.G.),UniversityofMiami:privilegedaccess AlvinI.Goldman(A.I.G.),UniversityofArizona:naturalisticepistemology, reliabilism,socialepistemology AlfonsoGömez-Lobo(A.G.-L.),GeorgetownUniversity:hexis,PeripateticSchool LennE.Goodman(L.E.G.),VanderbiltUniversity:al-Räzi,Averroes,Avicenna, IbnDaud,Maimonides,Miskawayh,Saadiah RobertM.Gordon(R.M.G.),UniversityofMissouri,St.Louis:emotion,empathy, James-Langetheory,simulationtheory JorgeJ.E.Gracia(J.J.E.G.),StateUniversityofNewYork,Buffalo:Banez,Gradan yMorales,individuation,JohnofSaintThomas,LatinAmericanphilosophy, Mariana,Molina,OrtegayGassett,principiumindividuationis,Soto,Suårez, Toletus,Unamuno,Våzquez,Vitoria DanielW.Graham(D.W.G.),BrighamYoungUniversity:Anaxagoras, Anaximander,AnaximenesofMiletus,ancientatomism,apeiron,Democritus, Empedocles,Heraclitus,Leucippus,Milesians,pre-Socratics,Thales GeorgeA.Graham(G.A.G.),UniversityofAlabama,Birmingham:associationism, attributiontheory,behaviortherapy,cognitivedissonance,conditioning, interveningvariable,povertyofthestimulus,redintegration,sensorium, synaesthesia RichardE.Grandy(R.E.G.),RiceUniversity:Grice,Löwenheim-Skolem theorem,psycholinguistics I.Grattan-Guinness(I.G.-G.),MiddlesexPolytechnicUniversity:calculus, Euclideangeometry,non-Euclideangeometry,Peanopostulates JohnGreco(J.G.),FordhamUniversity:inferencetothebestexplanation PhilipT.Grier(P.T.G.),DickinsonCollege:Il'in,Kropotkin,Shpet NicholasGriffin(N.G.),McMasterUniversity:emotiveconjugation,mnemic causation NicholasGriffin(N.G.),McMasterUniversity;andDavidB.Mårtens(D.B.M.), MountRoyalCollege:Russell DavidA.Griffiths(D.A.G.),UniversityofVictoria:Leroux CONTRIBUTORS PaulJ.Griffiths(P.J.G.),UniversityofChicago:abhidharma,älaya-vijnäna, bhavanga,citta-mätra,dravyasat,jhåna,nirodha-samäpatti,samanantara-pratyaya, samatha,sunyatå,våsanä,vijhapti,vipassanå CharlesL.Griswold,Jr.(CL.G.),BostonUniversity:Smith CharlesB.Guignon(C.B.G.),UniversityofVermont:Heidegger PeteA.Y.Gunter(P.A.Y.G.),UniversityofNorthTexas:Bergson DimitriGutas(D.Gu.),YaleUniversity:Arabicphilosophy,IbnKhaldun,Sufism GaryGutting(G.G.),UniversityofNotreDame:Bachelard;Canguilhem;Foucault; Lacan;Maclntyre;Rorty;Taylor,Charles;Voltaire PaulGuyer(P.Gu.),UniversityofPennsylvania:Baumgarten,Cavell,Wolff KyameGyekye(K.G.),UniversityofGhana:Africanphilosophy OscarA.Haac(O.A.H.),NewYorkCity:Condillac,Constant,Cousin MichaelHallett(M.H.),McGillUniversity:Cantor,Dedekind,Skolem EdwardC.Halper(E.C.H.),UniversityofGeorgia:aitia,autarkia,dianoia, elenchus,notis,one-manyproblem,oneövermanyousia,telos JeanHampton(J.Ham.),UniversityofArizona:contractarianism,socialcontract R.JamesHankinson(R.J.H.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:Galen,Hippocrates K.R.Hanley(K.R.H.),LeMoyneCollege:Marcel RussellHardin(R.Har.),NewYorkUniversity:gametheory,Paretoefficiency, votingparadox RobertM.Harnish(R.M.H.),UniversityofArizona:Searle WilliamHarper(W.Har.),UniversityofWesternOntario:naturalkind DavidHarrah(D.H.),UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside:axiomofconsistencycut- eliminationtheorem,erotetic,fuzzyset,tonk WilliamHasker(W.Has.),HuntingtonCollege:evidentialism,justificationby faith,middleknowledge,self-referentialincoherence JohnHaugeland(J.Hau.),UniversityofPittsburgh:artificialintelligence RogerHausheer(R.Hau.),UniversityofBradford:Berlin WilliamHeald(W.He.),Universityoflowa:Bergmann PeterHeath(P.He.),UniversityofVirginia:Austin,J.L.;Carroll JohnHeil(J.F.H.),DavidsonCollege:analyticphilosophy,awareness,blindsight, Dennett,directrealism,doxastic,Kim,Molyneuxquestion,ordinarylanguage philosophy,power,preanalytic,proattitude,prototypetheory, pseudohallucination,reasonsforbelief,subdoxastic,Twin-Earth FrancisHeylighen(F.H.),PreeUniversityofBrussels;andCliffJoslyn(C.J.),State UniversityofNewYork,Binghamton:systemstheory KathleenMarieHiggins(K.M.H.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:Schopenhauer RistoHilpinen(R.Hi.),UniversityofMiamiandUniversityofTurku:epistemic logic,epistemicprinciple,KK-thesis,Peirce,tychism HaroldT.Hodes(H.T.H.),CornellUniversity:degreeofunsolvability,hierarchy, lambda-calculus,logicism JoshuaHoffman(J.Ho.)andGaryRosenkrantz(G.Ro.),UniversityofNorth Carolina,Greensboro:Boscovich,life,mereology,organism,perdurance CONTRIBUTORS AlanHolland(A.Ho.),UniversityofLancaster:environmentalphilosophy RobertL.Holmes(R.L.H.),UniversityofRochester:Gandhi,justwartheorynon- violence,pacifism,violence BrådW.Hooker(B.W.H.),UniversityofReading:ascriptivism,Brandt,casuistry, descriptivism,Hare,justice,prescriptivism,sanction TerenceE.Horgan(T.E.H.),UniversityofMemphis:folkpsychology, supervenience TamaraHorowitz(T.H.),UniversityofPittsburgh:entropy,stochasticprocess PaulHorwich(PHor.),MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology:truth PaulHo|3feld(P.Ho(3.),AlbertusMagnusInstitut:AlbertusMagnus AnneHudson(A.Hu.),LadyMargaretHall,UniversityofOxford:Wyclif DealW.Hudson(D.W.H.),FordhamUniversity:Gilson,Maritain,Mercier,Neo- Thomism CarlA.Huffman(C.A.H.),DePauwUniversity:Archytas,Philolaus,Pythagoras DavidL.Hull(D.L.H.),NorthwesternUniversity:Darwinism,mechanistic explanation,Mendel,philosophyofbiology,teleology PatriciaHuntington(P.Hu.),LoyolaUniversityofChicago:Kristeva RosalindHursthouse(R.Hu.),OpenUniversity:Foot RonaldE.Hustwit(R.E.H.),CollegeofWooster:Bouwsma SarahHutton(S.H.),London:Cockburn,Conway HarryA.Ide(H.A.I.),UniversityofNebraska,Lincoln:Cynics,Cyrenaics,Sophists, thema PhilipJ.Ivanhoe(P.J.I.),UniversityofMichigan:ChangHsiieh-ch'eng;Chang Tsai;Ch'engHao,Ch'engYi;ch'i;ching;ChouTun-yi;hsin2;hsii;Huang-Lao; I-Ching;KuoHsiang;Ii1;ShaoYung;shen;TaiChen;Taoism;tzujan;WangFu- chih;WangPi;YenYuan AlfredL.Ivry(A.L.I.),NewYorkUniversity:al-Färäbi,al-Ghäzali,cabala,Ibn Gabirol,Jewishphilosophy DaleJacquette(D.J.),PennsylvaniaStateUniversity:abstractentity,act-object psychology,Brentano,extensionalism,haecceity,impredicativedefinition, Meinong,subject-objectdichotomy,use-mentiondistinction RichardJeffrey(R.J.),PrincetonUniversity:Bayes'stheorem,computability, decisiontheory,Ramsey DavidAlanJohnson(D.A.J.),YeshivaUniversity:Bayesianrationality,doomsday argument,envelopeparadox,grueparadox,qualitativepredicate EdwardJohnson(E.J.),UniversityofNewOrleans:moralstatus,personhood MarkD.Jordan(M.D.J.),UniversityofNotreDame:Ambrose,Augustine, BernardofChartres,Eckhart,Lull,patristicauthors,TeresaofÅvila,William ofMoerbeke HwaYolJung(H.Y.J.),MoravianCollege:Bakhtin,transversality RobertHillaryKane(R.H.K.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:Arminius,Bloch,book oflife,Lequier,liberumarbitrium,principleofinsufficientreason,principleof plenitude,Renouvier,Socinianism CONTRIBUTORS TomisKapitan(T.K.),NorthernIllinoisUniversity:freewillproblem,guisetheory, practition,quasi-indicator,self-determination JacquelynAnnK.Kegley(J.A.K.K.),CaliforniaStateUniversity,Bakersfield:Royce JamesA.Keller(J.A.K.),WoffordCollege:processtheologythoughtexperiment, unityindiversity RalphKennedy(R.Ke.),WakeForestUniversity:Dutchbook,Dutchbook argument,Dutchbooktheorem,enantiamorphs,gambler'sfallacy, homomorphism,problemofthespeckledhen,self-presenting JaegwonKim(J.K.),BrownUniversity:causallaw,causation,explanation YersuKim(Y.K.),SeoulNationalUniversity:Koreanphilosophy PatriciaKitcher(P.K.),ColumbiaUniversity:Beattie PeterD.Klein(P.D.K.),RutgersUniversity:certainty,closure E.D.Klemke(E.D.K.),IowaStateUniversity:Moore VirginiaKlenk(V.K.),MoorheadStateUniversity:axiomofcomprehension, comprehension,connected,copula,counterinstance,lexicalordering,normal form,ordertypeomega,sententialconnective GeorgeL.Kline(G.L.K.),BrynMawrCollege:Bakunin,Berdyaev,Herzen, Russiannihilism,Russianphilosophy,Solovyov SimoKnuuttila(S.K.),UniversityofHelsinki:futurecontingents JosephJ.Kockelmans(J.J.K.),PennsylvaniaStateUniversity:Continental philosophy,phenomenology KonstantinKolenda(K.K.),RiceUniversity:humanism IsaacKramnick(I.K.),CornellUniversity:Burke RichardKraut(R.Kr.),NorthwesternUniversity:Plato,Socrates ManfredKuehn(M.K.),PurdueUniversity:acosmism,Haeckel,Hamann, Hamilton,Herbart,Lambert,Maimon,Reimarus,Schulze,Tetens,Vaihinger StevenT.Kuhn(S.T.K.),GeorgetownUniversity:decidability,deductiontheorem, formalism,formalize,formållanguage,ideallanguage,is,Kripkesemantics, sortalpredicate,truth-valuesemantics HenryE.Kyburg,Jr.(H.E.K.),UniversityofRochester:Carnap JohnLachs(J.La.),VanderbiltUniversity:Santayana StephenE.Lahey(S.E.L.),LeMoyneCollege:insolubilia,obligationes,sophismata, topics ThomasH.Leahey(T.H.L.),VirginiaCommonwealthUniversity:Bain,camera obscura,facultypsychology,Fechner,Hartley,hologram,ideo-motoraction, Köhler,Lewin,McDougall,Stout,Ward,Wundt JooHeungLee(J.H.L.),WrightCollege.:Bataille KeithLehrer(K.L.),UniversityofArizona:Reid DorothyLeland(D.Le.),PurdueUniversity:embodiment NoahM.Lemos(N.M.L.),DePauwUniversity:falsepleasure,Perry,value,value theory ErnestLePore(E.L.),RutgersUniversity:Davidson,dedicto,holism,principleof verifiabilitysemanticholism,verificationism CONTRIBUTORS IsaacLevi(I.L.),ColumbiaUniversity:Bernoulli'stheorem;Nagel,Ernest; reductionsentence;statisticalexplanation AndrewLevine(A.L.),UniversityofWisconsin,Madison:Althusser AlanE.Lewis(A.E.L.),AustinPresbyterianTheologicalSeminary:Arianism, Athanasius,ClementofAlexandria,henotheism,homoousios,Montanism, Pelagianism,Tertullian DanielE.Little(D.E.L.),BucknellUniversity:ethnographyethnology ethnomethodology,philosophyofthesocialsciences Shu-hsienLiu(S.-h.L.),ChineseUniversityofHongKong:Ch'enHsien-chang; ch'eng;ChiaYi;ch'ien,k'un;Ch'ienMu;Chinesephilosophy;ChuHsi;Fång; FungYu-lan;HanYii;hsing-erh-shang;HsiungShih-li;HsiiFu-kuan;Huang Tsung-hsi;HuHung;HuShih;K'angYu-wei;LiangCh'i-ch'ao;LiangSou- ming;LiAo;li-i-fen-shu;LiuShao-ch'i;LiuTsung-chou;MaoTse-tung;Mou Tsung-san;Neo-Confucianism;shan,o;SunYat-sen;t'ai-chi;T'angChiin-i; T"anSsu-tung;tao-hsin,jen-hsin;tao-t'ung;Vi,yung;fienli,jen-yu;TungChung- shu;WangCh'ung;YangHsiung;yu,wu Shu-hsienLiu(S.-h.L.),ChineseUniversityofHongKong,andAlanK.L.Chan (A.K.L.C.),NationalUniversityofSingapore:ChiaoHung BrianLoar(B.L.),RutgersUniversity:meaning LawrenceB.Lombard(L.B.L.),WayneStateUniversity:event JohnLongeway(J.Lo.),UniversityofWisconsin,Parkside:AdelardofBath,Albert ofSaxonyBoehme,Erigena,Fludd,GregoryI,JohnofDamascus,Marsilius ofInghen,NemesiusofEmesa,NicholasofCusa,Nihilexnihilofit,sensus communis,terministlogic,WilliamofAlnwick,WilliamofAuvergne MichaelJ.Loux(M.J.L.),UniversityofNotreDame:essentialism E.J.Lowe(E.J.L.),UniversityofDurham:Armstrong,Dummett StevenLuper(S.L.),TrinityUniversity,SanAntonio:Nozick EugeneC.Luschei(E.C.L.),BrownUniversity:Kotarbiriski,Lesniewski,Polish logic WilliamG.Lycan(W.G.L.),UniversityofNorthCarolina,ChapelHill:philosophy oflanguage DavidLyons(D.Ly.),BostonUniversity:Hart WilliamL.McBride(W.L.M.),PurdueUniversity:existentialism,Marx, Marxism StorrsMcCall(S.Mc),McGillUniversity:Lukasiewicz HughJ.McCann(H.J.M.),TexasA&MUniversity:actiontheory,practical reason,practicalreasoning,reasonsforaction RobertN.McCauley(R.N.Mc),EmoryUniversity:evolutionarypsychology JohnJ.McDermott(J.J.M.),TexasA&MUniversity:Emerson,James,specious present ScottMacDonald(S.Ma.),CornellUniversity:Boethius,PeterLombard, transcendentals RalphMclnerny(R.M.),UniversityofNotreDame:neo-Scholasticism,philosophia perennis,potency,synderesis CONTRIBUTORS ThomasMcKay(T.M.),SyracuseUniversity:connotation,denotation,indirect discourse,propositionalopacity,referentiallytransparent LouisH.Mackey(L.H.M.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:literarytheory,philosophy ofliterature PenelopeMackie(P.Mac.),UniversityofBirmingham:compossible,counterpart theoryorganic,organicism,process-productambiguity MichaelMcKinsey(M.M.),WayneStateUniversity:anaphora,implicature, indexical BrianP.McLaughlin(B.P.M.),RutgersUniversity:philosophyofmind ErnanMcMullin(E.M.),UniversityofNotreDame:Kepler,Mach,Poincaré EdwardH.Madden(E.H.M.),UniversityofKentucky:Thoreau, transcendentalism,Wright PenelopeMaddy(P.Mad.),UniversityofCalifornia,Irvine:class,complementary class,continuumproblem,maximalconsistentset,Schröder-Bernstein theorem,settheory,transfinitenumber G.B.Madison(G.B.M.),McMasterUniversity:Merleau-Ponty BerndMagnus(B.M.),UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside:postmodern RudolfA.Makkreel(R.A.M.),EmoryUniversity:DiltheyEinfilhlung WilliamE.Mann(W.E.M.),UniversityofVermont:accidentalism,Bernardof Clairvaux,concursusdei,dictumdeomnietnullo,emanationism,eternalreturn, infimaspecies,mysticalexperience,mysticism,Nihilestinintellectuquodnon priusfueritinsensu,paradoxesofomnipotence,Porphyry,soul,survival,tree ofPorphyry PeterMarkie(P.Mar.),UniversityofMissouri,Columbia:egocentricparticular, egocentricpredicament Jean-PierreMarquis(J.-P.M.),UniversityofMontreal:categorytheory A.Marras(A.M.),UniversityofWesternOntario:behaviorism MikeW.Martin(M.W.M.),ChapmanCollege:badfaith,falseconsciousness, institution,professionalethics,self-deception,vitallie A.P.Martinich(A.P.M.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:distribution,ensase,ens rationis,ensrealissimum,fundamentumdivisionis,notumperse,obiectumquo, pantheism,Pantheismusstreit,reism,rerumnatura,terminusaquo,theologia naturalis,theosophy JackW.Meiland(J.W.M.),UniversityofMichigan:category,categorymistake, Ryle AlfredR.Mele(A.R.M.),DavidsonCollege:accidie,akrasia,control,extrinsic desire,motivation,rationalization,Socraticparadoxes,theoreticalreason, toxinpuzzle JosephR.Mendola(J.R.M.),UniversityofNebraska,Lincoln:informedconsent, moralpsychology,rationalpsychology ChristopherMenzel(C.M.),TexasA&MUniversity:alethicmodalities,type theory MichaelJ.Meyer(M.J.M.),SantaClaraUniversity:character,dignity,Percival DavidW.Miller(D.W.M.),UniversityofWarwick:demarcation,Popper CONTRIBUTORS RobertN.Minor(R.N.Mi.),UniversityofKansas:ädhyätman,ahamkära,ahirhsä, aksara,avatar,bhakti,samsära,sat/chit/änanda,Vishnu PhillipMitsis(P.Mi.),CornellUniversity:Cicero JamesA.Montmarquet(J.A.M.),TennesseeStateUniversity:hedonism, perfectionism,summumbonum,virtueepistemology MichaelS.Moore(M.S.M.),UniversityofPennsylvania:basicnorra,cheapest- costavoider,criticallegalstudies,mensrea,M'Naghtenrule,punishment, telishment DonaldR.Morrison(D.R.M.),RiceUniversity:Xenophon StephenJ.Morse(S.J.M.),UniversityofPennsylvania:diminishedcapacity PaulK.Moser(P.K.M.),LoyolaUniversityofChicago:belief,epistemicregress argument,epistemology,foundationalism,irrationality,metaphilosophy, pretheoretical AlexanderP.D.Mourelatos(A.P.D.M.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:Abderites, EleaticSchool,homoeomerous,hylozoism,Ionianphilosophy,Melissusof Samos,Orphism,Parmenides,Xenophanes lanMueller(I.M.),UniversityofChicago:Celsus,doxographers,Hypatia, Simplicius JamesBernardMurphy(J.B.M.),DartmouthCollege:commongood,semiosis, subsidiarity StevenNadler(S.N.),UniversityofWisconsin,Madison:Arnauld,Malebranche, occasionalism,Port-RoyalLogic JanNarveson(J.Na.),UniversityofWaterloo:socialphilosophy AlanNelson(A.N.),UniversityofCalifornia,Irvine:Arrow'sparadox;ideal märket;Keynes;Mill,James;perfectcompetition;productiontheory;social choicetheory JeromeNeu(J.Ne.),UniversityofCalifornia,SantaCruz:Freud KaiNielsen(K.N.),UniversityofCalgary:Engels,historicism IlkkaNiiniluoto(I.N.),UniversityofHelsinki:coveringlawmodel,truthlikeness, vonWright CarlosG.Norefia(C.G.Nore.),UniversityofCalifornia,SantaCruz:Vives CalvinG.Normore(C.G.Norm.),UniversityofToronto:Kilwardby,Scholasticism, SigerofBrabant DavidFäteNorton(D.F.N.),McGillUniversity:Hume DonaldNute(D.N.),UniversityofGeorgia:defaultlogic,defeasibility,intension DavidS.Oderberg(D.S.O.),UniversityofReading:Geach SteveOdin(S.O.),UniversityofHawaii:Japanesephilosophy WillardG.Oxtoby(W.G.O.),UniversityofToronto:Zoroastrianism HeinzPaetzold(H.P.),UniversityofHamburg:Bodin,Erasmus,Helvétius GeorgeS.Pappas(G.S.P.),OhioStateUniversity:basingrelation,Berkeley,idea, immaterialism AnthonyJ.Parel(A.J.P.),UniversityofCalgary:Machiavelli R.P.Peerenboom(R.P.P)andRogerT.Ames(R.T.A.),UniversityofHawaii: ChineseLegalism;HsiiHsing;HuaiNanTzu;HuiShih;KuanTzu;LiehTzu;Lu- CONTRIBUTORS shihch'un-ch'iu;Mohism;SchoolofNames;ShangYang;ShenPu-Hai;ShenTao; shih1;shih2;shu1;SungHsing;TsouYen;wu-hsing;YangChu;yin,yang FrancisJeffryPelletier(F.J.P.)andIstvånBerkeley(I.Be.),UniversityofAlberta: vagueness AdriaanT.Peperzak(A.T.P.),LoyolaUniversityofChicago:Levinas PhilipPettit(P.P.),AustralianNationalUniversity:Smart EdmundL.Pincoffs(E.L.P.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:Austin,John RobertB.Pippin(R.B.P.),UniversityofChicago:Hegel AlvinPlantinga(A.P.),UniversityofNotreDame:Alston LouisP.Pojman(L.P.P.),UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,WestPoint:agnoiology agnosticism,apocatastasis,atheism,Basilides,Buchmanism,gnosticism, GregoryofNyssa,meliorism,Origen,relativism,Valentinus,Westermarck RichardH.Popkin(R.H.P.),UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles:Charron,Ha- Levi,Mendelssohn,Montaigne,Sanches,SextusEmpiricus,Skeptics JohnF.Post(J.F.P.),VanderbiltUniversity:naturalism CarlJ.Posy(C.J.P.),DukeUniversity:choicesequence,mathematical intuitionism,philosophyofmathematics WilliamJ.Prior(W.J.P.),SantaClaraUniversity:ananke,dividedline,physis,ring ofGyges,shipofTheseus,Socraticironytechne RichardPurtill(R.P.),WesternWashingtonUniversity:afortioriargument, argument,consequentiamirabilis,equipollence,equivalence,Eulerdiagram, principleofbivalence,principleofcontradiction,principleofexcludedmiddle, Venndiagram PhilipL.Quinn(P.L.Q.),UniversityofNotreDame:divinecommandethics, doubletruth,philosophyofreligion,Swinburne,transubstantiation, Trinitarianism ElizabethS.Radcliffe(E.S.R.),SantaClaraUniversity:Gay,Hutcheson,moral sensetheory,sentimentalism,ShaftesburyWollaston DianaRaffman(D.R.),OhioStateUniversity;andWalterSinnott-Armstrong (W.S.-A.),DartmouthCollege:Marcus GerardRaulet(G.Ra.),GroupedeRecherchesurlaCulturedeWeimar,Paris:Kleist, Lessing StephenL.Read(S.L.R.),UniversityofSt.Andrews:exponible,many-valued logic,pluralitivelogic,relevancelogic NicholasRescher(N.R.),UniversityofPittsburgh:idealism HenryS.Richardson(H.S.R.),GeorgetownUniversity:Nussbaum RobertC.Richardson(R.C.R.),UniversityofCincinnati:blackbox,figure- ground,neuristics,modularitysplitbraineffects,Zeigarnikeffect ThomasRicketts(T.R.),UniversityofPennsylvania:Frege MarkRoberts(M.Ro.),StateUniversityofNewYork,StonyBrook:Barthes,signifier AlexanderRosenberg(A.R.),UniversityofGeorgia:Coasetheorem,philosophy ofeconomics WilliamL.Rowe(W.L.R.),PurdueUniversity:agentcausation,antinomianism, causasui,Clarke,immanence,primemover,privation,theologicalnaturalism CONTRIBUTORS T.M.Rudavsky(T.M.R.),OhioStateUniversity:Abrabanel,Isaac;Abrabanel, Judah;Crescas MichaelRuse(M.Ru.),UniversityofGuelph:creationism,evolutionary epistemology,socialbiology BruceRussell(B.R.),WayneStateUniversity:definist,dutyegoism,good-making characteristic,intuition,self-evidence Lilly-MarleneRussow(L.-M.R.),PurdueUniversity:imagination R.M.Sainsbury(R.M.S.),King'sCollege,UniversityofLondon:soritesparadox, unexpectedexaminationparadox,Zeno'sparadoxes NathanSalmon(N.S.),UniversityofCalifornia,SantaBarbara;Kripke WesleyC.Salmon(W.C.S.),UniversityofPittsburgh:confirmation,problemof induction,Reichenbach,theoreticalterm DavidH.Sanford(D.H.S.),DukeUniversity:circularreasoning,determinable, implication,indiscernibilityofidenticals,inference,Johnson MarcoSantambrogio(M.Sa.),UniversityofCagliari:Eco DavidSapire(D.S.),UniversityofTheWitwatersrand:disposition,propensity,state RuthA.Saunders(R.A.Sa.),WayneStateUniversity:Piaget GeoffreySayre-McCord(G.S.-M.),UniversityofNorthCarolina,ChapelHill:fact- valuedistinction CharlesSayward(C.S.),UniversityofNebraska,Lincoln:conventionalism, deduction,diagonalprocedure,formålsemantics,openformula,propositional function,quantification JamesP.Scanlan(J.P.Sc),OhioStateUniversity:Lenin,Plekhanov RichardSchacht(R.Sc),UniversityofIllinois,Urbana-Champaign:Nietzsche, philosophicalanthropology FrederickF.Schmitt(F.F.S.),UniversityofIllinois,Urbana-Champaign:Goldman JeromeB.Schneewind(J.B.S.),JohnsHopkinsUniversity:classical republicanism,Crusius,Cumberland,duVair,Filmer,Godwin,Grotius, humannature,naturallaw,Prichard,Pufendorf,Scottishcommonsense philosophy,Sidgwick,Stephen CalvinO.Schrag(C.O.S.),PurdueUniversity:pluralism,praxis,speculative philosophy AlanD.Schrift(A.D.S.),GrinnellCollege:Lyotard GeorgeFSchumm(G.F.S.),OhioStateUniversity:Booleanalgebra, completeness,conditionalproof,conjunctionelimination,conjunction introduction,DeMorgan'slaws,dilemma,disjunctionelimination, disjunctionintroduction,distributivelaws,doublenegation,existential import,exportation,formållogic,Hintikkaset,logicalconstant,logistic system,meaningpostulate,modusponens,modustallens,paraconsistency, Peirce'slaw,reductioadabsurdum,relationallogic,singularterm,soundness, transformationrule,universalinstantiation,valid,well-formedformula, AppendixofSpecialSymbols Jean-LoupSeban(J.-L.S.),FacultéUniversitairedeThéologieProtestantede Bruxelles:Brunschvicg,Cournot,Couturat,d'Ailly,d'Alembert,deMaistre, CONTRIBUTORS d'Holbach,Diderot,Encyclopedia,Fontenelle,Huygens,Jansenism,Laffitte,La Mettrie,LaPeyrére,Luther,Saint-Simon,Swedenborgianism,synergism, Troeltsch,Valentinianism,Vauvenargues DavidN.Sedley(D.N.S.),ChrisfsCollege,UniversityofCambridge:Epicureanism, Hellenisticphilosophy,Stoicism KennethSeeskin(K.See.),NorthwesternUniversity:Buber,Rosenzweig KristerSegerberg(K.Seg.),UniversityofUppsala:dynamiclogic CharleneHaddockSeigfried(C.H.S.),PurdueUniversity:Paine,pragmatism DennisM.Senchuk(D.M.S.),IndianaUniversity:philosophyofeducation JamesF.Sennett(J.F.S.),McNeeseStateUniversity:Plantinga WilliamLadSessions(W.L.S.),WashingtonandLeeUniversity:Tillich StewartShapiro(S.Sha.),OhioStateUniversity:effectiveprocedure, mathematicalstructuralism,second-orderlogic DonaldW.Sherburne(D.W.S.),VanderbiltUniversity:Whitehead RogerA.Shiner(R.A.Sh.),UniversityofAlberta:Dworkin,jurynullification, legalrealism,philosophyoflaw,responsibility SydneyShoemaker(S.Sho.),CornellUniversity:Malcolm,personalidentity, physicalism,qualia,spatiotemporalcontinuity RobertK.Shope(R.K.S.),UniversityofMassachusetts,Boston:Lewis,C.I. Kwong-loiShun(K.-l.S.),UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley:chih2;ChuangTzu; chung,shu;Confucianism;Confucius;FourBooks;HanFeiTzu;hsing;jen;Kao Tzu;kowu,chihchih;IP;MoTzu;wuwei;yi;yung WilfriedSieg(W.S.),Carnegie'-MellonUniversity:Church'sthesis,consistency, formalization,prooftheory MarcusG.Singer(M.G.S.),UniversityofWisconsin,Madison:moralepistemology, polarity,universalizability GeorgetteSinkler(G.S.),UniversityofIllinois,Chicago:Bacon,Roger;Gregoryof Rimini;Grosseteste;JohnofSalisbury WalterSinnott-Armstrong(W.S.-A.),DartmouthCollege:impartiality,moral dilemma,moralskepticism MattiT.Sintonen(M.T.S.),UniversityofHelsinki:Hintikka LawrenceSklar(L.S.),UniversityofMichigan:philosophyofscience BrianSkyrms(B.Sk.),UniversityofCalifornia,Irvine:induction,inductivism, mathematicalinduction,maximinstrategy RobertC.Sleigh(R.C.Sl.),UniversityofMassachusetts,Amherst:Leibniz MichaelAnthonySlote(M.A.Sl.),UniversityofMaryland,CollegePark: satisfice HansSluga(H.S.),UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley:Wittgenstein BarrySmith(B.Sm.),StateUniversityofNewYork,Buffalo:Ingarden MichaelSmith(M.Sm.),AustralianNationalUniversity:directionoffit,moral rationalism RobinSmith(R.Sm.),TexasA&MUniversity:dialectic RobertSokolowski(R.So.),TheCatholicUniversityofAmerica:Husserl RobertC.Solomon(R.C.So.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:Camus,Sartre CONTRIBUTORS PhilipSoper(P.S.),UniversityofMichigan:civildisobedience,jurisprudence,legal moralism,legalpositivism,ruleoflaw ErnestSosa(E.S.),BrownUniversity:Chisholm,condition,justification, skepticism,stateofaffairs PaulVincentSpade(P.V.S.),IndianaUniversity:complexesignificabile,genus generalissimum,Heytesbury,Kilvington,praedicamenta,predicables,proprietates terminorum,proprium,secundumquid,suppositio,syncategoremata T.L.S.Sprigge(T.L.S.S.),UniversityofEdinburgh:ethicalobjectivism, panpsychism EricO.Springsted(E.O.S.),IllinoisCollege:Weil GeorgeJ.Stack(G.J.S.),StateUniversityofNewYork,Brockport:Avenarius; Beneke;Czolbe;Hartmann,E.von;Lange;Spir;Steiner;Stirner;Teichmuller JasonStanley(J.Sta.),CornellUniversity:Chomsky SörenStenlund(S.St.),UppsalaUniversity:combinatorylogic JamesP.Sterba(J.P.St.),UniversityofNotreDame:ideology,political philosophy JosefStern(J.Ste.),UniversityofChicago:Gersonides,PhiloJudaeus MatthiasSteup(M.St.),SaintCloudStateUniversity:Clifford,diallelon,epistemic deontologism,problemofthecriterion M.A.Stewart(M.A.St.),UniversityofLancaster:Fordyce,Ray,Stillingfleet, Turnbull FrederickSuppe(F.S.),UniversityofMaryland,CollegePark:abduction,eduction, modalityoperationalism JerePaulSurber(J.P.Su.),UniversityofDenver:Erfahrung,Feuerbach,Herder, Humboldt,Krause,Lebensphilosophie,Lotze ZenoG.Swijtink(Z.G.S.),IndianaUniversity:Beth'sdefinabilitytheorem, categoricaltheory,Craig'sinterpolationtheorem,modeltheorysatisfiable, standardmodel RichardSwinburne(R.Sw.),OrielCollege,UniversityofOxford:miracle EdithDudleySulla(E.D.S.),NorthCarolinaStateUniversity:OxfordCalculators PaulTeller(P.Te.),UniversityofCalifornia,Davis:fieldtheory,reduction LarryS.Temkin(L.S.T.),RutgersUniversity:Parfit H.S.Thayer(H.S.T.),CityUniversityofNewYork:Newton AlanThomas(A.T.),UniversityofKentatCanterbury:Williams TerrenceN.Tice(T.N.T.),UniversityofMichigan:Schleiermacher PaulTidman(PTi.),MountUnionCollege:conceivability MarkC.Timmons(M.C.T.),UniversityofMemphis:constitution;idealobserver; Nagel,Thomas;objectiverightness;resultance WilliamTolhurst(W.T.),NorthernIllinoisUniversity:externalism,freerider, slipperyslopeargument,viciousregress JamesE.Tomberlin(J.E.T.),CaliforniaStateUniversity,Northridge:Castaneda, deonticlogic,deonticparadoxes CONTRIBUTORS RosemarieTong(R.T.),UniversityofNorthCarolina,Charlotte:feminist philosophy;Taylor,Harriet J.D.Trout(J.D.T.),LoyolaUniversityofChicago:alchemy,beliefrevision, empiricaldecisiontheory,scientificrealism,uniformityofnature MartinM.Tweedale(M.M.T.),UniversityofAlberta:Abelard,Roscelin ThomasUebel(T.U.),LondonSchoolofEconomics:ViennaCircle JamesVanCleve(J.V.C.),BrownUniversity:dependence HarryvanderLinden(H.v.d.L.),ButlerUniversity:Cohen,neo-Kantianism, Windelband PetervanInwagen(P.v.L),UniversityofNotreDame:substance BryanW.VanNorden(B.W.V.N.),VassarCollege:chengming;ch'ing;Chung-yung; fa;hsiao;hsin1;Kung-sunLungTzu;LaoTzu;Ii2;Mencius;ming;shangti;Ta- hsiieh;tao;te;fien;wang,pa;yu DonaldPhillipVerene(D.P.V.),EmoryUniversity:Cassirer,Croce,Vico ThomasVinci(T.V.),DalhousieUniversity:given;immediacy;Sellars,Wilfrid; solipsism DonaldWayneViney(D.W.V),PittsburghStateUniversity:Hartshorne BarbaraVonEckardt(B.VE.),UniversityofNebraska,Lincoln:Födor StevenJ.Wagner(S.J.W.),UniversityofIllinois,Urbana-Champaign:accident, Cambridgechange,identity,peraccidens,proposition,relation WilliamJ.Wainwright(W.J.Wa.),UniversityofWisconsin,Milwaukee:deism, demiurge,Edwards,naturalreligion,Paley PaulE.Walker(P.E.W.),UniversityofChicago:al-Kindi,IbnBäjja,IbnTufayl, IslamicNeoplatonism,kalam RobertE.Wall(R.E.W.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:donkeysentences,formål learnabilitytheory,grammar,parsing CraigWalton(C.Wa.),UniversityofNevada,LasVegas:Ramus DouglasWalton(D.W.),UniversityofWinnipeg:informalfallacy,informallogic RichardA.Watson(R.A.W.),WashingtonUniversity:dualism,Gassendi, Mersenne MichaelV.Wedin(M.V.W.),UniversityofCalifornia,Davis:Aristotle RudolphH.Weingartner(R.H.W.),UniversityofPittsburgh:Simmel PaulWeirich(P.We.),UniversityofMissouri,Columbia:Allais'sparadox, bargainingtheory,Bertrand'sboxparadox,Bertrand'sparadox,Comte, Condorcet,Laplace,Newcomb'sparadox,SaintPetersburgparadox PaulJ.Weithman(P.J.W.),UniversityofNotreDame:liberalism CarlWellman(C.We.),WashingtonUniversity:Hohfeld,rights HowardWettstein(H.W.),UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside:causaltheoryof propernames SamuelC.WheelerIII(S.C.W.),UniversityofConnecticut:deconstruction StephenA.White(S.A.W.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:Lyceum,Megarians,myth ofEr,PyrrhoofElis,StratoofLampsacus CONTRIBUTORS EdwardR.Wierenga(E.R.W.),UniversityofRochester:creationexnihilo, disembodiment,divineattributes,divineforeknowledge,paradoxof omniscience MichaelWilliams(M.W.),NorthwesternUniversity:contextualism,logical construction FredWilson(F.W.),UniversityofToronto:Mill,J.S.;Mill'smethods W.KentWilson(W.K.W.),UniversityofIllinois,Chicago:ambiguitycountnoun, equivocation,formålfallacy,linguisticrelativityopentexture,theoryofsigns KennethP.Winkler(K.P.W.),WellesleyCollege:Collier,sensationalism JohnF.Wippel(J.F.W.),TheCatholicUniversityofAmerica:Aquinas,Gilesof Rome,GodfreyofFontaines,HenryofGhent,Thomism AllanB.Wolter(A.B.W.),TheCatholicUniversityofAmerica:DunsScotus NicholasP.Wolterstorff(N.P.W.),YaleUniversity:aestheticformalism, empiricism,Locke,metaphor,mimesis RegaWood(R.W.),NewHaven,Conn.:AlexanderofHales,BurleyOlivi,Richard Rufus,Wodeham W.JayWood(W.J.Wo.),WheatonCollege:Lewis,C.S. PaulWoodruff(P.Wo.),UniversityofTexas,Austin:Academyarete,dunamis, entelechy,Gorgias,hyle,hylomorphism,Isocrates,NewAcademy Thrasymachus TakashiYagisawa(T.Y.),CaliforniaStateUniversity,Northridge:definiendum, definition,intensionality,logicalsyntax,rationalreconstruction,Sapir-Whorf hypothesis YutakaYamamoto(Y.Y.),UniversityofNewHampshire:cognitivepsychotherapy KeithE.Yandell(K.E.Y.),UniversityofWisconsin,Madison:Advaita,ägarna, Ätman,BhagavadGita,Brahman,Buddha,Buddhagosa,Buddhism,Cärväka, Dharmakirti,dravya,DvaitaVedanta,Hinduism,Jainism,kala,karma, Madhva,Mädhyamika,Mahävira,Manichaeanism,måyä,Mimämsä, Nägärjuna,Nyäya-Vaishesika,Rämänuja,Sakti,Sankhya-Yoga,Shahkara, Siva,sutra,Upanishads,Vasubandhu,Vedanta,Vedas,VisistadvaitaVedanta GiinterZoller(G.Z.),LudwigMaximillianUniversity,Munich:Goethe JackA.Zupko(J.A.Z.),SanDiegoStateUniversity:Bonaventure,Buridan, NicholasofAutrecourt,WilliamofAuxerre PREFACETOTHEFIRSTEDITION Philosophyhasalwaysdoneextraordinarythingswithordinaryterms-'believe' and'know','cause'and'explain','space'and'time','justice'and'goodness',ian- guage'and'meaning','truth'and'beauty','art','religion','science','mind','per- ception','reason',andcountlessothers.Thefieldhasnumeroustechnicalterms thatarealsodifficulttodefine,butitpresentsadictionarymakerwithaneven greaterchallengebecauseofwhatitdoeswithoureverydayvocabulary.Imean notonlythekindsofcommonwordsjustlistedbutmanyperhapshumbler-sound- ingtermslike'accident','action','grammar','set',and'vague'.Alloftheevery- daytermscharacterizedinthisvolumearedefined-insomemanner-instandard dictionariesoftheEnglishlanguageorcoveredinoneoranotherencyclopedia. Butmanyreadersofphilosophy-especiallylayreadersandthoseinother fields-needsomethingquitedifferentfromboth,areferenceworkmuchmore specializedthantheformerandmuchlessvoluminousthanthelatter.However largetheymaybe,ordinarydictionaries,evenwhenaccurate,areinsufficiently informativetohelpreaderswhomustlookuptermsforphilosophicalreasons;and, evenwhenphilosophicallyilluminating,encyclopediasandspecializedreference booksareoftentoolengthy,andsometimestoodiffuse,togivereadersaconcise statementofwhatisphilosophicallycentralintheuseofaterm.Thisdictionary respondstotheneedforacomprehensive,multi-authorphilosophicalreference workthatisatonceenormouslywideinscope,intermediateinsize,andauthor- itativeincontent.Infarlessspacethanisneededforcomparableentriesinanency- clopediaofphilosophyorinahandbookdevotedtoasinglesubfield,thisvolume treatsthemultitudeofsubjectsappropriatetoadictionaryofphilosophywithsome ofthedepthmadepossiblebyspecialistauthors.Itdoesthis,sofaraspossible,in awaythatmakesmanyofitsentriesinterestingreadingforpeoplesimplycurious abouttheintriguingconceptsortheprofoundthinkersofthefield. Inthefirsthalfofthiscentury,themajorphilosophicaldictionarypublishedin EnglishwasJamesMarkBaldwin'sDictionaryofPhilosophyandPsychology,amulti- authorworkpublishedbyPeterSmithofGloucester,Massachusetts;itappeared in1901intwovolumes(followedbyabibliographyin1905)andwasreprinted withrevisionsin1925.Inthesecondhalfofthecentury,dictionariesofphiloso- phyinEnglishhavebeenmuchsmallerthanBaldwin'sandeitherwrittenbyasin- gleauthoror,occasionally,preparedbyagroupofwritersrarelymuchlargerthan adozenworkingwithintheconfinesofasmallspace.Fewoftheentriesinthese booksarelongerthan500words;themosttypicalhavebeensketchesof150words orless. Thisdictionary,bycontrast,istheworkofaninternationalteamthatincludes 381carefullyselectedcontributorsrepresentingthemajorsubfieldsofphilosophy PREFACETOTHEFIRSTEDITION andmanyphilosophicaltraditions.Itcontainssubstantialtreatmentsofmajor philosophers,manyoftheseentriesrunningtoseveralthousandwords.Ithas hundredsofentries,oftenof500to1,000words,onothersignificantthinkers,and thousandsofbriefdefinitionsofphilosophicallyimportantterms.Inaddition,it providesdetailedoverviews,somemorethan6,000words,ofthesubfieldsofphi- losophy,suchasepistemology,ethics,metaphysics,philosophyofmind,andphi- losophyofscience.Itsuppliesnumerouscross-referencestohelpreadersin comprehendingphilosophicalideas,inunderstandingtheterminologyofthedis- cipline,andinappreciatingphilosophersthemselves.Therearehundredsofentries onimportanttermsandthinkersfromnon-Westernphilosophy,forinstancefrom theChinese,Indian,Japanese,andKoreantraditions.Thedictionaryalsocoversa numberofphilosophicallysignificantthinkersandtermsfromfieldscloselyrelated tophilosophy,includingcomputerscience,economics,law,linguistics,literature, mathematics,psychologyandotherbehavioralsciences,andreligion.The Appendixdefineslogicalsymbolsandidentifiesotherspecialsymbolsusedinphi- losophy. Inanerathatisproducingaplethoraofencyclopedias,companions,handbooks, andsimilarreferenceworks,somethingmoreshouldbesaidabouttheneedfora philosophicaldictionary.Thesekindsofreferenceworksdiffersignificantly:adic- tionaryisdefinitional,thoughlikethisoneitmaybefarmorethanthat;encyclo- pedias,companions,andsimilarworkssometimesdonotdefinethetermsthat headtheirentries,andthemainpurposesoftheseworkstendtobeinformational, historical,andbibliographical.Thereisnosharpdistinctionhere;adefinitionmay beinformative,andtherightkindofinformationaboutatopiccanservetodefine theconceptinquestion.Butinpracticeagooddefinitioncaptureswhatiscon- ceptuallycentraltoitstargetsubjectinawaythatanencyclopediaorhandbook artideoftendoesnot(andneednot)doatall,andquitecommonlydoesnotdoin anybrief,initialformulation. Apuristmightthinkthatadictionaryshouldexcludeentriesonthinkersalto- gether,onthegroundthatpropernamesdonotadmitofdefinition.Evenif,strictly speaking,thisshouldbetrue,itisperfectlyintelligibletoaskwhatSocrates,for instance,meanstophilosophers,orwhohewas,philosophicallyspeaking.Such questionsaboutthinkersareamongthekindsappropriatelytreatedinaphilo- sophicaldictionaryandlikelytointerestgeneralreadersaswellasmanyinthe fieldofphilosophy.Answeringthemdoesnotrequirebibliographyorextensive biography,andtoincludeeitherofthesewouldhavemeantamuchlongerand quitedifferentvolume.Primarytextsareoftencitedinentriesthatfocuson philosophers;butthoseentriesaremainlydevotedtocentralideasofthethinkers inquestion.Ascompared,however,withtheother,muchsmallercontemporary philosophicaldictionariesinEnglish,thisonehasmoredepth,particularlyin entriesonmajorphilosophers,onsubfieldsofphilosophy,andonpivotalphilo- sophicalconcepts. AlthoughthescopeofthisvolumeextendsbeyondWesternphilosophyand indeedbeyondphilosophynarrowlyconceived,thecentralfocusisonWestern philosophersandWesternthought.Wehavesoughtcomprehensiveness,butmake nopretenseofcompleteness.Evenwithentriesandsubentriescoveringmorethan 4,000conceptsandphilosophers,wecouldnotincludeeveryphilosophicallysig- PREFACETOTHEFIRSTEDITION nificantterm,oreverythinker,thatpeopleinterestedinphilosophyorreading philosophicalliteraturemightwanttolookup.Thisappliesparticularlytotheareas wherephilosophyoverlapsotherfields,suchascognitivescience,economicthe- ory,feministstudies,linguistics,literarytheory,mathematics,philosophyandreli- gion.Wehave,however,soughttoincludeenoughentriestoassistreadersboth inapproachingagreatvarietyof"purely"philosophicaltextsandincompre- hendingasubstantialrangeofinterdisciplinaryphilosophicalworks. Toavoiddistractionandinterruptionsofthetext,internalcross-references(the "Seealso"ones)aresuppliedonlyattheendsofentries.Theexternalcross-refer- ences(the"See"ones)arealphabetizedalongwiththemainentriesandreferthe readertooneormoreentriesthatdealwiththetermorthinkerinquestion. Internalcross-referencesarenotgenerallyusedwhereitseemsobviouswhatsorts ofotherentriesmightbeconsultedforsupplementaryorrelatedinformation.The numberofinternalcross-referenceshasalsobeenkeptsmall.Thisisinparttoavoid diffusingthereader'seffortsandinpartbecausetheDictionaryhasentriesthat covermostofthephilosophersdiscussedinthetextandthevästmajorityofthe philosophicaltermsthecontributorsuseintheirentries.Pursuingthecross-refer- encesthataresupplied,however,willoftenleadtootherusefulonesandtoabet- terunderstandingofthetopicareaderoriginallylooksup. ManyphilosophersstilllivingwhentheDictionarywenttopressarecitedin theIndexofNames,whichlists,foreachnamecited,oneormoreentriesprovid- inginformationaboutthepersoninquestion.Thenamesincludedrepresentmore than600philosophersandthinkersfromallperiodsofphilosophywhoarenot subjectsofentriesdevotedentirelytotheirwork.Thereareseveralreasonswhy theDictionarydoesnotcontainentriesfocusingentirelyonlivingfigures.Above all,manywhowouldhavesuchentries,includingmostoftheseniorphilosophers citedintheIndex,arestillproducingphilosophicalwork,anditshouldnotbepre- sumedthatadequateportraitsofthemcanbedoneatthistime.Thetaskofwrit- ingadescriptionthatisbothsufficientlyshortforavolumelikethisand intellectuallyadequateisoftenimpossiblewithoutameasureofhistoricaldistance. Inmanycases,readerswillfindhelpfulinformationthroughtheIndex,whichlists hundredsofcontemporaryphilosophersandmanyotherthinkers(thoughbyno meansallofthenumerouspersonalnamesmentionedinthemainentries).There are,ofcourse,manyimportantfiguresinthefieldwhomcontributorsunfortu- natelycouldnotbringintothetightconfinesoftheirentries. Somereadersmightbesurprisedtofindthatthereisnoentrysimplyonphi- losophyitself.Thisispartlybecausenoshortdefinitionisadequate.Itwillnotdo todefine'philosophy'intheetymologicalwaymanyhave,as'theloveofwisdom': grantingthatitisnaturalforphilosopherstolovewisdomandformanyloversof wisdomtobeinspiredtopursuephilosophy,aloverofwisdomcanbequite unphilosophical,andevenagoodphilosophercanbewiseinatmostafew domainsofinquiry.Perhapsagreatmanyphilosophers(thoughcertainlynotall ofthem)wouldagreethatphilosophyisroughlythecritical,normallysystematic, studyofanunlimitedrangeofideasandissues;butthischaracterizationsaysnötn- ingaboutwhatsortsofideasandissuesarecentralinphilosophyoraboutitsdis- tinctivemethodsofstudyingthem.Inaway,thisdictionaryasawholepresentsa conceptionofphilosophy,onethatisrichincontentandwidelyrepresentativeof PREFACETOTHEFIRSTEDITION whathasbeen,is,andperhapswilllongcontinuetobe,generallyviewedasphilo- sophicalwork.Thosewantingasenseofwhatagooddefinitionof'philosophy' mustencompassmightfruitfullyconsiderhowonecandefinetheconcernscen- traltoanumberofmajorphilosophersrepresentingdifferentperiods,stylesofphi- losophy,andcultures.OnesuchlistmightincludePlato,Aristotle,Aquinas, Descartes,Hume,Kant,Hegel,Mill,Peirce,Heidegger,andWittgenstein.Wemight alsotrytoconstructaunifyingcharacterizationofsomeofthebasicfieldsofphi- losophy-forinstanceepistemology,ethics,logic,andmetaphysics-andbeyond this,oneshouldalsoconsiderwhatiscentralinsuchsubfieldsasaesthetics,phi- losophyofhistory,philosophyoflanguage,philosophyoflogic,philosophyof mind,philosophyofreligion,andphilosophyofscience.Readingtheentrieson thesephilosophersandfieldswillprobablyyieldamuchbetterindicationofwhat philosophyisthanwecouldexpectfromevenathousand-wordentry. Threefeaturesofthetextmay,forsomereaders,needcomment.First,follow- ingapracticecommonamongcarefulphilosophicalwriters,weplacesinglequo- tationmarksaroundwordsorlongerexpressionswhenthoseexpressionsare namedordirectlyreferredto,aswhereonesaysthattheterm'argument'maydes- ignateeithertheprocessofarguingoranargumentpresentedtherein.Thesecond pointconcernstermsbeginningwith'non',suchas'non-mental'.Exceptwhere suchtermshaveawell-establisheduseaswordswhosemeaningis,likethatof 'nonviolence'and'noncombatant',notmerelythatofthenegationoftheirbasic, positiveelement,ourpracticeistoplaceahyphenafter'non'.Anexampleshould bringoutthedifference.Anythingatallthatisnotacombatant-anythingfrom shipsandshoesandsealingwaxtohills,brooks,standinglakes,andgroves-isa ttow-combatant,butthesethingsarenottherebynoncombatants.Thus,'noncom- batant','nonviolence','nonstarter',and'noncognitivism'appearasjustwritten, whereas'non-mental'and'non-inferential'arehyphenated.Thispracticereflects anaturaltendencyofmostphilosophersandmaybegroundedpartlyinthesense thatwhenusedtoformacomplementaryterm,'non'playsaspecialandvery importantrole:morethatofanoperatoronanestablishedtermthantheroleofa prefixcreatingasemanticallydistinctiveterm.Thethirdpointhereconcernsthe substitutionofaneverydaywordforatermoftenusedbyphilosophersinatech- nicalway.Bothforbrevityandtoaidreadersnotfamiliarwiththetechnicaluse of'justincase',wehavefrequentlyused'provided'insteadof'justincase'where thelatterisequivalentto'ifandonlyif.Thissubstitutionmighthavegoneunno- ticedbyanyoneotherthanthecontributorsaffectedbyit,andnooneconsulted onthematterhasjudgedthatthesubstitutionalterscontent;butImentionthe changejustincaseanyoneshouldbecuriousaboutit. Itisprobablyimpossibletoproduceaworkofthiskindwithouterrors,espe- ciallyerrorsofomission.Comprehensiveness,ofcourse,doesnotrequirecom- pleteness(supposingthereisaclearnotionofcompletenessforaworklikethis); noriscompletenessevenpossibleinadictionarycoveringadynamicandgrowing field.Iwouldbehappytoreceivecommentsorcorrectionsandwillundertaketo sendthemtotheappropriatecontributor(s)andtofiléthemforpossiblefuture use.Twofurthercommentsmaybeinorderhere.First,althoughthelengthofthe entriesisnotunrelatedtotheimportanceoftheirtopics,otherfactors,suchasthe complexityoftheconceptinquestion,thedegreeofcurrentorrecentinterestin PREFACETOTHEFIRSTEDITION it,andthestyleandwishesofthecontributors,havealsofiguredindetermining length.Second,althoughauthorswereaskedtostriveforthehighestlevelofacces- sibilityappropriatetotheirtopics,someentriesarenotintendedtobefullyintel- ligibletoeveryreader(and,iftheywere,wouldillservethosewhoneedthem). Wetrustthatalloftheentrieshavesomethingofvalueforanyinterestedreader; butsomeareintendedtogivespecializedortechnicalinformation,andotherspro- ceedtospecializedortechnicalmattersshortlyafteranopeningthatismeantto providewhatislikelytobeessentialforanyreaderconsultingtheentry. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SpecialthanksareduetotheBoardofAdvisors,whoplayedamajorpartindeter- miningtheselectionofentries.Anumberofthemcarefullystudiedlongprelimi- naryentrylistsIsentthemandalsoreviewedsampledraftsofentries.Forwork farbeyondthecallofdutyIwouldparticularlyliketothankWilliamP.Alston, ArthurW.Burks,RoderickM.Chisholm,DanielGarber,TerenceIrwin,Norman Kretzmann,JohnLucas,JohnPerryandAllénWood,allofwhomrepeatedlypro- videdcommentsandadvice.Iamalsogratefulforsubstantialhelp,duringatleast onestage,fromthelateHector-NeriCastanedaandfromFredDretske,Sally McConnell-Ginet,MichaelMoore,Onora0'Neill,RichardRorty,andRaimo Tuomela. Ifthereisanysinglepersonwhoståndsoutasajudicious,steady,andperva- siveinfluenceinthedevelopmentofthisdictionaryitisTerenceMoore,Executive EditoratCambridgeUniversityPress.Hepersuadedmetoundertaketheworkof Editor-in-Chiefinthefirstplace,helpedinthedevelopmentofthevolumeateach formativestage,andprovidededitorialadviceineverymajorphase.Withasharp criticaleye,heattendedtofinepointsofstyleandorganization;heproposed authors,topics,andprocedures;andheguidedthedesignofboththetextandits cover. Manyofthecontributorsprovidedindispensableadvicealongtheway,andI amdeeplygratefulfortheirhelp.Alargenumberofthemrevisedtheirentriesin thelightofeditorialcomments,sometimesmorethanonce.Manyalsosponta- neouslysentmeupdatedversionsorimprovementsduringtheyearsoftheproj- ect.Formypart,philosophicaldiscussionswiththecontributorsandtheEditorial Boardwereasustainingfactorinalongandarduoustask.Theseyearsofinten- siveworkwithacrosssectionoftheworld'sbestphilosophershavegivenmea strongsenseofthevitalityandintellectualpoweroftheprofessionofphilosophy. Ibelievethatacommitmenttoscholarshipandtruthprevailsöverfashionand idiosyncrasyandpolemics. TheDictionaryhasbenefitedfromtheadviceofanumberofexpertsinsubfields ofphilosophy.MichaelDetlefsen,drawingonhisownlongeditorialexperiencein thefieldoflogic,andGeorgeSchumm,whoproducedtheAppendixofSpecial Symbols,wereimmenselyhelpfulindeterminingandpreparingagoodportionof thehundredsofentriesinlogicandphilosophyofmathematics.Kwong-loiShun gavemeadviceatseveralpointsontheChinesephilosophyentries.KeithYandell playedasimilaradvisoryrolefortheentriesconcerningBuddhismandHinduism. AlexanderMourelatosprovidedexcellentadviceonsomeoftheGreekphilosophy entries.CommentsandadvicewerealsocontributedbymorepeoplethanIcan PREFACETOTHEFIRSTEDITION name.TheyincludeJamesAllard,DavidAllison,KentBach,LawrenceBecker, JosephBien,DanielBreazeale,RobertButts,VictorCaston,JamesChildress, WayneDavis,JohnDillon,JohnEtchemendy,BernardGert,LennGoodman, JorgeGrada,JamesGustafson,GaryCutting,JohnHeil,RobertKane,George Kline,JosephKockelmans,ManfredKuehn,StevenKuhn,WilliamMcBride, WilliamMann,A.P.Martinich,AlfredMele,PaulMoser,DonaldMunro,Paul Pines,LouisPojman,CarlPosy,WilliamRowe,WesleySalmon,RichardSchacht, JeromeSchneewind,CalvinSchrag,Jean-LoupSeban,HansSeigfried,Sydney Shoemaker,ErnestSosa,M.A.Stewart,ElenoreStump,PaulWalker,Stephen White,RegaWood,and,especially,HughMcCann. Technicalandeditorialassistancewasprovidedbyanumberofpeople.W.M. Havighurstsingle-handedlydidthecopyeditingforthePressand,withakeeneye andadefthand,markedlyimprovedthetextatmanypoints.Hisworkrequired verifyinglargequantitiesofinformation,trackingthousandsofdetails,andmain- tainingconstantcommunicationwithmeövernearlyayear.Togetherwehave triedtopreserveboththecontributors'contentand,sofaraspossibleinavolume ofthiskind,theirstyle.IamalsoespeciallygratefultoAllisonNesporforexten- sivehelpwiththeIndexofNames,forproofreadingoftheentirevolume,andfor editorialadviceatmanypointsthroughouttheyearsoftheproject.Ishouldadd thattheproductionscheduledidnotpermiteverycontributortoreadproofs,and somewhoreadproofsdidnotreadthemforeveryentrytheywrote.Errorsthat mayhaveslippedthroughtheseveralproofreadingsmaynotbetheresponsibility ofthecontributors. AtthePress,IhavereceivedhelpandadvicefromMichaelAgnes,AlanGold, KennethGreenhall,CathyHennessy,ChristineMurray,AlexisRuda,and,espe- ciallySophiaPrybylski,whopainstakinglyoversawtheentireprocessofcorrecting theproofs.MyassistantsintheDepartmentofPhilosophyattheUniversityof Nebraska,Lincoln,havealsobeenofhelp:PriscellaGuerra,NancySlonneger, MichaelTonderum,DouglasWeber,andXiaomeiYang.ThesupportoftheUniver- sityofNebraskaand,especially,ofmycolleaguesinthePhilosophyDepartment,has beenindispensable.IamalsogratefulforassistancefromthePhilosophy DepartmentatSantaClaraUniversityduringmytermasFagotheyDistinguished Professorin1994. Ioweanincalculabledebttomyfamily.Överthesevenyearsofthisproject, mywife,Marie-Louise,gavemebothadviceontextualandliterarymattersand helpwithorganizationoffilésandsomeofthemanymailingstoauthors.Sheand mychildren,Katherine,Evelyn,andPaul,alsoassistedwithmyriadeditorialand clericaltasksandcheerfullytoleratedtheinterruptionsandproblemsthatare inevitableinproducingaworkofthismagnitude. RobertAudi Lincoln,Nebraska February1995 PREFACETOTHESECONDEDITION ThewidespreadpositivereceptionoftheFirstEditionhasbeengratifying,anda numberoftranslationsareproceeding,intoChinese,Italian,Korean,Russian,and Spanishatthiswriting.Thefieldofphilosophyhasexpanded,however,andeven apartfromthatIhavebecomeawareofseveralrespectsinwhichtheDictionary canbetterserveitsreaders.Theresultisamultitudeofexpansionsinstand- ingentriesandtheadditionofsomefourhundrednewentries.Thisextended coveragerequiredsixtynewauthors,nearlyhalfofthemfromoutsideNorth America. Thenewentriesrangeacrosstheentirefieldofphilosophy.Wehavemadea specialefforttoincreaseourcoverageofContinentalphilosophyandofsubfields wheregrowthisexceptionallyrapid,suchasethics,philosophyofmind,andpolit- icalphilosophy.Wehavealsoaddednumerouscross-references.Thecross-refer- encesareanelementinthevolumethatmanyreadershavesaidtheyfoundnot onlyvaluableinenhancingtheirinitialunderstandingofanentrybutalsowel- comeasasourceofintriguingconnectionsandasaninvitationtobrowse. InadditiontocitationsofmanylivingphilosophersintheIndexofNames,there isnowselectivecoverageofanumberoflivingphilosophersinseparateentries. Withveryfewexceptions,this(quitesmall)groupincludesonlythinkersintheir mid-sixtiesorolder.Thisconstraintoninclusionisinpartdictatedbythedifficulty ofprovidinganadequateportraitofphilosophersstillactivelyadvancingtheirposi- tions,andithasrequiredomittinganumberofdistinguishedyoungerphilosophers stillmakingmajorchangesintheirviews.Evenwithmucholderthinkerswedo notpresupposethattherewillbenosignificantdevelopments,butonlyagreater likelihoodofdiscerningaroundedpositionthatisunlikelytobeabandoned. Inthedifficult-andinasenseimpossible-taskofdeterminingentriesonliv- ingthinkers,advicewassoughtfromboththeBoardandmanyothersources.We werealsoguidedinpartbytheextenttowhichcontributorstotheFirstEdition reliedonreferencestocertainlivingthinkers.GiventheDictionary'soverallpur- posesanditswideaudience,whichincludesmanyreadersoutsidephilosophy, selectionwasweightedtowardwriterswhommanynon-philosophersmaywantto lookup,andsomeweightwasalsogiventoconsiderationsofdiversity.Inkeeping withtheoverallpurposesofthevolumeandthediversityofitsreaders,wehave alsodecidednottoundertakethelargetaskofcoveringeitherlivingcontributors tohighlyspecializedsubfields-suchaslogicorcomputertheoryormuchofphi- losophyofscience-orphilosopherswhosemaincontributionsaretothehistory ofphilosophy.Thereare,however,manyimportantphilosophersinthesefields. AnumberarecitedintheIndex,whichalsolistsmanyofthethinkerswhoare mentionedbyoneormorecontributorsbutarenotsubjectsofseparateentries. PREFACETOTHESECONDEDITION IntakingaccountoftheresponsesfromreadersoftheFirstEdition,wehave triedtodoasmuchaspossiblewithoutmakingtheDictionarytoobulkyforasin- glevolume.Somuchoftheresponsehasbeenpositivethatalthoughmanystand- ingentrieshavebeenrevised,wehavesoughttomakeimprovementsinthebook mainlybyaddingnewones.Afewreadersexpressedpuzzlementordisappoint- mentthatwedonothaveabibliographyattheendofeachentry.Wedogener- allyhavereferencestoprimaryworksbythethinkerbeingportrayedor,insome cases,secondaryworksnoteworthyintheirownright.Ourpolicyhereisshaped partlybyseverespaceconstraintsand,especiallygiventhose,byadesiretoavoid directingreaderstoinadequatelyrepresentativesourcesorworksthatmaysoon becomeobsolete.Itisalsobasedonasenseofthedifferencebetweenadictionary andanencyclopedia.Grantingthatthisdifferenceisnotsharp,adictionaryis abovealldefinitional,whereasencyclopediasaremainlyinformational,historical, andbibliographical.Adictionaryclarifiesbasicconceptsinawayencyclopedias neednot.Indeed,someencyclopediasarebestunderstoodwiththehelpofagood dictionary;someareevendifficulttoreadwithoutone. AswiththeFirstEdition,Iwouldbehappytoreceivecommentsorcorrections andwillundertaketofiléthemandtosendthemtotheappropriateauthor(s). ManyoftheDictionary'scontributors,aswellasanumberofcarefulreaders,sent suggestedcorrections,andmostofthesuggestionshavebeenfollowedortaken intoaccountinpreparingthisedition.Ishouldreiteratethat,againaswiththeFirst Edition,theseyearsofintensiveworkwithacrosssectionoftheworld'sbest philosophershavegivenmeastrongsensethattheprofessionofphilosophyhas greatvitalityandintellectualstrength.Inbothcontributorsandadvisors,Ihave seenasteadfastcommitmenttoscholarship,anabidingconcernwithaccuracyand theoreticaldepth,anabundanceofphilosophicalimagination,andafidelityto highstandardsthatprevailsövertheoftenalluringcurrentsofschoolsorfashions orpolemics.Itisperhapsnotappropriateformetodedicateacollaborativevol- umeofthiskind,butifIweretodoso,Iwoulddedicateittothecontributors,in thehopethatitmaygivetothemandtoallitsreaderssomeofthepleasurethat theeditinghasgiventome. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Inconstructingthisvolumeöveranumberofyears,Ihavebenefitedfrommore commentsandreactionsthanIcanpossiblyremember,andIregretanyomissions intheexpressionsofgratitudethatfollow. TheBoardofAdvisorsdeservesheartythanksforamajorpartintheselection ofnewentriesandnewcontributors.IwouldparticularlyliketothankWilliamP. Alston,ArthurW.Burks,FredDretske,TerenceIrwin,thelateNorman Kretzmann,JohnLucas,SallyMcConnell-Ginet,AlexanderNehamas,Onora 0'Neill,JohnPerry,RichardRorty,JohnSearle,RaimoTuomela,andBasvan Fraassen,manyofwhomrepeatedlyprovidedcommentsoradvice.Theeditorial adviceofTerenceMoore,ExecutiveEditoratthePress,andmyregulardiscussions withhimonmattersofpolicyanddesign,havebeenincalculablyvaluable.Neither editionwouldhavebeenpossiblewithouthiscontributions. TheSecondEditionhasbenefitedfromtheadviceofmanyothers,includinga numberwhohelpedinpreparingtheFirstEdition.AmongtheseareJohn PREFACETOTHESECONDEDITION Corcoran,GaryGutting,GeorgeSchumm,Kwong-loiShun,andKeithYandell,all ofwhomprovidededitorialadviceandrecommendedaddingcertainentriesin theirareasofphilosophicalworkorrevisingothers.Corcorandeservesagreatdeal ofcreditforbothidentifyingandfillinggaps.Commentsandadvicewerealsocon- tributedbymorepeoplethanIcanname.TheyincludeMargaretAtherton, ClaudiodeAlmeida,LynneRudderBaker,JosephBien,NoélCarroll,RogerCrisp, WayneDavis,PhilipGasper,BerysGaut,LennGoodman,PaulGriffiths,Oscar Haac,MikeHarnish,JohnHeil,BrådHooker,PatriciaHuntington,DaleJacquette, RobertKane,GeorgeKline,ManfredKuehn,StevenKuhn,BrianMcLaughlin, WilliamMann,AusonioMarras,AlMartinich,AlfredMele,JosephMendola, DavidW.Miller,PaulMoser,JamesMurphyLouisPojman,WilliamPrior,Wesley Salmon,MarkSainsburyCharlesSayward,JeromeSchneewind,CalvinSchrag, DavidSedley,RogerShiner,MarcusSinger,BrianSkyrms,M.A.Stewart,William Wainwright,PaulWeirich,and,especiallyHughMcCann,ErnestSosa,andJ.D. Trout. Conscientiousreviewersaswellascolleaguesandreaderswhocontributed commentshavebeenofhelptomeinexpandingandrevisingtheFirstEdition. Amongthereaders-mainlyphilosophers-1particularlywanttothankAlasdair Maclntrye,RuthMarcus,DanMueller,EleonoreStump,andMarkvanRoojen. Editorialandtechnicalassistancewasprovidedbyanumberofpeople.Atthe Press,IhavereceivedhelporadvicefromMichaelAgnes,JanisBolster-whoover- sawtheentireprocessofcorrectingtheproofs-AlanGold,KennethGreenhall, CathyHennessyNicholasMirra,ChristineMurrayGwenSeznec,andothers.W. M.HavighurstagainservedasthemaincopyeditorforthePress;hisskillfuland painstakingworkhasbeenofgreathelpthroughout.AllisonNesporandmyassis- tantsintheDepartmentofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNebraska,Lincoln, JonathanEvansandXiaomeiYang,havealsocontributed.Thesupportofthe UniversityofNebraskaandmycolleaguesinthePhilosophyDepartmenthasbeen indispensable.IamalsogratefulforassistancefromthePhilosophyDepartmentat SantaClaraUniversityduringmytermasDistinguishedProfessoroftheCollege ofArtsandSciencesin1999. AsinthecaseoftheFirstEdition,Ioweanincalculabledebttomyfamily.My wife,Marie-Louise,gavemebothliteraryadviceandhelpwithorganizationoffilés andsomeofthemanymailings.Sheandmychildrenhavealsocheerfullytoler- atedtheinterruptionsandproblemsthatareinevitableindoingevenasecond editionofaworkofthisscope. RobertAudi Lincoln,Nebraska June1999 A Abailard,Pierre.Seeabelard. Abdera,Schoolof.Seeabderites. Abderites,theGreekphilosophersLeucippusand Democritus,thetwoearliestexponentsofatom- ism.EventhoughAbdera,inThrace(northern Greece),washometothreepre-Socratics-Leu- cippus,Democritus,andProtagoras-theterm 'Abderites'andthephrase'SchoolofAbdera'are appliedonlytoLeucippusandDemocritus.We canthusdistinguishbetweenearlyGreekatom- ismandEpicureanism,whichisthelåterversion ofatomismdevelopedbyEpicurusofAthens. Thismodernusageisinonerespectinapt:the correspondingGreekterm,Abderites,-ai,was usedinantiquityasasynonymof'simple- ton'-notindisparagementofanyofthethree philosophersofAbderabutasaregionalslur.See alsoANCIENTATOMISM,PRE-SOCRATICS. A.P.D.M. abduction,canonsofreasoningforthediscovery, asopposedtothejustification,ofscientifichypo- thesesortheories. Reichenbachdistinguishedthecontextofjustifi- cationandthecontextofdiscovery,arguingthatphi- losophylegitimatelyisconcernedonlywiththe former,whichconcernsverificationandconfir- mation,whereasthelatterisamatterforpsy- chology.Thusheandotherlogicalpositivists claimedthereareinductivelogicsofjustification butnotlogicsfordiscovery.Bothhypothetico- deductiveandBayesianorotherprobabilistic inductivelogicsofjustificationhavebeenpro- posed.Closeexaminationofactualscientific practiceincreasinglyrevealsjustificatoryargu- mentsandproceduresthatcallintoquestionthe adequacyofsuchlogics. NorwoodRussellHansondistinguishedthe reasonsforacceptingaspecifichypothesisfrom thereasonsforsuggestingthatthecorrect hypothesiswillbeofaparticularkind.Forthe latterheattemptedtodeveloplogicsofretroduc- tiveorabductivereasoningthatstressedanalogi- calreasoning,butdidnotsucceedinconvincing manythattheselogicsweredifferentinkind fromlogicsofjustification.Todayfewregardthe searchforrigorousformållogicsofdiscoveryas promising.Rather,thesearchhasturnedtolook- ingfor"logics"insomeweakersense.Heuristic procedures,strategiesfordiscovery,andthelike areexplored.Othershavefocusedoninvestigat- ingrationalityinthegrowthofscientificknowl- edge,say,byexploringconditionsunderwhich researchtraditionsorprogramsareprogressive ordegenerating.Somehaveexploredrecourseto techniquesfromcognitivescienceorartificial intelligence.Claimsofsuccessgenerallyarecon- troversial. Seealsoconfirmation,induction, REICHENBACH.F.S. Abelard,Peter,inFrench,PierreAbailardor Abélard(1079-1144),Frenchtheologianwhose writings,particularlyTheologiaChristiana,consti- tuteoneofthemoreimpressiveattemptsofthe medievalperiodtouselogicaltechniquesto explicateChristiandogmas.Hewasbomofa minornoblefamilyinBrittanyandstudiedlogic andtheologyundersomeofthemostnotable teachersoftheearlytwelfthcentury,including Roscelin,WilliamofChampeaux,andAnselmof Laon.Herapidlyeclipsedhisteachersinlogic andattractedstudentsfromallöverEuropé.His foraysintotheologywerelessenthusiastically received.TwicehisviewsontheTrinitywere condemnedasheretical.Abelardledadramatic lifepunctuatedbybitterdisputeswithhisoppo- nentsandadangerousandcelebratedloveaffair withHéloi'se(cl117).Muchofthisstoryistold inhisautobiographicalwork,Historiacalamita- titm. Abelard'stwomostimportantworksinlogic arehisLogicaingredientibnsandhisDialectica.In thesetreatisesandothersheisthefirstmedieval ScholastictomakefulluseofAristotle'sOnInter- pretationandBoethius'scommentariesonitto produceasophisticatedtheoryofthesignifica- tionofwordsandsentences.Thetheorydistin- guishesthesignificationofanexpressionboth fromwhattheexpressionnamesandtheideain themindofthespeakerassociatedwiththe expression.Abelardallowsaroleformental imagesinthinking,buthecarefullyavoidsclaim- ingthatthesearewhatwordssignify.Inthishe isverymuchawareofthepitfallsofsubjectivist theoriesofmeaning.Hispositivedoctrineson abhidharma Abrabanel,IsaacbenJudah whatwordssignifytieincloselywithhisviews onthesignificationofpropositionsanduniver- sals.ForAbelardpropositionsaresentencesthat areeithertrueorfalse;whattheysay(theirdicta) iswhattheysignifyandthesedictaarethepri- marybearersoftruthandfalsity.Abelarddevel- opedagenuinelypropositionallogic,thefirst sincetheStoics.Auniversal,ontheotherhand, isacommonnounoradjective,andwhatit meansiswhattheverbphrasepartofaproposi- tionsignifies.Thisisasortoftruncateddictum, whichAbelardvariouslycalledastatus,nature, orproperty.Neitherstatusnordictaarethings, Abelardsaid,buttheyaremind-independent objectsofthought.Abelardwasparticularlydev- astatinginhisattacksonrealisttheoriesofuni- versals,buthisviewthatuniversalsarewords wasnotmeanttodenytheobjectivityofour knowledgeoftheworld. Abelard'stheoriesinlogicandontologywent farbeyondthetraditionalideasthathadbeen handeddownfromAristotlethroughthemedi- ationofthelateancientcommentators,Boethius inparticular.Theycouldhaveformedthebasis ofafundamentallynewsynthesisinWestern logic,butwhenmoreoftheAristoteliancorpus becameavailableinWesternEuropéduringthe twelfthcentury,concentrationshiftedtoassimi- latingthisalreadyfullyelaboratedsystemof ideas.Consequently,Abelard'sinfluenceonlåter Scholasticthought,thoughnoticeable,isnot nearlyasgreatasonemightexpect,giventhe acutenessandoriginalityofhisinsights. Seealsoboethius,roscelin,scholasti- cism.M.M.T. abhidharma,theanalyticalandsystematicpre- sentationofthemajorconceptualcategoriescon- stitutingBuddhistdoctrine;usedasalabelfor boththetextsthatcontainsuchpresentations andthecontentofwhatispresented.Earlyabhid- harmatexts(uptoaboutthesecondcenturyA.d.) arecatecheticalinform,definingkeydoctrinal termsschematicallythroughquestionand answer;låterworksaremorediscursive,often containingextensivediscussionsofcontroverted metaphysicalissuessuchastheexistenceofpast objectsorthenatureofreference.Thegoalof abhidharmaistomakeacompleteinventoryof existentsandoftherelationsthatmayhold amongthem.Seealsobuddhism.P.J.G. abhinivesha,Sanskritwordmeaning'self-love' or'willtolive'.InIndianphilosophyingeneral andintheSankhya-Yogasysteminparticular, abhiniveshawasregardedasanaspectofavidya (ignorance).Someothermanifestationsofavidya weresaidtobefear,attachment,andaversion, allofwhichwerethoughttogeneratekarmic bondageandpreventonefromattainingspiritual liberation.Lumpedtogetherwiththese,abhinive- shaobviouslyhasanegativeconnotation,even thoughintheIndiantraditionitwasnotneces- sarilywrong,andevencommendableattimes,to exhibitself-loveandahealthywilltoliveand prosperinthematerialworld.Sopresumablythe negativeconnotationofabhiniveshaisanindica- tionthatwhatmaybeotherwisepermissiblecan beimproperormorallywrongifpursuedin excessorforthewrongreason.Seealso avidya.D.K.C. abortion.Seemoralstatus. Abrabanel,IsaacbenJudah(1437-1508),Span- ishJewishphilosopherandstatesman.Onthe peripherybetweenlatemedievalSpanishphilos- ophyandRenaissancehumanism,Abrabanel concemedhimselfwithtraditionalmedieval Jewishsubjectssuchascreation,prophecy,and theodicy.Hisworksincludebiblicalcommen- tariesaswellasphilosophicalandtheological treatises;hismostsignificantwritingsconstitute hiscritiqueofMaimonides'GuideofthePerplexed, foundinRoshAmanah(1505)andMifalotElohim (1503).InhiscriticismoftheAristotelians,Abra- banelwasinfluencedbyIsaacArama.Endorsing therabbinicconceptofprophecy,Abrabanel attacksMaimonides'naturalisticviewsofproph- ecy:hearguesthatMosesisnottobedistin- guishedfromtheotherprophetsandthatthe knowledgeoftheprophetsisnotmerelyscien- tificandmetaphysical,butmiraculouslypro- ducedbyGod.Thisemphasisuponthemiracu- lousasopposedtothenaturalisdevelopedinhis theoryofhistoryandpolitics.Hisviewsaboutthe idealstatereflecthumanistleanings.WhileAbra- baneldoesseethecivilizedstateofhumansasa rebellionagainstGodresultingfromthefall,he isinterestedinthebestkindofgovernment underthesecircumstances.Accordingly,unityof societydoesnotrequireaconcentratedpower butcanbeachievedthroughacollectivewill. Thiskindofgovernment,Abrabanelclaims,is advocatedbytheTorahandshowntobeeffec- tivebytheItalianrepublicsoftheperiod.With thecomingoftheMessiah,humankindwillreal- izeitsspiritualpotential,andwhenthecorporeal universevanishes,eachsoulwillbeabletocon- templateetemallytheessenceofGod.Abra- banel'spoliticalviewsinfluencedlåterJewish messianicmovements,andhisbiblicalcommen- Abrabanel,Judah abstractentity taries,translatedintoLatin,influencedlåter Christianhumanistcircles.Seealsoabra- banel,judah;maimonides.T.M.R. Abrabanel,Judah,alsocalledLeoneEbreoorLeo Hebraeus(c.1460-c.1523),SpanishJewish philosopher,poet,andphysician.Theoldestson ofIsaacAbrabanel,JudahAbrabanelwas,philo- sophically,arepresentativeofItalianPlatonism. HewrotehispredominantlyNeoplatonicphilo- sophicalworkDialoghid'Amore(DialoguesofLove) in1535.TheoriginalItalianmanuscriptwas translatedintoFrench,Latin,Spanish,and Hebrewbetween1551and1560.Theinterlocu- torsofthisPlatonic-styledialogue,Sophiaand Philo,explorethenatureofcosmiclove.This lovenotonlyexistsbetweenGodandcreatures, butalsooperatesinmatterandform,thefour elements,andtheentireuniverse;itreflectsboth sensuousandintellectualbeauty;inshortitis transformedfromarelationbetweenGodand theuniverseintoafundamentalforcearound whichallthingsareordered.Thereisamystical aspecttoAbrabanel'saccountoflove,anditis notsurprisingthatreflectionsonmysticism,in additiontoastrology,astronomy,andaesthetics, emergethroughoutthework.Althoughprimar- ilyreflectingmedievalPlatonismandNeoplaton- ism,AbrabanelwasalsoinfluencedbyMarcilio Ficino,PicodellaMirandola,Maimonides,and IbnGabirol.Hisdialoguewasreadbymany philosophers,includingGiordanoBrunoand Spinoza.Hisconceptoflovemaybefoundin lyricalpoetryoftheperiodinItaly,France,and Spain,aswellasinMichelangelo'sSonnetsand TorquatoTasso'sMinturno.Seealsoabra- banel,isaac.T.M.R. absentqualia.Seefunctionalism,philosophyof mind. absolute,the,termusedbyidealiststodescribe theoneindependentrealityofwhichallthings areanexpression.Kantusedtheadjective 'absolute'tocharacterizewhatisuncondition- allyvalid.Heclaimedthatpurereasonsearched forabsolutegroundsoftheunderstandingthat wereidealsonly,butthatpracticalreasonpostu- latedtherealexistenceofsuchgroundsasnec- essaryformorality.Thisapparentinconsistency ledhissuccessorstoattempttosystematizehis viewofreason.Todothis,Schellingintroduced theterm'theAbsolute'fortheunconditioned ground(andhenceidentity)ofsubjectand object.SchellingwascriticizedbyHegel,who definedtheAbsoluteasspirit:thelogicalneces- sitythatembodiesitselfintheworldinorderto achieveself-knowledgeandfreedomduringthe courseofhistory.Manyprominentnineteenth- centuryBritishandAmericanidealists,including Bosanquet,Royce,andBradley,defendedthe existenceofaquasi-Hegelianabsolute.Seealso HEGEL,idealism,schelling.J.W.A. absoluteright.Seerights. absolutespace.Seespace. AbsoluteSpirit.Seehegel. absolutethreshold.Seefechner. absolutetime.Seetime. absolutism,ethical.Seerelativism. abstract.Seeappendixofspecialsymbols. abstracta.Seeabstractentity,naturalism. abstractentity,anobjectlackingspatiotemporal properties,butsupposedtohavebeing,toexist, or(inmedievalScholasticterminology)tosub- sist.Abstracta,sometimescollectedunderthe categoryofuniversals,includemathematical objects,suchasnumbers,sets,andgeometrical figures,propositions,properties,andrelations. Abstractentitiesaresaidtobeabstractedfrom particulars.Theabstracttrianglehasonlythe propertiescommontoalltriangles,andnone peculiartoanyparticulartriangles;ithasnodef- initecolor,size,orspecifictype,suchasisosceles orscalene.Abstractaareadmittedtoanontology byQuine'scriterioniftheymustbesupposedto exist(orsubsist)inordertomaketheproposi- tionsofanacceptedtheorytrue.Propertiesand relationsmaybeneededtoaccountforresem- blancesamongparticulars,suchastheredness sharedbyallredthings.Propositionsasthe abstractcontentsormeaningsofthoughtsand expressionsofthoughtaresometimessaidtobe necessarytoexplaintranslationbetweenlan- guages,andothersemanticpropertiesandrela- tions. Historically,abstractentitiesareassociated withPlato'srealistontologyofIdeasorForms. ForPlato,thesearetheabstractandonlyreal entities,instantiatedorparticipatedinbyspa- tiotemporalobjectsintheworldofappearanceor empiricalphenomena.Aristotledeniedtheinde- pendentexistenceofabstractentities,andrede- finedadilutedsenseofPlato'sFormsasthe abstraction Academy secondarysubstancesthatinhereinprimarysub- stancesorspatiotemporalparticularsastheonly genuineexistents.Thedisputepersistedin medievalphilosophybetweenrealistmetaphysi- cians,includingAugustineandAquinas,who acceptedtheexistenceofabstracta,andnomi- nalists,suchasOckham,whomaintainedthat similarobjectsmaysimplybereferredtobythe samenamewithoutparticipatinginanabstract form.Inmodernphilosophytheproblemof abstractahasbeenapointofcontentionbetween rationalism,whichisgenerallycommittedtothe existenceofabstractentities,andempiricism, whichrejectsabstractabecausetheycannotbe experiencedbythesenses.BerkeleyandHume arguedagainstLocke'stheoryofabstractideasby observingthatintrospectionshowsallideastobe particular,fromwhichtheyconcludedthatwe canhavenoadequateconceptofanabstract entity;instead,whenwereasonaboutwhatwe callabstractaweareactuallythinkingaboutpar- ticularideasdelegatedbythemindtorepresent anentireclassofresemblantparticulars,from whichwemayfreelysubstituteothersifwemis- takenlydrawconclusionspeculiartotheexam- plechosen.Abstractpropositionsweredefended byBolzanoandFregeinthenineteenthcentury asthemeaningsofthoughtinlanguageand logic.Disputepersistsabouttheneedforand natureofabstractentities,butmanyphiloso- phersbelievetheyareindispensableinmeta- physics. Seealsoaristotle,berkeley,frege, METAPHYSICALREALISM,OCKHAM,PLATO, PROPERTY.D.J. abstraction.Seeabstractentity,berkeley. abstraction,axiomof.Seeaxiomofcomprehen- SION. abstraction,lambda-.Seecombinatorylogic. absurd.Seecamus,existentialism. absurdity.Seecategory,reductioadabsurdum. Abunaser.Seeal-färäbi. AC.Seeappendixofspecialsymbols. AcademicSkepticism.Seeskepticism,skeptics. Academy,theschoolestablishedbyPlatoaround 385b.c.athispropertyoutsideAthensnearthe publicparkandgymnasiumknownbythat name.Althoughitmaynothavemaintaineda continuoustradition,themanyandvaried philosophersoftheAcademyallconsidered themselvesPlato'ssuccessors,andallofthemcel- ebratedandstudiedhiswork.Theschoolsur- vivedinsomeformuntila.d.529,whenitwas dissolved,alongwiththeotherpaganschools,by theEasternRomanemperorJustinianI.Thehis- toryoftheAcademyisdividedbysomeauthori- tiesintothatoftheOldAcademy(Plato, Speusippus,Xenocrates,andtheirfollowers)and theNewAcademy(theSkepticalAcademyofthe thirdandsecondcenturiesb.c).Othersspeakof fivephasesinitshistory:Old(asbefore),Middle (Arcesilaus),New(Carneades),Fourth(Philoof Larisa),andFifth(AntiochusofAscalon). FormostofitshistorytheAcademywas devotedtoelucidatingdoctrinesassociatedwith Platothatwerenotentirelyexplicitinthedia- logues.These"unwrittendoctrines"wereappar- entlypasseddowntohisimmediatesuccessors andareknowntousmainlythroughtheworkof Aristotle:therearetwoopposedfirstprinciples, theOneandtheIndefiniteDyad(Greatand Small);thesegenerateFormsorIdeas(which maybeidentifiedwithnumbers),fromwhichin turncomeintermediatemathematicalsand,at thelowestlevel,perceptiblethings(Aristotle, Metapliysics1.6). AfterPlato'sdeathin347,theAcademypassed tohisnephewSpeusippus(c.407-339),wholed theschooluntilhisdeath.Althoughhiswritten workshaveperished,hisviewsoncertainmain points,alongwithsomequotations,were recordedbysurvivingauthors.Undertheinflu- enceoflatePythagoreans,Speusippusantici- patedPlotinusbyholdingthattheOnetran- scendsbeing,goodness,andevenIntellect,and thattheDyad(whichheidentifieswithmatter) isthecauseofallbeings.Toexplainthegrada- tionsofbeings,hepositedgradationsofmatter, andthisgaverisetoAristotle'schargethat Speusippussawtheuniverseasaseriesofdis- jointedepisodes.Speusippusabandonedthethe- oryofFormsasidealnumbers,andgaveheavier emphasisthanotherPlatoniststothemathemat- icals. Xenocrates(396-314),whooncewentwith PlatotoSicily,succeededSpeusippusandledthe Academytillhisowndeath.Althoughhewasa prolificauthor,Xenocrates'workshavenotsur- vived,andheisknownonlythroughthework ofotherauthors.HewasinducedbyAristotle's objectionstorejectSpeusippus'sviewsonsome points,andhedevelopedtheoriesthatwerea majorinfluenceonMiddlePlatonism,aswellas accent,fallacyof accidentalism onStoicism.InXenocrates'theorytheOneis Intellect,andtheFormsareideasinthemindof thisdivineprinciple;theOneisnottranscen- dent,butitresidesinanintellectualspaceabove theheavens.WhiletheOneisgood,theDyadis evil,andthesublunaryworldisidentifiedwith Hades.HavingtakenFormstobemathematical entities,hehadnouseforintermediatemathe- maticals.Formshedefinedfurtherasparadig- maticcausesofreguiarnaturalphenomena,and soulasself-movingnumber. Polemon(c.350-267)iedtheAcademyfrom 314to267,andwaschieflyknownforhisfine character,whichsetanexampleofself-control forhisstudents.TheStoicsprobabiyderived theirconceptofoikeiosis(anaccommodationto nature)fromhisteaching.AfterPolemon's death,hiscolleagueCratesledtheAcademyuntil theaccessionofArcesilaus. TheNewAcademyarosewhenArcesilaus becametheleaderoftheschoolinabout265b.c. andturnedthedialecticaltraditionofPiatotothe Skepticalaimofsuspendingbelief.Thedebate betweentheNewAcademyandStoicismdomi- natedphilosophicaldiscussionforthenextcen- turyandahalf.OntheAcademicsidethemost prominentspokesmanwasCarneades(c.213- 129B.c). Intheearlyyearsofthefirstcenturyb.c,Philo ofLarisaattemptedtoreconciletheOldandthe NewAcademy.Hispupil,theformerSkeptic AntiochusofAscalon,wasenragedbythisand brokeawaytorefoundtheOldAcademyin about87b.c.ThiswasthebeginningofMid- dlePlatonism(c.80b.c.-a.d.220).Antiochus's schoolwaseclecticincombiningelementsofPla- tonism,Stoicism,andAristotelianphilosophy, andisknowntousmainlythroughCicero'sAca- demica.MiddlePlatonismrevivedthemain themesofSpeusippusandXenocrates,butoften usedStoicorneo-Pythagoreanconceptsto explainthem.TheinfluenceoftheStoicPosido- nius(135-50/51b.c.)wasstronglyfeltonthe Academyinthisperiod,andPlatonismflour- ishedatcentersotherthantheAcademyin Athens,mostnotablyinAlexandria,with Eudorus(firstcenturyb.c.)andPhiloofAlexan- dria(fl.a.d.39). AfterthedeathofPhilo,thecenterofinterest returnedtoAthens,wherePlutarchofChaero- nia(a.d.c.45-c.125)studiedwithAmmoniusat theAcademy,althoughPlutarchspentmostof hiscareerathishomeinnearbyBoeotia.His manyphilosophicaltreatises,whicharerich sourcesforthehistoryofphilosophy,aregath- eredunderthetitleMoralia:hisinterestinethics andmoraleducationledhimtowritetheParal- lelLives(pairedbiographiesoffamousRomans andAthenians),forwhichheisbestknown. Afterthisperiod,theAcademyceasedtobethe nameforaspeciesofPlatonicphilosophy, althoughtheschoolremainedacenterforPla- tonism,andwasespeciallyprominentunderthe leadershipoftheNeoplatonistProclus(c.410- 85). Seealsomiddleplatonism,neoplaton- ISM,NEWACADEMY,PLATO.P.Wo. accent,fallacyof.Seeinformalfallacy. accessibility,epistemic.Seeepistemology. accessibilitybetweentwoworlds.Seepossible WORLDS. accident,afeatureorpropertyofasubstance (e.g.,anorganismoranartifact)withoutwhich thesubstancecouldstillexist.Accordingtoa commonessentialistviewofpersons,Socrates' size,color,andintegrityareamonghisaccidents, whilehishumanityisnot.ForDescartes,think- ingistheessenceofthesoul,whileanyparticu- larthoughtasoulentertainsisanaccident. Accordingtoacommontheology,Godhasno accidents,sincealltruthsabouthimflowby necessityfromhisnature.Theseexamplessug- gestthediversityoftraditionalusesofthenotion ofaccident.Thereisnouniformconception;but theCartesianview,accordingtowhichtheacci- dentsaremodesof(waysofspecifying)the essenceofasubstance,isrepresentative.An importantambiguityconcernstheidentityof accidents:ifPlatoandAristotlehavethesame weight,isthatweightoneaccident(say,the propertyofweighingprecisely70kilograms)or two(oneaccidentforPlato,oneforAristotle)? Differenttheoristsgivedifferentanswers(and somehavechangedtheirminds).Issuesabout accidentshavebecomeperipheralinthiscentury becauseofthedeclineoftraditionalconcerns aboutsubstance.Butthemoregeneralquestions aboutnecessityandcontingencyareverymuch alive.Seealsocontingent,essentialism, PROPERTY.S.J.W. accident,fallacyof.Seeinformalfallacy. accidentalgeneralization.Seelawlikegeneral- IZATION. accidentalism,themetaphysicalthesisthatthe occurrenceofsomeeventsiseithernotnecessi- accidentalproperty actiontheory tatedornotcausallydeterminedornotpre- dictable.Manydeterministshavemaintained thatalthoughalleventsarecaused,somenever- thelessoccuraccidentally,ifonlybecausethe causallawsdeterminingthemmighthavebeen different.Somephilosophershavearguedthat evenifdeterminismistrue,someevents,suchas adiscovery,couldnothavebeenpredicted,on groundsthattopredictadiscoveryistomakethe discovery. Thetermmayalsodesignateatheoryofindi- viduation:thatindividualsofthesamekindor speciesarenumericallydistinctinvirtueofpos- sessingsomedifferentaccidentalproperties.Two horsesarethesameinessencebutnumerically distinctbecauseoneofthemisblack,e.g.,while theotheriswhite.Accidentalismpresupposes theidentityofindiscerniblesbutgoesbeyondit byclaimingthataccidentalpropertiesaccount fornumericaldiversitywithinaspecies.Peter Abelardcriticizedaversionofaccidentalismes- pousedbyhisteacher,WilliamofChampeaux, onthegroundthataccidentalpropertiesdepend fortheirexistenceonthedistinctindividualsin whichtheyinhere,andsothepropertiescannot accountforthedistinctnessoftheindividuals. Seealsodeterminism,identityofindis- cernibles.W.E.M. accidentalproperty.Seeproperty. accidie(alsoacedia),apathy,listlessness,or ennui.Thisconditionisproblematicfortheinter- nalistthesisthat,necessarily,anybeliefthatone morallyoughttodosomethingisconceptually sufficientforhavingmotivationtodoit.Annhas longbelievedthatsheought,morally,toassist herailingmother,andshehasdutifullyacted accordingly.Seemingly,shemaycontinueto believethis,eventhough,owingtoarecentper- sonaltragedy,shenowsuffersfromaccidieandis whollylackinginmotivationtoassisthermother. Seealsoakrasia,motivationalinternal- ISM,SOCRATICPARADOXES.A.R.M. accomplishmentverb.Seeactionverb. achievementverb.Seeactionverb. Achillesparadox.Seezeno'sparadoxes. acosmism,atermformedinanalogyto'atheism,' meaningthedenialoftheultimaterealityofthe world.ErnstPlatneruseditinf776todescribe Spinoza'sphilosophy,arguingthatSpinozadid notintendtodeny"theexistenceoftheGod- head,buttheexistenceoftheworld."Maimon, Fichte,Hegel,andothersmakethesameclaim. BythetimeofFeuerbachitwasalsousedtochar- acterizeabasicfeatureofChristianity:thedenial oftheworldorworldliness.Seealsofichte, HEGEL,SPINOZA.M.K. acquaintance,knowledgeby.Seeknowledgeby ACQUAINTANCE. acrasia.Seeakrasia. act-content-object-psychology.Seeact-objectpsy- CHOLOGY. act,propositional.Seeintentionality. act,voluntary.Seeactiontheory. action,basic.Seephilosophyofaction. action,philosophyof.Seeactiontheory. actionatadistance.Seefieldtheory. actiontheory,thestudyoftheontologicalstruc- tureofhumanaction,theprocessbywhichit originates,andthewaysinwhichitisexplained. Mosthumanactionsareactsofcommission:they constituteaclassofeventsinwhichasubject (theagent)bringsaboutsomechangeor changes.Thus,inmovingone'sfinger,onebrings itaboutthatone'sfingermoves.Whenthe changebroughtaboutisanongoingprocess (e.g.,thecontinuingappearanceofwordsona page),thebehavioriscalledanactivity(writing). Anactionofomissionoccurswhenanagent refrainsfromperforminganactionofcommis- sion.Sinceactionsofcommissionareevents,the questionoftheirontologyisinpartamatterof thegeneralontologyofchange.Animportant issuehereiswhetherwhatoccurswhenan actionisperformedshouldbeviewedasabstract orconcrete.Onthefirstapproach,actionsare understoodeitherasproposition-likeentities (e.g.,Booth'smovingafinger),orasaspeciesof universal-namely,anact-type(movingafinger). What"occurred"whenBoothmovedhisfinger inFord'sTheateronApril14,1865,isheldtobe theabstractentityinquestion,andtheentityis viewedasrepeatable:thatis,preciselythesame entityisheldtohaveoccurredoneveryother occasionofBooth'smovinghisfinger.When actionsareviewedasconcrete,ontheother hand,Booth'smovinghisfingerinFord'sTheater isunderstoodtobeanon-repeatableparticular, actiontheory actiontheory andthemovementofthefingercountsasanact- token,whichinstantiatesthecorrespondingact- type.Concreteactionsaretime-bound:each belongstoasinglebehavioralepisode,andother instantiationsofthesameact-typecountasdis- tinctevents. Asecondimportantontologicalissueconcems thefactthatbymovinghisfinger,Boothalso firedagun,andkilledLincoln.Itiscommonfor morethanonethingtobeaccomplishedinasin- gleexerciseofagencyandhowsuchdoingsare relatedisamatterofdebate.Ifactionsareunder- stoodasabstractentities,theanswerisessen- tiallyforegone:theremustbeasmanydifferent actionsonBooth'spartastherearetypesexem- plified.Butifactionsareviewedasparticularsthe sametokencancountasaninstanceofmore thanonetype,andidentityclaimsbecomepos- sible.Herethereisdisagreement.Fine-grained theoriesofactindividuationtendtoconfine identityclaimstoactionsthatdifferonlyinways describablethroughdifferentmodificationsof thesamemainverb-e.g.,wherePlacidoboth singsandsingsloudly.Otherwise,differenttypes areheldtorequiredifferenttokens:BoouYs actionofmovinghisfingerisheldtohavegen- eratedorgivenrisetodistinctactionsoffiringthe gunandkillingLincoln,byvirtueofhavinghad ascausalconsequencesthegun'sdischargeand Lincoln'sdeath.Theopposite,coarse-grainedthe- ory,however,viewsthesecausalrelationsas groundsforclaimingBooth'sactswereprecisely identical.Onthisview,forBoothtokillLincoln wassimplyforhimtodosomethingthatcaused Lincoln'sdeath-whichwasinfactnothingmore thantomovehisfinger-andsimilarlyforhisfir- ingthegun.Thereisalsoacompromiseaccount, onwhichBoouYsactionsarerelatedaspartto whole,eachconsistinginalongersegmentofthe causalchainthatterminateswithLincolrfs death.TheactionofkillingLincolnconsisted,on thisview,intheentiresequence;butthatoffir- ingthegunterminatedwiththegun'sdischarge, andthatofmovingthefingerwiththefinger's motion. When,asinBoouYscase,morethanonething isaccomplishedinasingleexerciseofagency, somearedonebydoingothers.Butifallactions wereperformedbyperformingothers,aninfmite regresswouldresult.Theremust,then,beaclass ofbasicactions-i.e.,actionsfundamentaltothe performanceofallothers,butnotthemselves donebydoingsomethingelse.Thereisdisagree- ment,however,onwhichactionsarebasic. Sometheoriestreatbodilymovements,suchas BoouYsmovinghisfinger,asbasic.Otherspoint outthatitispossibletoengageinactionbutto accomplishlessthanabodilymovement,as whenonetriestomovealimbthatisrestrained orparalyzed,andfails.Accordingtothese accounts,bodilyactionsariseoutofastillmore basicmentalactivity,usuallycalledvolitionor willing,whichisheldtoconstitutethestandard meansforperformingallovertactions. Thequestionofhowbodilyactionsoriginateis closelyassociatedwiththatofwhatdistinguishes themfrominvoluntaryandreflexbodilyevents, aswellasfromeventsintheinanimateworld. Thereisgeneralagreementthatthecrucialdiffer- enceconcernsthementalstatesthatattend action,andinparticularthefactthatvoluntary actionstypicallyariseoutofstatesofintending onthepartoftheagent.Butthenatureofthe relationisdifficult,andthereisthecomplicating factorthatintentionissometimesheldtoreduce toothermentalstates,suchastheagenfsdesires andbeliefs.Thatissueaside,itwouldappearthat unintentionalactionsariseoutofmorebasic actionsthatareintentional,aswhenoneunin- tentionallybreaksashoelacebyintentionally tuggingonit.Buthowintentionisfirsttranslated intoactionismuchmoreproblematic,especially whenbodilymovementsareviewedasbasic actions.Onecannot,e.g.,countBooth'smoving hisfingerasanintentionalactionsimplybecause heintendedtodoso,orevenontheground(ifit istrue)thathisintentioncausedhisfingerto move.Thelattermighthaveoccurredthrougha strictlyautonomicresponsehadBoothbeenner- vousenough,andthenthemovingofthefinger wouldnothavecountedasanactionatall,much lessasintentional.Avoidingsuch"wayward causalchains"requiresaccountingfortheagenfs voluntarycontrolöverwhatoccursingenuinely intentionalaction-adifficulttaskwhenbodily actionsareheldtobebasic.Volitionalaccounts havegreatersuccesshere,sincetheycanhold thatmovementsareintentionalonlywhenthe agenfsintentionisexecutedthroughvolitional activity.Buttheymustsidestepanotherthreat- enedregress:ifwecallforanactivityofwillingto explainwhyBooth'smovinghisfingercountsas intentionalaction,wecannotdothesamefor willingitself.Yetonmostaccountsvolitiondoes havethecharacteristicsofintentionalbehavior. Volitionaltheoriesofactionmust,then,provide analternativeaccountofhowmentalactivitycan beintentional. Actionsareexplainedbyinvokingtheagenfs reasonsforperformingthem.Characteristically, areasonmaybeunderstoodtoconsistinaposi- tiveattitudeoftheagenttowardoneoranother act(ion)-token actionverb outcome,andabelieftotheeffectthattheout- comemaybeachievedbyperformingtheaction inquestion.ThusEmilymightspendthesum- merinFranceoutofadesiretolearnFrench,and abeliefthatspendingtimeinFranceisthebest waytodoso.Disputedquestionsaboutreasons includehowconfidenttheagentmustbethatthe actionselectedwillinfactleadtotheenvisioned outcome,andwhetherobligationrepresentsa sourceofmotivationthatcanoperateindepen- dentlyoftheagenfsdesires. Frequently,morethanonecourseofactionis availabletoanagent.Deliberationistheprocess ofsearchingoutandweighingthereasonsfor andagainstsuchalternatives.Whensuccessfully concluded,deliberationusuallyissuesinadeci- sion,bywhichanintentiontoundertakeoneof thecontemplatedactionsisformed.Theinten- tionisthencarriedoutwhenthetimeforaction comes.Muchdebatehascenteredontheques- tionofhowreasonsarerelatedtodecisionsand actions.Aswithintention,anagenfssimply havingareasonisnotenoughforthereasonto explainherbehavior:herdesiretoleamFrench notwithstanding,Emilymighthavegoneto Francesimplybecauseshewastransferredthere. Onlywhenanagentdoessomething/örareason doesthereasonexplainwhatisdone.Itisfre- quentlyclaimedthatthisbespeaksacausalrela- tionbetweentheagenfsstrongestreasonand herdecisionoraction.This,however,suggestsa deterministstanceonthefreewillproblem,lead- ingsomephilosopherstobalk.Analternativeis totreatreasonexplanationsasteleologicalexpla- nations,whereinanactionisheldtobereason- ableorjustifiedinvirtueofthegoalstoward whichitwasdirected.Butpositionsthattreat reasonexplanationsasnon-causalrequirean alternativeaccountofwhatitistodecideoract foronereasonratherthananother. Seealsoevent,freewillproblem, INTENTION,PRACTICALREASONING,VOLI- TION.H.J.M. act(ion)-token.Seeactiontheory. act(ion)-type.Seeactiontheory,typetheory. actionverb,averbappliedtoanagentand describinganactivity,anaction,oranattemptat oraculminationofanaction.Verbsapplyingto agentsmaybedistinguishedintwobasicways: bywhethertheycantaketheprogressive(con- tinuous)formandbywhetherornotthereisa specificmomentofoccurrence/completionof theactionnamedbytheverb.Anactivityverbis onedescribingsomethingthatgoesonforatime butwithnoinherentendpoint,suchas'drive', 'laugh',or'meditate'.Onecanstopdoingsucha thingbutonecannotcompletedoingit.Indeed, onecanbesaidtohavedoneitassoonasone hasbegundoingit.Anaccomplishmentverbisone describingsomethingthatgoesonforatime towardaninherentendpoint,suchas'painf(a fence),'solve'(aproblem),or'climb'(amoun- tain).Suchathingtakesacertaintimetodo,and onecannotbesaidtohavedoneituntilithas beencompleted.Anachievementverbisone describingeithertheculminationofanactivity, suchas'finish'(ajob)or'reach'(agoal);the effectingofachange,suchas'fire'(an employee)or'dröp'(anegg);orundergoinga change,suchas'hear'(anexplosion)or'forgef (aname).Anachievementdoesnotgoonfora periodoftimebutmaybetheculminationof somethingthatdoes.Rylesingledoutachieve- mentverbsandstateverbs(seebelow)partlyin ordertodisabusephilosophersoftheideathat whatpsychologicalverbsnamemustinvariably beinneractsoractivitiesmodeledonbodily actionsoractivities.Ataskverbisanactivityverb thatimpliesattemptingtodosomethingnamed byanachievementverb.Forexample,toseekis toattempttolind,tosniffistoattempttosmell, andtotreatistoattempttocure.Astateverbis averb(notanactionverb)describingacondi- tion,disposition,orhabitratherthansomething thatgoesonortakesplace.Examplesinclude 'own','weigh','wanf,'hate','frequenf,and 'teetotal'. ThesedifferenceswerearticulatedbyZeno VendierinLinguisticsandPhilosophy(1967).Tak- ingthemintoaccount,linguistshaveclassified verbs(andverbphrases)intofourmainaspec- tualclasses,whichtheydistinguishinrespectto theavailabilityandinterpretationofthesimple presenttense,oftheperfecttenses,ofthepro- gressiveconstruction,andofvarioustemporal adverbials,suchasadverbslike'yesterday', 'finally',and'often',andprepositionalphrases like'foralongtime'and'inawhile'.Manyverbs belongtomorethanonecategorybyvirtueof havingseveralrelateduses.Forexample,'run'is bothanactivityandanaccomplishmentverb, and'weigh'isbothastateandanaccomplish- mentverb.Linguistssingleoutaclassofcausative verbs,suchas'force','inspire',and'persuade', someofwhichareachievementandsome accomplishmentverbs.Suchcausativeverbsas 'break','burn',and'improve'haveacorrelative intransitiveuse,sothat,e.g.,tobreaksomething istocauseittobreak. activeeuthanasia AdelardofBath Seealsophilosophyoflanguage, SPEECHACTTHEORY.K.B. activeeuthanasia.Seeeuthanasia. activepower.Seepower. activityverb.Seeactionverb. act-objectdistinction.Seebrentano,meinong. act-objectpsychology,alsocalledact-content- objectpsychology,aphilosophicaltheorythat identifiesineverypsychologicalstateamental act,alived-throughphenomenologicalcontent, suchasamentalimageordescriptionofproper- ties,andanintendedobjectthatthementalact isaboutortowardwhichitisdirectedbyvirtue ofitscontent.Thedistinctionbetweentheact, content,andobjectofthoughtoriginatedwith AloisHöfler'sLogik(1890),writtenincollabora- tionwithMeinong.Butthetheoryishistorically mostoftenassociatedwithitsdevelopmentin KazimierzTwardowski'sZurLehrevomInhaltund GegenstandderVorstellung("OntheContentand ObjectofPresentations,"1894),despiteTwar- dowski'sacknowledgmentofhisdebttoHöfler. Act-objectpsychologyaroseasareactionto FranzBrentano'simmanentintentionalitythesis inhisinfluentialPsychologievomempirischen Ståndpunkt("PsychologyfromanEmpirical Standpoint,"1874),inwhichBrentanomain- tainsthatintentionalityis"themarkofthemen- tal,"bycontrastwithpurelyphysicalphe- nomena.Brentanorequiresthatintended objectsbelongimmanentlytothementalacts thatintendthem-aphilosophicalcommitment thatlaidBrentanoopentochargesofepistemo- logicalidealismandpsychologism.YetBren- tano^followers,whoacceptedtheintentionality ofthoughtbutresistedwhattheycametoseeas itsdetachableidealismandpsychologism,re- spondedbydistinguishingtheact-immanent phenomenologicalcontentofapsychological statefromitsact-transcendentintendedobject, arguingthatBrentanohadwronglyandunnec- essarilyconflatedmentalcontentwiththeexter- nalobjectsofthought. Twardowskigoessofarastoclaimthatcontent andobjectcanneverbeidentical,anexclusionin turnthatisvigorouslychallengedbyHusserlin hisLogischeUntersuchungen("LogicalInvestiga- tions,"1913,1922),andbyothersinthephe- nomenologicaltraditionwhoacknowledgethe possibilitythataself-reflexivethoughtcansome- timesbeaboutitsowncontentasintended object,inwhichcontentandobjectareindistin- guishable.Act-objectpsychologycontinuestobe ofinteresttocontemporaryphilosophybecause ofitsrelationtoongoingprojectsinphenome- nology,andasaresultofaresurgenceofstudy oftheconceptofintentionalityandqualiainphi- losophyofmind,cognitivepsychology,and Gegenstandstheorie,orexistentandnon-existent intendedobjecttheory,inphilosophicallogicand semantics. Seealsobrentano,husserl,intention- ality,MEINONG,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,POL- ISHLOGIC,QUALIA.D.J. actofcommission.See ACTIONTHEORY. actofomission.Seeactiontheory. actualinfinite.Seearistotle. actualism.Seegentile. actualist.Seemodallogic. actuality.Seepossibleworlds. actualization,first.Seearistotle. actualization,second.Seearistotle. actualoccasion.Seewhitehead. actualreality.Seereality. actutilitarianism.Seeutilitarianism. AdamdeWodeham.Seewodeham. adaptation.Seedarwinism. adaptivesystem.Seecomputertheory. AdelardofBath(c.l070-c.l145),English Benedictinemonknotableforhiscontributions totheintroductionofArabicscienceintheWest. AfterstudyingatTours,hetaughtatLaon,then spentsevenyearstravelinginItaly,possibly Spain,andCiliciaandSyria,beforereturningto England.InhisdialogueOntheSameandthe Different,heremarks,concerninguniversals,that thenamesofindividuals,species,andgeneraare imposedonthesameessenceregardedindiffer- entrespects.HealsowroteSeventy-sixQuestionson Nature,basedonArabiclearning;worksonthe useoftheabacusandtheastrolabe;aworkonfal- conry;andtranslationsofAbuMa'shar'sArabic adequacy,analytic Advaita ShorterIntrodnctiontoAstronomy,al-Khwarizmi's (fl.c.830)astronomicaltables,andEuclid's Elements.J.Lo. adequacy,analytic.Seematerialadequacy. adequacy,material.Seematerialadequacy. adequation.Seehusserl. adhoc.Seecurve-fittingproblem. adhochypothesis.Seecurve-fittingproblem. ädhyättnan(Sanskrit,'relatingtoorbelongingto theself),inearlyHindutextsconcemingsuch topicsasknowledgeoftheself,meditatingon thatwhichappertainstotheself,orspiritual exerciserelatedtotheself(ädhyätma-yoga).Låter, itbecameatermfortheSupremeSpirit,the SupremeSelf,orthesoul,which,inIndian thought,isotherthantheego.Inmonisticsys- tems,e.g.AdvaitaVedanta,theädhyättnanisthe oneSelfthatistheimpersonalAbsolute(Brah- man),astateofpureconsciousness,ultimately theonlyReal.Indualistsystems,e.g.Dvaita Vedanta,itisthetrueselforsoulofeachindi- vidual.R.N.Mi. adiaphora.Seestoicism. adicity.Seedegree. adjunction.Seeconjunctionintroduction. Adorno,TheodorWiesengrund(1903-69),Ger- manphilosopherandaesthetictheorist,oneof themainphilosophersofthefirstgenerationof theFrankfurtSchoolofcriticaltheory.With Horkheimer,Adornogavephilosophicaldirec- tiontotheFrankfurtSchoolanditsresearch projectsinitsInstituteforSocialResearch.An accomplishedmusicianandcomposer,Adorno firstfocusedonthetheoryofcultureandart, workingtodevelopanon-reductionistbutmate- rialisttheoryofartandmusicinmanyessays fromthe1930s.UndertheinfluenceofWalter Benjamin,heturnedtowarddevelopinga "micrological"accountofculturalartifacts,view- ingthemas"constellations"ofsocialandhistor- icalforces. AshiscollaborationwithHorkheimerin- creased,Adornoturnedtotheproblemofaself- defeatingdialecticofmodemreasonand freedom.Undertheinfluenceoftheseemingly imminentvictoryoftheNazisinEuropé,this analysisfocusedonthe"entwinementofmyth andEnlightenment."TheDialecticofEnlight- enment(1941)arguesthatinstrumentalreason promisesthesubjectautonomyfromtheforcesof natureonlytoenslaveitagainbyitsownrepres- sionofitsimpulsesandinclinations.Theonly wayaroundthisself-dominationis"non-identity thinking,"foundintheunifyingtendenciesofa non-repressivereason.Thisself-defeatingdialec- ticisrepresentedbythestrikingimageofUlysses tiedtothemasttosurvivehisencounterwiththe Sirens.Adornoinitiallyhopedforapositive analysisoftheEnlightenmenttoovercomethis genealogyofmodernreason,butitisnever developed.Instead,heturnedtoanincreasingly pessimisticanalysisofthegrowingreificationof modernlifeandofthepossibilityofa"totally administeredsociety." Adornoheldthat"autonomousart"canopen upestablishedrealityandnegatetheexperience ofreification.AestheticTheory(1970)develops thisideaofautonomousartintermsofaesthetic form,orthecapacityoftheinternalorganization ofarttorestructureexistingpatternsofmeaning. Authenticworksofarthavea"truth-value"in theircapacitytobringtoawarenesssocialcon- tradictionsandantinomies.InNegativeDialectics (1966)Adornoprovidesamoregeneralaccount ofsocialcriticismunderthe"fragmenting"con- ditionsofmodemrationalizationanddomina- tion.Theseandotherwritingshavehadalarge impactonculturalcriticism,particularlythrough Adorno'sanalysisofpopulärcultureandthe "cultureindustry." Seealsocriticaltheory,Frankfurt school.J.Bo. Advaita,alsocalledUttaraMImämsä,inHin- duism,thenon-dualisticformofVedanta. AdvaitaVedantamakesanepistemologicaldis- tinction(notametaphysicalone)betweenthe levelofappearanceandthelevelofreality.This marksoffhowthingsappearversushowthey are;thereappeartobeamultitudeofdistinct personsandphysicalobjects,andapersonal deity,whereasthereisonlyineffableBrahman. Thisdoctrine,accordingtoAdvaita,istaughtin theUpanishadsandrealizedinanesoteric enlightenmentexperiencecalledmoksha.The opposingevidenceprovidedbyallexperiences that(a)haveasubject-consciousness-object structure(e.g.,seeingasunset)andevidencea distinctionbetweenwhatoneexperiencesand oneself,or(b)haveasubject/contentstructure (e.g.,feelingpain)andevidenceadistinction betweenoneselfandone'sstates,isdismissedon 10 adventitiousideas aesthetics thegroundthattheseexperiencesinvolve"the makingofdistinctions."Criticsclaimthatmoksha itself,asanexperienceinwhichsomething allegedlyislearnedorgrasped,alsomustinvolve "themakingofdistinctions."Seealso VEDANTA.K.E.Y. adventitiousideas.Seeidea. adverbialtheory.Seeperception. Aenesidemus.Seeskepticism,skeptics. aestheticattitude,theappropriateattitudeor frameofmindforapproachingart(ornatureor otherobjectsorevents)sothatonemightboth appreciateitsintrinsicperceptualqualities,and asaresulthaveanaestheticexperience. Theaestheticattitudehasbeenconstruedin manyways:(1)asdisinterested,sothatone's experienceoftheworkisnotaffectedbyany interestinitspossiblepracticaluses,(2)asa"dis- tancing"ofoneselffromone'sownpersonalcon- cerns,(3)asthecontemplationofanobject, purelyasanobjectofsensation,asitisinitself, foritsownsake,inawayunaffectedbyanycog- nitionorknowledgeonemayhaveofit.These differentnotionsofaestheticattitudehaveat timesbeencombinedwithinasingletheory. Thereisconsiderabledoubtaboutwhether thereissuchathingasanaestheticattitude. Thereisneitheranyspecialkindofactionnor anyspecialwayofperforminganordinaryaction thatensuresthatweseeaworkasit"reallyis," andthatresultsinourhavinganaestheticexpe- rience.Furthermore,therearenopurelysensory experiences,divorcedfromanycognitivecon- tentwhatsoever.Criticismsofthenotionofaes- theticattitudehavereinforcedattackson aestheticsasaseparatefieldofstudywithinphi- losophy. Seealsoaestheticproperty,aesthet- ics,BEAUTY.S.L.F. aestheticform.Seeaestheticformalism,aes- thetics. aestheticformalism,theviewthatinourinterac- tionswithworksofart,formshouldbegivenpri- macy.Ratherthantaking'formalism'asthe nameofonespecifictheoryinthearts,itisbet- terandmoretypicaltotakeittonamethattype oftheorywhichemphasizestheformoftheart- work.Or,sinceemphasisonformissomething thatcomesindegrees,itisbesttothinkoftheo- riesofartasrangedonacontinuumofmorefor- malistandlessformalist.Itshouldbeaddedthat theoriesofartaretypicallycomplex,including definitionsofart,recommendationsconcerning whatweshouldattendtoinart,analysesofthe natureoftheaesthetic,recommendationscon- cerningthemakingofaestheticevaluations,etc; andeachofthesecomponentsmaybemorefor- malistorlessso. Thosewhousetheconceptofformmainly wishtocontrasttheartifactitselfwithitsrela- tionstoentitiesoutsideitself-withitsrepresent- ingvariousthings,itssymbolizingvariousthings, itsbeingexpressiveofvariousthings,itsbeing theproductofvariousintentionsoftheartist,its evokingvariousstatesinbeholders,itsstanding invariousrelationsofinfluenceandsimilarityto preceding,succeeding,andcontemporaryworks, etc.Therehavebeensome,however,whoin emphasizingformhavemeanttoemphasizenot justtheartifactbuttheperceptibleformordesign oftheartifact.Kant,e.g.,inhistheoryofaesthetic excellence,notonlyinsistedthattheonlything relevanttodeterminingthebeautyofanobjectis itsappearance,butwithintheappearance,the form,thedesign:invisualart,notthecolorsbut thedesignthatthecolorscompose;inmusic,not thetimbreoftheindividualsoundsbutthefor- malrelationshipsamongthem. Itcomesasnosurprisethattheoriesofmusic havetendedtobemuchmoreformalistthanthe- oriesofliteratureanddrama,withtheoriesofthe visualartslocatedinbetween. Seealsoaesthetics.N.P.W. aestheticproperty,apropertyorqualitysuchas beingdainty,garish,graceful,balanced,charm- ing,majestic,trite,elegant,lifeless,ugly,orbeau- tiful.Bycontrast,non-aestheticpropertiesare propertiesthatrequirenospecialsensitivityor perceptivenesstoperceive-suchasapainting's beingpredominantlyblue,itshavingasmallred squareinacornerorakneelingfigureinthe foreground,orthatthemusicbecomeslouderat agivenpoint.Sometimesitisarguedthataspe- cialperceptivenessortasteisneededtoperceive awork'saestheticqualities,andthatthisisa definingfeatureofaproperty'sbeingaesthetic.A corollaryofthisviewisthataestheticqualities cannotbedefinedintermsofnon-aestheticqual- ities,thoughsomehaveheldthataestheticqual- itiessuperveneonnon-aestheticqualities.See alsoAESTHETICS,beauty,supervenience. S.L.F. aesthetics,thebranchofphilosophythatexam- inesthenatureofartandthecharacterofour 11 aesthetics aesthetics experienceofartandofthenaturalenviron- ment.Itemergedasaseparatefieldofphilo- sophicalinquiryduringtheeighteenthcentury inEnglandandontheContinent.Recognitionof aestheticsasaseparatebranchofphilosophy coincidedwiththedevelopmentoftheoriesofart thatgroupedtogetherpainting,poetry,sculp- ture,music,anddance(andoftenlandscapegar- dening)asthesamekindofthing,lesbeauxarts, orthefinearts.Baumgartencoinedtheterm 'aesthetics'inhisReflectionsonPoetry(1735)as thenameforoneofthetwobranchesofthe studyofknowledge,i.e.,forthestudyofsensory experiencecoupledwithfeeling,whichhe arguedprovidedadifferenttypeofknowledge fromthedistinct,abstractideasstudiedby "logic."HederiveditfromtheancientGreek aisthanomai('toperceive'),and"theaesthetic" hasalwaysbeenintimatelyconnectedwithsen- soryexperienceandthekindsoffeelingsit arouses. Questionsspecifictothefieldofaestheticsare: Isthereaspecialattitude,theaestheticattitude, whichweshouldtaketowardworksofartand thenaturalenvironment,andwhatisitlike?Is thereadistinctivetypeofexperience,anaes- theticexperience,andwhatisit?Isthereaspe- cialobjectofattentionthatwecancallthe aestheticobject?Finally,isthereadistinctive value,aestheticvalue,comparablewithmoral, epistemic,andreligiousvalues?Somequestions overlapwiththoseinthephilosophyofart,such asthoseconcerningthenatureofbeauty,and whetherthereisafacultyoftastethatisexer- cisedinjudgingtheaestheticcharacterandvalue ofnaturalobjectsorworksofart. Aestheticsalsoencompassesthephilosophyof art.Themostcentralissueinthephilosophyof arthasbeenhowtodefine'art'.Notallcultures have,orhavehad,aconceptofartthatcoincides withtheonethatemergedinWesternEuropé duringtheseventeenthandeighteenthcen- turies.Whatjustifiesourapplyingourconceptto thethingspeopleintheseothercultureshave produced?Therearealsomanypictures(includ- ingpaintings),songs,buildings,andbitsofwrit- ing,thatarenotart.Whatdistinguishesthose pictures,musicalworks,etc,thatareartfrom thosethatarenot?Variousanswershavebeen proposedthatidentifythedistinguishingfea- turesofartintermsofform,expressiveness, intentionsofthemaker,andsocialrolesoruses oftheobject. Sincetheeighteenthcenturytherehavebeen debatesaboutwhatkindsofthingscountas "art."Somehavearguedthatarchitectureand ceramicsarenotartbecausetheirfunctionsare primarilyutilitarian,andnovelswereforalong timenotlistedamongthe"finearts"because theyarenotembodiedinasensuousmedium. Debatescontinuetoariseövernewmediaand whatmaybenewartforms,suchasfilm,video, photography,performanceart,foundart,furni- ture,posters,earthworks,andcomputerand electronicart.Sculpturesthesedaysmaybe madeoutofdirt,feces,orvariousdiscardedand mass-producedobjects,ratherthanmarbleor bronze.Thereisoftenanexplicitrejectionof craftandtechniquebytwentieth-centuryartists, andthesubjectmatterhasexpandedtoinclude thebanalandeveryday,andnotmerelymytho- logical,historical,andreligioussubjectsasin yearspast.Allofthesedevelopmentsraiseques- tionsabouttherelevanceofthecategoryof "fine"or"high"art. Anothersetofissuesinphilosophyofartcon- cernshowartworksaretobeinterpreted,appre- ciated,andunderstood.Someviewsemphasize thatartworksareproductsofindividualefforts, sothataworkshouldbeunderstoodinlightof theproducer'sknowledge,skill,andintentions. Othersseethemeaningofaworkasestablished bysocialconventionsandpracticesoftheartisfs owntime,butwhichmaynotbeknownor understoodbytheproducer.Stillotherssee meaningasestablishedbythepracticesofthe users,eveniftheywerenotineffectwhenthe workwasproduced. Arethereobjectivecriteriaorstandardsfor evaluatingindividualartworks?Therehasbeen muchdisagreementöverwhethervaluejudg- mentshaveuniversalvalidity,orwhetherthere canbenodisputingabouttaste,ifvaluejudg- mentsarerelativetothetastesandinterestsof eachindividual(ortosomegroupofindividuals whosharethesametastesandinterests).Ajudg- mentsuchas"Thisisgood"certainlyseemsto makeaclaimabouttheworkitself,thoughsuch aclaimisoftenbasedonthesortoffeeling, understanding,orexperienceapersonhas obtainedfromthework.Awork'saestheticor artisticvalueisgenerallydistinguishedfromsim- plylikingit.Butisitpossibletoestablishwhat sort(s)ofknowledgeorexperience(s)anygiven workshouldprovidetoanysuitablyprepared perceiver,andwhatwoulditbetobesuitably prepared?Itisamatterofcontentionwhethera work'saestheticandartisticvaluesareindepen- dentofitsmoral,political,orepistemicstanceor impact. Philosophyofarthasalsodealtwiththenature oftaste,beauty,imagination,creativity,repre- 12 affirmingtheconsequent Africanphilosophy sentation,expression,andexpressiveness;style; whetherartworksconveyknowledgeortruth; thenatureofnarrativeandmetaphor;the importanceofgenre;theontologicalstatusof artworks;andthecharacterofouremotional responsestoart. Workinthefieldhasalwaysbeeninfluenced byphilosophicaltheoriesoflanguageormean- ing,andtheoriesofknowledgeandperception, andcontinuestobeheavilyinfluencedbypsy- chologicalandculturaltheory,includingver- sionsofsemiotics,psychoanalysis,cognitivepsy- chologyfeminism,andMarxism.Sometheorists inthelatetwentiethcenturyhavedeniedthat theaestheticandthe"finearts"canlegitimately beseparatedoutandunderstoodasseparate, autonomoushumanphenomena;theyargue insteadthattheseconceptualcategoriesthem- selvesmanifestandreinforcecertainkindsof culturalattitudesandpowerrelationships.These theoristsurgethataestheticscanandshouldbe eliminatedasaseparatefieldofstudy,andthat "theaesthetic"shouldnotbeconceivedasaspe- cialkindofvalue.Theyfavörinsteadacritique oftherolesthatimages(notonlypainting,but film,photography,andadvertising),sounds,nar- rative,andthree-dimensionalconstructions haveinexpressingandshapinghumanattitudes andexperiences. Seealsoaestheticattitude,aesthetic PROPERTY,BEAUTY,EXPRESSIONTHEORYOF ART,INSTITUTIONALTHEORYOFART.S.L.F. affirmingtheconsequent.Seeformålfallacy. afortioriargument,anargumentthatmoves fromthepremisesthateverythingwhichpos- sesses(a)certaincharacteristic(s)willpossess somefurthercharacteristic(s)andthatcertain thingspossesstherelevantcharacteristic(s)toan eminentdegreetotheconclusionthatafortiori (evenmoreso)thesethingswillpossessthefur- thercharacteristic(s).Thesecondpremiseis oftenleftimplicit,soafortioriargumentsare oftenenthymemes.Anexampleofanafortiori argumentcanbefoundinPlato'sCrito:Weowe gratitudeandrespecttoourparentsandso shoulddonothingtoharmthem.Atheniansowe evengreatergratitudeandrespecttothelawsof Athensandsoafortiorishoulddonothingto harmthoselaws.Seealsoenthymeme,syl- LOGISM.R.P. Africanphilosophy,thephilosophyproducedby thepreliterateculturesofAfrica,distinctivein thatAfricanphilosophyinthetraditionalsetting isunwritten.Forsomeonewhoisinterestedin studying,say,ChineseorArabicphilosophy,the writtenworksoftheindividualthinkersare available;Africanphilosophy,bycontrast(with theexceptionofEthiopianphilosophy),haspro- ducednowrittenphilosophicalworks. Thelackofwrittenphilosophicalliteraturein Africa'sculturalpastistheoutstandingreason forthepersistentskepticismabouttheexistence ofAfricanphilosophyoftenentertainedbyschol- ars.Therearesomewhowouldwithholdthe term'philosophy'fromAfricantraditional thoughtandwouldreservethattermforthe philosophicalworksbeingwrittenbyindividual Africanphilosopherstoday.Thereareothers who,onthebasisof(i)theirownconceptionof thenatureofphilosophy,(ii)theirsenseofthe historyofthedevelopmentofphilosophicalideas inothercultures,(iii)theirconvictionaboutthe importanceoftheuniversalcharacterofthe humancapacitytowonder,orofthecuriosity thatleadssomeindividualsinvariousculturesto raisefundamentalquestionsabouthumanlife andexperience,or(iv)theirconvictionthatlit- eracyisnotanecessaryconditionforphiloso- phizing,wouldapply'philosophy'toAfrican traditionalthought,eventhoughsomeofthem wouldwanttocharacterizeitfurtherasethno- philosophyorfolkphilosophy.Twoassumptions madeaboutthecharacterofAfricantraditional thoughthaveearneditthoselabels:oneisthe allegedcommunal(collective)subscriptiontoa 'monolithic'setofideasorbeliefs;theotheristhe allegedlackofindividualistelementsintradi- tionalthought.Theseassumptionshaveled somescholarstobelievethatAfricanthoughtis asystemofideasorbeliefsunanimouslyheldby awholetribe(ethnos),eventhoughitmaybe arguedthatthoughtassuchisalwaystheprod- uctofanindividualintellect.Anindividualmay refineorbuildonthephilosophicalworkof anotherindividual,buttheproductwillstillbe anindividualintellectualenterprise. WhatseemstohavehappenedinAfricaisthat duetolackofadoxographictradition,theideas ofunnamable(becauseunidentifiable)individu- alsthatgainedcurrencyamongthewidercom- munitybecamepartofthepoolofcommunal thought,asiftheywerethethoughtorapro- ductionofawholeethnos,andexpressedinits oralliterature:inproverbs,mythsandfolktales, rituals,religiousbeliefs,artsymbols,customs, andtraditions.Thesewould,infact,constitute thewarpandwoofofthefabricoftraditional philosophyinAfrica. Anextensiveandprofoundcriticalevaluation 13 agama agentcausation ofconceptsandvaluesoftraditionalthoughtcan bethestartingpointofmodernAfricanphiloso- phy.Thereasonisthatmostofthetraditional concepts,beliefs,andvalueshavenotrelaxed theirgriponmodernAfricanlifeandthought. ButthemodernAfricanphilosophywillalso havetoincludetheconceptualresponsestothe circumstances,experiences,andproblemsof modemAfricansocieties.Thisaspectofthe philosophicalenterprisewillhavetodealwith thecriticalanalysis,interpretation,andassess- mentofthechangesthattraditionalvaluesand ideasaregoingthroughinresponsetothepres- sures,bothinternalandexternal,weighing heavilyonthemthroughtheethosofcontem- porarylife.Thus,Africanphilosophywillnotbe auniquesystem,awindowlessmonadimpervi- oustoexternalinfluences.Butitisconceiv- able-perhapsexpected-thatitwillhavesome characteristicsofitsown. AstothecentralthemesofAfricanphilosophy, whatonecanappropriatelydoatthisstageofits developmentisindicatesomeofthepersistent assumptions,beliefs,andvaluesembeddedin Africanculturalandhistoricalexperiences. Thesewouldundoubtedlyinclude:supernatural- ism-ideasaboutGodandotherspiritualentities conceivedinAfricanontologies,thedualisticor monisticperceptionoftheexternalworld,the (alleged)religiosityorspiritualityoftheAfrican life,humandestiny,andthemorallife;person- hoodandcommunitarianism-socialandhumanis- ticethics,notionsofthecommunityandthe commongood,thenatureofthegoodlife,the statusofindividualityinAfricansocioethical thought;politicalideas-chiefshipandtraditional politicalauthority,traditionalideasofdemoc- racy,democraticthoughtinacommunitarian framework,consensualpoliticsanddecision making,politicallegitimacy,corruptionand politicalmorality;andtraditionandmodernity- thenotionofculture,ethnicityandnationhood, thenatureanddevelopmentofnationalculture andidentity,theconceptofdevelopment,tech- nology,society,andvalues. Thesethemesandothershavegeneratedvar- iousideasthatmustbecriticallyanalyzedand evaluatedbycontemporaryAfricanphiloso- phers,whowouldinthiswaycreateamodern Africanphilosophywithoriginsinthecompre- hensivecultureandmany-sidedexperiencesof theAfrican,yetaspectsofwhichmaybeconsid- eredbyotherculturestobeworthwhile.Thanks totheliteraryculturetheyhaveinherited,con- temporaryAfricanphilosophers,throughtheir ownindividualanalysesandarguments,areina positiontocontributetotheemergenceofa modemAfricanphilosophythatwouldnaturally compriseamultiplicityofindividualphilosophi- calideas,arguments,andpositions.K.G. ägarna(Sanskrit,'whathascomedown'),an authoritativereligioustextofanIndiansect. ThereareHindu,Jain,andBuddhistägarnas.The Hinduägarnasfallintothreemainclasses:Vais- navatextsconcerningtheworshipofVishnu, SaivatextsdealingwithworshipofSiva,and TantrictextsregardingworshipofSakti.Saivism, e.g.,hastwenty-eightägarnas.Anägarnamay giveinstructionsregardingmakingtemplesor idols,offermeditationtechniques,teachphilo- sophicaldoctrines,orcommendmethodsofwor- ship.TheMahayanaBuddhisttermforthebasic teachingsoftheTheravadaBuddhisttraditionis 'ägarna'.K.E.Y. agape,unselfishloveforallpersons.Anethical theoryaccordingtowhichsuchloveisthechief virtue,andactionsaregoodtotheextentthat theyexpressit,issometimescalledagapism. AgapeistheGreekwordmostoftenusedforlove intheNewTestament,andisoftenusedinmod- ernlanguagestosignifywhateversortoflovethe writertakestobeidealizedthere.InNewTesta- mentGreek,however,itwasprobablyaquite generalwordforlove,sothatanyethicalideal mustbefoundinthetexfssubstantiveclaims, ratherthaninthelinguisticmeaningofthe word.R.M.A. agathon,Greekwordmeaning'agood'or'the good'.FromSocratesonward,agathonwastaken tobeacentralobjectofphilosophicalinquiry;it hasfrequentlybeenassumedtobethegoalofall rationalaction.Platointhesimileofthesunin theRepublicidentifieditwiththeFormofthe Good,thesourceofreality,truth,andintelligi- bility.Aristotlesawitaseudaimonia,intellectual orpracticalvirtue,aviewthatfounditsway,via StoicismandNeoplatonism,intoChristianity. Moderntheoriesofutilitycanbeseenascon- cernedwithessentiallythesameSocraticques- tion.R.C. agent-basedethics.Seevirtueethics. agentcausation,theideathattheprimarycause ofaneventisasubstance;morespecifically,cau- sationbyasubstance,asopposedtoanevent. Thusabrick(asubstance)maybesaidtobethe causeofthebreakingoftheglass.Theexpression isalsousedmorenarrowlybyReidandothersfor 14 agent-neutral Ailly,Pierred' theviewthatanaction(orevent)iscausedbyan exertionofpowerbysomeagentendowedwith willandunderstanding.Thus,apersonmaybe saidtobethecauseofheractionofopeningthe door.Inthisrestrictedsense(Reidcalledit"the strictandpropersense"),anagent-causemust havethepowertocausetheactionoreventand thepowernottocauseit.Moreover,itmustbe "upto"theagentwhethertocausetheeventor nottocauseit.(Itisnot"upto"thebrickwhether tocauseornottocausethebreakingoftheglass.) Therestrictedsenseofagentcausationdevel- opedbyReidiscloselytiedtotheviewthatthe agentpossessesfreewill. Medievalphilosophersdistinguishedtheinter- nalactivityoftheagentfromtheextemalevent producedbythatactivity.Theformerwascalled "immanentcausation"andthelatter"transeunt causation."Thesetermshavebeenadaptedby Chisholmandotherstomarkthedifference betweenagentcausationandeventcausation. Theideaisthattheinternalactivityisagent- causedbythepersonwhoseactivityitis; whereastheexternaleventisevent-causedby theintemalactivityoftheagent. Seealsocausation,freewillproblem. W.L.R. agent-neutral.Seeutilitarianism. agent-relative.Seeutilitarianism. agnoiology(fromGreekagnoia,'ignorance'),the studyofignorance,itsqualityanditsconditions. L.P.P. agnosticism(fromGreeka-,'not',andgnästos, 'known'),terminventedbyThomasHenryHux- leyin1869todenotethephilosophicalandreli- giousattitudeofthosewhoclaimthatmeta- physicalideascanbeneitherprovednordis- proved.Huxleywrote,"Ineitheraffirmnordeny theimmortalityofman.Iseenoreasonfor believingit,butontheotherhand,Ihaveno meansofdisprovingit.Ihavenoaprioriobjec- tiontothedoctrine." Agnosticismisaformofskepticismappliedto metaphysics,especiallytheism.Thepositionis sometimesattributedtoKant,whoheldthatwe cannothaveknowledgeofGodorimmortality butmustbecontentwithfaith.Agnosticism shouldnotbeconfusedwithatheism,thebelief thatnogodexists. Seealsoatheism.L.RP. agreement,methodof.Seemillsmethods. AgricultureSchool.SeeHsiihsing. ahamkära(Sanskrit,'I-maker','I-crier'),in Hinduthought,theegoorfacultythatgivesthe senseofTorindividualpersonality;byexten- sion,egotism,pride,conceit.IntheSankhyaand Yogasystems,itisthethirdelementofever- changingNatureevolvingincreation.Fromit evolvestheremainderofthephenomenalworld. OtherthanNature,whichincludestheindivid- ualintellect(buddhi),thefacultyofperception (manas),theorgans,andthesenses,isthe unchangingindividualself(purusa,Ätman).The humanpredicamentresultsfromtheignorant identificationofoneselfwithNatureratherthan thetrueself.Inearliertextsthecosmicsenseof ahamkäradominatesasthemeansbywhichthe CreatorformulatesHimselftocreatetheworld. R.N.Mi. ahantä.Sanskritwordmeaning'indestructible', 'unchangeable','eternal'.IntraditionalHindu philosophicalthought,thetrulyrealwas thoughttobeindestructibleandeternal.Thus, becausetheUpanishadicBrahmananditssub- jectivecounterpart,theÄtman,wereregardedas thetrulyreal,theywerethoughttobe unchangeableandeternal.TheHindureligious classic,theBhagavadGita(probablywritten betweenthefifthandthesecondcenturyb.c), madeahantäawell-knownconceptthroughthe teachingsofKrishna,whoadvisedArjunathat eventhoughone'sbodymayperishone'ssoulis eternalandindestructible,thusimplyingthatthe humansoulcontainstheessenceofthedivine reality.Seealsobhagavadgita,brahman. D.K.C. ahimsä(Sanskrit),traditionallyandliterally, nonviolencetolivingcreatures;formodern Indianthinkers,apositivesenseofkindnessto allcreatures.TotheJains,ahimsäwasavowto injurenolivingbeing(jiva)inthought,word,or deed.ManyBuddhistspracticeahimsäasapre- ceptthatdeniestheexistenceoftheego,since injuringanotherisanassertionofegoism.With themodernperiod,particularlyGandhi,ahimsä wasequatedwithself-sacrificialloveforall beings.ForGandhiitwasthefirstvowofthe satyägrahi,theonewho"heldontoTruth,"the nonviolentresister.Seealsogandhi,jainism. R.N.Mi. AhuraMazda.Seezoroastrianism. Ailly,Pierred'.Seed'ailly. 15 aisthesis akrasia aisthesis.Seearistotle. aitia(Greek),cause.Originallyreferringto responsibilityforacrime,thisGreektermcame tobeusedbyphilosopherstosignifycausalityin asomewhatbroadersensethantheEnglish 'cause'-thetraditionalrenderingofaitia-can convey.Anaitiaisanyanswertoawhy-ques- tion.AccordingtoAristotle,howsuchquestions oughttobeansweredisaphilosophicalissue addresseddifferentlybydifferentphilosophers. Hehimselfdistinguishesfourtypesofanswers, andthusfouraitiai,bydistinguishingdifferent typesofquestions:(1)Whyisthestatueheavy? Becauseitismadeofbronze(materialaitia).(2) WhydidPersiansinvadeAthens?Becausethe Athenianshadraidedtheirterritory(movingor efficientaitia).(3)Whyaretheanglesofatrian- gleequaltotworightangles?Becauseofthetri- angle'snature(formålaitia).(4)Whydid someonewalkafterdinner?Because(orforthe sake)ofhishealth(finalaitia).Onlythesecond ofthesewouldtypicallybecalledacauseinEng- lish.Thoughsomerenderaitiaas'explanatory principle'or'reason',theseexpressionsinaptly suggestamerelymentalexistence;instead,an aitiaisathingoraspectofathing.Seealsoaris- totle,EXPLANATION.E.C.H. äkäsa,Sanskritwordtranslatedas'ether'or 'space'.Indianphilosophicalsystemsrecognized variousontologicalcategories,includingthatof substance.Äkäsawasthoughtofasasubstance becauseitwasbelievedtobethesubstratumof sound.Becauseäkäsawasunderstoodtotrans- mitsoundwaves,thetermisbettertranslatedas 'ether'than'space',butscholarsarenotunani- mousonthis.Äkäsa,thoughextendedinspace, wasviewedasanon-materialsubstance.Itwas thoughtofasall-pervading,infmite,indivisible andimperceivable,beinginferredfromthe sensedqualityofsound.D.K.C. akrasia,alsospelledacrasia,Greektermforweak- nessofwill.Akrasiaisacharacterflaw,alsocalled incontinence,exhibitedprimarilyinintentional behaviorthatconflictswiththeagenfsownval- uesorprinciples.Itscontraryisenkrateia (strengthofwill,continence,self-control).Both akrasiaandenkrateia,Aristotlesays,"arecon- cernedwithwhatisinexcessofthestatechar- acteristicofmostpeople;forthecontinentabide bytheirresolutionsmore,andtheincontinent less,thanmostpeoplecan"(NicomacheanEthics 1152a25-27).Theseresolutionsmaybeviewed asjudgmentsthatitwouldbebesttoperforman actionofacertainsort,orbettertodoonething thananother.Enkrateia,onthatview,isthe power(kratos)toactasonejudgesbestintheface ofcompetingmotivation.Akrasiaisawantor deficiencyofsuchpower.(Aristotlehimselflim- itedthesphereofbothstatesmorestrictlythan isnowdone,regardingbothasconcernedspecif- icallywith"pleasuresandpainsandappetites andaversionsarisingthroughtouchandtaste" [1150a9-10].) Philosophersaregenerallymoreinterestedin incontinentandcontinentactionsthaninthecor- respondingstatesofcharacter.Variousspeciesof incontinentorakraticbehaviormaybedistin- guished,includingincontinentreasoningand akraticbeliefformation.Thespeciesofakratic behaviorthathasattractedmostattentionis uncompelled,intentionalactionthatconflicts withabetterorbestjudgmentconsciouslyheld bytheagentatthetimeofaction.If,e.g.,while judgingitbestnottoeatasecondpieceofpie, youintentionallyeatanotherpiece,youact incontinently-providedthatyoursoactingis uncompelled(e.g.,yourdesireforthepieisnot irresistible).Socratesdeniedthatsuchactionis possible,therebycreatingoneoftheSocratic paradoxes. In"unorthodox"instancesofakraticaction,a deedmanifestsweaknessofwilleventhoughit accordswiththeagenfsbetterjudgment.Aboy whodecides,againsthisbetterjudgment,topar- ticipateinacertaindangerousprank,might- owingtoanavoidablefailureofnerve-failto executehisdecision.Insuchacase,somewould claim,hisfailuretoactonhisdecisionmanifests weaknessofwillorakrasia.If,instead,hemas- tershisfear,hisparticipatingintheprankmight manifeststrengthofwill,eventhoughhissoact- ingconflictswithhisbetterjudgment. Theoccurrenceofakraticactionsseemstobe afactoflife.Unlikemanysuch(apparent)facts, thisonehasreceivedconsiderablephilosophical scrutinyfornearlytwoandahalfmillennia.A majorsourceoftheinterestisclear:akratic actionraisesdifficultquestionsaboutthecon- nectionbetweenthoughtandaction,aconnec- tionofparamountimportanceformost philosophicaltheoriesoftheexplanationof intentionalbehavior.Insofarasmoraltheory doesnotfloatfreeofevidenceabouttheetiology ofhumanbehavior,thetoughquestionsarise thereaswell.Ostensibleakraticaction,then, occupiesaphilosophicalspaceintheintersection ofthephilosophyofmindandmoraltheory. Seealsoactiontheory,intention, PRACTICALREASONING,VOLITION.A.R.M. 16 aksara AlbertusMagnus aksara(Sanskrit,'imperishable'),thehighest realityinavarietyofHinduthoughtsystems. Fromearliesttimesitalsomeant'syllable', reflectingthesearchfortheultimaterealityby Vedicpriest-thinkersandtheearlyprimacygiven tothesacredutteranceasthesupportoftheritual orderoftheuniverse,låteridentifiedasthesylla- bleOm.Inlåtertextsandthesystematicthinkers itreferstothehighestreality,whichmaybea personalsupremebeingoranimpersonal absolute,suchastheHighestSelf(paramätman) ofSharikara(700-50).Non-technically,itcanbe usedinanythoughtsystemofanyentitybelieved tobeimperishable.R.N.Mi. älaya-vijnäna.Sanskrittermmeaningliterally 'storehouseconsciousness',acategorydeveloped byIndianBuddhistmetaphysicianstosolvesome specificphilosophicalproblems,notablythoseof delayedkarmiceffectandcausationatatemporal distance.Theälaya-vijnäna"stores,"inunactual- izedbutpotentialform,as"seeds,"theresultsof anagenfsvolitionalactions.Thesekarmic "seeds"maycometofruitionatalåtertime.Most Buddhiststhinkofmomentsofconsciousness (vijnäna)asintentional(havinganobject,being o/something);theälaya-vijnänaisanexception, allowingforthecontinuanceofconsciousness whentheagentisapparentlynotconsciousof anything(suchasduringdreamlesssleep),andso alsoforthecontinuanceofpotentialforfuture actionduringthosetimes.Seealsobhavanga, väsanä.P.J.G. AlbertofSaxony(1316-90),terministlogician fromlowerSaxonywhotaughtintheartsfac- ultyatParis,1351-62.Heneverfinishedhisthe- ologydegree,as,undertheinfluenceofBuridan andNicholasofOresme,heturnedtomathe- matics,physics,andlogic.Hewasafounderof theUniversityofViennain1365andwasbishop ofHalberstadtfrom1366.Hisworksonlogic includeLogic,QuestionsonthePosteriorAnalytics, Sophismata,TreatiseonObligations,andInsolubilia. HealsowrotequestionsonAristotle'sphysical worksandonJohnofSacrobosco'sDeSphaera, andshorttreatisesonsquaringthecircleandon theratioofthediametertothesideofasquare. Hisworkiscompetentbutrarelyoriginal.See alsoTERMINISTLOGIC.J.Lo. AlberttheGreat.Seealbertusmagnus. AlbertusMagnus,alsocalledAlberttheGreat (c.1200-80),GermanDominicanphilosopher- theologian.AsaParisianmasteroftheology,he servedonacommissionthatcondemnedtheTal- mud.HeleftParistofoundthefirstDominican studiumgeneraleinGermanyatColognein1248. From1252untiloldage,Albertwasrepeatedly askedtobeanarbiterandpeacemaker.After servingbrieflyasbishopofRegensburgin1260, hewasorderedtopreachthecrusadeof1263- 64inGermany.Hespenthislastyearswritingin Cologne. Albertcontributedtophilosophychieflyasa commentatoronAristotle,althoughheocca- sionallyreacheddifferentconclusionsfromAris- totle.Primarily,Albertwasatheologian,asis evidentfromhisextensivecommentaryonPeter Lombard'sSentencesandhiscommentariesonthe OldandNewTestaments.Asatheologian,he customarilydevelopedhisthoughtbycomment- ingontraditionaltexts.ForAlbert,Aristotle offeredknowledgeascertainableusingreason, justasScripture,basedonGod'sword,tellsofthe supernatural.AlbertsawAristotle'sworks,many newlyavailable,asanencyclopediccom- pendiumofinformationonthenaturaluniverse; includedhereisthestudyofsocialandpolitical conditionsandethicalobligations,forAris- totelian"naturalknowledge"dealswithhuman natureaswellasnaturalhistory.Aristotleisthe Philosopher;however,unlikeHolyScripture,he mustbecorrectedinplaces.LikeHolyScripture, though,Aristotleisoccasionallyobscure.Torec- tifytheseshortcomingsonemustrelyonother authorities:inthecaseofHolyScripture,refer- enceistothechurchfathersandestablished interpreters;inthecaseofAristotle,tothePeri- patetics.Theterm'Peripatetics'extendstomod- ernaswellasancientauthors-al-Färäbl, Avicenna(Ibn-SInä),andAverroes(Ibn-Rushd), aswellasThemistiusandAlexanderofAphro- disias;evenSeneca,Maimonides,and"our" Boethiusareincluded. Forthemostpart,AlbertsawPlatothrough theeyesofAristotleandAverroes,sinceapart fromtheTimaeusverylittleofPlato'sworkwas availableinLatin.AlbertconsideredtheLiberde causisaworkofAristotle,supplementedbyal- Färäbl,Avicenna,andal-Ghazällandtranslated intoLatin.WhenhecommentedontheLiberde causis,AlbertwasnotawarethatthisNeoplatonic work-whichspeaksoftheworldemanating fromtheOneasfromafirstcause-wasbasedon ProclusandultimatelyonPlotinus.ButAlberfs student,Aquinas,whohadbettertranslationsof Aristotle,recognizedthattheLiberdecausiswas notanAristotelianwork. Alberfsmetaphysics,whichisexpoundedin hiscommentariesonAristotle'sMetaphysicsand 17 Albinus alchemy ontheLiberdecausis,containsprofoundlycontra- dictoryelements.Hisinclinationtosynthesisled himtoattempttoreconciletheseelements-as onsocialandecclesiasticalquestionsheoften soughtpeacethroughcompromise.Inhis MetaphysicsandPhysicsandinhisOntheHeavens andOnGenerationandCorruption,Aristotlepre- sentedtheworldasever-changingandtaught thatanunmovedmover("thoughtthinking itself")maintainedeverythinginmovementand animationbyallowingitsspiritualnaturetobe seeninallitscold,unapproachablebeauty.The Liberdecausis,ontheotherhand,developsthe theorythattheworldemanatesfromtheOne, causingeverythingintheworldinitspantheistic creativity,sothatthecausedworldreturnsin mysticharmonytotheOne.ThusAlberfs Aristoteliancommentaries,begunin1251-52, culminatedin1265withhiscommentaryona workwhosepseudo-Aristoteliancharacterhe wasunabletorecognize.Nevertheless,the ChristianNeoplatonismthatAlbertplacedonan Aristotelianbasiswastoexertaninfluencefor centuries. Innaturalphilosophy,Albertoftenarrivedat viewsindependentofAristotle.Accordingto Aristotle'sPhysics,motionbelongstonosingle category;itisincompletebeing.Following AvicennaandAverroes,Albertaskswhether"be- comingblack,"e.g.-whichceaseswhenchange ceasesandblacknessisfinallyachieved-differs fromblacknessessentially(essentia)oronlyin itsbeing(esse).Albertestablishes,contraryto Avicenna,thatthedistinctionisonlyoneof being. Inhisdiscussionsofplaceandspace,stimu- latedbyAvicenna,Albertalsomakesanoriginal contribution.Onlytwodimensions-widthand breadth-areessentialtoplace,sothatafluidin abottleisframedbytheinnersurfaceofthebot- tle.AccordingtoAlbert,thesignificanceofthe thirddimension,depth,ismoremodest,but nonethelessimportant.Considerabucketof water:itsbaseistheessentialpart,butitsround wallsmaintainthecohesionofthewater. ForAristotle,time'smaterialfoundationisdis- tinctfromitsformåldefinition.Materially,the movementofthefixedstarsisbasic,although timeitselfisneithermovementnorchange. Rather,justasbeforeandafterarecontinuousin spaceandthereareearlierandlåtermomentsin movementasitproceedsthroughspace,so time-beingthenumberofmotion-hasearlier andlåtermomentsor"nows."Thematerialof timeconsistsoftheuninterruptedflowofthe indivisiblenows,whiletime'sformandessential expressionisnumber.Followingal-Färäbland Avicenna,Alberfsinterpretationofthesedoc- trinesemphasizesnotonlytheuninterrupted continuityoftheflowof"nows,"butalsothe quantityoftime,i.e.,theseriesofdiscrete,sepa- rate,andclearlydistinctnumbers.Alberfstreat- mentoftimedidnotlenditselfwelltolåter considerationoftimeasadimension;hisconcept oftimeisthereforenotwellsuitedtoaccommo- dateourunifiedconceptofspace-time. Theuseofthepseudo-AristotelianDepropri- etatibuselementoruminDecausisproprietatumele- mentorumgaveAlberfsworldviewastrong astrologicalflavor.Atissuehereishowtheplan- etsinfluencetheearthandmankind.Particularly importantistheinfluenceofJupiterandSaturn onfireandtheseas;whenincreased,itcouldpro- ducefieryconflagrations,andwhencircum- scribed,floods. Albertwasencyclopedic:ascientistand scholaraswellasaphilosopherandtheologian. Inadditiontotheworksmentioned,heproduced commentariesonPseudo-Dionysius,aSummade creaturis,aSummaTheologica,andmanyother treatises.Unlikeothercommentators,hisexpo- sitionwascontinuous,anextensiveparaphrase; heprovidedacompleteLatinandChristianphi- losophy.Eveninhislifetime,hewasanamed authority;accordingtoRogerBacon,hisviews wereoftengivenasmuchweightasthoseof Aristotle,Avicenna,andAverroes.Hisstudents orfollowersincludeAquinas,UlrichofStrass- burg(d.l278?),TheodoricofFreiberg(d.l310?), GilesofLessines(d.l304?),MeisterEckhart, JohannesTauler(d.l361),HenrySuso(d.l366), andJanvanRuysbroeck(d.1381). Seealsoaristotle,neoplatonism,peter LOMBARD.P.HoR. Albinus.Seecommentariesonplato,middle PLATONISM. alchemy,aquasi-scientificpracticeandmystical art,mainlyancientandmedieval,thathadtwo broadaims:tochangebasermetalsintogoldand todeveloptheelixiroflife,themeanstoimmor- tality.ClassicalWesternalchemyprobablyorigi- natedinEgyptinthefirstthreecenturiesa.d. (withearlierChineseandlåterIslamicand Indianvariants)andwaspracticedineamestin EuropébysuchfiguresasParacelsusandNewton untiltheeighteenthcentury.Westernalchemy addressedconcemsofpracticalmetallurgy,but itsphilosophicalsignificancederivedfroman earlyGreektheoryoftherelationsamongthe basicelementsandfromareligious-allegorical 18 Alcinous AlexanderofHales understandingofthealchemicaltransmutation oföresintogold,anunderstandingthattreats thisprocessasaspiritualascentfromhuman towarddivineperfection.Thepurificationof crudeöres(worldlymatter)intogold(material perfection)wasthoughttorequireatransmut- ingagent,thephilosopher'sstone,amysticalsub- stancethat,whenmixedwithalcoholand swallowed,wasbelievedtoproduceimmortality (spiritualperfection).Thealchemicalsearchfor thephilosopher'sstone,thoughabortive,re- sultedinthedevelopmentofultimatelyuseful experimentaltools(e.g.,thesteampump)and methods(e.g.,distillation).J.D.T. Alcinous.Seemiddleplatonism. AlcmaeonofCroton.Seepre-socratics. Alembert,JeanLeRondd'.Seed'alembert. alethicmodalities,historically,thefourcentral waysormodesinwhichagivenproposition mightbetrueorfalse:necessity,contingency, possibility,andimpossibility.(Theterm'alethic' derivesfromGreekaletheia,'truth'.)These modalities,andtheirlogicalinterconnectedness, canbecharacterizedasfollows.Aproposition thatistruebutpossiblyfalseiscontingentlytrue(e.g., thatAristotletaughtAlexander);onethatistrue andnot-possibly(i.e.,"impossibly")falseisnecessar- ilytrue(e.g.,thatredthingsarecolored).Like- wise,apropositionthatisfalsebutpossiblytrueis contingentlyfalse(e.g.,thattherearenotigers); andonethatisfalseandnot-possiblytrueisneces- sarilyfalse(e.g.,thatsevenandfivearefourteen). Thoughanyoneofthefourmodalitiescanbe definedintermsofanyother,necessityandpos- sibilityaregenerallytakentobethemorefun- damentalnotions,andmostsystemsofalethic modallogictakeoneortheotherasbasic.Dis- tinctmodalsystemsdifferchieflyinregardto theirtreatmentofiteratedmodalities,asinthe propositionItisnecessarilytruethatitispossiblytrue thatitispossiblytruethattherearenotigers.Inthe weakestofthemostcommonsystems,usually calledT,everyiteratedmodalityisdistinctfrom everyother.InthestrongersystemS4,iterations ofanygivenmodalityareredundant.So,e.g., theabovepropositionisequivalenttoItisneces- sarilytruethatitispossiblytruethatthereareno tigers.Inthestrongestandmostwidelyaccepted systemS5,alliterationisredundant.Thus,the twopropositionsabovearebothequivalentsim- plytoItispossiblytruethattherearenotigers. Seealsocontingent,modallogic.CM. Alexander,Samuel(1859-1938),Australian- bornBritishphilosopher.BorninSydney,hewas educatedatBalliolCollege,Oxford,andtaught formostofhiscareerattheUniversityofMan- chester.Hisaim,whichhemostfullyrealizedin Space,Time,andDeity(1920),wastoprovidea realisticaccountoftheplaceofmindinnature. Hedescribednatureasaseriesoflevelsofexis- tencewhereirreduciblehigher-levelqualities emergeinexplicablywhenlowerlevelsbecome sufficientlycomplex.Atitslowestlevelreality consistsofspace-time,aprocesswhereinpoints ofspaceareredistributedatinstantsoftimeand whichmightalsobecalledpuremotion.From complexitiesinspace-timematterarises,fol- lowedbysecondaryqualities,life,andmind. Alexanderthoughtthatthestill-higherqualityof deity,whichcharacterizesthewholeuniverse whilesatisfyingreligioussentiments,isnowin theprocessofemergingfrommind.Seealso PHILOSOPHYOFMIND.J.W.A. AlexanderofAphrodisias(fl.a.d.c.200),Greek philosopher,oneoftheforemostcommentators onAristotleinlateantiquity.Heexercisedcon- siderableinfluenceonlåterGreek,Arabic,and LatinphilosophythroughtotheRenaissance.On theproblemofuniversals,Alexanderendorsesa brandofconceptualism:althoughseveralpartic- ularsmayshareasingle,commonnature,this naturedoesnotexistasauniversalexceptwhile abstractedinthoughtfromthecircumstances thataccompanyitsparticularinstantiations. RegardingAristotle'snotoriousdistinction betweenthe"agent"and"patient"intellectsin OntheSoulIII.5,Alexanderidentifiestheagent intellectwithGod,who,asthemostintelligible entity,makeseverythingelseintelligible.Asits ownself-subsistentobject,thisintellectaloneis imperishable;thehumanintellect,incontrast, perishesatdeath.OfAlexander'smanycommen- taries,onlythoseonAristotle'sMetaphysicsA-A, PriorAnalyticsI,Topics,OntheSenses,and Meterologicsareextant.Wealsohavetwopolemi- caltreatises,OnFäteandOnMixture,directed againsttheStoics;apsychologicaltreatise,theDe anima(basedonAristotle's);aswellasanassort- mentofessays(includingtheDeintellectu)andhis ProblemsandSolutions.Nothingisknownof Alexander'slifeapartfromhisappointmentby theemperorSeverustoachairinAristotelian philosophybetween198and209.Seealso ARISTOTLE,CONCEPTUALISM,STOICISM.V.C. AlexanderofHales(cl185-1245),EnglishFran- ciscantheologian,knownastheDoctorIrrefraga- 19 AlexandrianSchool al-Farabi,AbuNasr bilis.Thefirsttoteachtheologybylecturingon theSentencesofPeterLombard,Alexander's emphasisonspeculativetheologyinitiatedthe goldenageofScholasticism.Alexanderwrote commentariesonthePsalmsandtheGospels;his chiefworksincludehisGlossainquattuorlibros sententiarum,Quaestionesdisputatataeantequam essetfräter,andQuaestionesquodlibetales.Alexan- derdidnotcompletetheSummafratrisAlexandri; PopeAlexanderIVorderedtheFranciscansto completetheStimmaHalesianain1255. Masteroftheologyin1222,Alexanderplayed animportantroleinthehistoryoftheUniversity ofParis,writingpartsofGregoryIX'sParenssci- entiarum(1231).Healsohelpednegotiatethe peacebetweenEnglandandFrancein1235-36. Låterin1236hegaveuphispositionascanonof LichfieldandarchdeaconofCoventrytobecome aFranciscan,thefirstFranciscanmasterofthe- ology;hiswastheoriginalFranciscanchairof theologyatParis.AmongtheFranciscans,his mostprominentdisciplesincludeSt.Bonaven- ture,RichardRufusofCornwall,andJohnofLa Rochelle,towhomheresignedhischairinthe- ologyneartheendofhislife.R.W. AlexandrianSchool,thoseNeoplatonicphiloso- pherscontemporarywithandsubsequenttoPro- clus(a.d.412-85)whosettledinAlexandria andtaughtthere.TheyincludeHermeias(fl. c.440),Proclus'sfellow-studentofSyrianus;Her- meias^sonAmmonius(either435-517or445- 526);andAmmonius'sthreepupils,JohnPhilo- ponus(c.490-575),Simplicius(writingafter 532),andAsclepius(mid-sixthcentury).Låter AlexandriansincludeOlympiodorus(495/505- after565)andtheChristiansElias(fl.c.540)and David(latesixthcentury).Alltheseworked exclusivelyorprimarilyontheexegesisofAris- totle.Damascius(c.456-540)alsotooklectures fromAmmoniusatsometimebetween475and 485,butinhisdoctrinehebelongsmuchmore totheAtheniantradition.Simplicius,onthe otherhand,whilehemovedtoAthenstoteach, remainsmoreintheAlexandriantradition. EversinceKarlPraechter,whowasinfluenced byaHegelianviewofhistoricaldevelopment, theAlexandrianPlatonistshavebeenseenas professingasimplerformofmetaphysicsthan theAthenianSchool,anddeliberatelyavoiding controversywiththepowerfulChristianestab- lishmentinAlexandriabyconfiningthemselves largelytologic,mathematics,andtheexegesisof Aristotle.Thereisacertainmanifesttruthinthis picture,butmodernscholarship(inparticular IlsetrautHadot)hasdonemuchtoshowthat eveninAmmonius'scommentariesonAristotle therelurksdistinctiveNeoplatonicdoctrine,so thatthecontrastwiththeAthenianSchoolhas becomesomewhatblurred.TheSchoolmaybe saidtohavecometoanendwiththedeparture ofStephanustotakeupthechairofphilosophy inConstantinopleinabout610. Seealsoneoplatonism.J.M.D. al-Färäbl,AbuNasr,alsocalledAbunaser,in Latin,Alpharabius(870-950),Islamicphiloso- pher.BominTurkestan,hestudiedandtaught inBaghdadwhenitwastheculturalcapitalof theIslamicworld,responsivetothephilosophi- calandscientificlegacyoflateantiquity.Al- Färäblwashighlyinstrumentalineffectinga transitionofGreekphilosophy,lastpublicly knowninitsentiretyinsixth-centuryAlexan- dria,intoIslamicculture.Despiteongoingoppo- sitionbecauseofphilosophy'sidentificationwith paganandChristianauthors,al-Färäblsuc- ceededinnaturalizingWesternphilosophyinthe Islamicworld,whereitretainedvitalityforthe nextthreehundredyears.Al-Färäblbecame knownas"thesecondteacher,"afterAristotle themainsourceofphilosophicalinformation. Hissummariesandinterpretationsoftheteach- ingsofAristotleandPlatowerewidelyread,and hisattemptatsynthesizingtheirviewswasvery influential.Believingintheuniversalnatureof truthandholdingPlatoandAristotleinthehigh- estesteem,heminimizedtheirdifferencesand adoptedNeoplatonicteachingsthatincorporated elementsofbothtraditions. UnlikethefirstphilosopheroftheIslamic world,theninth-centuryal-Kindl,al-Färäblwas inpossessionoffullArabictranslationsofmany ofthemostimportanttextsofclassicaltimesand ofsomemajorHellenisticcommentarieson them.Hisowncommentariesanddigestsofthe worksofPlatoandAristotlemadethemmore accessibletolåtergenerationsofscholars,evenas hisrelativelyindependenttreatisesestablisheda highstandardoflogicalrigorandsubtletyfor låterMuslimandJewishphilosophers.Avicenna foundhisMetaphysicscommentaryindispensable forunderstandingAristotle'stext,whileMai- monidesrecommendedallhiswritings,calling them"pureflour."MedievalScholasticthought, however,wasmoreinterestedinAverroesand Avicennathaninal-Färäbl.Contemporaryschol- arssuchasLeoStraussandMuhsinMahdihave emphasizedtheesotericnatureofal-FäräbI's writings,seenascriticalforunderstandingmuch ofmedievalIslamicandJewishphilosophy. Al-Färäbi'smaininterestslayinlogicandpolit- 20 algebra,Boolean algorithm icaltheory.HeunderstoodthattheOrganonwas justthat,auniversalinstrumentforunderstand- ingandimprovingreasoningandlogicaldis- course.Againstthetraditionalgrammariansof Islam,hearguedforthevalue-freeandneutral natureofGreeklogic,whileagainstthetheolo- giansofIslam,themutakallimun,heemphasized thedifferencebetweentheirdialecticaltypeof discourseandthepreferreddemonstrativesyllo- gismofthephilosophers.Muchoftheresponsi- bilityfortheseparationbetweenIslamictheology andphilosophymaybeattributedtoal-Färäbl, whoavoidedengagingreligiousdogmasand specificallyMuslimbeliefsasmuchaspossible. Hewasabletoaccommodatebeliefinprophecy andrevelationtoageneraltheoryofemanation, thoughhemadenospecialclaimsfortheprophet ofIslam.Hisgeneralviewofreligionwasthatit wasapopulärandsymbolicrepresentationof philosophicalideas,oftendesignedbyphiloso- phers.TheinfluenceofPlato'sRepublicinthisand otherareasofpoliticalphilosophyisevident, thoughal-FäräbI'sPrinciplesoftheViewsofthe CitizensoftheBestStatemanagestogiveanIslamic colorationtoPlatonicteachings.Al-Färäbl's metaphysicalbeliefsaremoreproblematicalstill, andhewasreputedtohavedisownedhisearlier beliefintheimmortalityofthesoul. Seealsoarabicphilosophy.A.L.I. algebra,Boolean.Seebooleanalgebra. algebra,fullsubset.Seebooleanalgebra. al-GhazäUAbuHamid(1058-1111).Islamic philosopher,theologian,jurist,andmystic.He wasborninKhurasanandeducatedinNishapur, thenanintellectualcenterofeasternIslam.He wasappointedtheheadofaseminary,thenewly foundedNizamiyahofBaghdad,inwhichhe taughtlawandtheologywithgreatsuccess.Yet hisexposuretologicandphilosophyledhimto seekacertaintyinknowledgebeyondthat assumedbyhisprofession.Atfirstheattempted toaddresshisproblemacademically,butafter fiveyearsinBaghdadheresigned,lefthisfamily, andembarkedonthemystic'ssolitaryquestfor al-Haqq(Arabicfor'thetruth','theTrueOne'). AsaSufihewanderedfortenyearsthrough manyofIslam'smajorcitiesandcentersoflearn- ing,finallyreturningtoNishapurandtoteach- ingtheologybeforehisdeath. Al-Ghazäll'sliteraryandintellectuallegacyis particularlyrichandmultifaceted.Inthe catholicityofhisworkandtheesteeminwhich heisheldwithinIslamhemaybecomparedto AquinasandMaimonidesintheChristianand Jewishtraditionsrespectively.HisRevivificationof theReligiousSciencesisconsideredtothisdaya majortheologicalcompendium.Hismystical treatisesalsohaveretainedtheirpopularity,as hashismuchcelebratedautobiography,The DeliverancefromError.Thisbookchronicleshis lifelongquestfortruthandcertainty,andhisdis- appointmentwiththepremisesofdogmaticthe- ology,bothorthodoxSunniandheterodoxShiite thought,aswellaswiththeteachingsofthe philosophers.Thelightoftruthcametohim,he believed,onlythroughdivinegrace;heconsid- eredhissensesandreasoningpowersallsuscep- tibletoerror. Itwasthispervasivesenseofskepticismthat ledhim,whilestillinBaghdad,toinvestigate philosophy'sclaimstoknowledge.Hefirstcom- posedasummaofphilosophicalteachings,based primarilyontheviewsofAvicenna,andcalledit TheIntentionsofthePhilosophers.Helåterpub- lishedadetailedandpenetratingcritiqueofthese views,TheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers.Averroes aroselåterinMuslimSpaintodefendphiloso- phy,particularlythatofAristotle,callinghis bookTheIncoherenceoftheIncoherence.Averroes' workwasmoreappreciatedintheWest,how- ever,whichalsopreferredal-GhazäH'sIntentions tohisIncoherence.Theformer,shornofitspolem- icalpurposeandthusappearingasaphilosophi- calsumma,wastranslatedbyDominicus GundissalinusasLogicaetPhilosophiaAlgazelis, givingal-GhazällareputationintheWestasat leastasometimeadvocateofphilosophy.His attackuponthephysicsandmetaphysicsofhis day,whichwasanamalgamofAristotelianand Neoplatonicdoctrines,wasfirmlyrootedinAris- totelianlogic,andanticipatesHumeinunder- standingthenon-necessarynatureofcausal relationships.Foral-Ghazäll,theworldasa wholeproceedsnotbyanyeternalorlogical necessity,butbythewillofGod.Thatwillisinde- fensibleonphilosophicalgrounds,hebelieved, asisthephilosophers'notionofdivineomni- science.Theirgodcannotontheirtermsbe relatedtotheworld,andisultimatelyredundant logically.Whatisregardedasmiraculous becomespossible,oncenatureisunderstoodto havenoautonomyornecessaryentailments. Seealsoarabicphilosophy,sufism. A.L.I. algorithm,aclericaloreffectiveprocedurethat canbeappliedtoanyofaclassofcertainsym- bolicinputsandthatwillinafinitetimeand numberofstepseventuateinaresultinacorre- 21 algorithmicfunction allegoryofthecave spondingsymbolicoutput.Afunctionforwhich analgorithm(sometimesmorethanone)canbe givenisanalgorithmicfunction.Thefollowing arecommonexamples:(a)givenn,findingthe Mthprimenumber;(b)differentiatingapolyno- mial;(c)findingthegreatestcommondivisorof xandy(theEuclideanalgorithm);and(d)given twonumbersx,y,decidingwhetherxisamulti- pleofy.Whenanalgorithmisusedtocalculate valuesofanumericalfunction,asin(a),(b),and (c),thefunctioncanalsobedescribedasalgo- rithmicallycomputable,effectivelycomputable, orjustcomputable.Algorithmsaregenerally agreedtohavethefollowingproperties-which madethemessentialtothetheoryofcomputa- tionandthedevelopmentoftheChurch-Turing thesis-(i)analgorithmcanbegivenbyafinite stringofinstructions,(ii)acomputationdevice (oragent)cancarryoutorcomputeinaccor- dancewiththeinstructions,(iii)therewillbe provisionsforcomputing,storing,andrecalling stepsinacomputation,(iv)computationscanbe carriedoutinadiscreteandstepwisefashion(in, say,adigitalcomputer),and(v)computations canbecarriedoutinadeterministicfashion(in, say,adeterministicversionofaTuringmachine). Seealsochurch'sthesis,computability, COMPUTERTHEORY.F.A. algorithmicfunction.Seealgorithm. alienation.Seemarx. aliorelative.Seerelation. al-Kind!,AbuYusuf,inLatin,Alkindus(c.800- 70),Arabphilosopherwhowasanearlyand prominentsupporterofphilosophicalstudies amongtheMuslims.HecombinedanobleArab lineagewithaninfluentialpositioninthe caliphateduringacriticalperiodforthetransla- tionandpropagationofGreeksciencesinArabic. Knownas"thephilosopheroftheArabs,"he morethananyotherscholarofhisgeneration wasresponsible,asapatron,bookcollector,edi- tor,andwriter,fortheacceptanceofphilosophy, despiteitsforeignandnon-IslamicGreeksource. Låterwriterssurpassedhiminknowledgeofphi- losophy,andhisnumerousepistles,treatises, andbookswereeventuallyleftinlimbo.Ofthe 250titlesrecordedinhisnameonanunusual varietyofsubjects,mostarelöst.Aboutförtysur- viveinapoorstate,fullofuncertainreadingsand othertextualproblems.Nevertheless,al-KindI's worksprovideampleevidenceofhiscloseinter- estinAristotleandtoanextentPlato. UnlikelåterphilosophersintheIslamicworld, hefirmlybelievedhecouldcombineliteral KoranicreligiousdoctrinesandGreekphilo- sophicalconcepts.Amonghisbest-knownphilo- sophicalworksisOnFirstPhilosophy(English translationbyA.Ivry,1974),whosethemeis thatthenoblestpartofphilosophyisfirstphilos- ophy,whichisknowledgeoftheFirstTruthand theFirstCause.Al-Kindiincludesanextended demonstrationofthefinitenessoftheuniverse, time,andmotionandtheconsequentinfinitude ofacreatorwhowastheircause,whoisthepure unitythatistheultimatesourceofallelseand yetwho,inal-KindI'smind,bringstheworld intobeingexnihilo.InOntheNumberofAristotle's Books,heseparatespropheticknowledgefrom ordinary,discursivephilosophy:prophetsknow intuitivelywithouteffortortime. Seealsoarabicphilosophy.P.E.W. Allais'sparadox,apuzzleaboutrationality devisedbyMauriceAllais(b.1911).Leonard Savage(1917-71)advancedthesure-thingprin- ciple,whichstatesthatarationalagenfsranking ofapairofgambleshavingthesameconse- quenceinastateSagreeswithherrankingofany otherpairofgamblesthesameasthefirstpair exceptforhavingsomeothercommonconse- quenceinS.Allaisdevisedanapparentcoun- terexamplewithfourgamblesinvolvinga 100-ticketlottery.Thetablelistsprizesinunitsof $100,000. TicketNumbers Gambles 1 2-11 12- 100 A 5 5 5 B 25 5 C 5 5 D 25 ChangingA'sandB'scommonconsequencefor tickets12-100from5toyieldsCandDrespec- tively.Hencethesure-thingprincipleprohibits simultaneouslypreferringAtoB,andDtoC.Yet mostpeoplehavethesepreferences,whichseem coherent.Thisconflictgeneratestheparadox. Savagepresentedthesure-thingprinciplein TheFoundationsofStatistics(1954).Respondingto preliminarydraftsofthatwork,Allaisformu- latedhiscounterexamplein"TheFoundationsof aPositiveTheoryofChoiceInvolvingRiskanda CriticismofthePostulatesandAxiomsofthe AmericanSchool"(1952). Seealsodecisiontheory,empiricaldeci- SIONTHEORY.P.We. allegoryofthecave.Seeplato. 22 all-things-consideredreason Althusser,Louis all-things-consideredreason.Seereasonsfor ACTION. Alnwick,Williamof.See WILLIAMOFALNWICK. Alpharabius.Seeal-färäbI. al-Räzi,AbuBakr,inLatin,Rhazes(c.854-925or 932),Persianphysician,philosopher,and chemist.HeheadedthehospitalinRayy,his birthplace,andlåterinBaghdad,oftenreturning toRayy,wherehedied.AlearnedGalenistand criticofGalen,hebroughtthesameempirical, Hippocraticspirittomedicinethathehadusedin transmutingalchemyintoa(Neoplatonically) naturalisticart.Hismedicalworks,includingthe firsttreatiseonsmallpox,drewonextensive(and compassionate)clinicalexperienceandomnivo- rousreading-bothreadingandobservationpre- servedinthetwenty-five-volumeHäwi,trans- latedin1279astheContinens.al-RäzI'smildly asceticethicsspringsfromhedonicprudential considerationsandfromhisatomism.Inkeeping withtheEpicureanismhemighthaveimbibed fromGalenicsources,herejectsspecialprophecy asimposture,arguingthatreason,God'sgifttoall alike,issufficientguidance.(Onlydifferencesof interestandapplicationseparatethesubtle devicesofartisansfromthoseofintellectuals.) God,theworldSoul,time,space,andmatterare alleternalsubstances.Natureoriginatesfrom Soul'sirrationaldesireforembodiment,whichis heronlywayoflearningthathertruehomeland istheintellectualworld.God'sgiftofintelligence gaveordertothemovementsshestirredupatthe creation,andallowsherescapefromaworldin whichpainsoutweighpleasuresanddeathis surcease.Foronewhoengagesinphilosophy "creatively,diligently,andpersistently"will inevitablysurpasshispredecessors;andanyone whothinksindependentlyisassuredofboth progressandimmortality.L.E.G. Alston,WilliamP.(b.1921),Americanphiloso- pherwidelyacknowledgedasoneofthemost importantcontemporaryepistemologistsand oneofthemostimportantphilosophersofreli- gionofthetwentiethcentury.Heisparticularly knownforhisargumentthatputativeperception ofGodisepistemologicallyonallfourswith putativeperceptionofeverydaymaterialobjects. AlstongraduatedfromCentenaryCollegein 1942andtheU.S.Armyin1946.Afinemusi- cian,hehadtochoosebetweenphilosophyand music.Philosophywonout;hereceivedhis Ph.D.fromtheUniversityofChicagoandbegan hisphilosophicalcareerattheUniversityof Michigan,wherehetaughtfortwenty-two years.Since1980hehastaughtatSyracuseUni- versity.Althoughhisdissertationandsomeofhis earlyworkwereonWhitehead,hesoonturned tophilosophyoflanguage(PhilosophyofLan- guage,1964).Sincetheearly1970sAlstonhas concentratedonepistemologyandphilosophyof religion. Inepistemologyhehasdefendedfoundation- alism(althoughnotclassicalfoundationalism), investigatedepistemicjustificationwithunusual depthandpenetration,andcalledattentionto importantlevelsdistinctions.Hischiefworks hereareEpistemicJustification(1989),acollection ofessays;andTheReliabilityofSensePerception (1993).Hischiefworkinphilosophyofreligion isDivineNatureandHumanLanguage(1989),a collectionofessaysonmetaphysicalandepiste- mologicaltopics;andPerceivingGod(1991).The latterisamagisterialargumentfortheconclu- sionthatexperientialawarenessofGod,more specificallyperceptionofGod,makesanimpor- tantcontributiontothegroundsofreligious belief.Inadditiontothisscholarlywork,Alston wasafounderoftheSocietyofChristianPhiloso- phers,aprofessionalsocietywithmorethan 1,100members,andthefoundingeditorotFaith andPhilosophy. Seealsoepistemology,evidentialism, FOUNDATIONALISM,JUSTIFICATION,PHILOS- OPHYOFRELIGION.A.P. alternative,relevant.Seecontextualism. alternativedenial.Seeshefferstroke. Althusser,Louis(1918-90),FrenchMarxist philosopherwhosepublicationin1965oftwo collectionsofessays,PourMarx('TorMarx")and LireleCapital("ReadingCapital"),madehima sensationinFrenchintellectualcirclesand attractedalargeinternationalreadership.The Englishtranslationsofthesetextsin1969and 1970,respectively,helpedshapethedevelop- mentofMarxistthoughtintheEnglish-speaking worldthroughoutthe1970s. Drawingontheworkofnon-positivistFrench historiansandphilosophersofscience,especially Bachelard,Althusserproclaimedtheexistenceof an"epistemologicalbreak"inMarx'swork, occurringinthemid-1840s.Whatprecededthis breakwas,inAlthusser'sview,aprescientific theoreticalhumanismderivedfromFeuerbach andultimatelyfromHegel.Whatfollowedit, Althussermaintained,wasascienceofhistorya 23 altruism Ambrose,Saint developmentasmonumental,potentially,asthe riseofthenewsciencesofnatureintheseventh century.Althusserarguedthatthenatureand eventheexistenceofthisnewkindofscience hadyettobeacknowledged,evenbyMarxhim- self.Itthereforehadtobereconstructedfrom Marx'swritings,DasKapitalespecially,andalso discernedinthepoliticalpracticeofLeninand otherlike-mindedrevolutionarieswhoimplic- itlyunderstoodwhatMarxintended.Althusser didlittle,however,toelaboratethecontentof thisnewscience.Rather,hetirelesslydefended itprogrammaticallyagainstrivalconstrualsof Marxism.Insodoing,hetookparticularaimat neo-Hegelianand"humanistic"currentsinthe largerMarxistcultureand(implicitly)inthe FrenchCommunistParty,towhichhebelonged throughouthisadultlife. After1968,Althusser'sinfluenceinFrance faded.Buthecontinuedtoteachat1'ÉcoleNor- maleSuperieureandtowrite,makingimportant contributionstopoliticaltheoryandtounder- standingsof"ideology"andrelatedconcepts.He alsofacedincreasinglysevereboutsofmaniaand depression.In1980,inwhattheFrenchcourts deemedanepisodeof"temporaryinsanity,"he strangledhiswife.Althusseravoidedprison,but spentmuchofthe1980sinmentalinstitutions. Duringthisperiodhewrotetwoextraordinary memoirs,Uavenirdurelongtemps("TheFuture LastsForever")andLesfaits('TheFacts"),pub- lishedposthumouslyin1992. Seealsobachelard,feuerbach,hecel, MARXISM,PHILOSOPHYOFHISTORY.A.L. altruism.Seeegoism. ambiguity,aphonological(ororthographic)form havingmultiplemeanings(senses,characters, semanticrepresentations)assignedbythelan- guagesystem.Alexicalambiguityoccurswhena lexicalitem(word)isassignedmultiplemean- ingsbythelanguage.Itincludes(a)homonymy, i.e.,distinctlexicalitemshavingthesamesound orformbutdifferentsenses-'knightTnight', 'lead'(n.)/'lead'(v.),'bear'(n.)/'bear'(v.);and (b)polysemy,i.e.,asinglelexicalitemhavingmul- tiplesenses-'lamb'(theanimal)/'lamb'(the flesh),'window'(glass)/'window'(opening). Thedistinctionbetweenhomonymyandpoly- semyisproblematic. Astructnralambiguityoccurswhenaphraseor sentenceiscorrelatedbythegrammarofthelan- guagewithdistinctconstituentstructures (phrasemarkersorsequencesofphrasemark- ers).Example:'Competentwomenandmen shouldapply'-'[[NpCompetentwomen]and men]...'vs.'[NpCompetent[Npwomenand men]]...',where'np'ståndsfor'nounphrase'. Ascopeambiguityisastructuralambiguity derivingfromalternativeinterpretationsof scopesofoperators(seebelow).Examples:'Walt willdietandexerciseonlyifhisdoctor approves'-sentenceoperatorscope:doctor's approvalisanecessaryconditionforbothdiet andexercise(widescope'onlyif)vs.approval necessaryforexercisebutnotfordieting(wide scope'and');'Bertiehasatheoryaboutevery occurrence'-quantifierscope:onegrandtheory explainingalloccurrences('atheory'having widescopeöver'everyoccurrence')vs.alloccur- rencesexplainedbyseveraltheoriestogether ('everyoccurrence'havingwidescope).Thescope ofanoperatoristheshortestfullsubformulato whichtheoperatorisattached.Thus,inV(A&B) C,thescopeof'&'is'(A&B)'.Fornaturallan- guages,thescopeofanoperatoriswhatitC-com- mands.(XC-commandsFinatreediagram providedthefirstbranchingnodethatdominates XalsodominatesY.)Anoccurrenceofanopera- torhaswidescoperelativetothatofanotheroper- atorprovidedthescopeoftheformerproperly includesscopeofthelatter.Examples:in'~(A& B)','—'haswidescopeover'&';in'(3x)(Vy)Fxy', theexistentialquantifierhaswidescopeöverthe universalquantifier. Apragmaticambiguityisdualityofuseresting onpragmaticprinciplessuchasthosewhich underliereferenceandconversationalimplica- ture;e.g.,dependingoncontextualvariables,'I don'tknowthathe'sright'canexpressdoubtor merelythedenialofgenuineknowledge. Seealsoimplicature,meaning,philoso- PHYOFLANGUAGE,PRAGMATICCONTRADIC- TION,SCOPE,VAGUENESS.W.K.W. ambiguity,elliptic.Seeellipsis. Ambrose,Saint,knownasAmbroseofMilan (c.339-97),Romanchurchleaderandtheolo- gian.WhilebishopofMilan(374-97),henot onlyledthestruggleagainsttheArianheresy anditspoliticalmanifestations,butofferednew modelsforpreaching,forScripturalexegesis, andforhymnody.Hisworksalsocontributedto medievalLatinphilosophy.Ambrose'sappropri- ationofNeoplatonicdoctrineswasnoteworthy initself,anditworkedpowerfullyonand throughAugustine.Ambrose'scommentaryon theaccountofcreationinGenesis,hisHexae- meron,preservedformedievalreadersmany piecesofancientnaturalhistoryandevensome 24 Ammonius analyticalfunctionalism elementsofphysicalexplanation.Perhapsmost importantly,Ambroseengagedancientphilo- sophicalethicsinthesearchformorallessons thatmarkshisexegesisofScripture;healso reworkedCicero'sDeofficiisasatreatiseonthe virtuesanddutiesofChristianliving.M.D.J. Ammonius.Seecommentariesonaristotle. AmmoniusSaccas(earlythirdcenturya.d.),Pla- tonistphilosopherwhotaughtinAlexandria.He apparentlyservedearlyinthecenturyasthe teacheroftheChristianphilosopherOrigen.He attractedtheattentionofPlotinus,whocameto thecityin232insearchofphilosophicalenlight- enment(Porphyry,LifeofPlotinus3).Ammonius (theepithet'Saccas'seemstomean'thebag- man')wasundoubtedlyacharismaticfigure,but itisnotatallclearwhat,ifany,werehisdistinc- tivedoctrines,thoughheseemstohavebeen influencedbyNumenius.Hewrotenothing,and maybethoughtof,inE.R.Dodds'swords,asthe SocratesofNeoplatonism.Seealsoneopla- tonism.J.M.D. amoralist.Seeemotivism. amphiboly.Seeinformalfallacy. ampliatio.Seeproprietatesterminorum. ampliativeinference.Seeinduction. ampliativejudgment.Seekant. Analects.Seeconfucius. analogicalargument.Seephilosophyofreligion, PROBLEMOFOTHERMINDS. analogicalpredication.Seeaquinas. analogiesofexperience.Seekant. analogy,argumentfrom.Seephilosophyofreli- gion,PROBLEMOFOTHERMINDS. analogyofproportion.Seecajetan. analysandum.Seeanalysis,definiendum. analysans.Seeanalysis,definiendum. analysis,theprocessofbreakingupaconcept, proposition,linguisticcomplex,orfactintoits simpleorultimateconstituents.Thatonwhich theanalysisisdoneiscalledtheanalysandum, andthatwhichdoestheanalysisiscalledthe analysans.Anumberofthemostimportant philosophersofthetwentiethcentury,including Russell,Moore,and(theearly)Wittgenstein, havearguedthatphilosophicalanalysisisthe propermethodofphilosophy.Butthepracti- tionersofanalyticphilosophyhavedisagreed aboutwhatkindofthingistobeanalyzed.For example,Mooretriedtoanalyzesense-datainto theirconstituentparts.Heretheanalysandumis acomplexpsychologicalfact,thehavingofa sense-datum.Morecommonly,analyticphiloso- phershavetriedtoanalyzeconceptsorproposi- tions.Thisisconceptualanalysis.Stillothers haveseenitastheirtasktogiveananalysisof variouskindsofsentences-e.g.,thoseinvolving propernamesordefinitedescriptions.Thisislin- guisticanalysis.Eachofthesekindsofanalysis facesaversionofapuzzlethathascometobe calledtheparadoxofanalysis.Forlinguisticanaly- ses,theparadoxcanbeexpressedasfollows:for ananalysistobeadequate,theanalysansmust besynonymouswiththeanalysandum;e.g.,if 'malesibling'istoanalyze'brother',theymust meanthesame;butiftheyaresynonymous, then'abrotherisamalesibling'issynonymous with'abrotherisabrother';butthetwosen- tencesdonotseemsynonymous.Expressedasa dilemma,theparadoxisthatanyproposed analysiswouldseemtobeeitherinadequate (becausetheanalysansandtheanalysandum arenotsynonymous)oruninformative(because theyaresynonymous).Seealsoanalytic PHILOSOPHY,DEFINITION,MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS,MEANING,PARADOXOFANALYSIS, RUSSELL.R.FO. analysis,mathematical.Seemathematicalanaly- analysis,noematic.Seehusserl. analysis,noetic.Seehusserl. analysis,regression.Seeregressionanalysis. analysis,standard.Seemathematicalanalysis. analytic.Seeanalytic-syntheticdistinction. analytic,transcendental.Seekant. analyticaldefinition.Seedefinition. analyticalfunctionalism.Seephilosophyofmind. 25 analyticaljurisprudence analytic-syntheticdistinction analyticaljurisprudence.Seejurisprudence. analyticalpsychology.Seejung. analytichierarchy.Seehierarchy. analyticjurisprudence.Seejurisprudence. analyticMarxism.Seemarxism. analyticphilosophy,anumbrellatermcurrently usedtocoveradiverseassortmentofphilosophi- caltechniquesandtendencies.Asinthecaseof chicken-sexing,itisrelativelyeasytoidentify analyticphilosophyandphilosophers,though difficulttosaywithanyprecisionwhatthecrite- riaare.Analyticphilosophyissometimescalled Oxfordphilosophyorlinguisticphilosophy,but theselabelsare,atleast,misleading.Whatever elseitis,analyticphilosophyismanifestlynota school,doctrine,orbodyofacceptedproposi- tions.Analyticphilosopherstendlargely,though notexclusively,tobeEnglish-speakingacade- micswhosewritingsaredirected,onthewhole, tootherEnglish-speakingphilosophers.Theyare theintellectualheirsofRussell,Moore,and Wittgenstein,philosopherswhoself-consciously pursued"philosophicalanalysis"intheearlypart ofthetwentiethcentury.Analysis,aspracticed byRussellandMoore,concernednotlanguage perse,butconceptsandpropositions.Intheir eyes,whileitdidnotexhaustthedomainofphi- losophy,analysisprovidedavitaltoolforlaying barethelogicalformofreality.Wittgenstein,in theTractatusLogico-Philosophicus(1921),con- tended,thoughobliquely,thatthestructureof languagerevealsthestructureoftheworld; everymeaningfulsentenceisanalyzableinto atomicconstituentsthatdesignatethefine- grainedconstituentsofreality.This"Tractarian" viewwasoneWittgensteinwastorenouncein hislåterwork,butithadconsiderableinfluence withintheViennaCircleinthe1920s,andinthe subsequentdevelopmentoflogicalpositivismin the1930sand1940s.CarnapandAyer,both exponentsofpositivism,heldthatthetaskofphi- losophywasnottouncoverelusivemetaphysical truths,buttoprovideanalysesofscientificsen- tences.(Othersentences,thoseinethics,for instance,werethoughttolack"cognitivesignifi- cance.")TheirmodelwasRussell'stheoryof descriptions,whichprovidedatechniquefor analyzingawayapparentcommitmentstosuspi- ciousentities.Meanwhile,anumberofformer proponentsofanalysis,influencedbyWittgen- stein,hadtakenupwhatcametobecalledordi- narylanguagephilosophy.Philosophersofthis persuasionfocusedontheroleofwordsinthe livesofordinaryspeakers,hopingtherebyto escapelong-standingphilosophicalmuddles. Thesemuddlesresulted,theythought,froma naturaltendency,whenpursuingphilosophical theses,tobemisledbythegrammaticalformof sentencesinwhichthosequestionswereposed. (AclassicillustrationmightbeHeidegger'ssup- positionthat'nothing'mustdesignatesome- thing,thoughaverypeculiarsomething.) Today,itisdifficulttolindmuchunanimityin theranksofanalyticphilosophers.Thereis,per- haps,animplicitrespectforargumentandclar- ity,anevolvingthoughinformalagreementasto whatproblemsareandarenottractable,anda convictionthatphilosophyisinsomesensecon- tinuouswithscience.Thepracticeofanalytic philosopherstoaddressoneanotherratherthan thebroaderpublichasledsometodecryphilos- ophy^"professionalization"andtocallfora returntoapluralistic,community-orientedstyle ofphilosophizing.Analyticphilosophersrespond bypointingoutthatanalytictechniquesand standardshavebeenwellrepresentedinthehis- toryofphilosophy. Seealsocontinentalphilosophy,ordi- naryLANGUAGEPHILOSOPHY,PLURALISM, VIENNACIRCLE.J.F.H. analytic-syntheticdistinction,thedistinction, madefamousbyKant,accordingtowhichan affirmativesubject-predicatestatement(proposi- tion,judgment)iscalledanalyticifthepredicate conceptiscontainedinthesubjectconcept,and syntheticotherwise.Thestatement'Allredroses arered'isanalytic,sincetheconcept'red'iscon- tainedintheconcept'redroses'.'Allrosesare red'issynthetic,sincetheconcept'red'isnot containedintheconcept'roses'.Thedenialofan affirmativesubject-predicatestatemententailsa contradictionifitisanalytic.E.g.,'Notallred rosesarered'entails'Somerosesarebothred andnotred'. Oneconceptmaybecontainedinanother,in Kanfssense,eventhoughthetermsusedto expressthemarenotrelatedasparttowhole. Since'biped'means'two-footedanimal',the concept'two-footed'iscontainedintheconcept 'biped'.Itisaccordinglyanalyticthatallbipeds aretwo-footed.Thesameanalyticstatementis expressedbythesynonymoussentences'All bipedsaretwo-footed'and'Alltwo-footedani- malsaretwo-footed'.Unlikestatements,sen- tencescannotbeclassifiedasanalyticor syntheticexceptrelativetoaninterpretation. 26 anamnesis ananke Witness'AllRussianteachersareRussian', whichinonesenseexpressestheanalyticstate- ment'AllteachersthatareRussianareRussian', andinanotherthesyntheticstatement'All teachersofRussianareRussian'. KanfsinnovationöverLeibnizandHumelay inseparatingthelogicosemanticanalytic-syn- theticdistinctionfromtheepistemologicalapri- ori-aposterioridistinctionandfromthemodal- metaphysicalnecessary-contingentdistinction. Itseemsevidentthatanyanalyticstatementisa priori(knowablewithoutempiricalevidence) andnecessary(somethingthatcouldnotbe false).Theconverseishighlycontroversial.Kant andhisrationalistfollowersmaintainthatsomea prioriandnecessarystatementsaresynthetic,cit- ingexamplesfromlogic('Contradictionsare impossible','Theidentityrelationistransitive'), mathematics('Thesumof7and5is12','The straightlinebetweentwopointsistheshortest'), andmetaphysics('Everyeventiscaused'). EmpiricistslikeJ.S.Mill,Carnap,Ayer,andC.I. Lewisarguethatsuchexamplesareeithersyn- theticaposteriorioranalyticapriori. PhilosopherssinceKanthavetriedtoclarify theanalytic-syntheticdistinction,andgeneral- izeittoallstatements.Ononedefinition,asen- tenceisanalytic(onagiveninterpretation) provideditis"truesolelyinvirtueofthemean- ingordefinitionofitsterms."Thetruthofany sentencedependsinpartonthemeaningsofits terms.~A11emeraldsaregreen'wouldbefalse, e.g.,if'emerald'meant'ruby'.Whatmakesthe sentencesynthetic,itisclaimed,isthatitstruth alsodependsonthepropertiesofemeralds, namely,theirbeinggreen.Butthesameholdsfor analyticsentences:thetruthof'Allredrosesare red'dependsonthepropertiesofredroses, namely,theirbeingred.Neitheristruesolelyin virtueofmeaning. Amoreadequategeneralizationdefinesan analyticstatementasaformållogicaltruth:one "trueinvirtueofitslogicalform,"sothatall statementswiththesameformaretrue.Interms ofsentencesunderaninterpretation,ananalytic truthisanexplicitlogicaltruth(onewhosesur- facestructurerepresentsitslogicalform)orone thatbecomesanexplicitlogicaltruthwhensyn- onymsaresubstituted.Thenegativestatement thattomorrowisnotbothSundayandnotSun- dayisanalyticbythisdefinition,becauseall statementsoftheformJ(p&~p)aretrue.Kanfs definitionisobtainedasaspecialcasebystipu- latingthatthepredicateofanaffirmativesubject- predicatestatementiscontainedinthesubject providedthestatementislogicallytrue. Onathirdgeneralization,'analytic'denotes anystatementwhosedenialentailsacontradic- tion.SubjectScontainspredicatePprovided beingSentailsbeingP.Whetherthisisbroader ornarrowerthanthesecondgeneralization dependsonhow'entailmenf,'logicalform',and 'contradiction'aredefined.Onsomeconstruals, 'Redisacolor'countsasanalyticonthethird generalization(itsdenialentails'Somethingis andisnotacolor')butnotonthesecond('red' and'colored'arelogicallyunstructured),while therulingsarereversedforacounterfactualcon- ditionallike'Ifthiswerearedroseitwouldbe red'. FollowingQuine,manyhavedeniedanydis- tinctionbetweenanalyticandsyntheticstate- ments.Someargumentspresumetheproble- matic"truebymeaning"definition.Othersare that:(1)thedistinctioncannotbedefinedwith- outusingrelatednotionslike'meaning','con- cept',and'statement',whichareneitherexten- sionalnordefmableintermsofbehavior;(2) somestatements(like'Allcatsareanimals')are härdtoclassifyasanalyticorsynthetic;and(3) nostatement(allegedly)isimmunefromrejec- tioninthefaceofnewempiricalevidence.If theseargumentsweresound,however,thedis- tinctionbetweenlogicaltruthsandotherswould seemequallydubious,aconclusionseldom embraced. Somedescribeaprioritruths,bothsynthetic andanalytic,asconceptualtruths,onthetheory thattheyarealltrueinvirtueofthenatureofthe conceptstheycontain.Conceptualtruthsaresaid tohaveno"factualcontent"becausetheyare aboutconceptsratherthanthingsintheactual world.Whileitisnaturaltoclassifyaprioritruths together,theprofferedtheoryisquestionable.As indicatedabove,alltruthsholdinpartbecauseof theidentityoftheirconcepts,andinpartbecause ofthenatureoftheobjectstheyareabout.Itisa factthatallemeraldsareemeralds,andthis propositionisaboutemeralds,notconcepts. Seealsoapriori,conventionalism, NECESSITY,PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE, QUINE.W.A.D. anamnesis.Seeform,plato. änanda.Seesat/chit/änanda. ananke(Greek),necessity.Thetermwasusedby earlyGreekphilosophersforaconstrainingor movingnaturalforce.InParmenides(frg.8,line 30)anankeencompassesrealityinlimiting bonds;accordingtoDiogenesLaertius,Democri- 27 anaphor Anaximander tuscallsthevortexthatgeneratesthecosmos ananke;Piato(Timaeus47eff.)referstoanankeas theirrationalelementinnature,whichreason ordersincreatingthephysicalworld.Asusedby Aristotle(MetaphysicsV.5),thebasicmeaningof 'necessary'is'thatwhichcannotbeotherwise', asensethatincludeslogicalnecessity.Healso distinguishes(PhysicsII.9)betweensimpleand hypotheticalnecessity(conditionsthatmust holdifsomethingistooccur).Seealsoaris- totle,PARMENIDES.W.J.P. anaphor.Seeanaphora. anaphora,adeviceofreferenceorcross-refer- enceinwhichaterm(calledananaphor),typi- callyapronoun,hasitssemanticproperties determinedbyatermornounphrase(calledthe anaphor'santecedent)thatoccursearlier.Some- timestheantecedentisapropernameorother independentlyreferringexpression,asin'Jill wentupthehillandthenshecamedownagain'. Insuchcases,theanaphorreferstothesame objectasitsantecedent.Inothercases,the anaphorseemstofunctionasavariablebound byanantecedentquantifier,asin'Ifanyminer boughtadonkey,heispenniless'.Butanaphora ispuzzlingbecausenoteveryexamplefalls neatlyintooneofthesetwogroups.Thus,in 'JohnownssomesheepandHarryvaccinates them'(anexampleduetoGarethEvans)the anaphorisarguablynotboundbyitsantecedent 'somesheep'.Andin'Everyminerwhoownsa donkeybeatsit(afamoustypeofcasediscov- eredbyGeach),theanaphorisarguablyneither boundby'adonkey'norauniquelyreferring expression.Seealsoquantification,the- ORYOFDESCRIPTIONS.M.M. anarchism.Seekropotkin,politicalphilosophy. anattäväda,theBuddhistdoctrineofno-soul, attributedtotheBuddha(sixthcenturyb.c). TheBuddha'sideaofdependentorigination (pratityasamutpäda)leadstoaprocessontologyof changewherenothingisabsolute,permanent, orsubstantive.Accordingly,theBuddhataught thataperson'sselfconsistsofabundleoffleet- ingimpressions,analyzedintofivegroups (skandhas),ratherthanasubstantiveentity calledthe"soul."TheBuddha'smethodofintro- spectiontofindoutwhetherwecanbeawareof asoullikesubstanceinsideusisremarkablysim- ilartoDavidHume's.TheHinduphilosophical schoolsobjectedtoanattävädabecausethey thoughtitcouldnotsatisfactorilyexplainsuch issuesaspersonalidentity,moralresponsibility andkarma,andrebirth.D.K.C. Anaxagoras(c.500-428b.c),Greekphilosopher whowasthefirstofthepre-Socraticstoteachin Athens(c.480-450),whereheinfluencedlead- ingintellectualssuchasPericlesandEuripides. HeleftAthenswhenhewasprosecutedforimpi- ety.WritinginresponsetoParmenides,heelab- oratedatheoryofmatteraccordingtowhich nothingcomesintobeingorperishes.Theulti- materealitiesarestuffssuchaswaterandearth, fleshandbone,butsoarecontrariessuchashot andcold,likewisetreatedasstuffs.Everyphe- nomenalsubstancehasaportionofeveryele- mentalstuff,andtherearenominimalpartsof anything,butmattertakesonthephenomenal propertiesofwhateverpredominatesinthemix- ture.Anaxagoraspositsanindefmitenumberof elementalstuffs,incontrasttohiscontemporary Empedocles,whorequiresonlyfourelements; butAnaxagorasfollowsParmenidesmorerigor- ously,allowingnopropertiesorsubstancesto emergethatwerenotalreadypresentinthecos- mosasitsconstituents.Thusthereisnoultimate gapbetweenappearanceandreality:everything weperceiveisreal.InAnaxagoras'scosmogony, aninitialchaosofcompletemixturegiveswayto anorderedworldwhennous(mind)beginsa vortexmotionthatseparatescosmicmassesof ether(thebrightupperair),air,water,andearth. Mindisfinerthanthestuffsandisfoundinliv- ingthings,butitdoesnotmixwithstuffs. Anaxagoras'stheoryofmindprovidesthefirst hintofamind-matterdualism.PlatoandAris- totlethoughthisassigningacosmicroletomind madehimsoundlike"asoberman"amonghis contemporaries,buttheyweredisappointedthat hedidnotexploithisideatoprovideteleological explanationsofnaturalphenomena.Seealso PRE-SOCRATICS.D.W.G. Anaximander(c.612-545b.c),Greekphiloso- pherandcosmologist,reputedlythestudentand successorofThalesintheMilesianschool.He describedthecosmosasoriginatingfromapeiron (theboundless)byaprocessofseparatingoff;a disk-shapedearthwasformed,surroundedby concentricheavenlyringsoffireenclosedinair. At"breathingholes"intheairweseejetsoffire, whicharethestars,moon,andsun.Theearth staysinplacebecausethereisnoreasonforitto tendonewayoranother.Theseasonsarisefrom alternatingperiodswherehotanddryorwetand 28 AnaximenesofMiletus Angst coldpowerspredominate,governedbyatempo- ralprocess(figurativelyportrayedasthejudg- mentofTime).Anaximanderdrewamapofthe worldandexplainedwinds,ram,andlightning bynaturalistichypotheses.Healsodescribedthe emergenceoflifeinawaythatprefiguresthethe- oryofevolution.Anaximander'sinterestincos- mologyandcosmogonyandhisbrilliant conjecturessetthemajorquestionsforlåterpre- Socratics.Seealsoapeiron,milesians. D.W.G. AnaximenesofMiletus(fl.c.545b.c),Greek philosopher,apre-Socraticwho,followinginthe traditionoftheMilesiansThalesandAnaximan- der,speculatedaboutcosmologyandmeteorol- ogy.Thesource(arché)ofthecosmosisair(aer, originallymist),whichbyaprocessofrarefaction becomesfire,andbyaprocessofcondensation becomeswind,clouds,water,earth,andstones. Airisdivineandcauseslife.Theearthisflatand ridesonacushionofair,whileaheavenlyfir- mamentrevolvesaboutitlikeafeltcap. Anaximenesalsoexplainedmeteorologicalphe- nomenaandearthquakes.Althoughlessinno- vativethanhispredecessorAnaximander,he madeprogressinnaturalisticexplanationsby appealingtoaquantitativeprocessofrarefaction andcondensationratherthantomythical processesinvolvingquasi-personalagents. D.W.G. ancestral(ofagivenrelationR),therelation(also calledthetransitiveclosureofR)thatrelätesone givenindividualtoasecondifandonlyifthefirst canbe"reached"fromthesecondbyrepeated "applications"ofthegivenrelationR.Theances- torrelationistheancestraloftheparentrelation sinceonepersonisanancestorofasecondifthe firstisaparentofthesecondorthefirstisaparent ofaparentofthesecondorthefirstisaparentof aparentofaparentofthesecond,andsoon. Fregediscoveredasimplemethodofgivinga materiallyadequateandformallycorrectdefini- tionoftheancestralofagivenrelationintermsof therelationitself(pluslogicalconcepts).This methodisinformallyillustratedasfollows:in orderforonepersonAtobeanancestorofasec- ondpersonBitisnecessaryandsufficientforAto haveeverypropertythatbelongstoeveryparent ofBandthatbelongstoeveryparentofanyper- sontowhomitbelongs.Thisandothersimilar methodsmadepossiblethereductionofall numericalconceptstothoseofzeroandsucces- sor,whichFregethenattemptedtoreduceto conceptsofpurelogic.Frege'sdefinitionofthe ancestralhasbecomeaparadigminmodernana- lyticphilosophyaswellasahistoricalbenchmark ofthewatershedbetweentraditionallogicand modernlogic.Itdemonstratestheexactnessof modernlogicalanalysisand,incomparison,the narrownessoftraditionallogic.Seealsofrege, LOGICISM,RELATION.J.Cor. ancientatomism,thetheory,originatedbyLeu- cippusandelaboratedbyDemocritus,thatthe ultimaterealitiesareatomsandthevoid.The theorywaslåterusedbyEpicurusasthefoun- dationforaphilosophystressingethicalcon- cerns,Epicureanism.Seealsodemocritus, EPICUREANISM.D.W.G. AndronicusofRhodes(firstcenturyb.c),Greek philosopher,aleadingmemberoftheLyceum whowaslargelyresponsibleforestablishingthe canonofAristotle'sworksstillreadtoday.Healso editedtheworksofTheophrastus.Atthetime, Aristotlewasknownprimarilyforhisphilosoph- icaldialogues,onlyfragmentsofwhichnowsur- vive;hismoremethodicaltreatiseshadstopped circulatingsoonafterhisdeath.Byproducingthe firstsystematiceditionofAristotle'scorpus, Andronicusrevivedstudyofthetreatises,and theresultingcriticaldebatesdramatically affectedthecourseofphilosophy.Littleis recordedaboutAndronicus'slabors;butbesides editingthetextsanddiscussingtitles,arrange- ment,andauthenticity,hesoughttoexplicate andassessAristotle'sthought.Insodoing,he andhiscolleaguesinitiatedtheexegeticaltradi- tionofAristoteliancommentaries.Nothinghe wrotesurvives;asummaryaccountofemotions formerlyascribedtohimisspurious.Seealso ARISTOTLE,COMMENTARIESONARISTOTLE, LYCEUM.V.C.&S.A.W. Anesidemus.Seehellenisticphilosophy,skep- tics. Angst,Germantermforaspecialformofanxiety, anemotionseenbyexistentialistsasbothconsti- tutingandrevealingthehumancondition.Angst playsakeyroleinthewritingsofHeidegger, whoseconceptiscloselyrelatedtoKierkegaard's ångestandSartre'sangoisse.Theconceptisfirst treatedinthisdistinctivewayinKierkegaard's TheConceptofAnxiety(1844),whereanxietyis describedas"thedizzinessoffreedom."Anxiety hererepresentsfreedom'sself-awareness;itis thepsychologicalpreconditionfortheindivid- 29 anhomoeomerous Anselm ual'sattempttobecomeautonomous,apossibil- itythatisseenasbothalluringanddisturbing. Seealsoheidegger,kierkegaard,sartre. C.S.E. anhomoeomerous.Seehomoeomerous. animalfaith.Seesantayana. Anniceraioi.Seeanniceris. Anniceris(fl.c.320-280b.c),Greekphiloso- pher.ApupilofAntipater,heestablishedasep- aratebranchoftheCyrenaicschoolknownas theAnniceraioi.HesubscribedtotypicalCyrenaic hedonism,arguingthattheendofeachaction shouldbeone'sownpleasure,sincewecan knownothingofothers'experiences.Hetem- peredtheimplicationsofhedonismwiththe claimthatawisemanattachésweighttorespect forparents,patriotism,gratitude,andfriendship, perhapsinfruencingEpicurusinthisregard. AnnicerisalsoplayeddowntheCyrenaicstress ontheintellecfsroleinhedonisticpractical rationality,takingtheAristotelianviewthatcul- tivationoftherighthabitsisindispensable.See alsoCYRENAICS.R.C. anomalismofthemental.Seephilosophyofmind. anomalousmonism.Seephilosophyofmind. anomaly.Seeparadigm. Anschauung.Seekant. Anscombe,G(ertrude)E(lizabeth)M(argaret)(b. 1919),Englishphilosopherwhohasheldposi- tionsatOxfordandCambridge,bestknownfor herworkinthephilosophyofmindandforher editionsandtranslationsofWittgenstein'slåter writings.Anscombestudiedphilosophywith Wittgensteinandbecamecloselyassociatedwith him,writing^4KIntroductiontoWittgenstein'sTrac- tatus(1959).SheismarriedtoPeterGeach. Anscombe'sfirstmajorworkwasIntention (1957).Shearguesthattheconceptofintention iscentraltoourunderstandingofourselvesas rationalagents.Thebasiccaseisthatoftheinten- tionswithwhichweact.Theseareidentifiedby thereasonswegiveinanswertowhy-questions concerningouractions.Suchreasonsusually formahierarchythatconstitutesapracticalsyl- logismofwhichactionitselfistheconclusion. Henceourintentionsareaformofactivepracti- calknowledgethatnormallyleadstoaction. Anscombecomparesthedirectionoffitofthis kindofknowledgewithashoppinglisfsrelation toone'spurchases,andcontrastsitwiththe directionoffitcharacteristicofalistofthesepur- chasesdrawnupbyanobserveroftheshopper. Shemaintainsthatthedeepmistakeofmodern (i.e.,post-medieval)philosophyhasbeento thinkthatallknowledgeisofthislatter,obser- vational,type. Thisconceptionofactiveknowledgeexpressed throughanagenfsintentionsconflictswiththe passiveconceptionofrationalitycharacteristicof Humeandhisfollowers,andAnscombedevelops thischallengeinpaperscriticaloftheis-ought distinctionofHumeandhismodernsuccessors. Inafamouspaper,"ModernMoralPhilosophy" (1958),shealsoarguesthatought-statements makesenseonlyinthecontextofamoraltheol- ogythatgroundsmoralityindivinecommands. Sinceourculturerejectsthistheology,itisno surprisethat"modernmoralphilosophers"can- notfindmuchsenseinthem.Weshouldthere- foreabandonthemandretumtotheolder conceptionsofpracticalrationalityandvirtue. Theseconceptions,andtheassociatedconcep- tionofnaturallaw,providethebackgroundtoan uncompromisingdefenseoftraditionalCatholic moralityconcerningsexuality,war,andthe importanceofthedistinctionbetweenintention andforesight. Anscombehasneverbeenafraidofunpopular positions-philosophicalandethical.Herthree volumesofCollectedPapers(1981)includea defenseofsingularcausation,anattackonthe veryideaofasubjectofthought,andacritiqueof pacifism.Sheisoneofthemostoriginalanddis- tinctiveEnglishphilosophersofhergeneration. Seealsoactiontheory,directionof FIT,HUME,INTENTION,NATURALLAW, WITTGENSTEIN.T.R.B. Anselm,Saint,calledAnselmofCanterbury (1033-1109),Italian-bornEnglishphilosophical theologian.ABenedictinemonkandthesecond NormanarchbishopofCanterbury,heisbest knownforhisdistinctivemethod-fidesquaerens intellectum;his"ontological"argumentforthe existenceofGodinhistreatiseProslogion;andhis classicformulationofthesatisfactiontheoryof theAtonementintheCurDeushomo. LikeAugustinebeforehim,AnselmisaChris- tianPlatonistinmetaphysics.Hearguesthatthe mostaccessibleproofsoftheexistenceofGodare throughvaluetheory:inhistreatiseMonologion, 30 Anselm Anselm hedeploysacosmologicalargument,showing theexistenceofasourceofallgoods,whichisthe Goodperseandhencesupremelygood;that samethingexistsperseandistheSupreme Being.IntheProslogion,Anselmbeginswithhis conceptionofabeingagreaterthanwhichcan- notbeconceived,andmountshisontological argumentthatabeingagreaterthanwhichcan- notbeconceivedexistsintheintellect,because eventhefoolunderstandsthephrasewhenhe hearsit;butifitexistedintheintellectalone,a greatercouldbeconceivedthatexistedinreality. Thissupremelyvaluableobjectisessentially whateveritis-otherthingsbeingequal-thatis bettertobethannottobe,andhenceliving, wise,powerful,true,just,blessed,immaterial, immutable,andeternalperse;eventhepara- digmofsensorygoods-Beauty,Harmony, Sweetness,andPleasantTexture,initsowninef- fablemanner.Nevertheless,Godissupremely simple,notcompoundedofapluralityofexcel- lences,but"omneetunum,totumetsolumbonum," abeingamoredelectablethanwhichcannotbe conceived. EverythingotherthanGodhasitsbeingandits well-beingthroughGodasefficientcause.More- over,Godistheparadigmofallcreatednatures, thelatterrankingasbettertotheextentthatthey moreperfectlyresembleGod.Thus,itisbetterto behumanthantobehorse,tobehorsethanto bewood,eventhoughincomparisonwithGod everythingelseis"almostnötning."Forevery creatednature,thereisathat-for-which-it-is- made{adquodfactumest).Ontheonehand, Anselmthinksofsuchteleologyaspartofthe internalstructureofthenaturesthemselves:a creatureoftypeFisatrueFonlyinsofarasit is/does/exemplifiesthatforwhichF'swere made;adefectiveF,totheextentthatitdoesnot. Ontheotherhand,forAnselm,thetelosofacre- atednatureisthat-for-which-God-made-it. BecauseGodispersonalandactsthroughreason andwill,Anselminfersthatprior(intheorderof explanation)tocreation,therewas,intherea- sonofthemaker,anexemplar,form,likeness,or ruleofwhathewasgoingtomake.InDeveritate Anselmmaintainsthatsuchteleologygivesrise toobligation:sincecreaturesowetheirbeingand well-beingtoGodastheircause,sotheyowe theirbeingandwell-beingtoGodinthesenseof havinganobligationtopraisehimbybeingthe bestbeingstheycan.Sinceeverycreatureisof somenatureorother,eachcanbeitsbestby beingthat-for-which-God-made-it.Abstracting fromimpediments,non-rationalnaturesfulfill thisobligationand"actrightly"bynaturalneces- sity;rationalcreatures,whentheyexercisetheir powersofreasonandwilltofulfillGod'spurpose increatingthem.Thus,thegoodnessofacrea- ture(howgoodabeingitis)isafunctionoftwin factors:itsnaturaltelos(i.e.,whatsortofimita- tionofdivinenatureitaimsfor),anditsright- ness(inexercisingitsnaturalpowerstofulfillits telos).Bycontrast,Godasabsolutelyindepen- dentowesnooneanythingandsohasnoobli- gationstocreatures. InDecasudiaboli,Anselmunderlinestheopti- mismofhisontology,reasoningthatsincethe SupremeGoodandtheSupremeBeingareiden- tical,everybeingisgoodandeverygoodabeing. Twofurtherconclusionsfollow.First,evilisapri- vationofbeing,theabsenceofgoodinsome- thingthatproperlyoughttohaveit(e.g., blindnessinnormallysightedanimals,injustice inhumansorängels).Second,sinceallgenuine powersaregiventoenableabeingtofulfillits naturaltelosandsotobethebestbeingitcan,all genuine(metaphysicallybasic)powersareopti- mificandessentiallyaimatgoods,sothatevils aremerelyincidentalsideeffectsoftheiropera- tion,involvingsomelackofcoordinationamong powersorbetweentheirexerciseandthesur- roundingcontext.Thus,divineomnipotence doesnot,properlyspeaking,includecorruptibil- ity,passibility,ortheabilitytolie,becausethe latteraredefectsand/orpowersinotherthings whoseexerciseobstructstheflourishingofthe corruptible,passible,orpotentialliar. Anselm'sdistinctiveactiontheorybeginstele- ologicallywiththeobservationthathumansand ängelsweremadeforahappyimmortalityenjoy- ingGod,andtothatendweregiventhepowersof reasontomakeaccuratevalueassessmentsand willtoloveaccordingly.Anselmregardsfreedom andimputabilityofchoiceasessentialandper- manentfeaturesofallrationalbeings.Butfree- domcannotbedefinedasapowerforopposites (thepowertosinandthepowernottosin),both becauseneitherGodnorthegoodängelshave anypowertosin,andbecausesinisanevilat whichnometaphysicallybasicpowercanaim. Rather,freedomisthepowertopreservejustice foritsownsake.Choicesandactionsare imputabletoanagentonlyiftheyaresponta- neous,fromtheagentitself.Creaturescannotact spontaneouslybythenecessityoftheirnatures, becausetheydonothavetheirnaturesfrom themselvesbutreceivethemfromGod.Togive themtheopportunitytobecomejustofthem- selves,Godfurnishesthemwithtwomotiva- 31 AnSich antinomianism tionaldrivestowardthegood:anaffectionforthe advantageous(affectiocommodi)oratendencyto willthingsforthesakeoftheirbenefittothe agentitself;andanaffectionforjustice(affectio justitiae)oratendencytowiilthingsbecauseof theirownintrinsicvaiue.Creaturesareableto alignthesedrives(bylettingthelattertemperthe former)ornot.Thegoodangeis,whopreserved justicebynotwillingsomeadvantagepossiblefor thembutforbiddenbyGodforthattime,canno longerwillmoreadvantagethanGodwillsfor them,becausehewillstheirmaximumasa reward.Bycontrast,creatures,whosinbyrefus- ingtodelaygratificationinaccordancewith God'swill,losebothuprightnessofwillandtheir affectionforjustice,andhencetheabilitytotem- pertheirpursuitofadvantageortowillthebest goods.Justicewillneverberestoredtoangeis whodesertit.Butifanimalitymakeshuman natureweaker,italsoopensthepossibilityof redemption. AnsehrTsargumentforthenecessityofthe Incarnationplaysoutthedialecticofjusticeand mercysocharacteristicofhisprayers.Hebegins withthedemandsofjustice:humansoweitto Godtomakealloftheirchoicesandactionscon- formtohiswill;failuretorenderwhatwasowed insultsGod'shonorandmakestheoffender liabletomakesatisfaction;becauseitisworseto dishonorGodthanforcountlessworldstobe destroyed,thesatisfactionowedforanysmallsin isincommensuratewithanycreatedgood;it wouldbemaximallyindecentforGodtoover- looksuchagreatoffense.Suchcalculations threatencertainruinforthesinner,becauseGod alonecando/beimmeasurablydeserving,and deprivingthecreatureofitshonor(throughthe etemalfrustrationofitstelos)seemstheonlyway tobalancethescales.Yet,justicealsoforbidsthat God'spurposesbethwartedthroughcreated resistance,anditwasdivinemercythatmade humansforabeatificimmortalitywithhim. Likewise,humanscomeinfamiliesbyvirtueof theirbiologicalnature(whichangeisdonot share),andjusticeallowsanoffensebyonefam- ilymembertobecompensatedbyanother. Assumingthatallactualhumansaredescended fromcommonfirstparents,Anselmclaimsthat thehumanracecanmakesatisfactionforsin,if GodbecomeshumanandrenderstoGodwhat Adam'sfamilyowes. WhenAnselminsiststhathumansweremade forbeatificintimacywithGodandthereforeare obligedtostriveintoGodwithalloftheirpow- ers,heemphaticallyincludesreasonorintellect alongwithemotionandwill.God,thecontrol- lingsubjectmatter,isinpartpermanentlyinac- cessibletous(becauseoftheontologicalincom- mensurationbetweenGodandcreatures)and ourprogressisfurtherhamperedbytheconse- quencesofsin.Ourpowerswillfunctionbest, andhencewehaveadutytofollowrightorder intheiruse:bysubmittingfirsttotheholisticdis- ciplineoffaith,whichwillfocusoursoulsand pointusintherightdirection.Yetitisalsoaduty nottoremainpassiveinourappreciationof authority,butratherforfaithtoseektounder- standwhatithasbelieved.AnsehrTsworksdis- playadialecticalstructure,fullofquestions, objections,andcontrastingopinions,designedto stirupthemind.Hisquartetofteachingdia- logues-Degrammatico,Deveritate,Delibertate arbitrii,andDecasudiaboliaswellashislastphilo- sophicaltreatise,Deconcordia,anticipatethe genreoftheScholasticquestion(qnaestio)so dominantinthethirteenthandfourteenthcen- turies.Hisdiscussionsarelikewiseremarkable fortheirattentiontomodalitiesandproper-ver- sus-improperlinguisticusage. Seealsodivineattributes,freewill PROBLEM,PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION. M.M.A. AnSich.Seehegel,kant. antecedent.Seecounterfactuals. antecedent,fallacyofdenyingthe.Seeformålfal- LACY. anteremrealism.Seeproperty. anthropology,philosophical.Seephilosophical ANTHROPOLOGY. anthroposophy.Seesteiner. antilogism,aninconsistenttriadofpropositions, twoofwhicharethepremisesofavalidcategor- icalsyllogismandthethirdofwhichisthecon- tradictoryoftheconclusionofthisvalid categoricalsyllogism.Anantilogismisaspecial formofantilogyorself-contradiction.Seealso INCONSISTENTTRIAD.R.W.B. antinomianism,theviewthatoneisnotbound bymorallaw;specifically,theviewthatChris- tiansarebygracesetfreefromtheneedto observemorallaws.DuringtheReformation, antinomianismwasbelievedbysome(butnot 32 antinomy apeiron MartinLuther)tofollowfromtheLutherandoc- trineofjustificationbyfaithalone.Seealsojus- TIFICATIONBYFAITH,LUTHER.W.L.R. antinomy.Seekant. AntiochusofAscalon(c.l30-c.68b.c),Greek philosopherandthefastprominentmemberof theNewAcademy.Heplayedthemajorrolein endingitstwocenturiesofSkepticismand helpedreviveinterestindoctrinesfromtheOld AcademyashecailedPlato,Aristotle,andtheir associates. Theimpulseforthisdecisiveshiftcameinepis- temologywheretheSkepticalAcademyhad iongagreedwithStoicismthatknowledge requiresaninfailible"criterionoftruth"butdis- putedtheStoicclaimtofindthiscriterionin "cognitiveperception."Antiochus'steacher, PhiloofLarissa,brokewiththistraditionand proposedthatperceptionneednotbecognitive toqualifyasknowledge.Rejectingthisconces- sion,Antiochusofferednewargumentsforthe Stoicclaimthatsomeperceptioniscognitive,and henceknowledge.Healsoproposedasimilar accommodationinethics,whereheagreedwith theStoicsthatvirtuealoneissufficientforhap- pinessbutinsistedwithAristotlethatvirtueis nottheonlygood.Theseandsimilarattemptsto mediatefundamentaldisputeshaveledsometo labelAntiochusaneclecticorsyncretist;but someofhisproposals,especiallyhisappealtothe OldAcademy,setthestageforMiddlePlatonism, whichalsosoughttoreconcilePlatoandAris- totle.NoworksbyAntiochussurvive,buthis studentsincludedmanyeminentRomans,most notablyCicero,whosummarizesAntiochus's epistemologyintheAcademica,hiscritiqueof StoicethicsinDefinibusiv,andhispurportedly AristotelianethicsinDefinibusV. Seealsoacademy,aristotle,cicero, MIDDLEPLATONISM,PLATO,STOICISM. V.C.&S.A.W. Antipater.Seestoicism. Antiphon.Seesophists. anti-razor.Seeockham'srazor. anti-realism,rejection,inoneoranotherformor areaofinquiry,ofrealism,theviewthatthereare knowablemind-independentfacts,objects,or properties.Metaphysicalrealistsmakethegen- eralclaimthatthereisaworldofmind-inde- pendentobjects.Realistsinparticularareasmake morespecificorlimitedclaims.Thusmoralreal- istsholdthattherearemind-independentmoral properties,mathematicalrealiststhatthereare mind-independentmathematicalfacts,scientific realiststhatscientificinquiryrevealstheexis- tenceofpreviouslyunknownandunobservable mind-independententitiesandproperties.Anti- realistsdenyeitherthatfactsoftherelevantsort aremind-independentorthatknowledgeof suchfactsispossible. Berkeley'ssubjectiveidealism,whichclaims thattheworldconsistsonlyofmindsandtheir contents,isametaphysicalanti-realism.Con- structivistanti-realists,ontheotherhand,deny thattheworldconsistsonlyofmentalphenom- ena,butclaimthatitisconstitutedby,orcon- structedfrom,ourevidenceorbeliefs.Many philosophersfindconstructivismimplausibleor evenincoherentasametaphysicaldoctrine,but muchmoreplausiblewhenrestrictedtoapartic- ulardomain,suchasethicsormathematics. Debatesbetweenrealistsandanti-realistshave beenparticularlyintenseinphilosophyofsci- ence.Scientificrealismhasbeenrejectedbothby constructivistssuchasKuhn,whoholdthatsci- entificfactsareconstructedbythescientificcom- munity,andbyempiricistswhoholdthat knowledgeislimitedtowhatcanbeobserved.A sophisticatedversionofthelatterdoctrineisBas vanFraassen'sconstructiveempiricism,which allowsscientistsfreereininconstructingscien- tificmodels,butclaimsthatevidenceforsuch modelsconfirmsonlytheirobservableimplica- tions. Seealsoconstructivism,directreal- ism,MORALREALISM,SCIENTIFICREALISM. P.Gas. Antisthenes.Seecynics. antisymmetrical.Seeordering,relation. antithesis.Seehegel. apagoge.Seearistotle. apatheia.Seestoicism. apeiron,Greektermmeaning'theboundless'or 'theunlimited',whichevolvedtosignify'the infinite'.Anaximanderintroducedthetermto philosophybysayingthatthesourceofallthings wasapeiron.Thereissomedisagreementabout whetherhemeantbythisthespatially 33 apellatio appliedethics unbounded,thetemporallyunbounded,orthe qualitativelyindeterminate.Itseemslikelythat heintendedthetermtoconveythefirstmean- ing,buttheothertwosensesalsohappento applytothespatiallyunbounded.After Anaximander,Anaximenesdeclaredashisfirst principlethatairisboundless,andXenophanes madehisflatearthextenddownwardwithout bounds,andprobablyoutwardhorizontally withoutlimitaswell.Rejectingthetraditionof boundlessprinciples,Parmenidesarguedthat "what-is"mustbeheldwithindeterminate boundaries.ButhisfollowerMelissusagain arguedthatwhat-ismustbeboundless-inboth timeandspace-foritcanhavenobeginningor end.AnotherfollowerofParmenides,Zenoof Elea,arguedthatiftherearemanysubstances, antinomiesarise,includingtheconsequences thatsubstancesarebothlimitedandunlimited (apeird)innumber,andthattheyaresosmallas nottohavesizeandsolargeastobeunlimited insize.Rejectingmonism,Anaxagorasargued foranindefinitenumberofelementsthatare eachunlimitedinsize,andthePythagorean Philolausmadelimiters(perainonta)andunlim- iteds[apeird]theprinciplesfromwhichallthings arecomposed.TheatomistsLeucippusand Democritusconceivedofaboundlessuniverse, partlyfull(ofaninfinitenumberofatoms)and partlyvoid;andintheuniversearecountless (apeiroi)worlds.FinallyAristotlearrivedatan abstractunderstandingoftheapeironas"theinfi- nite,"claimingtosettleparadoxesaboutthe boundlessbyallowingforrealquantitiestobe infinitelydivisiblepotentially,butnotactually (Physicsni.4-8).Thedevelopmentofthenotion oftheapeironshowshowGreekphilosophers evolvedevermoreabstractphilosophicalideas fromrelativelyconcreteconceptions.Seealso ARISTOTLE,PRE-SOCRATICS.D.W.G. apellatio.Seeproprietatesterminorum. apocatastasis(fromGreek,'reestablishment'), therestorationofallsouls,includingSatan'sand hisminions',inthekingdomofGod.God'sgood- nesswilltriumphöverevil,andthrougha processofspiritualeducationsoulswillbe broughttorepentanceandmadefitfordivine life.ThetheoryoriginateswithOrigenbutwas alsoheldbyGregoryofNyssa.Inmoderntimes F.D.Maurice(1805-72)andKarlBarth(1886- 1968)heldthisposition.Seealsogregoryof NYSSA,ORIGEN.L.P.P. apodictic.Seehusserl,kant. apodosis.Seecounterfactuals. apophantic.Seehusserl. aporetic.Seeaporia. aporia(plural:aporiai),Greektermmeaning 'puzzle','questionfordiscussion','stateofper- plexity'.Theaporeticmethod-theraisingofpuz- zleswithoutofferingsolutions-istypicalofthe elenchusintheearlySocraticdialoguesofPlato. Theseconsistinthetestingofdefinitionsand oftenendwithanaporia,e.g.,thatpietyisboth whatisandwhatisnotlovedbythegods.Com- paretheparadoxesofZeno,e.g.,thatmotionis bothpossibleandimpossible. InAristotle'sdialectic,theresolutionofaporiai discoveredintheviewsonasubjectisanimpor- tantsourceofphilosophicalunderstanding.The beliefsthatoneshouldloveoneselfmostofall andthatself-loveisshameful,e.g.,canbere- solvedwiththerightunderstandingof'self. Thepossibilityofargumentfortwoinconsis- tentpositionswasanimportantfactorinthe developmentofSkepticism.Inmodernphiloso- phy,theantinomiesthatKantclaimedreason wouldarriveatinattemptingtoprovetheexis- tenceofobjectscorrespondingtotranscendental ideasmaybeseenasaporiai. Seealsoelenchus.R.C. aposteriori.Seeapriori. appearing,theoryof.Seetheoryofappearing. appellation.Seesherwood. apperception.Seekant. application(ofafunction).Seecombinatory LOGIC. appliedethics,thedomainofethicsthatincludes professionalethics,suchasbusinessethics,engi- neeringethics,andmedicalethics,aswellas practicalethicssuchasenvironmentalethics, whichisapplied,andthuspracticalasopposedto theoretical,butnotfocusedonanyonedisci- pline.Oneofthemajordisputesamongthose whoworkinappliedethicsiswhetherornot thereisageneralanduniversalaccountof moralityapplicablebothtotheethicalissuesin theprofessionsandtovariouspracticalprob- lems.Somephilosophersbelievethateachofthe professionsoreachfieldofactivitydevelopsan ethicalcodeforitselfandthatthereneedbeno 34 apnori apnori closerelationshipbetween(e.g.)businessethics, medicalethics,andenvironmentalethics.Others holdthatthesamemoralsystemappliestoall professionsandfields.Theyclaimthatthe appearanceofdifferentmoralsystemsissimply duetocertainproblemsbeingmoresalientfor someprofessionsandfieldsthanforothers. Theformerpositionacceptstheconsequence thattheethicalcodesofdifferentprofessions mightconflictwithoneanother,sothataphysi- cianinbusinessmightfindthatbusinessethics wouldrequireoneactionbutmedicalethics another.Engineerswhohavebeenpromotedto managementpositionssometimesexpresscon- cernöverthetensionbetweenwhattheyper- ceivetobetheirresponsibilityasengineersand theirresponsibilityasmanagersinabusiness. Manylawyersseemtoholdthatthereissimilar tensionbetweenwhatcommonmoralityre- quiresandwhattheymustdoaslawyers.Those whoacceptauniversalmoralityholdthatthese tensionsareallresolvablebecausethereisonly onecommonmorality. Underlyingbothpositionsisthepervasivebut falseviewofcommonmoralityasprovidinga uniquerightanswertoeverymoralproblem. Thosewhoholdthateachprofessionorfieldhas itsownmoralcodedonotrealizethatcommon moralityallowsforconflictsofduties.Mostof thosewhoputforwardmoraltheories,e.g.,util- itarians,Kantians,andcontractarians,attemptto generateauniversalmoralsystemthatsolvesall moralproblems.Thiscreatesasituationthat leadsmanyinappliedethicstodismisstheoreti- calethicsasirrelevanttotheirconcems.An alternativeviewofamoraltheoryistothinkof itonthemodelofascientifictheory,primarily concernedtodescribecommonmoralityrather thangenerateanewimprovedversion.Onthis model,itisclearthatalthoughmoralityrulesout manyalternativesasunacceptable,itdoesnot provideuniquerightanswerstoeverycontro- versialmoralquestion. Onthismodel,differentfieldsanddifferent professionsmayinterpretthecommonmoral systeminsomewhatdifferentways.Forexam- ple,althoughdeceptionisalwaysimmoralifnot justified,whatcountsasdeceptionisnotthe sameinallprofessions.Notinformingapatient ofanalternativetreatmentcountsasdeceptive foraphysician,butnottellingacustomerofan alternativetowhatsheisabouttobuydoesnot countasdeceptiveforasalesperson.Theprofes- sionsalsohaveconsiderableinputintowhatspe- cialdutiesareincurredbybecomingamember oftheirprofession.Appliedethicsisthusnotthe mechanicalapplicationofacommonmoralityto aparticularprofessionorfield,butanindepen- dentdisciplinethatclarifiesandanalyzesthe practicesinafieldorprofessionsothatcommon moralitycanbeapplied. Seealsobioethics,ethics,morality, PRACTICALREASON,RATIONALITY.B.Ge. apriori,priortoorindependentofexperience; contrastedwith'aposteriori'(empirical).These twotermsareprimarilyusedtomarkadistinc- tionbetween(1)twomodesofepistemicjustifi- cation,togetherwithderivativedistinctions between(2)kindsofpropositions,(3)kindsof knowledge,and(4)kindsofargument.Theyare alsousedtoindicateadistinctionbetween(5) twowaysinwhichaconceptorideamaybe acquired. (1)Abelieforclaimissaidtobejustifiedapri- oriifitsepistemicjustification,thereasonorwar- rantforthinkingittobetrue,doesnotdependat allonsensoryorintrospectiveorothersortsof experience;whereasifitsjustificationdoesdepend atleastinpartonsuchexperience,itissaidtobe justifiedaposterioriorempirically.Thisspecific distinctionhastodoonlywiththejustificationof thebelief,andnotatallwithhowtheconstituent conceptsareacquired;thusitisnoobjectiontoa claimofapriorijustificatorystatusforaparticu- larbeliefthatexperienceisrequiredforthe acquisitionofsomeoftheconstituentconcepts. Itisclearthattherelevantnotionofexperi- enceincludessensoryandintrospectiveexperi- ence,aswellassuchthingsaskinesthetic experience.Equallyclearly,toconstrueexperi- enceinthebroadestpossiblesenseof,roughly,a consciousundergoingofanysortwouldbeto destroythepointofthedistinction,sinceevena priorijustificationpresumablyinvolvessome sortofconsciousprocessofawareness.Thecon- strualthatisperhapsmostfaithfultothetradi- tionalusageisthatwhichconstruesexperience asanysortofcognitiveinputthatderives,pre- sumablycausally,fromfeaturesoftheactual worldthatmaynotholdinotherpossibleworlds. Thus,e.g.,suchthingsasclairvoyanceortelepa- thy,iftheyweretoexist,wouldcountasforms ofexperienceandanyknowledgeresulting therefromasaposteriori;buttheintuitiveappre- hensionofpropertiesornumbersorothersorts ofabstractentitiesthatarethesameinallpossi- bleworlds,wouldnot. Understoodinthisway,theconceptofapriori justificationisanessentiallynegativeconcept, specifyingasitdoeswhatthejustificationofthe beliefdoesnotdependon,butsayingnothing 35 aprioriargument Aquinas,SaintThomas aboutwhatitdoesdependon.Historically,the mainpositiveconceptionwasthatofferedby proponentsofrationalism(suchasPlato, Descartes,Spinoza,andLeibniz),accordingto whichapriorijustificationderivesfromtheintu- itiveapprehensionofnecessaryfactspertaining touniversalsandotherabstractentities. (AlthoughKantisoftenregardedasarationalist, hisrestrictionofsubstantiveaprioriknowledge totheworldofappearancesrepresentsamajor departurefromthemainrationalisttradition.)In contrast,proponentsoftraditionalempiricism,if theydonotrepudiatetheconceptofapriorijus- tificationaltogether(asdoesQuine),typically attempttoaccountforsuchjustificationby appealtolinguisticorconceptualconventions. Themoststandardformulationofthisempiricist view(adevelopmentoftheviewofHumethat allaprioriknowledgepertainsto''relationsof ideas")istheclaim(typicaloflogicalpositivism) thatallaprioriknowableclaimsorpropositions areanalytic.(Arationalistwouldclaiminoppo- sitionthatatleastsomeaprioriclaimsorpropo- sitionsaresynthetic.) (2)Apropositionthatisthecontentofanapri- orijustifiedbeliefisoftenreferredtoasanapri- oriproposition(oranaprioritruth).Thisusage isalsooftenextendedtoincludeanyproposition thatiscapableofbeingthecontentofsucha belief,whetheritactuallyhasthisstatusornot. (3)If,inadditiontobeingjustifiedapriorior aposteriori,abeliefisalsotrueandsatisfies whateverfurtherconditionsmayberequiredfor ittoconstituteknowledge,thatknowledgeis derivativelycharacterizedasapriorioraposte- riori(empirical),respectively.(Thoughapriori justificationisoftenregardedasbyitselfguaran- teeingtruth,thisshouldberegardedasafurther substantivethesis,notaspartoftheverycon- ceptofapriorijustification.)Examplesofknowl- edgethathavebeenclassicallyregardedasa prioriinthissensearemathematicalknowledge, knowledgeoflogicaltruths,andknowledgeof necessaryentailmentsandexclusionsofcom- monsenseconcepts('Nötningcanberedand greenallöveratthesametime','IfAislåterthan BandBislåterthanC,thenAislåterthanC); butmanyclaimsofmetaphysics,ethics,and eventheologyhavealsobeenclaimedtohave thisstatus. (4)Adeductivelyvalidargumentthatalsosat- isfiesthefurtherconditionthateachofthe premises(orsometimesoneormoreparticularly centralpremises)arejustifiedaprioriisreferred toasanaprioriargument.Thislabelisalsosome- timesappliedtoargumentsthatareclaimedto havethisstatus,evenifthecorrectnessofthis claimisinquestion. (5)Inadditiontotheusesjustcataloguedthat derivefromthedistinctionbetweenmodesof justification,theterms'apriori'and'aposteriori' arealsoemployedtodistinguishtwowaysin whichaconceptorideamightbeacquiredbyan individualperson.Anaposterioriorempirical conceptorideaisonethatisderivedfromexpe- rience,viaaprocessofabstractionorostensive definition.Incontrast,anaprioriconceptoridea isonethatisnotderivedfromexperienceinthis wayandthuspresumablydoesnotrequireany particularexperiencetoberealized(thoughthe explicitrealizationofsuchaconceptmightstill requireexperienceasa"trigger").Themainhis- toricalaccountofsuchconcepts,againheld mainlybyrationalists,construesthemasinnate, eitherimplantedinthemindbyGodor,inthe morecontemporaryversionoftheclaimheldby Chomsky,Födor,andothers,resultingfromevo- lutionarydevelopment.Conceptstypicallyre- gardedashavingthissortofstatusincludethe conceptsofsubstance,causation,God,necessity, infinity,andmanyothers.Empiricists,incon- trast,typicallyholdthatallconceptsarederived fromexperience. Seealsoanalytic-syntheticdistinc- tion,NECESSITY,RATIONALISM.L.B. aprioriargument.Seeapriori. apriorijustification.Seeapriori,justification. A-proposition.Seesyllogism. ApuleiusofMadaura.Seemiddleplatonism. Aquinas,SaintThomas(1225-74),Italian philosopher-theologian,themostinfluential thinkerofthemedievalperiod.Heproduceda powerfulphilosophicalsynthesisthatcombined AristotelianandNeoplatonicelementswithina Christiancontextinanoriginalandingenious way. Lifeandworks.ThomaswasbornatAquino castleinRoccasecca,Italy,andtookearlyschool- ingattheBenedictineAbbeyofMonteCassino. Hethenstudiedliberalartsandphilosophyatthe UniversityofNaples(1239-44)andjoinedthe Dominicanorder.WhilegoingtoParisforfurther studiesasaDominican,hewasdetainedbyhis familyforaboutayear.Uponbeingreleased,he studiedwiththeDominicansatParis,perhaps privately,until1248,whenhejourneyedto 36 Aquinas,SaintThomas Aquinas,SaintThomas ColognetoworkunderAlbertusMagnus. Thomas'sownreport(reportatio)ofAlbertus's lecturesontheDivineNatnesofDionysiusandhis notesonAlbertus'sfecturesonAristotle'sEthics datefromthisperiod.In1252Thomasreturned toParistolecturethereasabachelorintheology. HisresultingcommentaryontheSentencesof PeterLombarddatesfromthisperiod,asdotwo philosophicaltreatises,OnBeingandEssence(De enteetessentia)andOnthePrinciplesofNature(De principiisnaturae). In1256hebeganlecturingasmasteroftheol- ogyatParis.Fromthisperiod(1256-59)datea seriesofscripturalcommentaries,thedisputa- tionsOnTruth(Deveritate),QuodlibetalQues- tionsVII-XI,andearlierpartsoftheSumma againsttheGentiles(Summacontragentiles;here- afterSCG).AtdifferentlocationsinItalyfrom 1259to1269,Thomascontinuedtowriteprodi- giously,including,amongotherworks,thecom- pletionoftheSCG;acommentaryontheDivine Names;disputationsOnthePowerofGod(Depoten- tiaDei)andOnEvil(Demalö);andSummaofThe- ology(Summatheologiae;hereafterST),PartI.In January1269,heresumedteachinginParisas regentmasterandwroteextensivelyuntil returningtoItalyin1272.Fromthissecond ParisianregencydatethedisputationsOntheSoul (Deanima)andOnVirtues(Devirtutibus);contin- uationofST;QuodlibetsI-VIandXII;Onthe UnityoftheIntellectagainsttheAverroists(Deunitate intellectuscontraAverroistas);mostifnotallofhis commentariesonAristotle;acommentaryon theBookofCauses(Liberdecausis);andOntheEter- nityoftheWorld(Deaeternitatemundi).In1272 ThomasreturnedtoItalywherehelecturedon theologyatNaplesandcontinuedtowriteuntil December6,1273,whenhisscholarlywork ceased.Hediedthreemonthslåterenrouteto theSecondCouncilofLyons. Doctrine.Aquinaswasbothaphilosopher andatheologian.Thegreaterpartofhiswritings aretheological,buttherearemanystrictlyphilo- sophicalworkswithinhiscorpus,suchasOn BeingandEssence,OnthePrinciplesofNature,Onthe EternityoftheWorld,andthecommentarieson AristotleandontheBookofCauses.Alsoimpor- tantarelargesectionsofstrictlyphilosophical writingincorporatedintotheologicalworkssuch astheSCG,ST,andvariousdisputations. Aquinasclearlydistinguishesbetweenstrictly philosophicalinvestigationandtheological investigation.Ifphilosophyisbasedonthelight ofnaturalreason,theology(sacradoctrina)pre- supposesfaithindivinerevelation.Whilethe naturallightofreasonisinsufficienttodiscover thingsthatcanbemadeknowntohumanbeings onlythroughrevelation,e.g.,beliefintheTrin- ity,Thomasholdsthatitisimpossibleforthose thingsrevealedtousbyGodthroughfaithtobe opposedtothosewecandiscoverbyusing humanreason.Forthenoneortheotherwould havetobefalse;andsincebothcometousfrom God,Godhimselfwouldbetheauthoroffalsity, somethingThomasrejectsasabhorrent.Henceit isappropriateforthetheologiantousephilo- sophicalreasoningintheologizing. Aquinasalsodistinguishesbetweentheorders tobefollowedbythetheologianandbythe philosopher.Intheologyonereasonsfrombelief inGodandhisrevelationtotheimplicationsof thisforcreatedreality.Inphilosophyonebegins withaninvestigationofcreatedrealityinsofaras thiscanbeunderstoodbyhumanreasonand thenseekstoarriveatsomeknowledgeofdivine realityviewedasthecauseofcreatedrealityand theendorgoalofone'sphilosophicalinquiry (SCGII,c.4).ThismeansthattheorderAquinas followsinhistheologicalSummae(SCGandST) isnotthesameasthatwhichheprescribesfor thephilosopher(ef.ProoemiumtoCommentary ontheMetaphysics).Alsounderlyingmuchof Aquinas'sthoughtishisacceptanceofthediffer- encebetweentheoreticalorspeculativephiloso- phy(includingnaturalphilosophy,mathematics, andmetaphysics)andpracticalphilosophy. Beingandanalogy.ForAquinasthehighest partofphilosophyismetaphysics,thescienceof beingasbeing.Thesubjectofthisscienceisnot God,butbeing,viewedwithoutrestrictiontoany givenkindofbeing,orsimplyasbeing (ProoemiumtoCommentaryonMetaphysics;In detrinitate,qu.5,a.4).Themetaphysiciandoes notenjoyadirectvisionofGodinthislife,but canreasontoknowledgeofhimbymovingfrom createdeffectstoawarenessofhimastheir uncreatedcause.Godisthereforenotthesubject ofmetaphysics,norisheincludedinitssubject. Godcanbestudiedbythemetaphysicianonly indirectly,asthecauseofthefinitebeingsthat fallunderbeingasbeing,thesubjectofthesci- ence.Inordertoaccountforthehumanintel- lecfsdiscoveryofbeingasbeing,incontrastwith beingasmobile(studiedbynaturalphilosophy) orbeingasquantified(studiedbymathematics), Thomasappealstoaspecialkindofintellectual operation,anegativejudgment,technically namedbyhim''separation."Throughthisoper- ationonediscoversthatbeing,inordertobe realizedassuch,neednotbematerialandchang- 37 Aquinas,SaintThomas Aquinas,SaintThomas ing.Onlyasaresultofthisjudgmentisonejus- tifiedinstudyingbeingasbeing. FollowingAristotle(andAverroes),Thomasis convincedthattheterm'being'isusedinvari- ouswaysandwithdifferentmeanings.Yetthese differentusagesarenotunrelatedanddoenjoy anunderlyingunitysufficientforbeingasbeing tobethesubjectofasinglescience.Onthelevel offinitebeingThomasadoptsandadaptsAris- totie'stheoryofunitybyreferencetoafirstorder ofbeing.ForThomasasforAristotlethisunityis guaranteedbytheprimaryreferentinourpred- icationofbeing-substance.Otherthingsare namedbeingonlybecausetheyareinsomeway orderedtoanddependentonsubstance,thepri- maryinstanceofbeing.Hencebeingisanalo- gous.SinceThomas'sapplicationofanalogyto thedivinenamespresupposestheexistenceof God,weshallfirstexaminehisdiscussionofthat TheexistenceofGodandthe"fiveways." Thomasholdsthatunaidedhumanreason,i.e., philosophicalreason,candemonstratethatGod exists,thatheisone,etc,byreasoningfrom effecttocause(Detrinitate,qu.2,a.3;SCGI,c. 4).Best-knownamonghismanypresentations ofargumentationforGod'sexistencearethe "fiveways."Perhapsevenmoreinterestingfor today'sstudentofhismetaphysicsisabriefargu- mentdevelopedinoneofhisfirstwritings,On BeingandEssence(c.4).Therehewishestodeter- minehowessenceisrealizedinwhatheterms "separatesubstances,"i.e.,thesoul,intelligences (ängelsoftheChristiantradition),andthefirst cause(God). Aftercriticizingtheviewthatcreatedseparate substancesarecomposedofmatterandform, Aquinascountersthattheyarenotentirelyfree fromcomposition.Theyarecomposedofaform (oressence)andanactofexisting(esse).He immediatelydevelopsacomplexargument:(1) Wecanthinkofanessenceorquidditywithout knowingwhetherornotitactuallyexists.There- foreinsuchentitiesessenceandactofexisting differunless(2)thereisathingwhosequiddity andactofexistingareidentical.Atbesttherecan beonlyonesuchbeing,hecontinues,byelimi- natingmultiplicationofsuchanentityeither throughtheadditionofsomedifferenceor throughthereceptionofitsformindifferent instancesofmatter.Hence,anysuchbeingcan onlybeseparateandunreceivedesse,whereas esseinallelseisreceivedinsomethingelse,i.e., essence.(3)Sinceesseinallotherentitiesis thereforedistinctfromessenceorquiddity,exis- tenceiscommunicatedtosuchbeingsbysome- thingelse,i.e.,theyarecaused.Sincethatwhich existsthroughsomethingelsemustbetraced backtothatwhichexistsofitself,theremustbe somethingthatcausestheexistenceofevery- thingelseandthatisidenticalwithitsactof existing.Otherwiseonewouldregresstoinfmity incausedcausesofexistence,whichThomas heredismissesasunacceptable. Inqu.2,a.1ofSTIThomasrejectstheclaim thatGod'sexistenceisself-evidenttousinthis life,andina.2maintainsthatGod'sexistence canbedemonstratedbyreasoningfromknowl- edgeofanexistingeffecttoknowledgeofGodas thecauserequiredforthateffecttoexist. Thefirstwayorargument(art.3)restsupon thefactthatvariousthingsinourworldofsense experiencearemoved.Butwhateverismovedis movedbysomethingelse.Tojustifythis,Thomas reasonsthattobemovedistobereducedfrom potentialitytoactuality,andthatnothingcan reduceitselffrompotencytoact;foritwould thenhavetobeinpotency(ifitistobemoved) andinactatthesametimeandinthesame respect.(Thisdoesnotmeanthatamovermust formallypossesstheactitistocommunicateto somethingelseifitistomovethelatter;itmust atleastpossessitvirtually,i.e.,havethepower tocommunicateit.)Whateverismoved,there- fore,mustbemovedbysomethingelse.Onecan- notregresstoinfmitywithmovedmovers,for thentherewouldbenofirstmoverand,conse- quently,noothermover;forsecondmoversdo notmoveunlesstheyaremovedbyafirstmover. Onemust,therefore,concludetotheexistence ofafirstmoverwhichismovedbynothingelse, andthis"everyoneunderstandstobeGod." Thesecondwaytakesasitspointofdeparture anorderingofefficientcausesasindicatedtous byourinvestigationofsensiblethings.Bythis Thomasmeansthatweperceiveintheworldof sensiblethingsthatcertainefficientcausescan- notexercisetheircausalactivityunlesstheyare alsocausedbysomethingelse.Butnothingcan betheefficientcauseofitself,sinceitwouldthen havetobepriortoitself.Onecannotregressto infinityinorderedefficientcauses.Inordered efficientcauses,thefirstisthecauseoftheinter- mediary,andtheintermediaryisthecauseofthe lastwhethertheintermediaryisoneormany. Henceiftherewerenofirstefficientcause,there wouldbenointermediaryandnolastcause. Thomasconcludesfromthisthatonemust acknowledgetheexistenceofafirstefficient cause,"whicheveryonenamesGod." Thethirdwayconsistsoftwomajorparts.Some 38 Aquinas,SaintThomas Aquinas,SaintThomas textualvariantshavecomplicatedtheproper interpretationofthefirstpart.Inbrief,Aquinas appealstothefactthatcertainthingsaresubject togenerationandcorruptiontoshowthatthey are"possible,"i.e.,capableofexistingandnot existing.Notallthingscanbeofthiskind(revised text),forthatwhichhasthepossibilityofnot existingatsometimedoesnotexist.If,therefore, allthingsarecapableofnotexisting,atsome timetherewasnothingwhatsoever.Ifthatwere so,evennowtherewouldbenothing,sincewhat doesnotexistcanonlybegintoexistthrough somethingelsethatexists.Thereforenotall beingsarecapableofexistingandnotexisting. Theremustbesomenecessarybeing.Sincesuch anecessary,i.e.,incorruptible,beingmightstill becausedbysomethingelse,Thomasaddsasec- ondparttotheargument.Everynecessarybeing eitherdependsonsomethingelseforitsneces- sityoritdoesnot.Onecannotregresstoinfinity innecessarybeingsthatdependonsomething elsefortheirnecessity.Thereforetheremustbe somebeingthatisnecessaryofitselfandthat doesnotdependonanothercauseforitsneces- sity,i.e.,God. Thestatementinthefirstparttotheeffectthat whathasthepossibilityofnotexistingatsome pointdoesnotexisthasbeensubjecttoconsid- erabledisputeamongcommentators.Moreover, evenifonegrantsthisandsupposesthatevery individualbeingisa"possible"andthereforehas notexistedatsomepointinthepast,itdoesnot easilyfollowfromthisthatthetotalityofexist- ingthingswillalsohavebeennonexistentat somepointinthepast.Giventhis,someinter- pretersprefertosubstituteforthethirdwaythe moresatisfactoryversionsfoundinSCGI(ch.15) andSCGII(ch.15). Thomas'sfourthwayisbasedonthevarying degreesofperfectionwediscoveramongthe beingsweexperience.Somearemoreorless good,moreorlesstrue,moreorlessnoble,etc, thanothers.Butthemoreandlessaresaidofdif- ferentthingsinsofarastheyapproachinvarying degreessomethingthatissuchtoamaximum degree.Thereforethereissomethingthatis truestandbestandnoblestandhencethatisalso beingtothemaximumdegree.Tosupportthis Thomascommentsthatthosethingsthataretrue tothemaximumdegreealsoenjoybeingtothe maximumdegree;inotherwordsheappealsto theconvertibilitybetweenbeingandtruth(of being).Inthesecondpartofthisargument Thomasarguesthatwhatissupremelysuchina givengenusisthecauseofallotherthingsinthat genus.Thereforethereissomethingthatisthe causeofbeing,goodness,etc,forallother beings,andthiswecallGod. MuchdiscussionhascenteredonThomas's claimthatthemoreandlessaresaidofdifferent thingsinsofarastheyapproachsomethingthatis suchtothemaximumdegree.Somefindthis insufficienttojustifytheconclusionthatamax- imummustexist,andwouldhereinsertan appealtoefficientcausalityandhistheoryofpar- ticipation.Ifcertanentitiesshareorparticipatein suchaperfectiononlytoalimiteddegree,they mustreceivethatperfectionfromsomething else.Whilemoresatisfactoryfromaphilosophi- calperspective,suchaninsertionseemsto changetheargumentofthefourthwaysignifi- cantly. Thefifthwayisbasedonthewaythingsinthe universearegoverned.Thomasobservesthat certainthingsthatlacktheabilitytoknow,i.e., naturalbodies,actforanend.Thisfollowsfrom thefactthattheyalwaysoratleastusuallyactin thesamewaytoattainthatwhichisbest.For Thomasthisindicatesthattheyreachtheirends by"intention"andnotmerelyfromchance.And thisintumimpliesthattheyaredirectedtotheir endsbysomeknowingandintelligentbeing. Hencesomeintelligentbeingexiststhatorders naturalthingstotheirends.Thisargumentrests onfinalcausalityandshouldnotbeconfused withanybasedonorderanddesign. Aquinas'sfrequentlyrepeateddenialthatin thislifewecanknowwhatGodisshouldherebe recalled.IfwecanknowthatGodexistsand whatheisnot,wecannotknowwhatheis(see, e.g.,SCGI,c.30).Evenwhenweapplythe namesofpureperfectionstoGod,wefirstdis- coversuchperfectionsinlimitedfashionincrea- tures.Whatthenamesofsuchperfectionsare intendedtosignifymayindeedbefreefromall imperfection,buteverysuchnamecarrieswith itsomedeficiencyinthewayinwhichitsigni- fies.Whenanamesuchas'goodness',for instance,issignifiedabstractly(e.g.,'Godisgood- ness'),thisabstractwayofsignifyingsuggests thatgoodnessdoesnotsubsistinitself.When suchanameissignifiedconcretely(e.g.,'Godis good'),thisconcretewayofsignifyingimplies somekindofcompositionbetweenGodandhis goodness.Hencewhilesuchnamesaretobe affirmedofGodasregardsthatwhichtheysig- nify,thewayinwhichtheysignifyistobedenied ofhim. ThisfinalpointsetsthestageforThomasto applyhistheoryofanalogytothedivinenames. Namesofpureperfectionssuchas'good','true', 'being',etc,cannotbeappliedtoGodwith 39 Arabicphilosophy Arabicphilosophy exactlythesamemeaningtheyhavewhen affirmedofcreatures(univocally),norwith entirelydifferentmeanings(equivocally).Hence theyareaffirmedofGodandofcreaturesbyan analogybasedontherelationshipthatobtains betweenacreatureviewedasaneffectandGod itsuncausedcause.Becausesomeminimum degreeofsimilaritymustobtainbetweenany effectanditscause,Thomasisconvincedthatin somewayacausedperfectionimitatesandpar- ticipatesinGod,itsuncausedandunparticipated source.Becausenocausedeffectcaneverbe equaltoitsuncreatedcause,everyperfection thatweaffirmofGodisrealizedinhiminaway differentfromthewaywediscoveritincrea- tures.Thisdissimilarityissogreatthatwecan neverhavequidditativeknowledgeofGodin thisiife(knowwhatGodis).Butthesimilarityis sufficientforustoconcludethatwhatweunder- standbyaperfectionsuchasgoodnessincrea- turesispresentinGodinunrestrictedfashion. EventhoughThomas'sidentificationofthekind ofanalogytobeusedinpredicatingdivinenames underwentsomedevelopment,inmatureworks suchasOnthePowerofGod(qu.7,a.7),SCGI (c.34),andSTI(qu.13,a.5),heidentifiesthisas theanalogyof"onetoanother,"ratherthanas theanalogyof"manytoone."Innoneofthese worksdoesheproposeusingtheanalogyof"pro- portionality"thathehadpreviouslydefendedin OnTruth(qu.2,a.11). Theologicalvirtues.WhileAquinasiscon- vincedthathumanreasoncanarriveatknowl- edgethatGodexistsandatmeaningful predicationofthedivinenames,hedoesnot thinkthemajorityofhumanbeingswillactually succeedinsuchaneffort(SCGI,c.4;STII-IIae, qu.2,a.4).Henceheconcludesthatitwasfit- tingforGodtorevealsuchtruthstomankind alongwithothersthatpurelyphilosophical inquirycouldneverdiscovereveninprinciple. Acceptanceofthetruthofdivinerevelationpre- supposesthegiftofthetheologicalvirtueoffaith inthebeliever.Faithisaninfusedvirtuebyrea- sonofwhichweacceptonGod'sauthoritywhat hehasrevealedtous.Tobelieveisanactofthe intellectthatassentstodivinetruthasaresultof acommandonthepartofthehumanwill,awill thatitselfismovedbyGodthroughgrace(STII- IIae,qu.2,a.9). ForThomasthetheologicalvirtues,having God(theultimateend)astheirobject,areprior toallothervirtueswhethernaturalorinfused. Becausetheultimateendmustbepresentinthe intellectbeforeitispresenttothewill,and becausetheultimateendispresentinthewillby reasonofhopeandcharity(theothertwotheo- logicalvirtues),inthisrespectfaithispriorto hopeandcharity.Hopeisthetheologicalvirtue throughwhichwetrustthatwithdivineassis- tancewewillattaintheinfinitegood-eternal enjoymentofGod(STII-IIae,qu.17,aa.1-2). Intheorderofgeneration,hopeispriortochar- ity;butintheorderofperfectioncharityisprior bothtohopeandfaith.Whileneitherfaithnor hopewillremaininthosewhoreachtheeternal visionofGodinthelifetocome,charitywill endureintheblessed.Itisavirtueorhabitual formthatisinfusedintothesoulbyGodandthat inclinesustolovehimforhisownsake.Ifchar- ityismoreexcellentthanfaithorhope(STII- nae,qu.23,a.6),throughcharitytheactsofall othervirtuesareorderedtoGod,theirultimate end(qu.23,a.8). Seealsoaristotle,philosophyofreli- gion,THOMISM.J.F.W. Arabicphilosophy,thephilosophyproducedin Arabicbyphilosophersofvariousethnicandreli- giousbackgroundswholivedinsocietiesin whichIslamiccivilizationwasdominantand whoidentifiedwithitsculturalvalues.(The appellation'Islamicphilosophy'ismisleading, foritsuggestsaspecificreligiouscontentthatwas notnecessarilythere-justasmedievalLatin philosophyisnot"Christian"philosophy.)Inthe historicalevolutionofWesternphilosophyitis theheirtopost-PlotinianlateGreekphilosophy andtheimmediateprecursoroflåtermedieval philosophy,whichitheavilyinfluencedandto whichitexhibitsaparallelbutindependent developmentafterAvicennawellintothetwen- tiethcentury. Thephilosophicalcurriculumofhighereduca- tionthathadspreadamongtheHellenizedpeo- plesofEgypt,theMiddleEast,andIraninthe sixthcenturyfollowedtheclassificationofthe sciencescurrentinAlexandria,aclassification thathaddevelopedfromthatofAristotle's works.Aristotle'sOrganon,includingtheRhetoric andPoetics,andprefacedbyPorphyry'sIsagoge, constitutedthecanonicalninebooksonlogic, theinstrumentofphilosophy.Philosophyproper wasthendividedintotheoreticalandpractical: theoreticalphilosophywasfurthersubdivided intophysics,mathematics,andmetaphysics;and practicalintoethics,economics(household management),andpolitics.Carriersofthis highereducationwereprimarilytheEastern churchesandmonasticcentersintheFertile Crescent.WiththeadventofIslamintheseventh 40 Arabicphilosophy Arabicphilosophy centuryandtheeventualspreadofArabicasthe languageoflearning,theentirecurriculumwas translatedupondemandintoArabicbySyriac- speakingChristiansintheeighththroughthe tenthcenturies.ThedemandfromArabintellec- tuals,whobythetimeofthetranslationshad developedasignificantscholarlytraditionof theirownandactivelycommissionedthetrans- lations.TheentirecorpusofAristotle'swritings, togetherwiththecompleterangeofcommen- tariesfromAlexanderofAphrodisiasonward, constitutedinArabicthestandardtextbooksin logic,physics(includingmeteorology,thetheory ofthesoul,andzoology),metaphysics,and ethics.Metaphysicswasalsostudiedasarulein conjunctionwithorinthelightofthepseudo- AristotelianTheologiaAristotelis(selectionsfrom Plotinus'sEnneads,Books4-6)andtheLiberde causis,alongwithotherselectionsfromProclus's ElementsofTheology.Mathematicsincludedge- ometry(Euclid'sElements),astronomy(Ptol- emy'sAlmagest),arithmetic(Nicomachus'sIntro- duction),andmusic(Ptolemy'sHarmonics).Eco- nomicswasbasedalmostexclusivelyonthe neo-PythagoreanBryson'sOikonomikos,while politicsmainlydrewonPlato'sRepublicandthe Lawsandespeciallyonthepseudepigraphiccor- respondencebetweenAristotleandAlexander (Aristotle'sPoliticswasknowninArabicinfrag- mentaryform).Inmedicine,whichwasconsid- eredanappliedscienceandassuchremained outsidethisclassification,Galen'sentireworks weretranslated.HisabridgmentsofPlatoandhis Stoicizinglogicformedthebasicsourceof knowledgeonthesesubjectsinArabic. TheearlyhistoryofArabicphilosophypre- sentstwoindependentlinesofdevelopment. Oneisassociatedwiththefirstphilosopherand Arabpolymathal-Kindl(d.873)andhisfollow- ers,notablyas-SarakhsT(d.889),Abu-Zaydal- Balkhl(d.934),andal-'ÄmirI(d.992).These philosophers,whoappeartoståndclosertothe NeoplatonismofAthensthantotheneo-Aris- totelianismofAlexandria,soughtintheirworks topresentthevariouspartsofphilosophytoan Arabaudience,integratethemintoIslamicintel- lectuallife,andsolvethephilosophicalproblems thataroseintheprocess.Thefamousphysician Rhazes(Abu-Bakrar-RäzI,d.925)maybetenu- ouslyrelatedtothisline,althoughheappearsto bemostlyanautodidactandhisphilosophywas decidedlymoreeclectic,leavingnofollowing. ThesecondisthatoftheAristoteliansofBagh- dad,foundedbytheNestorianscholarandtrans- latorMattaIbnYänus(d.940).HisAris- totelianismcanbetraceddirectlytotheAlexan- driancommentatorsandreachesbeyondthem toAlexanderofAphrodisiasandThemistius.His students,al-Färäbl(d.950)andYahyäIbn'Adl (d.974),andthewidecircleofdisciplesofthelat- ter,prominentamongwhomareAbu-Sulaymän as-Sijistänl(d.c.985),TsäIbn-Zur'a(d.1008),Al- HasanIbn-Suwär(d.c.1030),andAbu-1-Faraj Ibnat-Tayyib(d.1043),engagedinrigoroustex- tualanalysisandphilosophicalinterpretationof Aristotle'sworksandcomposedindependent monographsonallbranchesofphilosophy.The AristotelianlineofBaghdad,andespeciallythe workofal-Färäbl,wastransmittedtoIslamic Spain(al-Andalus)towardtheendofthetenth centuryandformedthebasisofthephilosophi- caltraditionthere,whosemajorexponentswere IbnBäjja(Avempace,d.1139),IbnTufayl (d.1186),Averroes(IbnRushd,d.1198),and Maimonides(IbnMaymun,d.1204).Thistradi- tioncametoanendwiththereconquistaofall IslamicSpainexceptGranadaabouttwodecades afterthedeathofIbnTumläs(d.1223),thelast majorAndalusianphilosopher. Thesetwolineseventuallymergeinthework ofAvicenna,whosethimselfthetaskofsynthe- sizing,inthelightofconcemsvalidinhistime, thedivergenttendenciesofAristotelianphiloso- phyasithaddevelopedthroughouttheages.The Alexandrianschemaoftheclassificationofthe sciences,whichwasadoptedbyArabicphiloso- phy,implicitlyalsopresented,bymeansofthe connectionsitestablishedamongthevarious subjects,ablueprintofaworkthatwould encompassallphilosophy.Philosopherspriorto Avicenna,boththeGreeksafterPlotinusandthe Arabs,failedtonoteitspotentialasanoutlinefor acomprehensiveworkonallphilosophy,and hadworkedondifferentpartsofit.Avicennawas thefirsttoperceivethisandtocreateinhisvar- iouswritingsaninternallyconsistentsystem havingmutuallyinterdependentpartsandbased onthesyllogisticlogicofAristotle.Hisphilo- sophicalsummaethusmarktheendofancient andthebeginningofScholasticphilosophy.In theseworksAvicennapaidrelativelylittleatten- tiontocertainpartsofphilosophy,inparticular themathematicalpartoftheoretical,andvirtu- allytheentiretyofpractical,philosophy.Asa result,Arabicphilosophyafterhimconcentrated onthreemajorfields-logic,physics,andmeta- physics-whichbecamethenorm.Practicalphi- losophydevelopedalongdifferentlines,toa largeextentdivorcedfrommainstreamphiloso- phy.ThehighlyinfluentialworkbyMiskawayh (d.1030)onethicsprovidedamodelthatwasfol- lowedbylåtertreatises,whichconstitutedasep- 41 aradhya Arendt,Hannah arategenreofphilosophicalwritings.Asfor mathematics,itsdifferentpartswerepursued largelyindependentlyoftherestofphilosophy. AfterAvicenna,Arabicphilosophywasdomi- natedbyhisthoughtanddevelopedalongthe linesofthereconstructedPeripateticismhe established.Inthefirstplace,hispowerfulinte- grativesystematizationofphilosophyeliciteda reactionbycertainphilosopherstowardamore pristineAristotelianism,notablybyAverroes, 'Abd-al-Latlfal-Baghdädl(d.1231),andthe eighteenth-centuryOttomanscholarYanyali Esat(As'adofYanyä,d.1730),whoevenexe- cutednewArabictranslationsfromtheGreekof someofAristotle'sphysicalworks.Secondly,it generatedamonghisfollowers,notableamong whomareNasIr-ad-DInat-Tus!(d.1274)and Qutb-ad-DInar-RäzI(d.1364),alongseriesof philosophicallyfecundcommentariesandsuper- commentaries.Thirdly,itforcedmosttheological writingtoadoptlogicasitsmethod,andphilo- sophical,ratherthantheological,analysisasthe meansofargumentation,aprocedureestab- lishedbyal-Ghazäll(d.1111)andConsolidated byFakhr-ad-DInar-RäzI(d.1209).Andfourthly, itformedthebasisforthefurtherdevelopment ofhismetaphysics(inparticulartheconceptsof essenceandexistenceandtheschemaoferna- nation)throughtheincorporationoftheillumi- nationistphilosophyofSuhrawardIofAleppo (d.1193)andthemysticaltheoriesofIbn'ArabI (d.1240)intheworksofShiitephilosophers activesinceSafavidtimes(sixteenthcentury). Thismovement,initiatedbyMIrDämäd (d.1632)anddevelopedbyhispupilMulläSadrä (d.1640),hascontinuedafterthelatter'sdeath amongIranianphilosopherswritingpartlyalso inPersian. ThecolonizationoftheArabworldbyWestern powerssincethenineteenthcenturyhas resultedinthespreadofmodernEuropean,and especiallyFrench,philosophyamongArabintel- lectuals.ModernArabphilosophicalthoughtis nowdevelopingalongtheselineswhileatthe sametimeeffortsarebeingmadetoreläteitto traditionalArabicphilosophy. Seealsoal-färäbI,al-ghazälI,al-kindI, ARISTOTLE,AVERROES,AVICENNA,ISLAMIC NEOPLATONISM.D.Gu. ärädhya,Sanskritwordmeaning'objectofwor- shiporreverence'.IntraditionalIndiansociety, reverencewasalmostawayoflife.Elders,espe- ciallyone'sparentsandteachers,wereheldin godlikeesteem.TheIndiansreveredlifeinany formassacred;hence,ahimsä(nonviolence)and vegetarianismweretwoimportantfeaturesof theidealIndianlife.IntheHindupolytheistic tradition,whichcontinueseventoday,the countlessVedicdeities,alongwiththelåtergods andgoddessesintheHindupantheon,serveas ärädhyaobjects.Apopulärformofärädhyain today'sHindusocietyisoftenachosendeitywor- shipedinahousehold.Seealsoahimsä. D.K.C. ArcesilausofPitane(c.315-242b.c),Greek Skepticphilosopher,founderoftheMiddle Academy.InfluencedbySocraticelenchus,he claimedthat,unlikeSocrates,hewasnoteven certainthathewascertainofnothing.Heshows theinfluenceofPyrrhoinattackingtheStoic doctrinethatthesubjectivecertaintyofthewise isthecriterionoftruth.Atthetheoreticallevel headvocatedepoche,suspensionofrationaljudg- ment;atthepractical,hearguedthateulogon, probability,canjustifyaction-anearlyversion ofcoherentism.Hisethicalviewswerenot extreme;heheld,e.g.,thatoneshouldattendto one'sownliferatherthanexternalobjects. Thoughhewrotenothingexceptverse,heled theAcademyintotwohundredyearsofSkepti- cism.R.C. ArchelausofAthens.Seepre-socratics,skeptics. archetype.Seejung. Archimedianordering.Seelexicalordering. architecture,cognitive.Seecognitivescience. Archytas(fl.400-350b.c),GreekPythagorean philosopherfromTarentuminsouthernItaly.He waselectedgeneralseventimesandsentaship torescuePlatofromDionysiusnofSyracusein 361.Heisfamousforsolutionstospecificmath- ematicalproblems,suchasthedoublingofthe cube,butlittleisknownabouthisgeneralphilo- sophicalprinciples.Hisproofthatthenumbersin asuperparticularratiohavenomeanpropor- tionalhasrelevancetomusictheory,asdoeshis workwiththearithmetic,geometric,andhar- monicmeans.Hegavemathematicalaccountsof thediatonic,enharmonic,andchromaticscales anddevelopedatheoryofacoustics.Fragments 1and2andperhaps3areauthentic,butmost materialpreservedinhisnameisspurious.See alsoPYTHAGORAS.C.A.H. Arendt,Hannah(1906-75),German-born Americansocialandpoliticaltheorist.Shewas 42 aretaic argumentfromanalogy educatedinhernativeGermany,studyingwith HeideggerandJaspers;fledtoFrancein1933; andemigratedin1941totheUnitedStates, whereshetaughtatvariousuniversities.Her majorworksareTheOriginsofTotalitariankm (1951),TheHumanCondition(1958),BetweenPast andFuture(1961),OnRevolution(1963),Crisesof theRepublic(1972),andTheLifeoftheMind (1978). InArendfsview,forreasonsestablishedby KantanddeepenedbyNietzsche,thereisa breachbetweenbeingandthinking,onethat cannotbeclosedbythought.Understoodasphi- losophizingorcontemplation,thinkingisaform ofegoismthatisolatesusfromoneanotherand ourworld.DespiteKant,modernityremains miredinegoism,aconditioncompoundedbythe emergenceofa"mäss"thatconsistsofbodies withneedstemporarilymetbyproducingand consumingandwhichdemandsgovernments thatministertotheseneeds.Inplaceofthinking, laboring,andtheadministrationofthingsnow calleddemocracy,allofwhichareinstrumental butfutileasresponsestothe"thrown"qualityof ourcondition,Arendtproposedtothosecapable ofitamodeofbeing,politicalaction,thatshe foundinpronouncedforminpre-Socratic Greeceandbrieflybutgloriouslyatthefounding oftheRomanandAmericanrepublics.Political actionisinitiation,themakingofbeginningsthat canbeexplainedneithercausallynorteleologi- cally.Itisdoneinthespaceofappearancescon- stitutedbythepresenceofotherpoliticalactors whosere-sponses-thetellingofequallyunpre- dictablestoriesconcerningoneanother's actions-determinewhatactionsaretakenand givecharactertotheactingparticipants.Inaddi- tiontotherefineddiscernmentsalreadyimplied, politicalactionrequiresthecouragetoinitiate oneknowsnotwhat.Itsoutcomeispower;not överotherpeopleorthingsbutmutualempow- ermenttocontinueactinginconcertandthereby toovercomeegoismandachieve(positive)free- domandhumanity. Seealsokant,nietzsche,politicalthe- ory.R.E.F. aretaic.Seearete. arete,ancientGreektermmeaning'virtue'or 'excellence'.Inphilosophicalcontexts,theterm wasusedmainlyofvirtuesofhumancharacter; inbroadercontexts,aretewasapplicabletomany differentsortsofexcellence.Thecardinalvirtues intheclassicalperiodwerecourage,wisdom, temperance(sophrosune),piety,andjustice. SophistssuchasProtagorasclaimedtoteach suchvirtues,andSocrateschallengedtheircre- dentialsfordoingso.SeveralearlyPlatonicdia- loguesshowSocratesaskingafterdefinitionsof virtues,andSocratesinvestigatesareteinother dialoguesaswell.Conventionalviewsallowed thatapersoncanhaveonevirtue(suchas courage)butlackanother(suchaswisdom),but Plato'sProtagorasshowsSocratesdefendinghis thesisoftheunityofarete,whichimpliesthata personwhohasonearetehasthemall.Platonic accountsofthecardinalvirtues(withtheexcep- tionofpiety)aregiveninBookivoftheRepub- lic.SubstantialpartsoftheNicomacheanEthicsof Aristotlearegivenövertodiscussionsofarete, whichhedividesintovirtuesofcharacterand virtuesofintellect.Thisdiscussionistheances- torofmostmoderntheoriesofvirtueethics.See alsoaristotle,virtueethics.P.Wo. argument,asequenceofstatementssuchthat someofthem(thepremises)purporttogiverea- sontoacceptanotherofthem,theconclusion. Sincewespeakofbadargumentsandweakargu- ments,thepremisesofanargumentneednot reallysupporttheconclusion,buttheymustgive someappearanceofdoingsoortheterm'argu- ment'ismisapplied.Logicismainlyconcemed withthequestionofvalidity:whetherifthe premisesaretruewewouldhavereasonto accepttheconclusion.Avalidargumentwith truepremisesiscalledsound.Avaliddeductive argumentisonesuchthatifweacceptthe premiseswearelogkallyboundtoacceptthecon- clusionandifwerejecttheconclusionweare logicallyboundtorejectoneormoreofthe premises.Alternatively,thepremiseslogically entailtheconclusion. Agoodinductiveargument-somewould reserve'valid'fordeductivearguments-isone suchthatifweacceptthepremiseswearelogi- callyboundtoregardtheconclusionasprobable, and,inaddition,asmoreprobablethanitwould beifthepremisesshouldbefalse.Afewargu- mentshaveonlyonepremiseand/ormorethan oneconclusion. Seealsoimplication,induction,logi- CALCONSEQUENCE,MATHEMATICALFUNC- tion.R.P. argument,apriori.Seeapriori. argument,practical.Seepracticalreasoning. argumentfromanalogy.Seephilosophyofreli- gion,PROBLEMOFOTHERMINDS. 43 argumentfromauthority Aristotle argumentfromauthority.Seeinformalfallacy. argumentfromdesign.Seephilosophyofreli- gion. argumentfromevil.Seephilosophyofreligion. argumentfromhallucination.Seeperception. argumentfromillusion.Seeperception. argument(ofafunction).SeeMATHEMATicALfunc- argumentumadbaculum.Seeinformalfal- lacy. argumentumadhominem.Seeinformalfal- lacy. argumentumadignorantium.Seeinformalfal- lacy. argumentumadjudicium.Seeinformalfallacy. argumentumadmisericordiam.Seeinformalfal- lacy. argumentumadpopulum.Seeinformalfallacy. argumentumadverecundiam.Seeinformal fallacy. argumentumconsensus.Seeinformalfallacy. Arianism,diversebutrelatedteachingsinearly ChristianitythatsubordinatedtheSontoGod theFather.Inreactionthechurchdevelopedits doctrineoftheTrinitywherebytheSon(and HolySpirit),thoughdistinctpersons(hypostases), sharewiththeFather,ashisontologicalequals, theonebeingorsubstance(ousia)ofGod.Arius (c.250-c.336)taughtinAlexandria,where,on thehierarchicalmodelofMiddlePlatonism,he sharplydistinguishedScripture'stranscendent GodfromtheLogosorSonincarnateinJesus.The latter,subjecttosufferingandhumanlyobedient toGod,isinferiortotheimmutableCreator,the objectofthatobedience.Godaloneiseternaland ungenerated;theSon,divinenotbynaturebut byGod'schoosing,isgenerated,withabegin- ning:theuniquecreature,throughwhomallelse ismade.TheCouncilofNicea,in325,con- demnedAriusandfavoredhisenemyAthana- sius,affirmingtheSon'screatorhoodandfull deity,havingthesamebeingorsubstance (homoousios)astheFather.Arianismstillflour- ished,evolvingintotheextremeviewthatthe Son'sbeingwasneitherthesameastheFather's norlikeit(homoiousios),butunlikeit(anomoios). Thistoowasanathematized,bytheCouncilof 381atConstantinople,which,ratifyingwhatis commonlycalledtheNiceneCreed,sealed orthodoxTrinitarianismandtheequalityofthe threepersonsagainstAriansubordinationism. Seealsohomoousios.A.E.L. AristippusofCyrene.Seecyrenaics. Aristotle(384-322b.c),preeminentGreek philosopherborninStagira,hencesometimes calledtheStagirite.AristotlecametoAthensasa teenagerandremainedfortwodecadesinPlato's Academy.FollowingPlato'sdeathin347,Aristot- letraveledtoAssosandtoLesbos,whereheasso- ciatedwithTheophrastusandcollectedawealth ofbiologicaldata,andlåtertoMacedonia,where hetutoredAlexandertheGreat.In335he returnedtoAthensandfoundedhisownphilo- sophicalschoolintheLyceum.Thesite'scolon- nadedwalk(peripatos)conferredonAristotleand hisgroupthename'thePeripatetics'. Alexander'sdeathin323unleashedanti- MacedonianforcesinAthens.Chargedwith impiety,andmindfulofthefäteofSocrates, AristotlewithdrewtoChalcis,wherehedied. Chieflyinfluencedbyhisassociationwith Plato,Aristotlealsomakeswideuseofthepre- Socratics.Anumberofworksbeginbycriticizing and,ultimately,buildingontheirviews.The directionofPlato'sinfluenceisdebated.Some scholarsseeAristotle'scareerasameasured retreatfromhisteacher'sdoctrines.Forothershe beganasaconfirmedanti-Platonistbutreturned tothefoldashematured.Morelikely,Aristotle earlyondevelopedakeenlyindependentvoice thatexpressedenduringpuzzlementöversuch Platonicdoctrinesastheseparateexistenceof Ideasandtheconstructionofphysicalreality fromtwo-dimensionaltriangles.Suchunease wasnodoubtheightenedbyAristotle'sappreci- ationfortheevidentialvalueofobservationas wellasbyhisconvictionthatlong-receivedand well-entrenchedopinionislikelytocontainat leastpartofthetruth. Aristotlereportedlywroteafewpopulär worksforpublication,someofwhicharedia- logues.Ofthesewehaveonlyfragmentsand reports.Notablylöstarealsohislecturesonthe goodandontheIdeas.Ancientcataloguersalso 44 Aristotle Aristotle listunderAristotle'snamesome158constitu- tionsofGreekstates.Ofthese,onlytheConstitu- tionofAthenshassurvived,onapapyrus discoveredin1890.Whatremainsisanenor- mousbodyofwritingonvirtuallyeverytopicof philosophicalsignificance.Muchofitconsistsof detailedlecturenotes,workingdrafts,and accountsofhislectureswrittenbyothers. Althougheffortsmayhavebeenunderwayin Aristotle'slifetime,AndronicusofRhodes,inthe firstcenturyb.c,iscreditedwithgivingtheAris- toteliancorpusitspresentorganization.Virtually noextantmanuscriptspredatetheninthcentury a.d.,sothecorpushasbeentransmittedbya complexhistoryofmanuscripttranscription.In 1831theBerlinAcademypublishedthefirstcrit- icaleditionofAristotle'swork.Scholarsstillcite Aristotlebypage,column,andlineofthisedi- tion. Logicandlanguage.Thewritingsonlogicand languageareconcentratedinsixearlyworks: Categories,OnInterpretation,PriorAnalytics,Poste- riorAnalytics,Topics,andSophisticalRefutations. KnownsincelateantiquityastheOrganon,these worksshareaconcernwithwhatisnowcalled semantics.TheCategoriesfocusesontherelation betweenuncombinedterms,suchas'white'or 'man',andtheitemstheysignify;On Interpretationoffersanaccountofhowterms combinetoyieldsimplestatements;PriorAn- alyticsprovidesasystematicaccountofhow threetermsmustbedistributedintwocategori- calstatementssoastoyieldlogicallyathirdsuch statement;PosteriorAnalyticsspecifiesthecondi- tionsthatcategoricalstatementsmustmeetto playaroleinscientificexplanation.TheTopics, sometimessaidtoincludeSophisticalRefutations, isahandbookof"topics"andtechniquesfor dialecticalargumentsconcerning,principally, thefourpredicables:accident(whatmayormay notbelongtoasubject,assittingbelongsto Socrates);definition(whatsignifiesasubjecfs essence,asrationalanimalistheessenceof man);proprium(whatisnotintheessenceofa subjectbutisuniquetoorcounterpredicableof it,asallandonlypersonsarerisible);andgenus (whatisintheessenceofsubjectsdifferingin species,asanimalisintheessenceofbothmen andoxen). Categoriestreatsthebasickindsofthingsthat existandtheirinterrelations.Everyuncombined term,saysAristotle,signifiesessentiallysome- thinginoneoftencategories-asubstance,a quantity,aquality,arelative,aplace,atime,a position,ahaving,adoing,orabeingaffected. ThisdoctrineunderliesAristotle'sadmonition thatthereareasmanyproperorpersesensesof 'being'astherearecategories.Inordertoisolate thethingsthatexistprimarily,namely,primary substances,fromallotherthingsandtogivean accountoftheirnature,twoasymmetricrela- tionsofontologicaldependenceareemployed. First,substance(ousia)isdistinguishedfromthe accidentalcategoriesbythefactthateveryacci- dentispresentinasubstanceand,therefore,can- notexistwithoutasubstanceinwhichtoinhere. Second,thecategoryofsubstanceitselfisdivided intoordinaryindividualsorprimarysubstances, suchasSocrates,andsecondarysubstances,such asthespeciesmanandthegenusanimal.Sec- ondarysubstancesaresaidofprimarysubstances andindicatewhatkindofthingthesubjectis.A markofthisisthatboththenameandthedefi- nitionofthesecondarysubstancecanbepredi- catedoftheprimarysubstance,asbothmanand rationalanimalcanbepredicatedofSocrates. Universalsinnon-substancecategoriesarealso saidofsubjects,ascolorissaidofwhite.There- fore,directlyorindirectly,everythingelseis eitherpresentinorsaidofprimarysubstances andwithoutthemnothingwouldexist.And becausetheyareneitherpresentinasubjectnor saidofasubject,primarysubstancesdependon nothingelsefortheirexistence.So,intheCate- gories,theordinaryindividualisontologically basic. OnInterpretationoffersanaccountofthose meaningfulexpressionsthataretrueorfalse, namely,statementsorassertions.Following Plato'sSophist,asimplestatementiscomposedof thesemanticallyheterogeneousparts,name (onoma)andverb(rhema).In'Socratesruns'the namehasthestrictlyreferentialfunctionofsig- nifyingthesubjectofattribution.Theverb,on theotherhand,isessentiallypredicative,signi- fyingsomethingholdingofthesubject.Verbs alsoindicatewhensomethingisassertedtohold andsomakeprecisethestatemenfstruthcon- ditions.Simplestatementsalsoincludegeneral categoricalstatements.Sincemedievaltimesit hasbecomecustomarytorefertothebasiccat- egoricalsbyletters:(A)Everymaniswhite, (E)Nomaniswhite,(I)Somemaniswhite, and(O)Noteverymaniswhite.OnInterpretation outlinestheirlogicalrelationsinwhatisnow calledthesquareofopposition:AErEarecon- traries,A&OandEErIarecontradictories,and AErIandEErOaresuperimplications.ThatA implies/reflectsthenolongercurrentviewthat 45 Aristotle Aristotle allaffirmativestatementscarryexistential import. OneambitionofOnInterpretationisatheoryof thetruthconditionsforallstatementsthataffirm ordenyonethingoranother.However,state- mentsinvolvingfuturecontingenciesposeaspe- cialproblem.ConsiderAristotle'snotorioussea battle.Eitheritwilloritwillnothappentomor- row.Ifthefirst,thenthestatement'Therewillbe aseabattletomorrow'isnowtrue.Hence,itis nowfixedthattheseabattleoccurtomorrow.If thesecond,thenitisnowfixedthattheseabat- tlenotoccurtomorrow.Eitherwaytherecanbe nofuturecontingencies.Althoughsomehold thatAristotlewouldembracethedeterminism theyfindimplicitinthisconsequence,most argueeitherthathesuspendsthelawof excludedmiddleforfuturecontingenciesorthat hedeniestheprincipleofbivalenceforfuture contingentstatements.OnthefirstoptionAris- totlegivesuptheclaimthateithertheseabattle willhappentomorrowornot.Onthesecondhe keepstheclaimbutallowsthatfuturecontingent statementsareneithertruenorfalse.Aristotle's evidentattachmenttothelawofexcludedmid- dle,perhaps,favörsthesecondoption. PriorAnalyticsmarkstheinventionoflogicasa formåldisciplineinthattheworkcontainsthe firstvirtuallycompletesystemoflogicalinfer- ence,sometimescalledsyllogistic.Thefactthat thefirstchapterofthePriorAnalyticsreportsthat thereisasyllogismwhenever,certainthings beingstated,somethingelsefollowsofnecessity, mightsuggestthatAristotleintendedtocapture ageneralnotionoflogicalconsequence.How- ever,thesyllogismsthatconstitutethesystemof thePriorAnalyticsarerestrictedtothebasiccate- goricalstatementsintroducedinOnInterpreta- tion.Asyllogismconsistsofthreedifferent categoricalstatements:twopremisesandacon- clusion.ThePriorAnalyticstellsuswhichpairsof categoricalslogicallyyieldathird.Thefourteen basicvalidformsaredividedintothreefigures and,withineachfigure,intomoods.Thesystem isfoundationalbecausesecond-andthird-figure syllogismsarereducibletofirst-figuresyllogisms, whosevalidityisself-evident.Althoughsyllo- gismsareconvenientlywrittenasconditional sentences,thesyllogisticproperis,perhaps,best seenasasystemofvaliddeductiveinferences ratherthanasasystemofvalidconditionalsen- tencesorsentenceforms. PosteriorAnalyticsextendssyllogistictoscience andscientificexplanation.Ascienceisadeduc- tivelyorderedbodyofknowledgeaboutadefi- nitegenusordomainofnature.Scientific knowledge(episteme)consistsnotinknowing that,e.g.,thereisthunderintheclouds,but ratherinknowingwhythereisthunder.Sothe theoryofscientificknowledgeisatheoryof explanationandthevehicleofexplanationisthe first-figuresyllogismBarbara:If(1)Pbelongsto allMand(2)AfbelongstoallS,then(3)Pbelongs toallS.Toexplain,e.g.,whythereisthunder, i.e.,whythereisnoiseintheclouds,wesay:(3') Noise(P)belongstotheclouds(S)because(2') Quenchingoffire(Af)belongstotheclouds(S) and(f)Noise(P)belongstoquenchingoffire (Af).Becausewhatisexplainedinscienceis invariantandholdsofnecessity,thepremisesof ascientificordemonstrativesyllogismmustbenec- essary.Inrequiringthatthepremisesbepriorto andmoreknowablethantheconclusion,Aristo- tleembracestheviewthatexplanationisasym- metrical:knowledgeoftheconcfusiondepends onknowledgeofeachpremise,buteachpremise canbeknownindependentlyoftheconclusion. Thepremisesmustalsogivethecausesofthe conclusion.ToinquirewhyPbelongstoSis,in effect,toseekthemiddletermthatgivesthe cause.Finally,thepremisesmustbeimmediate andnon-demonstrable.Apremiseisimmediate justincasethereisnomiddletermconnecting itssubjectandpredicateterms.WerePtobelong toAfbecauseofanewmiddle,Ml,thenthere wouldbeanew,morebasicpremise,thatis essentialtothefullexplanation. Ultimately,explanationofareceivedfactwill consistinachainofsyllogismsterminatinginpri- marypremisesthatareimmediate.Theseserveas axiomsthatdefinethescienceinquestion becausetheyreflecttheessentialnatureofthe facttobeexplained-asin(!')theessenceof thunderliesinthequenchingoffire.Because theyareimmediate,primarypremisesarenot capableofsyllogisticdemonstration,yetthey mustbeknownifsyllogismscontainingthemare toconstituteknowledgeoftheconclusion. Moreover,wereitnecessarytoknowtheprimary premisessyllogistically,demonstrationwould proceedinfinitelyorinacircle.Thefirstalterna- tivedefeatstheverypossibilityofexplanation andthesecondunderminesitsasymmetricchar- acter.Thus,theprimarypremisesmustbeknown bythedirectgraspofthemind(noiis).Thisjust signalstheappropriatewayforthehighestprin- ciplesofasciencetobeknown-evendemon- strablepropositionscanbeknowndirectly,but theyareexplainedonlywhenlocatedwithinthe structureoftherefevantscience,i.e.,oniywhen demonstratedsyllogistically.Althoughallsci- encesexhibitthesameformålstructureanduse 46 Aristotle Aristotle certaincommonprinciples,differentsciences havedifferentprimarypremisesand,hence,dif- ferentsubjectmatters.This"onegenustoonesci- ence"rulelegislatesthateachscienceandits explanationsbeautonomous. Aristotlerecognizesthreekindsofintellectual discipline.Productivedisciplines,suchashouse building,concernthemakingofsomething externaltotheagent.Pradicaldisciplines,suchas ethics,concernthedoingofsomethingnotsep- aratefromtheagent,namely,actionandchoice. Theoreticaldisciplinesareconcernedwithtruth foritsownsake.Assuch,theyalonearesciences inthespecialsenseofthePosteriorAnalytics.The threemainkindsofspecialscienceareindividu- atedbytheirobjects-naturalsciencebyobjects thatareseparatebutnotchangeless,mathemat- icsbyobjectsthatarechangelessbutnotsepa- rate,andtheologybyseparateandchangeless objects.Themathematicianstudiesthesame objectsasthenaturalscientistbutinaquitedif- ferentway.Hetakesanactualobject,e.g.achalk figureusedindemonstration,andabstractsfrom or"thinksaway"thoseofitsproperties,suchas definitenessofsizeandimperfectionofshape, thatareirrelevanttoitsstandingasaperfect exemplarofthepurelymathematicalproperties underinvestigation.Mathematicianssimply treatthisabstractedcircle,whichisnotseparate frommatter,asifitwereseparate.Inthiswaythe theoremstheyproveabouttheobjectcanbe takenasuniversalandnecessary. Physics.Asthescienceofnature(physis), physicsstudiesthosethingswhoseprinciplesand causesofchangeandrestareinternal.Aristotle's centraltreatiseonnature,thePhysics,analyzes themostgeneralfeaturesofnaturalphenomena: cause,change,time,place,infinity,andcontinu- ity.Thedoctrineofthefourcausesisespecially importantinAristotle'swork.Acause(aitia)is somethinglikeanexplanatoryfactor.Themater- ialcauseofahouse,forinstance,isthematter (hyle)fromwhichitisbuilt;themovingoreffi- cientcauseisthebuilder,moreexactly,theform inthebuilder'ssoul;theformålcauseisitsplanor form(eidos);andthefinalcauseisitspurposeor end(telos):provisionofshelter.Thecomplete explanationofthecomingtobeofahousewill factorinallofthesecauses.Innaturalphenom- enaefficient,formål,andfinalcausesoftencoin- cide.Theformtransmittedbythefatherisboth theefficientcauseandtheformofthechild,and thelatterisglossedintermsofthechild'sendor completedevelopment.ThisexplainswhyAris- totleoftensimplycontrastsmatterandform. Althoughitsobjectsarecompoundsofboth, physicsgivesprioritytothestudyofnatural form.ThisaccordswiththePosteriorAnalytics' insistencethatexplanationproceedthrough causesthatgivetheessenceandreflectsAristo- tle^commitmenttoteleology.Anaturalprocess countsessentiallyasthedevelopmentof,say,an oakoramanbecauseitsveryidentitydepends onthecompleteformrealizedatitsend.Aswith allthingsnatural,theendisaninternalgovern- ingprincipleoftheprocessratherthananexter- nalgoal. Allnaturalthingsaresubjecttochange(kine- sis).Definedastheactualizationofthepotential quapotential,achangeisnotanontologically basicitem.Thereisnocategoryforchanges. Rather,theyarereductivelyexplainedinterms ofmorebasicthings-substances,properties, andpotentialities.Apåleman,e.g.,hasthe potentialitytobeorbecometanned.Ifthis potentialityisutterlyunactualized,nochange willensue;ifcompletelyactualized,thechange willhaveended.Sothepotentialitymustbe actualizedbutnot,sotospeak,exhausted;i.e.,it mustbeactualizedquapotentiality.Designedfor theongoingoperationsofthenaturalworld,the Physics'definitionofchangedoesnotcoverthe generationandcorruptionofsubstantialitems themselves.Thissortofchange,whichinvolves matterandelementalchange,receivesextensive treatmentinOnGenerationandCorruption. Aristotlerejectstheatomists'contentionthat theworldconsistsofaninfinitetotalityofindi- visibleatomsinvariousarrangements.Rather, hisbasicstuffisuniformelementalmatter,any partofwhichisdivisibleintosmallersuchparts. Becausenothingthatisactuallyinfinitecan exist,itisonlyinprinciplethatmatterisalways furtherdividable.Sowhilecountenancingthe potentialinfinite,Aristotlesquarelydeniesthe actualinfinite.Thisholdsforthemotionsof thesublunaryelementalbodies(earth,air,fire, andwater)aswellasforthecircularmotionsof theheavenlybodies(composedofafifthele- ment,aether,whosenaturalmotioniscircular). ThesearediscussedinOntheHeavens.Thefour sublunaryelementsarefurtherdiscussedinMete- orology,thefourthbookofwhichmightbe describedasanearlytreatiseonchemicalcombi- nation. Psychology.Becausethesoul(psyche)isoffi- ciallydefinedastheformofabodywiththe potentialityforlife,psychologyisasubfieldof naturalscience.Ineffect,Aristotleappliesthe 47 Aristotle Aristotle apparatusofformandmattertothetraditional Greekviewofthesoulastheprincipleandcause oflife.Althougheventhenutritiveandrepro- ductivepowersofplantsareeffectsofthesoul, mostofhisattentionisfocusedontopicsthatare psychologicalinthemodemsense.OntheSoul givesageneralaccountofthenatureandnum- berofthesoul'sprincipalcognitivefaculties. Subsequentworks,chieflythosecollectedasthe Parvanaturalia,applythegeneraltheorytoa broadrangeofpsychologicalphenomenafrom memoryandrecollectiontodreaming,sleeping, andwaking. Thesoulisacomplexoffaculties.Faculties,at leastthosedistinctiveofpersons,arecapacities forcognitivelygraspingobjects.Sightgraspscol- ors,smellodörs,hearingsounds,andthemind graspsuniversals.Anorganism'sformisthepar- ticularorganizationofitsmaterialpartsthat enableittoexercisethesecharacteristicfunc- tions.Becauseaninfant,e.g.,hasthecapacityto dogeometry,Aristotledistinguishestwovari- etiesofcapacityorpotentiality(dynamis)and actuality(entelecheia).Theinfantisageometer onlyinpotentiality.Thisfirstpotentialitycomesto himsimplybybelongingtotheappropriate species,i.e.,bycomingintotheworldendowed withthepotentialtodevelopintoacompetent geometer.Byactualizing,throughexperience andtraining,thisfirstpotentiality,heacquiresa firstactualization.Thisactualizationisalsoasecond potentiality,sinceitrendershimacompetent geometerabletoexercisehisknowledgeatwill. Theexerciseitselfisasecondactualizationand amountstoactivecontemplationofaparticular itemofknowledge,e.g.thePythagoreantheo- rem.Sothesoulisfurtherdefinedasthefirst actualizationofacomplexnaturalbody. Faculties,likesciences,areindividuatedby theirobjects.Objectsofperception(aisthesis)fall intothreegeneralkinds.Special(proper)sensi- bles,suchascolorsandsounds,aredirectlyper- ceivedbyoneandonlyonesenseandare immunetoerror.Theydemarcatethefivespecial senses:sight,hearing,smell,taste,andtouch. Commonsensibles,suchasmovementandshape, aredirectlyperceivedbymorethanonespecial sense.Bothspecialandcommonsensiblesare properobjectsofperceptionbecausetheyhavea directcausaleffectontheperceptualsystem.By contrast,thesonofDiaresisanincidentalsensible becauseheisperceivednotdirectlybutasacon- sequenceofdirectlyperceivingsomethingelse thathappenstobethesonofDiares-e.g.,a whitething. Aristotlecallsthemind(nous)theplaceof formsbecauseitisabletograspobjectsapart frommatter.Theseobjectsarenothinglike Plato'sseparatelyexistingForms.AsAristotelian universals,theirexistenceisentailedbyand dependsontheirhavinginstances.Thus,Onthe Soul'sremarkthatuniversalsare"somehowin thesoul"onlyreflectstheirroleinassuringthe autonomyofthought.Themindhasnoorgan becauseitisnottheformorfirstactualizationof anyphysicalstructure.So,unlikeperceptualfac- ulties,itisnotstronglydependentonthebody. However,themindthinksitsobjectsbywayof images,whicharesomethinglikeinternalrepre- sentations,andthesearephysicallybased.Inso- farasitthusdependsonimagination(phantasia), themindisweaklydependentonthebody.This wouldbesufficienttoestablishthenaturalized natureofAristotle'smindwereitnotforwhat someconsideranincurablydualistintrusion.In distinguishingsomethinginthemindthatmakes allthingsfromsomethingthatbecomesall things,Aristotleintroducesthenotoriousdis- tinctionbetweentheactiveandpassiveintellects andmayevensuggestthatthefirstisseparable fromthebody.Opiniononthenatureofthe activeintellectdivergeswidely,someevendis- countingitasanirrelevantinsertion.Butunlike perception,whichdependsonexternalobjects, thinkingisuptous.Therefore,itcannotsimply beamatterofthemind'sbeingaffected.SoAris- totleneedsamechanismthatenablesustopro- ducethoughtsautonomously.Inlightofthis functionalrole,thequestionofactiveintellecfs ontologicalstatusislesspressing. Biology.Aristotle'sbiologicalwritings,which constituteaboutaquarterofthecorpus,bring biologicalphenomenaunderthegeneralframe- workofnaturalscience:thefourcauses,form andmatter,actualityandpotentiality,andespe- ciallytheteleologicalcharacterofnatural processes.IfthePhysicsproceedsinanapriori style,theHistoryofAnimals,PartsofAnimals,and GenerationofAnimalsachieveanextraordinary synthesisofobservation,theory,andgeneralsci- entificprinciple.HistoryofAnimalsisacompara- tivestudyofgenericfeaturesofanimals, includinganalogousparts,activities,anddispo- sitions.Althoughitsmorphologicalandphysio- logicaldescriptionsshowsurprisinglylittle interestinteleology,PartsofAnimalsissquarely teleological.Animalparts,especiallyorgans,are ultimatelydifferentiatedbyfunctionratherthan morphology.Thecompositionof,e.g.,teethand fleshisdeterminedbytheirroleintheoverall functioningoftheorganismand,hence,requires 48 Aristotle Aristotle teleology.GenerationofAnimalsappliesthe form-matterandactuality-potentialitydistinc- tionstoanimalreproduction,inheritance,and thedevelopmentofaccidentalcharacteristics. Thespeciesformgovernsthedevelopmentofan organismanddetermineswhattheorganismis essentially.AlthoughintheMetaphysicsandelse- whereaccidentalcharacteristics,including inheritedones,areexcludedfromscience,inthe biologicalwritingsformhasanexpandedrole andexplainstheinheritanceofnon-essential characteristics,suchaseyecolor.Themorefully thefather'sformisimposedontheminimally formedmatterofthemother,themorecom- pletelythefather'straitsarepassedontotheoff- spring.Theextenttowhichmatterresists impositionofformdeterminestheextentto whichtraitsofthemotheremerge,oreventhose ofmoredistantancestors. AristotlesharedthePlatonists'interestinani- malclassification.Recentscholarshipsuggests thatthisislessaninterestinelaboratingaLin- nean-styletaxonomyoftheanimalkingdom thananinterestinestablishingthecomplexdif- ferentiaeandgeneracentraltodefinitionsofliv- ingthings.Thebiologicalworksargue,more- over,thatnosingledifferentiacouldgivethe wholeessenceofaspeciesandthatthedifferen- tiaethatdogivetheessencewillfallintomore thanonedivision.Ifthesecondpointrejectsthe methodofdichotomousdivisionfavoredbyPlato andtheAcademy,thefirstcountersAristotle's ownstandardviewthatessencecanbereduced toasinglefinaldifferentia.Thebiologicalsci- encesarenot,then,automaticallyaccommo- datedbythePosteriorAnalyticsmodelof explanation,wheretheessenceorexplanatory middleisconceivedasasinglecausalproperty. Anumberofthemesdiscussedinthissection arebroughttogetherinarelativelylatework, MotionofAnimals.Itspsychophysicalaccountof themechanismsofanimalmovementståndsat thejunctureofphysics,psychology,andbiology. Metaphysics.InAndronicus'sedition,the fourteenbooksnowknownastheMetaphysics wereplacedafterthePhysics,whencecomesthe word'metaphysics',whoseliteralmeaningis 'whatcomesafterthephysics'.Aristotlehimself prefers'firstphilosophy'or'wisdom'(sophia). Thesubjectisdefinedasthetheoreticalscience ofthecausesandprinciplesofwhatismost knowable.Thismakesmetaphysicsalimiting caseofAristotle'sbroadlyuseddistinction betweenwhatisbetterknowntousandwhatis betterknownbynature.Thegenusanimal,e.g., isbetterknownbynaturethanthespeciesman becauseitisfurtherremovedfromthesensesand becauseitcanbeknownindependentlyofthe species.Thefirstconditionsuggeststhatthemost knowableobjectswouldbetheseparatelyexist- ingandthoroughlynon-sensibleobjectsofthe- ologyand,hence,thatmetaphysicsisaspecial science.Thesecondconditionsuggeststhatthe mostknowableobjectsaresimplythemostgen- eralnotionsthatapplytothingsingeneral.This favörsidentifyingmetaphysicsasthegeneralsci- enceofbeingquabeing.Specialsciencesstudy restrictedmodesofbeing.Physics,forinstance, studiesbeingquahavinganinternalprincipleof changeandrest.Ageneralscienceofbeingstud- iestheprinciplesandcausesofthingsthatare, simplyinsofarastheyare.Agooddealofthe Metaphysicssupportsthisconceptionofmeta- physics.Forexample,BookIV,ontheprinciple ofnon-contradiction,andBookX,onunity,sim- ilarity,anddifference,treatnotionsthatapplyto anythingwhatever.So,too,forthediscussionof formandactualityinthecentralbooksVII,VIII, andIX.BookXII,ontheotherhand,appearsto regardmetaphysicsasthespecialscienceofthe- ology. Aristotlehimselfattemptstoreconcilethese twoconceptionsofmetaphysics.Becauseitstud- iesimmovablesubstance,theologycountsasfirst philosophy.However,itisalsogeneralprecisely becauseitisfirst,andsoitwillincludethestudy ofbeingquabeing.Scholarshavefoundthis solutionasperplexingastheproblem.Although BookXIIprovesthecausalnecessityformotion ofaneternalsubstancethatisanunmoved mover,thisestablishesnoconceptualconnection betweentheformsofsensiblecompoundsand thepureformthatistheunmovedmover.Yet suchaconnectionisrequired,ifasinglescience istoencompassboth. Problemsofreconciliationaside,Aristotlehad tofaceapriordifficultyconcerningtheverypos- sibilityofageneralscienceofbeing.ForthePos- teriorAnalyticsrequirestheexistenceofagenus foreachsciencebuttheMetaphysicstwiceargues thatbeingisnotagenus.Thelatterclaim,which Aristotleneverrelinquishes,isimplicitintheCat- egories,wherebeingfallsdirectlyintokinds, namely,thecategories.Becausethesehighest generadonotresultfromdifferentiationofasin- glegenus,nounivocalsenseofbeingcovers them.Althoughbeingis,therefore,ambiguous inasmanywaysastherearecategories,athread connectsthem.Theontologicalpriorityaccorded primarysubstanceintheCategoriesismadepart oftheverydefinitionofnon-substantialentities 49 Aristotle Aristotle intheMetaphysics:tobeanaccidentisbydefini- tiontobeanaccidentofsomesubstance.Thus, thedifferentsensesofbeingallrefertothepri- marykindofbeing,substance,inthewaythat exercise,diet,medicine,andclimatearehealthy bystandinginsomerelationtothesinglething health.Thediscoveryoffocalmeaning,asthisis sometimescalled,introducesanewwayofpro- vidingasubjectmatterwiththeintemalunity requiredforscience.Accordingly,theMetaphysics modifiesthestrict"onegenustoonescience" ruleofthePosteriorAnalytics.Asinglesciencemay alsoincludeobjectswhosedefinitionsarediffer- entsolongasthesedefinitionsarerelatedfocally toonething.Sofocalmeaningmakespossible thescienceofbeingquabeing. Focalmeaningalsomakessubstancethecen- tralobjectofinvestigation.Theprinciplesand causesofbeingingeneralcanbeilluminatedby studyingtheprinciplesandcausesoftheprimary instanceofbeing.AlthoughtheCategoriesdistin- guishesprimarysubstancesfromotherthings thatareandindicatestheirsalientcharacteristics (e.g.,theirabilitytoremainoneandthesame whiletakingcontraryproperties),itdoesnot explainwhyitisthatprimarysubstanceshave suchcharacteristics.Thedifficultcentralbooksof theMetaphysics-VII,VIII,andIX-investigate preciselythis.Ineffect,theyaskwhat,primarily, abouttheCategories'primarysubstancesexplains theirnature.Theirtarget,inshort,isthesubstance oftheprimarysubstancesoftheCategories.As concreteempiricalparticulars,thelatterarecom- poundsofformandmatter(thedistinctionisnot explicitintheCategories)andsotheirsubstance mustbesoughtamongtheseintemalstructural features.Thus,MetaphysicsVIIconsidersform, matter,andthecompoundofformandmatter, andquicklyturnstoformasthebestcandidate. Indevelopingaconceptionofformthatcanplay therequiredexplanatoryrole,thenotionof essence(totieneinai)assumescenterstage.The essenceofaman,e.g.,isthecauseofcertainmat- terconstitutingaman,namely,thesoul.Soform inthesenseofessenceistheprimarysubstanceof theMetaphysics.Thisisobviouslynottheprimary substanceoftheCategoriesand,althoughthe sameword(eidos)isused,neitheristhisformthe speciesoftheCategories.Thelatteristreatedinthe Metaphysicsasakindofuniversalcompound abstractedfromparticularcompoundsand appearstobedeniedsubstantialstatus. Whilethereisbroad,thoughnotuniversal, agreementthatintheMetaphysicsformisprimary substance,thereisequallybroaddisagreement överwhetherthisisparticularform,theform belongingtoasingleindividual,orspeciesform, theformcommontoallindividualsinthe species.Thereisalsolivelydiscussionconcerning therelationoftheMetaphysicsdoctrineofpri- marysubstancetotheearlierdoctrineoftheCat- egories.Althoughafewscholarsseeanoutright contradictionhere,mosttakethedivergenceas evidenceofthedevelopmentofAristotle'sviews onsubstance.Finally,theroleofthecentral booksintheMetaphysicsasawholecontinuesto bedebated.Someseethemasanentirelyself- containedanalysisofform,othersaspreparatory toBookXIFsdiscussionofnon-sensibleform andtheroleoftheunmovedmoverasthefinal causeofmotion. Practicalphilosophy.TwoofAristotle'smost heraldedworks,theNicomacheanEthicsandthe Politics,aretreatisesinpracticalphilosophy.Their aimiseffectiveactioninmattersofconduct.So theydealwithwhatisuptousandcanbeother- wisebecauseinthisdomainliechoiceandaction. Thepracticalnatureofethicsliesmainlyinthe developmentofacertainkindofagent.The NicomacheanEthicswaswritten,Aristotlereminds us,"notinordertoknowwhatvirtueis,butin ordertobecomegood."Onebecomesgoodby becomingagoodchooseranddoer.Thisisnot simplyamatterofchoosinganddoingright actionsbutofchoosingordoingthemintheright way.Aristotleassumesthat,forthemostpart, agentsknowwhatoughttobedone(theevilor viciouspersonisanexception).Theakraticor morallyweakagentdesirestodootherthanwhat heknowsoughttobedoneandactsonthisdesire againsthisbetterjudgment.Theenkraticor morallystrongpersonsharestheakraticagenfs desirebutactsinaccordancewithhisbetterjudg- ment.Inneitherkindofchoicearedesireand judgmentinharmony.Inthevirtuous,onthe otherhand,desireandjudgmentagree.Sotheir choicesandactionswillbefreeoftheconflictand painthatinevitablyaccompanythoseofthe akraticandenkraticagent.Thisisbecausethe partoftheirsoulthatgovernschoiceandactionis sodisposedthatdesireandrightjudgmentcoin- cide.Acquiringastabledisposition(hexis)ofthis sortamountstoacquiringmoralvirtue(ethike arete).Thedispositionisconcernedwithchoices aswouldbedeterminedbythepersonofpractical wisdom(phronesis);thesewillbeactionslying betweenextremealternatives.Theywilllieina mean-popularlycalledthe"goldenmean"- relativetothetalentsandstoresoftheagent. Choosinginthiswayisnoteasilydone.It involves,forinstance,feelingangerorextending 50 Aristotle,commentarieson Arminius,Jacobus generosityattherighttime,towardtherightpeo- ple,intherightway,andfortherightreasons. Intellectualvirtues,suchasexcellenceatmathe- matics,canbeacquiredbyteaching,butmoral virtuecannot.Imayknowwhatoughttobedone andevenperformvirtuousactswithoutbeing abletoactvirtuously.Nonetheless,becausemoral virtueisadispositionconcerningchoice,deliber- ateperformanceofvirtuousactscan,ultimately, instilladispositiontochoosetheminharmony andwithpleasureand,hence,toactvirtuously. AristotlerejectedPlato'stranscendentalForm oftheGoodasirrelevanttotheaffairsofpersons and,ingeneral,hadlittlesympathywiththe notionofanabsolutegood.Thegoalofchoice andactionisthehumangood,namely,living well.This,however,isnotsimplyamatterof possessingtherequisitepracticaldisposition. Practicalwisdom,whichisnecessaryforliving well,involvesskillatcalculatingthebestmeans toachieveone'sendsandthisisanintellectual virtue.Buttheendsthatarepresupposedby deliberationareestablishedbymoralvirtue.The endofallaction,thegoodforman,ishappiness (eudaimonia).Mostthings,suchaswealth,are valuedonlyasameanstoaworthyend.Honor, pleasure,reason,andindividualvirtues,suchas courageandgenerosity,aredeemedworthyin theirownrightbuttheycanalsobesoughtfor thesakeofeudaimonia.Eudaimoniaalonecan besoughtonlyforitsownsake.Eudaimoniais notastaticstateofthesoulbutakindofactivity (energeia)ofthesoul-somethinglikehuman flourishing.Thehappyperson'slifewillbeself- sufficientandcompleteinthehighestmeasure. Thegoodforman,then,isactivityinaccordance withvirtueorthehighestvirtue,shouldtherebe one.Here'virtue'meanssomethinglikeexcel- lenceandappliestomuchbesidesman.The excellenceofanaxliesinitscutting,thatofa horseinitsequestrianqualities.Inshort,a thing'sexcellenceisamatterofhowwellitper- formsitscharacteristicfunctionsor,wemight say,howwellitrealizesitsnature. Thenaturalfunctionsofpersonsresideinthe exerciseoftheirnaturalcognitivefaculties,most importantly,thefacultyofreason.Sohuman happinessconsistsinactivityinaccordancewith reason.However,personscanexercisereasonin practicalorinpurelytheoreticalmatters.The firstsuggeststhathappinessconsistsintheprac- ticallifeofmoralvirtue,thesecondthatitcon- sistsinthelifeoftheoreticalactivity.Mostofthe NicomacheanEthicsisdevotedtothemoralvirtues butthefinalbookappearstofavörtheoretical activity(theoria)asthehighestandmostchoice- worthyend.Itisman'sclosestapproachtodivine activity.Muchrecentscholarshipisdevotedto therelationbetweenthesetwoconceptionsof thegood,particularly,towhethertheyareof equalvalueandwhethertheyexcludeorinclude oneanother. Ethicsandpoliticsarecloselyconnected.Aris- totleconceivesofthestateasanaturalentity arisingamongpersonstoserveanaturalfunc- tion.Thisisnotmerely,e.g.,provisionforthe commondefenseorpromotionoftrade.Rather, thestateofthePoliticsalsohaseudaimoniaasits goal,namely,fosteringthecompleteandself- sufficientlivesofitscitizens.Aristotleproduced acomplextaxonomyofconstitutionsbut reducedthem,ineffect,tothreekinds:monar- chy,aristocracy,anddemocracy.Whichbest servesthenaturalendofastatewas,tosome extent,arelativematterforAristotle.Although heappearstohavefavoreddemocracy,insome circumstancesmonarchymightbeappropriate. ThestandardorderingofAristotle'sworks endswiththeRhetoricandthePoetics.The Rhetoric'sextensivediscussionoforatoryorthe artofpersuasionlocatesitbetweenpoliticsand literarytheory.TherelativelyshortPoeticsis devotedchieflytotheanalysisoftragedy.Ithas hadanenormoushistoricalinfluenceonaes- thetictheoryingeneralaswellasonthewriting ofdrama. Seealsoaquinas,essentialism,meta- PHYSICS,PLATO,PRACTICALREASONING, SOCRATES,SYLLOGISM,VIRTUEETHICS. M.V.W. Aristotle,commentarieson.Seecommentarieson ARISTOTLE. arithmetichierarchy.Seehierarchy. arity.Seedegree. Arius.Seearianism. Arminianism.Seearminius. Arminius,jacobus(1560-1609),Dutchtheolo- gianwho,asaDutchReformedpastorandlåter professorattheUniversityofLeiden,challenged Calvinistorthodoxyonpredestinationandfree will.Afterhisdeath,followerscodifiedAr- minius^viewsinadocumentassertingthat God'sgraceisnecessaryforsalvation,butnot irresistible:thedivinedecreedependsonhuman freechoice.ThisbecamethebasisforArminian- ism,whichwascondemnedbytheDutchRe- 51 Armstrong,DavidM. Arnauld,Antoine formedsynodbutvigorouslydebatedforcen- turiesamongProtestanttheologiansofdifferent denominations.Theterm'Arminian'isstillocca- sionallyappliedtotheologianswhodefendafree humanresponsetodivinegraceagainstpredes- tinationism.R.H.K. Armstrong,DavidM.(b.1926),Australian philosopherofmindandmetaphysician,and untilhisretirementChallisProfessorofPhiloso- phyatSydney,notedforhisallegiancetoaphys- icalistaccountofconsciousnessandtoarealist viewofpropertiesconceivedasuniversals.A MaterialistTheoryoftheMind(1968)developsa scientificallymotivatedversionoftheviewthat mentalstatesareidenticalwithphysicalstatesof thecentralnervoussystem.UniversalsandScien- tificRealism(1978)andWhatIsaLawofNature? (1983)arguethatascientificallyadequateontol- ogymustincludeuniversalsinordertoexplain thestatusofnaturallaws.Armstrongcontends thatlawsmustbeconstruedasexpressingrela- tionsofnecessitationbetweenuniversalsrather thanmereregularitiesamongparticulars.How- ever,heisonlypreparedtoacknowledgethe existenceofsuchuniversalsasarerequiredfor thepurposesofscientificexplanation.Moreover, headoptsan"immanent"or"Aristotelian"(as opposedtoa"transcendent"or"Platonic")real- ism,refusingtoaccepttheexistenceofunin- stantiateduniversalsanddenyingthatuniversals somehowexist"outside"spaceandtime. Morerecently,Armstronghasintegratedhis scientificallyinspiredphysicalismandproperty realismwithintheoverallframeworkofan ontologyofstatesofaffairs,notablyinAWorldof StatesofAffairs(1997).Hereheadvocatesthe truthmakerprinciplethateverytruthmustbe madetruebysomeexistingstateofaffairsand contendsthatstatesofaffairs,ratherthanthe universalsandparticularsthatheregardsastheir constituents,arethebasicbuildingblocksofreal- ity.Withinthisontology,whichinsomeways resemblesthatofWittgenstein'sTractatus,ne- cessityandpossibilityareaccommodatedby appealtocombinatorialprinciples.AsArmstrong explainsinACombinatorialTheoryofPossibility (1989),thisapproachoffersanontologicallyeco- nomicalalternativetotherealistconceptionof possibleworldsdefendedbyDavidLewis. Seealsolawlikegeneralization,meta- PHYSICALREALISM,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE, SCIENTIFICREALISM.E.J.L. Arnauld,Antoine(1612-94),Frenchtheologian andphilosopher,perhapsthemostimportant andbest-knownintellectualassociatedwiththe JansenistcommunityatPort-Royal,aswellasa staunchandorthodoxchampionofCartesian philosophy.Histheologicalwritingsdefendthe Augustiniandoctrineofefficaciousgrace,accord- ingtowhichsalvationisnoteamedbyone'sown acts,butgrantedbytheirresistiblegraceofGod. Healsoarguesinfavörofastrictcontritionism, wherebyone'sabsolutionmustbebasedona true,heartfeltrepentance,aloveofGod,rather thanaselfishfearofGod'spunishment.These viewsbroughthimandPort-Royaltothecenter ofreligiouscontroversyinseventeenth-century France,asJansenismcametobeperceivedasa subversiveextensionofProtestantreform. Arnauldwasalsoconstantlyengagedinphilo- sophicaldisputation,andwasregardedasoneof thesharpestandmostphilosophicallyacute thinkersofhistime.Hisinfluenceonseveral majorphilosophersoftheperiodresultedmainly fromhispenetratingcriticismoftheirsystems.In 1641,Arnauldwasaskedtocommenton Descartes'sMeditations.Theobjectionshesent- regarding,amongothertopics,therepresenta- tionalnatureofideas,thecircularityof Descartes'sproofsfortheexistenceofGod,and theapparentirreconcilabilityofDescartes'scon- ceptionofmaterialsubstancewiththeCatholic doctrineofEucharistictransubstantiation-were consideredbyDescartestobethemostintelli- gentandseriousofall.Arnauldofferedhisobjec- tionsinaconstructivespirit,andsoonbecamean enthusiasticdefenderofDescartes'sphilosophy, regardingitasbeneficialbothtotheadvance- mentofhumanlearningandtoChristianpiety. Heinsists,forexample,thattheimmortalityof thesouliswellgroundedinCartesianmind- bodydualism. In1662,Arnauldcomposed(withPierre Nicole)thePort-RoyalLogic,aninfluentialtreatise onlanguageandreasoning.Afterseveral decadesoftheologicalpolemic,duringwhichhe fledFrancetotheNetherlands,Arnauldresumed hispublicphilosophicalactivitieswiththepubli- cationin1683ofOnTrueandFalseIdeasandin 1685ofPhilosophicalandTheologicalReflectionson theNewSystemofNatureandGrace.Thesetwo works,openingsalvosinwhatwouldbecomea longdebate,constituteadetailedattackonMale- branche'stheologyanditsphilosophicalfounda- tions.Inthefirst,mainlyphilosophicaltreatise, Arnauldinsiststhatideas,orthementalrepre- sentationsthatmediatehumanknowledge,are nothingbutactsofthemindthatputusindirect cognitiveandperceptualcontactwiththingsin theworld.(Malebranche,asArnauldreadshim, 52 Arouet,Francois-Marie artificialintelligence arguesthatideasareimmaterialbutnonmental objectsinGod'sunderstandingthatweknow andperceiveinsteadofphysicalthings.Thus,the debateisoftencharacterizedasbetween Arnauld'sdirectrealismandMalebranche'srep- resentativetheory.)Suchmentalactsalsohave representationalcontent,orwhatAmauld(fol- lowingDescartes)calls"objectivereality."This contentexplainstheacfsintentionality,or directednesstowardanobject.Arnauldwould låterarguewithPierreBayle,whocametoMale- branche'sdefense,överwhetherallmentalphe- nomenahaveintentionality,asArnauldbelieves, or,asBayleasserts,certaineventsinthesoul (e.g.,pleasuresandpains)arenon-intentional. ThisinitialcritiqueofMalebranche'sepiste- mologyandphilosophyofmind,however,was intendedbyArnauldonlyasaprolegomenonto themoreimportantattackonhistheology;in particular,onMalebranche'sclaimthatGod alwaysactsbygeneralvolitionsandneverby particularvolitions.Thisview,Arnauldargues, underminesthetrueCatholicsystemofdivine providenceandthreatenstheefficacyofGod's willbyremovingGodfromdirectgovernanceof theworld. In1686,Arnauldalsoenteredintodiscussions withLeibnizregardingthelatter'sDiscourseon Metaphysics.Intheensuingcorrespondence, ArnauldfocuseshiscritiqueonLeibniz'sconcept ofsubstanceandonhiscausaltheory,the preestablishedharmony.Inthisexchange,like theonewithMalebranche,Amauldisconcerned topreservewhathetakestobetheproperway toconceiveofGod'sfreedomandprovidence; althoughhisremarksonsubstance(inwhichhe objectstoLeibniz'sreintroductionof"substantial forms")isalsoclearlymotivatedbyhiscommit- menttoastrictCartesianontology-bodiesare nothingmorethanextension,devoidofanyspir- itualelement.Mostofhisphilosophicalactivity inthelatterhalfofthecentury,infact,isavig- orousdefenseofCartesianism,particularlyon theologicalgrounds(e.g.,demonstratingthe consistencybetweenCartesianmetaphysicsand theCatholicdogmaofrealpresenceinthe Eucharist),asitbecametheobjectofcondemna- tioninbothCatholicandProtestantcircles. Seealsobayle,descartes,leibniz,male- branche.S.N. Arouet,Francois-Marie.Seevoltaire. around.SeeAppendixofSpecialSymbols. arrowparadox.Seezeno'sparadoxes. Arrow'sparadox,alsocalledArrow's(impossi- bility)theorem,amajorresultinsocialchoice theory,namedforitsdiscoverer,economist KennethArrow.Itisintuitivetosupposethat thepreferencesofindividualsinasocietycanbe expressedformally,andthenaggregatedintoan expressionofsocialpreferences,asocialchoice function.Arrow'sparadoxisthatindividual preferenceshavingcertainwell-behavedformal- izationsdemonstrablycannotbeaggregatedinto asimilarlywell-behavedsocialchoicefunction satisfyingfourplausibleformålconditions:(1) collectiverationality-anysetofindividual orderingsandaltemativesmustyieldasocial ordering;(2)Paretooptimality-ifallindividu- alspreferoneorderingtoanother,thesocial orderingmustalsoagree;(3)non-dictator- ship-thesocialorderingmustnotbeidentical toaparticularindividual'sordering;and(4) independenceofirrelevantaltematives-the socialorderingdependsonnopropertiesofthe individualorderingsotherthantheordersthem- selves,andforagivensetofaltemativesit dependsonlyontheorderingsofthoseparticu- laraltematives. Mostattemptstoresolvetheparadoxhave focusedonaspectsof(1)and(4).Someargue thatpreferencescanberationaleveniftheyare intransitive.Othersarguethatcardinalorder- ings,andhence,interpersonalcomparisonsof preferenceintensity,arerelevant. Seealsodecisiontheory,socialchoice theory.A.N. Arrow'stheorem.Seearrow'sparadox. art,philosophyof.Seeaesthetics. art,representationaltheoryof.Seemimesis. artifactuality.Seeinstitutionaltheoryofart. artificialintelligence,alsocalledAI,thescientific efforttodesignandbuildintelligentartifacts. Sincetheeffortinevitablypresupposesandtests theoriesaboutthenatureofintelligence,ithas implicationsforthephilosophyofmind-per- hapsevenmorethandoesempiricalpsychology. Foronething,actualconstructionamountstoa directassaultonthemind-bodyproblem; shoulditsucceed,someformofmaterialism wouldseemtobevindicated.Foranother,a workingmodel,evenalimitedone,requiresa moreglobalconceptionofwhatintelligenceis thandoexperimentstotestspecifichypotheses. Infact,psychology'sownoverviewofitsdomain 53 artificialintelligence artificialintelligence hasbeenmuchinfluencedbyfundamentalcon- ceptsdrawnfromAI. Althoughtheideaofanintelligentartifactis old,seriousscientificresearchdatesonlyfrom the1950s,andisassociatedwiththedevelop- mentofprogrammablecomputers.Intelligence isunderstoodasastruduralpropertyorcapacityof anactivesystem;i.e.,itdoesnotmatterwhatthe systemismadeof,aslongasitspartsandtheir interactionsyieldintelligentbehavioroverall. Forinstance,ifsolvinglogicalproblems,playing chess,orconversinginEnglishmanifestsintelli- gence,thenitisnotimportantwhetherthe "implementation"iselectronic,biological,or mechanical,justaslongasitsolves,plays,or talks.Computersarerelevantmainlybecauseof theirflexibilityandeconomy:Softwaresystems areunmatchedinachievableactivecomplexity perinvestedeffort. Despitethegeneralityofprogrammablestruc- turesandthevarietyofhistoricalapproachesto themind,thebulkofAIresearchdividesinto twobroadcamps-whichwecanthinkofaslan- guage-orientedandpattern-oriented,respec- tively.Conspicuousbytheirabsenceare significantinfluencesfromtheconditioned- responseparadigm,thepsychoanalytictradition, thementalpictureidea,empiricist(atomistic) associationism,andsoon.Moreover,bothAI campstendtofocusoncognitiveissues,some- timesincludingperceptionandmotorcontrol. Notablyomittedaresuchpsychologicallyimpor- tanttopicsasaffect,personality,aestheticand moraljudgment,conceptualchange,mentalill- ness,etc.Perhapssuchmattersarebeyondthe purviewofartificialintelligence;yetitisanunob- vioussubstantivethesisthatintellectcanbecor- donedoffandrealizedindependentlyoftherest ofhumanlife. ThetwomainAIparadigmsemergedtogether inthe1950s(alongwithcyberneticandinforma- tion-theoreticapproaches,whichturnedoutto bedeadends);andbotharevigoroustoday.But formostofthesixtiesandseventies,thelan- guage-basedorientationdominatedattention andfunding,forthreesignalreasons.First,com- puterdatastructuresandprocessesthemselves seemedlanguagelike:dataweresyntacticallyand semanticallyarticulated,andprocessingwas localized(serial).Second,twentieth-centurylin- guisticsandlogicmadeitintelligiblethatand howsuchsystemsmightwork:automaticsymbol manipulationmadeclear,powerfulsense. Finally,thesortsofperformancemostamenable totheapproach-explicitreasoningand"figur- ingout"-strikebothpopulärandeducatedopin- ionasparticularly"intellectual";hence,early successeswereallthemoreimpressive,while "trivial"stumblingblockswereeasiertoignore. Thebasicideaofthelinguisticorsymbolmanip- ulationcampisthatthinkingisliketalking- innerdiscourse-and,hence,thatthoughtsare likesentences.Thesuggestionisvenerable;and Hobbesevenlinkeditexplicitlytocomputation. Yet,itwasamajorscientificachievementtoturn thegeneralideaintoaserioustheory.The accountdoesnotapplyonly,orevenespecially, tothesortofthinkingthatisaccessibletocon- sciousreflection.Noristhe"languageof thought"supposedtobemuchlikeEnglish, predicatelogic,lisp,oranyotherfamiliarnota- tion;rather,itsdetailedcharacterisanempirical researchproblem.And,despitefictionalstereo- types,theaimisnottobuildsuperlogicalor inhumanlyrationalautomata.Ourhumanten- denciestotakethingsforgranted,makeintuitive leaps,andresistimplausibleconclusionsarenot weaknessesthatAIstrivestoovercomebutabil- itiesintegraltorealintelligencethatAIaspiresto share. Inwhatsense,then,isthoughtsupposedtobe languagelike?Threeitemsareessential.First, thoughttokenshaveacombinatorialsyntactic structure;i.e.,theyarecompoundsofwell- definedatomicconstituentsinwell-defined (recursivelyspecifiable)arrangements.Sothe constituentsareanalogoustowords,andthe arrangementsareanalogoustophrasesandsen- tences;butthereisnosuppositionthatthey shouldresembleanyknownwordsorgrammar. Second,thecontentsofthoughttokens,what they"mean,"areasystematicfunctionoftheir composition:theconstituentsandformsofcom- binationhavedeterminatesignificancesthat togetherdeterminethecontentofanywell- formedcompound.Sothisislikethemeaningof asentencebeingdeterminedbyitsgrammarand themeaningsofitswords.Third,theintelligent progressorsequenceofthoughtisspecifiableby rulesexpressedsyntactically-theycanbecar- riedoutbyprocessessensitiveonlytosyntactic properties.Heretheanalogyistoprooftheory: theformålvalidityofanargumentisamatterof itsaccordingwithrulesexpressedformally.But thisanalogyisparticularlytreacherous,because itimmediatelysuggeststherigoroflogicalinfer- ence;but,ifintelligenceisspecifiablebyformål rules,thesemustbefarmorepermissive,con- text-sensitive,andsoon,thanthoseofformål logic. Syntaxassuchisperfectlyneutralastohow theconstituentsareidentified(bysound,by 54 artificialintelligence artificialintelligence shape,bymagneticprofile)andarranged(in time,inspace,viaaddresspointers).Itis,in effect,afreeparameter:whatevercanserveasa bridgebetweenthesemanticsandtheprocess- ing.Theaccountshareswithmanyothersthe assumptionsthatthoughtsarecontentful (meaningful)andthattheprocessesinwhich theyoccurcansomehowberealizedphysically. Itisdistinguishedbythetwofurtherthesesthat theremustbesomeindependentwayofdescrib- ingthesethoughtsthatmediatesbetween (simultaneouslydetermines)theircontentsand howtheyareprocessed,andthat,sodescribed, theyarecombinatoriallystructured.Sucha descriptionissyntactical. Wecandistinguishtwoprincipalphasesinlan- guage-orientedAI,eachlastingabouttwenty years.Veryroughly,thefirstphaseemphasized processing(searchandreasoning),whereasthe secondhasemphasizedrepresentation(knowl- edge).Toseehowthiswent,itisimportantto appreciatetheintellectualbreakthroughre- quiredtoconceiveAIatall.Amachine,suchas acomputer,isadeterministicsystem,exceptfor randomelements.Thatisfineforperfectlycon- straineddomains,likenumericalcalculation, sorting,andparsing,orfordomainsthatarecon- strainedexceptforprescribedrandomness,such asstatisticalmodeling.But,inthegeneralcase, intelligentbehaviorisneitherperfectlycon- strainednorperfectlyconstrainedwithalittle randomvariationthrownin.Rather,itisgener- allyfocusedandsensible,yetalsofallibleand somewhatvariable.Consider,e.g.,chessplaying (anearlytestbedforAI):listingallthelegal movesforanygivenpositionisaperfectlycon- strainedproblem,andeasytoprogram;but choosingthebestmoveisnot.Yetanintelligent playerdoesnotsimplydeterminewhichmoves wouldbelegalandthenchooseonerandomly; intelligenceinchessplayistochoose,ifnot alwaysthebest,atleastusuallyagoodmove. Thisissomethingbetweenperfectdeterminacy andrandomness,a"between"thatisnotsimply amixtureofthetwo.Howisitachievableina machine? ThecrucialinnovationthatfirstmadeAIcon- cretelyandrealisticallyconceivableisthatofa heuristicprocedure.(Theterm'heuristic'derives fromtheGreekwordfordiscovery,asin Archimedes'exclamation"Eureka!")Therele- vantpointforAIisthatdiscoveryisamatternei- theroffollowingexactdirectionstoagoalnorof dumbluck,butoflookingaroundsensibly,being guidedasmuchaspossiblebywhatyouknowin advanceandwhatyoufindalongtheway.Soa heuristicprocedureisoneforsensiblediscovery, aprocedureforsensiblyguidedsearch.Inchess, e.g.,aplayerdoeswelltobearinmindanumber ofrulesofthumb:otherthingsbeingequal, rooksaremorevaluablethanknights,itisan assettocontrolthecenteroftheboard,andso on.Suchguidelines,ofcourse,arenotvalidin everysituation;norwilltheyallbebestsatisfied bythesamemove.But,byfollowingthemwhile searchingasfaraheadthroughvariousscenarios aspossible,aplayercanmakegenerallysensible moves-muchbetterthanrandom-withinthe constraintsofthegame.Thispictureeven accordsfairlywellwiththeintrospectivefeelof choosingamove,particularlyforlessexperi- encedplayers. TheessentialinsightforAIisthatsuchrough- and-ready(ceterisparibus)rulescanbedetermin- isticallyprogrammed.Italldependsonhowyou lookatit.Oneandthesamebitofcomputerpro- gramcanbe,fromonepointofview,adeter- ministic,infallibleprocedureforcomputinghow agivenmovewouldchangetherelativebalance ofpieces,andfromanother,agenerallysensible butfallibleprocedureforestimatinghow"good" thatmovewouldbe.Thesubstantivethesis aboutintelligence-humanandartificialalike- thenisthatourpowerfulbutfallibleabilityto form"intuitive"hunches,educatedguesses,etc, istheresultof(largelyunconscious)search, guidedbysuchheuristicrules. Thesecondphaseoflanguage-inspiredAI, datingroughlyfromthemid-1970s,buildson theideaofheuristicprocedure,butdramatically changestheemphasis.Theearlierworkwas framedbyaconceptionofintelligenceasfinding solutionstoproblems(goodmoves,e.g.).From suchaperspective,thespecificationoftheprob- lem(therulesofthegameplusthecurrentposi- tion)andtheprovisionofsomeheuristicguides (domain-specificrulesofthumb)aremerelya settingoftheparameters;therealwork,thereal exerciseofintelligence,liesintheintensive guidedsearchundertakeninthespecifiedterms. Thelåterphase,impressednotsomuchbyour problem-solvingprowessasbyhowwellweget alongwith"simple"commonsense,hasshifted theemphasisfromsearchandreasoningto knowledge. Themotivationforthisshiftcanbeseeninthe followingtwosentences: Wegavethemonkeythebananabecauseit wasripe. Wegavethemonkeythebananabecauseit washungry. 55 artificialintelligence artificialintelligence Theword'it'isambiguous,astheterminal adjectivesmakeclear.Yetlistenerseffortlessly understandwhatismeant,tothepoint,usually, ofnotevennoticingtheambiguity.Thequestion is,how?Ofcourse,itis"justcommonsense"that monkeysdon'tgetripeandbananasdon'tget hungry,so...Butthreefurtherobservations showthatthisisnotsomuchananswerasa restatementoftheissue.First,sentencesthatrely oncommonsensetoavoidmisunderstandingare anythingbutrare:conversationisrifewiththem. Second,justaboutanyoddfactthat"everybody knows"canbethebitofcommonsensethat understandingthenextsentencedependson; andtherangeofsuchknowledgeisväst.Yet, third,dialogueproceedsinrealtimewithouta hitch,almostalways.Sothewholerangeofcom- monsenseknowledgemustbesomehowatour mentalfingertipsallthetime. Theunderlyingdifficultyisnotwithspeedor quantityalone,butwithrelevance.Howdoesa system,givenallthatitknowsaboutaardvarks, Alabama,andaxhandles,"homeinon"theper- tinentfactthatbananasdon'tgethungry,inthe fractionofaseconditcanaffordtospendon thepronoun'it'?Theanswerproposedisboth simpleandpowerful:commonsenseisnotjust randomlystoredinformation,butisinstead highlyorganizedbytopics,withlotsofindexes, cross-references,tables,hierarchies,andsoon. Thewordsinthesentenceitselftriggerthe"arti- des"onmonkeys,bananas,hunger,andsoon, andthesequicklyrevealthatmonkeysaremam- mals,henceanimals,thatbananasarefruit, hencefromplants,thathungeriswhatanimals feelwhentheyneedtoeat-andthatsettlesit. Theamountofsearchandreasoningisminimal; theissueofrelevanceissolvedinsteadbythe antecedentstrudureinthestoredknowledge itself.Whilethisrequireslargerandmoreelabo- ratesystems,thehopeisthatitwillmakethem fasterandmoreflexible. Theothermainorientationtowardartificial intelligence,thepattern-basedapproach-often called"connectionism"or"paralleldistributed processing"-reemergedfromtheshadowof symbolprocessingonlyinthe1980s,and remainsinmanywayslessdeveloped.Thebasic inspirationcomesnotfromlanguageorany otherpsychologicalphenomenon(suchas imageryoraffect),butfromthemicrostructure ofthebrain.Thecomponentsofaconnectionist systemarerelativelysimpleactivenodes-lotsof them-andrelativelysimpleconnections betweenthosenodes-again,lotsofthem.One importanttype(andtheeasiesttovisualize)has thenodesdividedintolayers,suchthateach nodeinlayerAisconnectedtoeachnodeinlayer B,eachnodeinlayerBisconnectedtoeachnode inlayerC,andsoon.Eachnodehasanactiva- tionlevel,whichvariesinresponsetotheacti- vationsofother,connectednodes;andeach connectionhasaweight,whichdetermineshow strongly(andinwhatdirection)theactivationof onenodeaffectsthatoftheother.Theanalogy withneuronsandsynapses,thoughimprecise,is intended. Soimaginealayerednetworkwithfinely tunedconnectionweightsandrandom(orzero) activationlevels.Nowsupposetheactivationsof allthenodesinlayerAaresetinsomeparticu- larway-somepatternisimposedontheactiva- tionstateofthislayer.Theseactivationswill propagateoutalongalltheconnectionsfrom layerAtolayerB,andactivatesomepattern there.TheactivationofeachnodeinlayerBisa functionoftheactivationsofallthenodesin layerA,andoftheweightsofalltheconnections toitfromthosenodes.Butsinceeachnodein layerBhasitsownconnectionsfromthenodes inlayerA,itwillrespondinitsownuniqueway tothispatternofactivationsinlayerA.Thus,the patternthatresultsinlayerBisajointfunctionof thepatternthatwasimposedonlayerAandof thepatternofconnectionweightsbetweenthe twolayers.Andasimilarstorycanbetoldabout layerB'sinfluenceonlayerC,andsoon,until somefinalpatternisinducedinthelastlayer. Whatarethesepattems?Theymightbeany numberofthings;buttwogeneralpossibilities canbedistinguished.Theymightbetantamount to(orsubstratabeneath)representationsofsome familiarsort,suchassentencelikestructuresor images;ortheymightbeakind(orkinds)ofrep- resentationpreviouslyunknown.Now,people certainlydosometimesthinkinsentences(and probablyimages);so,totheextentthatnetworks aretakenascompletebrainmodels,thefirst alternativemustbeatleastpartlyright.But,to thatextent,themodelsarealsomorephysiolog- icalthanpsychological:itisrathertheimple- mentedsentencesorimagesthatdirectlymodel themind.Thus,itisthepossibilityofanew genusofrepresentation-sometimescalleddis- tributedrepresentation-thatisparticularly exciting.Onthisalternative,thepatternsinthe mindrepresentinsomewayotherthanby mimeticimageryorarticulatedescription.How? Animportantfeatureofallnetworkmodelsis thattherearetwoquitedifferentcategoriesof pattern.Ontheonehand,therearetherelatively ephemeralpatternsofactivationinvarious 56 artificiallanguage artificiallife groupsofnodes;ontheother,therearetherel- ativelystablepatternsofconnectionstrength amongthenodes.Sincethereareingeneral manymoreconnectionsthannodes,thelatter patternsarericher;anditistheythatdetermine thecapabilitiesofthenetworkwithregardtothe formerpatterns.Manyoftheabilitiesmosteas- ilyand"naturally"realizedinnetworkscanbe subsumedundertheheadingpatterncompletion: theconnectionweightsareadjusted-perhaps viaatrainingregime-suchthatthenetwork willcompleteanyoftheactivationpatternsfrom apredeterminedgroup.So,supposesomefrac- tion(sayhalf)ofthenodesinthenetareclamped tothevaluestheywouldhaveforoneofthose patterns(sayP)whiletheremainderaregiven random(ordefault)activations.Thenthenet- work,whenrun,willresetthelatteractivations tothevaluesbelongingtoP—thus"completing" it.Iftheunclampedactivationsareregardedas variationsordeviations,patterncompletion amountstonormalization,orgroupingbysimilar- ity.Iftheinitialorinputnodesarealwaysthe same(asinlayerednetworks),thenwehavepat- ternassociation(ortransformation)frominputto output.Iftheinputpatternisamemoryprobe, patterncompletionbecomesaccessbycontent.If theoutputpatternisanidentifier,thenitispat- ternrecognition.Andsoon.Notethat,although theoperandsareactivationpatterns,the "knowledge"aboutthem,theabilitytocomplete them,iscontainedintheconnectionpatterns; hence,thatabilityorknow-howiswhatthenet- workrepresents. Thereisnoobviousupperboundonthepos- siblerefinementorintricacyofthesepattern groupingsandassociations.Iftheinputpatterns aresensorystimuliandtheoutputpatternsare motorcontrol,thenwehaveapotentialmodel ofcoordinatedandevenskillfulbehavior.Ina systemalsocapableoflanguage,anetwork model(orcomponent)mightaccountforverbal recognitionandcontentassociation,andeven such"nonliteral"effectsastropeandtone.Yetat leastsomesortof"symbolmanipulation"seems essentialforlanguageuse,regardlessofhownet- workliketheimplementationis.Onecurrent speculationisthatitmightsufficetoapproximate abatteryofsymbolicprocessesasaspecialsub- systemwithinacognitivesystemthatfunda- mentallyworksonquitedifferentprinciples. Theattractionofthepattern-basedapproach is,atthispoint,notsomuchactualachievement asitispromise-ontwogrounds.Inthefirst place,thespaceofpossiblemodels,notonlynet- worktopologiesbutalsowaysofconstruingthe patterns,isväst.Thosebuiltandtestedsofar havebeen,forpracticalreasons,rathersmall;so itispossibletohopebeyondtheirpresentlimita- tionstosystemsofsignificantlygreatercapabil- ity.Butsecond,andperhapsevenmore attractive,thosedirectionsinwhichpattern- basedsystemsshowthemostpromise-skills, recognition,similarity,andthelike-areamong theareasofgreatestfrustrationforlanguage- basedAI.Henceitremainspossible,forawhile atleast,tooverlookthefaetthat,todate,nocon- nectionistnetworkcanperformlongdivision,let aloneplaychessorsolvesymboliclogicprob- lems. Seealsocognitivescience,computer THEORY,CONNECTIONISM,FORMÅLLOGIC, GRAMMAR,PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE,PHI- LOSOPHYOFMIND.J.HaU. artificiallanguage.Seeformållanguage,philos- OPHYOFLANGUAGE. artificiallife,aninterdisciplinarysciencestudy- ingthemostgeneralcharacterofthefundamen- talprocessesoflife.Theseprocessesinclude self-organization,self-reproduction,learning, adaptation,andevolution.Artificiallife(or ALife)istotheoreticalbiologyroughlywhatarti- ficialintelligence(AI)istotheoreticalpsychol- ogy-computersimulationisthemethodology ofchoice.Infact,sincethemindexhibitsmany oflife'sfundamentalproperties,AIcouldbecon- sideredasubfieldofALife.However,whereas mosttraditionalAImodelsareserialsystems withcomplicated,centralizedcontrollersmaking decisionsbasedonglobalstateinformation,most naturalsystemsexhibitingcomplexautonomous behaviorareparallel,distributednetworksof simpleentitiesmakingdecisionsbasedsolelyon theirlocalstateinformation,sotypicalALife modelshaveacorrespondingdistributedarchi- tecture. Acomputersimulationofevolving"bugs"can illustratewhatALifemodelsarelike.Moving aroundinatwo-dimensionalworldperiodically ladenwithheapsof"food,"thesebugseat,repro- duce,andsometimesperishfromstarvation. Eachbug'smovementisgeneticallydetermined bythequantitiesoffoodinitsimmediateneigh- borhood,andrandommutationsandcrossovers modifythesegenomesduringreproduetion. Simulationsstartedwithrandomgenesshow spontaneouswavesofhighlyadaptivegenetic noveltiescontinuouslysweepingthroughthe populationatpreciselyquantifiableråtes.See C.Langstonetal.,eds.,ArtificialLifeII(1991). 57 ascriptivism Astell,Mary ALifescienceraisesandpromisestoinform manyphilosophicalissues,suchas:Isfunction- alismtherightapproachtowardlife?When,if ever,isasimulationoflifereallyalive?Whendo systemsexhibitthespontaneousemergenceof properties? Seealsoartificialintelligence,com- PUTERTHEORY,CONNECTIONISM,FUNCTION- ALISM.M.A.B. ascriptivism,thetheorythattocallanactionvol- untaryisnottodescribeitascausedinacertain waybytheagentwhodidit,buttoexpressa commitmenttoholdtheagentresponsiblefor theaction.Ascriptivismisthusakindofnoncog- nitivismasappliedtojudgmentsaboutthevol- untarinessofacts.IntroducedbyHartin "AscriptionofRightsandResponsibilities,"Pro- ceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety(1949),ascrip- tivismwasgivenitsnameandattackedin Geach's''Ascriptivism,"PhilosophicalReview (1960).HartrecantedinthePrefacetohisPun- ishmentandResponsibility(1968).Seealso DESCRIPTIVISM.B.W.H. ase.Seeensase. aseity.Seedivineattributes,ensase. A-series.Seetime. Aspasius.Seecommentariesonaristotle. aspectualactionparadox.Seedeonticparadoxes. assent,notional.Seenewman. assent,real.Seenewman. assertability,warranted.Seedewey. assertabilityconditions.Seemeaning. assertion.Seeproposition. assertionsign.SeeAppendixofSpecialSymbols. assertoric.Seemodality. assistedsuicide.Seebioethics. associationism,thepsychologicaldoctrinethat associationisthesoleorprimarybasisoflearn- ingaswellasofintelligentthoughtandbehav- ior.Associationoccurswhenonetypeof thought,idea,orbehaviorfollows,oriscontin- gentupon,anotherthought,idea,orbehavioror externalevent,andthesecondsomehowbonds withthefirst.Iftheideaofeggsispairedwiththe ideaofham,thenthetwoideasmaybecome associated.Associationistsarguethatcomplex statesofmindandmentalprocessescanbeana- lyzedintoassociatedelements.Thecomplexmay benovel,buttheelementsareproductsofpast associations.Associationismofteniscombined withhedonism.Hedonismexplainswhyevents associateorbond:bondsareforgedbypleasant experiences.Ifthepleasantnessofeatingeggsis combinedwiththepleasantnessofeatingham, thenideasofhamandeggsassociate.Bonding mayalsobeexplainedbyvariousnon-hedonis- ticprinciplesofassociation,asinHume'stheory oftheassociationofideas.Oneoftheseprinci- plesiscontiguityinplaceortime. Associationismcontributestothecomponen- tialanalysisofintelligent,rationalactivityinto non-intelligent,non-rational,mechanicalproc- esses.Peoplebelieveastheydo,notbecauseof rationalconnectionsamongbeliefs,butbecause beliefsassociativelybond.Thusonemaythinkof LondonwhenthinkingofEngland,notbecause onepossessesaninnerlogicofgeographicbeliefs fromwhichoneinfersthatLondonisinEngland. Thetwothoughtsmayco-occurbecauseofconti- guityorotherprinciples. Kindsofassociationismoccurinbehaviorist modelsofclassicalandoperantconditioning. Certainassociationistideas,ifnotassociationism itself,appearinconnectionistmodelsofcogni- tion,especiallytheprinciplethatcontiguities breedbonding. Severalphilosophersandpsychologists,in- cludingHume,Hartley,andJ.S.Millamong philosophersandE.L.Thorndike(1874-1949) andB.F.Skinner(1904-90)amongpsycholo- gists,areassociationists. Seealsoconnectionism;hartley;hedo- nism;hume;mill,j.s.G.A.G. associationofideas.Seeassociationism. Astell,Mary(1666-1731),anearlyEnglishfem- inistandauthorofASeriousProposaltotheLadies (1694and1697)andSomeReflectionsonMarriage (1700).Theseworksarguethatwomen'sshort- comingsarenotduetoalackofintellectualabil- ity,sincewomenhaverationalsouls,andpresent aneducationalprogramtofitthemrationallyfor theirreligiousduties.Astellenteredaswellinto thephilosophical,theological,andpoliticalcon- troversiesofherday.HerLettersConcerningthe LoveofGod(1695)isacorrespondencewiththe 58 asymmetrical attributiontheory EnglishMalebranchian,JohnNorris,översuch issuesasNorris'scontentionthatourdutyisto Godonly.Hermostsubstantialwork,TheChris- tianReligion,asProfessedbyaDaughteroftheChurch ofEngland(1705),laysoutherviewsonthe groundsandimplicationsofnaturalandrevealed religion.Thisworkincludesconsiderablecritical attentiontoJohnLocke'sideas,andboththis andtheLetterscalledforthrefutationsfrom Locke'sfriend,DamarisCudworth.Seealso cudworth,damaris;feministphiloso- phy;malebranche.M.At. asymmetrical.Seerelation. ataraxia.Seeepicureanism,sextusempiricus, SKEPTICS. Athanasius(c.297-373),earlyChristianfather, bishopinAlexandria(thoughfrequentlyexiled), andaleadingprotagonistinthefourth-century disputesconcerningChrisfsrelationshiptoGod. ThroughmajorworkslikeOntheIncarnation, AgainsttheArians,andLettersontheHolySpirit, Athanasiuscontributedgreatlytotheclassical doctrinesoftheIncarnationandtheTrinity. OpposingallformsofArianism,whichdenied Chrisfsdivinityandreducedhimtoacreature, Athanasiustaught,inthelanguageoftheNicene Creed,thatChristtheSon,andlikewisetheHoly Spirit,wereofthesamebeingasGodtheFather (homoousios).Thuswithterminologyandcon- ceptsdrawnfromGreekphilosophy,hehelpedto forgethedistinctlyChristianandun-Hellenistic doctrineoftheeternaltriuneGod,whobecame enfleshedintimeandmatterandrestored humanitytoimmortality,forfeitedthroughsin, byinvolvementinitsconditionofcorruptionand decay.Seealsoarianism.A.E.L. atheism(fromGreeka-,'not',andtheos,'god'), theviewthattherearenogods.Awidelyused sensedenotesmerelynotbelievinginGodandis consistentwithagnosticism.Astrictersense denotesabeliefthatthereisnoGod;thisusehas becomethestandardone.IntheApologySocrates isaccusedofatheismfornotbelievingintheoffi- cialAtheniangods.Somedistinguishbetween theoreticalatheismandpracticalatheism.Atheoret- icalatheistisonewhoself-consciouslydeniesthe existenceofasupremebeing,whereasapracti- calatheistmaybelievethatasupremebeing existsbutlivesasthoughtherewerenogod. L.P.P. Atheismusstreit.Seefichte. AthenianAcademy.Seedamascius. AthenianSchool.Seemiddleplatonism. A-theoryoftime.Seetime. Ätman,inHinduthought,theindividual,viewed byAdvaitaVedantaasnumericallyidenticalto, andbyothervarietiesofVedantaasdependent onandcapableofworshipof,Brahman.Some- timesinHinduismconceivedasinherentlycon- sciousandpossessedofintrinsicmentalqualities, andsometimesviewedashavingmentalquali- tiesonlyinthesensethatthecompositeof Ätman-embodied-in-a-physical-bodyhasthisfea- ture,Ätmanbeginninglesslytransmigratesfrom lifetolife(or,forAdvaita,appearstodoso).Itis embodiedinsuccessivebodies,accumulating karmaandpossiblyachievingenlightenment withitsconsequentreleasefromsamsära,the transmigratorywheel.K.E.Y. atomism,ancient.Seeancientatomism. atomism,logical.Seerussell. atomism,semantic.Seesemanticholism. Atticus.Seecommentariesonplato,middlepla- tonism. attitude,phenomenological.Seehusserl. attitude,practical.Seepracticalreasoning. attitude,propositional.Seeproposition,philoso- phyOFMIND. attitude,reactive.Seestrawson. attribute.Seeproperty. attributiontheory,atheoryinsocialpsychology concernedwithhowandwhyordinarypeople explainevents.Peopleexplainbyattributing causalpowerstocertaineventsratherthanoth- ers.Thetheoryattemptstodescribeandclarify everydaycommonsenseexplanation,toidentify criteriaofexplanatorysuccesspresupposedby commonsense,andtocompareandcontrast commonsenseexplanationwithscientificexpla- nation.Theheartofattributiontheoryisthethe- sisthatpeopletendtoattributecausalpowerto factorspersonallyimportanttothem,whichthey believecovarywithallegedeffects.Forexample, awomanmaydesignatesexualdiscriminationas 59 attributivepluralism Augustine thecauseofhernotbeingpromotedinaCorpo- ration.Beingfemaleisimportanttoherandshe believesthatpromotionandfailurecovarywith gender.Malesgetpromoted;femalesdon't. Causalattributionstendtopreserveself-esteem, reducecognitivedissonance,anddiminishthe attributor'spersonalresponsibilityformisdeeds. Whenattributionalstylesorhabitscontributeto emotionalill-being,e.g.tochronic,inappropri- atefeelingsofdepressionorguilt,attribution theoryoffersthefollowingtherapeuticrecom- mendation:changeattributionssoastoreduce emotionalill-beingandincreasewell-being. Henceifthewomanblamesherselfforthefail- ure,andifself-blameispartofherdepressive attributionalstyle,shewouldbeencouragedto lookoutsideherself,perhapstosexualdiscrimi- nation,fortheexplanation.Seealsoexplana- TION,MOTIVATIONALEXPLANATION.G.A.G. attributivepluralism.Seepluralism. attributiveuseofdescriptions.Seetheoryof DESCRIPTIONS. Augustine,Saint,knownasAugustineofHippo (354-430),Christianphilosopherandchurch father,oneofthechiefsourcesofChristian thoughtintheWest;hisimportanceformedieval andmodernEuropeanphilosophyisimpossible todescribebrieflyorevertocircumscribe.Mat- tersaremademoredifficultbecauseAugustine wrotevoluminouslyanddialecticallyasaChris- tiantheologian,treatingphilosophicaltopicsfor themostpartonlyastheywerehelpfultotheol- ogy-orascorrectedbyit. AugustinefashionedthenarrativeoftheCon- fessions(397-400)outoftheeventsofthefirst halfofhislife.Hethussuppliedlåterbiographers withbothaseductiveselectionofbiographical detailandacompellingstoryofhissuccessive conversionsfromadolescentsensuality,tothe image-ladenreligionoftheManichaeans,toa versionofNeoplatonism,andthentoChristian- ity.Thestoryisanunexcelledintroductionto Augustine'sviewsofphilosophy.Itshows,for instance,thatAugustinereceivedverylittlefor- maleducationinphilosophy.Hewastrainedas arhetorician,andtheonlyphilosophicalwork thathementionsamonghisearlyreadingis Cicero's(löst)Hortensius,anexerciseinpersua- siontothestudyofphilosophy.Again,thenar- rativemakesplainthatAugustinefinallyrejected Manichaeanismbecausehecametoseeitasbad philosophy:asetofsophisticalfantasieswithout rationalcoherenceorexplanatoryforce.More importantly,Augustine'sfinalconversionto Christianitywaspreparedbyhisreadingin"cer- tainbooksofthePlatonists"(Confessions7.9.13). TheseLatintranslations,whichseemtohave beenanthologiesormanualsofphilosophic teaching,taughtAugustineaformofNeoplaton- ismthatenabledhimtoconceiveofacosmic hierarchydescendingfromanimmaterial,eter- nal,andintelligibleGod.OnAugustine'sjudg- ment,philosophycoulddonomorethanthat;it couldnotgivehimthepowertoorderhisown lifesoastolivehappilyandinastablerelation withthenow-discoveredGod.Yetinhisfirst yearsasaChristian,Augustinetooktimetowrite anumberofworksinphilosophicalgenres.Best knownamongthemarearefutationofAcade- micSkepticism(Contraacademicos,386),atheod- icy(Deordine,386),andadialogueontheplace ofhumanchoicewithintheprovidentially orderedhierarchycreatedbyGod(Deliberoarbi- trio,388/391-95). Withinthedecadeofhisconversion,Augus- tinewasdraftedintothepriesthood(391)and thenconsecratedbishop(395).Thethirty-five yearsofhislifeafterthatconsecrationwerecon- sumedbylaborsonbehalfofthechurchin northernAfricaandthroughtheLatin-speaking portionsoftheincreasinglyfragmentedempire. MostofAugustine'sepiscopalwritingwas polemicalbothinoriginandinform;hecom- posedagainstauthorsormovementshejudged heretical,especiallytheDonatistsandPelagians. ButAugustine'ssenseofhisauthorshipalsoled himtowriteworksoffundamentaltheology conceivedonagrandscale. Themostfamousoftheseworks,beyondthe Confessions,areOntheTrinity(399-412,420),On GenesisaccordingtotheLetter(401-15),andOnthe CityofGod(413-26).OntheTrinityelaboratesin subtledetailthedistinguishable"traces"of Father,Son,andSpiritinthecreatedworldand particularlyinthehumansoul'striadofmemory, intellect,andwill.ThecommentaryonGenesis 1-3,whichismeanttobemuchmorethana"lit- eral"commentaryinthemodemsense,treats manytopicsinphilosophicalpsychologyand anthropology.Italsoteachessuchcosmological doctrinesasthe"seed-reasons"(rationessemi- nales)bywhichcreaturesaregivenintelligible form.TheCityofGodbeginswithacritiqueofthe bankruptcyofpagancivicreligionanditsatten- dantphilosophies,butitendswiththedepiction ofhumanhistoryasacombatbetweenforcesof self-love,conceivedasadiaboliccityofearth,and thegracedloveofGod,whichfoundsthatheav- enlycitywithinwhichalonepeaceispossible. 60 Aurelius,Marcus AustinJ(ohn)L(angshaw) Anumberofother,discretedoctrineshave beenattachedtoAugustine,usuallywithoutthe dialecticalnuanceshewouldhaveconsidered indispensable.Onesuchdoctrineconcems divine"illumination"ofthehumanintellect,i.e., someactiveinterventionbyGodinordinary processesofhumanunderstanding.Another doctrinetypicallyattributedtoAugustineisthe inabilityofthehumanwilitodomorallygood actionswithoutgrace.Amoreauthentically Augustinianteachingisthatintrospectionor inwardnessisthewayofdiscoveringthecreated hierarchiesbywhichtoascendtoGod.Another authenticteachingwouldbethattime,whichis adistensionofthedivine"now,"servesasthe mediumornarrativestructureforthecreation's returntoGod.Butnolistofdoctrinesorposi- tions,howeverauthenticorinauthentic,can serveasafaithfulrepresentationofAugustine's thought,whichgivesitselfonlythroughthe carefullywroughtrhetoricalformsofhistexts. Seealsoneoplatonism,patristicau- THORS,PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION.M.D.J. Aurelius,Marcus.Seemarcusaurelius,stoicism. Austin,John(1790-1859),Englishlegalphiloso- pherknownespeciallyforhiscommandtheory oflaw.Hiscareerasalawyerwasunsuccessful buthisreputationasascholarwassuchthaton thefoundingofUniversityCollege,London,he wasofferedthechairofjurisprudence.In1832 hepublishedthefirsttenofhislectures,com- pressedintosixasTheProvinceofJurisprudence Determined.Althoughhepublishedafewpapers, andhissomewhatfragmentaryLectureson Jurisprudence(1863)waspublishedposthu- mously,itisontheProvincethathisreputation rests.HeandBentham(hisfriend,London neighbor,andfellowutilitarian)werethefore- mostEnglishlegalphilosophersoftheirtime, andtheirinfluenceonthecourseoflegalphilos- ophyendures. Austinheldthatthefirsttaskoflegalphiloso- phy,onetowhichhebendsmostofhisenergy,is tomakeclearwhatlawsare,andifpossibleto explainwhytheyarewhattheyare:theirratio- nale.Untilthosemattersareclear,legislativepro- posalsandlegalargumentscanneverbeclear, sinceirrelevantconsiderationswillinevitably creepin.Theproperplaceformoralortheologi- calconsiderationsisindiscussionofwhatthe positivelawoughttobe,notofwhatitis.Theo- logicalconsiderationsreducetomoralones,since Godcanbeassumedtobeagoodutilitarian.Itis positivelaws,"thatistosaythelawswhichare simplyandstrictlysocalled,...whichformthe appropriatematterofgeneralandparticular jurisprudence."Theymustalsobedistinguished from"lawsmetaphoricalorfigurative." Alawinitsmostgeneralsenseis"arulelaiddown fortheguidanceofanintelligentbeingbyan intelligentbeinghavingpoweröverhim."Itisa command,howeverphrased.Itisthecommands ofmentomen,ofpoliticalsuperiors,thatform thebodyofpositivelaw.Generalorcomparative jurisprudence,thesourceoftherationale,ifany, ofparticularlaws,ispossiblebecausethereare commandsnearlyuniversalthatmaybeattrib- utedtoGodorNature,buttheybecomepositive lawonlywhenlaiddownbyaruler.Thegeneral modelofanAustiniananalyticjurisprudence builtuponaframeworkofdefinitionshasbeen widelyfollowed,butcogentobjections,espe- ciallybyHart,haveunderminedthecommand theoryoflaw. Seealsojurisprudence,philosophyof LAW.E.L.P. Austin,J(ohn)L(angshaw)(1911-60),English philosopher,aleadingexponentofpostwar"lin- guistic"philosophy.Educatedprimarilyasaclas- sicistatShrewsburyandBalliolCollege,Oxford, hetaughtphilosophyatMagdalenCollege.Dur- ingWorldWarIIheservedatahighlevelinmil- itaryintelligence,whichearnedhimtheO.B.E., CroixdeGuerre,andLegionofMerit.In1952he becameWhite'sProfessorofMoralPhilosophyat Oxford,andin1955and1958heheldvisiting appointmentsatHarvardandBerkeley,respec- tively.Inhisrelativelybriefcareer,Austinpub- lishedonlyafewinvitedpapers;hisinfluence wasexertedmainlythroughdiscussionwithhis colleagues,whomhedominatedmorebycritical intelligencethanbyanypreconceivedviewof whatphilosophyshouldbe. Unlikesomeothers,Austindidnotbelieve thatphilosophicalproblemsallariseoutofaber- rationsfrom"ordinarylanguage,"nordidhe necessarilylindsolutionsthere;hedwelt,rather, ontheauthorityofthevemacularasasourceof niceandpregnantdistinctions,andheldthatit deservesmuchcloserattentionthanitcom- monlyreceivesfromphilosophers.Itisuseless, hethought,topontificateatlargeaboutknowl- edge,reality,orexistence,forexample,without firstexaminingindetailhow,andwhen,the words'know','real',and'exist'areemployedin dailylife.InSenseandSensibilia(1962;compiled fromlecturenotes),thesense-datumtheory comesunderwitheringlireforitsfailingsinthis respect.Austinalsoprovokedcontroversywith 61 Australianmaterialism Avenarius,Richard hiswell-knowndistinctionbetween"performa- tive"and"constative"utterances('Ipromise' makesapromise,whereas'hepromised'merely reportsone);helåterrecastthisasathreefold differentiationoflocutionary,illocutionary,and perlocutionary"forces"inutterance,corre- sponding(roughly)tothemeaning,intention, andconsequencesofsayingathing,inonecon- textoranother.Thoughneververystable orfullyworkedout,theseideashavesince foundaplaceinthestill-evolvingstudyof speechacts. Seealsoordinarylanguagephiloso- PHY,SPEECHACTTHEORY.P.He. Australianmaterialism.Seesmart. autarkia,ancientGreektermmeaning'self-suffi- ciency'.Autarkiawaswidelyregardedasamark ofthehumangood,happiness(eudaimonia).A lifeisself-sufficientwhenitisworthyofchoice andlacksnothing.Whatmakesalifeself-suffi- cient-andtherebyhappy-wasamatterofcon- troversy.Stoicsmaintainedthatthemere possessionofvirtuewouldsuffice;Aristotleand thePeripateticsinsistedthatvirtuemustbeexer- cisedandeven,perhaps,accompaniedbymate- rialgoods.Therewasalsoadebateamonglåter Greekthinkersöverwhetheraself-sufficientlife issolitaryorwhetheronlylifeinacommunity canbeself-sufficient.Seealsoaristotle,sto- icism.E.C.H. authenticity.Seeexistentialism,heidegger. autological.Seesemanticparadoxes. automatatheory.Seecomputertheory,self- REPRODUCINGAUTOMATON. automatism,conscious.Seephilosophyofmind. automaton.Seecomputertheory,self-repro- DUCINGAUTOMATON. automaton,cellulär.Seeself-reproducingautom- aton. automaton,finite.Seecomputertheory,turing machine. automaton,self-reproducing.Seeself-reproduc- ingautomaton. autonomy.Seefreewillproblem,kant,positive ANDNEGATIVEFREEDOM. autonomyofbiology.Seeunityofscience. autonomyofethics.SeeETHics. autonomyofpsychology.Seephilosophyofpsy- CHOLOGY. avatar(fromSanskritavatära),inHinduthought, anyoftherepeated"descents"oftheSupreme Beingintothephysicalworldasananimal, humanbeing,orcombinationthereof,todestroy evilandrestoreorder.Predominatelyidentified astheactionsofthegodVishnu,theseentrances intotheworldindicatethatVishnuaslordwill adjustthecycleofkarma.Itsearliestreferenceis intheBhagavadGita(150b.c),whereKrishna saysthatwheneverdharmalanguishesheincar- natesinageafteragetodestroyevildoersand promotethegood.LåterlistsofavatarsofVishnu citeten,twenty,ormore,withKrishnaandthe Buddhaasfamousexamples.Theinclusionof prominentlocaldeitiesinthelistbroughtthem underthemfluenceofVishnudevotees,and todayevenJesusandMuhammadmaybe included.ModernphilosopherssuchasRad- hakrishnan(1888-1975)redefinetheconcept non-theistically,identifyinganavatarasa humanbeingwhohasattainedenlightenment. R.N.Mi. Avempace.SeeibnBäjja. Avenarius,Richard(1843-96),Germanphiloso- pher.HewasborninParisandeducatedatthe UniversityofLeipzig.Hebecameaprofessorat LeipzigandsucceededWindelbandattheUni- versityofZtirichin1877.Foratimehewasedi- toroftheZeitschriftfurwissenschaftlichePhilo- sophie.HisearliestworkwasUberdiebeidenersten PhasendesSpinozischenPantheismus(1868).His majorwork,KritikderreinenErfahrung(Critique ofPureExperience,1vols.,1888-90),wasfol- lowedbyhislaststudy,DermenschlicheWeltbe- griffe(1891). Inhispost-KantianKritikAvenariuspresented aradicalpositivismthatsoughttobasephiloso- phyonscientificprinciples.This"empirio-criti- cism"emphasized''pureexperience"and descriptiveandgeneraldefinitionsofexperience. Metaphysicalclaimstotranscendexperience wererejectedasmerecreationsofthemind.Like Hume,Avenariusdeniedtheontologicalvalidity ofsubstanceandcausality.Seekingascientific empiricism,heendeavoredtodelineatea descriptivedeterminationoftheformandcon- tentofpureexperience.Hethoughtthatthesub- 62 Averroes Avicenna ject-objectdichotomy,theseparationofinner andouterexperiences,falsifiedreality.Ifwe couldavoid"introjecting"feeling,thought,and willintoexperience(andtherebysplittingitinto subjectandobject),wecouldattaintheoriginal "natural"viewoftheworld. AlthoughAvenarius,inhisCritiqueofPure Experience,thoughtthatchangesinbrainstates parallelstatesofconsciousness,hedidnotreduce sensationsorstatesofconsciousnesstophysio- logicalchangesinthebrain.Becausehistheory ofpureexperienceundermineddogmaticmate- rialism,LeninattackedhisphilosophyinMateri- alismandEmpirio-Criticism(1952).Hisepiste- mologyinfluencedMachandhisemphasisupon pureexperiencehadconsiderableinfluenceon James. Seealsosubject-objectdichotomy. G.J.S. Averroes,inArabic,IbnRushd(1126-98), Islamicphilosopher,jurist,andphysician.Scion ofalonglineofqädis(religiousjudges),hewas bornatCordovaandeducatedinIslamiclaw. IntroducedtotheAlmohadrulerbyIbnTufayl, authorofthephilosophicalallegoryHayyIbn Yaqzän,hefeignedignoranceofphilosophy,only tolearnthattheleaderofthedynastysofeared foritsorthodoxywasthoroughlyathomewith philosophicalissues.Hewasgivenarobeof honorandamountandlåterinvitedtowritehis famouscommentariesonAristotleandmade qädiofSeville,finallysucceedingIbnTufaylas royalphysicianandbecomingchiefqädiofCor- dova.Hewaspersecutedwhenthesultan'ssuc- cessorneededorthodoxsupportinhiswarwith ChristianSpain,butdiedinthecalmofMar- rakesh,theedictsagainsthimrescinded. Hisworks,mostoftenpreservedinHebrewor Latintranslations('Averroes'reflectseffortsto Latinize'IbnRushd'),includemedicalandastro- nomicalwritings;short,middle,andlongcom- mentariesonAristotle("hiswastheultimate humanmind");acommentaryonPlato's Republic;andspiritedjuridicalandconceptual defensesofphilosophy:TheDecisiveTreatiseand IncoherenceoftheIncoherence.Theformerargues thatphilosophy,althoughrestrictedtotheadept, ismandatedbytheKoranic(59:2)injunctionto reflectonGod'sdesign.Thelatteranswersal- GhazälTsIncoherenceofthePhilosophers,defending naturalismanditspresumedcorollary,the world'seternity,butoftencuttingadriftthemore PlatonizingandoriginaldoctrinesofAvicenna, al-GhazälI'schiefstalkinghorse.ThusAverroes rejectsAvicenna'sideathattheworlditselfiscon- tingentifitisnecessitatedbyitscauses,arguing thatremovingthenecessitythatisthehallmark ofGod'swisdomwouldleaveusnowayofinfer- ringawiseAuthorofnature.UltimatelyAverroes rejectsemanationandseekstoreturnnatural theologytothephysicsofmatterandmotion, discreditingAvicenna'smetaphysicalapproach andlocatingGod'sactintheorderingofeternal matter.Onbodilyresurrection,individualprovi- dence,andmiracles,hetakesrefugeinauthority, fudge,andbluff;andevenhisdefenseofcausal necessitysmacksofadogmatismexpressiveof theawkwardnessofhispositionandthestiffen- ingofPeripateticthought.Yetheretainstheidea thattheintellectisimmortal,indeedimpersonal: sinceonlymatterdifferentiatesindividuals,all mindsareultimatelyone;theyreachfulfillment andbeatitudebymakingcontact(ittisäl;ef. Plotinus'saphe)withtheActiveIntellect. ManyJewishphilosopherslikeNarboniand AlbalagfollowedAverroes'argumentsexplicitly, reinterpretingMaimonidesaccordingly.But Averroes'effortstoaccommodaterhetoricaland dialecticalalongwithphilosophicaldiscourseled tothebrandingofhisChristianfollowersas exponentsofa"doubletruth,"althoughnotext advancessuchadoctrine.SigerofBrabant, BoethiusofDacia,andBernierofNivelleswere condemnedforAverroisticheresiesatParisin the1270s.Butfromthethirteenthtomid-sev- enteenthcenturiesLatinscholarsregularlyread AristotlewithAverroes'commentaries.His philosophicrespondentsincludeIbnTaymiyya (d.1327),Gersonides,AlbertusMagnus,and Aquinas.Spinoza'sdoggedeternalismlinkshim vividlytoAverroes. Seealsoarabicphilosophy.L.E.G. aversiontherapy.Seebehaviortherapy. Avicebron.Seeibngabirol. Avicenna,inArabic,IbnSina(980-1037), Islamicphilosopherandphysician.Bornnear Bukhara,wherehisfatherservedasaprovincial governor,Avicennacametomanhoodasthe PersianSamaniddynastywascrumblingand spentmuchofhislifefleeingfromcourttocourt toavoidtheelutchesoftherapaciousconqueror MarhhmädofGhaznä.Hisautobiography describeshimasanintuitivestudentofphiloso- phyandotherGreekscienceswhocouldnotsee thepointofAristotle'sMetaphysics,untilheread atinyessaybyal-Färäbl(870-950),whoshowed himwhatitmeanstoseekthenatureofbeingas such. 63 avidya awareness ItwasinmetaphysicsthatAvicennamadehis greatestcontributionstophilosophy,brilliantly synthesizingtherivalapproachesofthe Aristotelian-Neoplatonictraditionwiththecre- ationistmonotheismofIslamicdialecticaltheol- ogy(kaläm).WhereAristotlesoughtandfound beinginitsfullestsenseinwhatwaschangeless initsnature(aboveall,inthespeciesofthings, theheavenlybodies,thecosmosasawhole), kalämunderstoodbeingastheimmediately given,allowingnoinferencebeyondasingle contingentdatumtoanynecessaryproperties, correlatives,continuators,orsuccessors.The resultwasastringentatomistoccasionalismrest- ingultimatelyonanearlyversionoflogical atomism.AvicennapreservedanAristotelian naturalismalongsidetheScripturalideaofthe contingencyoftheworldbyarguingthatany finitebeingiscontingentinitselfbutnecessary inrelationtoitscauses.Headaptedal-Färäbi's Neoplatonicemanationismtothisschematiza- tionandnaturalizedinphilosophyhisowndis- tinctiveversionofthekalämargumentfrom contingency:anybeingmustbeeithernecessary orcontingent,butifcontingent,itrequiresa cause;sincenoinfinitecausalregressispossible, theremustbeaNecessaryBeing,whichisthere- foresimple,theultimatecauseofallother things. Avicennafoundrefugeatthecourtofone'Alä al-Dawla,whobravelyresistedthemilitarypres- suresofMahmudagainsthislandsaroundIsfa- hanandmadethephilosopherandsavanthis vizier.HereAvicennacompletedhisfamous philosophicworktheShifä'(knowninLatinas theSufficientia)andhisQänunfiTibb,theGalenic Canon,whichremainedinuseasamedicaltext- bookuntilfinallybroughtdownbytheweightof criticismsduringtheRenaissance.Avicenna's philosophywasthecentraltargetofthepolemi- calcritiqueoftheMuslimtheologianal-Ghazäll (1058-1111)inhisIncoherenceofthePhilosophers, mainlyonthegroundsthatthephilosopher's retentionoftheAristoteliandoctrineoftheeter- nityoftheworldwasinconsistentwithhisclaim thatGodwastheauthoroftheworld.Avicenna's relatedaffirmationsofthenecessityofcausation anduniversalityofGod'sknowledge,al-Ghazäll argued,mademiraclesimpossibleanddivine governancetooimpersonaltodeservethename. YetAvicenna'sphilosophicworks(numbering överahundredintheirArabicandsometimes Persianoriginals)continuedtoexerciseamajor influenceonMuslimandJewishphilosophers and(throughLatintranslations)onphilosophers intheWest. Seealsoarabicphilosophy.L.E.G. avidya,Sanskritwordmeaning'ignorance','lack ofwisdom'.AvidyaisakeyconceptinIndia's philosophicalsystems,whichattemptedtoex- plainthereasonsforkarmicbondageleadingto sufferingandreleasefromsuchbondagethrough spiritualliberation.Thegeneralideawasthat karmicfettersarisebecauseofavidya,whichis ignoranceofthetruenatureofreality.When wisdomdispellsavidya,theindividualisfreed frombondage.Therewasintensespeculationin Indianphilosophyregardingthenatureandthe metaphysicalstatusofavidya.Ifavidyacauses bondagethattrapstheindividualinthetransmi- gratorycycleoflifeanddeath(samsära),then wheredoesavidyaresideandhowdoesitcome intobeing?D.K.C. awareness,consciousness,acentralfeatureof ourlivesthatisnotoriouslydifficulttocharacter- ize.Youexperiencegoings-onintheworld,and, turninginward("introspecting"),youexperi- enceyourexperiencing.Objectsofawareness canbeexternalorinternal.Pressingyourfinger ontheedgeofatable,youcanbeawareofthe table'sedge,andawareofthefeelingofpressure (thoughperhapsnotsimultaneously). PhilosophersfromLocketoNagelhavein- sistedthatourexperienceshavedistinctivequal- ities:thereis"somethingitislike"tohavethem. Itwouldseemimportant,then,todistinguish qualitiesofobjectsofwhichyouareawarefrom qualitiesofyourawareness.Supposeyouare awareofaround,redtomato.Thetomato,but notyourawareness,isroundandred.Whatthen arethequalitiesofyourawareness?Herewe encounteradeeppuzzlethatdividestheorists intointransigentcamps. Somematerialists,likeDennett,insistthat awarenesslacksqualities(orlacksqualitiesdis- tinctfromitsobjects:thequalitiesweattributeto experiencesarereallythoseofexperienced objects).Thisopensthewaytoadismissalof "phenomenal"qualities(qualia),qualitiesthat seemtohavenoplaceinthematerialworld. Others(T.Nagel,NedBlock)regardsuchquali- tiesaspatentlygenuine,preferringtodismissany theoryunabletoaccommodatethem.Convinced thatthequalitiesofawarenessareineliminable andirreducibletorespectablematerialproper- ties,somephilosophers,followingFrankJack- son,contendtheyare"epiphenomenal":realbut causallyinefficacious.Stillothers,including Searle,pointtowhattheyregardasafundamen- taldistinctionbetweenthe"intrinsicallysubjec- 64 axiology axiomofcomprehension tive"characterofawarenessandthe"objective," "public"characterofmaterialobjects,butdeny thatthisyieldsepiphenomenalism. Seealsophenomenology,philosophyof MIND,QUALIA.J.F.H. axiology.Seevaluetheory. axiom.Seeaxiomaticmethod. axiomaticmethod,originally,amethodforreor- ganizingtheacceptedpropositionsandconcepts ofanexistentscienceinordertoincreasecer- taintyinthepropositionsandclarityinthecon- cepts.Applicationofthismethodwasthoughtto requiretheidentificationof(1)the"universeof discourse"(domain,genus)ofentitiesconstitut- ingtheprimarysubjectmatterofthescience,(2) the"primitiveconcepts"thatcanbegrasped immediatelywithouttheuseofdefinition,(3) the"primitivepropositions"(or"axioms"), whosetruthisknowableimmediately,without theuseofdeduction,(4)animmediatelyaccept- able"primitivedefinition"intermsofprimitive conceptsforeachnon-primitiveconcept,and(5) adeduction(constructedbychainingimmediate, logicallycogentinferencesultimatelyfromprim- itivepropositionsanddefinitions)foreachnon- primitiveacceptedproposition.Prominent proponentsofmoreorlessmodernizedversions oftheaxiomaticmethod,e.g.Pascal,Nicod (1893-1924),andTarski,emphasizingthecriti- calandregulatoryfunctionoftheaxiomatic method,explicitlyopenthepossibilitythat axiomatizationofanexistent,preaxiomaticsci- encemayleadtorejectionormodificationof propositions,concepts,andargumentationsthat hadpreviouslybeenaccepted. Inmanycasesattemptstorealizetheidealof anaxiomaticsciencehaveresultedindiscovery of"smuggledpremises"andotherpreviously unnotedpresuppositions,leadingintumto recognitionoftheneedfornewaxioms.Modern axiomatizationsofgeometryaremuchricherin detailthanthoseproducedinancientGreece. Theearliestextantaxiomatictextisbasedonan axiomatizationofgeometryduetoEuclid(fl.300 b.c),whichitselfwasbasedonearlier,no- longer-extanttexts.Archimedes(287-212b.c.) wasoneoftheearliestofasuccessionofpost- Euclideangeometers,includingHilbert,Oswald Veblen(1880-1960),andTarski,topropose modificationsofaxiomatizationsofclassical geometry.Thetraditionalaxiomaticmethod, oftencalledthegeometricmethod,madeseveral presuppositionsnolongerwidelyaccepted.The adventofnon-Euclideangeometrywasparticu- larlyimportantinthisconnection. Forsomeworkers,thegoalofreorganizingan existentsciencewasjoinedtoorreplacedbya newgoal:characterizingorgivingimplicitdefi- nitiontothestructureofthesubjectmatterofthe science.Moreover,subsequentinnovationsin logicandfoundationsofmathematics,especially developmentofsyntacticallypreciseformalized languagesandeffectivesystemsofformåldeduc- tions,havesubstantiallyincreasedthedegreeof rigorattainable.Inparticular,criticalaxiomatic expositionofabodyofscientificknowledgeis nownotthoughttobefullyadequate,however successfulitmaybeinrealizingthegoalsofthe originalaxiomaticmethod,solongasitdoesnot presenttheunderlyinglogic(includinglanguage, semantics,anddeductionsystem).Fortheseand otherreasonstheexpression'axiomaticmethod' hasundergonemany"redefinitions,"someof whichhaveonlythemosttenuousconnection withtheoriginalmeaning. Seealsocategoricity,deduction,for- MALIZATION.J.Cor. axiomaticsystem.Seeaxiomaticmethod,deduc- tion. axiomofabstraction.Seeaxiomofcomprehen- sion. axiomofchoice.SeeLöwenheim-skolemtheo- REM,SETTHEORY. axiomofcomprehension,alsocalledaxiomof abstraction,theaxiomthatforeveryproperty, thereisacorrespondingsetofthingshavingthat property;i.e.,()(3^4)(x)(xEi=tyx),where tyisapropertyandAisaset.Theaxiomwasused inFrege'sformulationofsettheoryandisthe axiomthatyieldsRussell'sparadox,discovered in1901.Iftyxisinstantiatedasx(£x,thenthe resultthatAE.A—A(£Aiseasilyobtained, whichyields,inclassicallogic,theexplicitcon- tradictionAGA&A£A.Theparadoxcanbe avoidedbymodifyingthecomprehensionaxiom andusinginsteadtheseparationaxiom,(ty)(3A) (x)(xGA=(tyx&xGB)).Thisyieldsonlythe resultthatAGA=(AgA&AGB),whichis notacontradiction.Theparadoxcanalsobe avoidedbyretainingthecomprehensionaxiom butrestrictingthesymboliclanguage,sothat'x Gx'isnotameaningfulformula.Russell'stype theory,presentedinPrincipiaMathematica,uses thisapproach.Seealsofrege,russell,set THEORY,TYPETHEORY.V.K. 65 axiomofconsistency Ayer,A(lfred)J(ules) axiomofconsistency,anaxiomstatingthata givensetofsentencesisconsistent.LetLbeafor- mallanguage,DadeductivesystemforL,Sany setofsentencesofL,andCthestatement'Sis consistent'(i.e.,'Nocontradictionisderivable fromSviaD').ForcertainsetsS(e.g.,thetheo- remsofD)itisinterestingtoask:CanCbe expressedinL?Ifso,canCbeprovedinD?IfC canbeexpressedinLbutnotprovedinD,canC beadded(consistently)toDasanewaxiom? Example(fromGödel):LetLandDbeadequate forelementarynumbertheory,andSbethe axiomsofD;thenCcanbeexpressedinLbutnot provedinD,butcanbeaddedasanewaxiomto formastrongersystemD'.Sometimeswecan expressinLanaxiomofconsistencyinthe semanticsense(i.e.,"Thereisauniverseinwhich allthesentencesinSaretrue').Trivialexample: supposetheonlynon-logicalaxiominDis'For anytwosetsBandB',thereexiststheunionof BandB''.ThenCmightbe'ThereisasetUsuch that,foranysetsBandB'inU,thereexistsinU theunionofBandB''.Seealsoconsistency, PROOFTHEORY.D.H. axiomofextensionality.Seesettheory. axiomofinfinity.Seesettheory. axiomofreducibility.Seetypetheory. axiomofreplacement.Seesettheory. axiomofseparation.Seeaxiomofcomprehen- SION,SETTHEORY. axiomschema.Seetransformationrule. Ayer,A(lfred)J(ules)(1910-89),Britishphiloso- pher,oneofthemostimportantoftheBritish logicalpositivists.Hecontinuedtooccupya dominantplaceinanalyticphilosophyashe graduallymodifiedhisadherencetocentral tenetsoftheview.HewaseducatedatEtonand Oxford,and,afterabriefperiodattheUniversity ofVienna,becamealecturerinphilosophyat ChristChurchin1933.Afterthewarhereturned toOxfordasfellowanddeanofWadhamCol- lege.HewasGroteProfessorofthePhilosophyof MindandLogicattheUniversityofLondon (1946-59),WykehamProfessorofLogicinthe UniversityofOxfordandafellowofNewCollege (1959-78),andafellowofWolfsonCollege, Oxford(1978-83).Ayerwasknightedin1973 andwasaChevalierdelaLegiond'Honneur. Hisearlyworkclearlyandforcefullydevel- opedtheimplicationsofthepositivists'doctrines thatallcognitivestatementsareeitheranalytic andapriori,orsynthetic,contingent,andapos- teriori,andthatempiricallymeaningfulstate- mentsmustbeverifiable(mustadmitof confirmationordisconfirmation).Indoingsohe defendedreductionistanalysesoftheself,the externalworld,andotherminds.Valuestate- mentsthatfailtheempiricisfscriterionofmean- ingbutdefynaturalisticanalysisweredenied truth-valueandassignedemotivemeaning. Throughouthiswritingshemaintainedafoun- dationalistperspectiveinepistemologyinwhich sense-data(låtermoreneutrallydescribed)occu- piednotonlyaprivilegedepistemicpositionbut constitutedthesubjectmatterofthemostbasic statementstobeusedinreductiveanalyses. Althoughinlåterworkshesignificantlymodified manyofhisearlyviewsandabandonedmuchof theirstrictreductionism,heremainedfaithfulto anempiricisfsversionoffoundationalismand thebasicideabehindtheverifiabilitycriterionof meaning.HisbooksincludeLanguage,Truthand Logic;TheFoundationsofEmpiricalKnowledge;The ProblemsofKnowledge;PhilosophicalEssays;The ConceptofaPerson;TheOriginsofPragmatism;Meta- physicsandCommonSense;RussellandMoore:The AnalyticalHeritage;TheCentralQuestionsofPhiloso- phy;ProbabilityandEvidence;Philosophyinthe TwentiethCentury;Russell;Hume;Freedomand Morality,LudwigWittgenstein;andVoltaire. Seealsoemotivism,logicalpositivism. R.A.F. 66 B Babbage,Charles(1792-1871),Englishapplied mathematician,inventor,andexpertonmachin- eryandmanufacturing.Hischiefinterestwasin developingmechanical"engines"tocompute tablesoffunctions.Untiltheinventionofthe electroniccomputer,printedtablesoffunctions wereimportantaidstocalculation. Babbageinventedthedifferenceengine,a machinethatconsistedofaseriesofaccumula- torseachofwhich,intura,transmitteditscon- tentstoitssuccessor,whichaddedtothemtoits owncontents.Hebuiltonlyamodel,butGeorge andEdvardScheutzbuiltdifferenceenginesthat wereactuallyused.Thoughtablesofsquaresand cubescouldbecalculatedbyadifferenceengine, themorecommonlyusedtablesoflogarithms andoftrigonometricfunctionscouldnot.Tocal- culatetheseandotherusefulfunctions,Babbage conceivedoftheanalyticalengine,amachinefor numericalanalysis. Theanalyticalenginewastohaveastore (memory)andamill(arithmeticunit).Thestore wastoholddecimalnumbersontoothedwheels, andtotransmitthemtothemillandbackby meansofwheelsandtoothedbars.Themillwas tocarryoutthearithmeticoperationsofaddi- tion,subtraction,multiplication,anddivision mechanically,greatlyextendingthetechnology ofsmallcalculators.Theoperationsofthemill weretobegovernedbypeggeddrums,derived fromthemusicbox. Adesiredsequenceofoperationswouldbe punchedoncards,whichwouldbestrung togetherlikethecardsofaJacquardloomand readbythemachine.Thecontrolmechanisms couldbranchandexecuteadifferentsequenceof cardswhenadesignatedquantitychangedsign. Numberswouldbeenteredfrompunchedcards andtheanswerspunchedoncards.Theanswers mightalsobeimprintedonmetalsheetsfrom whichthecalculatedtableswouldbeprinted, thusavoidingtheerrorsofproofreading. AlthoughBabbageformulatedvariouspartial plansfortheanalyticalengineandbuiltafew piecesofit,themachinewasneverrealized. Giventhelimitationsofmechanicalcomputing technology,buildingananalyticalenginewould probablynothavebeenaneconomicalwayto producenumericaltables. Themodernelectroniccomputerwasinvented anddevelopedcompletelyindependentlyof Babbage'spioneeringwork.Yetbecauseofit, Babbage'sworkhasbeenpublicizedandhehas becomefamous. SeealsoCOMPUTERTHEORY.A.W.B. Bachelard,Gaston(1884-1962),Frenchphi- losopherofscienceandliteraryanalyst.Hisphi- losophyofscience(developed,e.g.,inTheNew ScientificSpirit,1934,andRationalMaterialism, 1953)beganfromreflectionsontherelativistic andquantumrevolutionsintwentieth-century physics.Bachelardviewedscienceasdeveloping throughaseriesofdiscontinuouschanges(epis- temologicalbreaks).Suchbreaksovercomeepis- temologicalobstacles:methodologicalandconcep- tualfeaturesofcommonsenseoroutdatedsci- encethatblockthepathofinquiry.Bachelard's emphasisonthediscontinuityofscientific changestrikinglyanticipatedThomasKuhn's focus,manyyearslåter,onrevolutionarypara- digmchange.However,unlikeKuhn,Bachelard heldtoastrongnotionofscientificprogress acrossrevolutionarydiscontinuities.Although eachscientificframeworkrejectsitspredecessors asfundamentallyerroneous,earlierframeworks mayembodypermanentachievementsthatwill bepreservedasspecialcaseswithinsubsequent frameworks.(Newton'slawsofmotion,e.g.,are speciallimit-casesofrelativitytheory.) Bachelardbasedhisphilosophyofscienceon a"non-Cartesianepistemology"thatrejects Descartes'sclaimthatknowledgemustbe foundedonincorrigibleintuitionsoffirsttruths. Allknowledgeclaimsaresubjecttorevisionin thelightoffurtherevidence.Similarly,he rejectedanaiverealismthatdefinesrealityin termsofgivensofordinarysenseexperienceand ignorestheontologicalconstructionsofscientific conceptsandinstrumentation.Hemaintained, however,thatdenyingthissortofrealismdidnot entailacceptingidealism,whichmakesonlythe mentalultimatelyreal.Insteadhearguedforan "appliedrationalism,"whichrecognizesthe activeroleofreasoninconstitutingobjectsof knowledgewhileadmittingthatanyconstituting actofreasonmustbedirectedtowardan antecedentlygivenobject. 67 backwardcausation Bacon,Francis AlthoughBachelarddeniedtheobjectivereal- ityoftheperceptualandimaginativeworlds,he emphasizedtheirsubjectiveandpoeticsignifi- cance.Complementinghiswritingsonscience areaseriesofbooksonimaginationandpoetic imagery(e.g.,ThePsychoanalysisofFire,1938;The PoeticsofSpace,1957)whichsubtlyunpackthe meaningofarchetypal(inJung'ssense)images. Heputforwarda"lawofthefourelements," accordingtowhichallimagescanberelatedto theearth,air,fire,andwaterpositedbyEmpe- doclesasthefundamentalformsofmatter. TogetherwithGeorgesCanguilhem,hissuc- cessorattheSorbonne,Bachelardhadan immenseimpactonseveralgenerationsof Frenchstudentsofphilosophy.HeandCanguil- hemofferedanimportantalternativetothemore fashionableandwidelyknownphenomenology andexistentialismandweremajorinfluenceson (amongothers)AlthusserandFoucault. Seealsoalthusser,Foucault,Frank- furtschool.G.G. backwardcausation.Seecausation. Bacon,Francis(1561-1626),Englishphiloso- pher,essayist,andscientificmethodologist.In politicsBaconrosetothepositionoflordchan- cellor.In1621heretiredtoprivatelifeaftercon- victionfortakingbribesinhisofficialcapacityas judge. Baconchampionedthenewempiricismre- sultingfromtheachievementsofearlymodern science.Heopposedallegedknowledgebasedon appealstoauthority,andonthebarrennessof Scholasticism.Hethoughtthatwhatisneededisa newattitudeandmethodologybasedstrictlyon scientificpractices.Thegoalofacquiringknowl- edgeisthegoodofmankind:knowledgeispower. Thesocialorderthatshouldresultfromapplied scienceisportrayedinhisNewAtlantis(1627).The methodofinductiontobeemployedisworkedout indetailinhisNovumOrganum(1620).Thisnew logicistoreplacethatofAristotle'ssyllogism,as wellasinductionbysimpleenumerationof instances.Neitheroftheseolderlogicscanpro- duceknowledgeofactualnaturallaws.Bacon thoughtthatwemustinterveneinnature,manip- ulatingitbymeansofexperimentalcontrollead- ingtotheinventionofnewtechnology. Therearewell-knownhindrancestoacquisi- tionofknowledgeofcausallaws.Suchhin- drances(falseopinions,prejudices),which "anticipate"natureratherthanexplainit,Bacon callsidols(idola).Idolsofthetribe(idolatribus)are naturalmentaltendencies,amongwhicharethe idlesearchforpurposesinnature,andthe impulsetoreadourowndesiresandneedsinto nature.Idolsofthecave{idolaspecus)arepredispo- sitionsofparticularindividuals.Theindividualis inclinedtoformopinionsbasedonidiosyncrasies ofeducation,socialintercourse,reading,and favoredauthorities.Idolsofthemarketplace(idola fori)Baconregardsasthemostpotentiallydan- gerousofalldispositions,becausetheyarisefrom commonusesoflanguagethatoftenresultin verbaldisputes.Manywords,thoughthoughtto bemeaningful,ståndfornonexistentthings;oth- ers,althoughtheynameactualthings,arepoorly definedorusedinconfusedways.Idolsofthethe- ater(idolatheatri)dependupontheinfluenceof receivedtheories.Theonlyauthoritypossessed bysuchtheoriesisthattheyareingeniousverbal constructions.Theaimofacquiringgenuine knowledgedoesnotdependonsuperiorskillin theuseofwords,butratheronthediscoveryof naturallaws. Oncetheidolsareeliminated,themindisfree toseekknowledgeofnaturallawsbasedon experimentation.Baconheldthatnothingexists innatureexceptbodies(materialobjects)acting inconformitywithfixedlaws.Theselawsare "forms."Forexample,Baconthoughtthatthe formorcauseofheatisthemotionofthetiny particlesmakingupabody.Thisformisthaton whichtheexistenceofheatdepends.What inductionseekstoshowisthatcertainlawsare perfectlygeneral,universalinapplication.In everycaseofheat,thereisameasurablechange inthemotionoftheparticlesconstitutingthe movingbody. Baconthoughtthatscientificinductionpro- ceedsasfollows.First,welookforthosecases where,givencertainchanges,certainothers invariablyfollow.Inhisexample,ifcertain changesintheform(motionofparticles)take place,heatalwaysfollows.Weseektofindallof the"positiveinstances"oftheformthatgiverise totheeffectofthatform.Next,weinvestigatethe "negativeinstances,"caseswhereintheabsence oftheform,thequalitativechangedoesnottake place.Intheoperationofthesemethodsitis importanttotrytoproduceexperimentally"pre- rogativeinstances,"particularlystrikingortypi- calexamplesofthephenomenonunder investigation.Finally,incaseswheretheobject understudyispresenttosomegreaterorlesser degree,wemustbeabletotakeintoaccountwhy thesechangesoccur.Intheexample,quantita- tivechangesindegreesofheatwillbecorrelated toquantitativechangesinthespeedofthe motionoftheparticles.Thismethodimpliesthat 68 Bacon,Roger Bacon,Roger inmanycaseswecaninventinstrumentsto measurechangesindegree.Suchinventionsare ofcoursethehoped-foroutcomeofscientific inquiry,becausetheirpossessionimprovesthe fotofhumanbeings. Bacon'sstrikinglymodern(butnotentirely novel)empiricistmethodologyinfluencednine- teenth-centuryfigures(e.g.,SirJohnHerschel andJ.S.Mill)whogeneralizedhisresultsand usedthemasthebasisfordisplayingnew insightsintoscientificmethodology. Seealsoinduction;mill,j.s.;whewell. R.E.B. Bacon,Roger(c.1214-c.1293),Englishphiloso- pherwhoearnedthehonorifictitleofDoctor Mirabilis.Hewasoneofthefirstmedievalsinthe LatinWesttolectureandcommentonnewly recoveredworkbyAristotleinnaturalphiloso- phy,physics,andmetaphysics.BominSomerset andeducatedatbothOxfordUniversityandthe UniversityofParis,hebecameby1273amaster ofartsatParis,wherehetaughtforaboutten years.In1247heresignedhisteachingpostto devotehisenergiestoinvestigatingandpromot- ingtopicsheconsideredneglectedbutimportant insofarastheywouldleadtoknowledgeofGod. TheEnglish"experimentalist"Grosseteste,the FrenchmanPeterofMaricourt,whodidpio- neeringworkonmagnetism,andtheauthorof thepseudo-AristotelianSecretumsecretoruminflu- encedRoger'snewperspective.By1257,how- ever,partlyfromfatigue,Rogerhadputthis workasideandenteredtheFranciscanorderin England.Tohisdismay,hedidnotreceivewithin theordertherespectandfreedomtowriteand teachhehadexpected. Duringtheearly1260sRoger'sviewsabout reformingtheuniversitycurriculumreached CardinalGuyleGosdeFoulques,who,upon becomingPopeelementIVin1265,demanded toseeRoger'swritings.Inresponse,Rogerpro- ducedtheOpusmaius(1267)-anencyclopedic workthatargues,amongotherthings,that(1) thestudyofHebrewandGreekisindispensable forunderstandingtheBible,(2)thestudyof mathematics(encompassinggeometry,astron- omy,andastrology)is,withexperimentation, thekeytoallthesciencesandinstrumentalin theology,and(3)philosophycanservetheology byhelpingintheconversionofnon-believers. RogerbelievedthatalthoughtheBibleisthe basisforhumanknowledge,wecanusereason intheserviceofknowledge.Itisnotthatratio- nalargumentcan,onhisview,providefull- blownproofofanything,butratherthatwiththe aidofreasononecanformulatehypotheses aboutnaturethatcanbeconfirmedbyexperi- ence.AccordingtoRoger,knowledgearrivedat inthiswaywillleadtoknowledgeofnature's creator.Allphilosophical,scientific,andlinguis- ticendeavorsarevaluableultimatelyfortheser- vicetheycanrendertotheology.Roger summarizesanddevelopshisviewsonthese mattersintheOpusminusandtheOpustertium, producedwithinayearoftheOpusmaius. Rogerwasaltogetherseriousinadvocating curricularchange.Hetookeveryopportunityto railagainstmanyofhiscelebratedcontempo- raries(e.g.,AlexanderofHales,Bonaventure, AlbertusMagnus,andAquinas)fornotbeing properlytrainedinphilosophyandforcon- tributingtothedemiseoftheologybyleeturing onPeterLombard'sSentencesinsteadoftheBible. HealsowrotebothGreekandHebrewgram- mars,didimportantworkinoptics,andargued forcalendarreformonthebasisofhis(admit- tedlyderivative)astronomicalresearch.One shouldnot,however,thinkthatRogerwasa goodmathematicianornaturalscientist.He apparentlyneverproducedasingletheoremor proofinmathematics,hewasnotalwaysagood judgeofastronomicalcompetence(hepreferred al-BitrujItoPtolemy),andheheldalehemyin highregard,believingthatbasemetalscouldbe turnedintosilverandgold.Somehavegoneso farastoclaimthatRoger'srenowninthehistory ofscienceisvastlyoverrated,basedinpartonhis beingconfusedlylinkedwiththefourteenth- centuryOxfordCalculators,whododeserve creditforpavingthewayforcertaindevelop- mentsinseventeenth-centuryscience. Roger'sdevotiontocurricularreformeventu- allyledtohisimprisonmentbyJeromeofAscoli (thefuturePopeNicholasIV),probablybe- tween1277and1279.Roger'steachingswere saidtohavecontained"suspectnovelties."Judg- ingfromthedateofhisimprisonment,these noveltiesmayhavebeenanynumberofpropo- sitionscondemnedbythebishopofParis,Éti- enneTempier,in1277.Buthisimprisonment mayalsohavehadsomethingtodowiththe angerheundoubtedlyprovokedbyconstantly abusingthemembersofhisorderregardingtheir approachtoeducation,orwithhiscontroversial Joachimiteviewsabouttheapocalypseandthe imminentcomingoftheAntichrist. GivenRoger'sinterestineducationalreform andhisknackforsystematization,itisnot unlikelythathewasabreastofandhadsome- thingtosayaboutmostofthecentralphilosoph- icalissuesoftheday.Ifso,hiswritingscouldbe 69 BadenSchool Bakhtin,MikhailMikhailovich animportantsourceofinformationaboutthir- teenth-centuryScholasticphilosophygenerally. Inthisconnection,recentinvestigationshave revealed,e.g.,thathemaywellhaveplayedan importantroleinthedevelopmentoflogicand philosophyoflanguageduringthethirteenth andearlyfourteenthcenturies.Inthecourseof challengingtheviewsofcertainpeople(someof whomhavebeententativelyidentifiedas RichardofCornwall,LambertofAuxerre,Siger ofBrabant,HenryofGhent,BoethiusofDacia, WilliamSherwood,andtheMagisterAbstrac- tionum)onthenatureofsignsandhowwords functionassigns,Rogerdevelopsanddefends viewsthatappeartobeoriginal.Thepertinent textsincludetheSumuledialectices(c.1250),the Designis(partofPartIIIoftheOpusmaius),and theCompendiumstudiitheologiae(1292).E.g.,in connectionwiththequestionwhetherJesus couldbecalledamanduringthethree-day entombment(and,thus,inconnectionwiththe relatedquestionwhethermancanbesaidtobe animalwhennomanexists,andwiththe sophism'Thisisadeadman,thereforethisisa man'),Rogerwasnotcontenttodistinguish wordsfromallothersignsashadbeenthetradi- tion.Hedistinguishedbetweensignsoriginating fromnatureandfromthesoul,andbetweennat- uralsignificationandconventional(adplacitum) significationwhichresultsexpresslyortacitly fromtheimpositionofmeaningbyoneormore individuals.Hemaintainedthatwordssignify existingandnon-existingentitiesonlyequivo- cally,becausewordsconventionallysignifyonly presentlyexistingthings.Onthisview,therefore, 'man'isnotusedunivocallywhenappliedtoan existingmanandtoadeadman. Seealsoaristotle,grosseteste,peter LOMBARD.G.S. BadenSchool.Seeneo-kantianism. badfaith,(1)dishonestandblameworthy instancesofself-deception;(2)inauthenticand self-deceptiverefusaltoadmittoourselvesand othersourfullfreedom,therebyavoidinganxi- etyinmakingdecisionsandevadingresponsibil- ityforactionsandattitudes(Sartre,Beingand Nothingness,1943);(3)hypocrisyordishonesty inspeechandconduct,asinmakingapromise withoutintendingtokeepit.Oneself-deceiving strategyidentifiedbySartreistoembraceother people'sviewsinordertoavoidhavingtoform one'sown;anotheristodisregardoptionssothat one'slifeappearspredeterminedtomoveina fixeddirection.OccasionallySartreusedanar- rower,fourthsense:self-deceptivebeliefsheld onthebasisofinsincereandunreasonableinter- pretationsofevidence,ascontrastedwiththe dishonestyof"sincerely"acknowledgingone truth("Iamdisposedtobeathief")inorderto denyadeepertruth("Iamfreetochange").See alsoFALSECONSCIOUSNESS,SARTRE,VITAL LIE.M.W.M. Bain,Alexander(1818-1903),Britishphiloso- pherandreformer,biographerofJamesMill (1882)andJ.S.Mill(1882)andfounderofthe firstpsychologicaljournal,Mind(1876).Inthe developmentofpsychology,Bainrepresentsin England(alongsideContinentalthinkerssuchas TaineandLotze)thefinalsteptowardthefound- ingofpsychologyasascience.Hissignificance stemsfromhiswishto"unitepsychologyand physiology,"fulfilledinTheSensesandtheIntellect (1855)andTheEmotionsandtheWill(1859), abridgedinonevolume,MentalandMoralScience (1868).NeitherBain'spsychologynorhisphys- iologywereparticularlyoriginal.Hispsychology camefromEnglishempiricismandassociation- ism,hisphysiologyfromJohannesMuller's (1801-58)ElementsofPhysiology(1842).Muller wasanearlyadvocateofthereflex,orsensori- motor,conceptionofthenervoussystem,hold- ingthatneuronsconductsensoryinformationto thebrainormotorcommandsfromthebrain, thebrainconnectingsensationwithappropriate motorresponse.LikeHartleybeforehim,Bain groundedthelawsofmentalassociationinthe lawsofneuralconnection.Inoppositiontofac- ultypsychology,Bainrejectedtheexistenceof mentalpowerslocatedindifferentpartsofthe brain(OntheStudyofCharacter,1861).Bycom- biningassociationismwithmodernphysiology, hevirtuallycompletedthemovementofphilo- sophicalpsychologytowardscience.Inphiloso- phy,hismostimportantconceptwashisanalysis ofbeliefas"apreparationtoact."Bythus entwiningconceptionandaction,helaidthe foundationforpragmatism,andforthefocuson adaptivebehaviorcentraltomodernpsychology. Seealsoassociationism.T.H.L. Bakhtin,MikhailMikhailovich(1895-1975), Russianphilosopherandculturaltheoristwhose influenceispervasiveinawiderangeofacade- micdisciplines-fromliteraryhermeneuticsto theepistemologyofthehumansciences,cultural theory,andfeminism.Hemaylegitimatelybe calledaphilosophicalanthropologistintheven- erableContinentaltradition.Becauseofhissem- inalworkonRabelaisandDostoevsky'spoetics, 70 Bakunin,Mikhail Banez,Domingo hisinfluencehasbeengreatestinliterary hermeneutics. Withoutquestiondialogism,ortheconstrual ofdialogue,isthehallmarkofBakhtin'sthought. Dialoguemarkstheexistentialconditionof humanityinwhichtheselfandtheotherare asymmetricalbutdouble-binding.Inhiswords, toexistmeanstocommunicatedialogically,and whenthedialogueends,everythingelseends. UnlikeHegelianandMarxiandialecticsbutlike theChinesecorrelativelogicofyinandyang, Bakhtin'sdialogismisinfinitelypolyphonic, open-ended,andindeterminate,i.e.,"unfinaliz- able"-tousehisterm.Dialoguemeansthat thereareneitherfirstnorlastwords.Thepast andthefutureareinterlockedandrevolve aroundtheaxisofthepresent. Bakhtin'sdialogismisparadigmaticinathree- foldsense.First,dialogueisneverabstractbut embodied.Thelivedbodyisthematerialcondi- tionofsocialexistenceasongoingdialogue.Not onlydoesthewordbecomeenfleshed,butdia- logueisalsotheincorporationoftheselfandthe other.Appropriately,therefore,Bakhtin'sbody politicsmaybecalledaSlavicversionofTantrism. Second,theRabelaisiancarnivalesquethat Bakhtin'sdialogismincorporatespointstothe "jesterly"politicsofresistanceandprotestagainst the"priestly"establishmentofofficialdom.Third, themostdistinguishingcharacteristicofBakh- tin'sdialogismistheprimacyoftheotheröver theself,withatwofoldconsequence:onecon- cernsethicsandtheotherepistemology.Inmod- ernphilosophy,thediscoveryof"Thou"orthe primacyoftheotherövertheselfinasymmet- ricalreciprocityiscreditedtoFeuerbach.Itis hailedasthe"Copernicanrevolution"ofmind, ethics,andsocialthought.Ethically,Bakhtin's dialogism,basedonheteronomy,signalsthe birthofanewphilosophyofresponsibilitythat challengesandtransgressestheAnglo-American traditionof"rightstalk."Epistemologically,it lendsourwelcomingearstothecredencethat theothermayberight-theattitudethatGada- mercallsthesoulofdialogicalhermeneutics. Seealsobuber,feuerbach,gadamer, HERMENEUTICS, POLOGY. PHILOSOPHICALANTHRO- H.Y.J. Bakunin,Mikhail(1814-76),Russianrevolu- tionaryanarchist.HelivedinWesternEuropéin 1840-49andagainin1861-76afteraninter- veningperiodinWesternandRussianprisons andSiberianexile.Bakuninisbestknownforhis vigorousifincoherentanarchist-socialistviews. Ontheonehand,heclaimedthatthemasses' "instinctforfreedom"wouldsparkthesocialrev- olution;ontheother,heclaimedthattherevo- lutionwouldbetheworkofaconspiratorialelite ofdisciplinedprofessionals.Still,Bakuninmade twosignificantiflimitedphilosophiccontribu- tions. (1)Intheearly1840shespökeofthe"inces- santself-immolationofthepositiveinthepure flameofthenegative,"andcametoseethat "flame"asanecessarydialecticalcomponentof revolutionaryaction.Hissharpestcriticismwas directednotatconservativeattemptstodefend theexistingorderbutratherat(Hegelian) attemptstoreconcilepositiveandnegativeand "liberal"effortstofinda''modestandharmless place"forthenegativewithinthepositive.For Bakuninthenegativeisabsolutelyjustifiedinits "constructive"eliminationofthepositive.Writ- inginGerman(in1842)heexploitedbothsenses ofthewordLust,namely"joy"and"urge," declaringthattheLusttodestroyisatthesame timeacreativeLust. (2)From1861untiltheendofhislifeBakunin wascommittedtoscientism,materialism,and atheism.Butinthelate1860sheformulateda forcefulcritiqueofthepoliticalandsocialroleof scientificelitesandinstitutions.Individuallifeis concreteandparticular;scienceisabstractand generalandincapableofunderstandingorvarn- inglivingindividuals.Instead,ittendstoignore ortoexploitthem.Bakunin,whohadpreached ananarchistrevoltagainstchurchandstate,now preacheda"revoltoflifeagainstscience,or ratheragainstgovernmentbyscience."Thiswas relatedtohisanarchistcritiqueofMarx'sstatism andtechnicism;butitraisedthemoregeneral question-oneofcontinuingrelevanceand urgency-oftheroleofscientificexpertsindeci- sionsaboutpublicpolicy. Seealsopoliticalphilosophy,russian NIHILISM.G.L.K. Balguy,John.Seehutcheson. Banez,Domingo(1528-1604),SpanishDomini- cantheologianandphilosopher.BorninVal- ladolid,hestudiedatSalamanca,wherehealso taughtformanyyears.AsspiritualdirectorofSt. TeresaofÅvila,heexertedconsiderableinflu- enceonherviews.Heisknownforhisdisputes withMolinaconcemingdivinegrace.Against Molinaheheldphysicalpredetermination,the viewthatGodphysicallydeterminesthesec- ondarycausesofhumanaction.Thisrenders graceintrinsicallyefficaciousandindependentof humanwillandmerits.Heisalsoknownforhis 71 Barbara basicnorm understandingofthecentralityoftheactofexis- tence(esse)inThomisticmetaphysics.Bafiez's mostimportantworksarehiscommentarieson Aquinas'sSummatheologiaeandAristotle'sOn GenerationandCorruption.Seealsoaquinas, FREEWILLPROBLEM,METAPHYSICS,MOLINA. J.J.E.G. Barbara.Seearistotle,syllogism. barberparadox.Seeparadox. Barcanformula.Seemodallogic. bareparticular.Seemetaphysics. bargainingtheory,thebranchofgametheory thattreatsagreements,e.g.,wageagreements betweenlaborandmanagement.Inthesimplest bargainingproblemstherearetwobargainers. Theycanjointlyrealizevariousoutcomes, includingtheoutcomethatoccursiftheyfailto reachanagreement.Eachbargainerassignsa certainamountofutilitytoeachoutcome.The questionis,whatoutcomewilltheyrealizeif theyarerational?Methodsofsolvingbargaining problemsarecontroversial.Thebest-knownpro- posalsareNash'sandKalaiandSmorodinsky's. Nashproposesmaximizingtheproductofutility gainswithrespecttothedisagreementpoint.Kalai andSmorodinskyproposemaximizingutility gainswithrespecttothedisagreementpoint, subjecttotheconstraintthattheratioofutility gainsequalstheratioofgreatestpossiblegains. Thesemethodsofselectinganoutcomehave beenaxiomaticallycharacterized.Foreach method,therearecertainaxiomsofoutcome selectionsuchthatthatmethodalonesatisfies theaxioms.Theaxiomsincorporateprinciplesof rationalityfromcooperativegametheory.They focusonfeaturesofoutcomesratherthanbar- gainingstrategies.Forexample,oneaxiom requiresthattheoutcomeselectedbePareto-opti- mal,i.e.,beanoutcomesuchthatnoaltemative isbetterforoneofthebargainersandnotworse fortheother. Bargainingproblemsmaybecomemorecom- plicatedinseveralways.First,theremaybemore thantwobargainers.Ifunanimityisnotrequired forbeneficialagreements,splintergroupsor coalitionsmayform.Second,theprotocolfor offers,counteroffers,etc,mayberelevant.Then principlesofnon-cooperativegametheoryconcern- ingstrategiesareneededtojustifysolutions. Third,thecontextofabargainingproblemmay berelevant.Forinstance,opportunitiesforside payments,differencesinbargainingpower,and interpersonalcomparisonsofutilitymayinflu- encethesolution.Fourth,simplifyingassump- tions,suchastheassumptionthatbargainers havecompleteinformationabouttheirbargaining situation,maybediscarded. Bargainingtheoryispartofthephilosophical studyofrationality.Itisalsoimportantinethics asafoundationforcontractariantheoriesof moralityandforcertaintheoriesofdistributive justice. Seealsodecisiontheory,gametheory. P.We. Barthes,Roland(1915-80),Frenchpost-struc- turalistliterarycriticandessayist.BorninCher- bourg,hesufferedfromnumerousailmentsasa childandspentmuchofhisearlylifeasasemi- invalid.Afterleavingthemilitary,hetookup severalpositionsteachingsubjectslikeclassics, grammar,andphilology.Hisinterestinlinguis- ticsfinallydrewhimtoliterature,andbythe mid-1960shehadalreadypublishedwhatwould becomeaclassicinstructuralanalysis,TheEle- mentsofSemiology.Itsprincipalmessageisthat wordsaremerelyonekindofsignwhosemean- ingliesinrelationsofdifferencebetweenthem. Thisconceptwaslåteramendedtoincludethe readingsubject,andthestructuringeffectthat thesubjecthasontheliterarywork-aconcept expressedlåterinhisS/ZandThePleasureofthe Text.Barthes'smostmaturecontributionstothe post-structuralistmovementwerebrilliantand wittyinterpretationsofvisual,tactile,andaural signsystems,culminatinginthepublicationof severalbooksandessaysonphotography,adver- tising,film,andcuisine.Seealsopostmodern, SEMIOSIS,STRUCTURALISM.M.Ro. base,supervenience.Seesupervenience. baseclause.Seemathematicalinduction. basicaction.Seeactiontheory. basicbelief.Seeberkeley,foundationalism, LOGICALPOSITIVISM,PLANTINGA. basicnorm,alsocalledGrundnorm,inalegalsys- tem,thenormthatdeterminesthelegalvalidity ofallothernorms.Thecontentofsuchanulti- matenormmayprovide,e.g.,thatnormscreated byalegislatureorbyacourtarelegallyvalid.The validityofsuchanultimatenormcannotbe establishedasamatterofsocialfact(suchasthe socialfactthatthenormisacceptedbysome 72 basicparticular Baumgarten,AlexanderGottlieb groupwithinasociety).Rather,thevalidityof thebasicnormforanygivenlegalsystemmust bepresupposedbythevalidityofthenormsthat itlegitimatesaslaws.Theideaofabasicnormis associatedwiththelegalphilosopherHans Kelsen.Seealsojurisprudence,philoso- PHYOFLAW.M.S.M. basicparticular.Seestrawson. basicproposition.Seeepistemology. basicsentence.Seefoundationalism. basicstatement.Seefoundationalism. Basilides(a.d.c.120-40),SyrianChristiangnos- ticteacherinAlexandriawhorivaledValentinus. HeimprovedonValentinus'sdoctrineofemana- tions,positing365(thenumberofdaysinayear) levelsofexistenceinthePleroma(thefullnessof theGodhead),alldescendingfromtheineffable Father.HetaughtthattherivalGodwastheGod oftheJews(theGodoftheOldTestament),who createdthematerialworld.Redemptionconsists inthecomingofthefirstbegottenoftheFather, Nom(Mind),inhumanforminordertorelease thespiritualelementimprisonedwithinhuman bodies.Likeothergnosticshetaughtthatweare savedbyknowledge,notfaith.Heapparently heldtotheideaofreincarnationbeforethe restorationofallthingstothePleroma.Seealso GNOSTICISM,VALENTINUS.L.RP. basingrelation,alsocalledbasisrelation,the relationbetweenabelieforitemofknowledge andasecondbelieforitemofknowledgewhen thelatteristheground(basis)ofthefirst.Itis clearthatsomeknowledgeisindirect,i.e.,hador gainedonthebasisofsomeevidence,asopposed todirectknowledge,which(assumingthereis any)isnotsogained,orbased.Thesameholds forjustifiedbelief.Inonebroadsenseoftheterm, thebasingrelationisjusttheoneconnecting indirectknowledgeorindirectlyjustifiedbelief totheevidence:togiveanaccountofeither ofthelatteristogiveanaccountofthebasing relation. Thereisanarrowerviewofthebasingrelation, perhapsimplicitinthefirst.Apersonknows somepropositionPonthebasisofevidenceor reasonsonlyifherbeliefthatPisbasedonthe evidenceorreasons,orperhapsontheposses- sionoftheevidenceorreasons.Thenarrowbas- ingrelationisindicatedbythisquestion:where abeliefthatPconstitutesindirectknowledgeor justification,whatisitforthatbelieftobebased ontheevidenceorreasonsthatsupportthe knowledgeorjustification?Themostwidely favoredviewisthattherelevantbeliefisbased onevidenceorreasonsonlyifthebeliefis causallyrelatedtothebelieforreasons.Propo- nentsofthiscausalviewdifferconcerningwhat, beyondthiscausalrelationship,isneededbyan accountofthenarrowbasingrelation. Seealsocoherenttsm,foundational- ism,INFERENTIALKNOWLEDGE.G.S.P. basisclause.Seemathematicalinduction. basisrelation.Seebasingrelation. Bataille,Georges(1897-1962),Frenchphiloso- pherandnovelistwithenormousinfluenceon post-structuralistthought.Bylocatingvaluein expenditureasopposedtoaccumulation,Ba- tailleinauguratestheeraofthedeathofthesub- ject.Heinsiststhatindividualsmusttransgress thelimitsimposedbysubjectivitytoescapeiso- lationandcommunicate.Bataille'sprewarphilo- sophicalcontributionsconsistmainlyofshort essays,themostsignificantofwhichhavebeen collectedinVisionsofExcess.Theseessaysintro- ducethecentralideathatbasematterdisrupts rationalsubjectivitybyattestingtothecontinu- ityinwhichindividualslosethemselves.Inner Experience(1943),Bataille'sfirstlengthyphilo- sophicaltreatise,wasfollowedbyGuilty(1944) andOnNietzsche(1945).Together,thesethree worksconstituteBataille'sSummaAtheologica, whichexplorestheplayoftheisolationandthe dissolutionofbeingsintermsoftheexperience ofexcess(laughter,tears,eroticism,death,sacri- fice,poetry).TheAccursedSkare(1949),whichhe consideredhismostimportantwork,ishismost systematicaccountofthesocialandeconomic implicationsofexpenditure.InErotism(1957) andTheTearsofEros(1961),hefocusesonthe excessesofsexanddeath.Throughouthislife, Bataillewasconcernedwiththequestionof value.Helocateditintheexcessthatlacerates individualsandopenschannelsofcommunica- tion.Seealsopostmodern,structuralism. J.H.L. Baumgarten,AlexanderGottlieb(1714-62), Germanphilosopher.BorninBerlin,hewas educatedinHalleandtaughtatHalle(1738-40) andFrankfurtanderÖder(1740-62).Baum- gartenwasbroughtupinthePietistcircleof A.H.Franckebutadoptedtheanti-Pietistratio- nalismofWolff.Hewrotetextbooksinmeta- 73 Bayesian Bayes'stheorem physics(Metaphysica,1739)andethics(Ethica Philosophica,1740;InitiaPhilosophiaePracticae Prima["FirstElementsofPracticalPhilosophy"], 1760)onwhichKantlectured.Forthemostpart, Baumgartendidnotsignificantlydepartfrom Wolff,althoughinmetaphysicshewasbothfur- therandyetclosertoLeibnizthanwasWolff: unlikeLeibniz,hearguedforrealphysicalinflux, but,unlikeWolff,hedidnotrestrictpreestab- lishedharmonytothemind-bodyrelationship alone,but(paradoxically)reextendeditto includeallrelationsofsubstances. Baumgarten'sclaimtofame,however,restson hisintroductionofthedisciplineofaesthetics intoGermanphilosophy,andindeedonhis introductionoftheterm'aesthetics'aswell. Wolffhadexplainedpleasureastheresponseto theperceptionofperfectionbymeansofthe senses,inturnunderstoodasclearbutconfused perception.Baumgartensubtlybutsignificantly departedfromWolffbyredefiningourresponse tobeautyaspleasureintheperfectionofsensory perception,i.e.,intheuniquepotentialofsen- soryasopposedtomerelyconceptualrepresen- tation.Thisconceptwasfirstintroducedinhis dissertationMeditationesPhilosophicaedeNonnullis adPoemaPertinentibus("PhilosophicalMedita- tionsonsomeMatterspertainingtoPoetry," 1735),whichdefinedapoemasa"perfectsen- satediscourse,"andthengeneralizedinhistwo- volume(butstillincomplete)Aesthetica(1750- 58).OnemightdescribeBaumgarten'saesthetics ascognitivistbutnolongerrationalist:whilein scienceorlogicwemustalwayspreferdiscursive clarity,inartwerespondwithpleasuretothe maximallydense(or"confused")intimationof ideas.Baumgarten'stheoryhadgreatinfluence onLessingandMendelssohn,onKanfstheory ofaestheticideas,andevenontheaestheticsof Hegel. Seealsowolff.P.Gu. Bayesian.Seebayesianrationality,confirma- tion. Bayesianrationality,minimally,apropertyasys- temofbeliefs(orthebeliever)hasinvirtueofthe system's"conformingtotheprobabilitycalcu- lus.""Bayesians"differonwhat"rationality" requires,butmostagreethat(i)beliefscomein degrees(offirmness);(ii)these"degreesofbelief" are(theoreticallyorideally)quantifiable;(iii) suchquantificationcanbeunderstoodinterms ofperson-relative,time-indexed"credencefunc- tions"fromappropriatesetsofobjectsofbelief (propositionsorsentences)-eachsetclosed under(atleast)finitetruth-functionalcombina- tions-intothesetofrealnumbers;(zv)atany giventimet,aperson'scredencefunctionatt oughttobe(usually:"onpainofaDutchbook argument")aprobabilityfunction;thatis,amap- pingfromthegivensetintotherealnumbersin suchawaythatthe"probability"(thevalue) assignedtoanygivenobjectAinthesetisgreater thanorequaltozero,andisequaltounity(=1) ifAisanecessarytruth,and,foranygivenobjects AandBintheset,ifAandBareincompatible (thenegationoftheirconjunctionisanecessary truth)thentheprobabilityassignedtotheirdis- junctionisequaltothesumoftheprobabilities assignedtoeach;sothattheusualpropositional probabilityaxiomsimposeasortoflogicon degreesofbelief.Ifacredencefunctionisaprob- abilityfunction,thenit(orthebelieveratthe giventime)is"coherent." Onthesematters,onconditionaldegreesof belief,andonthefurtherconstraintonrational- itymanyBayesiansimpose(thatchangeofbelief oughttoaccordwith"conditionalization"),the readershouldconsultJohnEarman,Bayesor Bust?ACriticalExaminationofBayesianConfirma- tionTheory(1992);ColinHowsonandPeter Urbach,ScientificReasoning:TheBayesianApproach (1989);andRichardJeffrey,TheLogicofDecision (1965). Seealsobayes'stheorem,decisionthe- ory,DUTCHBOOKARGUMENT,PROBABILITY, RATIONALITY.D.A.J. Bayes'srule.Seebayes'stheorem. Bayes'stheorem,anyofseveralrelationships betweenpriorandposteriorprobabilitiesor odds,especially(l)-(3)below.Allofthese dependuponthebasicrelationship(0)between contemporaneousconditionalanduncondi- tionalprobabilities.Non-Bayesiansthinkthese usefulonlyinnarrowrangesofcases,generally becauseofskepticismaboutaccessibilityorsig- nificanceofpriors. Accordingto(1),posteriorprobabilityisprior (0)px(hyp, (1)pr(hyp, pr(hyp, |data)=pr(hyp,Erdata)IV(data) ,,,.,,.vpx(data\hyp1 \data)=pr(hyp,)x (2) data)pr(hyp, V(data) px(data|hyp,) pr(hyp2 (3)pr(hypt jdata) \data) pr(hyp2)pi(data|hyp2) pr(hyp,)xpi(data\hyp,) 2npr(hyp„)xpi(data\hypn) probabilitytimesthe"relevancequotient"(Car- nap'sterm).Accordingto(2),posterioroddsare 74 Bayle,Pierre beauty prioroddstimesthe"likelihoodratio"(R.A. Fisher'sterm).Relationship(3)comesfrom(1) byexpandingP(data)viathelawoftotalproba- bility. Bayes'srule(4)forupdatingprobabilitieshas yousetyournewunconditionalprobabilities equaltoyouroldconditionaloneswhenfresh certaintyaboutdataleavesprobabilitiescondi- tionallyuponthedataunchanged.Thecorre- spondingrule(5)hasyoudothesameforodds. Indecisiontheorythetermisuseddifferently,for therule"Choosesoastomaximizeexpectation ofutility." (4)newpT(hypj)=oldpT(hyp,\data) newpi(hyp,)oldpr(hypt\data) (5) newpi(hyp2)oldpr(hyp2\data) Seealsodecisiontheory,probability. R.J. Bayle,Pierre(1647-1706),Frenchphilosopher whoalsopioneeredindisinterested,criticalhis- tory.ACalvinistforcedintoexilein1681,Bayle neverthelessrejectedtheprevailinguseofhis- toryasaninstrumentofpartisanorsectarian interest.Heachievedfameandnotorietywithhis multivolumeDictionnairehistoriqueetcritique (1695).Foreachsubjectcovered,Bayleprovided abiographicalsketchandadispassionateexam- inationofthehistoricalrecordandinterpretive controversies.Healsorepeatedlyprobedthe troubledandtroublingboundarybetweenrea- sonandfaith(philosophyandreligion).Inthe artide"David,"theseeminglyillicitconductof God'spurportedagentyieldedreflectionsonthe moralsoftheelectandtheautonomyofethics. In"Pyrrho,"Baylearguedthatself-evidence,the mostplausiblecandidateforthecriterionof truth,isdiscreditedbyChristianitybecausesome self-evidentprinciplescontradictessentialChris- tiantruthsandarethereforefalse.Finally,pro- vokingLeibniz'sTheodky,Bayleargued,most relentlesslyin"Manichaeans"and"Paulicians," thatthereisnodefensiblerationalsolutiontothe problemofevil. BayleportrayedhimselfasaChristianskeptic, butothershaveseeninsteadanironiccriticof religion-aprecursoroftheFrenchEnlighten- ment.Bayle'spurelyphilosophicalreflections supporthisself-assessment,sinceheconsistently maintainsthatphilosophyachievesnotcompre- hensionandcontentment,butparadoxandpuz- zlement.Inmakingthiscaseheprovedtobea superbcriticofphilosophicalsystems.Some examplesare"ZenoofElea"-onspace,time, andmotion;"Rorarius"-onmindandbodyand animalmechanism;and"Spinoza"-ontheper- ilsofmonism.Bayle'sskepticismconcerningphi- losophysignificantlyinfluencedBerkeleyand Hume.HisotherimportantworksincludePensées diversesdelacométede1683(1683);Commentaire philosophiquesurcesparolesdeJesusChrist:contrain tesd'entrer(1686);andRéponseauxquestionsd'un provincial(1704);andanearlyleamedperiodical, theNouvellesdelaRépubliquedesLettres(1684- 87). Seealsoleibniz.P.D.C. Beattie,James(1735-1803),Scottishphiloso- pherandpoetwho,incriticizingHume,widened thelatter'saudience.AmemberoftheScottish schoolofcommonsensephilosophyalongwith OswaldandReid,Beattie'smajorworkwasAn EssayontheNatureandImmutabilityofTruth (1771),inwhichhecriticizesHumeforfostering skepticismandinfidelity.Hispositiveviewwas thatthemindpossessesacommonsense,i.e.,a powerforperceivingself-evidenttruths.Com- monsenseisinstinctive,unalterablebyeduca- tion;truthiswhatcommonsensedeterminesthe mindtobelieve.BeattiecitedHumeandthen claimedthathisviewsledtomoralandreligious evils.WhenBeattie'sEssaywastranslatedinto German(1772),KantcouldreadHume'sdiscus- sionsofpersonalidentityandcausation.Since thesetopicswerenotcoveredinHume'sInquiry ConcerningHumanUnderstanding,Beattiepro- videdKantaccesstotwoissuesintheTreatisesof HumanNaturecriticaltothedevelopmentof transcendentalidealism.Seealsohume,scot- tishCOMMONSENSEPHILOSOPHY.P.K. beauty,anaestheticpropertycommonlythought ofasaspeciesofaestheticvalue.Assuch,ithas beenvariouslythoughttobe(1)asimple,inde- finablepropertythatcannotbedefinedinterms ofanyotherproperties;(2)apropertyorsetof propertiesofanobjectthatmakestheobject capableofproducingacertainsortofpleasurable experienceinanysuitableperceiver;or(3) whateverproducesaparticularsortofpleasur- ableexperience,eventhoughwhatproducesthe experiencemayvaryfromindividualtoindivid- ual.Itisinthislastsensethatbeautyisthought tobe"intheeyeofthebeholder." Ifbeautyisasimple,indefinableproperty,asin (1),thenitcannotbedefinedconceptuallyand hastobeapprehendedbyintuitionortaste. Beauty,onthisaccount,wouldbeaparticular sortofaestheticproperty.Ifbeautyisanobjecfs 75 Beauvoir,Simonede behaviorism capacitytoproduceaspecialsortofpleasurable experience,asin(2),thenitisnecessarytosay whatpropertiesprovideitwiththiscapacity.The mostfavoredcandidatesforthesehavebeenfor- malorstructuralproperties,suchasorder,sym- metry,andproportion.InthePhilebusPlato arguesthattheformoressenceofbeautyis knowable,exact,rational,andmeasurable.He alsoholdsthatsimplegeometricalshapes,simple colors,andmusicalnotesallhave"intrinsic beauty,"whicharousesapure,"unmixed"plea- sureintheperceiverandisunaffectedbycontext. Inthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies manytreatiseswerewrittenonindividualart forms,eachallegedlygovernedbyitsownrules. Intheeighteenthcentury,Hutchesonheldthat 'beauty'referstoan"idearaisedinus,"andthat anyobjectthatexcitesthisideaisbeautiful.He thoughtthatthepropertyoftheobjectthat excitesthisideais"uniformityinvariety." Kantexplainedthenatureofbeautybyanalyz- ingjudgmentsthatsomethingisbeautiful.Such judgmentsrefertoanexperienceoftheper- ceiver.Buttheyarenotmerelyexpressionsof personalexperience;weclaimthatothersshould alsohavethesameexperience,andthatthey shouldmakethesamejudgment(i.e.,judgments thatsomethingisbeautifulhave"universalvalid- ity").Suchjudgmentsaredisinterested-deter- minednotbyanyneedsorwantsonthepartof theperceiver,butjustbycontemplatingthemere appearanceoftheobject.Thesearejudgments aboutanobjecfsfreebeauty,andmakingthem requiresusingonlythosementalcapacitiesthat allhumanshavebyvirtueoftheirabilitytocom- municatewithoneanother.Hencethepleasures experiencedinresponsetosuchbeautycanin principlebesharedbyanyone. Somehaveheld,asin(3),thatweapplythe term'beautiful'tothingsbecauseofthepleasure theygiveus,andnotonthebasisofanyspecific qualitiesanobjecthas.ArchibaldAlisonheld thatitisimpossibletofindanypropertiescom- montoallthosethingswecallbeautiful.San- tayanabelievedbeautyis"pleasureregardedasa qualityofathing,"andmadenopretensethat certainqualitiesoughttoproducethatpleasure. TheGreektermtokalon,whichisoftentrans- latedas'beauty',didnotrefertoathing's autonomousaestheticvalue,butrathertoits "excellence,"whichisconnectedwithitsmoral worthand/orusefulness.Thisconceptiscloserto Kanfsnotionofdependentbeauty,possessedbyan objectjudgedasaparticularkindofthing(such asabeautifulcatorabeautifulhorse),thanitis tofreebeauty,possessedbyanobjectjudgedsim- plyonthebasisofitsappearanceandnotin termsofanyconceptofuse. Seealsoaestheticproperty,aesthet- ics.S.L.F. Beauvoir,Simonede.Seeexistentialism. Beccaria,Cesare(1738-94),Italiancriminolo- gistandjudicialandpenalreformer.Hestudied inParmaandPaviaandtaughtpoliticaleconomy inMilan.Here,hemetPietroandAlessandro VerriandotherMilaneseintellectualsattempting topromotepolitical,economical,andjudiciary reforms.Hismajorwork,Detdelittiedellepene ("OnCrimesandPunishments,"1764),de- nouncesthecontemporarymethodsinthe administrationofjusticeandthetreatmentof criminals.Beccariaarguesthatthehighestgood isthegreatesthappinesssharedbythegreatest numberofpeople;hence,actionsagainstthe statearethemostseriouscrimes.Crimesagainst individualsandpropertyarelessserious,and crimesendangeringpublicharmonyaretheleast serious.Thepurposesofpunishmentaredeter- renceandtheprotectionofsociety.However,the employmentoftorturetoobtainconfessionsis unjustanduseless:itresultsinacquittalofthe strongandtheruthlessandconvictionofthe weakandtheinnocent.Beccariaalsorejects thedeathpenaltyasawarofthestateagainstthe individual.Heclaimsthatthedurationandcer- taintyofthepunishment,notitsintensity,most stronglyaffectcriminals.Beccariawasinfluenced byMontesquieu,Rousseau,andCondillac.His majorworkwastranslatedintomanylanguages andsetguidelinesforrevisingthecriminaland judicialsystemsofseveralEuropeancountries. P.Gar. becoming.Seetime. becoming,temporal.Seetime. Bedeutung.Seefrege. beggingthequestion.Seecircularreasoning. Begriff.Seehegel. behavioralequivalence.Seeturingmachine. behavioralism.Seejurisprudence. behaviorism,broadly,theviewthatbehavioris fundamentalinunderstandingmentalphenom- ena.Thetermappliesbothtoascientificresearch 76 behaviorism behaviorism programinpsychologyandtoaphilosophical doctrine.Accordingly,wedistinguishbetween scientific(psychological,methodological)behav- iorismandphilosophical(logical,analytical) behaviorism. Scientificbehaviorism.Firstpropoundedby theAmericanpsychologistJ.B.Watson(who introducedthetermin1913)andfurtherdevel- opedespeciallybyC.L.Hull,E.C.Tolman,and B.F.Skinner,itdepartedfromtheintrospection- isttraditionbyredefiningthepropertaskofpsy- chologyastheexplanationandpredictionof behavior-wheretoexplainbehavioristopro- videa"functionalanalysis"ofit,i.e.,tospecify theindependentvariables(stimuli)ofwhichthe behavior(response)islawfullyafunction.It insistedthatallvariables-includingbehavioras thedependentvariable-mustbespecifiableby theexperimentalproceduresofthenaturalsci- ences:merelyintrospectible,internalstatesof consciousnessarethusexcludedfromtheproper domainofpsychology.Althoughsomebehavior- istswerepreparedtoadmitintemalneurophysi- ologicalconditionsamongthevariables("inter- veningvariables"),othersofmoreradicalbent (e.g.Skinner)insistedonenvironmentalvari- ablesalone,arguingthatanyrelevantvariations inthehypotheticalinnerstateswouldthem- selvesingeneralbeafunctionofvariationsin (pastandpresent)environmentalconditions(as, e.g.,thirstisafunctionofwaterdeprivation). Althoughsomebasicresponsesareinherited reflexes,mostarelearnedandintegratedinto complexpatternsbyaprocessofconditioning.In classical(respondent)conditioning,aresponse alreadyunderthecontrolofagivenstimuluswill beelicitedbynewstimuliifthesearerepeatedly pairedwiththeoldstimulus:thisishowweleam torespondtonewsituations.Inoperantcondition- ing,aresponsethathasrepeatedlybeenfollowed byareinforcingstimulus(reward)willoccur withgreaterfrequencyandwillthusbe "selected"överotherpossibleresponses:thisis howwelearnnewresponses.Conditioned responsescanalsobeunlearnedor"extin- guished"byprolongeddissociationfromtheold elicitingstimuliorbyrepeatedwithholdingofthe reinforcingstimuli.Toshowhowallhuman behavior,including"cognitive"orintelligent behavior,canbe"shaped"bysuchprocessesof selectivereinforcementandextinctionof responseswastheultimateobjectiveofscientific behaviorism.Gravedifficultiesinthewayofthe realizationofthisobjectiveledtoincreasingly radicalliberalizationofthedistinctivefeaturesof behavioristmethodologyandeventuallytoits displacementbymorecognitivelyoriented approaches(e.g.thoseinspiredbyinformation theoryandbyChomsky'sworkinlinguistics). Philosophicalbehaviorism.Asemanticthesis aboutthemeaningofmentalisticexpressions,it receiveditsmostsanguineformulationbythe logicalpositivists(particularlyCarnap,Hempel, andAyer),whoassertedthatstatementscon- tainingmentalisticexpressionshavethesame meaningas,andarethustranslatableinto,some setofpubliclyverifiable(confirmable,testable) statementsdescribingbehavioralandbodily processesanddispositions(includingverbal- behavioraldispositions).Becauseofthereduc- tivistconcernsexpressedbythelogicalpositivist thesisofphysicalismandtheunityofscience, logicalbehaviorism(assomepositivistspreferred tocallit)wasacorollaryofthethesisthatpsy- chologyisultimately(viaabehavioristicanaly- sis)reducibletophysics,andthatallofits statements,likethoseofphysics,areexpressible inastrictlyextensionallanguage. Anotherinfluentialformulationofphilosoph- icalbehaviorismisduetoRyle(TheConceptof Mind,1949),whoseclassiccritiqueofCartesian dualismrestsontheviewthatmentalpredicates areoftenusedtoascribedispositionstobehave incharacteristicways:butsuchascriptions,for Ryle,havetheformofconditional,lawlikestate- mentswhosefunctionisnottoreporttheoccur- renceofinnerstates,physicalornon-physical,of whichbehavioristhecausalmanifestation,but tolicenseinferencesabouthowtheagentwould behavez/certainconditionsobtained.Tosuppose thatalldeclarativeusesofmentallanguagehave afact-statingor-reportingroleatallis,forRyle, tomakeaseriesof"categorymistakes"-of whichbothDescartesandthelogicalpositivists wereequallyguilty.Unlikethebehaviorismof thepositivists,Ryle'sbehaviorismrequiredno physicalisticreductionofmentallanguage,and reliedinsteadonordinarylanguagedescriptions ofhumanbehavior. Afurtherversionofphilosophicalbehaviorism canbetracedtoWittgenstein(PhilosophicalInves- tigations,1953),whoarguesthattheepistemic criteriafortheapplicabilityofmentalisticterms cannotbeprivate,introspectivelyaccessible innerstatesbutmustinsteadbeintersubjectively observablebehavior.Unlikethepreviouslymen- tionedversionsofphilosophicalbehaviorism, WittgenstehVsbehaviorismseemstobeconsis- tentwithmetaphysicalmind-bodydualism,and isthusalsonon-reductivist. 77 behaviorism,supervenient belief Philosophicalbehaviorismunderwentsevere criticisminthe1950sand1960s,especiallyby Chisholm,CharlesTaylor,Putnam,andFödor. Nonethelessitstilllivesoninmoreorlessatten- uatedformsintheworkofsuchdiversephiloso- phersasQuine,Dennett,Armstrong,David Lewis,U.T.Place,andDummett.Thoughcur- rent"functionalism"isoftenreferredtoasthe naturalheirtobehaviorism,functionalism (especiallyoftheArmstrong-Lewisvariety)cru- ciallydiffersfrombehaviorismininsistingthat mentalpredicates,whiledefmableintermsof behaviorandbehavioraldispositions,nonethe- lessdesignateinnercausalstates-statesthatare apttocausecertaincharacteristicbehaviors. Seealsocognitivescience,functional- ism,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,PHILOSOPHY OFPSYCHOLOGY,RYLE,VERIFICATIONISM. A.M. behaviorism,supervenient.Seephilosophyof MIND. behaviortherapy,aspectrumofbehaviormodifi- cationtechniquesappliedastherapy,suchas aversiontherapy,extinction,modeling,redinte- gration,operantconditioning,anddesensitiza- tion.Unlikepsychotherapy,whichprobesa clienfsrecollectedhistory,behaviortherapy focusesonimmediatebehavior,andaimstoelim- inateundesiredbehaviorandproducedesired behaviorthroughmethodsderivedfromtheex- perimentalanalysisofbehaviorandfromrein- forcementtheory.Achronicproblemwithpsy- chotherapyisthattheclienfspastisfiltered throughlimitedandbiasedrecollection.Be- haviortherapyismoremechanical,creatingsys- temsofreinforcementandconditioningthatmay workindependentlyoftheclienfslong-term memory. Collectively,behavior-therapeutictechniques composeamotleyset.Somebehaviortherapists adapttechniquesfrompsychotherapy,asin covertdesensitization,whereverballyinduced mentalimagesareemployedasreinforcers.A persistentproblemwithbehaviortherapyisthat itmayrequirerepeatedapplication.Consider aversiontherapy.Itconsistsofpairingpainfulor punishingstimuliwithunwelcomebehavior.In theabsence,aftertherapy,ofthepainfulstimu- lus,thebehaviormayrecurbecauseassociation betweenbehaviorandpunishmentisbroken. Criticschargethatbehaviortherapydealswith immediatedisturbancesandovertbehavior,to theneglectofunderlyingproblemsandirra- tionalities. Seealsocognitivepsychotherapy. G.A.G. being.Seeheidegger,metaphysics,transcen- DENTALS. belief,adispositionalpsychologicalstateinvirtue ofwhichapersonwillassenttoaproposition undercertainconditions.Propositionalknowl- edge,traditionallyunderstood,entailsbelief. Abehavioralviewimpliesthatbeliefsarejust dispositionstobehaveincertainways.Your believingthatthestoveishotisjustyourbeing disposedtoactinamannerappropriatetoits beinghot.Theproblemisthatourbeliefs,includ- ingtheirpropositionalcontentindicatedbya "thaf-clause,typicallyexplainwhywedowhat wedo.Youavoidtouchingthestovebecauseyou believethatifsdangerouslyhot.Explaining actionviabeliefsrefersindispensablytoproposi- tionalcontent,butthebehavioralviewdoesnot accommodatethis. Astate-objectviewimpliesthatbeliefconsistsof aspecialrelationbetweenapsychologicalstate andanobjectofbelief,whatisbelieved.The objectsofbelief,traditionallyunderstood,are abstractpropositionsexistingindependentlyof anyone'sthinkingofthem.Thestateofbelieving isapropositionalattitudeinvolvingsomedegreeof confidencetowardapropositionalobjectofbe- lief.Suchaviewallowsthattwopersons,even separatedbyalongperiodoftime,canbelieve thesamething. Astate-objectviewallowsthatbeliefsbedis- positionalratherthanepisodic,sincetheycan existwhilenoactionisoccurring.Suchaview grants,however,thatonecanhaveadisposition toactowingtobelievingsomething.Regarding mentalaction,abelieftypicallygeneratesadis- positiontoassent,atleastunderappropriatecir- cumstances,tothepropositionbelieved.Given thecentralroleofpropositionalcontent,how- ever,astate-objectviewdeniesthatbeliefsare justdispositionstoact.Inaddition,suchaview shoulddistinguishbetweendispositionalbeliev- ingandameredispositiontobelieve.Onecanbe merelydisposedtobelievemanythingsthatone doesnotactuallybelieve,owingtoone'slacking theappropriatepsychologicalattitudetorele- vantpropositionalcontent. Beliefsareeitheroccurrentornon-occurrent. Occurrentbelief,unlikenon-occurrentbelief, requirescurrentassenttotheproposition believed.Iftheassentisself-conscious,thebelief isanexplicitoccurrentbelief;iftheassentisnot self-conscious,thebeliefisanimplicitoccurrent 78 belief,basic Bentham,Jeremy belief.Non-occurrentbeliefspermitthatwedo notceasetobelievethat2+2=4,forinstance, merelybecausewenowhappentobethinking ofsomethingelseornothingatall. Seealsoact-objectpsychology,behav- IORISM,DISPOSITION,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND. P.K.M. belief,basic.Seeberkeley,foundationalism, LOGICALPOSITIVISM. belief,degreeof.Seebayesianrationality. belief,ethicsof.Seeclifford. belief,partial.Seeprobability. belief,properlybasic.Seeevidentialism,plån- tinga. belief-desiremodel.Seeintention. beliefrevision,theprocessbywhichcognitive stateschangeinlightofnewinformation.This topicloomslargeindiscussionsofBayes's Theoremandotherapproachesindecisionthe- ory.Thereasonspromptingbeliefrevisionare characteristicallyepistemic;theyconcernsuch notionsasqualityofevidenceandthetendency toyieldtruths.Manydifferentruleshavebeen proposedforupdatingone'sbeliefset.Ingeneral, beliefrevisiontypicallybalancesriskoferror againstinformationincrease.Beliefrevisionis widelythoughttoproceedeitherbyexpansion orbyconceptualrevision.Expansionoccursin virtueofnewobservations;abeliefischanged,or anewbeliefestablished,whenahypothesis(or provisionalbelief)issupportedbyevidence whoseprobabilityishighenoughtomeeta favoredcriterionofepistemicwarrant.The hypothesisthenbecomespartoftheexisting beliefcorpus,orissufficienttopromptrevision. Conceptualrevisionoccurswhenappropriate changesaremadeintheoreticalassumptions-in accordancewithsuchprinciplesassimplicityand explanatoryorpredictivepower-bywhichthe corpusisorganized.Inactualcases,wetendto revisebeliefswithaneyetowardadvancingthe bestcomprehensiveexplanationintherelevant cognitivedomain.Seealsobayesianratio- nality,COHERENTISM,EPISTEMOLOGY,FOUN- DATIONALISM,REFLECTIVEEQUILIBRIUM. J.D.T. Bell'stheorem.Seephilosophyofscience,quan- TUMMECHANICS. beneficence.Seevirtueethics. Beneke,FriedrichEduard(1798-1854),German philosopherwhowasinfluencedbyHerbartand Englishempiricismandcriticizedrationalistic metaphysics.HetaughtatBerlinandpublished someeighteenbooksinphilosophy.Hismajor workwasLehrbuchderPsychologiealsNaturwis- senschaft(1833).Hewroteacriticalstudyof KanfsCritiqueofPureReasonandanotheronhis moraltheory;otherworksincludedPsychologie Skizzen(1825),MetaphysikundReligionphilosophie (1840),andDieneuePsychologie(1845). The"newpsychology"developedbyBeneke heldthatthehypostatizationof"faculties"ledto amythicalpsychology.Heproposedamethod thatwouldyieldanaturalscienceofthesoulor, ineffect,anassociationistpsychology.Influenced bytheBritishempiricists,heconceivedtheele- mentsofmentallifeasdynamic,activeprocesses orimpulses(Trieben).These"elementaryfacul- ties,"originallyactivatedbystimuli,generatethe substantialunityofthenatureofthepsychicby theirpersistenceastraces,aswellasbytheirre- ciprocaladjustmentinrelationtothecontinuous productionofnewforces. InwhatBenekecalled"pragmaticpsychol- ogy,"thepsycheisabundleofimpulses,forces, andfunctions.Psychologicaltheoryshouldrest oninductiveanalysesofthefactsofinnerper- ception.This,inturn,isthefoundationofthe philosophicaldisciplinesoflogic,ethics,meta- physics,andphilosophyofreligion.Inthis regard,Benekeheldapsychologism.Heagreed withHerbartthatpsychologymustbebasedon innerexperienceandmusteschewmetaphysical speculation,butrejectedHebarfsmathematical reductionism.Benekesoughttocreatea"prag- maticphilosophy"basedonhispsychology.In hislastyearshecontributedtopedagogictheory. Seealsoassociationism.G.J.S. benevolence.Seevirtueethics. Bentham,Jeremy(1748-1832),Britishphiloso- pherofethicsandpolitical-legaltheory.Bornin London,heenteredQueen'sCollege,Oxford,at age12,andaftergraduationenteredLincoln's Inntostudylaw.Hewasadmittedtothebarin 1767butneverpracticed.Hespenthislifewrit- ing,advocatingchangesalongutilitarianlines (maximalhappinessforeveryoneaffected)ofthe wholelegalsystem,especiallythecriminallaw. Hewasastronginfluenceinchangesofthe Britishlawofevidence;inabolitionoflawsper- mittingimprisonmentforindebtedness;inthe 79 Bentham,Jeremy Bentham,Jeremy reformofParliamentaryrepresentation;inthe formationofacivilservicerecruitedbyexami- nation;andinmuchelse.Hismajorworkpub- lishedduringhislifetimewasAnIntroductionto thePrinciplesofMoralsandLegklation(1789).He becameheadofa"radical"groupincluding JamesMillandJ.S.Mill,andfoundedtheWest- minsterReviewandUniversityCollege,London (wherehisembalmedbodystillreposesina closet).HewasafriendofCatherineofRussia andJohnQuincyAdams,andwasmadeacitizen ofFranceinf792. Pleasure,hesaid,istheonlygood,andpain theonlyevil:"elsethewordsgoodandevilhave nomeaning."Hegivesalistofexamplesofwhat hemeansby'pleasure':pleasuresoftaste,smell, ortouch;ofacquiringproperty;oflearningthat onehasthegoodwillofothers;ofpower;ofa viewofthepleasuresofthoseonecaresabout. Benthamwasalsoapsychologicalhedonist: pleasuresandpainsdeterminewhatwedo.Take pain.Yourstateofmindmaybepainfulnow(at thetimejustpriortoaction)becauseitincludes theexpectationofthepain(say)ofbeingburned; thepresentpain(ortheexpectationoflåter pain-Benthamisundecidedwhich)motivates actiontopreventbeingburned.Oneofaperson's pleasures,however,maybesympatheticenjoy- mentofthewell-beingofanother.Soitseems onecanbemotivatedbytheprospectofthehap- pinessofanother.Hispsychologyhereisnot incompatiblewithaltruisticmotivation. Bentham'scriticalutilitarianismliesinhis claimthatanyaction,ormeasureofgovern- ment,oughttobetakenifandonlyifittendsto augmentthehappinessofeveryoneaffected- notatallanovelprinciple,historically.When "thusinterpreted,thewordsought,andrightand wrong...haveameaning:whenotherwise,they havenone."Benthamevidentlydidnotmean thisstatementasapurelylinguisticpointabout theactualmeaningofmoralterms.Neithercan thisprinciplebeproved;itisafirstprinciplefrom whichallproofsproceed.Whatkindofreason, then,canheofferinitssupport?Atonepointhe saysthattheprincipleofutility,atleastuncon- sciously,governsthejudgmentof"everythink- ingman...unavoidably."Buthischiefanswer ishiscritiqueofawidelyheldprinciplethata personproperlycallsanactwrongif(when informedofthefacts)hedisapprovesofit.(Ben- thamcitesotherlanguageascomingtothesame thesis:talkofa"moralsense,"orcommonsense, ortheunderstanding,orthelawofnature,or rightreason,orthe"fitnessofthings.")Hesays thatthisisnoprincipleatall,sincea"principleis somethingthatpointsoutsomeexternalconsid- eration,asameansofwarrantingandguiding theinternalsentimentsofapprobation...."The allegedprinciplealsoallowsforwidespreaddis- agreementaboutwhatismoral. Sofar,Bentham'sproposalhasnottoldus exactlyhowtodeterminewhetheranactionor socialmeasureisrightorwrong.Benthamsug- gestsahedoniccalculus:incomparingtwo actionsunderconsideration,wecountupthe pleasuresorpainseachwillprobablypro- duce-howintense,howlong-lasting,whether nearorremote,includinganyderivativelåter pleasuresorpainsthatmaybecaused,andsum themupforallpersonswhowillbeaffected.Evi- dentlythesedirectionscanprovideatbestonly approximateresults.Weareinnopositionto decidewhetheronepleasureforonehouris greaterthananotherpleasureforhalfanhour, evenwhentheyarebothpleasuresofoneper- sonwhocancomparethem.Howmuchmore whenthepleasuresareofdifferentpersons?Still, wecanmakejudgmentsimportantforthethe- oryofpunishment:whetherablowintheface withnolastingdamageforonepersonismoreor lesspainfulthanfiftylashesforhisassailant! Benthamhasbeenmuchcriticizedbecausehe thoughtthattwopleasuresareequalinvalue,if theyareequallyintense,enduring,etc.Ashe said,"Quantityofpleasurebeingequal,pushpin isasgoodaspoetry."Ithasbeenthought(e.g., byJ.S.Mill)thatsomepleasures,especially intellectualones,arehigheranddeservetocount more.Butitmayberepliedthattheso-called higherpleasuresaremoreenduring,areless likelytobefollowedbysatiety,andopenupnew horizonsofenjoyment;andwhenthesefactsare takenintoaccount,itisnotclearthatthereis needtoaccordhigherstatustointellectualplea- suresassuch. AmajorgoalofBentham'swastoapplytothe criminallawhisprincipleofmaximizingthegen- eralutility.Benthamthoughtthereshouldbeno punishmentofanoffenseifitisnotinjuriousto someone.Sohowmuchpunishmentshould therebe?Theleastamounttheeffectofwhich willresultinagreaterdegreeofhappiness,over- all.Thebenefitofpunishmentisprimarilydeter- rence,byattachingtothethoughtofagivenact thethoughtofthepainfulsanction-whichwill deterboththepastandprospectivelawbreakers. Thepunishment,then,mustbesevereenoughto outweighthebenefitoftheoffensetotheagent, makingallowance,byaddition,fortheuncer- taintythatthepunishmentwillactuallyoccur. Therearesomeharmfulacts,however,thatitis 80 Berdyaev,Nicolas Bergmann,Gustav notbeneficialtopunish.Oneisanactneedfulto produceagreaterbenefit,oravoidaseriousevil, fortheagent.Othersarethosewhichapenalpro- hibitioncouldnotdeter:whenthelawisunpub- lishedortheagentisinsaneoraninfant.Insome casessocietyneedfeelnoalarmaboutthefuture actionsoftheagent.Thus,anactiscriminalonly ifintentional,andtheagentisexcusedifheacted onthebasisofbeliefssuchthat,weretheytrue, theactwouldhavecausednoharm,unlessthese beliefswereculpableinthesensethattheywould nothavebeenheldbyapersonofordinarypru- denceorbenevolence.Theproprietyofpunish- inganactalsodependssomewhatonitsmotive, althoughnomotivee.g.,sexualdesire,curiosity, wantingmoney,loveofreputation-isbadin itself.Yettheproprietyofpunishmentisaffected bythepresenceofsomemotivationsthat enhancepublicsecuritybecauseitisunlikelythat they-e.g.,sympatheticconcernorconcernfor reputation-willleadtobadintentionalacts. Whenagivenmotiveleadstoabadintention,it isusuallybecauseoftheweaknessofmotiveslike sympathy,concernforavoidingpunishment,or respectforlaw. Ingeneral,thesanctionofmoralcriticism shouldtakelinesroughlysimilartothoseofthe ideallaw.Buttherearesomeformsofbehavior, e.g.,imprudenceorfornication,whichthelawis hardlysuitedtopunish,thatcanbesanctioned bymorality. Thebusinessofthemoralphilosopheriscenso- rial:tosaywhatthelaw,ormorality,oughttobe. Tosaywhatisthelawisadifferentmatter:what itisisthecommandsofthesovereign,definedas onewhomthepublic,ingeneral,habitually obeys.Asconsistingofcommands,itisimperati- val.Theimperativesmaybeaddressedtothe public,asin''Letnoonesteal,"ortojudges:"Let ajudgesentenceanyonewhostealstobe hanged."Itmaybethoughtthatthereisathird part,anexplanation,say,ofwhatisaperson's property;butthiscanbeabsorbedintheimpera- tivalpart,sincethedesignationsofpropertyare justimperativesaboutwhoistobefreetodo what.Whyshouldanyoneobeytheactuallaws? Bentham'sansweristhatoneshoulddosoifand onlyifitpromisestomaximizethegeneralhap- piness.Heeschewscontracttheoriesofpolitical obligation:individualsnowalivenevercon- tracted,andsohowaretheybound?Healso opposesappealtonaturalrights.Ifwhatareoften mentionedasnaturalrightsweretakenseriously, nogovernmentcouldsurvive:itcouldnottax, requiremilitaryservice,etc.Nordoesheaccept appealto"naturallaw,"asif,oncesomelawis showntobeimmoral,itcanbesaidtobenot reallylaw.Thatwouldbeabsurd. Seealsohedonism,philosophyoflaw, UTILITARIANISM.R.B.B. Berdyaev,Nicolas(1874-1948),Russianreli- giousthinker.Hebeganasa"KantianMarxist"in epistemology,ethicaltheory,andphilosophyof history,butsoonturnedawayfromMarxism (althoughhecontinuedtoacceptMarx'scritique ofcapitalism)towardatheisticphilosophyof existencestressingthevaluesofcreativityand "meonic"freedom-afreedomallegedlypriorto allbeing,includingthatofGod.Inexileafter 1922,Berdyaevappearstohavebeenthefirstto graspclearly(intheearly1920s)thattheMarxist viewofhistoricaltimeinvolvesamorallyunac- ceptabledevaluingandinstrumentalizingofthe historicalpresent(includinglivingpersons)for thesakeoftheremotefutureendofaperfected communistsociety.BerdyaevrejectstheMarxist positiononbothChristianandKantiangrounds, asaviolationoftheintrinsicvalueofhumanper- sons.Heseesthehistoricalorderasmarkedby inescapabletragedy,andwelcomesthe"endof history"asan"overcoming"ofobjectivehistori- caltimebysubjective"existential"timewithits free,unobjectifiedcreativity.ForBerdyaevthe "worldofobjects"-physicalthings,lawsof nature,socialinstitutions,andhumanrolesand relationships-isapervasivethreatto"freespiri- tualcreativity."Yetsuchcreativityappearstobe subjecttoinevitablefrustration,sinceitsoutward embodimentsarealways"partialandfragmen- tary"andno"outwardaction"canescapeulti- mate"tragicfailure."RussianOrthodoxtradi- tionalistscondemnedBerdyaevforclaimingthat allcreationisa"divine-humanprocess"andfor denyingGod'somnipotence,butsuchWestern processtheologiansasHartshornefindBer- dyaev^positionhighlycongenial.Seealso RUSSIANPHILOSOPHY.G.L.K. Bergmann,Gustav(1906-87),Austrianphiloso- pher,theyoungestmemberoftheViennaCircle. BorninVienna,hereceivedhisdoctoratein mathematicsin1928fromtheUniversityof Vienna.Originallyinfluencedbylogicalposi- tivism,hebecameaphenomenalistwhoalso positedmentalactsirreducibletosense-data(see hisTheMetaphysicsofLogicalPositivism,1954). Althoughheeventuallyrejectedphenomenal- ism,hisontologyofmaterialobjectsremained structurallyphenomenalistic.BergmamVsworld isoneofmomentarybare(i.e.natureless)par- ticularsexemplifying(phenomenally)simple 81 Bergson,HenriLouis Bergson,HenriLouis universals,relationalaswellasnon-relational. Someoftheseuniversalsarenon-mental,such ascolorpropertiesandspatialrelations,while others,suchasthe"intentionalcharacters"in virtueofwhichsomeparticulars(mentalacts) intendorrepresentthefactsthataretheir "objects,"aremental.Bergmanninsistedthatthe worldisindependentofbothourexperienceof itandourthoughtanddiscourseaboutit:he claimedthattheconnectionofexemplification andeventhepropositionalconnectivesand quantifiersaremind-independent.(SeeMeaning andExistence,1959;LogicandReality,1964;and Realism:ACritiqueofBrentanoandMeinong,1967.) Suchextremerealismproducedmanycriti- cismsofhisphilosophythatareonlyfinally addressedinBergmann'srecently,andposthu- mously,publishedbook,NewFoundationsof Ontology(1992),inwhichheconcedesthathis atomisticapproachtoontologyhasinevitable limitationsandproposesawayofsquaringthis insightwithhisthoroughgoingrealism. Seealsometaphysics,viennacircle. W.He. Bergson,HenriLouis(1859-1941),French philosopher,themostinfluentialofthefirsthalf ofthetwentiethcentury.BorninParisandedu- catedattheprestigiousÉcoleNormale Supérieure,hebeganhisteachingcareeratCler- mont-Ferrandin1884andwascalledin1900to theCollegedeFrance,wherehislectures enjoyedunparalleledsuccessuntilhisretirement in1921.Ideallyplacedinlabelleépoqueofprewar Paris,hisideasinfluencedabroadspectrumof artistic,literary,social,andpoliticalmovements. In1918hereceivedtheLegiond'honneurand wasadmittedintotheFrenchAcademy.From 1922through1925heparticipatedintheLeague ofNations,presidingöverthecreationofwhat waslåtertobecomeunesco.Forcedbycrippling arthritisintovirtualseclusionduringhislåter years,BergsonwasawardedtheNobelPrizefor literaturein1928. InitiallyadiscipleofSpencer,Bergsonbroke withhimafteracarefulexaminationofSpencer's conceptoftimeandmechanisticpositivism.Fol- lowingadeeplyentrenchedtraditioninWestern thought,Spencertreatstime(onananalogywith space)asaseriesofdiscretenumericalunits: instants,seconds,minutes.Whenconfronted withexperience,however-especiallywiththat ofourownpsychologicalstates-suchconcepts are,Bergsonconcludes,patentlyinadequate. Realduration,unlikeclocktime,isqualitative, dynamic,irreversible.Itcannotbe"spatialized" withoutbeingdeformed.Itgivesriseinus,more- over,tofreeacts,which,beingqualitativeand spontaneous,cannotbepredicted. Bergson'sdramaticcontrastofrealduration andgeometricalspace,firstdevelopedinTime andFreeWill(1890),wasfollowedin1896bythe mind-bodytheoryofMatterandMemory.He arguesherethatthebrainisnotalocalefor thoughtbutamotororganthat,receivingstim- ulifromitsenvironment,mayrespondwith adaptivebehavior.Tohispsychologicaland metaphysicaldistinctionbetweendurationand spaceBergsonadds,inAnIntroductiontoMeta- physics(1903),animportantepistemologicaldis- tinctionbetweenintuitionandanalysis. Intuitionprobestheflowofdurationinitscon- creteness;analysisbreaksupdurationintostatic, fragmentaryconcepts. InCreativeEvolution(1907),hisbest-known work,BergsonarguesagainstbothLamarckand Darwin,urgingthatbiologicalevolutionis impelledbyavitalimpetusorelanvitalthat driveslifetoovercomethedownwardentropic driftofmatter.Biologicalorganisms,unlikedice, mustcompeteandsurviveastheyundergoper- mutations.Hencetheunresolveddilemmaof Darwinism.Eithermutationsoccuroneorafew atatime(inwhichcasehowcantheybe"saved up"toconstituteneworgans?)ortheyoccurall atonce(inwhichcaseonehasa"miracle"). Bergson'svitalism,populärinliterarycircles, wasnotacceptedbymanyscientistsorphiloso- phers.Hismostgeneralcontention,however- thatbiologicalevolutionisnotconsistentwithor evenwellservedbyamechanisticphilosophy- wasbroadlyappreciatedandtomanyseemed convincing.ThisaspectofBergson'swritings influencedthinkersasdiverseasLloydMorgan, AlexisCarrel,SewallWright,PierreTeilhardde Chardin,andA.N.Whitehead. ThecontrastsintermsofwhichBergsondevel- opedhisthought(duration/space,intuition/ analysis,life/entropy)arereplacedinTheTwo SourcesofMoralityandReligion(1932)byanew duality,thatofthe"open"andthe"closed."The Judeo-Christiantradition,hecontends,ifithas embracedinitshistoryboththeopensocietyand theclosedsociety,exhibitsinitsgreatsaintsand mysticsaprofoundopeningoutofthehuman spirittowardallhumanity.Bergson'sdistinction betweentheopenandtheclosedsocietywas popularizedbyKarlPopperinhisTheOpenSoci- etyandItsEnemies. Whileithasattractedseriouscriticism,Berg- son^philosophyhasalsosignificantlyaffected subsequentthinkers.Novelistsasdiverseas 82 Berkeley,George Berkeley,George NikosKazantzakis,MarcelProust,andWilliam Faulkner;poetsasunlikeasCharlesPéguy, RobertFrost,andAntonioMachado;andpsy- chologistsasdissimilarasPierreJanetandJean Piagetweretoprofitsignificantlyfromhisexplo- rationsofduration,conceptualization,and memory.BothFrenchexistentialismandAmer- icanprocessphilosophybeartheimprintofhis thought. Seealsospencer,time,whitehead. P.A.Y.G. Berkeley,George(1685-1753),Irishphiloso- pherandbishopintheAnglicanChurchofIre- land,oneofthethreegreatBritishempiricists alongwithLockeandHume.Hedevelopednovel andinfluentialviewsonthevisualperceptionof distanceandsize,andanidealistmetaphysical systemthathedefendedpartlyontheseemingly paradoxicalgroundthatitwasthebestdefense ofcommonsenseandsafeguardagainstskepti- cism. BerkeleystudiedatTrinityCollege,Dublin, fromwhichhegraduatedatnineteen.Hewas electedtoafellowshipatTrinityin1707,anddid thebulkofhisphilosophicalwritingbetween thatyearand1713.HewasmadedeanofDerry in1724,followingextensivetravelingonthe Continent;hespenttheyears1728-32inRhode Island,waitinginvainforpromisedCrownfunds toestablishacollegeinBermuda.Hewasmade bishopofCloyne,Ireland,in1734,andhe remainedthereasaclericfornearlytheremain- derofhislife. Berkeley'sfirstmajorpublication,theEssay TowardsaNewTheoryofVision(1709),isprinci- pallyaworkinthepsychologyofvision,though ithasimportantphilosophicalpresuppositions andimplications.Berkeley'stheoryofvision becamesomethinglikethereceivedviewonthe topicfornearlytwohundredyearsandisaland- markworkinthehistoryofpsychology.The workisdevotedtothreeconnectedmatters:how dowesee,orvisuallyestimate,thedistancesof objectsfromourselves,thesituationorplaceat whichobjectsarelocated,andthemagnitudeof suchobjects? Earlierviews,suchasthoseofDescartes,Male- branche,andMolyneux,arerejectedonthe groundthattheiranswerstotheabovequestions allowthatapersoncanseethedistanceofan objectwithouthavingfirstlearnedtocorrelate visualandothercues.Thiswassupposedlydone byakindofnaturalgeometry,acomputationof thedistancebydeterminingthealtitudeofatri- angleformedbylightraysfromtheobjectand thelineextendingfromoneretinatotheother. Onthecontrary,Berkeleyholdsthatitisclear thatseeingdistanceissomethingoneleamstodo throughtrialanderror,mainlybycorrelating cuesthatsuggestdistance:thedistinctnessor confusionofthevisualappearance;thefeelings receivedwhentheeyesturn;andthesensations attendingthestrainingoftheeyes.Noneofthese bearsanynecessaryconnectiontodistance. Berkeleyinfersfromthisaccountthataperson bornblindandlåtergivensightwouldnotbe abletotellbysightalonethedistancesobjects werefromher,nortellthedifferencebetweena sphereandacube.Healsoarguesthatinvisually estimatingdistance,oneisreallyestimating whichtangibleideasonewouldlikelyexperi- enceifoneweretotakestepstoapproachthe object.Notthatthesetangibleideasarethem- selvesnecessarilyconnectedtothevisual appearances.Instead,Berkeleyholdsthattangi- bleandvisualideasareentirelyheterogeneous, i.e.,theyarenumericallyandspecificallydistinct. Thelatterisaphilosophicalconsequenceof Berkeley'stheoryofvision,whichissharplyat oddswithacentraldoctrineofLocke'sEssay, namely,thatsomeideasarecommontoboth sightandtouch. Locke'sdoctrinesalsoreceiveagreatdealof attentioninthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge (1710).HereBerkeleyconsidersthedoctrineof abstractgeneralideas,whichhefindsinBookIII ofLocke'sEssay.Hearguesagainstsuchideas partlyonthegroundthatwecannotengagein theprocessofabstraction,partlyontheground thatsomeabstractideasareimpossibleobjects, andalsoonthegroundthatsuchideasarenot neededforeitherlanguagelearningorlanguage use.Theseargumentsareoffundamentalimpor- tanceforBerkeley,sincehethinksthatthedoc- trineofabstractideashelpstosupportmeta- physicalrealism,absolutespace,absolute motion,andabsolutetime(Principles,5,100, 110-11),aswellastheviewthatsomeideasare commontosightandtouch(NewTheory,123). AllofthesedoctrinesBerkeleyholdstobemis- taken,andthefirstisindirectconflictwithhis idealism.Hence,itisimportantforhimtounder- mineanysupportthesedoctrinesmightreceive fromtheabstractideasthesis. Berkeleyanidealismistheviewthattheonly existingentitiesarefiniteandinfiniteperceivers eachofwhichisaspiritormentalsubstance,and entitiesthatareperceived.Suchathesisimplies thatordinaryphysicalobjectsexistifandonlyif theyareperceived,somethingBerkeleyencap- sulatesintheesseestpercipiprinciple:forallsen- 83 Berkeley,George Berkeley,George sibleobjects,i.e.,objectscapableofbeingper- ceived,theirbeingistobeperceived.Hegives essentiallytwoargumentsforthisthesis.First,he holdsthateveryphysicalobjectisjustacollec- tionofsensiblequalities,andthateverysensible qualityisanidea.So,physicalobjectsarejustcol- lectionsofsensibleideas.Noideacanexistunper- ceived,somethingeveryoneintheperiodwould havegranted.Hence,nophysicalobjectcanexist unperceived.Thesecondargumentistheso- calledmasterargumentofPrinciples22-24. ThereBerkeleyarguesthatonecannotconceive asensibleobjectexistingunperceived,becauseif oneattemptstodothisonemusttherebycon- ceivethatveryobject.Heconcludesfromthis thatnosuchobjectcanexist"withoutthemind," thatis,whollyunperceived. ManyofBerkeley'sopponentswouldhave heldinsteadthataphysicalobjectisbestana- lyzedasamaterialsubstratum,inwhichsome sensiblequalitiesinhere.SoBerkeleyspends someeffortarguingagainstmaterialsubstrataor whathesometimescallsmatter.Hisprincipal argumentisthatasensiblequalitycannotinhere inmatter,becauseasensiblequalityisanidea, andsurelyanideacannotexistexceptinamind. Thisargumentwouldbedecisiveifitweretrue thateachsensiblequalityisanidea.Unfortu- nately,Berkeleygivesnoargumentwhateverfor thiscontentioninthePrinciples,andforthatrea- sonBerkeleyanidealismisnottherewell founded.Nordoesthemasterargumentfare muchbetter,forthereBerkeleyseemstorequire apremiseassertingthatifanobjectisconceived, thenthatobjectisperceived.Yetsuchapremiseis highlydubious. ProbablyBerkeleyrealizedthathiscasefor idealismhadnotbeensuccessful,andcertainly hewasstungbythepoorreceptionofthePrinci- ples.Hisnextbook,ThreeDialoguesBetweenHylas andPhilonous(1713),isaimedatrectifyingthese matters.Therehearguesatlengthforthethesis thateachsensiblequalityisanidea.Themaster argumentisrepeated,butitisunnecessaryif everysensiblequalityisanidea. IntheDialoguesBerkeleyisalsomuchcon- cernedtocombatskepticismanddefendcom- monsense.Hearguesthatrepresentativerealismas heldbyLockeleadstoskepticismregardingthe extemalworldandthis,Berkeleythinks,helps tosupportatheismandfreethinkinginreligion. Healsoargues,moredirectly,thatrepresentative realismisfalse.Suchathesisincorporatesthe claimthatsomesensibleideasrepresentrealqual- itiesinobjects,theso-calledprimaryqualities. ButBerkeleyarguesthatasensibleideacanbe likenothingbutanotheridea,andsoideascan- notrepresentqualitiesinobjects.Inthisway, Berkeleyeliminatesonemainsupportofskepti- cism,andtothatextenthelpstosupportthe commonsensicalideathatwegainknowledgeof theexistenceandnatureofordinaryphysical objectsbymeansofperception. Berkeley'spositiveviewsinepistemologyare usuallyinterpretedasaversionoffoundational- ism.Thatis,heisgenerallythoughttohave defendedtheviewthatbeliefsaboutcurrently perceivedideasarebasicbeliefs,beliefsthatare immediatelyandnon-inferentiallyjustifiedor thatcountaspiecesofimmediateknowledge, andthatallotherjustifiedbeliefsincontingent propositionsarejustifiedbybeingsomehow baseduponthebasicbeliefs.Indeed,suchafoun- dationalistdoctrineisoftentakentohelpdefine empiricism,heldincommonbyLocke,Berkeley, andHume.Butwhateverthemeritsofsucha viewasaninterpretationofLockeorHume,itis notBerkeley'stheory.Thisisbecauseheallows thatperceiversoftenhaveimmediateandnon- inferentialjustifiedbeliefs,andknowledge, aboutphysicalobjects.Hence,Berkeleyacceptsa versionoffoundationalismthatallowsforbasic beliefsquitedifferentfromjustbeliefsabout one'scurrentlyperceivedideas.Indeed,hegoes sofarastomaintainthatsuchphysicalobject beliefsareoftencertain,somethingneither LockenorHumewouldaccept. Inarguingagainsttheexistenceofmatter, Berkeleyalsomaintainsthatweliterallyhaveno coherentconceptofsuchstuffbecausewecan- nothaveanysensibleideaofit.Parityofreason- ingwouldseemtodictatethatBerkeleyshould rejectmentalsubstanceaswell,therebythreat- eninghisidealismfromanotherquarter.Berke- leyissensitivetothislineofreasoning,and repliesthatwhilewehavenoideaoftheself,we dohavesomenotionoftheself,thatis,someless- than-completeconcept.Hearguesthataperson gainssomeimmediateknowledgeoftheexis- tenceandnatureofherselfinareflexad;thatis, whensheisperceivingsomethingsheisalsocon- sciousthatsomethingisengaginginthispercep- tion,andthisissufficientforknowledgeofthat perceivingentity. Tocomplementhisidealism,Berkeleyworked outaversionofscientificinstrumentalism,both inthePrinciplesandinalåterLatinwork,DeMotu (1721),adoctrinethatanticipatestheviewsof Mach.IntheDialogueshetriestoshowhowhis idealismisconsistentwiththebiblicalaccountof thecreation,andconsistentaswellwithcom- monsense. 84 Berlin,Isaiah Berlin,Isaiah ThreelåterworksofBerkeley'sgainedhiman enormousamountofattention.Alciphron(1734) waswrittenwhileBerkeleywasinRhodeIsland, andisaphilosophicaldefenseofChristiandoc- trine.Italsocontainssomeadditionalcomments onperception,supplementingearlierworkon thattopic.TheAnalyst(1734)containstrenchant criticismofthemethodoffluxionsindifferential calculus,anditsetoffaflurryofpamphletreplies toBerkeley'scriticisms,towhichBerkeley respondedinhisADefenseofFreeThinkingin Mathematics.Siris(1744)containsadetailed accountofthemedicinalvaluesoftar-water, waterboiledwiththebarkofcertaintrees.This bookalsocontainsadefenseofasortofcorpus- cularianphilosophythatseemstobeatoddswith theidealismelaboratedintheearlierworksfor whichBerkeleyisnowfamous. Intheyears1707-08,theyouthfulBerkeley keptaseriesofnotebooksinwhichheworked outhisideasinphilosophyandmathematics. Thesebooks,nowknownasthePhilosophical Commentaries,providethestudentofBerkeley withtherareopportunitytoseeagreatphiloso- pher'sthoughtindevelopment. Seealsohume,idealism,locke,percep- tion,PHENOMENALISM.G.S.P. Berlin,Isaiah(1909-97),Britishphilosopherand historianofideas.Heiswidelyacclaimedforhis doctrineofradicalobjectivepluralism;hiswrit- ingsonliberty;hismodification,refinement,and defenseoftraditionalliberalismagainstthetotal- itariandoctrinesofthetwentiethcentury(not leastMarxism-Leninism);andhisbrilliantand illuminatingstudiesinthehistoryofideasfrom MachiavelliandVicotoMarxandSorel.A foundingfatherwithAustin,Ayer,andothersof Oxfordphilosophyinthe1930s,hepublished severalinfluentialpapersinitsgeneralspirit,but, withoutabandoningitsempiricalapproach,he cameincreasinglytodissentfromwhatseemed tohimitsundulybarren,doctrinaire,andtruth- denyingtendencies.Fromthe1950sonwardhe brokeawaytodevotehimselfprincipallyto socialandpoliticalphilosophyandtothestudy ofgeneralideas. Histwomostimportantcontributionsinsocial andpoliticaltheory,broughttogetherwithtwo othervaluableessaysinFourEssaysonLiberty (1969),are"HistoricalInevitability"(1954)and his1958inaugurallectureasChicheleProfessor ofSocialandPoliticalTheoryatOxford,"Two ConceptsofLiberty."Thefirstisaböldanddeci- siveattackonhistoricaldeterminismandmoral relativismandsubjectivismandaringingen- dorsementoftheroleoffreewillandresponsi- bilityinhumanhistory.Thesecondcontains Berlin'senormouslyinfluentialattempttodis- tinguishclearlybetween"negative"and"posi- tive"liberty.Negativeliberty,foreshadowedby suchthinkersasJ.S.Mill,Constant,andabove allHerzen,consistsinmakingminimalassump- tionsabouttheultimatenatureandneedsofthe subject,inensuringaminimumofexternal interferencebyauthorityofanyprovenance, andinleavingopenaslargeafieldforfreeindi- vidualchoiceasisconsonantwithaminimumof socialorganizationandorder.Positiveliberty, associatedwithmonistandvoluntaristthinkers ofallkinds,notleastHegel,theGermanIdeal- ists,andtheirhistoricalprogeny,beginswiththe notionofself-masteryandproceedstomake dogmaticandfar-reachingmetaphysicalas- sumptionsabouttheessenceofthesubject.It thendeducesfromthesetheproperpathstofree- dom,and,finally,seekstodriveflesh-and-blood individualsdownthesepreordainedpaths, whethertheywishitornot,withintheframe- workofatight-knitcentralizedstateunderthe irrefragableruleofrationalexperts,thusper- vertingwhatbeginsasalegitimatehumanideal, i.e.positiveself-directionandself-mastery,into atyranny."TwoConceptsofLiberty"alsosetsout todisentanglelibertyineitherofthesesenses fromotherends,suchasthecravingforrecogni- tion,theneedtobelong,orhumansolidarity, fraternity,orequality. Berlin'sworkinthehistoryofideasisofapiece withhisotherwritings.VicoandHerder(1976) presentstheemergenceofthathistoricismand pluralismwhichshookthetwo-thousand-year- oldmonistrationalistfaithinaunifiedbodyof truthregardingallquestionsoffactandprinciple inallfieldsofhumanknowledge.Fromthispro- foundintellectualoverturnBerlintracesinsub- sequentvolumesofessays,suchasAgainstthe Current(1979),TheCrookedTimberofHumanity (1990),andTheSenseofReality(1996),the growthofsomeoftheprincipalintellectual movementsthatmarkourera,amongthem nationalism,fascism,relativism,subjectivism, nihilism,voluntarism,andexistentialism.He alsopresentswithpersuasivenessandclaritythat peculiarobjectivepluralismwhichheidentified andmadehisown.Thereisanirreducibleplu- ralityofobjectivehumanvalues,manyofwhich areincompatiblewithoneanother;hencethe ineluctableneedforabsolutechoicesbyindivid- ualsandgroups,aneedthatconferssupreme valueupon,andformsoneofthemajorjustifi- cationsof,hisconceptionofnegativeliberty; 85 BernardofChartres Bertrand'sboxparadox hence,too,hisinsistencethatutopia,namelya worldwhereallvalidhumanendsandobjective valuesaresimultaneouslyrealizedinanultimate synthesis,isaconceptualimpossibility. Whilenothimselffounderofanydefmable schoolormovement,Berlin'sinfluenceasa philosopherandasahumanbeinghasbeen immense,notleastonavarietyofdistinguished thinkerssuchasStuartHampshire,CharlesTay- lor,BernardWilliams,RichardWollheim,Gerry Cohen,StevenLukes,DavidPears,andmany others.Hisgeneralintellectualandmoralimpact onthelifeofthetwentiethcenturyaswriter, diplomat,patronofmusicandthearts,interna- tionalacademicelderstatesman,lovedand trustedfriendtothegreatandthehumble,and dazzlinglecturer,conversationalist,andanima- teurdesidées,willfurnishinexhaustiblematerial tofuturehistorians. Seealsofreewillproblem,liberalism, POLITICALPHILOSOPHY,POSITIVEANDNEGA- TIVEFREEDOM.R.HaU. BernardofChartres(fl.1114-26),French philosopher.Hewasfirstateacher(1114-19) andlåterchancellor(1119-26)ofthecathedral schoolatChartres,whichwasthenanactive centeroflearningintheliberalartsandphiloso- phy.Bernardhimselfwasrenownedasagram- marian,i.e.,asanexpositorofdifficulttexts,and asateacherofPlato.Noneofhisworkshassur- vivedwhole,andonlythreefragmentsarepre- servedinworksbyothers.Heisnowbestknown foranimagerecordedbothbyhisstudent,John ofSalisbury,andbyWilliamofConches.In Bernard'simage,heandallhismedievalcon- temporarieswereinrelationtotheancient authorslike"dwarfssittingontheshouldersof giants."JohnofSalisburytakestheimageto meanboththatthemedievalscouldseemore andfurtherthantheancients,andthatthey coulddosoonlybecausetheyhadbeenliftedup bysuchpowerfulpredecessors.M.D.J. BernardofClairvaux,Saint(1090-1153),French Cistercianmonk,mystic,andreligiousleader.He ismostnotedforhisdoctrineofChristianhumil- ityandhisdepictionofthemysticalexperience, whichexertedconsiderableinfluenceonlåter Christianmystics.EducatedinFrance,he enteredthemonasteryatCiteauxin1112,and threeyearslåterfoundedadaughtermonastery atClairvaux. AccordingtoBernard,honestself-knowledge shouldrevealtheextenttowhichwefailtobe whatweshouldbeintheeyesofGod.Thatself- knowledgeshouldleadustocurbourprideand sobecomemorehumble.Humilityisnecessary forspiritualpurification,whichinturnisneces- saryforcontemplationofGod,thehighestform ofwhichisunionwithGod.Consistentwith orthodoxChristiandoctrine,Bernardmaintains thatmysticaluniondoesnotentailidentity.One doesnotbecomeGod;rather,one'swilland God'swillcomeintocompleteconformity. Seealsomysticism.W.E.M. Bernoulli'stheorem,alsocalledthe(weak)law oflargenumbers,theprinciplethatifaseriesof trialsisrepeatedntimeswhere(a)therearetwo possibleoutcomes,and1,oneachtrial,(b)the probabilitypofisthesameoneachtrial,and (c)thisprobabilityisindependentoftheout- comeofothertrials,then,forarbitrarypositive e,asthenumbernoftrialsisincreased,theprob- abilitythattheabsolutevalueIrln—p\ofthe differencebetweentherelativefrequencyrlnof 0'sinthentrialsandpislessthaneapproaches 1.Thefirstproofofthistheoremwasgivenby JakobBernoulliinPartIVofhisposthumously TpubMshedArsConjectandioi1713.Simplifications werelåterconstructedandhisresulthasbeen generalizedinaseriesof"weaklawsoflarge numbers."AlthoughBernoulli'stheoremde- rivesaconclusionabouttheprobabilityofthe relativefrequencyrlnof0'sforlargenoftrials giventhevalueofp,inArsConjectandiandcor- respondencewithLeibniz,Bernoullithoughtit couldbeusedtoreasonfrominformationabout rlntothevalueofpwhenthelatterisunknown. SpeculationpersistsastowhetherBernoulli anticipatedtheinverseinferenceofBayes,the confidenceintervalestimationofPeirce, J.Neyman,andE.S.Pearson,orthefiducial argumentofR.A.Fisher.Seealsoprobabil- ity.I.L. Berry'sparadox.Seesemanticparadoxes. Bertrand'sboxparadox,apuzzleconcerningcon- ditionalprobability.Imaginethreeboxeswith twodrawersapiece.Eachdrawerofthefirstbox containsagoldmedal.Eachdrawerofthesec- ondcontainsasilvermedal.Onedrawerofthe thirdcontainsagoldmedal,andtheotherasil- vermedal.Atrandom,aboxisselectedandone ofitsdrawersisopened.Ifagoldmedalappears, whatistheprobabilitythatthethirdboxwas selected?TheprobabilityseemstobeV2,because theboxiseitherthefirstorthethird,andthey seemequallyprobable.Butagoldmedalisless probablefromthethirdboxthanfromthefirst, 86 Bertrand'sparadox bhakti sothethirdboxisactuallylessprobablethanthe first.ByBayes'stheoremitsprobabilityislh. JosephBertrand,aFrenchmathematician,pub- lishedtheparadoxinCalculdesprobabilités(Cal- culusofProbabilities,1889).Seealsobayes's THEOREM,PROBABILITY.P.We. BertrancTsparadox,aninconsistencyarising fromtheclassicaldefinitionofanevenfsproba- bilityasthenumberoffavorablecasesdividedby thenumberofpossiblecases.Givenacircle,a chordisselectedatrandom.Whatistheproba- bilitythatthechordislongerthanasideofan equilateraltriangleinscribedinthecircle?The eventhasthesecharacterizations:(1)theapex angleofanisoscelestriangleinscribedinthecir- cleandhavingthechordasalegislessthan60°, (2)thechordintersectsthediameterperpendic- ulartoitlessthanV2aradiusfromthecircle's center,and(3)thechord'smidpointlieswithin acircleconcentricwiththeoriginalandof14its area.Thedefinitionthussuggeststhattheevenfs probabilityisV3,V2,andalsoVi.JosephBertrand, aFrenchmathematician,publishedtheparadox inCalculdesprobabilités(1889).Seealsoprob- ability.P.We. Beth'sdefinabilitytheorem,atheoremforfirst- orderlogic.Atheorydefinesatermtimplicitlyif andonlyifanexplicitdefinitionoftheterm,on thebasisoftheotherprimitiveconcepts,is entailedbythetheory.Atheorydefinesaterm implicitlyifanytwomodelsofthetheorywith thesamedomainandthesameextensionforthe otherprimitivetermsareidentical,i.e.,alsohave thesameextensionfortheterm.Anexplicitdef- initionofatermisasentencethatstatesneces- saryandsufficientconditionsfortheterm's applicability.Beth'stheoremwasimplicitina methodtoshowindependenceofatermthat wasfirstusedbytheItalianlogicianAlessandro Padoa(1868-1937).Padoasuggested,in1900, thatindependenceofaprimitivealgebraicterm fromtheothertermsoccurringinasetofaxioms canbeestablishedbytwotrueinterpretationsof theaxiomsthatdifferonlyintheinterpretation ofthetermwhoseindependencehastobe proven.Heclaimed,withoutproof,thattheexis- tenceoftwosuchmodelsisnotonlysufficient for,butalsoimpliedby,independence. TarskifirstgaveaproofofBeth'stheoremin 1926forthelogicofthePrincipiaMatliematicaof WhiteheadandRussell,buttheresultwasonly obtainedforfirst-orderlogicin1953bythe DutchlogicianEvertBeth(1908-64).Inmodern expositionsBeth'stheoremisadirectimplication ofCraig'sinterpolationtheorem.Inavariation onPadoa'smethod,KareldeBouvéredescribed in1959aone-modelmethodtoshowindefin- ability:ifthesetoflogicalconsequencesofathe- oryformulatedintermsoftheremaining vocabularycannotbeextendedtoamodelofthe fulltheory,atermisnotexplicitlydefinablein termsoftheremainingvocabulary.Inthephi- losophyofscienceliteraturethisiscalledafail- ureofRamsey-eliminabilityoftheterm. SeealsoMODELTHEORY.Z.G.S. BhagavadCita(fromSanskritBhagavadgitä,'song oftheblessedone/exaltedlord'),Hindudevo- tionalpoemcomposedandeditedbetweenthe fifthcenturyb.c.andthesecondcenturya.d.It containseighteenchaptersandsevenhundred verses,andformsthesixthbook(Chapters23- 40)oftheIndianepicMahabharata.Initsnarra- tive,thewarriorArjuna,reluctantlywaitingto wagewar,receivesarevelationfromtheLord Krishnathatemphasizesselflessdeedsand bhakti,ordevotion.Strictlyclassifiedassmrtior fallibletradition,theGitaistypicallytreatedas shrutiorinfalliblerevelation.Suchmajorthink- ersasSharikara,Rämänuja,andMadhvawrote commentariesonthisbelovedbook.Sharikara readsitasteachingthatenlightenmentcomes throughright(AdvaitaVedanta)knowledge aloneevenwithoutperformanceofreligious duties.Rämänujatakesittoholdthatenlighten- mentcomesthroughperformanceofreligious duties,particularlydevotiontoGodforwhose sakealoneallotherdutiesmustbeperformedif one'ssinsaretobewashedaway.Suchdevotion leadsto(oratitszenithincludes)self-knowledge andknowledgeofpersonalBrahman.Madhva seestheGitaasemphasizingdivineuniqueness andthenecessityofloveandattachmenttoGod andnottooneselfortheconsequencesofone's deeds.K.E.Y. bhakti(Sanskrit),inHindutheisticthoughtsys- tems,devotion.Bhaktiincludestheideasoffaith, surrender,love,affection,andattachment.Its mostcommonformofexpressionisworshipby meansofofferings,piijä.Theisticthinkerssuchas RämänujaandMadhvaarguethatdevotionis thekeyelementthatsolvesthehumanpredica- ment.Asaresultthedeityrespondswithgrace orkindness(prasädam)andtherebycausesthe devoteetoprosperorattainmoksha.TheBhakti Sutras(twelfthcenturya.d.)distinguish"lower bhakti,"i.e.,devotionwithpersonalgoalsin mind,from"higherbhakti,"i.e.,selflessdevotion practicedonlytopleasethedeity.Thelatterislib- 87 bhavahga bioethics eration.ModernHinduphilosophers,following ShaiikaraandthemodernHinduapologist SwamiVivekänanda(1862-1902),oftenrele- gatebhaktitoalowerpaththanknowledge (jriäna)forthosewhoareunabletofollowphi- losophy,butinthephilosophicalsystemsof manytheistsitisdefendedasthehighestpath withthemainobstacleasunbelief,notigno- rance.Seealsohinduism.R.N.Mi. bhavahga,asubliminalmodeofconsciousness, accordingtoTheravadaBuddhistphilosophers, inwhichnomentalactivityoccurs.Thecontin- uedexistenceofthebhavatiga-mmdinstates wherethereisnointentionalmentalactivity (e.g.,dreamlesssleep)iswhatguaranteesthe continuanceofaparticularmentalcontinuumin suchstates.Itoperatesalsoinordinaryeventsof sensationandconceptualization,beingcon- nectedwithsuchintentionalmentaleventsin complexways,andisappealedtoasanexplana- torycategoryintheaccountsoftheprocesslead- ingfromdeathtorebirth.SomeBuddhistsalso useitasasoteriologicalcategory,identifyingthe bhavariga-mindwithmindinitspurestate,mind asluminousandradiant.Seealsoälaya- VIJNÄNA,NIRODHA-SAMÄPATTI.P.J.G. biconditional,thelogicaloperator,usually writtenwithatriple-barsign(=)oradouble- headedarrow(),usedtoindicatethattwo propositionshavethesametruth-value:that eitherbotharetrueorelsebotharefalse.The termalsodesignatesapropositionhavingthis sign,oranaturallanguageexpressionofit,asits mainconnective;e.g.,PifandonlyifQ.Thetruth tableforthebiconditionalis PQP-biconditional-Q TTT TFF FTF FFT Thebiconditionalissocalledbecauseitsapplica- tionislogicallyequivalenttotheconjunction '(P-conditional-Q)-and-(Q-conditional-P)'.See alsoTRUTHTABLE.R.W.B. biconditional,Tarskian.Seetarski. bilateralreductionsentence.Seereductionsen- TENCE. binaryquantifier.Seepluralitivelogic. bioethics,thesubfieldofethicsthatconcernsthe ethicalissuesarisinginmedicineandfrom advancesinbiologicalscience.Onecentralarea ofbioethicsistheethicalissuesthatariseinrela- tionsbetweenhealthcareprofessionalsand patients.Asecondareafocusesonbroaderissues ofsocialjusticeinhealthcare.Athirdareacon- cernstheethicalissuesraisedbynewbiological knowledgeortechnology. Inrelationsbetweenhealthcareprofessionals andpatients,afundamentalissueistheappro- priateroleofeachindecisionmakingabout patientcare.Moretraditionalviewsassigning principaldecision-makingauthoritytophysi- cianshavelargelybeenreplacedwithidealsof shareddecisionmakingthatassignamoreactive roletopatients.Shareddecisionmakingis thoughttoreflectbettertheimportanceof patients'self-determinationincontrollingtheir care.Thisincreasedroleforpatientsisreflected intheethicalandlegaldoctrineofinformedcon- sent,whichrequiresthathealthcarenotberen- deredwithouttheinformedandvoluntary consentofacompetentpatient.Therequirement thatconsentbeinformedplacesapositive responsibilityonhealthcareprofessionalstopro- videtheirpatientswiththeinformationthey needtomakeinformeddecisionsaboutcare.The requirementthatconsentbevoluntaryrequires thattreatmentnotbeforced,northatpatients' decisionsbecoercedormanipulated.Ifpatients lackthecapacitytomakecompetenthealthcare decisions,e.g.youngchildrenorcognitively impairedadults,asurrogate,typicallyaparentin thecaseofchildrenoraclosefamilymemberin thecaseofadults,mustdecideforthem.Surro- gates'decisionsshouldfollowthepatienfs advancedirectiveifoneexists,bethedecision thepatientwouldhavemadeinthecircum- stancesifcompetent,orfollowthepatienfsbest interestsifthepatienthasneverbeencompetent orhisorherwishesarenotknown. Amajorfocusinbioethicsgenerally,andtreat- mentdecisionmakinginparticular,iscareator neartheendoflife.Itisnowwidelyagreedthat patientsareentitledtodecideaboutandto refuse,accordingtotheirownvalues,anylife- sustainingtreatment.Theyarealsoentitledto havedesiredtreatmentsthatmayshortentheir lives,suchashighdosesofpainmedicationsnec- essarytorelieveseverepainfromcancer, althoughinpracticepaintreatmentremains inadequateformanypatients.Muchmorecon- troversialiswhethermoreactivemeanstoend lifesuchasphysician-assistedsuicideandvolun- taryeuthanasiaaremorallypermissibleinindi- 88 biologicalnaturalism Birkhoff-vonNeumannlogic vidualcasesorjustifiedaspublicpolicy;both remainillegalexceptinaveryfewjurisdictions. Severalothermoralprincipleshavebeencen- traltodefmingprofessional-patientrelation- shipsinhealthcare.Aprincipleoftruthtelling requiresthatprofessionalsnotlietopatients. Whereasinthepastitwascommon,especially withpatientswithterminalcancers,notto informpatientsfullyabouttheirdiagnosisand prognosis,studieshaveshownthatpracticehas changedsubstantiallyandthatfullyinforming patientsdoesnothavethebadeffectsforpatients thathadbeenfearedinthepast.Principlesofpri- vacyandconfidentialityrequirethatinformation gatheredintheprofessional-patientrelationship notbedisclosedtothirdpartieswithoutpatients' consent.Especiallywithhighlypersonalinfor- mationinmentalhealthcare,orinformation thatmayleadtodiscrimination,suchasadiag- nosisofAIDS,assuranceofconfidentialityisfun- damentaltothetrustnecessarytoawell- functioningprofessional-patientrelationship. Nevertheless,exceptionstoconfidentialityto preventimminentandseriousharmtoothersare wellrecognizedethicallyandlegally. Morerecently,workinbioethicshasfocused onjusticeintheallocationofhealthcare. Whereasnearlyalldevelopedcountriestreat healthcareasamoralandlegalright,andensure ittoalltheircitizensthroughsomeformof nationalhealthcaresystem,intheUnitedStates about15percentofthepopulationremains withoutanyformofhealthinsurance.Thishas feddebatesaboutwhetherhealthcareisaright orprivilege,apublicorindividualresponsibility. Mostbioethicistshavesupportedarightto healthcarebecauseofhealthcare'sfundamental impactonpeople'swell-being,opportunity,abil- itytoplantheirlives,andevenlivesthemselves. Evenifthereisamoralrighttohealthcare,how- ever,fewdefendanunlimitedrighttoallbene- ficialhealthcare,nomatterhowsmallthebenefit andhowhighthecost.Consequently,itisnec- essarytoprioritizeorrationhealthcareservices toreflectlimitedbudgetsforhealthcare,and boththestandardsandproceduresfordoingso areethicallycontroversial.Utilitariansandde- fendersofcost-effectivenessanalysisinhealth policysupportusinglimitedresourcestomaxi- mizeaggregatehealthbenefitsforthepopula- tion.Theircriticsarguethatthisignoresconcerns aboutequity,concernsabouthowhealthcare resourcesandhealtharedistributed.Forexam- ple,somehavearguedthatequityrequiresgiv- ingprioritytotreatingtheworst-offorsickest, evenatasacrificeinaggregatehealthbenefits; moreover,takingaccountinprioritizationofdif- ferencesincostsofdifferenttreatmentscanlead toethicallyproblematicresults,suchasgiving higherprioritytoprovidingverysmallbenefitsto manypersonsthanverylargebutindividually moreexpensivebenefits,includinglife-saving interventions,toafewpersons,asthestateof Oregonfoundinitsinitialwidelypublicizedpri- oritizationprogram.Inthefaceofcontroversy överstandardsforrationingcare,itisnaturalto relyonfairprocedurestomakerationingdeci- sions. Otherbioethicsissuesarisefromdramatic advancesinbiologicalknowledgeandtechnol- ogy.Perhapsthemostprominentexampleisnew knowledgeofhumangenetics,propelledinsub- stantialpartbytheworldwideHumanGenome Project,whichseekstomaptheentirehuman genome.Thisprojectandrelatedresearchwill enablethepreventionofgeneticallytransmitted diseases,butalreadyraisesquestionsabout whichconditionstopreventinoffspringand whichshouldbeacceptedandlivedwith,partic- ularlywhenthemeansofpreventingthecondi- tionisbyabortionofthefetuswiththecondition. Lookingfurtherintothefuture,newgenetic knowledgeandtechnologywilllikelyenableus toenhancenormalcapacities,notjustpreventor curedisease,andtomanipulatethegenesof futurechildren,raisingprofoundlydifficultques- tionsaboutwhatkindsofpersonstocreateand thedegreetowhichdeliberatehumandesign shouldreplace"nature"inthecreationofour offspring.Adramaticexampleofnewabilitiesto createoffspring,thoughnowlimitedtotheani- malrealm,wasthedoninginScotlandin1997 ofasheepfromasinglecellofanadultsheep; thiseventraisedtheverycontroversialfuture prospectofdoninghumanbeings.Finally,new reproductivetechnologies,suchasoocyte(egg) donation,andpracticessuchassurrogatemoth- erhood,raisedeepissuesaboutthemeaningand natureofparenthoodandfamilies. Seealsodignity,ethics,euthanasia, INFORMEDCONSENT.D.W.B. biologicalnaturalism.Seesearle. biology,autonomyof.Seeunityofscience. biology,philosophyof.Seephilosophyofbiol- biology,social.Seesocialbiology. Birkhoff-vonNeumannlogic.Seequantumlogic. 89 bit Blondel,Maurice bit(frombinarydigii),aunitormeasureofinfor- mation.SuggestedbyJohnW.Tukey,abitisboth anamountofinformation(areductionofeight equallylikelypossibilitiestoonegeneratesthree bits[=log28]ofinformation)andasystemof representingthatquantity.Thebinarysystem usesl'sand0's.Seealsoinformationthe- ORY.F.A. bivalence,principleof.Seeprincipleofbiva- LENCE. blackbox,ahypotheticalunitspecifiedoniyby functionalrole,inordertoexplainsomeeffector behavior.Thetermmayrefertoasingieentity withanunknownstructure,orunknowninter- nalorganization,whichrealizessomeknown function,ortoanyoneofasystemofsuchenti- ties,whoseorganizationandfunctionsare inferredfromthebehaviorofanorganismor entityofwhichtheyareconstituents. Withinbehaviorismandciassicallearningthe- ory,thebasicfunctionsweretakentobegener- alizedmechanismsgoverningtherelationshipof stimulustoresponse,includingreinforcement, inhibition,extinction,andarousal.Theorgan- ismwastreatedasablackboxrealizingthese functions.Withincybernetics,thoughthereare nosimpleinput-outputrulesdescribingthe organism,thereisanemphasisonfunctional organizationandfeedbackincontrollingbehav- ior.Thecomponentswithinacyberneticsystem aretreatedasblackboxes.Inbothcases,the detailsofunderlyingstructure,mechanism,and dynamicsareeitherunknownorregardedas unimportant. Seealsobehaviorism,philosophyof MIND,THEORETICALTERM.R.C.R. bleen.Seegrueparadox. blindsight,aresidualvisualcapacityresulting fromlesionsincertainareasofthebrain(thestri- atecortex,area17).Underroutineclinicaltest- ing,personssufferingsuchlesionsappeartobe denselyblindinparticularregionsofthevisual field.Researchershavelongrecognizedthat,in primates,comparablelesionsdonotresultin similardeficits.Ithasseemedunlikelythatthis disparitycouldbeduetodifferencesinbrain function,however.And,indeed,whenhuman subjectsaretestedinthewaynon-humansub- jectsaretested,thedisparityvanishes.Although subjectsreportthattheycandetectnothingin theblindfield,whenrequiredto"guess"atprop- ertiesofitemssituatedthere,theyperform remarkablywell.Theyseemto"know"thecon- tentsoftheblindfieldwhileremainingunaware thattheyknow,oftenexpressingastonishment onbeingtoldtheresultsoftestingintheblind field.Seealsoperception.J.F.H. Bloch,Ernst(1885-1977),Germanphilosopher. InfluencedbyMarxism,hisviewswentbeyond Marxismashematured.HeHedGermanyinthe 1930s,butreturnedafterWorldWarIItoapro- fessorshipinEastGermany,wherehisincreas- inglyunorthodoxideaswereeventuallycen- suredbytheCommunistauthorities,forcinga movetoWestGermanyinthe1960s.Hismajor work,ThePrincipleofHope(1954-59),isinflu- encedbyGermanidealism,Jewishmysticism, Neoplatonism,utopianism,andnumerousother sourcesbesidesMarxism.Humansareessentially unfinished,movedbyacosmicimpulse,"hope," atendencyinthemtostrivefortheas-yet-unre- alized,whichmanifestsitselfasutopia,orvision offuturepossibilities.Despitehisatheism,Bloch wishedtoretrievethesenseofself-transcending thathesawinthereligiousandmythicaltradi- tionsofhumankind.Hisideashaveconsequently influencedtheologyaswellasphilosophy,e.g. the"theologyofhope"ofJurgenMoltmann. R.H.K. Blondel,Maurice(1861-1949),FrenchChristian philosopherwhodiscoveredthedeistback- groundofhumanaction.Inhismainwork, Action(1893,2drev.ed.1950),Blondelheldthat actionispartoftheverynatureofhumanbeings andassuchbecomesanobjectofphilosophy; throughphilosophy,actionshouldfinditsmean- ing,i.e.realizeitselfrationally.Anappropriate phenomenologyofactionthroughphenomeno- logicaldescriptionuncoversthephenomenal levelofactionbutpointsbeyondit.Sucha supraphenomenalsenseofactionprovidesita metaphysicalstatus.Thisphenomenologyof actionrestsonanimmanentdialecticsofaction: agapbetweentheaimoftheactionanditsreal- ization.Thisgap,whiledissatisfyingtotheactor, alsodriveshimtowardnewactivities.Theonly immanentsolutionofthisdialecticsanditscon- sequencesisatranscendentone.Wehaveto realizethatwe,likeotherhumans,cannotgrasp ourownactivitiesandmustacceptourlimita- tionsandourfinitudeaswellastheinsufficiency ofourphilosophy,whichisnowunderstoodasa philosophyofinsufficiencyandpointstoward theexistenceofthesupernaturalelementin everyhumanact,namelyGod.Humanactivity istheoutcomeofdivinegrace.Throughaction 90 bodilycontinuity Boethius,AniciusManliusSeverinus onetouchestheexistenceofGod,somethingnot possiblebylogicalargumentation. InthelåterphaseofhisdevelopmentBlondel desertedhisearly"anti-intellectualism"and stressedthecloserelationbetweenthought andaction,nowunderstoodasinseparableand mutuallyinterrelated.Hecametoseephiloso- phyasarationalinstrumentofunderstanding one'sactionsaswellasone'sinsufficiency. G.Fl. bodilycontinuity.Seepersonalidentity. Bodin,Jean(c.1529-96),Frenchpolitical philosopherwhosephilosophycentersonthe conceptofsovereignty.HisSixlivrésdela république(1577)definesastateasconstitutedby commonpublicinterests,families,andthesov- ereign.Thesovereignisthelawgiver,whostånds beyondtheabsoluterightshepossesses;hemust, however,followthelawofGod,naturallaw,and theconstitution.TheidealstatewasforBodina monarchythatusesaristocraticanddemocratic structuresofgovernmentforthesakeofthe commongood.Inordertoachieveabroader empiricalpictureofpoliticsBodinusedhistorical comparisons.Thisismethodologicallyreflected inhisMethodusadfacilemhistoriarumcognitionem (1566). Bodinwasclearlyatheoristofabsolutism.As amemberofthePolitiquegroupheplayedaprac- ticalroleinemancipatingthestatefromthe church.Histhinkingwasinfluencedbyhisexpe- rienceofcivilwar.InhisHeptaplomeres(posthu- mous)hepleadedfortolerancewithrespectto allreligions,includingIslamandJudaism.Asa publicprosecutor,however,hewroteamanual forjudgesinwitchcrafttrials(Deladémonomanie dessorciers,1580).Bystressingthepeacemaking roleofastrongstateBodinwasaforerunnerof Hobbes. Seealsohobbes,politicalphilosophy. H.P. body,objective.Seeembodiment. body,phenomenal.Seeembodiment. Boehme,Jakob(1575-1624),GermanProtestant speculativemystic.Influencedespeciallyby Paracelsus,Boehmereceivedlittleformåleduca- tion,butwassuccessfulenoughasashoemaker todevotehimselftohiswriting,explicatinghis religiousexperiences.Hepublishedlittleinhis lifetime,thoughenoughtoattractchargesof heresyfromlocalclergy.Hedidgatherfollowers, andhisworkswerepublishedafterhisdeath.His writingsareelaboratelysymbolicratherthan argumentative,butresponddeeplytofunda- mentalproblemsintheChristianworldview.He holdsthattheGodhead,omnipotentwill,isas nothingtous,sincewecaninnowaygraspit. TheMysteriumMagnum,theidealworld,iscon- ceivedinGod'smindthroughanimpulsetoself- revelation.Theactualworld,separatefromGod, iscreatedthroughHiswill,andseekstoretumto thepeaceoftheGodhead.Theworldisgood,as Godis,butitsgoodnessfallsaway,andisrestored attheendofhistory,thoughnotentirely,for somesoulsaredamnedeternally.Humanbeings enjoyfreewill,andcreatethemselvesthrough rebirthinfaith.TheFallisnecessaryfortheself- knowledgegainedinrecoveryfromit.Recogni- tionofone'shidden,freeselfisarecognitionof Godmanifestedintheworld,sothathumansal- vationcompletesGod'sactofself-revelation.Itis alsoarecognitionofevilrootedintheblindwill underlyingallindividualexistence,without whichtherewouldbenothingexcepttheGod- head.Boehme'sworksinfluencedHegelandthe låterSchelling.Seealsomysticism,paracel- sus.J.Lo. Boethius,AniciusManliusSeverinus(c.480- 525),RomanphilosopherandAristoteliantrans- latorandcommentator.Hewasbornintoa wealthypatricianfamilyinRomeandhadadis- tinguishedpoliticalcareerundertheOstrogothic kingTheodoricbeforebeingarrestedandexe- cutedonchargesoftreason.Hislogicandphilo- sophicaltheologycontainimportantcontribu- tionstothephilosophyofthelateclassicaland earlymedievalperiods,andhistranslationsof andcommentariesonAristotleprofoundlyinflu- encedthehistoryofphilosophy,particularlyin themedievalLatinWest. Hismostfamouswork,TheConsolationofPhi- losophy,composedduringhisimprisonment,isa movingreflectiononthenatureofhumanhap- pinessandtheproblemofevilandcontainsclas- sicdiscussionsofprovidence,fäte,chance,and theapparentincompatibilityofdivinefore- knowledgeandhumanfreechoice.Hewas knownduringhisownlifetime,however,asa brilliantscholarwhoseknowledgeoftheGreek languageandancientGreekphilosophysethim apartfromhisLatincontemporaries.Hecon- ceivedhisscholarlycareerasdevotedtopreserv- ingandmakingaccessibletotheLatinWestthe greatphilosophicalachievementofancient Greece.Tothisendheannouncedanambitious plantotranslateintoLatinandwritecommen- 91 Boltzmann,Ludwig Boltzmann,Ludwig tariesonallofPlatoandAristotle,butitseems thatheachievedthisgoalonlyforAristotle's Organon.HisextanttranslationsincludePor- phyry'sIsagoge(anintroductiontoAristotle'sCat- egories)andAristotle'sCategories,OnInterpretation, PriorAnalytics,Topics,andSophisticalRefutations. HewrotetwocommentariesontheIsagogeand OnInterpretationandoneontheCategories,and wehavewhatappeartobehisnotesforacom- mentaryonthePriorAnalytics.Histranslationof thePosteriorAnalyticsandhiscommentaryonthe Topicsarelöst.HealsocommentedonCicero's Topicaandwrotehisowntreatisesonlogic, includingDesyllogismishypotheticis,Desyllogismis categoricis,Introductioincategoricossyllogismos,De divisione,andDetopicisdifferentiis,inwhichhe elaboratesandsupplementsAristotelianlogic. BoethiussharedthecommonNeoplatonist viewthatthePlatonistandAristoteliansystems couldbeharmonizedbyfollowingAristotlein logicandnaturalphilosophyandPlatoinmeta- physicsandtheology.Thisplanforharmoniza- tionrestsonadistinctionbetweentwokindsof forms:(1)formsthatareconjoinedwithmatter toconstitutebodies-these,whichhecalls "images"(imagines),correspondtotheformsin Aristotle'shylomorphicaccountofcorporeal substances;and(2)formsthatarepureand entirelyseparatefrommatter,correspondingto Plato'sontologicallyseparateForms.Hecalls these"trueforms"and"theformsthemselves." Heholdsthattheformer,"enmattered"forms dependfortheirbeingonthelatter,pureforms. Boethiustakesthesethreesortsofentities-bod- ies,enmatteredforms,andseparateforms-tobe therespectiveobjectsofthreedifferentcognitive activities,whichconstitutethethreebranchesof speculativephilosophy.Naturalphilosophyis concernedwithenmatteredformsasenmat- tered,mathematicswithenmatteredformscon- sideredapartfromtheirmatter(thoughthey cannotbeseparatedfrommatterinactuality), andtheologywiththepureandseparateforms. Hethinksthatthementalabstractioncharacter- isticofmathematicsisimportantforunderstand- ingthePeripateticaccountofuniversals:the enmattered,particularformsfoundinsensible thingscanbeconsideredasuniversalwhenthey areconsideredapartfromthematterinwhich theyinhere(thoughtheycannotactuallyexist apartfrommatter).Buthestopsshortofendors- ingthismoderatelyrealistAristotelianaccountof universals.Hiscommitmenttoanontologythat includesnotjustAristoteliannaturalformsbut alsoPlatonistFormsexistingapartfrommatter impliesastrongrealistviewofuniversals. WiththeexceptionofDefidecatholica,whichis astraightforwardcredalstatement,Boethius's theologicaltreatises(DeTrinitate,UtrumPateret Filius,Quomodosubstantiae,andContraEuthychen etNestorium)showhiscommitmenttousinglogic andmetaphysics,particularlytheAristotelian doctrinesofthecategoriesandpredicables,to clarifyandresolveissuesinChristiantheology. DeTrinitate,e.g.,includesahistoricallyinfluential discussionoftheAristoteliancategoriesandthe applicabilityofvariouskindsofpredicatesto God.Runningthroughthesetreatisesishisview thatpredicatesinthecategoryofrelationare uniquebyvirtueofnotalwaysrequiringfortheir applicabilityanontologicalgroundinthesub- jectstowhichtheyapply,adoctrinethatgave risetothecommonmedievaldistinctionbe- tweenso-calledrealandnon-realrelations. Regardlessoftheintrinsicsignificanceof Boethius'sphilosophicalideas,heståndsasa monumentalfigureinthehistoryofmedieval philosophyrivaledinimportanceonlybyAris- totleandAugustine.Untiltherecoveryofthe worksofAristotleinthemid-twelfthcentury, medievalphilosophersdependedalmostentirely onBoethius'stranslationsandcommentariesfor theirknowledgeofpaganancientphilosophy, andhistreatisesonlogiccontinuedtobeinflu- entialthroughouttheMiddleAges.Thepreoc- cupationofearlymedievalphilosopherswith logicandwiththeproblemofuniversalsinpar- ticularisduelargelytotheirhavingbeentutored byBoethiusandBoethius'sAristotle.Thetheo- logicaltreatisesalsoreceivedwideattentionin theMiddleAges,givingrisetoacommentary traditionextendingfromtheninthcentury throughtheRenaissanceandshapingdiscussion ofcentraltheologicaldoctrinessuchastheTrin- ityandIncarnation. Seealsoaristotle,commentarieson ARISTOTLE,FUTURECONTINGENTS,PHILOSO- PHYOFRELIGION,PLATO.S.Ma. Boltzmann,Ludwig(1844-1906),Austrian physicistwhowasaspiritedadvocateofthe atomictheoryandapioneerindevelopingthe kinetictheoryofgasesandstatisticalmechanics. Boltzmann'smostfamousachievementswere thetransportequation,theH-theorem,andthe probabilisticinterpretationofentropy.Thiswork issummarizedinhisVorlesungenilberGastheorie ("LecturesontheTheoryofGases,"1896-98). Heheldchairsinphysicsattheuniversitiesof Graz,Vienna,Munich,andLeipzigbefore returningtoViennaasprofessoroftheoretical physicsin1902.In1903hesucceededMachat 92 Bolzano,Bernard Bolzano,Bernard Viennaandlecturedonthephilosophyofsci- ence. Inthe1890stheatomic-kinetictheorywas attackedbyMachandbytheenergeticistsledby WilhelmOstwald.Boltzmann'scounterattack canbefoundinhisPopuläreSchriften("Populär Writings,"1905).Boltzmannagreedwithhis criticsthatmanyofhismechanicalniodelsofgas moleculescouldnotbetruebut,likeMaxwell, defendedmodelsasinvaluableheuristictools. Boltzmannalsoinsistedthatitwasfutiletotryto eliminateallmetaphysicalpicturesfromtheories infavörofbareequations.ForBoltzmann,the goalofphysicsisnotmerelythediscoveryof equationsbuttheconstructionofacoherentpic- tureofreality.BoltzmanndefendedhisH-theo- remagainstthereversibilityobjectionof LoschmidtandtherecurrenceobjectionofZer- melobyconcedingthataspontaneousdecrease inentropywaspossiblebutextremelyunlikely. Boltzmann'sviewsthatirreversibilitydepends ontheprobabilityofinitialconditionsandthat entropyincreasedeterminesthedirectionof timearedefendedbyReichenbachinTheDirec- tionofTime(1956). Seealsoentropy,mach,maxwell,phi- losophyOFSCIENCE,REICHENBACH.M.C. Bolzano,Bernard(1781-1848),Austrian philosopher.Hestudiedphilosophy,mathemat- ics,physics,andtheologyinPrague;receivedthe Ph.D.;wasordainedapriest(1805);was appointedtoachairinreligionatCharlesUni- versityin1806;and,owingtohiscriticismofthe Austrianconstitution,wasdismissedin1819.He composedhistwomainworksfrom1823 through1841:theWissenschaftslehre(4vols., 1837)andtheposthumousGrössenlehre.His ontologyandlogicalsemanticsinfluenced Husserland,indirectly,Lukasiewicz,Tarski,and othersoftheWarsawSchool.Hisconceptionof ethicsandsocialphilosophyaffectedboththe culturallifeofBohemiaandtheAustriansystem ofeducation. Bolzanorecognizedaprofounddistinction betweentheactualthoughtsandjudgments (Urteile)ofhumanbeings,theirlinguisticexpres- sions,andtheabstractpropositions(Sätzeansich) andtheirpartswhichexistindependentlyof thosethoughts,judgments,andexpressions.A propositioninBolzano'ssenseisapreexistent sequenceofideas-as-such(Vorstellungenansich). Onlypropositionscontainingfiniteideas-as-such areaccessibletothemind.Realthingsexisting concretelyinspaceandtimehavesubsistence (Dasein)whereasabstractobjectssuchaspropo- sitionshaveonlylogicalexistence.Adherences, i.e.,forces,appliedtocertainconcretesubstances giverisetosubjectiveideas,thoughts,orjudg- ments.Asubjectiveideaisapartofajudgment thatisnotitselfajudgment.Thesetofjudgments isorderedbyacausalrelation. Bolzano'sabstractworldisconstitutedofsets, ideas-as-such,certainproperties(Beschaffen- heiten),andobjectsconstructedfromthese.Thus, sentenceshapesareakindofideas-as-such,and certaincomplexesofideas-as-suchconstitute propositions.Ideas-as-suchcanbegenerated fromexpressionsofalanguagebypostulatesfor therelationofbeinganobjectofsomething. Analogously,propertiescanbegeneratedbypos- tulatesfortherelationofsomethingbeing appliedtoanobject. Bolzano'snotionofreligionisbasedonhisdis- tinctionbetweenpropositionsandjudgments. HisLehrbuchderReligionswissenschaft(4vols., 1834)distinguishesbetweenreligioninthe objectiveandsubjectivesenses.Theformerisa setofreligiouspropositions,whereasthelatteris thesetofreligiousviewsofasingleperson. Hence,asubjectivereligioncancontainan objectiveone.Bydefiningareligiousproposition asbeingmoralandimperativestherulesofutil- itarianism,Bolzanointegratedhisnotionofreli- gionwithinhisontology. IntheGrössenlehreBolzanointendedtogivea detailed,well-foundedexpositionofcontempo- rarymathematicsandalsotoinauguratenew domainsofresearch.Naturalnumbersare defined,halfacenturybeforeFrege,asproper- tiesof"bijective"sets(themembersofwhichcan beputinone-to-onecorrespondence),andreal numbersareconceivedaspropertiesofsetsof certaininfinitesequencesofrationalnumbers. Theanalysisofinfinitesetsbroughthimtoreject theEuclideandoctrinethatthewholeisalways greaterthananyofitspartsand,hence,tothe insightthatasetisinfiniteifandonlyifitisbijec- tivetoapropersubsetofitself.Thisanticipates PeirceandDedekind.Bolzano'sextensionofthe linearcontinuumoffinitenumbersbyinfinites- imalsimpliesarelativelyconstructiveapproach tononstandardanalysis.Inthedevelopmentof standardanalysisthemostremarkableresultof theGrössenlehreistheanticipationofWeirstrass's discoverythatthereexistnowheredifferentiable continuousfunctions. TheWissenschaftslehrewasintendedtolaythe logicalandepistemologicalfoundationsof Bolzano'smathematics.Atheoryofsciencein Bolzano'ssenseisacollectionofrulesfordelim- itingthesetofscientifictextbooks.Whethera 93 Bonaventure,Saint Bonaventure,Saint classoftruepropositionsisaworthwhileobject ofrepresentationinascientifictextbookisan ethicalquestiondecidableonutilitarianprinci- ples. Bolzanoproceededfromanexpandedand standardizedordinarylanguagethroughwhich hecoulddescribepropositionsandtheirparts.He definedthesemanticnotionoftruthandintro- ducedthefunctioncorrespondingtoa"replace- ment"operationonpropositions.Oneofhis majorachievementswashisdefinitionoflogical derivability(logischeAbleitbarkeit)betweensetsof propositions:BislogicailyderivablefromAifand onlyifalielementsofthesumofAandBare simultaneouslytrueforsomereplacementof theirnon-logicalideas-as-suchandifallele- mentsofBaretrueforanysuchreplacementthat makesallelementsofAtrue.Inadditiontothis notion,whichissimilartoTarski'sconceptof consequenceof1936,Bolzanointroduceda notioncorrespondingtoGentzen'sconceptof consequence.Apropositionisuniversallyvalid (allgemeingiiltig)ifitisderivablefromthenull class.InhisprooftheoryBolzanoformulated counterpartstoGentzen'scutrule. Bolzanointroducedanotionofinductiveprob- abilityasageneralizationofderivabilityinalim- iteddomain.Thisnotionhastheformålproperties ofconditionalprobability.Thesefeaturesand Bolzano'scharacterizationofprobabilitydensity bythetechniqueofvariationarereminiscentof Wittgenstein'sinductivelogicandCarnap'sthe- oryofregularconfirmationfunctions. Thereplacementofconceptualcomplexesin propositionswould,ifappliedtoaformalized language,correspondcloselytoasubstitution- semanticconceptionofquantification.Hisown philosophicallanguagewasbasedonakindof freelogic.Inessence,Bolzanocharacterizeda substitution-semanticnotionofconsequence withafinitenumberofantecedents.Hisquan- tificationöverindividualandgeneralconcepts amountstotheintroductionofanon-elemen- tarylogicoflowestordercontainingaquantifi- cationtheoryofpredicatevariablesbutno set-theoreticalprinciplessuchaschoiceaxioms. Hisconceptionofuniversalvalidityandofthe semanticsuperstructureoflogicleadstoa semanticallyadequateextensionofthepredi- cate-logicalversionofLewis'ssystemS5of modallogicwithoutparadoxes.Itisalsopossible tosimulateBolzano'stheoryofprobabilityina substitution-semanticallyconstructedtheoryof probabilityfunctions.Hence,bymeansofan ontologicallyparsimonioussuperstructurewith- outpossible-worldsmetaphysics,Bolzanowas abletodelimitessentiallytherealmsofclassical logicaltruthandadditiveprobabilityspaces. IngeometryBolzanocreatedanewfounda- tionfromatopologicalpointofview.Hedefined thenotionofanisolatedpointofasetinaway reminiscentofthenotionofapointatwhicha setiswell-dimensionalinthesenseofUrysohn andMenger.Onthisbasisheintroducedhis topologicalnotionofacontinuumandformu- latedarecursivedefinitionofthedimensionality ofnon-emptysubsetsoftheEuclidean3-space, whichiscloselyrelatedtotheinductivedimen- sionconceptofUrysohnandMenger.Ina remarkableparagraphofanunfinishedlateman- uscriptongeometryhestatedthecelebrated curvetheoremofJordan. Seealsofreelogic,modallogic,phi- LOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICS,PROBABILITY,SET THEORY,TARSKI.J.Be. Bonaventure,Saint(c.1221-74),Italiantheolo- gian.BornJohnofFidanzainBagnorea,Tus- cany,hewaseducatedatParis,earningamaster's degreeinartsandadoctorateintheology.He joinedtheFranciscansabout1243,whilestilla student,andwaselectedministergeneralofthe orderin1257.MadecardinalbishopofAlbano byPopeGregoryXin1274,Bonaventurehelped organizetheSecondEcumenicalCouncilof Lyons,duringthecourseofwhichhedied,in July1274.Hewascanonizedin1482andnamed adoctorofthechurchin1587. Bonaventurewroteandpreachedextensively ontherelationbetweenphilosophyandtheol- ogy,theroleofreasoninspiritualandreligious life,andtheextenttowhichknowledgeinGod isobtainablebythe"wayfarer."Hisbasicposition isnicelyexpressedinDereductionearttumadthe- ologiam("OntheReductionoftheArtstoTheol- ogy"):"themanifoldwisdomofGod,whichis clearlyrevealedinsacredscripture,lieshiddenin allknowledgeandinallnature."Headds,"all divisionsofknowledgearehandmaidsoftheol- ogy."Butheiscriticalofthosetheologianswho wishtosevertheconnectionbetweenfaithand reason.Ashearguesinanotherfamouswork, Itinerariummentisaddeum("TheMind'sJourney untoGod,"1259),"since,relativetoourlifeon earth,theworldisitselfaladderforascendingto God,wefindherecertaintraces,certainimages" ofthedivinehand,inwhichGodhimselfismir- rored. AlthoughBonaventure'sownphilosophical outlookisAugustinian,hewasalsoinfluenced byAristotle,whosenewlyavailableworkshe bothreadandappreciated.Thus,whileuphold- 94 boo-hurrahtheory Booleanalgebra ingtheAristotelianideasthatknowledgeofthe externalworldisbasedonthesensesandthatthe mindcomesintoexistenceasatabularasa,he alsocontendsthatdivineilluminationisneces- sarytoexplainboththeacquisitionofuniversal conceptsfromsenseimages,andthecertaintyof intellectualjudgment.Hisownilluminationist epistemologyseeksamiddlegroundbetween,on theonehand,thosewhomaintainthattheeter- nallightisthesolereasonforhumanknowing, providingthehumanintellectwithitsarchetypal andintelligibleobjects,and,ontheother,those holdingthattheeternallightmerelyinfluences humanknowing,helpingguideittowardtruth. Heholdsthatourintellecthascertainknowledge whenstable;eternalarchetypesare"contuited byus[anobiscontuita],"togetherwithintelligible speciesproducedbyitsownfalliblepowers. Inmetaphysics,Bonaventuredefendsexem- plarism,thedoctrinethatallcreationispat- ternedafterexemplarcausesorideasinthemind ofGod.LikeAquinas,butunlikeDunsScotus,he arguesthatitisthroughsuchideasthatGod knowsallcreatures.Healsoadoptstheemana- tionistprinciplethatcreationproceedsfrom God'sgoodness,whichisself-diffusive,butdif- fersfromotheremanationists,suchasal-Färäbl, Avicenna,andAverroes,inarguingthatdivine emanationisneithernecessarynorindirect(i.e., accomplishedbysecondaryagentsorintelli- gences).Indeed,heseestheviewsofthese Islamicphilosophersastypicaloftheerrors boundtofollowonceAristotelianrationalismis takentoitsextreme.Heisalsowellknownfor hisanti-Aristotelianargumentthattheeternity oftheworld-somethingevenAquinas(follow- ingMaimonides)concedesasatheoreticalpossi- bility-isdemonstrablyfalse. Bonaventurealsosubscribestoseveralother doctrinescharacteristicofmedievalAugustini- anism:universalhylomorphism,thethesis, defendedbyIbnGabirolandAvicenna(among others),thateverythingotherthanGodiscom- posedofmatterandform;thepluralityofforms, theviewthatsubjectsandpredicatesinthecat- egoryofsubstanceareorderedintermsoftheir metaphysicalpriority;andtheontologicalview oftruth,accordingtowhichtruthisakindof rightnessperceivedbythemind.Inasimilar vein,Bonaventurearguesthatknowledgeulti- matelyconsistsinperceivingtruthdirectly,with- outargumentordemonstration. Bonaventurealsowroteseveralclassicworks inthetraditionofmysticaltheology.Hisbest- knownandmostpopulärmysticalworkisthe aforementionedItinerarium,writtenin1259on apilgrimagetoLaVema,duringwhichhebeheld thesix-wingedseraphthathadalsoappearedto FrancisofAssisiwhenFrancisreceivedthestig- mata.Bonaventureoutlinesaseven-stagespiri- tualjoumey,inwhichourmindmovesfromfirst consideringGod'stracesintheperfectionsof irrationalcreatures,toafinalstateofpeaceful repose,inwhichouraffectionsare"transferred andtransformedintoGod."Centraltohiswrit- ingsonspirituallifeisthethemeofthe"three ways":thepurgativeway,inspiredbycon- science,whichexpelssin;theilluminativeway, inspiredbytheintellect,whichimitatesChrist; andtheunitiveway,inspiredbywisdom,which unitesustoGodthroughlove. Bonaventure'swritingsmostimmediately influencedtheworkofothermedievalAugus- tinians,suchasMatthewofAquaspartaand JohnPeckham,andlåter,followersofDunsSco- tus.Buthismodernreputationrestsonhispro- foundcontributionstophilosophicaltheology, Franciscanspirituality,andmysticalthought,in allthreeofwhichheremainsanauthoritative source. Seealsoaristotle,augustine.J.A.Z. boo-hurrahtheory.Seeemotivism. BookofChanges.Seei-ching. bookoflife,expressionfoundinHebrewand Christianscripturessignifyingarecordkeptby theLordofthosedestinedforeternalhappiness (Exodus32:32;Psalms68;Malachi3:16;Daniel 12:l;Philippians4:3;Revelation3:5,17:8,20:12, 21:27).Medievalphilosophersoftenreferredto thebookoflifewhendiscussingissuesofpre- destination,divineomniscience,foreknowledge, andfreewill.FigureslikeAugustineandAquinas askedwhetheritrepresentedGod'sunerring foreknowledgeorpredestination,orwhether somenamescouldbeaddedordeletedfromit. Thetermisusedbysomecontemporaryphiloso- pherstomeanarecordofalltheeventsinaper- son^life.Seealsofreewillproblem. R.H.K. Boole,George.Seebooleanalgebra,logical form. Booleanalgebra,(1)anorderedtriple(B,—,fl), whereBisasetcontainingatleasttwoelements and—andDareunaryandbinaryoperationsin Bsuchthat(z)anb=bna,(ii)aD(bflc)= (anb)nc,(iii)aC\-a=bC\-b,and{tv)an b=aifandonly\laC\—b=aC\—a;(2)thethe- 95 borderlinecase Bosanquet,Bernard oryofsuchalgebras.Suchstructuresaremodern descendantsofalgebraspublishedbythemathe- maticianG.Booleini847andrepresentingthe firstsuccessfulalgebraictreatmentoflogic. (Interpreting—andf~lasnegationandconjunc- tion,respectively,makesBooleanalgebraacal- culusofpropositions.Likewise,ifB={XFjand —andflarethetruth-functionsfornegationand conjunction,then(B,—,Cl)-thetruthtablefor thosetwoconnectives-formsatwo-element Booleanalgebra.)PicturingaBooleanalgebrais simple.(B,—,f~l)isafullsubsetalgebraifBisthe setofallsubsetsofagivensetand—andHare setcomplementationandintersection,respec- tively.TheneveryfiniteBooleanalgebraisiso- morphictoafullsubsetalgebra,whileevery infiniteBooleanalgebraisisomorphictoasubal- gebraofsuchanalgebra.Itisforthisreasonthat Booleanalgebraisoftencharacterizedasthecal- culusofclasses.Seealsosettheory,truth TABLE.G.F.S. borderlinecase,inthelogicalsense,acasethat fallswithinthe"grayarea"or"twilightzone" associatedwithavagueconcept;inthepragmatic sense,adoubtful,disputed,orarguablecase. Thesetwosensesarenotmutuallyexclusive,of course.Amomentoftimenearsunriseorsunset maybeaborderlinecaseofdaytimeornighttime inthelogicalsense,butnotinthepragmatic sense.Asufficientlyfreshlyfertilizedovummay beaborderlinecaseofapersoninbothsenses. Fermafshypothesis,oranyofalargenumberof otherdisputedmathematicalpropositions,may beaborderlinecaseinthepragmaticsensebut notinthelogicalsense.Aborderlinecaseperse ineithersenseneednotbealimitingcaseora degeneratecase.Seealsodegeneratecase, LIMITINGCASE,VAGUENESS.J.Cor. Borninterpretation.Seequantummechanics. Bosanquet,Bernard(1848-1923),Britishphi- losopher,themostsystematicBritishabsolute idealistand,withF.H.Bradley,theleading Britishdefenderofabsoluteidealism.Although hederivedhisnamefromHuguenotancestors, BosanquetwasthoroughlyEnglish.Bornat AltwickandeducatedatHarrowandBalliolCol- lege,Oxford,hewasforelevenyearsafellowof UniversityCollege,Oxford.Thedeathofhis fatherin1880andtheresultinginheritance enabledBosanquettoleaveOxfordforLondon andacareerasawriterandsocialactivist.While writing,hetaughtcoursesfortheLondonEthi- calSociety'sCenterforUniversityExtensionand donatedtimetotheCharityOrganizationSoci- ety.In1895hemarriedhiscoworkerinthe CharityOrganizationSociety,HelenDendy,who wasalsothetranslatorofChristophSigwarfs Logic.Bosanquetwasprofessorofmoralphiloso- phyatSt.Andrewsfrom1903to1908.Hegave theGiffordLecturesin1911and1912.Other- wisehelivedinLondonuntilhisdeath. Bosanquefsmostcomprehensivework,his two-volumeGiffordLectures,ThePrincipleof IndividualityandValueandTheValueandDestinyof theIndividuell,coversmostaspectsofhisphiloso- phy.InThePrincipleofIndividualityandValuehe arguesthatthesearchfortruthproceedsbyelim- inatingcontradictionsinexperience.(ForBosan- quetacontradictionariseswhenthereare incompatibleinterpretationsofthesamefact.) Thisinvolvesmakingdistinctionsthatharmo- nizetheincompatibleinterpretationsinalarger bodyofknowledge.Bosanquetthoughtthere wasnowaytoarrestthisprocessshortofrecog- nizingthatallhumanexperienceformsacom- prehensivewholewhichisreality.Bosanquet calledthistotality"theAbsolute."Justascon- flictinginterpretationsofthesamefactfindhar- moniousplacesintheAbsolute,soconflicting desiresarealsoincluded.TheAbsolutethussat- isfiesalldesiresandprovidesBosanquefsstan- dardforevaluatingotherobjects.Thisisbecause inhisviewthevalueofanobjectisdetermined byitsabilitytosatisfydesires.FromthisBosan- quetconcludedthathumanbeings,asfragments oftheAbsolute,acquiregreatervalueasthey realizethemselvesbypartakingmorefullyinthe Absolute.InTheValueandDestinyoftheIndividual Bosanquetexplainedhowhumanbeingscould dothis.Asfinite,humanbeingsfaceobstacles theycannotovercome;yettheydesirethegood (i.e.,theAbsolute)whichforBosanquetover- comesallobstaclesandsatisfiesalldesires. Humanscanbestrealizeadesireforthegood, Bosanquetthinks,bysurrenderingtheirprivate desiresforthesakeofthegood.Thisattitudeof surrender,whichBosanquetcallsthereligious consciousness,reläteshumanbeingstowhatis permanentlyvaluableinrealityandincreases theirownvalueandsatisfactionaccordingly. Bosanquefsdefenseofthismetaphysical visionrestsheavilyonhisfirstmajorwork,Logic ortheMorphologyofKnowledge(1888;2ded., 1911).Asthesubtitleindicates,Bosanquettook thesubjectmatterofLogictobethestruetureof knowledge.LikeHegel,whowasinmanyways hisinspiration,Bosanquetthoughtthatthe natureofknowledgewasdefinedbystructures repeatedindifferentpartsofknowledge.He 96 Boscovich,RogerJoseph boundvariable calledthesestructuresformsofjudgmentand triedtoshowthatsimplejudgmentsaredepen- dentonincreasinglycomplexonesandfinallyon anall-inclusivejudgmentthatdefinesreality.For example,thesimplestelementofknowledgeisa demonstrativejudgmentlike'Thisishot."But makingsuchajudgmentpresupposesunder- standingthecontrastbetween'this'and'that'. Demonstrativejudgmentsthusdependoncom- parativejudgmentslike"Thisishotterthanthat." Sincethesejudgmentsarelessdependenton otherjudgments,theymorefullyembody humanknowledge.Bosanquetclaimedthatthe seriesofincreasinglycomplexjudgmentsarenot arrangedinasimplelinearorderbutdevelop alongdifferentbranchesfinallyunitingindis- junctivejudgmentsthatattributetorealityan exhaustivesetofmutuallyexclusivealternatives whicharethemselvesjudgments.Whenone containedjudgmentisassertedonthebasisof another,ajudgmentcontainingbothisaninfer- ence.ForBosanquetinferencesaremediated judgmentsthatasserttheirconclusionsbasedon grounds.Whenthesegroundsaremadefullyex- plicitinajudgmentcontainingthem,thatjudg- mentembodiesthenatureofinference:thatone mustaccepttheconclusionorrejectthewholeof knowledge.SinceforBosanquetthedifference betweenanyjudgmentandtherealityitrepre- sentsisthatajudgmentiscomposedofideasthat abstractfromreality,afullycomprehensivejudg- mentincludesallaspectsofreality.Itisthusiden- ticaltoreality.Bylocatingalljudgmentswithin thisone,Bosanquetclaimedtohavedescribed themorphologyofknowledgeaswellastohave shownthatthoughtisidenticaltoreality. Bosanquetremovedanobjectiontothisiden- tificationinHistoryofAesthetics(1892),wherehe tracesthedevelopmentofthephilosophyofthe beautifulfromitsinceptionthroughabsolute idealism.AccordingtoPlatoandAristotlebeauty isfoundinimitationsofreality,whileinobjec- tiveidealismitisrealityinsensuousform. DrawingheavilyonKant,Bosanquetsawthis processasanovercomingoftheopposition betweensenseandreasonbyshowinghowa pleasurablefeelingcanpartakeofreason.He thoughtthatabsoluteidealismexplainedthisby showingthatweexperienceobjectsasbeautiful becausetheirsensiblequalitiesexhibittheuni- fyingactivityofreason. Bosanquettreatedthepoliticalimplicationsof absoluteidealisminhisPhilosophicalTheoryofthe State(1898;3ded.,1920),wherehearguesthat humansachievetheirendsonlyincommunities. AccordingtoBosanquet,allhumansrationally willtheirownends.Becausetheirendsdiffer frommomenttomoment,theendstheyratio- nallywillarethosethatharmonizetheirdesires atparticularmoments.Similarly,becausethe endsofdifferentindividualsoverlapandconflict, whattheyrationallywillareendsthatharmonize theirdesires,whicharetheendsofhumansin communities.Theyarewilledbythegeneralwill, therealizationofwhichisself-ruleorliberty.This providestherationalgroundofpoliticalobliga- tion,sincethemostcomprehensivesystemof modernlifeisthestate,theendofwhichisthe realizationofthebestlifeforitscitizens. Seealsohegel,idealism.J.W.A. Boscovich,RogerJoseph,orRudjerJosip Boskovic(1711-87),Croatianphysicistand philosopher.BornofSerbianandItalianparents, hewasaJesuitandpolymathbestknownforhis ATheoryofNaturalPhilosophyRedncedtoaSingle LawoftheActionsExistinginNature.Thiswork attemptstoexplainallphysicalphenomenain termsoftheattractionsandrepulsionsofpoint particles(puncta)thatareindistinguishablein theirintrinsicqualitativeproperties.According toBoscovich'ssinglelaw,punctaatacertaindis- tanceattract,untiluponapproachingone anothertheyreachapointatwhichtheyrepel, andeventuallyreachequilibrium.Thus, Boscovichdefendsaformofdynamism,orthe theorythatnatureistobeunderstoodintermsof forceandnotmäss(whereforcesarefunctionsof timeanddistance).Bydispensingwithextended substance,Boscovichavoidedepistemological difficultiesfacingLocke'snaturalphilosophyand anticipateddevelopmentsinmodernphysics. AmongthoseinfluencedbyBoscovichwereKant (whodefendedaversionofdynamism),Faraday, JamesClerkMaxwell,andLordKelvin. Boscovich'stheoryhasprovedtobeempiri- callyinadequatetoaccountforphenomenasuch aslight.AphilosophicaldifficultyforBoscovich's puncta,whicharephysicalsubstances,arisesout oftheirzero-dimensionality.Itisplausiblethat anypowermusthaveabasisinanobjecfsintrin- sicproperties,andpunctaappeartolacksuch supportfortheirpowers.However,itisexten- sionalpropertiesthatpunctalack,andBoscovich couldarguethatthecategorialpropertyofbeing anunextendedspatialsubstanceprovidesthe neededbasis.J.Ho.&G.Ro. bottom-up.Seecognitivescience. boundvariable.Seeontologicalcommitment, VARIABLE. 97 Bouwsma,O(ets)K(olk) Bradley,F(rancis)H(erbert) Bouwsma,O(ets)K(olk)(1898-1978),American philosopher,apractitionerofordinarylanguage philosophyandcelebratedteacher.Through workonMooreandcontactwithstudentssuch asNormanMalcolmandMorrisLazerowitz, whomhesentfromNebraskatoworkwith Moore,BouwsmadiscoveredWittgenstein.He becameknownforconveyinganunderstanding ofWittgenstein'stechniquesofphilosophical analysisthroughhisownoftenhumorousgrasp ofsenseandnonsense.Focusingonaparticular pivotalsentenceinanargument,heprovided imaginativesurroundingsforit,showinghow,in thephilosopher'smouth,thesentencelacked sense.Hesometimesdescribedthisas"the methodoffailure."InconnectionwithDes- cartes'sevilgenius,e.g.,Bouwsmainventsan elaboratestoryinwhichtheevilgeniustriesbut failstopermanentlydeceivebymeansofatotally paperworld.Ourinabilitytoimaginesucha deceptionunderminesthesenseoftheevil geniusargument.Hiswritingsarerepletewith similarstories,analogies,andteasesofsenseand nonsenseforsuchphilosophicalstandardsas Berkeley'sidealism,Moore'stheoryofsense- data,andAnselm'sontologicalargument. Bouwsmadidnotadvocatetheoriesnorput forwardrefutationsofotherphilosophers'views. Histalentlayratherinexposingsomecentral sentenceinanargumentasdisguisednonsense. Inthis,hewentbeyondWittgenstein,working outthedetailsofthelatter'sinsightsintolan- guage.InadditiontothisappropriationofWitt- genstein,BouwsmaalsoappropriatedKierke- gaard,understandinghimtooasonewhodis- pelledphilosophicalillusions-thosearising fromtheattempttounderstandChristianity.The ordinarylanguageofreligiousphilosophywas thatofscriptures.Hedrewuponthislanguagein hismanyessaysonreligiousthemes.Hisreli- giousdimensionmadewholethispersonwho gavenoquartertotraditionalmetaphysics.His papersarepublishedunderthetitlesPhilosophi- calEssays,TowardaNewSensibility,WithoutProofor Evidence,andWittgensteinConversations1949-51. Hisphilosophicalnotebooksarehousedatthe HumanitiesResearchCenterinAustin,Texas. Seealsoordinarylanguagephiloso- phy,WITTGENSTEIN.R.E.H. Boyle,Robert(1627-91),Britishchemistand physicistwhowasamajorfigureinseventeenth- centurynaturalphilosophy.Tohiscontempo- rarieshewas"therestorer"inEnglandofthe mechanicalphilosophy.Hisprogramwasto replacethevacuousexplanationscharacteristic ofPeripateticism(the"qualityofwhiteness"in snowexplainswhyitdazzlestheeyes)byexpla- nationsemployingthe"twograndandmost catholicprinciplesofbodies,matterand motion,"matterbeingcomposedofcorpuscles, withmotion"thegrandagentofallthathappens innature."Boylewroteinfluentiallyonscientific methodology,emphasizingexperimentation(a Baconianinfluence),experimentalprecision, andtheimportanceofdevising"goodandexcel- lent"hypotheses.ThedisputewithSpinozaon thevalidationofexplanatoryhypothesescon- trastedBoyle'sexperimentalwaywithSpinoza's wayofrationalanalysis.The1670sdisputewith HenryMoreontheontologicalgroundsofcor- porealactivityconfrontedMore's"Spiritof Nature"withthe"essentialmodifications" (motionandthe"seminalprinciple"ofactivity) withwhichBoyleclaimedGodhaddirectly endowedmatter.Asachampionofthecorpus- cularianphilosophy,Boylewasanimportant linkinthedevelopmentbeforeLockeofthedis- tinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondaryquali- ties.Aleadingadvocateofnaturaltheology,he providedinhiswillfortheestablishmentofthe BoyleLecturestodefendProtestantChristianity againstatheismandmaterialism.Seealso MECHANISTICEXPLANATION,PHILOSOPHYOF SCIENCE,SPINOZA.A.G. bracketing.Seehusserl, PHENOMENOLOGY. Bradley,F(rancis)H(erbert)(1846-1924),the mostoriginalandinfluentialnineteenth-century Britishidealist.BornatClapham,hewasthe fourthsonofanevangelicalminister.His youngerbrotherA.C.Bradleywasawell-known Shakespeareancritic.From1870untilhisdeath BradleywasafellowofMertonCollege,Oxford. Akidneyailment,whichfirstoccurredin1871, compelledhimtoleadaretiringlife.This,com- binedwithhisforcefulliterarystyle,hisloveof irony,thededicationofthreeofhisbookstoan unknownwoman,andacclaimasthegreatest BritishidealistsinceBerkeley,haslentanauraof mysterytohispersonallife. TheaimofBradley'sfirstimportantwork,Eth- icalStudies(1876),isnottoofferguidancefor dealingwithpracticalmoralproblems(Bradley condemnedthisascasuistry),butratherto explainwhatmakesmoralityasembodiedinthe consciousnessofindividualsandinsocialinsti- tutionspossible.Bradleythoughtitwasthefact thatmoralagentstakemoralityasanendinitself whichinvolvesidentifyingtheirwillswithan ideal(providedinpartbytheirstationsinsoci- 98 Bradwardine,Thomas Brandt,RichardB. ety)andthentransferringthatidealtoreality throughaction.Bradleycalledthisprocess"self- realization."Hethoughtthatmoralagentscould realizetheirgoodselvesonlybysuppressing theirbadselves,fromwhichheconcludedthat moralitycouldneverbecompletelyrealized, sincerealizingagoodselfrequireshavingabad one.ForthisreasonBradleybelievedthatthe moralconsciousnesswoulddevelopintoreli- giousconsciousnesswhich,inhissecularized versionofChristianity,requireddyingtoone's naturalselfthroughfaithintheactualexistence ofthemoralideal. InEthicalStudiesBradleyadmittedthatafull defenseofhisethicswouldrequireametaphysical system,somethinghedidnotthenhave.Muchof Bradley'sremainingworkwasanattempttopro- videtheoutlineofsuchasystembysolvingwhat hecalled"thegreatproblemoftherelation betweenthoughtandreality."Hefirstconfronted thisprobleminThePrinciplesofLogic(1883),which ishisdescriptionofthought.Hetookthoughttobe embodiedinjudgments,whicharedistinguished fromothermentalactivitiesbybeingtrueorfalse. Thisismadepossiblebythefactthattheircon- tents,whichBradleycalledideas,representreal- ity.Aproblemarisesbecauseideasareuniversals andsorepresentkindsofthings,whilethethings themselvesareallindividuals.Bradleysolvesthis problembydistinguishingbetweenthelogical andgrammaticalformsofajudgmentandarguing thatalljudgmentshavethelogicalformofcondi- tionals.Theyassertthatuniversalconnections betweenqualitiesobtaininreality.Thequalities areuniversals,theconnectionsbetweenthemare conditional,whilerealityisoneindividualwhole thatwehavecontactwithinimmediateexperi- ence.Alljudgments,inhisview,areabstractions fromadiversebutnon-relationalimmediate experience.Sincejudgmentsareinescapablyrela- tional,theyfailtorepresentaccuratelynon-rela- tionalrealityandsofailtoreachtruth,whichisthe goalofthought.FromthisBradleyconcluded that,contrarytowhatsomeofhismoreHegelian contemporariesweresaying,thoughtisnotiden- ticaltorealityandisnevermorethanpartially true. AppearanceandReality(1893)isBradley's descriptionofreality:itisexperience,allofit,all atonce,blendedinaharmoniousway.Bradley defendedthisviewbymeansofhiscriterionfor reality.Reality,heproclaimed,doesnotcontra- dietitself;anythingthatdoesismerelyappear- ance.InPartIofAppearanceandRealityBradley reliedonaninfmiteregressargument,nowcalled Bradley'sregress,tocontendthatrelationsandall relationalphenomena,includingthought,are contradictory.Theyareappearance,notreality. InPartiiheclaimedthatappearancesarecontra- dictorybecausetheyareabstractedbythought fromtheimmediateexperienceofwhichtheyare apart.Appearancesconstitutethecontentofthis whole,whichinBradley'sviewisexperience.In otherwords,realityisexperienceinitstotality. Bradleycalledthisunified,consistentall-inclu- sivereality"theAbsolute." TodayBradleyismainlyrememberedforhis argumentagainsttherealityofrelations,andas thephilosopherwhoprovokedRusselfsand Moore'srevolutioninphilosophy.Hewouldbe betterrememberedasafounderoftwentieth- centuryphilosophywhobasedmetaphysical conclusionsonhisaccountofthelogicalformsof judgments. Seealsobosanquet,idealism.J.W.A. Bradwardine,Thomas.Seeoxfordcalculators. Brahma.Seebrahman. Brahman,inHinduism,theultimatereality,pos- sessedofbeing,consciousness,andbliss,depen- dentonnothingelseforexistence.Brahmanis conceivedasapersonaldeity(Brahma)inVis'is- tadvaitaandDvaitaVedantaandasapersonal andqualitylessinAdvaitaVedanta,inwhich "being,consciousness,andbliss"areinterpreted negatively.WhileBrahmanisconceivedas sagunaor"withqualities"inVislstadvaitaand Dvaita,forAdvaitaBrahmanisnirgunaorqual- ityless.ForVis'istadvaita,'Brahman'secondarily referstotheworlddependentonBrahman strictlysocalled,namelyallmindsandmaterial thingsthatconstituteBrahman'sbody.For Advaita,eachapparentlyindividualmind(or otherthing)isidenticaltoBrahman;Dvaitadoes notconstruetheworld,oranythingelse,as Brahman'sbody.Enlightenment,ormoksha, withitsconsequentescapefromthecyeleof rebirths,forAdvaitainvolvesrecognizingone's identitywithnirgunaBrahman,andforDvaita andVis'istadvaitainvolvesrepentingandforsak- ingone'ssinsandtrustingagraciousBrahman forsalvation.Seealsohinduism.K.E.Y. Brahmanism.Seebrahman. braininavat.Seeputnam,skepticism. Brandt,RichardB.(1910-97),Americanmoral philosopher,mostcloselyassociatedwithrule utilitarianism(whichtermhecoined).Brandt 99 Brentano,Franz Brentano,Franz earneddegreesfromDenisonCollegeand CambridgeUniversity,andobtainedaPh.D.from Yalein1936.HetaughtatSwarthmoreCollege from1937to1964andattheUniversityof Michiganfrom1964to1981.Hissixbooksand nearlyonehundredartidesincludedworkon philosophyofreligion,epistemology,philosophy ofmind,philosophyofaction,politicalphiloso- phyandphilosophyoflaw.Hisgreatestcontribu- tionswereinmoralphilosophy.Hefirstdefended ruleutilitarianisminhistextbookEthicalTheory (1959),butgreatlyrefinedhisviewinthe1960s inaseriesofartides,whichwerewidelydis- cussedandreprintedandeventuallycollected togetherinMorality,Utilitarianism,andRights (1992).FurtherrefinementsappearinhisA TheoryoftheGoodandtheRight(1979)andFacts, Values,andMorality(1996). Brandtfamouslyarguedfora"reformingdef- inition"of'rationalperson'.Heproposedthatwe useittodesignatesomeonewhosedesireswould surviveexposuretoallrelevantempiricalfacts andtocorrectlogicalreasoning.Healsopro- poseda''reformingdefinition"of'morallyright' thatassignsitthedescriptivemeaning'wouldbe permittedbyanymoralcodethatall(ornearly all)rationalpeoplewouldpubliclyfavörforthe agenfssocietyiftheyexpectedtospendalife- timeinthatsociety'.Inhisview,rationalchoice betweenmoralcodesisdeterminednotbyprior moralcommitmentsbutbyexpectedconse- quences.Brandtadmittedthatdifferentrational peoplemayfavördifferentcodes,sincedifferent rationalpeoplemayhavedifferentlevelsofnat- uralbenevolence.Buthealsocontendedthat mostrationalpeoplewouldfavörarule-utilitar- iancode. Seealsocognitivepsychotherapy, ETHICS,UTILITARIANISM.B.W.H. Brentano,Franz(1838-1917),Germanphiloso- pher,oneofthemostintellectuallyinfluential andpersonallycharismaticofhistime.Heis knownespeciallyforhisdistinctionbetween psychologicalandphysicalphenomenaonthe basisofintentionalityorinternalobject-direct- ednessofthought,hisrevivalofAristotelianism andempiricalmethodsinphilosophyandpsy- chology,andhisvaluetheoryandethicssup- portedbytheconceptofcorrectpro-and anti-emotionsorloveandhateattitudes. Brentanomadenotedcontributionstothethe- oryofmetaphysicalcategories,phenomenology, epistemology,syllogisticlogic,andphilosophyof religion.Histeachingmadeaprofoundimpact onhisstudentsinWiirzburgandVienna,many ofwhombecameinternationallyrespected thinkersintheirfields,includingMeinong, Husserl,Twardowski,ChristianvonEhrenfels, AntonMarty,andFreud. Brentanobeganhisstudyofphilosophyatthe AschaffenburgRoyalBavarianGymnasium;in 1856-58heattendedtheuniversitiesofMunich andWiirzburg,andthenenrolledatthe UniversityofBerlin,whereheundertookhisfirst investigationsofAristotle'smetaphysicsunder thesupervisionofF.A.Trendelenburg.In1859- 60,heattendedtheAcademyinMiinster,read- ingintensivelyinthemedievalAristotelians;in 1862hereceivedthedoctorateinphilosophyin absentiafromtheUniversityofTubingen.Hewas ordainedaCatholicpriestin1864,andwaslåter involvedinacontroversyöverthedoctrineof papalinfallibility,eventuallyleavingthechurch in1873.HetaughtfirstasPrivatdozentinthePhil- osophicalFacultyoftheUniversityofWiirzburg (1866-74),andthenacceptedaprofessorshipat theUniversityofVienna.In1880hedecidedto marry,temporarilyresigninghispositionto acquireSaxoncitizenship,inordertoavoidlegal difficultiesinAustria,wheremarriagesofformer priestswerenotofficiallyrecognized.Brentano waspromisedrestorationofhispositionafterhis circumventionoftheserestrictions,butalthough hewaslåterreinstatedaslecturer,hisappealsfor reappointmentasprofessorwereansweredonly withdelayandequivocation.HeleftViennain 1895,retiringtoItaly,hisfamily'scountryofori- gin.AtlasthemovedtoZiirich,Switzerland, shortlybeforeItalyenteredWorldWarI.Herehe remainedactivebothinphilosophyandpsychol- ogy,despitehisensuingblindness,writingand revisingnumerousbooksandartides,frequently meetingwithformerstudentsandcolleagues, andmaintaininganextensivephilosophical-lit- erarycorrespondence,untilhisdeath. InPsychologievomempirischenStåndpunkt("Psy- chologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,"1874), Brentanoarguedthatintentionalityisthemark ofthemental,thateverypsychologicalexperi- encecontainsanintendedobject-alsocalledan intentionalobject-whichthethoughtisabout ortowardwhichthethoughtisdirected.Thus,in desire,somethingisdesired.Accordingtothe immanentintentionalitythesis,thismeansthat thedesiredobjectisliterallycontainedwithin thepsychologicalexperienceofdesire.Brentano claimsthatthisisuniquelytrueofmentalas opposedtophysicalornon-psychologicalphe- nomena,sothattheintentionalityofthepsy- chologicaldistinguishesmentalfromphysical states.Theimmanentintentionalitythesispro- 100 Brentano'sthesis Broad,C(harlie)D(unbar) videsaframeworkinwhichBrentanoidentifies threecategoriesofpsychologicalphenomena: thoughts(Vorstellungen),judgments,andemo- tivephenomena.Hefurthermaintainsthat everythoughtisalsoself-consciouslyreflected backontoitselfasasecondaryintendedobjectin whathecalledtheeigentilmlicheVerfleckung. From1905through1911,withthepublication inthatyearofVonderKlassifikationderpsychischen Phänomene,Brentanograduallyabandonedthe immanentintentionalitythesisinfavörofhis låterphilosophyofreism,accordingtowhich onlyindividualsexist,excludingputativenonex- istentirrealia,suchaslacks,absences,andmere possibilities.Inthemeantime,hisstudentsTwar- dowski,Meinong,andHusserl,reactingnega- tivelytotheidealism,psychologism,andrelated philosophicalproblemsapparentintheearly immanentintentionalitythesis,developedarter- nativenon-immanenceapproachestointention- ality,leading,inthecaseofTwardowskiand MeinongandhisstudentsintheGrazschoolof phenomenologicalpsychology,totheconstruc- tionofGegenstandstheorie,thetheoryof(tran- scendentexistentandnonexistentintended) objects,andtoHusserl'slåtertranscendental phenomenology.Theintentionalityofthemen- talinBrentano'srevivalofthemedievalAris- toteliandoctrineisoneofhismostimportant contributionstocontemporarynon-mechanistic theoriesofmind,meaning,andexpression. Brentano'simmanentintentionalitythesiswas, however,rejectedbyphilosopherswhoother- wiseagreedwithhisunderlyingclaimthat thoughtisessentiallyobject-directed. Brentano'svaluetheory(Werttheorie)offersa pluralisticaccountofvalue,permittingmanydif- ferentkindsofthingstobevaluable-although,in keepingwithhislåterreism,hedeniestheexis- tenceofanabstractrealmofvalues.Intrinsicvalue isobjectiveratherthansubjective,inthesense thathebelievesthepro-andanti-emotionswe mayhavetowardanactorsituationareobjec- tivelycorrectiftheypresentthemselvestoemo- tionalpreferencewiththesameapodicityor unquestionablesenseofrightnessasotherself- evidentmattersofnon-ethicaljudgment.Among thecontroversialconsequencesofBrentano's valuetheoryistheconclusionthattherecanbeno suchthingasabsoluteevil.Theimplicationfol- lowsfromBrentano'sobservation,first,thatevil requiresevilconsciousness,andthatconscious- nessofanykind,eventheworstimaginablemal- iceormalevolentillwill,is(consideredmerelyas consciousness)intrinsicallygood.Thismeansthat necessarilythereisalwaysamixtureofintrinsic goodeveninthemostmaliciouspossiblestatesof mind,byvirtuealoneofbeingconsciouslyexperi- enced,sothatpureevilneverobtains.Brentano's valuetheoryadmitsofnodefenseagainstthose whohappennottosharethesame"correct"emo- tionalattitudestowardthesituationshedescribes. Ifitisobjectedthattoanotherperson'semotional preferencesonlygoodconsciousnessisintrinsi- callygood,whileinfinitelybadconsciousness despitebeingastateofconsciousnessappears insteadtocontainnointrinsicgoodandis absolutelyevil,thereisnorecoursewithin Brentano'sethicsexcepttoacknowledgethatthis contraryemotiveattitudetowardinfinitelybad consciousnessmayalsobecorrect,eventhoughit contradictshisevaluations. Brentano'sempiricalpsychologyandarticula- tionoftheintentionalitythesis,hismoralphi- losophyandvaluetheory,hisinvestigationsof Aristotle'smetaphysicsatatimewhenAris- totelianrealismwaslittleappreciatedinthepre- vailingclimateofpost-Kantianidealism,his epistemictheoryofevidentjudgment,hissug- gestionsforthereformofsyllogisticlogic,his treatmentoftheprincipleofsufficientreasonand existenceofGod,hisinterpretationofafour- stagecycleofsuccessivetrendsinthehistoryof philosophy,togetherwithhisteachingandper- sonalmoralexample,continuetoinspireavari- etyofdivergentphilosophicaltraditions. Seealsoaristotle,husserl,intention- ality,MEINONG,PHENOMENOLOGY,VALUE. D.J. Brentano'sthesis.Seeintentionality. bridgeIaw.Seereduction. Britishempiricists.Seerationalism. Broad,C(harlie)D(unbar)(1887-1971),English epistemologist,metaphysician,moralphiloso- pher,andphilosopherofscience.Hewasedu- catedatTrinityCollege,Cambridge,taughtat severaluniversitiesinScotland,andthen returnedtoTrinity,firstaslecturerinmoralsci- enceandeventuallyasKnightbridgeProfessorof MoralPhilosophy.Hisphilosophicalviewsarein thebroadlyrealisttraditionofMooreandRus- sell,thoughwithsubstantialinfluencealsofrom histeachersatCambridge,McTaggartandW.E. Johnson.Broadwrotevoluminouslyandinci- sivelyonanextremelywiderangeofphilosoph- icaltopics,includingmostprominentlythe natureofperception,aprioriknowledgeand concepts,theproblemofinduction,themind- 101 Brouwer,LuitzgenEgbertusJan Brouwer,LuitzgenEgbertusJan bodyproblem,thefreewillproblem,varioustop- icsinmoralphilosophy,thenatureandphilo- sophicalsignificanceofpsychicalresearch,the natureofphilosophyitself,andvarioushistori- calfiguressuchasLeibniz,Kant,andMcTaggart. Broad'sworkinthephilosophyofperception centersonthenatureofsense-data(orsensa,as hecallsthem)andtheirrelationtophysical objects.Hedefendsarathercautious,tentative versionofthecausaltheoryofperception.With regardtoaprioriknowledge,Broadrejectsthe empiricistviewthatallsuchknowledgeisofana- lyticpropositions,claiminginsteadthatreason canintuitnecessaryanduniversalconnections betweenpropertiesorcharacteristics;hisviewof conceptacquisitionisthatwhilemostconcepts areabstractedfromexperience,someareapri- ori,thoughnotnecessarilyinnate.Broadholds thattherationalityofinductiveinference dependsonafurthergeneralpremiseaboutthe world,amorecomplicatedversionofthethesis thatnatureisuniform,whichisdifficulttostate preciselyandevenmoredifficulttojustify. Broad'sviewofthemind-bodyproblemisa versionofdualism,thoughonethatplacespri- maryemphasisonindividualmentalevents,is muchmoreuncertainabouttheexistenceand natureofthemindasasubstance,andisquite sympathetictoepiphenomenalism.Hismain contributiontothefreewillproblemconsistsin anelaborateanalysisofthelibertarianconcep- tionoffreedom,whichheholdstobeboth impossibletorealizeandatthesametimequite possiblyanessentialpreconditionoftheordinary conceptionofobligation.Broad'sworkinethics isdiverseanddifficulttosummarize,butmuch ofitcentersontheissueofwhetherethicaljudg- mentsaregenuinelycognitiveincharacter. Broadwasoneofthefewphilosopherstotake psychicalresearchseriously.Heservedaspresi- dentoftheSocietyforPsychicalResearchand wasanoccasionalobserverofexperimentsinthis area.Hisphilosophicalwritingsonthissubject, whilenotuncritical,areinthemainsympathetic andarelargelyconcernedtodefendconceptslike precognitionagainstchargesofincoherenceand alsotodrawouttheirimplicationsformore familiarphilosophicalissues. Asregardsthenatureofphilosophy,Broaddis- tinguishesbetween"critical"and"speculative" philosophy.Criticalphilosophyisanalysisofthe basicconceptsofordinarylifeandofscience, roughlyinthetraditionofMooreandRussell.A veryhighproportionofBroad'sownworkcon- sistsofsuchanalyses,oftenamazinglydetailed andmeticulousincharacter.Butheisalsosym- pathetictothespeculativeattempttoarriveatan overallconceptionofthenatureoftheuniverse andthepositionofhumanbeingstherein,while atthesametimeexpressingdoubtsthatanything evenremotelyapproachingdemonstrationis possibleinsuchendeavors. Theforegoingcatalogofviewsrevealssome- thingoftherangeofBroad'sphilosophical thought,butitfailstobringoutwhatismost strikinglyvaluableaboutit.Broad'spositionson variousissuesdonotformanythinglikeasystem (hehimselfisreportedtohavesaidthatthereis nothingthatanswerstothedescription"Broad's philosophy").Whilehisviewsareinvariablysub- tle,thoughtful,andcriticallypenetrating,they rarelyhavethesortofone-sidednoveltythathas cometobesohighlyvaluedinphilosophy.What theydohaveisexceptionalclarity,dialectical insight,andeven-handedness.Broad'sskillat uncoveringanddisplayingthepreciseshapeofa philosophicalissue,clarifyingtherelevantargu- mentsandobjections,andcatalogingindetailthe meritsanddemeritsoftheopposingpositionshas rarelybeenequaled.Onewhoseeksaclear-cut resolutionofanissueislikelytobeimpatientand disappointedwithBroad'scareful,measureddis- cussions,inwhichunusualeffortismadeto accordallpositionsandargumentstheirdue.But onewhoseeksacomprehensiveandbalanced understandingoftheissueinquestionisunlikely tofindamoretrustworthyguide. Seealsoparapsychology,philosophy OFMIND.L.B Brouwer,LuitzgenEgbertusJan(i881-1966), Dutchmathematicianandphilosopherand founderoftheintuitionistschoolinthephiloso- phyofmathematics.EducatedattheMunicipal UniversityofAmsterdam,wherehereceivedhis doctoratein1907,heremainedthereforhis entireprofessionalcareer,asPrivaat-Docent (1909-12)andthenprofessor(1912-55).He wasamongthepreeminenttopologistsofhis time,provingseveralimportantresults.Philo- sophically,hewasalsouniqueinhisstrongly heldconvictionthatphilosophicalideasand argumentsconcerningthenatureofmathemat- icsoughttoaffectandbereflectedinitspractice. Hisgeneralorientationinthephilosophyof mathematicswasKantian.Thiswasmanifested inhisradicalcritiqueoftheroleaccordedtologi- calreasoningbyclassicalmathematics;arolethat Brouwer,followingKant,believedtobeincom- patiblewiththerolethatintuitionmustproperly playinmathematicalreasoning.Thebest- known,ifnotthemostfundamental,partofhis 102 Bruno,Giordano Brunschvicg,Leon critiqueoftheroleaccordedtologicbyclassical mathematicswashisattackontheprincipleof theexcludedmiddleandrelatedprinciplesof classicallogic.Hechallengedtheirreliability, arguingthattheirunrestricteduseleadstoresults that,intuitionisticallyspeaking,arenottrue. However,initsfundaments,Brouwer'scri- tiquewasnotsomuchanattackonparticular principlesofclassicallogicasacriticismofthe generalrolethatclassicalmathematicsgrantsto logicalreasoning.Hebelievedthatlogicalstruc- ture(andhencelogicalinference)isaproductof thelinguisticrepresentationofmathematical thoughtandnotafeatureofthatthoughtitself. Hestatedthisviewintheso-calledFirstActof Intuitionism,whichcontainsnotonlythechief criticalideaofBrouwer'sposition,butalsoits corepositiveelement.Thispositiveelementsays, withKant,thatmathematicsisanessentially languagelessactivityofthemind.(Brouwer wentontosaysomethingwithwhichKant wouldonlyhavepartiallyagreed:thatthisactiv- ityhasitsoriginintheperceptionofamoveof time.)Thecriticalelementcomplementsthisby sayingthatmathematicsisthustobekeptwholly distinctfrommathematicallanguageandthe phenomenaoflanguagedescribedbylogic. Theso-calledSecondActofIntuitionismthen extendsthepositivepartoftheFirstActbystat- ingthatthe"self-unfolding"oftheprimordial intuitionofamoveoftimeisthebasisnotonly oftheconstructionofthenaturalnumbersbut alsoofthe(intuitionistic)continuum.Together, thesetwoideasformthebasisofBrouwer'sphi- losophyofmathematics-aphilosophythatis radicallyatoddswithmostoftwentieth-century philosophyofmathematics. Seealsophilosophyofmathematics. M.D. Bruno,Giordano(1548-1600),Italianspecula- tivephilosopher.HewasborninNaples,where heenteredtheDominicanorderin1565.In1576 hewassuspectedofheresyandabandonedhis order.HestudiedandtaughtinGeneva,butleft becauseofdifficultieswiththeCalvinists. ThereafterhestudiedandtaughtinToulouse, Paris,England,variousGermanuniversities,and Prague.In1591herashlyreturnedtoVenice,and wasarrestedbytheVenetianInquisitionin1592. In1593hewashandedövertotheRomanInqui- sition,whichburnedhimtodeathasaheretic. Becauseofhisunhappyend,hissupportfor theCopernicanheliocentrichypothesis,andhis pronouncedanti-Aristotelianism,Brunohas beenmistakenlyseenastheproponentofasci- entificworldviewagainstmedievalobscuran- tism.Infact,heshouldbeinterpretedinthecon- textofRenaissancehermetism.Indeed,Bruno wassoimpressedbythehermeticcorpus,abody ofwritingsattributedtothemythicalEgyptian sageHermesTrismegistus,thathecalledfora returntothemagicalreligionoftheEgyptians. HewasalsostronglyinfluencedbyLull,Nicholas ofCusa,Ficino,andAgrippavonNettesheim,an earlysixteenth-centuryauthorofaninfluential treatiseonmagic.SeveralofBruno'sworkswere devotedtomagic,anditplaysanimportantrole inhisbooksontheartofmemory.Techniquesfor improvingthememoryhadlongbeenasubject ofdiscussion,buthelinkedthemwiththenotion thatonecouldsoimprintimagesoftheuniverse onthemindastoachievespecialknowledgeof divinerealitiesandthemagicpowersassociated withsuchknowledge.Heemphasizedtheimpor- tanceoftheimaginationasacognitivepower, sinceitbringsusintocontactwiththedivine. Nonetheless,healsoheldthathumanideasare mereshadowsofdivineideas,andthatGodis transcendentandhenceincomprehensible. Bruno'sbest-knownworksaretheItaliandia- logueshewrotewhileinEngland,includingthe following,allpublishedin1584:TheAshWednes- daySupper;OnCause,PrincipleandUnity;The ExpulsionoftheTriumphantBeast;andOnthelnfinite UniverseandWorlds.Hepresentsavisionofthe universeasalivingandinfinitelyextendedunity containinginnumerableworlds,eachofwhichis likeagreatanimalwithalifeofitsown.Hemain- tainedtheunityofmatterwithuniversalformor theWorld-Soul,thussuggestingakindofpanthe- ismattractivetolåterGermanidealists,suchas Schelling.However,heneveridentifiedthe World-SoulwithGod,whoremainedseparate frommatterandform.Hecombinedhisspecula- tivephilosophyofnaturewiththerecommenda- tionofanewnaturalisticethics.Bruno'ssupport ofCopemicusinTheAshWednesdaySupperwas relatedtohisbeliefthatalivingearthmustmove, andhespecificallyrejectedanyappealtomere mathematicstoprovecosmologicalhypotheses. Inlåterworkhedescribedthemonadasaliving versionoftheDemocriteanatom.Despitesome obviousparallelswithbothSpinozaandLeibniz, heseemsnottohavehadmuchdirectinfluence onseventeenth-centurythinkers.EJ.A. Brunschvicg,Leon(1869-1944),Frenchphi- losopher,aninfluentialprofessorattheSor- bonneandtheÉcoleNormaleSupérieureof Paris,andafounderoftheRevuedeMétaphysique etdeMorale(1893)andtheSociétéFrancaisede 103 B-series Buddhagosa Philosophie(1901).In1940hewasforcedbythe NazistoleaveParisandsoughtrefugeinthenon- occupiedzone,wherehedied.Amonisticideal- ist,Brunschvicgunfoldedaphilosophyofmind (IntrodudiontotheLifeoftheMind,1900).Hisepis- temologyhighlightsjudgment.Thinkingisjudg- ingandjudgingisacting.Hedefinedphilosophy as"themind'smethodicalself-reflection."Phi- losophyinvestigatesman'sgrowingself-under- standing.Themind'srecesses,ormetaphysical truth,areaccessiblethroughanalysisofthe mind'stimelymanifestations.Hismajorworks thereforedescribetheprogressofscienceas progressofconsciousness:TheStagesofMathe- maticalPhilosophy(1912),HumanExperienceand PhysicalCausality(1922),TheProgressofConscience inWesternPhilosophy(1927),andAgesofIntelli- gence(1934).AnheirofRenouvier,Cournot,and Revaisson,Brunschvicgadvocatedamoraland spiritualconceptionofscienceandattemptedto reconcileidealismandpositivism.J.-L.S. B-series.Seetime. B-theoryoftime.Seetime. Buber,Martin(1878-1965),GermanJewish philosopher,theologian,andpoliticalleader. Buber'searlyinfluencesincludeHasidismand neo-Kantianism.Eventuallyhebrokewiththe latterandbecameknownasaleadingreligious existentialist.Hischiefphilosophieworks includehismostfamousbook,Ichunddu("Iand Thou,"1923);Moses(1946);BetweenManand Man(1947);andEclipseofGod(1952). ThecruxofBuber'sthoughtishisconception oftwoprimaryrelationships:I-ThouandI-It.I- Thouischaracterizedbyopenness,reciprocity, andadeepsenseofpersonalinvolvement.TheI confrontsitsThounotassomethingtobestud- ied,measured,ormanipulated,butasaunique presencethatrespondstotheIinitsindividual- ity.I-Itischaracterizedbythetendencytotreat somethingasanimpersonalobjectgovernedby causal,social,oreconomicforces.Buberrejects theideathatpeopleareisolated,autonomous agentsoperatingaccordingtoabstractrules. Instead,realityarisesbetweenagentsasthey encounterandtransformeachother.Inaword, realityisdialogical.BuberdescribesGodasthe ultimateThou,theThouwhocanneverbecome anIt.ThusGodisreachednotbyinferencebut byawillingnesstorespondtotheconcretereal- ityofthedivinepresence. Seealsoexistentialism,jewishphiloso- phy.K.See. Buchmanism,alsocalledtheMoralRearmament Movement,anon-creedalinternationalmove- mentthatsoughttobringaboutuniversalbroth- erhoodthroughacommitmenttoanobjectivist moralsystemderivedlargelyfromtheGospels.It wasfoundedbyFrankBuchman(1878-1961), anAmericanLutheranministerwhoresigned fromhischurchin1908inordertoexpandhis ministry.Topromotethemovement,Buchman foundedtheOxfordGroupatOxfordUniversity in1921.L.P.P. Buddha(fromSanskrit,'theenlightenedone'),a title(butnotaname)ofSiddhärtaGötarna (c.563-c.483b.c),thehistoricalfounderof Buddhism,andofanyofhislåterrepresenta- tions.'Buddha'canalsomeananyonewhohas attainedthestateofenlightenment(Buddha- hood)soughtinBuddhism.ThePaliCanonmen- tionstwenty-fourBuddhas. SiddhärtaGötarnawasthesonoftherulerof asmallstateinwhatisnowNepal.Traditionsays thathelefthomeattheageoftwenty-nineto seekenlightenment,achieveditattheageof thirty-five,andwasawanderingteacheruntil hisdeathateighty.Hefoundready-madein Indianeulturetheideasofkarma('fruitsof action')andsamsära('wheelofrebirth')aswell astheviewthatescapefromthewheelisthe highestgood,andofferedhisownBuddhistway ofescape. Seealsobuddhism.K.E.Y. Buddhagosa(fourth-fifthcenturya.d.),Ther- avedaBuddhistphilosopherwhosemajorwork wastheVisuddhimagga("PathofPurification"). HeacceptedthetypicalBuddhistdoctrinethat everythingthatexists(Nirvanaaside)isimper- manentandmomentary.Amindatamomentis onlyamomentarycollectionofmomentary states;övertimeitisaseriesofsuchcollections; similarlyforaphysicalobject.Heheldthat, throughsensoryperception,physicalobjectsare knowntoexistmind-independently.Tothe objectionthatperceptionofanobjectcannot occurinamomentsinceperceptionrequires memory,attention,recognition,examination, andthelike,hetheorizedthatthereisphysical timeandthereismentaltime;asinglephysical momentpasseswhiledistinctmentalmoments mounttosixteeninnumber.Henceacomplex perceptualprocesscanoccurwithinaseriesof mentalmomentswhileasinglematerial momentpasses.Critics(e.g.,BuddhistYogäcära philosophers)sawinthisadenialofimperma- nence.Seealsobuddhism.K.E.Y. 104 Buddhism Buddhism Buddhism,areligionofeasternandcentralAsia foundedbySiddhärtaGötarnaBuddha.The Buddhafoundready-madeinIndianculturethe ideasofkarma('fruitsofaction')andsamsära ('wheelofrebirth'),aswellastheviewthat escapefromthewheelisthehighestgood. Buddhistdoctrine,likethatofotherIndianreli- gions,offersitsdistinctivewaytoachievethat end.Itteachesthatatthecoreoftheproblemis desireorcraving-forwealth,pleasure,power, continuedexistence-whichfuelstheflameof continuedlife.Itaddsthatthesolutionisthe snuffingoutofcravingbyfollowingtheEightfold Path(rightspeech,action,livelihood,effort, mindfulness,concentration,views,andinten- tions).Theideaisthatintuitivewisdomfollows uponmoralconductandmentaldisciplinein accordwithBuddhistprecepts.Thisinvolves acceptingtheseclaims:allexistenceisunsatisfac- tory(dukkha);allexistenceisimpermanent (anicca);andthereisnopermanentself(anatta). Alongwiththeseclaimsgothedoctrinesof momentariness(everythingthatexistsistransi- tory,lastingonlyamoment)andcodependent origination(everythingthatexistsdoesso dependentlyonotherthings). SinceGodistypicallyconceivedinmonothe- isticreligionsasexistingindependentlyandas eithereternaloreverlasting,thereisnoroom withinaBuddhistperspectiveformonotheism. Saveforahereticalschool,Buddhisttraditions alsorejectallbeliefinsubstances.Asubstance,in thissense,issomethingthathasproperties,isnot itselfapropertyoracollectionofproperties,and enduresthroughtime.Theobviouscontrastto theBuddhistperspectiveisthenotionofaselfin HinduismandJainism,whichisbeginningless andendless,anindestructibleentitysometimes conceivedasinherentlyself-consciousand sometimesviewedasconsciousonlywhen embodied.Buteventhenotionofasubstance thatenduredbuthadabeginningorendorboth, orasubstancethatexisteddependentlyand enduredsolongasitssustainingconditions obtained,wouldrundeepagainstthegrainof typicalBuddhistteaching. TheBuddhaissaidtohaveofferednoopinion, andtohavefoundnoprofitinspeculation,on certainquestions:whethertheworldisorisnot eternal,whethertheworldisorisnotinfinite, andwhetherthesoulisdifferentfromoridenti- caltothebody.Thereligiousreasongivenforthis indifferenceisthatreflectiononsuchmatters doesnotleadtoenlightenment.Aphilosophical reasonsometimesgivenisthatif,asBuddhism claims,thereisnoworldofsubstances,whether mindsorbodies,thenthesequestionshaveno straightforwardanswer.Theyareliketheques- tion,Whatdoesthehornofthehareweigh? Hareshavenohornstobeheavyorlight.Seen inthecontextoftheassumptionscommoninthe cultureinwhichtheywereasked,thequestions wouldsuggestthattherearesubstantivalminds andbodiesandaworldmadeupofthem,andto answerthesequestions,evennegatively,would haveinvolvedatleastimplicitlysanctioningthat suggestion. Broadly,IndianBuddhismdividesintoTher- avada("DoctrineoftheElders,"namelythose whoheardandfollowedtheBuddha;thisschool isalsocalledHinayana,or"LesserVehicle")and Mahayana("GreaterVehicle").TheSauträntika andVaibhäsikaschoolsbelongtoTheravadaand theMädhyamikaandYogäcäraschoolsare Mahayana. TheTheravadaschools.TheSauträntikaschool holdsthatwhilesensoryexperiencejustifies beliefintheexistenceofmind-independent objects,thejustificationitprovidesrequiresusto inferfromoursensoryexperiencephysical objectsthatwedonotdirectlyexperience;it embracesrepresentativerealism.Thus,whileour seemingtoexperiencemind-independent objectsisnoillusion,ourknowledgethatitisnot illusoryrestsasmuchoninferenceasonpercep- tion.Theexplanationofthefactthatwecannot perceiveaswewish-thatweseeandtastebut riceandwaterthoughwewouldprefermeatand wine-isthatwhatweseedependsonwhat thereistoberepresentedandwhatthecondi- tionsareunderwhichwedoourperceiving. TheVaibhäsika(followersoftheVaibhäsha commentary)schooldefendsdirectrealism,con- tendingthatifsensoryperceptiondoesnotjustify usinclaimingactuallytosenseobjectsthereisno wayinwhichwecaninfertheirexistence.If whatwedirectlyexperienceareallegedrepre- sentationsorcopiesofobjectsweneversee,from whichwemusttheninfertheobjectscopied,we havenoreasontothinkthatthecopiesarecopies ofanything.Wedonotdeterminethecontentof ourperceptionbecauseittypicallyisdetermined forusbytheobjectsthatwesee.Theverydistinc- tionsbetweendreamsandwakingperceptions, orveridicalperceptionsandillusions,towhich idealistsappeal,dependfortheirappropriateness totheidealisfspurposeonourbeingabletotell thatsomeperceptualexperiencesarereliableand somearenot;butthentheidealistcannotsuc- cessfullyusethem.ForbothTheravadaschools, thereisnoneedtocorrectourbeliefinphysical 105 Buddhism,Hinayana Buddhism,Son objects,orinminds,beyondourviewingboth mindsandobjectsascollectionsof(differentsorts of)momentarystates. TheMahayanaschools.TheMädhyamika schoolholdsoutforamoreradicalrevision.Our experienceofphysicalobjectsisreliableonlyifthe beliefsthatweproperlybaseonitaretrue-onlyif thingsareastheysensorilyseem.Thesebeliefsare trueonlyifwecansensorilydistinguishbetween individualobjects.Buteverythingexistsdepen- dentlyandnothingthatexistsdependentlyisan individual.Sotherearenoindividualsandwe cannotdistinguishbetweenindividualobjects.So oursensoryexperienceisnotreliable,butratheris systematicallyillusory.Mädhyamikathenadds thedoctrineofanineffableultimaterealityhidden behindourordinaryexperienceanddescriptions, whichisaccessibleonlyinesotericenlightenment experience.InthisrespectitislikeAdvaita Vedanta,whichitprobablyinfluenced.Oneresult oftheoverallMädhyamikateachingdescribed hereisthatNirvanaandsamsära,thegoalandordi- narylife,areidentified;roughlysamsäraishow Nirvanaseemstotheunenlightened(asroughly forAdvaita,theworldofdependentthingsishow qualitylessBrahmanappearstotheunenlight- ened). TheYogäcära(perhaps"Yoga"becauseitused meditationtoremovebeliefinmind-indepen- dentphysicalobjects)schoolofMahayana Buddhismcontendsforamoreambitiousrevi- sionofourbeliefsaboutobjectsthandoes SauträntikaorVaibhäsika,butalessradicalone thantheMädhyamika.Againstthelatter,itcon- tendsthatifminditselfisemptyofessenceandif allthereisisanineffablereality,thenthereisno onetoseethetruthandnoreliablewaytodis- coverit.Againstthedirectphysical-objectreal- ismoftheVaibhäsikaandtherepresentational realismoftheSauträntika,theYogäcäraphiloso- phersarguethatdreamexperienceseemstobeof objectsthatexistmind-independentlyandina publicspace,andyettherearenosuchobjects andthereisnosuchspace.Whatwehaveexperi- entialevidenceforistheexistenceof(non-sub- stantival)mindsandtheexperiencesthatthose mindshave.Therearenosubstancesatallandno physicalstates;thereareonlymentalstatesthat composeminds.Yogäcäraphilosopherstoohad toexplainwhyourperceptualcontentisnot somethingwecandecidebywhim,anditsexpla- nationcameintermsofthetheorythateachcol- lectionofmomentarystates,andhenceeach seriesorstreamofsuchcollections,contains impressionsthatrepresentpastexperiences. Theseimpressionsbecomepotentundercertain circumstancesanddeterminethecontentof one'sexplicitorconsciousperception.The stream,orsubstream,ofrepresentativeimpres- sionsisastorehouseofmemoriesandplaysarole inYogäcäratheoryanalogoustothatofthe ÄtmanorJivainsomeoftheschoolsofHinduism. Criticssuspecteditofbeingathinsurrogatefora substantivalself.AsaNga,Dignäga,andespecially VasubandhuwereleadingYogäcäraphiloso- phers.Further,criticsoftheYogäcäraidealism arguedthatwhiletheviewcontendsthatthere aremindsotherthanone'sown,itprovidedno wayinwhichthatbeliefcouldbejustified. OurdiscussionhasdealtwithIndianBuddhism. BuddhismlargelydiedoutinIndiaaroundthe thirteenthcentury.Itthrivedinotherplaces,espe- ciallyChina,Tibet,andJapan.JapanesePure LandBuddhismresemblesmonotheismmore thandoanyofthetraditionsthatwehavedis- cussed.ZenisaformofMahayanathatdeveloped inChinainthesixthandseventhcenturiesa.d. andspreadtoJapan.Itinvolvesesotericteachings outsidethesacredwritings,followingwhichis believedtoleadtorealizationofBuddhahood. Themetaphysicalandepistemologicalissues brieflydiscussedheredemonstratethatthe Buddhisttraditionfounditnaturaltotracethe consequencesofviewsaboutthenatureofobjects andpersons,andaboutwhatexperienceteaches, beyondthescopeofwhatBuddhismasareligion mightstrictlyrequire.Therearedirectrealists, representationalrealists,andidealists,andthe questionarisesastowhetheridealismslidesinto solipsism.Thereisnowayoftellingwhatapartic- ularreligiousdoctrinemayormaynotberelated to.Arguably,certainBuddhistdoctrinesare incompatiblewithcertainviewsincontemporary physics(andBuddhistapologistshaveclaimed thatcontemporaryphysicsprovidessomesortof confirmationofbasicBuddhistcategories).There isnoaprioriwaytolimittherelationshipsthat maycometolightbetweenapparentlyvery diverse,andquiteunrelated,issuesanddoctrines. Seealsochinesephilosophy,japanese PHILOSOPHY,KOREANPHILOSOPHY,META- PHYSICS,PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION.K.E.Y. Buddhism,Hinayana.Seebuddhism. Buddhism,Kyo-hak.Seekoreanphilosophy. Buddhism,Mahayana.Seebuddhism. Buddhism,Son.Seekoreanphilosophy. 106 Buddhism,Theravada Buridan,Jean Buddhism,Theravada.Seebuddhism. Buddhism,Zen.Seebuddhism. bundletheory,aviewthatacceptstheideathat concreteobjectsconsistofpropertiesbutdenies theneedforintroducingsubstratatoaccountfor theirdiversity.Bycontrast,onetraditionalview ofconcreteparticularobjectsisthattheyare complexesconsistingoftwomorefundamental kindsofentities:propertiesthatcanbeexempli- fiedbymanydifferentobjectsandasubstratum thatexemplifiesthosepropertiesbelongingtoa particularobject.Propertiesaccountforthequal- itativeidentityofsuchobjectswhilesubstrata accountfortheirnumericaldiversity. Thebundletheoryisusuallyglossedasthe viewthataconcreteobjectisnothingbutabun- dleofproperties.Thisgloss,however,isinade- quate.Forifa"bundle"ofpropertiesis,e.g.,aset ofproperties,thenbundlesofpropertiesdifferin significantwaysfromconcreteobjects.Forsetsof propertiesarenecessaryandeternalwhileconcrete objectsarecontingentandperishing. Amoreadequatestatementofthetheoryholds thataconcreteobjectisacomplexofproperties whichallståndinafundamentalcontingentrela- tion,callitco-instantiation,tooneanother.Onthis account,complexesofpropertiesareneithernec- essarynoreternal.Criticsofthetheory,however, maintainthatsuchcomplexeshavealltheir propertiesessentiallyandcannotchangeproper- ties,whereasconcreteobjectshavesomeoftheir propertiesaccidentallyandundergochange.This objectionfailstorecognizethattherearetwodis- tinctproblemsaddressedbythebundletheory: (a)individuationand(b)identitythroughtime. Thefirstproblemarisesforallobjects,both momentaryandenduring.Thesecond,however, arisesonlyforenduringobjects.Thebundlethe- orytypicallyofferstwodifferentsolutionsto theseproblems.Anenduringconcreteobjectis analyzedasaseriesofmomentaryobjectswhich ståndinsomecontingentrelationR.Different versionsofthetheoryofferdifferingaccountsof therelation.Forexample,Humeholdsthatthe selfisaseriesofco-instantiatedimpressionsand ideas,whosemembersarerelatedtooneanother bycausationandresemblance(thisishisbundle theoryoftheself).Amomentaryobject,however, isanalyzedasacomplexofpropertiesallofwhich ståndintherelationofco-instantiationtoone another.Consequently,evenifonegrantsthata momentarycomplexofpropertieshasallofits membersessentially,itdoesnotfollowthatan enduringobject,whichcontainsthecomplexasa temporalpart,hasthosepropertiesessentially unlessoneendorsesthecontroversialthesisthat anenduringobjecthasitstemporalpartsessen- tially.Similarly,evenifonegrantsthatamomen- tarycomplexofpropertiescannotchangeinits properties,itdoesnotfollowthatanenduring object,whichconsistsofsuchcomplexes,cannot changeitsproperties. Criticsofthebundletheoryarguethatits analysisofmomentaryobjectsisalsoproblem- atic.Foritappearspossiblethattwodifferent momentaryobjectshaveallpropertiesincommon, yettherecannotbetwodifferentcomplexeswithall propertiesincommon.Therearetworesponses availabletoaproponentofthetheory.Thefirst istodistinguishbetweenastrongandaweak versionofthetheory.Onthestrongversion,the thesisthatamomentaryobjectisacomplexof co-instantiatedpropertiesisanecessarytruth, whileontheweakversionitisacontingenttruth. Thepossibilityoftwomomentaryobjectswithall propertiesincommonimpugnsonlythestrong versionofthetheory.Thesecondistochallenge thebasisoftheclaimthatitispossiblefortwo momentaryobjectstohavealltheirpropertiesin common.Althoughcriticsallegethatsuchastate ofaffairsisconceivable,proponentsarguethat investigationintothenatureofconceivability doesnotunderwritethisclaim. Seealsoessentialism,identityofindis- CERNIBLES,METAPHYSICS,PHENOMENALISM, SUBSTANCE,TIMESLICE.A.C. bundletheoryoftheself.Seebundletheory. Burali-Forteparadox.Seeset-theoreticpara- doxes,SETTHEORY. Buridan,Jean(c.l300-after1358),French philosopher.HewasbominBéthuneandedu- catedattheUniversityofParis.Unlikemost philosophersofhistime,Buridanspenthisaca- demiccareerasamasterinthefacultyofarts, withoutseekinganadvanceddegreeintheology. Hewasalsounusualinbeingasecularcleric ratherthanamemberofareligiousorder. Buridanwroteextensivelyonlogicandnat- uralphilosophy,althoughonlyafewofhis workshaveappearedinmoderneditions.The mostimportantonlogicaretheSummulaede dialectica("SumofDialectic"),anintroductionto logicconceivedasarevisionof,andextended commentaryon,theSummulaelogicalesofPeter ofSpain,awidelyusedlogictextbookofthe period;andtheTractatusdeconsequentiis,atreatise onmodesofinference.MostofBuridan'sother 107 Buridan'sass Burke,Edmund writingsareshortliteralcommentaries(exposi- tiones)andlongercriticalstudies(quaestiones)of Aristotle'sworks. Likemostmedievalnominalists,Buridan arguedthatuniversalshavenorealexistence, exceptasconceptsbywhichthemind"conceives ofmanythingsindifferently."Likewise,he includedonlyparticularsubstancesandqualities inhisbasicontology.Buthisnominalistprogram isdistinctiveinitsimplementation.Hediffers,e.g., fromOckhaminhisaccountsofmotion,time,and quantity(appealing,inthelattercase,toquantita- tiveformstoexplaintheimpenetrabilityofbod- ies).Innaturalphilosophy,Buridanisbestknown forintroducingtotheWestthenon-Aristotelian conceptofimpetus,orimpressedforce,toexplain projectilemotion.Althoughassesappearoftenin hisexamples,theparticularexamplethathas come(viaSpinozaandothers)tobeknownas "Buridan'sass,"anassstarvingtodeathbetween twoequidistantandequallytemptingpilesofhay, isunknowninBuridan'swritings.Itmay,how- ever,haveoriginatedasacaricatureofBuridan's theoryofaction,whichattemptstolindamiddle groundbetweenAristotelianintellectualismand Franciscanvoluntarismbyarguingthatthewill's freedomtoactconsistsprimarilyinitsabilityto deferchoiceintheabsenceofacompellingreason toactonewayortheother. Buridan'sintellectuallegacywasconsiderable. Hisworkscontinuedtobereadanddiscussedin universitiesforcenturiesafterhisdeath.Threeof hisstudentsanddisciples,AlbertofSaxony,Mar- siliusofInghen,andNicoleOresme,wentonto becomedistinguishedphilosophersintheirown right. Seealsometaphysics,ockham.J.A.Z. Buridan'sass.Seeburidan. Burke,Edmund(1729-97),Britishstatesman andoneoftheeighteenthcentury'sgreatest politicalwriters.BorninDublin,hemovedto Londontostudylaw,thenundertookaliterary andpoliticalcareer.HesatintheHouseof Commonsfrom1765to1794.Inspeechesand pamphletsduringtheseyearsheofferedanideo- logicalperspectiveonpoliticsthatendurestothis dayasthefountainofconservativewisdom. ThephilosophicalstancethatpervadesBurke's parliamentarycareerandwritingsisskepticism,a profounddistrustofpoliticalrationalism,i.e.,the achievementinthepoliticalrealmofabstractand rationalstructures,ideals,andobjectives.Bur- keanskepticsareprofoundlyanti-ideological, detestingwhattheyconsiderthecomplex,mys- terious,andexistentialgivensofpoliticallifedis- torted,criticized,orplannedfromaperspective ofabstract,generalized,andrationalcategories. TheseminalexpressionofBurke'sskeptical conservatismisfoundintheReflectionsontheRev- olutioninFrance(1790).Theconservatismofthe Reflectionswasearlierdisplayed,however,in Burke'sresponsetoradicaldemandsinEngland fordemocraticreformofParliamentintheearly 1780s.TheEnglishradicalsassumedthatlegisla- torscouldremakegovernments,whenallwise menknewthat"aprescriptivegovemment neverwasmadeuponanyforegonetheory." Howridiculous,then,toputgovernmentson Procrusteanbedsandmakethemfit"thetheo- rieswhichlearnedandspeculativemenhave made."Suchpridefulpresumptionrequired muchmorerationalcapacitythancouldbe foundamongordinarymortals. OnevictimofBurke'sskepticismisthe vauntedliberalideaofthesocialcontract. Commonwealthswereneitherconstructednor oughttheytoberenovatedaccordingtoapriori principles.Theconceptofanoriginalactofcon- tractisjustsuchaprinciple.Theonlycontractin politicsistheagreementthatbindsgenerations past,present,andfuture,onethat"isbutaclause inthegreatprimevalcontractofaneternalsoci- ety."Burkerejectsthevoluntaristicqualityof rationalistliberalcontractualism.Individualsare notfreetocreatetheirownpoliticalinstitutions. Politicalsocietyandlawarenot"subjecttothe willofthosewho,byanobligationabovethem, andinfinitelysuperior,areboundtosubmittheir willtothatlaw."Menandgroups"arenot morallyatliberty,attheirpleasure,andontheir speculationsofacontingentimprovement"torip aparttheircommunitiesanddissolvetheminto an"unsocial,uncivil,unconnectedchaos." Burkesawourstockofreasonassmall;despite thispeoplestillfledtheirbasiclimitationsin flightsofideologicalfancy.Theyrecognizedno barriertotheirpowersandsoughtinpoliticsto makerealitymatchtheirspeculativevisions. Burkedevoutlywishedthatpeoplewould appreciatetheirweakness,their"subordinate rankinthecreation."Godhas"subjectedusto actthepartwhichbelongstotheplaceassigned us."Andthatplaceistoknowthelimitsofone's rationalandspeculativefaculties. Insteadofrelyingontheirownmeagersupply ofreason,politiciansshouldavailthemselves"of thegeneralbankandcapitalofnationsandof ages."Becausepeopleforgetthistheyweave rationalschemesofreformfarbeyondtheir powertoimplement. 108 Burley,Walter Butler,Joseph Burkeståndsasthechampionofpoliticalskep- ticisminrevoltagainstEnlightenmentrational- ismandits"smugnessofadulteratedmeta- physics,"whichproducedthe"revolutionofdoc- trineandtheoreticdogma."Thesinsofthe Frenchwereproducedbythe"clumsysubtletyof theirpoliticalmetaphysics."The"faithinthe dogmatismofphilosophers"ledthemtorelyon reasonandabstractideas,onspeculationanda prioriprinciplesofnaturalright,freedom,and equalityasthebasisforreforminggovernments. Englishmen,likeBurke,hadnosuchillusions; theyunderstoodthecomplexityandfragilityof humannatureandhumaninstitutions,they werenot"theconvertsofRousseau...thedis- ciplesofVoltaire;Helvetius[had]madeno progressamongst[them]." Seealsopoliticalphilosophy.I.K. Burley,Walter(c.1275-c.1344),Englishphiloso- pherwhotaughtphilosophyatOxfordandthe- ologyatParis.AnorthodoxAristoteliananda realist,heattackedOckham'slogicandhisinter- pretationoftheAristoteliancategories.Burley commentedonalmostofallofAristotle'sworks inlogic,naturalphilosophy,andmoralphiloso- phy. AnearlyOxfordCalculator,Burleybeganhis workasafellowofMertonCollegein1301.By 1310,hewasatParis.AstudentofThomas Wilton,heprobablyinceptedbefore1322;by 1324hewasafellowoftheSorbonne.Hiscom- mentaryonPeterLombard'sSentenceshasbeen löst.AfterleavingParis,Burleywasassociated withthehouseholdofRichardofBuryandthe courtofEdwardIII,whosenthimasanenvoy tothepapalcuriain1327.Devitaetmoribus philosophorum("OntheLifeandMannersof Philosophers"),aninfluential,populäraccount ofthelivesofthephilosophers,hasoftenbeen attributedtoBurley,butmodernscholarship suggeststhattheattributionisincorrect. ManyofBurley'sindependentworksdealt withproblemsinnaturalphilosophy,notablyDe intensioneetremissioneformarum("Onthe IntensionandRemissionofForms"),Depotentiis animae("OntheFacultiesoftheSoul"),andDe substantiaorbis.Deprimoetultimoinstanti("On FirstandLastInstants")discusseswhichtempo- ralprocesseshaveintrinsic,whichextrinsiclim- its.InhisTractatusdeformisBurleyattacks Ockham'stheoryofquantity.Similarly,Burley's theoryofmotionopposedOckham'sviews. Ockhamrestrictstheaccountofmotiontothe thingmoving,andthequality,quantity,and placeacquiredbymotion.Bycontrast,Burley emphasizestheprocessofmotionandthequan- titativemeasurementofthatprocess.Burley attackstheviewthattheformssuccessively acquiredinmotionareincludedintheform finallyacquired.Heridiculestheviewthatcon- traryqualities(hotandcold)couldsimultane- ouslyinhereinthesamesubjectproducing intermediatequalities(warmth). Burleyemphasizedtheformålcharacterof logicinhisDepuritateartislogicae("OnthePurity oftheArtofLogic"),oneofthegreatmedieval treatisesonlogic.Ockhamattackedapreliminary versionofDepuritateinhisSummalogicae;Burley calledOckhamabeginnerinlogic.InDepuritate artislogicae,Burleymakessyllogisticsasubdivi- sionofconsequences.Histreatmentofnegation isparticularlyinterestingforhisviewsondouble negationandtherestrictionsontherulethatnot- not-pimpliesp.Burleydistinguishedbetween analogouswordsandanalogousconceptsand natures.Histheoryofanalogydeservesdetailed discussion.Theseviews,liketheviewsexpressed inmostofBurley'sworks,haveseldombeen carefullystudiedbymodernphilosophers. Seealsoockham,peterlombard.R.W. businessethics.Seeethics. Butler,Joseph(1692-1752),Englishtheologian andAnglicanbishopwhomadeimportantcon- tributionstomoralphilosophy,totheunder- standingofmoralagency,andtothedevel- opmentofdeontologicalethics.Betterknownin hisowntimeforTheAnalogyofReligion(1736),a defense,alongbroadlyempiricistlines,ofortho- dox,"revealed"Christiandoctrineagainstdeist criticism,Butler'smainphilosophicallegacywas aseriesofhighlyinfluentialargumentsandthe- sescontainedinacollectionofSermons(1725) andintwo"Dissertations"appendedtoTheAnal- ogy—oneonvirtueandtheotheronpersonal identity.Theanalyticalmethodoftheseessays ("everythingiswhatitisandnotanotherthing") providedamodelformuchofEnglish-speaking moralphilosophytofollow.Forexample,Butler isoftencreditedwithrefutingpsychologicalhedo- nkm,theviewthatallmotivescanbereducedto thedesireforpleasureorhappiness.Thesources ofhumanmotivationarecomplexandstruc- turallyvarious,heargued.Appetitesandpas- sionsseektheirownpeculiarobjects,and pleasuremustitselfbeunderstoodasinvolving anintrinsicpositiveregardforaparticularobject. Otherphilosophershadmaintained,likeButler, thatwecandesire,e.g.,thehappinessofothers intrinsically,andnotjustasameanstoourown 109 Butler,Joseph Butler,Joseph happiness.Andothershadarguedthattheper- sonwhoaimssinglemindedlyathisownhappi- nessisunlikelytoattainit.Butler'sdistinctive contributionwastodemonstratethathappiness andpleasurethemselvesrequirecompletionby specificobjectsforwhichwehaveanintrinsic positiveregard.Self-love,thedesireforourown happiness,isareflectivedesirefor,roughly,the satisfactionofourotherdesires.Butself-loveis notouronlyreflectivedesire;wealsohave"aset- tledreasonableprincipleofbenevolence."We canconsiderthegoodsofothersandcomeon reflectiontodesiretheirwelfaremoreorless independentlyofparticularemotionalinvolve- mentsuchascompassion. Inmorals,Butlerequallyopposedattemptsto reducevirtuetobenevolence,evenofthemost universalandimpartialsort.Benevolenceseeks thegoodorhappinessofothers,whereasthereg- ulativeprincipleofvirtueisconscience,thefac- ultyofmoralapprovalordisapprovalofconduct andcharacter.Moralagencyrequires,heargued, thecapacitiestoreflectdisinterestedlyonaction, motive,andcharacter,tojudgetheseindistinc- tivelymoralterms(andnotjustintermsoftheir relationtothenon-moralgoodofhappiness), andtoguideconductbysuchjudgments.Butler's viewsaboutthecentralityofconscienceinthe morallifewereimportantinthedevelopmentof deontologicalethicsaswellasintheworkingout ofanassociatedaccountofmoralagency.Along thefirstlines,hearguedinthe''Dissertation"that whatitisrightforapersontododepends,notjust onthe(non-morally)goodorbadconsequences ofanaction,butonsuchothermorallyrelevant featuresastherelationshipstheagentbearsto affectedothers(e.g.,friendorbeneficiary),or whetherfraud,injustice,treachery,orviolenceis involved.Butlerthusdistinguishedanalytically betweendistinctivelymoralevaluationofaction andassessinganacfsrelationtosuchnon-moral valuesashappiness.Andheprovidedsucceeding deontologicaltheoristswithalitanyofexamples wheretherightthingtodoisapparentlynot whatwouldhavethebestconsequences. ButlerbelievedGodinstillsa"principleof reflection"orconscienceinusthroughwhichwe intrinsicallydisapproveofsuchactionsasfraud andinjustice.ButhealsobelievedthatGod,being omniscientandbenevolent,fitteduswiththese moralattitudesbecause"Heforesawthisconstitu- tionofournaturewouldproducemorehappi- ness,thanforminguswithatemperofmere generalbenevolence."Thispoints,however, towardakindofanti-deontologicalorconse- quentialistview,sometimescalledindirectconse- quentialism,whichreadilyacknowledgesthat whatitisrighttododoesnotdependonwhichad willhavethebestconsequences.Itisentirely appropriate,accordingtoindirectconsequential- ism,thatconscienceapproveordisapproveofacts ongroundsotherthanacalculationofconse- quencespreciselybecauseitsdoingsohasthebest consequences.Herewehaveaversionofthesort ofviewlåtertobefound,forexample,inMill's defenseofutilitarianismagainsttheobjectionthat itconflictswithjusticeandrights.Moralityisasys- temofsocialcontrolthatdemandsallegianceto considerationsotherthanutility,e.g.,justiceand honesty.Butitisjustifiableonlytotheextentthat thesystemitselfhasutility. Thissetsupsomethingofatension.Fromthe conscientiousperspectiveanagentmustdistin- guishbetweenthequestionofwhichaction wouldhavethebestconsequencesandtheques- tionofwhatheshoulddo.Andfromthatperspec- tive,Butlerthinks,onewillnecessarilyregard one'sanswertothesecondquestionasauthorita- tiveforconduct.Consciencenecessarilyimplicitly assertsitsownauthority,Butlerfamously claimed.Thus,insofarasagentscometoregard theirconscienceassimplyamethodofsocialcon- trolwithgoodconsequences,theywillcometobe alienatedfromtheinherentauthoritytheircon- scienceimplicitlyclaims.Asimilarissuearises concerningtherelationbetweenconscienceand self-love.Butlersaysthatbothself-loveandcon- scienceare"superiorprinciplesinthenatureof man"inthatanactionwillbeunsuitabletoaper- son^natureifitiscontrarytoeither.Thismakes conscience'sauthorityconditionalonitsnotcon- flictingwithself-love(andviceversa).Some scholars,moreover,readotherpassagesasimply- ingthatnoagentcouldreasonablyfollowcon- scienceunlessdoingsowasintheagenfsinterest. Butagain,itwouldseemthatanagentwhointer- nalizedsuchaviewwouldbealienatedfromthe authoritythat,ifButlerisright,conscienceimplic- itlyclaims.ForButler,conscienceortheprinciple ofreflectionisuniquelythefacultyofpractical judgment.Unlikeeitherself-loveorbenevolence, evenwhentheseareaddedtothepowersofinfer- enceandempiricalcognition,onlyconscience makesmoralagencypossible.Onlyacreature withconsciencecanaccordwithorviolatehis ownjudgmentofwhatheoughttodo,and therebybea"lawtohimself."Thissuggestsaview that,likeKanfs,seekstolinkdeontologytoacon- ceptionofautonomousmoralagency. Seealsoegoism,ethics,hedonism,util- ITARIANISM.S.L.D. 110 c cabala(fromHebrewqabbala,'tradition'),asys- temofJewishmysticismandtheosophyprac- ticedfromthethirteenthtotheeighteenth century;ioosely,allformsofJewishmysticism. Believedbyitsadherentstobeatraditioncom- municatedtoMosesatSinai,themainbodyof cabalisticwriting,theZohar,isthoughttobethe workprimarilyofMosesdeLeonofGuadalajara, inthethirteenthcentury,thoughheattributedit tothesecond-centuryrabbiSimonbarYohai. TheZoharbuildsonearlierJewishmysticism, andisrepletewithgnosticandNeoplatonic themes.Itofferstheinitiatedaccesstothemys- teriesofGod'sbeing,humandestiny,andthe meaningofthecommandments.Thetranscen- dentandstrictlyunitaryGodofrabbinicJudaism hereencounterstenapparentlyrealdivinepow- ers,calledsefirot,whichtogetherrepresentGod's beingandappearanceinthecosmosandinclude maleandfemaleprinciples.Evilintheworldis seenasareflectionofacosmicruptureinthissys- tem,andredemptiononearthentailsrestoration ofthedivineorder.Mankindcanassistinthis taskthroughknowledge,piety,andobservance ofthelaw. IsaacLuriainthesixteenthcenturydeveloped thesethemeswithgraphicdescriptionsofthe dramasofcreation,cosmicrupture,andrestora- tion,thelatterprocessrequiringhumanassis- tancemorethanever.A.L.I. Caird,Edward(1835-1908),Scottishphiloso- pher,aleadingabsoluteidealist.Influentialas bothawriterandateacher,Cairdwasprofessor ofmoralphilosophyatGlasgowandmasterof BalliolCollege,Oxford.Hisaiminphilosophy wastoovercomeintellectualoppositions.Inhis mainwork,TheCriticalPhilosophyofKant(1889), hearguedthatKanthaddonethisbyusingrea- sontosynthesizerationalismandempiricism whilereconcilingscienceandreligion.InCaird's view,Kantunfortunatelytreatedreasonassub- jective,therebyretaininganoppositionbetween selfandworld.LooselyfollowingHegel,Caird claimedthatobjectivereason,ortheAbsolute, wasalargerwholeinwhichbothselfandworld werefragments.InhisEvolutionofReligion(1893) Cairdarguedthatreligionprogressivelyunder- standsGodastheAbsoluteandhenceaswhat reconcilesselfandworld.Thisallowedhimto defendChristianityasthehighestevolutionary stageofreligionwithoutdefendingtheliteral truthofScripture.Seealsoidealism,philos- ophyOFRELIGION.J.W.A. Cajetan,originalname,TommasodeVio(c.1469- 1534),Italianprelateandtheologian.Bomin Gaeta(fromwhichhetookhisname),heentered theDominicanorderin1484andstudiedphilos- ophyandtheologyatNaples,Bologna,and Padua.Hebecameacardinalin1517;duringthe followingtwoyearshetraveledtoGermany, whereheengagedinatheologicalcontroversy withLuther.HismajorworkisaCommentaryon St.Thomas'SummaofTheology(1508),whichpro- motedarenewalofinterestinScholasticand Thomisticphilosophyduringthesixteenthcen- tury.InagreementwithAquinas,Cajetanplaces theoriginofhumanknowledgeinsensepercep- tion.IncontrastwithAquinas,hedeniesthatthe immortalityofthesoulandtheexistenceofGod asourcreatorcanbeproved.Cajetan'sworkin logicwasbasedontraditionalAristoteliansyllo- gisticlogicbutisoriginalinitsdiscussionofthe notionofanalogy.Cajetandistinguishesthree types:analogyofinequality,analogyofattribu- tion,andanalogyofproportion.Whereashe rejectedthefirsttwotypesasimproper,he regardedthelastasthebasictypeofanalogyand appealedtoitinexplaininghowhumanscometo knowGodandhowanalogicalreasoningapplied toGodandGod'screaturesavoidsbeingequivo- cal.Seealsothomism.P.Gar. calculiofrelations.Seerelationallogic. calculus,acentralbranchofmathematics,origi- nallyconceivedinconnectionwiththedetermi- nationofthetangent(ornormal)toacurveand oftheareabetweenitandsomefixedaxis;butit alsoembracedthecalculationofvolumesandof areasofcurvedsurfaces,thelengthsofcurved lines,andsoon.Mathematicalanalysisisastill broaderbranchthatsubsumedthecalculus underitsrubric(seebelow),togetherwiththe theoriesoffunctionsandofinfiniteseries.Still moregeneraland/orabstractversionsofanaly- sishavebeendevelopedduringthetwentieth 111 calculus calculus century,withapplicationstootherbranchesof mathematics,suchasprobabilitytheory. TheoriginsofthecalculusgobacktoGreek mathematics,usuallyinproblemsofdetermin- ingtheslopeofatangenttoacurveandthearea enclosedunderneathitbysomefixedaxesorby aclosedcurve;sometimesrelatedquestionssuch asthelengthofanareofacurve,ortheareaof acurvedsurface,wereconsidered.Thesubject flourishedintheseventeenthcenturywhenthe analyticalgeometryofDescartesgavealgebraic meanstoextendtheprocedures.Itdeveloped furtherwhentheproblemsofslopeandarea wereseentorequirethefindingofnewfunc- tions,andthatthepertainingprocesseswere seentobeinverse.NewtonandLeibnizhadthese insightsinthelateseventeenthcentury,inde- pendentlyandindifferentforms. IntheLeibniziandifferentialcalculusthediffer- entialdxwasproposedasaninfinitesimalincre- mentonx,andofthesamedimensionasx;the slopeofthetangenttoacurvewithyasafunction ofxwastheratiody/dx.Theintegral,fx,wasinfi- nitelylargeandofthedimensionofx;thusfor linearvariablesxandytheareajydxwasthesum oftheareasofrectanglesyhighanddxwide.All thesequantitieswerevariable,andsocould admithigher-orderdifferentialsandintegrals (ddx,Jjx,andsoon).Thistheorywasextended duringtheeighteenthcentury,especiallyby Euler,tofunctionsofseveralindependentvari- ables,andwiththecreationofthecalculusof variations.Thechiefmotivationwastosolvedif- ferentialequations:theyweremotivatedlargely byproblemsinmechanics,whichwasthenthe singlelargestbranchofmathematics. Newton'slesssuccessfulfluxionalcalculusused limitsinitsbasicdefinitions,therebychanging dimensionsforthedefinedterms.Thefluxion wastheråteofchangeofavariablequantityrel- ativeto"time";conversely,thatvariablewasthe "fluent"ofitsfluxion.Thesequantitieswerealso variable;fluxionsandfluentsofhigherorders couldbedefinedfromthem. Athirdtraditionwasdevelopedduringthelate eighteenthcenturybyJ.L.Lagrange.Forhimthe "derivedfunctions"ofafunction/(x)weredelin- ablebypurelyalgebraicmeansfromitsTaylorian power-seriesexpansionaboutanyvalueofx.By thesemeansitwashopedtoavoidtheuseofboth infinitesimalsandlimits,whichexhibitedconcep- tualdifficulties,theformerduetotheirunclear ontologyasvaluesgreaterthanzerobutsmaller thananyorthodoxquantity,thelatterbecauseof thenaivetheoriesoftheirdeployment. IntheearlynineteenthcenturytheNewton- iantraditiondiedaway,andLagrange'sdidnot gaingeneralconviction;however,theLeibniz- Eulerlinekeptsomeofitshealth,foritsutilityin physicalapplications.Butallthesetheoriesgrad- uallybecameeclipsedbythemathematical analysisofA.L.Cauchy.AswithNewton'scal- culus,thetheoryoflimitswascentral,butthey werehandledinamuchmoresophisticatedway. Hereplacedtheusualpracticeofdefiningthe integralas(moreorless)automaticallytheinverse ofthedifferential(orfluxionorwhatever)by givingindependentdefinitionsofthederivative andtheintegral;thusforthefirsttimethefun- damental"theorem"ofthecalculus,statingtheir inverserelationship,becameagenuinetheorem, requiringsufficientconditionsuponthefunction toensureitstruth.Indeed,Cauchypioneeredthe routinespecificationofnecessaryand/orsuffi- cientconditionsfortruthoftheoremsinanaly- sis.Hisdisciplinealsoincorporatedthetheoryof (dis)continuousfunctionsandtheconvergence ordivergenceofinfiniteseries.Again,general definitionswereprofferedandconditionssought forpropertiestohold. Cauchy'sdisciplinewasrefinedandextended inthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturyby K.WeierstrassandhisfollowersatBerlin.The studyofexistencetheorems(asforirrational numbers),andalsotechnicalquestionslargely concemedwithtrigonometricseries,ledtothe emergenceofsettopology.Inaddition,special attentionwasgiventoprocessesinvolvingsev- eralvariableschanginginvaluetogether,andas aresulttheimportanceofquantifierswasrecog- nized-forexample,reversingtheirorderfrom 'thereisaysuchthatforallx...'to'forallx, thereisay...'.Thisdevelopedlåterintogeneral settheory,andthentomathematicallogic:Can- torwasthemajorfigureinthefirstaspect,while G.Peanopioneeredmuchforthesecond. Underthisregimeof"rigor,"infinitesimals suchasdxbecameunacceptableasmathematical objects.However,theyalwayskeptanunofficial placebecauseoftheirutilitywhenapplyingthe calculus,andsinceWorldWarIItheorieshave beenputforwardinwhichtheestablishedlevel ofrigorandgeneralityarepreserved(andeven improved)butinwhichinfinitesimalsarerein- stated.Thebest-knownofthesetheories,the non-standardanalysisofA.Robinson,makesuse ofmodeltheorybydefininginfinitesimalsas arithmeticalinversesofthetransfiniteintegers generatedbya"non-standardmodel"ofPeano's postulatesforthenaturalnumbers. 112 calculus,fluxional Cambridgechange Seealsomathematicalanalysis,phil- OSOPHYOFMATHEMATICS,SETTHEORY. I.G.-G. calculus,fluxional.Seecalculus. calculus,lambda-.Seecombinatorylogic, LAMBDA-CALCULUS. calculus,propositional.Seeformållogic. calculus,sentential.Seeformållogic. calculus,sequential.Seecut-eliminationtheo- REM. calculusofclasses.Seebooleanalgebra. calculusofindividuals.Seemereology. calculusratiocinator.Seeleibniz. Calvin,John(1509-64),Frenchtheologianand churchreformer,amajorfigureintheProtestant Reformation.Hewasespeciallyimportantforthe so-calledReformedchurchesinFrance,Switzer- land,theNetherlands,Germany,Scotland,and England.Calvinwasatheologianinthehuman- isttraditionratherthanaphilosopher.Hevalued philosophyas"anoblegiftofGod"andcited philosophers(especiallyPlato)whenitsuitedhis purposes;butherejectedphilosophicalspecula- tionabout"higherthings"anddespised- thoughsometimesexploitingitsresources-the dominant(Scholastic)philosophyofhistime,to whichhehadbeenintroducedattheUniversity ofParis.Hiseclecticculturealsoincludedavari- etyofphilosophicalideas,ofwhosesourcehe wasoftenunaware,thatinevitablyhelpedto shapehisthought.HisChristianaereligionisinsti- tutio(firsted.1536butrepeatedlyenlarged;in EnglishgenerallycitedasInstitutes),histheolog- icaltreatises,hismassivebiblicalcommentaries, andhisletters,allofwhichweretranslatedinto mostEuropeanlanguages,thushelpedtotrans- mitvariousphilosophicalmotifsandattitudesin anunsystematicformbothtocontemporaries andtoposterity.Hepassedontohisfollowers impulsesderivedfromboththeantiquiandthe moderni. Fromtheformerheinheritedanintellectual- istanthropologythatconceivedofthepersonal- ityasahierarchyoffacultiesproperlysub- ordinatedtoreason,whichwasatoddswithhis evangelicaltheology;and,thoughheprofessed toscomStoicism,amoralismoftenmoreStoic thanevangelical.Healsoreliedoccasionallyon theScholasticquaestio,andregularlytreatedsub- stantives,liketheantiqui,asrealentities.These elementsinhisthoughtalsofoundexpressionin tendenciestoanaturaltheologybasedonan innateanduniversalreligiousinstinctthatcan discernevidencesoftheexistenceandattributes ofGodeverywhereinnature,andaconception oftheDietyasimmutableandintelligible.This sideofCalvinismeventuallyfoundexpressionin Unitarianismanduniversalism. Itwas,however,inuneasytensionwithother tendenciesinhisthoughtthatreflectbothhis biblicismandanominalistandScotistsenseof theextremetranscendenceofGod.Likeother humanists,therefore,hewasalsoprofoundly skepticalaboutthecapacityofthehumanmind tograspultimatetruth,anattitudethatrested, forhim,onboththeconsequencesoforiginalsin andthemerelyconventionaloriginsoflanguage. Corollariesofthiswerehissenseofthecontin- gencyofallhumanintellectualconstructions andatendencytoemphasizetheutilityrather thanthetruthevenofsuchmajorelementsinhis theologyasthedoctrineofpredestination.Itmay wellbenoaccident,therefore,thatlåterskepti- cismandpragmatismhavebeenconspicuousin thinkersnurturedbylåterCalvinism,suchas Bayle,Hume,andJames. Seealsohumanism,philosophyofreli- gion,TRANSCENDENCE.W.J.B. Cambridgechange,anon-genuinechange.IfI turnpåle,Iamchanging,whereasyourturning påleisonlyaCambridgechangeinme.WhenI acquirethepropertyofbeingsuchthatyouare påle,/donotchange.Ingeneral,anobjecfs acquiringanewpropertyisnotasufficientcon- ditionforthatobjecttochange(althoughsome otherobjectmaygenuinelychange).Thusalso, mybeingsuchthatyouarepålecountsonlyasa Cambridgepropertyofme,apropertysuchthatmy gainingorlosingitisonlyaCambridgechange. Cambridgepropertiesareapropersubclassof extrinsicproperties:beingsouthofChicagois consideredanextrinsicpropertyofme,butsince mymovingtoCanadawouldbeagenuine change,beingsouthofChicagocannot,forme, beaCambridgeproperty. TheconceptofaCambridgechangereflectsa wayofthinkingentrenchedincommonsense, butitisdifficulttoclarify,anditsphilosophical valueiscontroversial.Neithersciencenorformål semantics,e.g.,supportsthisviewpoint.Perhaps 113 CambridgePlatonists CambridgePlatonists Cambridgechangesandpropertiesare,forbetter orworse,inseparablefromavague,intuitive metaphysics. Seealsoproperty,time.S.J.W. CambridgePlatonists,agroupofseventeenth- centuryphilosopher-theologiansattheUniver- sityofCambridge,principallyincludingBenja- minWhichcote(i609-83),oftendesignatedthe fatheroftheCambridgePlatonists;HenryMore; RalphCudworth(1617-88);andJohnSmith (1616-52).Whichcote,Cudworth,andSmith receivedtheiruniversityeducationinorwereat sometimefellowsofEmmanuelCollege,a strongholdoftheCalvinisminwhichtheywere nurturedandagainstwhichtheyrebelledunder mainlyErasmian,Arminian,andNeoplatonic influences.OtherCambridgemenwhoshared theirideasandattitudestovaryingdegreeswere NathanaelCulverwel(16187-51),PeterSterry (1613-72),GeorgeRust(d.1670),JohnWor- thington(1618-71),andSimonPatrick(1625- 1707). Asagenericlabel,'CambridgePlatonists'isa handyumbrellatermratherthanadependable signalofdoctrinalunityoraffiliation.TheCam- bridgePlatonistswerenotaself-constituted grouparticledtoanexplicitmanifesto;notwoof themsharedquitethesamesetofdoctrinesor values.TheirPlatonismwasnotexclusivelythe pristineteachingofPlato,butwasformedrather fromPlatonicideassupposedlyprefiguredin HermesTrismegistus,intheChaldeanOracles, andinPythagoras,andwhichtheyfoundinOri- genandotherchurchfathers,intheNeoplaton- ismofPlotinusandProclus,andintheFlorentine NeoplatonismofFicino.Theytookcontrasting andchangingpositionsontheimportantbelief (originatinginFlorencewithGiovanniPicodella Mirandola)thatPythagorasandPlatoderived theirwisdomultimatelyfromMosesandthe cabala.Theywerenotequallycommittedto philosophicalpursuits,norweretheyequally versedinthenewphilosophiesandscientific advancesofthetime. TheCambridgePlatonists'concernswereulti- matelyreligiousandtheologicalratherthanpri- marilyphilosophical.Theyphilosophizedas theologians,makingeclecticuseofphilosophical doctrines(whetherPlatonicornot)forapolo- geticpurposes.Theywantedtodefend"truereli- gion,"namely,theirlatitudinarianvisionof AnglicanChristianity,againstavarietyofene- mies:theCalvinistdoctrineofpredestination; sectarianism;religiousenthusiasm;fanaticism; the"hide-bound,strait-lacedspirit"ofInterreg- numPuritanism;the"narrow,persecutingspirit" thatfollowedtheRestoration;atheism;andthe impietiesincipientincertaintrendsincontem- poraryscienceandphilosophy.Notableamong thelatterwerethedoctrinesofthemechanical philosophers,especiallythematerialismand mechanicaldeterminismofHobbesandthe mechanisticpretensionsoftheCartesians. TheexistenceofGod,theexistence,immor- tality,anddignityofthehumansoul,theexis- tenceofspiritactivatingthenaturalworld, humanfreewill,andtheprimacyofreasonare amongtheprincipalteachingsoftheCambridge Platonists.Theyemphasizedthepositiveroleof reasoninallaspectsofphilosophy,religion,and ethics,insistinginparticularthatitis/rrational- itythatendangerstheChristianlife.Humanrea- sonandunderstandingwas"theCandleofthe Lord"(Whichcote'sphrase),perhapstheirmost cherishedimage.InWhichcote'swords,"Togo againstReason,istogoagainstGod...Reason istheDivineGovemorofMan'sLife;itisthevery VoiceofGod."Accordingly,"thereisnoreal clashingatallbetwixtanygenuinepointof ChristianityandwhattruePhilosophyandright Reasondoesdetermineorallow"(More).Rea- sondirectsustotheself-evidenceoffirstprinci- ples,which"mustbeseenintheirownlight,and areperceivedbyaninwardpowerofnature."Yet inkeepingwiththePlotinianmysticaltenorof theirthought,theyfoundwithinthehumansoul the"DivineSagacity"(More'sterm),whichisthe primecauseofhumanreasonandtherefore superiortoit.DenyingtheCalvinistdoctrinethat revelationistheonlysourceofspirituallight, theytaughtthatthe"naturallight"enablesusto knowGodandinterprettheScriptures. CambridgePlatonismwasuncompromisingly innatist.Humanreasonhasinheritedimmutable intellectual,moral,andreligiousnotions,"antic- ipationsofthesoul,"whichnegatetheclaimsof empiricism.TheCambridgePlatonistswere skepticalwithregardtocertainkindsofknowl- edge,andrecognizedtheroleofskepticismasa criticalinstrumentinepistemology.Butthey weredismissiveoftheideathatPyrrhonismbe takenseriouslyinthepracticalaffairsofthe philosopheratwork,andespeciallyoftheChris- tiansoulinitsquestfordivineknowledgeand understanding.Truthisnotcompromisedbyour inabilitytodeviseapodicticdemonstrations. IndeedWhichcotepassedamoralcensureon thosewhopretend"thedoubtfulnessanduncer- taintyofreason." Innatismandthenaturallightofreason shapedtheCambridgePlatonists'moralphiloso- 114 Cambridgeproperty Campbell,NormanRobert phy.Theunchangeableandeternalideasofgood andevilinthedivinemindaretheexemplarsof ethicalaxiomsornoematathatenablethe humanmindtomakemoraljudgments.More arguedfora"boniformfaculty,"afacultyhigher thanreasonbywhichthesoulrejoicesinrea- son^judgmentofthegood. Themostphilosophicallycommittedandsys- tematicofthegroupwereMore,Cudworth,and Culverwel.Smith,perhapsthemostintellectu- allygiftedandcertainlythemostpromising (notehisdates),defendedWhichcote'sChristian teaching,insistingthattheologyismore"a DivineLifethanaDivineScience."Moreexclu- sivelytheologicalintheirleaningswereWhich- cote,whowrotelittleofsolidphilosophical interest,Rust,whofollowedCudworuVsmoral philosophy,andSterry.OnlyPatrick,More,and Cudworth(allfellowsoftheRoyalSociety)were sufficientlyattractedtothenewscience(espe- ciallytheworkofDescartes)todiscussitinany detailortoturnittophilosophicalandtheolog- icaladvantage.ThoughoftendescribedasaPla- tonist,Culverwelwasreallyaneo-Aristotelian withPlatonicembellishmentsand,likeSterry,a Calvinist.Hedeniedinnateideasandsupported thetabularasadoctrine,commending"thePla- tonists...thattheylooktuponthespiritofa manastheCandleoftheLord,thoughtheywere deceivedinthetimewhen'twaslighted." TheCambridgePlatonistswereinfluentialas latitudinarians,asadvocatesofrationaltheology, asseverecriticsofunbridledmechanismand materialism,andastheinitiators,inEngland,of theintuitionistethicaltradition.IntheEngland ofLocketheyareastrikingcounterinstanceof innatismandnon-empiricalphilosophy. Seealsomore,henry;neoplatonism; PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION;PLATO.A.G. Cambridgeproperty.SeeCambridgechange. cameraobscura,adarkenedenclosurethat focuseslightfromanexternalobjectbyapin- pointholeinsteadofalens,creatinganinverted, reversedimageontheoppositewall.Theadop- tionofthecameraobscuraasamodelfortheeye revolutionizedthestudyofvisualperceptionby renderingobsoletepreviousspeculativephilo- sophicaltheories,inparticulartheemanation theory,whichexplainedperceptionasdueto emanatedcopy-imagesofobjectsenteringthe eye,andtheoriesthatlocatedtheimageofper- ceptioninthelensratherthantheretina.By shiftingthelocationofsensationtoaprojec- tionontheretina,thecameraobscuradoctrine helpedsupportthedistinctionofprimaryand secondarysensequalities,underminingthe medievalrealistviewofperceptionandmoving towardtheideathatconsciousnessisradically splitofffromtheworld.Seealsoperception. T.H.L. Campanella,Tommaso(1568-1639),Italianthe- ologian,philosopher,andpoet.Hejoinedthe Dominicanorderin1582.Mostoftheyears between1592and1634hespentinprisonfor heresyandforconspiringtoreplaceSpanishrule insouthernItalywithautopianrepublic.HeHed toFrancein1634andspenthislastyearsinfree- dom.Someofhisbestpoetrywaswrittenwhile hewaschainedinadungeon;andduringlessrig- orousconfinementhemanagedtowriteövera hundredbooks,notallofwhichsurvive.His best-knownwork,TheCityoftheSun(1602;pub- lished1623),describesacommunitygovernedin accordancewithastrologicalprinciples,witha priestasheadofstate.Inlåterpoliticalwritings, CampanellaattackedMachiavelliandcalledfor eitherauniversalSpanishmonarchywiththe popeasspiritualheadorauniversaltheocracy withthepopeasbothspiritualandtemporal leader.HisfirstpublicationwasPhilosophyDemon- stratedbytheSenses(1591),whichsupportedthe theoriesofTelesioandinitiatedhislifelongattack onAristotelianism.Hehopedtofoundanew Christianphilosophybasedonthetwobooksof natureandScripture,bothofwhicharemani- festationsofGod.Whileheappealedtosense experience,hewasnotastraightforwardempiri- cist,forhesawthenaturalworldasaliveand sentient,andhethoughtofmagicasatoolfor utilizingnaturalprocesses.Inthishewas stronglyinfluencedbyFicino.Despitehisown difficultieswithRome,hewroteinsupportof Galileo.Seealsoficino,telesio.EJ.A. Campbell,NormanRobert(1880-1949),British physicistandphilosopherofscience.Asuccess- fulexperimentalphysicist,Campbell(withA. Wood)discoveredtheradioactivityofpotassium. Hisanalysisofsciencedependedonasharpdis- tinctionbetweenexperimentallawsandtheo- ries.Experimentallawsaregeneralizations establishedbyobservations.Atheoryhasthefol- lowingstructure.First,itrequiresa(largelyarbi- trary)hypothesis,whichinitselfisuntestable.To renderittestable,thetheoryrequiresa"dictio- nary"ofpropositionslinkingthehypothesisto scientificlaws,whichcanbeestablishedexperi- mentally.Buttheoriesarenotmerelylogical relationsbetweenhypothesesandexperimental 115 Camus,Albert Cantor,Georg laws;theyalsorequireconcreteanalogiesor models.Indeed,themodelssuggestthenatureof thepropositionsinthedictionary.Theanalogies areessentialcomponentsofthetheory,and,for Campbell,arenearlyalwaysmechanical.His theoryofsciencegreatlyinfluencedNagel'sThe StructureofScience(1961).Seealsophilosophy OFSCIENCE,THEORETICALTERM.R.E.B. Camus,Albert(1913-60),Frenchphilosophical novelistandessayistwhowasalsoaprosepoet andtheconscienceofhistimes.Hewasbomand raisedinAlgeria,andhisexperiencesasafather- less,tubercularyouth,asayoungplaywrightand journalistinAlgiers,andlåterintheanti-Ger- manresistanceinParisduringWorldWarII informedeverythinghewrote.Hisbest-known writingsarenotovertlypolitical;hismost famousworks,thenovelTheStranger(writtenin 1940,publishedin1942)andhisbook-length essayTheMythofSisyphus(writtenin1941,pub- lishedin1943)explorethenotionof"the absurd,"whichCamusaltemativelydescribesas thehumanconditionandas"awidespreadsen- sitivityofourtimes."Theabsurd,brieflydefined, istheconfrontationbetweenourselves-with ourdemandsforrationalityandjustice-andan "indifferentuniverse."Sisyphus,whowascon- demnedbythegodstotheendless,futiletaskof rollingarockupamountain(whenceitwould rollbackdownofitsownweight),thusbecomes anexemplarofthehumancondition,struggling hopelesslyandpointlesslytoachievesomething. TheoddantiheroofTheStranger,ontheother hand,unconsciouslyacceptstheabsurdityoflife. Hemakesnojudgments,acceptsthemostrepul- sivecharactersashisfriendsandneighbors,and remainsunmovedbythedeathofhismother andhisownkillingofaman.Facingexecution forhiscrime,he"openshishearttothebenign indifferenceoftheuniverse." Butsuchstoicacceptanceisnotthemessageof Camus'sphilosophy.Sisyphusthrives(heiseven "happy")byvirtueofhisscornanddefianceof thegods,andbyvirtueofa"rebellion"that refusestogiveintodespair.Thissametheme motivatesCamus'slåternovel,ThePlague(1947), andhislongessayTheRebel(1951).Inhislast work,however,anovelcalledTheFallpublished in1956,theyearbeforehewontheNobelprize forliterature,Camuspresentsanunforgettably perversecharacternamedJean-BaptisteCla- mence,whoexemplifiesallthebittemessand despairrejectedbyhispreviouscharactersandin hisearlieressays.Clamence,likethecharacterin TheStranger,refusestojudgepeople,butwhereas Meursault(the"stranger")isincapableofjudg- ment,Clamence(whowasoncealawyer)makes itamatterofphilosophicalprinciple,"forwho amongusisinnocent?"Itisunclearwhere Camus'sthinkingwasheadingwhenhewas killedinanautomobileaccident(withhispub- lisher,Gallimard,whosurvived). Seealsoexistentialism,sartre. R.C.So. Canguilhem,Georges(1904-96),Frenchhisto- rianandphilosopherofscience.Canguilhem succeededGastonBachelardasdirectorofthe Institutd'HistoiredesSciencesetdesTechniques attheUniversityofParis.Hedevelopedand sometimesrevisedBachelard'sviewofscience, extendingittoissuesinthebiologicalandmed- icalsciences,wherehefocusedparticularlyon theconceptsofthenormalandthepathological (TheNormalandthePathological,1966).Onhis accountnormsarenotobjectiveinthesenseof beingderivedfromvalue-neutralscientificin- quiry,butarerootedinthebiologicalrealityof theorganismsthattheyregulate. Canguilhemalsointroducedanimportant methodologicaldistinctionbetweenconcepts andtheories.Rejectingthecommonviewthat scientificconceptsaresimplyfunctionsofthe theoriesinwhichtheyareembedded,heargued thattheuseofconceptstointerpretdataisquite distinctfromtheuseoftheoriestoexplainthe data.Consequently,thesameconceptsmay occurinverydifferenttheoreticalcontexts.Can- guilhemmadeparticularlyeffectiveuseofthis distinctionintracingtheoriginoftheconceptof reflexaction. Seealsobachelard,philosophyofthe SOCIALSCIENCES,PSYCHOPATHOLOGY. G.G. Cantor,Georg(1845-1918),Germanmathe- matician,oneofanumberoflatenineteenth- centurymathematiciansandphilosophers (includingFrege,Dedekind,Peano,Russell,and Hilbert)whotransformedbothmathematicsand thestudyofitsphilosophicalfoundations.The philosophicalimportofCantor'sworkisthree- fold.First,itwasprimarilyCantorwhoturned arbitrarycollectionsintoobjectsofmathematical study,sets.Second,hecreatedacoherentmath- ematicaltheoryoftheinfinite,inparticularathe- oryoftransfinitenumbers.Third,linkingthese, hewasthefirsttoindicatethatitmightbepossi- bletopresentmathematicsasnothingbutthe theoryofsets,thusmakingsettheoryfounda- tionalformathematics.Thiscontributedtothe 116 Cantor'sparadox cardinalvirtues viewthatthefoundationsofmathematicsshould itselfbecomeanobjectofmathematicalstudy. Cantoralsoheldtoaformofprincipleofpleni- tude,thebeliefthatalltheinfinitiesgiveninhis theoryoftransfinitenumbersarerepresented notjustinmathematical(or"immanent"real- ity),butalsointhe"transient"realityofGod's createdworld. Cantor'smain,directachievementishisthe- oryoftransfinitenumbersandinfinity.Hechar- acterized(asdidFrege)samenessofsizeinterms ofone-to-onecorrespondence,thusaccepting theparadoxicalresultsknowntoGalileoand others,e.g.,thatthecollectionofallnatural numbershasthesamecardinalityorsizeasthat ofallevennumbers.Headdedtothesesurpris- ingresultsbyshowing(1874)thatthereisthe samenumberofalgebraic(andthusrational) numbersastherearenaturalnumbers,butthat therearemorepointsonacontinuouslinethan therearenatural(orrationaloralgebraic)num- bers,thusrevealingthatthereareatleasttwo differentkindsofinfinitypresentinordinary mathematics,andconsequentlydemonstrating theneedforamathematicaltreatmentofthese infinities.Thislatterresultisoftenexpressedby sayingthatthecontinuumisuncountable. Cantor'stheoremof1892isageneralizationof partofthis,foritsaysthatthesetofallsubsets (thepower-set)ofagivensetmustbecardinally greaterthanthatset,thusgivingrisetothepos- sibilityofindefinitelymanydifferentinfinities. (Thecollectionofallrealnumbershasthesame sizeasthepower-setofnaturalnumbers.) Cantor'stheoryoftransfinitenumbers(1880- 97)washisdevelopedmathematicaltheoryof infinity,withtheinfinitecardinalnumbers(the K-,oraleph-,numbers)basedontheinfinite ordinalnumbersthatheintroducedin1880and 1883.TheK-numbersareineffectthecardinal- itiesofinfinitewell-orderedsets.Thetheorythus generatestwofamousquestions,whetherall sets(inparticularthecontinuum)canbewell ordered,andifsowhichoftheN-numbersrep- resentsthecardinalityofthecontinuum.The formerquestionwasansweredpositivelyby Zermeloin1904,thoughattheexpenseofpos- tulatingoneofthemostcontroversialprinciples inthehistoryofmathematics,theaxiomof choice.Thelatterquestionisthecelebratedcon- tinuumproblem.Cantor'sfamouscontinuum hypothesis(CH)ishisconjecturethatthecardi- nalityofthecontinuumisrepresentedbyN„the secondaleph.CHwasshowntobeindependent oftheusualassumptionsofsettheorybyGödel (1938)andCohen(1963).Extensionsof Cohen'smethodsshowthatitisconsistentto assumethatthecardinalityofthecontinuumis givenbyalmostanyofthevästarrayofN-num- bers.Thecontinuumproblemisnowwidely consideredinsoluble. Cantor'sconceptionofsetisoftentakento admitthewholeuniverseofsetsasaset,thus engenderingcontradiction,inparticularinthe formofCantor'sparadox.ForCantor'stheorem wouldsaythatthepower-setoftheuniverse mustbebiggerthanit,while,sincethispower- setisasetofsets,itmustbecontainedintheuni- versalset,andthuscanbenobigger.However,it followsfromCantor'searly(1883)considera- tionsofwhathecalledthe"absoluteinfinite" thatnoneofthecollectionsdiscoveredlåtertobe atthebaseoftheparadoxescanbepropersets. Moreover,correspondencewithHilbertin1897 andDedekindin1899(seeCantor,Gesammelte Abhandlungenmathematischenundphilosophischen Inhalts,1932)showsclearlythatCantorwaswell awarethatcontradictionswillariseifsuchcol- lectionsaretreatedasordinarysets. Seealsocontinuumproblem,set- THEORETICPARADOXES,SETTHEORY.M.H. Cantor'sparadox.Seeset-theoreticparadoxes. Cantor'stheorem.Seecantor,continuumprob- lem. capacity,diminished.Seediminishedcapacity. capacityresponsibility.Seeresponsibility. cardinality.Seeset-theoreticparadoxes. cardinalutility.Seeutilitarianism. cardinalvirtues,prudence(practicalwisdom), courage,temperance,andjustice.Medievals deemedthemcardinal(fromLatincardo,'hinge') becauseoftheirimportantorpivotalrolein humanflourishing.InPlato'sRepublic,Socrates explainsthemthroughadoctrineofthethree partsofthesoul,suggestingthatapersonispru- dentwhenknowledgeofhowtolive(wisdom) informsherreason,courageouswheninformed reasongovernshercapacityforwrath,temperate whenitalsogovemsherappetites,andjustwhen eachpartperformsitspropertaskwithinformed reasonincontrol.Developmentofthoughton thecardinalvirtueswascloselytiedtothedoc- trineoftheunityofthevirtues,i.e.,thataper- sonpossessingonevirtuewillhavethemall.See alsoVIRTUEETHICS.J.L.A.G. 117 Carlyle,Thomas Carnap,Rudolf Carlyle,Thomas(1795-1881),Scottish-bornes- sayist,historian,andsocialcritic,oneofthemost populärwritersandlecturersinnineteenth-cen- turyBritain.Hisworksincludeliterarycriticism, historyandculturalcriticism.Withrespectto philosophyhisviewsonthetheoryofhistoryare hismostsignificantcontributions.Accordingto Carlyle,greatpersonagesarethemostimportant causalfactorinhistory.OnHeroes,Hero-Worship andtheHeroicinHistory(1841)asserts,''Universal History,thehistoryofwhatmanhasaccom- plishedinthisworld,isatbottomtheHistoryof theGreatMenwhohaveworkedhere.They weretheleadersofmen,thesegreatones;the modellers,pattems,andinawidesensecreators, ofwhatsoeverthegeneralmässofmencontrived todoortoattain;allthingsthatweseestanding accomplishedintheworldareproperlytheouter materialresult,thepracticalrealisationandem- bodiment,ofThoughtsthatdweltintheGreat Mensentintotheworld:thesoulofthewhole world'shistory,itmayjustlybeconsidered,were thehistoryofthese." Carlyle'sdoctrinehasbeenchallengedfrom manydifferentdirections.HegelianandMarxist philosophersmaintainthattheso-calledgreat menofhistoryarenotreallytheengineofhistory, butmerelyreflectionsofdeeperforces,suchas economicones,whilecontemporaryhistorians emphasizethepriorityof"historyfrombelow"- thesocialhistoryofeverydaypeople-asfarmore representativeofthehistoricalprocess. Seealsophilosophyofhistory.N.C. Carnap,Rudolf(1891-1970),German-born Americanphilosopher,oneoftheleadersofthe ViennaCircle,amovementlooselycalledlogical positivismorlogicalempiricism.Hemadefun- damentalcontributionstosemanticsandthe philosophyofscience,aswellastothefounda- tionsofprobabilityandinductivelogic.Hewasa staunchadvocateof,andactivein,theunityof sciencemovement. CarnapreceivedhisPh.D.inphilosophyfrom theUniversityofJenain1921.Hisfirstmajor workwasDieLogischeAufbauderWelt(1928),in whichhesoughttoapplythenewlogicrecently developedbyFregeandbyRussellandWhite- headtoproblemsinthephilosophyofscience. Althoughinfluential,itwasnottranslateduntil 1967,whenitappearedasTheLogicalStructureof theWorld.Itwasimportantasoneofthefirstclear andunambiguousstatementsthattheimportant workofphilosophyconcernedlogicalstructure: thatlanguageanditslogicweretobethefocus ofattention.In1935CarnaplefthisnativeGer- manyfortheUnitedStates,wherehetaughtat theUniversityofChicagoandthenatUCLA. DieLogicheSyntaxderSprach(1934)wasrapidly translatedintoEnglish,appearingasTheLogical SyntaxofLanguage(1937).Thiswasfollowedin 1941byIntroductiontoSemantics,andin1942by TheFormalizationofLogic.In1947Meaningand Necessityappeared;itprovidedthegroundwork foramodallogicthatwouldmirrorthemeticu- loussemanticdevelopmentoffirst-orderlogicin thefirsttwovolumes.Oneofthemostimportant conceptsintroducedinthesevolumeswasthatof astatedescription.Astatedescriptionisthelin- guisticcounterpartofapossibleworld:inagiven language,themostcompletedescriptionofthe worldthatcanbegiven. Carnapthenturnedtooneofthemostperva- siveandimportantproblemstoariseinboththe philosophyofscienceandthetheoryofmean- ing.Tosaythatthemeaningofasentenceis givenbytheconditionsunderwhichitwouldbe verified(astheearlypositivistsdid)orthatasci- entifictheoryisverifiedbypredictionsthatturn outtobetrue,isclearlytospeakloosely. Absoluteverificationdoesnotoccur.Tocarryout theprogramofscientificphilosophyinarealistic way,wemustbeabletospeakofthesupport givenbyinconclusiveevidence,eitherinprovid- ingepistemologicaljustificationforscientific knowledge,orincharacterizingthemeaningsof manyofthetermsofourscientificlanguage.This callsforanunderstandingofprobability,oras Carnappreferredtocallit,degreeofconfirma- tion.Wemustdistinguishbetweentwosensesof probability:whathecalledprobabilityj,corre- spondingtocredibility,andprobability,,corre- spondingtothefrequencyorempiricalconcep- tionofprobabilitydefendedbyReichenbachand vonMises.'Degreeofconfirmation'wastobethe formålconceptcorrespondingtocredibility. Thefirstbookonthissubject,writtenfromthe samepointofviewastheworksonsemantics, wasTheLogicalFoundationsofProbability(1950). Thegoalwasalogicaldefinitionof'c(h,e)'\the degreeofconfirmationofahypothesish,relative toabodyofevidencee,orthedegreeofrational beliefthatonewhosetotalevidencewaseshould committoh.Ofcoursewemustfirstsettleona formållanguageinwhichtoexpressthehypoth- esisandtheevidence;forthisCarnapchoosesa first-orderlanguagebasedonafinitenumberof one-placepredicates,andacountablenumberof individualconstants.Againstthisbackground, weperformthefollowingreductions:'c(h,e)frep- resentsaconditionalprobability;thusitcanbe representedastheratiooftheabsoluteprobabil- 118 Carneades Carroll,Lewis ityofh&etotheabsoluteprobabilityofe. Absoluteprobabilitiesarerepresentedbythe valueofameasurefunctionm,definedforsen- tencesofthelanguage.Theproblemistodefine m.ButeverysentenceinCarnap'slanguagesis equivalenttoadisjunctionofstatedescriptions; themeasuretobeassignedtoitmust,according totheprobabilitycalculus,bethesumofthe measuresassignedtoitsconstituentstate descriptions.Nowtheproblemistodefinemfor statedescriptions.(Recallthatstatedescriptions werepartofthemachineryCarnapdeveloped earlier.)Thefunctionc\isaconfirmationfunc- tionbasedontheassignmentofequalmeasures toeachstatedescription.Itisinadequate, becauseifhisnotentailedbye,c\(h,e)=m\(h), theapriorimeasureassignedtoh.Wecannot "learnfromexperience."Ameasurethatdoes nothavethatdrawbackism*,whichisbasedon theassignmentofequalmeasurestoeachstruc- turedescription.Astructuredescriptionisaset ofstatedescriptions;twostatedescriptions belongtothesamestructuredescriptionjustin caseonecanbeobtainedfromtheotherbya permutationofindividualconstants.Withinthe structuredescription,equalvaluesareassigned toeachstatedescription. Inthenextbook,TheContinuumofInductive Methods,Carnaptakestheråteatwhichwelearn fromexperiencetobeafundamentalparameter ofhisassignmentsofprobability.Likemeasures onstatedescriptions,thevaluesoftheprobabil- ityofthesingularpredictiveinferencedetermine allotherprobabilities.The"singularpredictive inference"istheinferencefromtheobservation thatindividual1hasonesetofproperties,indi- vidual2hasanothersetofproperties,etc,tothe conclusion:individualjwillhavepropertyk. Finally,inthelastworks(StudiesinInductive LogicandProbability,vols.I[1971]andII[1980], editedwithRichardJeffrey)Carnapofferedtwo longartidesconstitutinghisBasicSystemof InductiveLogic.Thissystemisbuiltaroundalan- guagehavingfamiliesofattributes(e.g.,coloror sound)thatcanbecapturedbypredicates.The basicstructureisstillmonadic,andthelogicstill lacksidentity,buttherearemoreparameters. ThereisaparameterXthatreflectsthe"råteof learningfromexperience";aparameterr\that reflectsaninductiverelationbetweenvaluesof attributesbelongingtofamilies.Withtheintro- ductionofarbitraryparameters,Carnapwas edgingtowardasubjectiveorpersonalisticview ofprobability.Howfarhewaswillingtogo downthesubjectivistgardenpathisopento question;thathediscoveredmoretoberelevant toinductivelogicthanthe"language"ofscience seemsclear. Camap'sworkonprobabilitymeasuresonfor- mallanguagesisdestinedtoliveforalongtime. Sotooishisworkonformålsemantics.Hewasa staunchadvocateofthefruitfulnessofformål studiesinphilosophy,ofbeingclearandexplicit, andofofferingconcreteexamples.Beyondthe particularphilosophicaldoctrinesheadvocated, thesecommitmentscharacterizehiscontribution tophilosophy. Seealsoconfirmation,philosophyof SCIENCE,PROBABILITY,VIENNACIRCLE. H.E.K. Carneades.Seeacademy. Carroll,Lewis,pennameofCharlesLutwidge Dodgson(1832-98),Englishwriterandmathe- matician.Theeldestsonofalargeclericalfamily, hewaseducatedatRugbyandChristChurch, Oxford,whereheremainedfortherestofhis uneventfullife,asmathematicallecturer(until 1881)andcuratoroftheseniorcommonroom. Hismathematicalwritings(underhisown name)aremorenumerousthanimportant.He was,however,theonlyOxonianofhisdayto contributetosymboliclogic,andisremembered forhissyllogisticdiagrams,forhismethodsfor constructingandsolvingelaboratesoritesprob- lems,forhisearlyinterestinlogicalparadoxes, andforthemanyamusingexamplesthatcon- tinuetoreappearinmoderntextbooks.Fame descendeduponhimalmostbyaccident,asthe authorofAlice'sAdventuresinWonderland(1865), ThroughtheLookingGlass(1872),TheHuntingof theSnark(1876),andSylvieandBruno(1889- 93);savingthelast,theonlychildren'sbooksto bringnoblushofembarrassmenttoanadult reader'scheek. Dodgsontookdeacon'sordersin1861,and thoughpastorallyinactive,wasinmanywaysan archetypeoftheprimVictorianclergyman.His religiousopinionswerecarefullythoughtout, butnotofgreatphilosophicinterest.TheOxford movementpassedhimby;heworriedaboutsin (thoughrejectingthedoctrineofeternalpunish- ment),abhorredprofanity,andfussedöverSun- dayobservance,butwasoddlytolerantof theatergoing,alifelonghabitofhisown.Apart fromthesentimentalmessageslåterinsertedin them,theAlicebooksandSnarkareblessedly devoidofreligiousormoralconcern.Fullof rudeness,aggression,andquarrelsome,iffalla- cious,argument,theyhave,ontheotherhand, anaturalattractionforphilosophers,whopillage 119 Cartesiancircle Cassirer,Ernst themfreelyforillustrations.Humpty-Dumpty, thevariousKingsandQueens,theMadHatter, theCaterpillar,theWhiteRabbit,theCheshire Cat,theUnicom,theTweedlebrothers,theBell- man,theBaker,andtheSnarkmakefleeting appearancesinthepagesofRussell,Moore, Broad,Quine,Nagel,Austin,Ayer,Ryle,Blan- shard,andevenWittgenstein(anunlikely admireroftheMockTurtle).Thefirstsuchallu- sion(totheMarchHare)isinVenn'sSymbolic Logic(1881).Theusualreasonsforquotationare tomakesomepointaboutmeaning,stipulative definition,thelogicofnegation,timereversal, dreamconsciousness,thereificationoffictions andnonentities,ortheabsurditiesthatarise fromtaking"ordinarylanguage"tooliterally. (Forexponentsofwordprocessing,theeffectof runningJabberwockythroughaspell-checkeris toextinguishallhopeforthefutureofArtificial Intelligence.) Thoughhimselfnophilosopher,Carroll's uniquesenseofphilosophichumorkeepshim (andhisillustrator,SirJohnTenniel)effortlessly aliveinthemodernage.Alicehasbeentranslated intoseventy-fivelanguages;neweditionsand criticalstudiesappeareveryyear;imitations,par- odies,cartoons,quotations,andephemerapro- liferatebeyondnumber;andCarrollsocieties flourishinseveralcountries,notablyBritainand theUnitedStates.P.He. Cartesiancircle.Seedescartes. Cartesiandemon.Seedescartes. Cartesiandualism.Seedualism,philosophyof mind. Cartesianinteractionism.Seephilosophyofmind. Cartesianism.Seedescartes. Cartesianproduct.Seesettheory. Cärväka,Indianmaterialism.Itsvarietiesshare theviewthatthemindissimplythebodyandits capacities,butdifferastowhethereverymental propertyissimplyaphysicalpropertyundersome psychologicaldescription(reductivematerialism) orthereareemergentirreduciblymentalproper- tiesthatarecausedbyphysicalpropertiesand themselveshavenocausalimpact(epiphenome- nalism).SomeCärväkaepistemologists,atleast accordingtotheircritics,acceptonlyperceptionas areliablesourceofknowledge,butinitsmost sophisticatedformCärväka,notunlikelogical positivism,allowsinferenceatleasttoconclusions thatconcernperceptuallyaccessiblestatesof affairs.Seealsohinduism.K.E.Y. Cassirer,Ernst(1874-1945),Germanphiloso- pherandintellectualhistorian.Hewasborninthe GermancityofBreslau(nowWroclaw,Poland) andeducatedatvariousGermanuniversities.He completedhisstudiesin1899atMarburgunder HermannCohen,founderoftheMarburgSchool ofneo-Kantianism.Cassirerlecturedatthe UniversityofBerlinfrom1906to1919,then acceptedaprofessorshipatthenewlyfounded UniversityofHamburg.WiththeriseofNazismhe leftGermanyin1933,goingfirsttoavisiting appointmentatAllSoulsCollege,Oxford(1933- 35)andthentoaprofessorshipattheUniversityof Göteborg,Sweden(1935-41).In1941hewentto theUnitedStates;hetaughtfirstatYale(1941-44) andthenatColumbia(1944-45). Cassirer'sworksmaybedividedintothosein thehistoryofphilosophyandcultureandthose thatpresenthisownsystematicthought.The formerincludemajoreditionsofLeibnizand Kant;hisfour-volumestudyTheProblemof Knowledge(vols.1-3,1906-20;vol.4,1950), whichtracesthesubjectfromNicholasofCusato thetwentiethcentury;andindividualworkson Descartes,Leibniz,Kant,Rousseau,Goethe,the Renaissance,theEnlightenment,andEnglish Platonism.Thelatterincludehismultivolume ThePhilosophyofSymbolicForms(1923-29), whichpresentsaphilosophyofhumanculture basedontypesofsymbolismfoundinmyth,lan- guage,andmathematicalscience;andindividual worksconcernedwithproblemsinsuchfieldsas logic,psychology,aesthetics,linguistics,andcon- ceptformationinthehumanities.Twoofhis best-knownworksareAnEssayonMan(1944) andTheMythoftheState(1946). Cassirerdidnotconsiderhissystematicphi- losophyandhishistoricalstudiesasseparate endeavors;eachgroundedtheother.Becauseof hisinvolvementwiththeMarburgSchool,his philosophicalpositionisfrequentlybutmistak- enlytypedasneo-Kantian.Kantisanimportant influenceonhim,butsoareHegel,Herder, WilhelmvonHumboldt,Goethe,Leibniz,and Vico.Cassirerderiveshisprincipalphilosophical concept,symbolicform,mostdirectlyfrom HeinrichHertz'sconceptionofnotationin mechanicsandtheconceptionofthesymbol inartoftheHegelianaesthetician,Friedrich TheodorVischer.Inawidersensehisconception ofsymbolicformisatransformationof"idea" and"form"withinthewholetraditionofphilo- 120 Castaneda,Hector-Neri casuistry sophicalidealism.Cassirer'sconceptionofsym- bolicformisnotbasedonadistinctionbetween thesymbolicandtheliteral.Inhisviewall humanknowledgedependsonthepowerto formexperiencethroughsometypeofsymbol- ism.Theformsofhumanknowledgearecoex- tensivewithformsofhumanculture.Thosehe mostoftenanalyzesaremythandreligion,art, language,historyandscience.Theseformsof symbolismconstituteatotalsystemofhuman knowledgeandculturethatisthesubjectmat- terofphilosophy. Cassirer'sinfluenceismostevidentintheaes- theticsofSusanneLanger(1895-1985),buthis conceptionofthesymbolhasenteredintotheo- reticalanthropology,psychology,structurallin- guistics,literarycriticism,myththeory,aesthe- tics,andphenomenology.Hisstudiesofthe RenaissanceandtheEnlightenmentstillstånd asgroundbreakingworksinintellectualhistory. Seealsohegel,leibniz,neo-kantianism, vico.D.P.V. Castaneda,Hector-Neri(1924-91),American analyticalphilosopher.Heavilyinfluencedbyhis owncriticalreactiontoQuine,Chisholm,and histeacherWilfridSellars,Castanedapublished fourbooksandmorethan175essays.Hiswork combinesoriginality,rigor,andpenetration, togetherwithanunusualcomprehensiveness- hisnetworkoftheoryandcriticismreachesinto nearlyeveryareaofphilosophy,includingaction theory;deonticlogicandpracticalreason;ethics; historyofphilosophy;metaphysicsandontol- ogy;philosophicalmethodology;philosophyof language,mind,andperception;andthetheory ofknowledge.Hisprincipalcontributionsareto metaphysicsandontology,indexicalreference, anddeonticlogicandpracticalreasoning. Inmetaphysicsandontology,Castaneda's chiefworkisguisetheory,firstarticulatedin a1974essay,acomplexandglobalaccountof language,mind,ontology,andpredication.By holdingthatordinaryconcreteindividuals, properties,andpropositionsallbreakdownor separateintotheirvariousaspectsorguises,he theorizesthatthinkingandreferenceare directedtowardthelatter.Eachguiseisagen- uineitemintheontologicalinventory,having propertiesinternallyandexternally.Inaddition, guisesarerelatedbystandinginvarioussame- nessrelations,onlyoneofwhichisthefamiliar relationofstrictidentitySinceeveryguise enjoysbonafideontologicalstanding,whereas onlysomeoftheseactuallyexist,Castaneda's ontologyandsemanticsareMeinongian.With itsintricateaccountofpredication,guisetheory affordsaunifiedtreatmentofawiderange ofphilosophicalproblemsconcerningreference tononexistents,negativeexistentials,inten- tionalidentity,referentialopacity,andother matters. Castanedaalsoplayedapivotalroleinempha- sizingthesignificanceofindexicalreference.If, e.g.,PaulassertivelyuttersTpreferChardon- nay',itwouldobviouslybeincorrectforBobto report'PaulsaysthatIpreferChardonnay',since thelaststatementexpresses(Bob's)speaker's reference,notPaul's.Atthesametime,Cas- tanedacontends,itislikewiseincorrectforBob toreportPaul'ssayingaseither'Paulsaysthat PaulprefersChardonnay'or'PaulsaysthatAl's luncheonguestprefersChardonnay'(whenPaul isAl'sonlyluncheonguest),sinceeachofthese failtorepresenttheessentiallyindexicalelement ofPaul'sassertion.Instead,Bobmaycorrectlyre- port'PaulsaysthathehimselfprefersChardon- nay',where'hehimselfisaquasi-indicator, servingtodepictPaul'sreferencetohimselfqua self.ForCastaneda(andothers),quasi-indicators areaperson'sirreducible,essentialmeansfor describingthethoughtsandexperiencesofoth- ers.Acompleteaccountofhisviewofindexicals, togetherwithafullarticulationofguisetheory andhisunorthodoxtheoriesofdefmitedescrip- tionsandpropernames,iscontainedinThinking, Language,andExperience(1989). Castaneda'smainviewsonpracticalreason anddeonticlogicturnonhisfundamentalprac- tition-propositiondistinction.Anumberofvalu- ableessaysontheseviews,togetherwithhis importantreplies,arecollectedinJamesE.Tom- berlin,ed.,Agent,Language,andtheStructureofthe World(1983),andTomberlin,ed.,Hector-NeriCas- taneda(1986).ThelatteralsoincludesCas- taneda^revealingintellectualautobiography. Seealsodeonticlogic,guisetheory, MEINONG,PRACTICALREASONING,PRACTI- TION,QUASI-INDICATOR.J.E.T. casuistry,thecase-analysisapproachtotheinter- pretationofgeneralmoralrules.Casuistrystarts withparadigmcasesofhowandwhenagiven generalmoralruleshouldbeapplied,andthen reasonsbyanalogytocasesinwhichtheproper applicationoftheruleislessobvious-e.g.,acase inwhichlyingistheonlywayforapriestnotto betrayasecretrevealedinconfession.Thepoint ofconsideringtheseriesofcasesistoascertain themorallyrelevantsimilaritiesanddifferences betweencases.Casuistry'sheydaywasthefirst halfoftheseventeenthcentury.Reactingagainst 121 categorematic category casuistry'spopularitywiththeJesuitsand againstitstendencytoqualifygeneralmoral rules,Pascalpennedapolemicagainstcasuistry fromwhichthetermneverrecovered(seehis ProvincialLetters,1656).Butthekindofreason- ingtowhichthetermrefersisflourishingincon- temporarypracticalethics.B.W.H. categorematic.Seesyncategoremata. categorematica.Seesyncategoremata. categoricalgrammar.Seegrammar. categoricalimperative.Seekant. categorical-in-power.Seecategoricaltheory. categoricalproposition.Seesyllogism. categoricaltheory,atheoryallofwhosemodels areisomorphic.Becauseofitsweakexpressive power,infirst-orderlogicwithidentityonlythe- orieswithafinitemodelcanbecategorical;with- outidentitynotheoriesarecategorical.Amore interestingproperty,therefore,isbeingcategor- icalinpower:atheoryiscategoricalinpowera whenthetheoryhas,uptoisomorphism,only onemodelwithadomainofcardinalitya.Cate- goricityinpowershowsthecapacitytocharac- terizeastructurecompletely,onlylimitedby cardinality.Forexample,thefirst-ordertheoryof denseorderwithoutendpointsiscategoricalin powercothecardinalityofthenaturalnumbers. Thefirst-ordertheoryofsimplediscreteorder- ingswithinitialelement,theorderingofthenat- uralnumbers,isnotcategoricalinpowerco. Therearecountablediscreteorders,notisomor- phictothenaturalnumbers,thatareelementary equivalenttoit,i.e.,havethesameelementary, first-ordertheory.Infirst-orderlogiccategorical theoriesarecomplete.Thisisnotnecessarilytrue forextensionsoffirst-orderlogicforwhichno completenesstheoremholds.Insuchalogicaset ofaxiomsmaybecategoricalwithoutproviding aninformativecharacterizationofthetheoryof itsuniquemodel.Theterm'elementaryequiva- lence'wasintroducedaround1936byTarskifor thepropertyofbeingindistinguishablebyele- mentarymeans.AccordingtoOswaldVeblen, whofirstusedtheterm'categorical'in1904,in adiscussionofthefoundationsofgeometry,that termwassuggestedtohimbytheAmerican pragmatistJohnDewey.Seealsocomplete- ness,MODELTHEORY.Z.G.S. categoricity,thesemanticpropertybelongingto asetofsentences,a"postulateset,"thatimplic- itlydefines(completelydescribes,orcharacter- izesuptoisomorphism)thestructureofits intendedinterpretationorstandardmodel.The best-knowncategoricalsetofsentencesisthe postulatesetfornumbertheoryattributedto Peano,whichcompletelycharacterizesthestruc- tureofanarithmeticprogression.Thisstructure isexemplifiedbythesystemofnaturalnumbers withzeroasdistinguishedelementandsuccessor (additionofone)asdistinguishedfunction. Otherexemplificationsofthisstructureare obtainedbytakingasdistinguishedelementan arbitraryinteger,takingasdistinguishedfunc- tiontheprocessofaddinganarbitrarypositiveor negativeintegerandtakingasuniverseofdis- course(ordomain)theresultofrepeatedappli- cationofthedistinguishedfunctiontothe distinguishedelement.(See,e.g.,Russell'sIntro- ductiontotheMathematkalPhilosophy,1918.) Moreprecisely,apostulatesetisdefinedtobe categoricalifeverytwoofitsmodels(satisfying interpretationsorrealizations)areisomorphic (toeachother),where,ofcourse,twointerpre- tationsareisomorphicifbetweentheirrespective universesofdiscoursethereexistsaone-to-one correspondencebywhichthedistinguishedele- ments,functions,relations,etc,oftheoneare mappedexactlyontothoseoftheother.The importanceoftheanalyticgeometryofDescartes involvesthefactthatthesystemofpointsofa geometricallinewiththe"left-ofrelation"dis- tinguishedisisomorphictothesystemofreal numberswiththe"less-than"relationdistin- guished.Categoricity,theideallimitofsuccess fortheaxiomaticmethodconsideredasa methodforcharacterizingsubjectmatterrather thanforreorganizingascience,isknowntobe impossiblewithrespecttocertainsubjectmatters usingcertainformållanguages.Theconceptof categoricitycanbetracedbackatleastasfaras Dedekind;thewordisduetoDewey. Seealsoaxiomaticmethod,löwenheim- SKOLEMTHEOREM,MATHEMATICALANALY- SIS,MODELTHEORY.J.COR. categories,tableof.Seekant. categoriesoftheunderstanding.Seekant. category,anultimateclass.Categoriesarethe highestgeneraofentitiesintheworld.Theymay containspeciesbutarenotthemselvesspeciesof anyhighergenera.Aristotle,thefirstphilosopher 122 categorymistake causallaw todiscusscategoriessystematically,listedten, includingsubstance,quality,quantityrelation, place,andtime.Ifasetofcategoriesiscomplete, theneachentityintheworldwillbelongtoacate- goryandnoentitywillbelongtomorethanone category.Aprominentexampleofasetofcate- goriesisDescartes'sdualisticclassificationofmind andmatter.Thisexamplebringsoutclearly anotherfeatureofcategories:anattributethatcan belongtoentitiesinonecategorycannotbean attributeofentitiesinanyothercategory.Thus, entitiesinthecategoryofmatterhaveextension andcolorwhilenoentityinthecategoryofmind canhaveextensionorcolor.Seealsoaristotle, GENUSGENERALISSIMUM,RYLE.J.W.M. categorymistake,theplacingofanentityinthe wrongcategory.InoneofRyle'sexamples,to placetheactivityofexhibitingteamspiritinthe sameclasswiththeactivitiesofpitching,batting, andcatchingistomakeacategorymistake; exhibitingteamspiritisnotaspecialfunctionlike pitchingorbattingbutinsteadawaythosespecial functionsareperformed.Aseconduseof'cate- gorymistake'istorefertotheattributiontoan entityofapropertywhichthatentitycannot have(notmerelydoesnothappentohave),asin 'Thismemoryisviolet'or,touseanexample fromCarnap,'Caesarisaprimenumber'.These twokindsofcategorymistakemayseemdiffer- ent,butbothinvolvemisunderstandingsofthe naturesofthethingsbeingtalkedabout.Itis thoughtthattheygobeyondsimpleerrororordi- narymistakes,aswhenoneattributesaproperty toathingwhichthatthingcouldhavebutdoes nothave,sincecategorymistakesinvolveattri- butionsofproperties(e.g.,beingaspecialfunc- tion)tothings(e.g.,teamspirit)thatthosethings cannothave.AccordingtoRyle,thetestforcate- gorydifferencesdependsonwhetherreplace- mentofoneexpressionforanotherinthesame sentenceresultsinatypeofunintelligibilitythat hecalls"absurdity."Seealsoryle.J.W.M. category-preserving.Seelogicalform. categorytheory,amathematicaltheorythatstud- iestheuniversalpropertiesofstructuresviatheir relationshipswithoneanother.AcategoryC consistsoftwocollectionsObandMor,the cc' objectsandthemorphismsofC,satisfyingthefol- lowingconditions:(i)foreachpair(a,b)of objectsthereisassociatedacollectionMorc(a,b) ofmorphismssuchthateachmemberofMor belongstooneofthesecollections;(ii)foreach objectaofOb,thereisamorphismid,calledthe identityona;(iii)acompositionlawassociating witheachmorphismf:a—>bandeachmorphism g:b—>camorphismgf:a—>c,calledthecompositeof /and^;(iv)formorphisms/!-a—>b,g:b^c,andh: c—>d,theequationh(gf)=(%)/holds;(v)forany morphismf:a—>b,wehaveidt/=/and/ida=/. Setswithspecificstructurestogetherwithacol- lectionofmappingspreservingthesestructures arecategories.Examples:(1)setswithfunctions betweenthem;(2)groupswithgrouphörnornor- phisms;(3)topologicalspaceswithcontinuous functions;(4)setswithsurjectionsinsteadof arbitrarymapsconstituteadifferentcategory. Butacategoryneednotbecomposedofsetsand set-theoreticalmaps.Examples:(5)acollection ofpropositionslinkedbytherelationoflogical entailmentisacategoryandsoisanypreordered set;(6)amonoidtakenastheuniqueobjectand itselementsasthemorphismsisacategory.The propertiesofanobjectofacategoryaredeter- minedbythemorphismsthatarecomingoutof andgoinginthisobject.Objectswithauniversal propertyoccupyakeyposition.Thus,aterminal objectaischaracterizedbythefollowinguniver- salproperty:foranyobjectbthereisaunique morphismfrombtoa.Asingletonsetisatermi- nalobjectinthecategoryofsets.TheCartesian productofsets,theproductofgroups,andthe conjunctionofpropositionsareallterminal objectsinappropriatecategories.Thuscategory theoryunifiesconceptsandshedsanewlighton thenotionofuniversality.Seealsophilosophy OFMATHEMATICS.J.-P.M. causalchain.Seecausation. causalclosure.Seedavidson. causaldecisiontheory.Seedecisiontheory. causaldependence.Seedependence. causaldeterminism.Seedeterminism. causal-historicaltheoryofreference.Seephiloso- phyOFLANGUAGE. causalimmediacy.Seeimmediacy. causallaw,astatementdescribingaregularand invariantconnectionbetweentypesofeventsor states,wheretheconnectionsinvolvedare causalinsomesense.Whenonespeaksofcausal lawsasdistinguishedfromlawsthatarenot 123 causaloverdetermination causaltheoryofpropernames causal,theintendeddistinctionmayvary.Some- times,alawissaidtobecausalifitrelätesevents orstatesoccurringatsuccessivetimes,alsocalled alawofsuccession:e.g.,'Ingestionofstrychnine leadstodeath.'Acausallawinthissensecon- trastswithalawofcoexistence,whichconnects eventsorstatesoccurringatthesametime(e.g., theWiedemann-Franzlawrelatingthermaland electricconductivityinmetals). Oneimportantkindofcausallawisthedeter- ministiclaw.Causallawsofthiskindstateexcep- tionlessconnectionsbetweenevents,while probabilisticorstatisticallawsspecifyprobability relationshipsbetweenevents.Foranysystem governedbyasetofdeterministiclaws,giventhe stateofasystematatime,ascharacterizedbya setofstatevariables,theselawswillyielda uniquestateofthesystemforanylåtertime(or, perhaps,atanytime,earlierorlåter).Probabilis- ticlawswillyield,foragivenantecedentstateof asystem,onlyaprobabilityvaluefortheoccur- renceofacertainstateatalåtertime.Thelaws ofclassicalmechanicsareoftenthoughttobe paradigmaticexamplesofcausallawsinthis sense,whereasthelawsofquantummechanics areclaimedtobeessentiallyprobabilistic. Causallawsaresometimestakentobelaws thatexplicitlyspecifycertaineventsascausesof certainotherevents.Simplelawsofthiskindwill havetheform'EventsofkindFcauseeventsof kindG';e.g.,'Heatingcausesmetalstoexpand'. Aweakerrelatedconceptisthis:acausallawis onethatstatesaregularitybetweenevents whichinfactarerelatedascausetoeffect, althoughthestatementofthelawitselfdoesnot sayso(lawsofmotionexpressedbydifferential equationsareperhapscausallawsinthissense). Thesesensesof'causallaw'presupposeaprior conceptofcausation. Finally,causallawsmaybecontrastedwith teleologicallaws,lawsthatsupposedlydescribe howcertainsystems,inparticularbiological organisms,behavesoastoachievecertain "goals"or"endstates."Suchlawsaresometimes claimedtoembodytheideathatafuturestate thatdoesnotasyetexistcanexertaninfluence onthepresentbehaviorofasystem.Justwhat formsuchlawstakeandexactlyhowtheydiffer fromordinarylawshavenotbeenmadewholly clear,however. Seealsocausation,determinism,law- LIKEGENERALIZATION.J.K. causaloverdetermination.Seecausation. causalrelation,singular.Seephilosophyofmind. causalresponsibility.Seeresponsibility. causalstatement,singular.Seecausation. causaltheoryofknowledge.Seeepistemology, NATURALISTICEPISTEMOLOGY. causaltheoryofmentalcontent.Seeskepticism. causaltheoryofmind.Seefunctionalism. causaltheoryofperception.Seeperception. causaltheoryofpropernames,theviewthat propernamesdesignatewhattheynameby virtueofakindofcausalconnectiontoit.This viewisaspecialcase,andinsomeinstancesan unwarrantedinterpretation,ofadirectreference viewofnames.Onthisapproach,propernames, e.g.,'Machiavelli',are,asJ.S.Millwrote, "purelydenotative....theydenotetheindivid- ualswhoarecalledbythem;buttheydonot indicateorimplyanyattributesasbelongingto thoseindividuals"(ASystemofLogic,1879). Propernamesmaysuggestcertainpropertiesto manycompetentspeakers,butanysuchassoci- atedinformationisnopartofthedefinitionof thename.Names,onthisview,havenodefini- tions.Whatconnectsanametowhatitnamesis notthelatter'ssatisfyingsomeconditionspeci- fiedinthename'sdefinition.Names,instead,are simplyattachedtothings,appliedaslabels,asit were.Apropername,onceattached,becomesa sociallyavailabledeviceformakingtherelevant namebearerasubjectofdiscourse. Ontheotherleadingview,thedescriptivistview, apropernameisassociatedwithsomethinglikea definition.'Aristotle',onthisview,appliesbydef- initiontowhoeversatisfiestherelevantproper- ties-e.g.,is'theteacherofAlexandertheGreat, whowrotetheNicomacheanEthics'.Russell,e.g., maintainedthatordinarypropernames(which hecontrastedwithlogicallyproperorgenuine names)havedefinitions,thattheyareabbrevi- ateddefmitedescriptions.Fregeheldthatnames havesense,aviewwhoseproperinterpretation remainsindispute,butisoftensupposedtobe closelyrelatedtoRussell'sapproach.Others, mostnotablySearle,havedefendeddescendants ofthedescriptivistview.Animportantvariant, sometimesattributedtoFrege,deniesthatnames havearticulabledefinitions,butneverthelessas- sociatesthemwithsenses.Andthebearerwill stillbe,bydefinition(asitwere),theunique thingtosatisfytherelevantmodeofpresenta- tion. 124 causaltheoryofreference causation Thedirectreferenceapproachissometimes misleadinglycalledthecausaltheoryofnames. Butthekeyideaneedhavenothingtodowith causation:apropernamefunctionsasatagor labelforitsbearer,notasasurrogatefora descriptiveexpression.Whencethe(allegedly) misleadingterm'causaltheoryofnames'?Con- temporarydefendersofMill'sconceptionlike KeithDonnellanandKripkefelttheneedto expanduponMill'sbriefremarks.Whatcon- nectsapresentuseofanamewithareferent? HereDonnellanandKripkeintroducethenotion ofa"historicalchainsofcommunication."As Kripketellsthestoryababyisbaptizedwitha propername.Thenameisused,firstbythose presentatthebaptism,subsequentlybythose whopickupthenameinconversation,reading, andsoon.Thenameisthuspropagated,spread byusage"fromlinktolinkasifbyachain"(Nam- ingandNecessity,1980).Thereemergesahistori- calchainofusesofthenamethat,accordingto DonnellanandKripke,bridgesthegapbetween apresentuseofthenameandtheindividualso named. This"historicalchainofcommunication"is occasionallyreferredtoasa"casualchainof communication."Theideaisthatone'suseofthe namecanbethoughtofasacausalfactorinone's listener'sabilitytousethenametorefertothe sameindividual.However,althoughKripkein NamingandNecessitydoesoccasionallyreferto thechainofcommunicationascausal,hemore oftensimplyspeaksofthechainofcommunica- tion,orofthefactthatthenamehasbeenpassed "bytraditionfromlinktolink"(p.106).The causalaspectisnotonethatKripkeunderscores. Inmorerecentwritingsonthetopic,aswellas inlectures,Kripkenevermentionscausationin thisconnection,andDonnellanquestions whetherthechainofcommunicationshouldbe thoughtofasacausalchain. Thisisnottosuggestthatthereisnoview properlycalleda"causaltheoryofnames."There issuchaview,butitisnottheviewofKripkeand Donnellan.Thecausaltheoryofnamesisaview propoundedbyphysicalisticallymindedphiloso- pherswhodesireto"reduce"thenotionof"ref- erence"tosomethingmorephysicalistically acceptable,suchasthenotionofacausalchain runningfrom"baptism"tolåteruse.Thisisa viewwhosemotivationisexplicitlyrejectedby Kripke,andshouldbesharplydistinguished fromthemorepopuläranti-Fregeanapproach sketchedabove. Seealsomeaning,theoryofdescrip- TIONS.H.W. causaltheoryofreference.Seephilosophyoflan- GUAGE. causation,therelationbetweencauseandeffect, ortheactofbringingaboutaneffect,whichmay beanevent,astate,oranobject(say,astatue). Theconceptofcausationhaslongbeenrecog- nizedasoneoffundamentalphilosophical importance.Humecalledit"thecementofthe universe":causationistherelationthatconnects eventsandobjectsofthisworldinsignificant relationships.Theconceptofcausationseems pervasivelypresentinhumandiscourse.Itis expressedbynotonly'cause'anditscognates butbymanyotherterms,suchas'produce', 'bringabout','issue','generate','result','effect', 'determine',andcountlessothers.Moreover, manycommontransitiveverbs("causatives"), suchas'kill','break',and'move',tacitlycontain causalrelations(e.g.,killinginvolvescausingto die).Theconceptofaction,ordoing,involvesthe ideathattheagent(intentionally)causesa changeinsomeobjectorother;similarly,the conceptofperceptioninvolvestheideathatthe objectperceivedcausesintheperceiveran appropriateperceptualexperience.Thephysical conceptofforce,too,appearstoinvolvecausa- tionasanessentialingredient:forceisthecausal agentofchangesinmotion.Further,causationis intimatelyrelatedtoexplanation:toaskforan explanationofaneventis,often,toaskforits cause.Itissometimesthoughtthatourabilityto makepredictions,andinductiveinferencein general,dependsonourknowledgeofcausal connections(ortheassumptionthatsuchcon- nectionsarepresent):theknowledgethatwater quenchesthirstwarrantsthepredictiveinfer- encefrom'Xisswallowingwater'to'X'sthirst willbequenched'.Moregenerally,theidentifi- cationandsystematicdescriptionofcausalrela- tionsthatholdinthenaturalworldhavebeen claimedtobethepreeminentaimofscience. Finally,causalconceptsplayacrucialrolein moralandlegalreasoning,e.g.,intheassessment ofresponsibilitiesandliabilities. Eventcausationisthecausationofoneevent byanother.Asequenceofcausallyconnected eventsiscalledacausalchain.Agentcausation referstotheactofanagent(person,object)in bringingaboutachange;thus,myopeningthe window(i.e.,mycausingthewindowtoopen) isaninstanceofagentcausation.Thereisacon- troversyastowhetheragentcausationis reducibletoeventcausation.Myopeningthe windowseemsreducibletoeventcausationsince inrealityacertainmotionofmyarms,anevent, 125 causation causation causesthewindowtoopen.Somephilosophers, however,haveclaimedthatnotallcasesofagent causationaresoreducible.Substantivalcausation isthecreationofagenuinelynewsubstance,or object,ratherthancausingchangesinpreexist- ingsubstances,ormerelyrearrangingthem.The possibilityofsubstantivalcausation,atleastin thenaturalworld,hasbeendisputedbysome philosophers.Eventcausation,however,has beentheprimaryfocusofphilosophicaldiscus- sioninthemodernandcontemporaryperiod. Theanalysisofeventcausationhasbeencon- troversial.Thefollowingfourapproacheshave beenprominent:theregularityanalysis,the counterfactualanalysis,themanipulationanaly- sis,andtheprobabilisticanalysis.Theheartof theregularity(ornomological)analysis,associated withHumeandJ.S.Mill,istheideathatcausally connectedeventsmustinstantiateageneralreg- ularitybetweenlikekindsofevents.Morepre- cisely:ifcisacauseofe,theremustbetypesor kindsofevents,FandG,suchthatcisofkindF, eisofkindG,andeventsofkindFareregularly followedbyeventsofkindG.Sometakethereg- ularityinvolvedtobemerelydefacto"constant conjunction"ofthetwoeventtypesinvolved;a morepopulärviewisthattheregularitymust holdasamatterof"nomologicalnecessity"-i.e., itmustbea"law."Anevenstrongerviewisthat theregularitymustrepresentacausallaw.Alaw thatdoesthisjobofsubsumingcausallycon- nectedeventsiscalleda"covering"or"sub- sumptive"law,andversionsoftheregularity analysisthatcallforsuchlawsareoftenreferred toasthe"covering-law"or"nomic-subsump- tive"modelofcausality. Theregularityanalysisappearstogiveasatis- factoryaccountofsomeaspectsofourcausalcon- cepts:forexample,causalclaimsareoftentested byre-creatingtheeventorsituationclaimedto beacauseandthenobservingwhetherasimilar effectoccurs.Inotherrespects,however,thereg- ularityaccountdoesnotseemtofaresowell:e.g., ithasdifficultyexplainingtheapparentfactthat wecanhaveknowledgeofcausalrelationswith- outknowledgeofgenerallaws.Itseemspossible toknow,forinstance,thatsomeone'scontraction ofthefluwascausedbyherexposuretoapatient withthedisease,althoughweknowofnoregu- laritybetweensuchexposuresandcontractionof thedisease(itmaywellbethatonlyaverysmall fractionofpersonswhohavebeenexposedtoflu patientscontractthedisease).DoIneedtoknow generalregularitiesaboutitchingsandscratch- ingstoknowthattheitchysensationonmyleft elbowcausedmetoscratchit?Further,notall regularitiesseemtorepresentcausalconnections (e.g.,Reid'sexampleofthesuccessionofdayand night;twosuccessivesymptomsofadisease). Distinguishingcausalfromnon-causalregulari- tiesisoneofthemainproblemsconfrontingthe regularitytheorist. Accordingtothecounterfactualanalysis,what makesaneventacauseofanotheristhefactthat ifthecauseeventhadnotoccurredtheeffect eventwouldnothave.Thisaccordswiththeidea thatcauseisaconditionthatissinequanonfor theoccurrenceoftheeffect.Theviewthata causeisanecessaryconditionfortheeffectis basedonasimilaridea.Thepreciseformofthe counterfactualaccountdependsonhowcoun- terfactualsareunderstood(e.g.,ifcounterfactu- alsareexplainedintermsoflaws,the counterfactualanalysismayturnintoaformof theregularityanalysis). Thecounterfactualapproach,too,seemsto encountervariousdifficulties.Itistruethaton thebasisofthefactthatifLarryhadwateredmy plants,ashehadpromised,myplantswouldnot havedied,IcouldclaimthatLarry'snotwater- ingmyplantscausedthemtodie.Butitisalso truethatifGeorgeBushhadwateredmyplants, theywouldnothavedied;butdoesthatlicense theclaimthatBush'snotwateringmyplants causedthemtodie?Also,thereappeartobe manycasesofdependenciesexpressedbycoun- terfactualsthat,however,arenotcasesofcausal dependence:e.g.,ifSocrateshadnotdied,Xan- thippewouldnothavebecomeawidow;ifIhad notraisedmyhand,Iwouldnothavesignaled. Thequestion,then,iswhetherthesenon-causal counterfactualscanbedistinguishedfromcausal counterfactualswithouttheuseofcausalcon- cepts.Therearealsoquestionsabouthow wecouldverifycounterfactuals-inparticular, whetherourknowledgeofcausalcounterfactu- alsisultimatelydependentonknowledgeof causallawsandregularities. Somehaveattemptedtoexplaincausationin termsofaction,andthisisthemanipulationanaly- sis:thecauseisaneventorstatethatwecanpro- duceatwill,orotherwisemanipulate,toproduce acertainothereventasaneffect.Thus,anevent isacauseofanotherprovidedthatbybringing aboutthefirsteventwecanbringaboutthesec- ond.Thisaccountexploitsthecloseconnection notedearlierbetweentheconceptsofactionand cause,andhighlightstheimportantrolethat knowledgeofcausalconnectionsplaysinour controlofnaturalevents.However,asananaly- sisoftheconceptofcause,itmaywellhave thingsbackward:theconceptofactionseemsto 126 causation,backward cause,final bearicherandmorecomplexconceptthatpre- supposestheconceptofcause,andananalysisof causeintermsofactioncouldbeaccusedofcir- cularity. Thereasonwethinkthatsomeone'sexposure toaflupatientwasthecauseofhercatchingthe disease,notwithstandingtheabsenceofan appropriateregularity(evenoneofhighproba- bility),maybethis:exposuretoflupatients increasestheprobabilityofcontractingthedis- ease.Thus,anevent,X,maybesaidtobeaprob- abilisticcauseofanevent,Y,providedthatthe probabilityoftheoccurrenceofY,giventhatX hasoccurred,isgreaterthantheantecedent probabilityofY.Tomeetcertainobviousdifficul- ties,thisroughdefinitionmustbefurtherelabo- rated(e.g.,toeliminatethepossibilitythatXand Y"arecollateraleffectsofacommoncause).There isalsothequestionwhetherprobabilisticcausa- tionistobetakenasananalysisofthegeneral conceptofcausation,orasaspecialkindof causalrelation,orperhapsonlyasevidenceindi- catingthepresenceofacausalrelationship. Probabilisticcausationhasoflatebeenreceiving increasingattentionfromphilosophers. Whenaneffectisbroughtaboutbytwoinde- pendentcauseseitherofwhichalonewould havesufficed,onespeaksofcausaloverdetermina- tion.Thus,ahousefiremighthavebeencaused bybothashortcircuitandasimultaneouslight- ningstrike;eithereventalonewouldhave causedthefire,andthefire,therefore,was causallyoverdetermined.Whetherthereare actualinstancesofoverdeterminationhasbeen questioned;onecouldarguethatthefirethat wouldhavebeencausedbytheshortcircuit alonewouldnothavebeenthesamefire,and similarlyforthefirethatwouldhavebeencaused bythelightningalone. Thesteadybuildupofpressureinaboiler wouldhavecausedittoexplodebutforthefact thatabombwasdetonatedsecondsbefore,lead- ingtoasimilareffect.Insuchacase,onespeaks ofpreemptive,orsuperseding,cause.Weareaptto speakofcausesinregardtochanges;however, "unchanges,"e.g.,thistable'sstandinghere throughsomeperiodoftime,canalsohave causes:thetablecontinuestoståndherebecause itissupportedbyarigidfloor.Thepresenceofthe floor,therefore,canbecalledasustainingcauseof thetable'scontinuingtostånd. Acauseisusuallythoughttoprecedeitseffect intime;however,somehavearguedthatwe mustallowforthepossibilityofacausethatis temporallyposteriortoitseffect-backwardcausa- tion(sometimescalledretrocausation).Andthere isnouniversalagreementastowhetheracause canbesimultaneouswithitseffect-concurrent causation.Noristhereageneralagreementasto whethercauseandeffectmust,asamatterof conceptualnecessity,be"contiguous"intime andspace,eitherdirectlyorthroughacausal chainofcontiguousevents-contiguouscausation. Theattemptto"analyze"causationseemsto havereachedanimpasse;theproposalsonhand seemsowidelydivergentthatonewonders whethertheyareallanalysesofoneandthe sameconcept.Buteachofthemseemsto addresssomeimportantaspectofthevariegated notionthatweexpressbytheterm'cause',and itmaybedoubtedwhetherthereisaunitary conceptofcausationthatcanbecapturedinan enlighteningphilosophicalanalysis.Onthe otherhand,thecentralityoftheconcept,both toordinarypracticaldiscourseandtothescien- tificdescriptionoftheworld,isdifficulttodeny. Thishasencouragedsomephilosopherstoview causationasaprimitive,onethatcannotbefur- theranalyzed.Thereareotherswhoadvocate theextremeview(causalnihilism)thatcausal conceptsplaynorolewhateverintheadvanced sciences,suchasfundamentalphysicaltheories ofspace-timeandmatter,andthatthevery notionofcauseisananthropocentricprojection derivingfromourconfusedideasofactionand power. Seealsoagentcausation,explanation, PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE.J.K. causation,backward.Seecausation. causation,counterfactualanalysisof.Seecausa- tion. causation,immanent.Seeagentcausation. causation,manipulationanalysisof.Seecausa- causation,probabilistic.Seecausation. causation,regularitytheoryof.Seecausation. causation,substance.Seeagentcausation. causation,transeunt.Seeagentcausation. causativeverb.Seeactionverb. cause,efficient.Seearistotle. cause,final.Seearistotle. 127 cause,formål Cavell,StanleyLouis cause,formål.Seearistotle. cause,material.Seearistotle. cause,preemptive.Seecausation. cause,superseding.Seecausation. cause,sustaining.Seecausation. causes,thefour.Seearistotle. causasui(Latin,'causeofitself),anexpression appliedtoGodtomeaninpartthatGodoweshis existencetonothingotherthanhimself.Itdoes notmeanthatGodsomehowbroughthimself intoexistence.Theideaisthattheverynatureof Godlogicallyrequiresthatheexists.What accountsfortheexistenceofabeingthatiscausa suiisitsownnature.Seealsophilosophyof RELIGION.W.L.R. cave,allegoryofthe.Seeplato. Cavell,StanleyLouis(b.1926),Americanphi- losopherwhoseworkhasexploredskepticism anditsconsequences.HewasWalterM.Cabot ProfessorofAestheticsandGeneralValueTheory atHarvardfrom1963until1997.Centralto Cavell'sthoughtistheviewthatskepticismis notatheoreticalpositiontoberefutedbyphilo- sophicaltheoryordismissedasameremisuseof ordinarylanguage;itisareflectionofthefunda- mentallimitsofhumanknowledgeoftheself,of others,andoftheexternalworld,limitsthat mustbeaccepted-inhisterm"acknowl- edged"-becausetherefusaltodosoresultsin illusionandriskstragedy. Cavell'sworkdefendsJ.L.Austinfromboth positivismanddeconstructionism(MustWeMean WhatWeSay?,1969,andThePitchofPhilosophy, 1994),butnotbecauseCavellisan"ordinary language"philosopher.Rather,hisdefenseof Austinhascombinedwithhisresponsetoskep- ticismtomakehimaphilosopheroftheordi- nary:heexplorestheconditionsofthepossibility andlimitsofordinarylanguage,ordinaryknowl- edge,ordinaryaction,andordinaryhumanrela- tionships.Heusesboththeresourcesofordinary languageandthediscourseofphilosophers,such asWittgenstein,Heidegger,Thoreau,andEmer- son,andofthearts.Cavellhasexploredthein- eliminabilityofskepticisminMustWeMeanWhat WeSay?,notablyinitsessayonKingLear,andhas developedhisanalysisinhis1979magnum opus,TheClaimofReason.Hehasexaminedthe benefitsofacknowledgingthelimitsofhuman self-understanding,andthecostsofrefusingto doso,inabroadrangeofcontextsfromfilm(The WorldViewed,1971;PursuitsofHappiness,1981; andContestingTears,1996)toAmericanphiloso- phy(TheSensesofWalden,1972;andthechapters onEmersoninThisNewYetUnapproachableAmer- ica,1989,andConditionsHandsomeandUnhand- some,1990). AcentralargumentinTheClaimofReason developsCavell'sapproachbylookingatWitt- genstein^notionofcriteria.Criteriaarenotrules fortheuseofourwordsthatcanguaranteethe correctnessoftheclaimswemakebythem; rather,criteriabringoutwhatweclaimbyusing thewordswedo.Moregenerally,inmaking claimstoknowledge,undertakingactions,and forminginterpersonalrelationships,wealways riskfailure,butitisalsopreciselyinthatroom forriskthatwefindthepossibilityoffreedom. ThisargumentisindebtednotonlytoWittgen- steinbutalsotoKant,especiallyintheCritiqueof Judgment. Cavellhasusedhisviewasakeytounder- standingclassicsofthetheaterandfilm. RegardingsuchtragicfiguresasLear,heargues thattheirtragediesresultfromtheirrefusalto acceptthelimitsofhumanknowledgeand humanlove,andtheirinsistenceonanillusory absoluteandpurelove.TheWorldViewedargues forarealisticapproachtofilm,meaningthatwe shouldacknowledgethatourcognitiveand emotionalresponsestofilmsareresponsestothe realitiesofthehumanconditionportrayedin them.This"ontologyoffilm"preparedtheway forCavell'streatmentofthegenreofcomedies ofremarriageinPursuitsofHappiness.Italso groundshistreatmentofmelodramainCon- testingTears,whicharguesthathumanbeings mustremaintragicallyunknowntoeachother ifthelimitstoourknowledgeofeachotherare notacknowledged. InTheClaimofReasonandlåterworksCavell hasalsocontributedtomoralphilosophybyhis defense-againstRawls'scritiqueof"moralper- fectionism"-of"Emersonianperfectionism": theviewthatnogeneralprinciplesofconduct, nomatterhowwellestablished,caneverbe employedinpracticewithouttheongoingbut nevercompletedperfectionofknowledgeof oneselfandoftheothersonandwithwhomone acts.Cavell'sEmersonianperfectionismisthus anotherapplicationofhisWittgensteinianand Kantianrecognitionthatrulesmustalwaysbe supplementedbythecapacityforjudgment. Seealsoaustin,j.l.;emerson;kant; 128 Cavendish,Margaret certainty ORDINARYLANGUAGEPHILOSOPHY;WITT- GENSTEIN.P.GU. Cavendish,Margaret,DuchessofNewcastle (1623-1673),Englishauthorofsomedozen worksinavarietyofforms.Hercentralphilo- sophicalinterestwasthedevelopmentsinnat- uralscienceofherday.Herearliestworks endorsedakindofatomism,buthersettledview, inPhilosophicalLetters(1664),Observationsupon ExperimentellPhilosophy(1666),andGroundsof NaturalPhilosophy(1668),wasakindoforganic materialism.Cavendisharguesforahierarchyof increasinglyfinematter,capableofself-motion. PhilosophicalLetters,amongothermatters,raises problemsforthenotionofinertmatterfoundin Descartes,andObservationsuponExperimentalPhi- losophycriticizesmicroscopistssuchasHookefor committingadoubleerror,firstofpreferringthe distortionsintroducedbyinstrumentstounaided visionandsecondofpreferringsensetoreason. Seealsoorganism.M.At. cellulärautomaton.Seeself-reproducingautom- aton. Celsus(latesecondcenturya.d.?),anti-Christian writerknownonlyastheauthorofaworkcalled TheTrueDoctrine{Aleth.esLogos),whichisquoted extensivelybyOrigenofAlexandriainhis response,AgainstCelsus(writteninthelate240s). TheTrueDoctrineismainlyimportantbecauseitis thefirstanti-Christianpolemicofwhichwehave significantknowledge.OrigenconsidersCelsus tobeanEpicurean,butheisuncertainabout this.TherearenotracesofEpicureanisminOri- gen^quotationsfromCelsus,whichindicate insteadthatheisaneclecticMiddlePlatonistof nogreatoriginality,apolytheistwhoseconcep- tionofthe"unnameable"firstdeitytranscending beingandknowableonlyby"synthesis,analysis, oranalogy"isbasedonPlato'sdescriptionofthe GoodinRepublicVI.Inaccordancewiththe Timaeus,CelsusbelievesthatGodcreated "immortalthings"andtumedthecreationof "mortalthings"övertothem.Accordingtohim, theuniversehasaprovidentialorganizationin whichhumansholdnospecialplace,anditshis- toryisoneofeternallyrepeatingsequencesof eventsseparatedbycatastrophes.Seealsomid- dlePLATONISM,ORIGEN.LM. centralstatematerialism.Seephilosophyofmind. certainty,thepropertyofbeingcertain,whichis eitherapsychologicalpropertyofpersonsoran epistemicfeatureofproposition-likeobjects (e.g.,beliefs,utterances,statements).Wecansay thataperson,S,ispsychologicallycertainthatp (where'p'ståndsforaproposition)providedS hasnodoubtwhatsoeverthatpistrue.Thus,a personcanbecertainregardlessofthedegreeof epistemicwarrantforaproposition.Ingeneral, philosophershavenotfoundthisaninteresting propertytoexplore.TheexceptionisPeter Unger,whoarguedforskepticism,claimingthat (1)psychologicalcertaintyisrequiredforknowl- edgeand(2)nopersonisevercertainofany- thingorhardlyanything.Asappliedto propositions,'certain'hasnounivocaluse.For example,someauthors(e.g.,Chisholm)may holdthatapropositionisepistemicallycertainpro- vidednopropositionismorewarrantedthanit. Giventhataccount,itispossiblethataproposi- tioniscertain,yettherearelegitimatereasonsfor doubtingitjustaslongasthereareequallygood groundsfordoubtingeveryequallywarranted proposition.Otherphilosophershaveadopteda Cartesianaccountofcertaintyinwhichapropo- sitionisepistemicallycertainprovideditiswar- rantedandtherearenolegitimategrounds whatsoeverfordoubtingit. BothChisholm'sandtheCartesiancharacter- izationsofepistemiccertaintycanbeemployed toprovideabasisforskepticism.Ifknowledge entailscertainty,thenitcanbearguedthatvery little,ifanything,isknown.For,theargument continues,onlytautologiesorpropositionslikeT exist'or'Ihavebeliefs'aresuchthateithernötn- ingismorewarrantedorthereareabsolutelyno groundsfordoubt.Thus,hardlyanythingis known.Mostphilosophershaveresponded eitherbydenyingthat'certainty'isanabsolute term,i.e.,admittingofnodegrees,orbydenying thatknowledgerequirescertainty(Dewey, Chisholm,Wittgenstein,andLehrer).Others haveagreedthatknowledgedoesentailabsolute certainty,buthavearguedthatabsolutecertainty ispossible(e.g.,Moore). Sometimes'certain'ismodifiedbyother expressions,asin'morallycertain'or'meta- physicallycertain'or'logicallycertain'.Once again,thereisnouniversallyacceptedaccountof theseterms.Typically,however,theyareusedto indicatedegreesofwarrantforaproposition,and oftenthatdegreeofwarrantistakentobeafunc- tionofthetypeofpropositionunderconsidera- tion.Forexample,thepropositionthatsmoking causescancerismorallycertainprovideditswar- rantissufficienttojustifyactingasthoughitwere true.Theevidenceforsuchapropositionmay,of necessity,dependuponrecognizingparticular featuresoftheworld.Ontheotherhand,in 129 ceterisparibusclause characteristicauniversalis orderforaproposition,saythateveryeventhas acause,tobemetaphysicallycertain,theevidence foritmustnotdependuponrecognizingpartic- ularfeaturesoftheworldbutratheruponrec- ognizingwhatmustbetrueinorderforour worldtobethekindofworlditis-i.e.,onehav- ingcausalconnections.Finally,aproposition,say thateveryeffecthasacause,maybelogicallycer- tainifitisderivablefrom"truthsoflogic"thatdo notdependinanywayuponrecognizingany- thingaboutourworld.Sinceothertaxonomies forthesetermsareemployedbyphilosophers,it iscrucialtoexaminetheuseofthetermsintheir contexts. Seealsoepistemology,justification, SKEPTICISM.P.D.K. ceterisparibusclause.Seephilosophyofscience. CH.SeeAppendixofSpecialSymbols. chance.Seedeterminism. change.Seeevent,time. change,Cambridge.SeeCambridgechange. ChangHsueh-ch'eng(1738-1801),Chinesehis- torianandphilosopherwhodevisedadialectical theoryofcivilizationinwhichbeliefs,practices, institutions,andartsdevelopedinresponseto naturalnecessities.Thisprocessreachedits zenithseveralcenturiesbeforeConfucius,whois uniqueinbeingthesagedestinedtorecordthis moment.Chang'steaching,''theSixClassicsare allhistory,"meanstheclassicsarenottheoreti- calstatementsaboutthetao(Way)buttracesofit inoperation.Intheidealage,aunityofchih (govemment)andchiao(teaching)prevailed; therewerenoprivatedisciplinesorschoolsof learningandallwritingwasanonymous,being tiedtosomeofficialfunction.Låterhistoryhas meanderedaroundthisideal,dominatedbysuc- cessiveagesofphilosophy,philology,andlitera- ture.P.J.I. ChangTsai(1020-1077),Chinesephilosopher,a majorNeo-ConfucianfigurewhoseHsi-ming ("WesternInscription")providedmuchofthe metaphysicalbasisforNeo-Confucianethics.It arguesthatthecosmosarosefromasingle source,thefaichi(SupremeUltimate),asundif- ferentiatedch'i(ether)tookshapeoutofan inchoate,primordialstate,t'ai-hsii(the supremelytenuous).Thustheuniverseisfun- damentallyone.Thesage"realizeshisoneness withtheuniverse"but,appreciatinghisparticu- larplaceandroleinthegreaterscheme, expresseshisloveforitinagradedfashion. Impureendowmentsofc/?7preventmostpeople fromseeingthetruenatureoftheworld.They act"selfishly"butthroughritualpracticeand learningcanovercomethisandachievesage- hood.P.J.I. chaostheory.Seephilosophyofscience. chaoticsystem.Seephilosophyofscience. character,thecomprehensivesetofethicaland intellectualdispositionsofaperson.Intellectual virtues-likecarefulnessintheevaluationofevi- dence-promote,forone,thepracticeofseeking truth.Moralorethicalvirtues-includingtraits likecourageandgenerosity-disposepersons notonlytochoicesandactionsbutalsotoatti- tudesandemotions.Suchdispositionsaregen- erallyconsideredrelativelystableandresponsive toreasons. Appraisalofcharactertranscendsdirecteval- uationofparticularactionsinfavörofexamina- tionofsomesetofvirtuesortheadmirable humanlifeasawhole.Onsomeviewsthis admirablelifegroundsthegoodnessofparticu- laractions.Thissuggestsseekingguidancefrom rolemodels,andtheirpractices,ratherthan relyingexclusivelyonrules.Rolemodelswill,at times,simplyperceivethesalientfeaturesofa situationandactaccordingly.Beingguidedby rolemodelsrequiressomerecognitionofjust whoshouldbearolemodel.Onemayactoutof character,sincedispositionsdonotautomati- callyproduceparticularactionsinspecificcases. Onemayalsohaveaconflictedcharacterifthe virtuesone'scharactercomprisescontaininter- naltensions(between,say,tendenciestoimpar- tialityandtofriendship).Theimportanceof formativeeducationtothebuildingofcharacter introducessomegoodfortuneintotheacquisi- tionofcharacter.Onecanhaveagoodcharac- terwithadisagreeablepersonalityorhaveafine personalitywithabadcharacterbecauseper- sonalityisnottypicallyanormativenotion, whereascharacteris. Seealsocardinalvirtues,ethics,per- sonalIDENTITY,EPISTEMOLOGY,VIRTUE ETHICS.M.J.M. character,semantic.Seeindexical. characteristicauniversalis.Seecomputerthe- ory,LEIBNIZ. 130 charity,principleof Ch'engHao,Ch'engYi charity,principleof.Seemeaning. Charron,Pierre(1541-1603),FrenchCatholic theologianwhobecametheprincipalexpositor ofMontaigne'sideas,presentingthemindidac- ticform.Hisfirstwork,TheThreeTruths(1595), presentedanegativeargumentforCatholicism byofferingaskepticalchallengetoatheism,non- Christianreligions,andCalvinism.Heargued thatwecannotknoworunderstandGodbecause ofHisinfinitudeandtheweaknessofourfacul- ties.Wecanhavenogoodreasonsforreject- ingChristianityorCatholicism.Therefore,we shouldacceptitonfaithalone.Hissecondwork, OnWisdom(1603),isasystematicpresentationof Pyrrhonianskepticismcoupledwithafideistic defenseofCatholicism.TheskepticismofMon- taigneandtheGreekskepticsisusedtoshow thatwecannotknowanythingunlessGod revealsittous.Thisisfollowedbyofferingan ethicstoliveby,anundogmaticversionofSto- icism.Thisisthefirstmodernpresentationofa moralityapartfromanyreligiousconsiderations. Charron'sOnWisdomwasextremelypopulärin FranceandEngland.Itwasreadandusedby manyphilosophersandtheologiansduringthe seventeenthcentury.Someclaimedthathis skepticismopenedhisdefenseofCatholicismto question,andsuggestedthathewasinsincerein hisfideism.Hewasdefendedbyimportantfig- uresintheFrenchCatholicchurch.Seealso MONTAIGNE.R.H.P. cheapest-costavoider,intheeconomicanalysis oflaw,thepartyinadisputethatcouldhavepre- ventedthedispute,orminimizedthelossesaris- ingfromit,withthelowestlosstoitself.Theterm encompassesseveraltypesofbehavior.Asthe lowest-costaccidentavoider,itisthepartythat couldhavepreventedtheaccidentatthelowest cost.Asthelowest-costinsurer,itistheparty thatcouldbeenhaveinsuredagainstthelosses arisingfromthedispute.Thiscouldbetheparty thatcouldhavepurchasedinsuranceatthelow- estcostorself-insured,orthepartybestableto appraisetheexpectedlossesandtheprobability oftheoccurrence.Asthelowest-costbriber,itis thepartyleastsubjecttotransactioncosts.This partyistheonebestabletocorrectanylegal errorsintheassignmentoftheentitlementby purchasingtheentitlementfromtheotherparty. Asthelowest-costinformationgatherer,itisthe partybestabletomakeaninformedjudgmentas tothelikelybenefitsandcostsofanaction.See alsoCOASETHEOREM,PHILOSOPHYOFECO- NOMICS.M.S.M. Ch'enHsien-chang(1428-1500),Chinesepoet- philosopher.IntheearlyMingdynastyChuHsi's li-hsiieh(leamingofprinciples)hadbeenfirmly establishedastheorthodoxyandbecamesome- whatfossilized.Ch'enopposedthistrendand emphasized"self-attainedlearning"bydigging deepintotheselftofindmeaninginlife.Hedid notcareforbooklearningandconceptualiza- tion,andchosetoexpresshisideasandfeelings throughpoems.PrimarilyaConfucian,healso drewfromBuddhismandTaoism.Hewascred- itedwithbeingthefirsttorealizethedepthand subtletyofhsin-hsiieh(learningofthemind), låterdevelopedintoacomprehensivephiloso- phybyWangYang-ming.Seealsochuhsi, NEO-CONFUCIANISM,WANGYANG-MING. S.-h.L. ch'eng,Chinesetermmeaning'sincerity'.It meansmuchmorethanjustapsychologicalatti- tude.Menciusbarelytoucheduponthesubject; itwasintheConfucianDoctrineoftheMeanthat theideawasgreatlyelaborated.Theultimate metaphysicalprincipleischaracterizedbych'eng, asitistrue,real,totallybeyondillusionanddelu- sion.Accordingtotheclassic,sincerityistheWay ofHeaven;tothinkhowtobesincereistheWay ofman;andonlythosewhocanbeabsolutely sincerecanfullydeveloptheirnature,after whichtheycanassistinthetransformingand nourishingprocessofHeavenandEarth.See alsomencius.S.-H.L. Ch'engHao(1032-85),Ch'engYi(1033-1107), Chinesephilosophers,brotherswhoestablished matureNeo-Confucianism.Theyelevatedthe notionofIi(pattern)topreeminenceandsys- tematicallylinkedtheirmetaphysicstocentral ethicalnotions,e.g.hsing(nature)andhsin (heart/mind). Ch'engHaowasmoremysticalandastronger intuitionist.Heemphasizedauniversal,creative spiritof\ife,jen(benevolence),whichpermeates allthings,justasch'i(ether/vitalforce)perme- atesone'sbody,andlikenedan"unfeeling"(i.e., unbenevolent)persontoan"unfeeling"(i.e., paralyzed)person.Bothfailtorealizeaunifying "oneness." Ch'engYipresentedamoredetailedand developedphilosophicalsysteminwhichtheIi (pattern)inthemindwasawakenedbyperceiv- ingtheIiintheworld,particularlyasrevealedin theclassics,andbyt'ui(extending/inferring) theirinterconnections.Ifonestudieswithching (reverentialattentiveness),onecangainboth cognitivelyaccurateandaffectivelyappropriate 131 chengming Ch'ien-fuLun "realknowledge,"whichCh'engYiillustrates withanallegoryaboutthosewho"know"(i.e., haveheardthat)tigersaredangerousandthose who"know"becausetheyhavebeenmauled. Thetwobrothersdiffermostintheirviewson self-cultivation.ForCh'engHao,itismorean inneraffair:settingoneselfrightbybringinginto fullplayone'smoralintuition.ForCh'engYi, self-cultivationwasmoreexternal:chihchih (extendingknowledge)throughkowu(investi- gatingthings).Hereliethebeginningsofthe majorschoolsofNeo-Confucianism:the Lu-WangandCh'eng-Chuschools. Seealsoli1,neo-confucianism.P.J.I. chengming,alsocalledRectificationofNames,a Confucianprogramoflanguagereformadvocat- ingareturntotraditionallanguage.Thereisa briefreferencetochengminginAnalects13:3,but HsiinTzupresentsthemostdetaileddiscussion ofit.Whileadmittingthatnewwords(ming)will sometimeshavetobecreated,HstinTzufears theproliferationofwords,dialects,andidiolects willendangereffectivecommunication.Heis alsoconcemedthatnewwaysofspeakingmay lendthemselvestosophistryorfailtoservesuch purposesasaccuratelydistinguishingthenoble fromthebase.Seealsoconfucianism. B.W.V.N. Cheng-shihhsuan-hsiieh.Seeneo-taoism. c/i'/,Chinesetermforether,air,corporealvital energy,andthe"atmosphere"ofaseason,per- son,event,orwork.Ch'icanbedense/impureor limpid/pure,warm/rising/activeorcool/set- tling/still.Thebravebrimwithch'i;acoward lacksit.Ch'iriseswithexcitementorhealthand sinkswithdepressionorillness.Ch'ibecamea conceptcoordinatewithli(pattern),beingthe mediuminwhichliisembeddedandthrough whichitcanbeexperienced.Ch'iservesarole akinto'matter'inWesternthought,butbeing "lively"and"flowing,"itgeneratedadistinctand differentsetofquestions.P.J.I. ChiaoHung(15407-1620),Chinesehistorian andphilosopheraffiliatedwiththeT'ai-chou school,oftenreferredtoastheleftwingofWang Yang-ming'shsin-hsiieh(learningofthemind). However,hedidnotrepudiatebooklearning;he wasveryerudite,andbecameaforerunnerof evidentialresearch.Hebelievedintheunityof theteachingsofConfucianism,Buddhism,and Taoism.InoppositiontoChuHsi'sorthodoxyhe madeuseofinsightsofCh'an(Zen)Buddhismto givenewinterpretationstotheclassics.Learning forhimisprimarilyandultimatelyaprocessof realizationinconsciousnessofone'sinnate moralnature.Seealsobuddhism,chuhsi, NEO-CONFUCIANISM,WANGYANG-MING. S.-h.L.8-A.K.L.C. ChiaYi(200-168b.c),Chinesescholarwho attemptedtosynthesizeLegalist,Confucian,and Taoistideas.TheCh'indynasty(221-206b.c.) usedtheLegalistpracticetounifyChina,but unlimiteduseofcruelpunishmentalsocausedits quickdownfall;hencetheConfuciansystemofli (propriety)hadtobeestablished,andthe emperorhadtodelegatehispowertoablemin- isterstotakecareofthewelfareofthepeople. TheultimateWayforChiaYiishsii(emptiness), aTaoistidea,butheinterpreteditinsuchaway thatitistotallycompatiblewiththepracticeofli andthedevelopmentofculture.Seealsocon- fucianism,taoism.S.-h.L. ch'ien,k'un,intraditionalChinesecosmology, thenamesofthetwomostimportanttrigramsin thesystemofI-Ching(theBookofChanges).Ch'ien (=)iscomposedofthreeundividedlines,the symbolofyang,andk'un(==)threedivided lines,thesymbolofyin.Ch'ienmeansHeaven, thefather,creativity;k'unmeansEarth,the mother,endurance.Thetwoarecomplemen- tary;theyworktogethertoformthewholecos- micorder.InthesystemofI-Ching,thereare eighttrigrams,thedoublingupoftwotrigrams formsahexagram,andthereareatotalofsixty- fourhexagrams.Thefirsttwohexagramsarealso namedch'ien(=)andk'un(ii).Seealsot'ai- chi.S.-h.L. chienni.Seemohism. Ch'ien-fuLun,ChinesetitleofCommentsofa Recluse(secondcenturya.d.),aConfucianpolit- icalandcosmologicalworkbyWangFu.Divided intothirty-sixessays,itgivesavividpictureof thesociopoliticalworldoflåterHanChinaand prescribespracticalmeasurestoovercomecor- ruptionandotherproblemsconfrontingthe state.Therearediscussionsoncosmologyaffirm- ingthebeliefthattheworldisconstitutedbyvital energy(ch'i).Thepivotalroleofhumanbeings inshapingtheworldisemphasized.Aperson maybefavorablyendowed,buteducationre- mainscrucial.Severalessaysaddresstheper- ceivedexcessesinreligiouspractices.Aboveall, theauthortargetsforcriticismthesystemofoffi- cialappointmentthatprivilegesfamilyback- 132 Ch'ienMu ChineseLegalism groundandreputationattheexpenseofmoral worthandability.LargelyConfucianinoutlook, theworkreflectsstrongutilitarianinterestremi- niscentofHsiinTzu.Seealsoch'i,confu- cianism.A.K.L.C. Ch'ienMu(1895-1990),Chinesehistorian,a leadingcontemporaryNewConfucianscholar andcofounder(withT'angChiin-i)ofNewAsia CollegeinHongKong(1949).Earlyinhiscareer hewasrespectedforhisefforttodatetheancient ChinesephilosophersandforhisstudyofCon- fucianthoughtintheHandynasty(206b.c.-a.d. 220).DuringWorldWarIIhewrotetheOutline ofChineseHistory,inwhichhedevelopeda nationalisthistoricalviewpointstressingthe vitalityoftraditionalChineseculture.Lateinhis careerhepublishedhismonumentalstudyof ChuHsi(1130-1200).Hefirmlybelievedthe spiritofConfuciusandChuHsishouldberevived today.Seealsochinesephilosophy,chu HSI,T'ANGCHUN-I.S.-h.L. chih1,Chinesetermroughlycorrespondingto 'knowledge'.Aconciseexplanationisfoundin theHsiinTzu:"Thatinmanbywhichheknows iscalledchih;thechihthataccordswithactuality iscalledwisdom(chih)."Thisdefinitionsuggests adistinctionbetweenintelligenceortheability toknowanditsachievementorwisdom,often indicatedbyitshomophone.ThelåterMohists providemoretechnicaldefinitions,stressing especiallytheconnectionbetweennamesand objects.Confuciansforthemostpartareinter- estedintheethicalsignificanceofchih.Thuschih, intheAnaledsofConfucius,isoftenusedasa verbinthesense'torealize',conveyingunder- standingandappreciationofethicallearning,in additiontotheuseofchihinthesenseofacquir- inginformation.Andoneofthebasicproblems inConfucianethicspertainstochih-hsingho-i (theunityofknowledgeandaction).Seealso CONFUCIANISM,MOHISM.A.S.C. chih2,Chinesetermoftentranslatedas'wilT.It referstogeneralgoalsinlifeaswellastomore specificaimsandintentions.Chihissupposedto pertaintotheheart/mind(hsin)andtobesome- thingthatcanbesetupandattained.Itissome- timescomparedinChinesephilosophicaltextsto aiminginarchery,andisexplainedbysome commentatorsas"directionsoftheheart/mind." Confuciansemphasizetheneedtosetupthe properchihtoguideone'sbehaviorandwayof lifegenerallywhileTaoistsadvocatelettingone- selfrespondspontaneouslytosituationsoneis confrontedwith,freefromdirectionbychih.See alsoCONFUCIANISM.K.-l.S. chih-hsingho-i,ChinesetermfortheConfucian doctrine,propoundedbyWangYang-ming,of theunityofknowledgeandaction.Thedoctrine issometimesexpressedintermsoftheunityof morallearningandaction.Arecentinterpreta- tionfocusesonthenon-contingentconnection betweenprospectiveandretrospectivemoral knowledgeorachievement.Noteworthyisthe roleofdesire,intention,will,andmotiveinthe mediationofknowledgeandactionasinformed bypracticalreasonablenessinreflectionthat respondstochangingcircumstances.Wang's doctrineisbestconstruedasanattempttoartic- ulatetheconcretesignificanceofjen,theNeo- Confucianidealoftheuniverseasamoral community.A.S.C. Chillington,Richard.Seekilvington. ChineseLegalism,thecollectiveviewsoftheChi- nese"schooloflaws"theorists,socalledinrecog- nitionoftheimportancegiventostrict applicationoflawsintheworkofShangYang (390-338b.c.)andhismostprominentsucces- sor,HanFeiTzu(d.223b.c).TheLegalistswere politicalrealistswhobelievedthatsuccessinthe contextofWarringStatesChina(403-221b.c.) dependedonorganizingthestateintoamilitary camp,andthatfailuremeantnothinglessthan politicalextinction.Althoughtheychallenged theviabilityoftheConfucianmodelofritually constitutedcommunitywiththeircalltolawand order,theysidesteppedtheneedtodisputethe ritual-versus-lawpositionsbyclaimingthatdif- ferentperiodshaddifferentproblems,anddiffer- entproblemsrequirednewandinnovative solutions. ShangYangbelievedthatthefundamentaland complementaryoccupationsofthestate,agricul- tureandwarfare,couldbeprosecutedmostsuc- cessfullybyinsistingonadherencetoclearly articulatedlawsandbyenforcingstrictpunish- mentsforevenminorviolations.Therewasan assumedantagonismbetweentheinterestsof theindividualandtheinterestsofthestate.By manipulatingrewardsandpunishmentsand controllingthe"handlesoflifeanddeath,"the rulercouldsubjugatehispeopleandbringthem intocompliancewiththenationalpurpose.Law wouldreplacemoralityandfunctionasthe exclusivestandardofgood.Fastidiousapplica- tionofthelaw,withseverepunishmentsfor infractions,wasbelievedtobeapolicythat 133 Chinesephilosophy Chinesephilosophy wouldarrestcriminalityandquicklymakepun- ishmentunnecessary. Giventhatthelawservedthestateasanobjec- tiveandimpartialstandard,thegoalwastomin- imizeanyrelianceuponsubjectiveinterpre- tation.TheLegaliststhusconceivedofthe machineryofstateasoperatingautomaticallyon thebasisofself-regulatingandself-perpetuating "systems."Theyadvocatedtechniquesofstate- craft(shu)suchas"accountability"(hsing-ming), thedemandforabsolutecongruencybetween stipulateddutiesandactualperformancein office,and"doingnothing"(wu-wei),theruler residingbeyondthelawsofthestatetoreformu- iatethemwhennecessarybuttoresistreinter- pretingthemtoaccommodateparticularcases. HanFeiTzu,thelastandmostinfluential spokespersonofLegalism,adaptedthemilitary preceptofstrategicadvantage(shih)totherule ofgovernment.Theruler,withouttheprestige andinfluenceofhisposition,wasmostoftena ratherordinaryperson.Hehadachoice:he couldrelyonhispersonalattributesandpithis characteragainstthecollectivestrengthofhis people,orhecouldtapthecollectivestrengthof theempirebyusinghispositionandhisexclu- sivepoweröverlifeanddeathasafulcrumto ensurethathiswillwascarriedout.Whatwas strategicadvantageinwarfarebecamepolitical purchaseinthegovernmentofthestate.Only therulerwiththeastutenessandtheresolveto hoardandmaximizealloftheadvantagesavail- abletohimcouldguaranteecontinuationin power.HanFeibelievedthatthecloseronewas totheseatofpower,thegreaterthreatoneposed totheruler.Hence,allnoblervirtuesandsenti- ments-benevolence,trust,honor,mercy- wererepudiatedasmeansforconspiringminis- tersandwould-beusurperstounderminethe absoluteauthorityofthethrone.Survivalwas dependentupontotalandunflaggingdistrust. Seealsofa,hanfeitzu,shangyang. R.P.P.&R.T.A. Chinesephilosophy,philosophyproducedin Chinafromthesixthcenturyb.c.tothepresent. TraditionalChinesephilosophy.Itshistory maybedividedintosixperiods: (1)Pre-Ch'in,before221b.c. SpringandAutumn,722-481b.c. WarringStates,403-222b.c. (2)Han,206b.c.-a.d.220 Western(Former)Han,206b.c.-a.d.8 Hsin,a.d.9-23 Eastern(Låter)Han,a.d.25-220 (3)Wei-Chin,220-420 Wei,220-65 WesternChin,265-317 EasternChin,317-420 (4)Sui-Tang,581-907 Sui,581-618 Tång,618-907 FiveDynasties,907-60 (5)Sung-(Yuan)-Ming,960-1644 NorthernSung,960-1126 SouthernSung,1127-1279 Yuan(Mongol),1271-1368 Ming,1368-1644 (6)Ch'ing(Manchu),1644-1912 InthelateChoudynasty(1111-249b.c), beforeCh'in(221-206b.c.)unifiedthecountry, Chinaenteredtheso-calledSpringandAutumn periodandtheWarringStatesperiod,andChou culturewasindecline.Theso-calledhundred schoolsofthoughtwerecontendingwithone another;amongthemsixwerephilosophically significant: (a)Ju-chia(Confucianism),representedby Confucius(551-479b.c),Mencius(371- 289b.c.?),andHstinTzu(fl.298-238 B.C.) (b)Tao-chia(Taoism),representedbyLaoTzu (sixthorfourthcenturyb.c.)andChuang Tzu(between399and295b.c.) (c)Mo-chia(Mohism),representedbyMoTzu (fl.479-438b.c.) (d)Ming-chia(Logicians),representedbyHui Shih(380-305b.c),Kung-sunLung (b.380b.c?) (e)Yin-yang-chia(Yin-yangschool),repre- sentedbyTsouYen(305-240b.c?) (f)Fa-chia(Legalism),representedbyHanFei (d.233b.c.) Thus,Chinaenjoyedherfirstgoldenperiodof philosophyinthePre-Ch'inperiod.AsmostChi- nesephilosophiesweregivingresponsestoexis- tentialproblemsthen,itisnowonderChinese philosophyhadapredominantlypracticalchar- acter.Ithasneverdevelopedthepurelytheoret- icalattitudecharacteristicofGreekphilosophy. DuringtheHandynasty,in136b.c,Confu- cianismwasestablishedasthestateideology.But itwasblendedwithideasofTaoism,Legalism, andtheYin-yangschool.Anorganicviewofthe universewasdeveloped;creativethinkingwas replacedbystudyoftheso-calledFiveClassics: BookofPoetry,BookofHistory,BookofChanges,Book ofRites,andSpringandAutumnAnnals.Asthe FirstEmperorofCh'inburnedtheClassicsexcept 134 Chinesephilosophy Chinesephilosophy fortheI-Ching,intheearlyHanscholarswere askedtowritedownthetextstheyhadmemo- rizedinmodernscript.Låtersometextsin ancientscriptwerediscovered,butwererejected asspuriousbymodem-scriptsupporters.Hence therewereconstantdisputesbetweenthemod- ern-scriptschoolandtheancient-scriptschool. Wei-Chinscholarswerefedupwithstudiesof theClassicsintrivialdetail.Theyalsoshoweda tendencytostepövertheboundsofrites.Their interestturnedtosomethingmoremetaphysical; theLaoTzu,theChuangTzu,andtheI-Chingwere theirfavoritereadings.Especiallyinfluential wereHsiangHsiu's(fl.a.d.250)andKuo Hsiang's(d.a.d.312)CommentariesontheChuang Tzu,andWangPi's(226-49)Commentariesonthe LaoTzuandI-Ching.AlthoughWang'sperspective waspredominantlyTaoist,hewasthefirstto brushasidethehsiang-shu(formsandnumbers) approachtothestudyoftheI-Chingandconcen- trateoni-H(meaningsandprinciples)alone. Sungphilosopherscontinuedthei-liapproach, buttheyreinterpretedtheClassicsfroma Confucianperspective. AlthoughBuddhismwasimportedintoChina inthelateHanperiod,ittookseveralhundred yearsfortheChinesetoabsorbBuddhistinsights andwaysofthinking.FirsttheChinesehadto relyonko-i(matchingtheconcepts)byusing TaoistideastotransmitBuddhistmessages.After theChineselearnedagreatdealfromBuddhism bytranslatingBuddhisttextsintoChinese,they attemptedtodeveloptheChineseversionsof BuddhismintheSui-Tangperiod.Onthewhole theyfavoredMahayanaöverHinayana(Ther- avada)Buddhism,andtheydevelopedamuch morelife-affirmingattitudethroughHua-yen andTien-taiBuddhism,whichtheybelievedto representBuddha'smaturethought.Ch'anwent evenfurther,seekingsuddenenlightenment insteadofscripturestudies.Ch'an,exportedto Japan,hasbecomeZen,abetter-knowntermin theWest. InresponsetotheBuddhistchallenge,the Neo-Confucianthinkersgaveatotallynew interpretationofConfucianphilosophybygoing backtoinsightsimplicitinConfucius'sso-called FourBooks:theAnalects,theMencius,TheGreat Learning,andtheDoctrineoftheMean(thelatter twowerechapterstakenfromtheBookofRites). TheywerealsofascinatedbytheI-Ching.They borrowedideasfromBuddhismandTaoismto developanewConfuciancosmologyandmoral metaphysics.Sung-MingNeo-Confucianism broughtChinesephilosophytoanewheight; someconsidertheperiodtheChineseRenais- sance.ThemovementstartedwithChouTun-i (1017-73),buttherealfoundersofNeo-Confu- cianismweretheCh'engbrothers:Ch'engHao (1032-85)andCh'engYi(1033-1107).Then cameChuHsi(1130-1200),agreatsynthesizer oftencomparedwithThomasAquinasorKantin theWest,whofurtherdevelopedCh'engYi's ideasintoasystematicphilosophyandoriginated theso-calledCh'eng-Chuschool.Buthewas opposedbyhisyoungercontemporaryLu Hsiang-shan(1139-93).DuringtheMing dynasty,WangYang-ming(1472-1529)reacted againstChuHsibyrevivingtheinsightofLu Hsiang-shan,hencetheso-calledLu-Wang school. DuringtheCh'ingdynasty,undertheruleof theManchus,scholarsturnedtohistoricalschol- arshipandshowedlittleinterestinphilosophical speculation.InthelateCh'ing,K'angYu-wei (1858-1927)revivedthemodern-scriptschool, pushedforradicalreform,butfailedmiserablyin hisattempt. ContemporaryChinesephilosophy.Three importanttrendscanbediscerned,intertwined withoneanother:theimportationofWesternphi- losophy,thedominanceofMarxismonMainland China,andthedevelopmentofcontemporary NewConfucianphilosophy.Duringtheearly twentiethcenturyChinaawoketothefactthattra- ditionalChineseculturecouldnotprovideallthe meansforChinatoenterintothemodernerain competitionwiththeWesternpowers.Hencethe firsturgenttaskwastolearnfromtheWest. Almostallphilosophicalmovementshadtheir exponents,buttheyweresoontotallyeclipsed byMarxism,whichwasestablishedastheofficial ideologyinChinaaftertheCommunisttakeover in1949.MaoTse-tung(1893-1976)succeeded inthelineofMarx,Engels,Lenin,andStalin. TheCommunistregimewasintolerantofall opposingviews.TheCulturalRevolutionwas launchedin1967,andforawholedecadeChina closedherdoorstotheoutsideworld.Almostall theintellectualsinsideoroutsideoftheCom- munistpartywerepurgedorsuppressed.After theCulturalRevolutionwasöver,universities werereopenedin1978.From1979to1989, intellectualsenjoyedunprecedentedfreedom. OneeditorialinPeople'sDailyNewssaidthat Marx'sideasweretheproductofthenineteenth centuryanddidnotprovidealltheanswersfor problemsatthepresenttime,andhenceitwas desirabletodevelopMarxismfurther.Sucha messagewasinterpretedbyscholarsindifferent ways.Althoughthethoughtssetforthbyschol- 135 Chineseroomargument Chisholm,RoderickMilton arslackeddepth,thelivelyatmospherecouldbe comparedtotheMayFourthNewCulture Movementin1919.Unfortunately,however, violentsuppressionofdemonstratorsinPeking's TiananmenSquarein1989putastoptoallthis. Controlofideologybecamemuchstricterforthe timebeing,althoughthedoorstotheoutside worldwerenotcompletelyclosed. AsfortheNationalistgovernment,whichhad fledtoTaiwanin1949,thecontrolofideology underitsjurisdictionwasnevertotalonthe island;liberalismhasbeenstrongamongthe intellectuals.Analyticphilosophy,existential- ism,andhermeneuticsallhavetheirfollowers; todayevenradicalismhasitsattractionforcer- tainyoungscholars. EventhoughmainstreamChinesethoughtin thetwentiethcenturyhascondemnedtheChi- nesetraditionaltogether,thattraditionhasnever completelydiedout.Infactthemostcreativetal- entswerefoundinthecontemporaryNewCon- fucianmovement,whichsoughttobringabout asynthesisbetweenEastandWest.Amongthose whostayedonthemainland,FungYu-lan (1895-1990)andHoLin(1902-92)changed theirearlierviewsaftertheCommunist takeover,butLiangSou-ming(1893-1988)and HsiungShih-li(1885-1968)keptsomeoftheir beliefs.Ch'ienMu(1895-1990)andTång Chtin-i(1909-78)movedtoHongKongand ThoméH.Fång(1899-1976),HsiiFu-kuan (1903-82),andMouTsung-san(1909-95) movedtoTaiwan,wheretheyexertedprofound influenceonyoungerscholars.Todaycontempo- raryNewConfucianismisstillavitalintellectual movementinHongKong,Taiwan,andoverseas; itisevenstudiedinMainlandChina.TheNew Confuciansurgearevivalofthetraditionalspirit ofjen(humanity)andsheng(creativity);atthe sametimetheytumtotheWest,arguingforthe incorporationofmodernscienceanddemocracy intoChineseculture. TheNewConfucianphilosophicalmovement inthenarrowersensederivedinspirationfrom HsiungShih-li.Amonghisdisciplesthemost originalthinkerisMouTsung-san,whohas developedhisownsystemofphilosophy.He maintainsthatthethreemajorChinesetradi- tions-Confucian,Taoist,andBuddhist-agreein assertingthathumanshavetheendowmentfor intellectualintuition,meaningpersonalpartici- pationintao(theWay).Buttheso-calledthird generationhasamuchbroaderscope;itincludes scholarswithvariedbackgroundssuchasYu Ying-shih(b.1930),LiuShu-hsien(b.1934), andTuWei-ming(b.1940),whoseideashave impactonintellectualsatlargeandwhose selectedwritingshaverecentlybeenallowedto bepublishedonthemainland.ThefutureofChi- nesephilosophywillstilldependontheinterac- tionsofimportedWesternthought,Chinese Marxism,andNewConfucianism. Seealsobuddhism,chuhsi,confucian- ism,HSIUNGSHIH-LI,NEO-CONFUCIANISM, TAOISM,WANGYANG-MING.S.-h.L. Chineseroomargument.Seesearle. ching,Chinesetermmeaning'reverence','seri- ousness','attentiveness','composure'.Inearly texts,chingistheappropriateattitudetoward spirits,one'sparents,andtheruler;itwasorigi- nallyinterchangeablewithanotherterm,kung (respect).AmongNeo-Confucians,theseterms aredistinguished:chingreservedfortheinner stateofmindandkungforitsoutermanifesta- tions.ThisdistinctionwaspartoftheNeo-Con- fucianresponsetothequietisticgoalofmed- itativecalmadvocatedbymanyTaoistsandBud- dhists.Neo-Confucianssoughttomaintainan imperturbablestateof"reverentialattentive- ness"notonlyinmeditationbutthroughoutall activity.Thissenseofchingisbestunderstoodas aNeo-ConfucianappropriationoftheCh'an (Zen)idealofyi-hsingsan-mei(universal samädhi),prominentintextssuchasthePlatform Sutra.P.J.I. ch'ing,Chinesetermmeaning(1)'essence', 'essential';(2)'emotion','passions'.Originally, thech'ingofxwasthepropertieswithoutwhich xwouldceasetobethekindofthingthatitis.In thissenseitcontrastswiththenature(hsing)of x:thepropertiesxhasifitisaflourishinginstance ofitskind.BythetimeofHsunTzu,though, ch'ingcomestorefertohumanemotionsorpas- sions.Alistof"thesixemotions"(liuch'ing)soon becamefairlystandard:fondness(hao),dislike (wu),delight(hsi),anger(nu),sadness(ai),and joy(le).B.W.V.N. Chisholm,RoderickMilton(1916-99),influen- tialAmericanphilosopherwhosepublications spannedthefield,includingethicsandthehis- toryofphilosophy.Heismainlyknownasan epistemologist,metaphysician,andphilosopher ofmind.Inearlyoppositiontopowerfulformsof reductionism,suchasphenomenalism,exten- sionalism,andphysicalism,Chisholmdeveloped anoriginalphilosophyofhisown.Educatedat BrownandHarvard(Ph.D.,1942),hespent nearlyhisentirecareeratBrown. 136 chit choicesequence Heisknownchieflyforthefollowingcontri- butions.(a)Togetherwithhisteacherandlåter hiscolleagueatBrown,C.J.Ducasse,hedevel- opedandlongdefendedanadverbialaccountof sensoryexperience,setagainstthesense-datum act-objectaccountthendominant,(b)Basedon deeplyprobinganalysisofthefreewillprob- lematic,hedefendedalibertarianposition,again inoppositiontothecompatibilismlongortho- doxinanalyticcircles.Hislibertarianismhad, moreover,anunusualaccountofagency,based ondistinguishingtranseunt(event)causation fromimmanent(agent)causation.(c)Inoppo- sitiontothecelebratedlinguisticturnoflinguis- ticphilosophy,hedefendedtheprimacyof intentionality,adefensemadefamousnotonly throughimportantpapers,butalsothroughhis extensiveandeventuallypublishedcorrespon- dencewithWilfridSellars.(d)Quicktorecog- nizetheimportanceanddistinctivenessofthede se,hewelcomeditasabasisformuchdere thought.(e)Hisrealistontologyisdeveloped throughanintentionalconceptof"entailment," usedtodefinekeyconceptsofhissystem,andto providecriteriaofidentityforoccupantsoffun- damentalcategories.(f)Inepistemology,he famouslydefendedformsoffoundationalism andinternalism,andofferedadelicatelyargued (dis)solutionoftheancientproblemofthecrite- rion. TheprinciplesofChisholm'sepistemologyand metaphysicsarenotlaiddownantecedentlyas hard-and-fastaxioms.Lackinganyinviolable antecedentprivilege,theymustpassmusterin thelightoftheirconsequencesandbycompari- sonwithwhateverelsewemayfindplausible.In thisregardhesharplycontrastswithsuchepis- temologistsasPopper,withtheskepticismof justificationattendantonhisdeductivism,and Quine,whosestrandednaturalismdrivesso muchofhisradicalepistemologyandmetaphy- sics.Bycontrast,Chisholmhasnoantecedently setepistemicormetaphysicalprinciples.His philosophicalviewsdevelopratherdialectically, withsensitivitytowhateverconsiderations, examples,orcounterexamplesreflectionmay revealasrelevant.Thismakesforademanding complexityofelaboration,relieved,however,by apowerfuldriveforontologicalandconceptual economy. Seealsoepistemology,foundational- ism,FREEWILLPROBLEM,KNOWLEDGEDESE, PROBLEMOFTHECRITERION,SKEPTICISM. E.S. chit.Seesat/chit/änanda. choice,axiomof.Seelöwenheim-skolemtheo- REM,SETTHEORY. choicesequence,avarietyofinfinitesequence introducedbyL.E.J.Brouwertoexpressthe non-classicalpropertiesofthecontinuum(the setofrealnumbers)withinintuitionism.A choicesequenceisdeterminedbyafiniteinitial segmenttogetherwitha"rule"forcontinuing thesequence.Therule,however,mayallow somefreedominchoosingeachsubsequentele- ment.Thusthesequencemightstartwiththe rationalnumbersandthenVi,andtherule mightrequirethen+1stelementtobesome rationalnumberwithin(Vi)"ofthewthchoice, withoutanyfurtherrestriction.Thesequenceof rationalsthusgeneratedmustconvergetoareal number,r.Butr'sdefinitionleavesopenitsexact locationinthecontinuum.Speakingintuitionis- tically,rviolatestheclassicallawoftrichotomy: givenanypairofrealnumbers(e.g.,randVi), thefirstiseitherlessthan,equalto,orgreater thanthesecond. Fromthe1940sBrouwergotthisnon-classical effectwithoutappealingtotheapparentlynon- mathematicalnotionoffreechoice.Insteadhe usedsequencesgeneratedbytheactivityofan idealizedmathematician(thecreatingsubject), togetherwithpropositionsthathetooktobe undecided.Givensuchaproposition,F-e.g. Fermafslasttheorem(thatforn>2thereisno generalmethodoffindingtripletsofnumbers withthepropertythatthesumofeachofthefirst tworaisedtothe«thpowerisequaltotheresult ofraisingthethirdtothewthpower)orGold- bach'sconjecture(thateveryevennumberisthe sumoftwoprimenumbers)-wecanmodifythe definitionofr:Then+1stelementisViifatthe wthstageofresearchPremainsundecided.That elementandallitssuccessorsareVi+(Vi)"ifby thatstagePisproved;theyareVi—(Vi)"ifPis refuted.Sinceheheldthatthereisanendless supplyofsuchpropositions,Brouwerbelieved thatwecanalwaysusethismethodtorefute classicallaws. Intheearly1960sStephenKleeneand RichardVesleyreproducedsomemainpartsof Brouwer'stheoryofthecontinuuminaformål systembasedonKleene'searlierrecursion-theo- reticinterpretationofintuitionismandofchoice sequences.Ataboutthesametime-butina differentandoccasionallyincompatiblevein- SaulKripkeformallycapturedthepowerof Brouwer'scounterexampleswithoutrecourseto recursivefunctionsandwithoutinvokingeither thecreatingsubjectorthenotionoffreechoice. 137 Chomsky,Noam ch'iian SubsequentlyGeorgKreisel,A.N.Troelstra,Dirk VanDalen,andothersproducedformålsystems thatanalyzeBrouwer'sbasicassumptionsabout open-futuredobjectslikechoicesequences. Seealsomathematicalintuitionism, PHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICS.C.J.P. Chomsky,Noam(b.1928),preeminentAmerican linguist,philosopher,andpoliticalactivistwho hasspenthisprofessionalcareerattheMassa- chusettsInstituteofTechnology.Chomsky's best-knownscientificachievementistheestab- lishmentofarigorousandphilosophicallycom- pellingfoundationforthescientificstudyofthe grammarofnaturallanguage.Withtheuseof toolsfromthestudyofformållanguages,hegave afarmorepreciseandexplanatoryaccountof naturallanguagegrammarthanhadpreviously beengiven(SyntacticStructures,1957).Hehas sincedevelopedanumberofhighlyinfluential frameworksforthestudyofnaturallanguage grammar(e.g.,AspectsoftheTheoryofSyntax, 1965;LecturesonGovernmentandBinding,1981; TheMinimalistProgram,1995).Thoughthereare significantdifferencesindetail,therearealso commonthemesthatunderlietheseapproaches. Perhapsthemostcentralisthatthereisaninnate setoflinguisticprinciplessharedbyallhumans, andthepurposeoflinguisticinquiryisto describetheinitialstateofthelanguagelearner, andaccountforlinguisticvariationviathemost generalpossiblemechanisms. OnChomsky'sconceptionoflinguistics,lan- guagesarestructuresinthebrainsofindividual speakers,describedatacertainlevelofabstrac- tionwithinthetheory.Thesestructuresoccur withinthelanguagefaculty,ahypothesized moduleofthehumanbrain.UniversalGrammar isthesetofprincipleshard-wiredintothelan- guagefacultythatdeterminetheclassofpossible humanlanguages.Thisconceptionoflinguistics involvesseveralinfluentialandcontroversial theses.First,thehypothesisofaUniversalGram- marentailstheexistenceofinnatelinguistic principles.Secondlythehypothesisofalan- guagefacultyentailsthatourlinguisticabilities, atleastsofarasgrammarisconcerned,arenota productofgeneralreasoningprocesses.Finally andperhapsmostcontroversially,sincehaving oneofthesestructuresisanintrinsicpropertyof aspeaker,propertiesoflanguagessoconceived aredeterminedsolelybystatesofthespeaker.On thisindividualisticconceptionoflanguage,there isnoroominscientificlinguisticsforthesocial entitiesdeterminedbylinguisticcommunities thatarelanguagesaccordingtopreviousanthro- pologicalconceptionsofthediscipline. ManyofChomsky'smostsignificantcontribu- tionstophilosophy,suchashisinfluentialrejec- tionofbehaviorism("ReviewofSkinner'sVerbal Behavior,"Language,1959),stemfromhiselabo- rationsanddefensesoftheaboveconsequences (ef.alsoCartesianLinguistics,1966;Reflectionson Language,1975;RulesandRepresentations,1980; KnowledgeofLanguage,1986).Chomsky'sphilo- sophicalwritingsarecharacterizedbyanadher- encetomethodologicalnaturalism,theviewthat themindshouldbestudiedlikeanyothernat- uralphenomenon.Inrecentyears,hehasalso arguedthatreference,inthesenseinwhichitis usedinthephilosophyoflanguage,playsnorole inascientifictheoryoflanguage("Languageand Nature,"Mind,1995). Seealsoformållearnabilitytheory, GRAMMAR,MEANING,PHILOSOPHYOFLAN- GUAGE,PSYCHOLINGUISTICS.J.Sta. Chomskyhierarchyoflanguages.Seephilosophy OFLANGUAGE. chora.Seekristeva. ChouTun-yi(1017-73),ChineseNeo-Confucian philosopher.Hismostimportantwork,theTai- chifu-shuo("ExplanationsoftheDiagramofthe SupremeUltimate"),consistsofachart,depict- ingtheconstituents,strueture,andevolutionary processofthecosmos,alongwithanexplanatory commentary.Thiswork,togetherwithhisTung- shu("PenetratingtheI-Ching"),introducedmany ofthefundamentalideasofNeo-Confucian metaphysics.Consequently,heateddebates aroseconcerningChou'sdiagram,someclaiming itdescribedtheuniverseasarisingoutofwu (non-being)andthuswasinspiredbyandsup- portedTaoism.Chou'sprimaryinterestwas alwayscosmological;heneversystematically relatedhismetaphysicstoethicalconcerns.See alsoT'AI-CHI.P.J.I. Chrysippus.Seestoicism. Chrysorrhoas.Seejohnofdamascus. ch'iian,ChinesetermforakeyConfuciancon- ceptthatmayberenderedasmeaning'weighing ofcircumstances','exigency',or'moraldiscre- tion'.Ametaphoricalextensionofthebasic senseofasteelyardformeasuringweight,ch'tian essentiallypertainstoassessmentoftheimpor- 138 ChuangTzu Chung-yung tanceofmoralconsiderationstoacurrentmat- terofconcern.Alternatively,theexerciseof ch'ilanconsistsinajudgmentofthecomparative importanceofcompetingoptionsansweringtoa currentproblematicsituation.Thejudgment mustaccordwithli(principle,reason),i.e.,bea principledorreasonedjudgment.Inthesenseof exigency,ch'iianisahärdcase,i.e.,onefalling outsidethenormalscopeoftheoperationof standardsofconduct.Inthesenseof'moraldis- cretion',ch'iianmustconformtotherequire- mentofi(rightness).Seealsoconfucianism. A.S.C. ChuangTzu,alsocalledChuangChou(4thcen- turyb.c.),ChineseTaoistphilosopher.According tomanyscholars,ideasintheinnerchapters (chapters1to7)ofthetextChuangTzumaybe ascribedtothepersonChuangTzu,whilethe otherchapterscontainideasrelatedtohis thoughtandlåterdevelopmentsofhisideas.The innerchapterscontaindialogues,stories,verses, sayings,andbriefessaysgearedtowardinducing analteredperspectiveonlife.Arealizationthat thereisnoneutralgroundforadjudicating betweenopposingjudgmentsmadefromdiffer- entperspectivesissupposedtoleadtoarelax- ationoftheimportanceoneattachéstosuch judgmentsandtosuchdistinctionsasthose betweenrightandwrong,lifeanddeath,andself andothers.Thewayoflifeadvocatedissubject todifferentinterpretations.Partsofthetextseem toadvocateawayoflifenotradicallydifferent fromtheconventionalone,thoughwithaless- enedemotionalinvolvement.Otherpartsseem toadvocateamoreradicalchange;oneissup- posedtoreactspontaneouslytosituationsoneis confrontedwith,withnopreconceivedgoalsor preconceptionsofwhatisrightorproper,andto viewalloccurrences,includingchangesinone- self,aspartofthetransformationprocessofthe naturalorder.Seealsotaoism.K.-l.S. ChuHsi(1130-1200),Neo-Confucianscholarof theSungdynasty(960-1279),commonly regardedasthegreatestChinesephilosopher afterConfuciusandMencius.Hismentorwas Ch'engYi(1033-1107),hencetheso-called Ch'eng-ChuSchool.ChuHsidevelopedCh'eng Yi'sideasintoacomprehensivemetaphysicsofIi (principle)andch'i(materialforce).Liisincor- poreal,one,eternal,andunchanging,always good;ch'iisphysical,many,transitory,and changeable,involvingbothgoodandevil.They arenottobemixedorseparated.Thingsarecom- posedofbothliandch'i.Chuidentifieshsing (humannature)asli,ch'ing(feelingsandemo- tions)asch'i,andhsin(mind/heart)asch'iofthe subtlestkind,comprisingprinciples.Heinter- pretsko-wuintheGreatLearningtomeanthe investigationofprinciplesinherentinthings, andchih-chihtomeantheextensionofknowl- edge.HewasopposedbyLuHsiang-shan(1139- 93)andWangYang-ming(1472-1529),who arguedthatmindisprinciple.MouTsung-san thinksthatLu'sandWang'spositionwascloser toMencius'sphilosophy,whichwashonoredas orthodoxy.ButCh'engandChu'scommentaries ontheFourBookswereusedasthebasisforcivil serviceexaminationsfrom1313untilthesystem wasabolishedin1905.Seealsoch'ienmu, CHINESEPHILOSOPHY,CONFUCIUS,FUNGYU- LAN,MENCIUS,WANGYANG-MING.S.-h.L. chung,shu,Chinesephilosophicaltermsimpor- tantinConfucianism,meaning'loyalty'or'com- mitment',and'consideration'or'reciprocity', respectively.IntheAnalects,Confuciusobserves thatthereisonethreadrunningthroughhisway oflife,andadiscipledescribestheonethreadas constitutedbychungandshu.Shuisexplainedin thetextasnotdoingtoanotherwhatonewould nothavewisheddonetooneself,butchungisnot explicitlyexplained.Scholarsinterpretchung variouslyasacommitmenttohavingone's behaviorguidedbyshu,asacommitmentto observingthenormsofli(rites)(tobesupple- mentedbyshu,whichhumanizesandaddsa flexibilitytotheobservanceofsuchnorms),oras astrictnessinobservingone'sdutiestoward superiorsorequals(tobesupplementedbyshu, whichinvolvesconsideratenesstowardinferiors orequals,therebyhumanizingandaddingaflex- ibilitytotheapplicationofrulesgoverningone's treatmentofthem).Thepairoftermscontinued tobeusedbylåterConfucianstorefertosupple- mentaryaspectsoftheethicalidealorself-culti- vationprocess;e.g.,someusedchungtoreferto afullmanifestationofone'soriginallygood heart/mind(hsin),andshutorefertotheexten- sionofthatheart/mindtoothers.Seealsocon- fucianism.K.-l.S. Chung-yung,aportionoftheChineseConfucian classicBookofRites.ThestandardEnglishtitleof theChung-yung(composedinthethirdorsecond centuryb.c.)isTheDodrineoftheMean,butCen- tralityandCommonalityismoreaccurate.Al- thoughfrequentlytreatedasanindependent classicfromquiteearlyinitshistory,itdidnot 139 chun-tzu Churchland,PatriciaSmith receivecanonicalstatusuntilChuHsimadeit oneoftheFourBooks.Thetextisacollectionof aphorismsandshortessaysunifiedbycommon themes.Portionsofthetextoutlineavirtue ethic,stressingflexibleresponsetochangingcon- texts,andidentifyinghumanflourishingwith completedevelopmentofthecapacitiespresent inone'snature(hsing),whichisgivenbyHeaven (fieri).AsistypicalofConfucianism,virtuein thefamilyparallelspoliticalvirtue.Seealso CH'ENG,TA-HSUEH.B.W.V.N. chiin-tzu,Chinesetermmeaning'gentleman', 'superiorman','nobleperson',or'exemplary individual'.Chiin-tzuisConfucius'spractically attainableidealofethicalexcellence.Achiin-tzu, unlikeasheng(sage),isonewhoexemplifiesin hislifeandconductaconcernforjen(human- ity),Ii(propriety),andi(rightness/righteous- ness).Jenpertainstoaffectionateregardtothe well-beingofone'sfellowsinthecommunity;Ii toritualproprietyconformabletotraditional rulesofproperbehavior;anditoone'ssenseof rightness,especiallyindealingwithchanging circumstances.Achiin-tzuismarkedbyacatholic andneutralattitudetowardpreconceivedmoral opinionsandestablishedmoralpractices,acon- cernwithharmonyofwordsanddeeds.These salientfeaturesenablethechiin-tzutocopewith novelandexigentcircumstances,whileatthe sametimeheedingtheimportanceofmoraltra- ditionasaguidetoconduct.A.S.C. Church,Alonzo(1903-95),Americanlogician, mathematician,andphilosopher,knowninpure logicforhisdiscoveryandapplicationofthe Churchlambdaoperator,oneofthecentralideas oftheChurchlambdacalculus,andforhisrigor- ousformalizationsofthetheoryoftypes,a higher-orderunderlyinglogicoriginallyformu- latedinaflawedformbyWhiteheadandRussell. Thelambdaoperatorenablesdirect,unambigu- ous,symbolicrepresentationofarangeof philosophicallyandmathematicallyimportant expressionspreviouslyrepresentableonlyam- biguouslyorafterelaborateparaphrasing.Inphi- losophy,Churchadvocatedrigorousanalytic methodsbasedonsymboliclogic.Hisphilosophy wascharacterizedbyhisownversionoflogicism, theviewthatmathematicsisreducibletologic, andbyhisunhesitatingacceptanceofhigher- orderlogics.Higher-orderlogics,includingsec- ond-order,areontologicallyrichsystemsthat involvequantificationofhigher-ordervariables, variablesthatrangeöverproperties,relations, andsoon.Higher-orderlogicswereroutinely usedinfoundationalworkbyFrege,Peano, Hilbert,Gödel,Tarski,andothersuntilaround WorldWarII,whentheysuddenlylöstfavör.In regardtobothhislogicismandhisacceptanceof higher-orderlogics,Churchcounteredtrends, increasinglydominantinthethirdquarterofthe twentiethcentury,againstreductionofmathe- maticstologicandagainsttheso-called"onto- logicalexcesses"ofhigher-orderlogic.Inthe 1970s,althoughadmiredforhishighstandards ofrigorandforhisachievements,Churchwas regardedasconservativeorperhapsevenreac- tionary.Opinionshavesoftenedinrecentyears. Onthecomputationalandepistemological sidesoflogicChurchmadetwomajorcontribu- tions.Hewasthefirsttoarticulatethenow widelyacceptedprincipleknownasChurch's thesis,thateveryeffectivelycalculablearithmetic functionisrecursive.Atfirsthighlycontroversial, thisprincipleconnectsintuitive,epistemic, extrinsic,andoperationalaspectsofarithmetic withitsformål,ontic,intrinsic,andabstract aspects.Church'sthesissetsapurelyarithmetic outerlimitonwhatiscomputationallyachiev- able.Church'sfurtherworkonHilberfs"deci- sionproblem"ledtothediscoveryandproofof Church'stheorem-basicallythatthereisno computationalprocedurefordetermining,ofa fmite-premisedfirst-orderargument,whetherit isvalidorinvalid.Thisresultcontrastssharply withthepreviouslyknownresultthatthecom- putationaltruth-tablemethodsufficestodeter- minethevalidityofafinite-premisedtruth- functionalargument.Church'sthesisatonce highlightsthevästdifferencebetweenproposi- tionallogicandfirst-orderlogicandsetsanouter limitonwhatisachievableby"automatedrea- soning." Church'smathematicalandphilosophical writingsareinfluencedbyFrege,especiallyby Frege'ssemanticdistinctionbetweensenseand reference,hisemphasisonpurelysyntactical treatmentofproof,andhisdoctrinethatsen- tencesdenote(arenamesof)theirtruth-values. Seealsochurch'sthesis,computability, FORMALIZATION,HILBERT,HILBERT'SPRO- GRAM,LOGICISM,RECURSIVEFUNCTIONTHE- ORY,SECOND-ORDERLOGIC,TRUTHTABLE, TYPETHEORY.J.Cor. churchfathers.See PATRISTICAUTHORS. Churchland,PatriciaSmith(b.1943),Canadian- bornAmericanphilosopherandadvocateof neurophilosophy.ShereceivedherB.Phil.from Oxfordin1969andheldpositionsattheUni- 140 Churchland,PaulM. Church'sthesis versityofManitobaandtheInstitutefor AdvancedStudiesatPrinceton,settlingatthe UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego,withappoint- mentsinphilosophyandtheInstituteforNeural Computation. Skepticalofphilosophy'sapriorispecification ofmentalcategoriesanddissatisfiedwithcompu- tationalpsychology'spurelytop-downapproach totheirfunction,Churchlandbeganstudyingthe brainattheUniversityofManitobamedical school.Theresultwasauniquemergerofscience andphilosophy,a"neurophilosophy"thatchal- lengedtheprevailingmethodologyofmind. Thus,inaseriesofartidesthatincludes"Födor onLanguageLearning"(1978)and"A PerspectiveonMind-BrainResearch"(1980), sheoutlinesanewneurobiologicallybasedpara- digm.Itsubsumessimplenon-linguisticstruc- turesandorganisms,sincethebrainisanevolved organ;butitpreservesfunctionalism,sinceacog- nitivesystem'smentalstatesareexplainedvia high-levelneurofunctionaltheories.Itisastrat- egyofcooperationbetweenpsychologyand neuroscience,a"co-evolutionary"processelo- quentlydescribedinNeurophilosophy(1986)with thepredictionthatgenuinecognitivephenom- enawillbereduced,someasconceptualized withinthecommonsenseframework,othersas transformedthroughthesciences. Thesameintellectualconfluenceisdisplayed throughChurchland'svariouscollaborations: withpsychologistandcomputationalneurobiol- ogistTerrenceSejnowskiinTheComputational Brain(1992);withneuroscientistRodolfoLlinas inTheMind-BrainContinuum(1996);andwith philosopherandhusbandPaulChurchlandinOn theContrary(1998)(sheandPaulChurchlandare jointlyappraisedinR.McCauley,TheChurchlands andTheirCritics,1996).Fromtheviewpointof neurophilosophy,interdisciplinarycooperation isessentialforadvancingknowledge,forthe truthliesintheintertheoreticdetails. Seealsophilosophyoflanguage,phi- losophyOFMIND,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE. R.P.E. Churchland,PaulM.(b.1942),Canadian-born Americanphilosopher,leadingproponentof eliminativematerialism.HereceivedhisPh.D. fromtheUniversityofPittsburghin1969and heldpositionsattheUniversitiesofToronto, Manitoba,andtheInstituteforAdvancedStud- iesatPrinceton.Heisprofessorofphilosophy andmemberoftheInstituteforNeuralCompu- tationattheUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego. Churchland'sliterarycorpusconstitutesa lucidlywritten,scientificallyinformednarrative wherehisneurocomputationalphilosophy unfolds.ScientificRealismandthePlasticityofMind (1979)maintainsthat,thoughscienceisbest construedrealistically,perceptionisconceptu- allydriven,withnoobservationalgiven,while languageisholistic,withmeaningfixedbynet- worksofassociatedusage.Moreover,regarding thestructureofscience,higher-leveltheories shouldbereducedby,incorporatedinto,orelim- inatedinfavörofmorebasictheoriesfrom naturalscience,and,inthespecificcase,com- monsensepsychologyisalargelyfalseempirical theory,tobereplacedbyanon-sentential,neu- roscientificframework.Thisskepticismregard- ing"sentential"approachesisacommonthread, presentinearlierpapers,andtakenupagainin "EliminativeMaterialismandthePropositional Attitudes"(1981). Whenfullydeveloped,thenon-sentential, neuroscientificframeworktakestheformofcon- nectionistnetworkorparalleldistributedpro- cessingmodels.Thus,withessaysinANeu- rocomputationalPerspective(1989),Churchland addsthatgenuinepsychologicalprocessesare sequencesofactivationpatternsöverneuronal networks.Scientifictheories,likewise,are learnedvectorsinthespaceofpossibleactivation patterns,withscientificexplanationbeingproto- typicalactivationofapreferredvector.Classical epistemology,too,shouldbeneurocomputation- allynaturalized.Indeed,Churchlandsuggestsa semanticviewwherebysynonymy,ortheshar- ingofconcepts,isasimilaritybetweenpatterns inneuronalstate-space.Evenmoralknowledge isanalyzedasstoredprototypesofsocialreality thatareelicitedwhenanindividualnavigates throughotherneurocomputationalsystems.The entirepictureisexpressedinTheEngineofReason, theSeatoftheSoul(1996)and,withhiswifePatri- ciaChurchland,bytheessaysinOntheContrary (1998).Whathasemergedisaneurocomputa- tionalembodimentofthenaturalistprogram,a panphilosophythatpromisestocapturescience, epistemology,language,andmoralsinonebroad sweepofitsconnectionistnet. Seealsoconnectionism,meaning,phi- losophyOFMIND,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE. R.P.E. Church'stheorem.Seechurch'sthesis. Church'sthesis,thethesis,proposedbyAlonzo ChurchatameetingoftheAmericanMathe- maticalSocietyinApril1935,"thatthenotionof aneffectivelycalculablefunctionofpositiveinte- 141 Church'sthesis Church'sthesis gersshouldbeidentifiedwiththatofarecursive function...."Thisproposalhasbeencalled Church'sthesiseversinceKleeneusedthatname inhisIntroductiontoMetamathematics(1952).The informalnotionofaneffectivelycalculablefunc- tion(effectiveprocedure,oralgorithm)hadbeen usedinmathematicsandlogictoindicatethata classofproblemsissolvableina"mechanical fashion"byfollowingfixedelementaryrules. Underlyingepistemologicalconcernscametothe förewhenmodernlogicmovedinthelatenine- teenthcenturyfromaxiomatictoformålpresen- tationsoftheories.Hilbertsuggestedin1904that suchformallypresentedtheoriesbetakenas objectsofmathematicalstudy,andmetamathe- maticshasbeenpursuedvigorouslyandsystem- aticallysincethe1920s.Initspursuit,concrete issuesarosethatrequiredfortheirresolutiona delimitationoftheclassofeffectiveprocedures. HilberfsimportantEntscheidungsproblem,the decisionproblemforpredicatelogic,wasone suchissue.ItwassolvednegativelybyChurch andTuring-relativetotheprecisenotionof recursiveness;theresultwasobtainedindepen- dentlybyChurchandTuring,butisusuallycalled Church'stheorem.Asecondsignificantissuewas thegeneralformulationoftheincompleteness theoremsasapplyingtoallformåltheories(satis- fyingtheusualrepresentabilityandderivability conditions),notjusttospecificformålsystems likethatofPrincipiaMathematica. AccordingtoKleene,Churchproposedin 1933theidentificationofeffectivecalculability withX-definability.Thatproposalwasnotpub- lishedatthetime,butin1934Churchmen- tioneditinconversationtoGödel,whojudgedit tobe"thoroughlyunsatisfactory."InhisPrince- tonLecturesof1934,Gödeldefinedtheconcept ofarecursivefunction,buthewasnotconvinced thatalleffectivelycalculablefunctionswouldfall underit.Theproofoftheequivalencebetween X-definabilityandrecursiveness(byChurchand Kleene)ledtoChurch'sfirstpublishedformula- tionofthethesisasquotedabove.Thethesiswas reiteratedinChurch's"AnUnsolvableProblem ofElementaryNumberTheory"(1936).Turing introduced,in"OnComputableNumbers,with anApplicationtotheEntscheidungsproblem" (1936),anotionofcomputabilitybymachines andmaintainedthatitcaptureseffectivecalcula- bilityexactly.Posfspaper"FiniteCombinatory Processes,Formulation1"(1936)containsa modelofcomputationthatisstrikinglysimilarto Turing's.However,Postdidnotprovideany analysis;hesuggestedconsideringtheidentifica- tionofeffectivecalculabilitywithhisconceptas aworkinghypothesisthatshouldbeverifiedby investigatingeverwiderformulationsandreduc- ingthemtohisbasicformulation.(Theclassic papersofGödel,Church,Turing,Post,and KleeneareallreprintedinDavis,ed.,TheUnde- cidable,1965.) Inhis1936paperChurchgaveonecentralrea- sonfortheproposedidentification,namelythat otherplausibleexplicationsoftheinformal notionleadtomathematicalconceptsweaker thanorequivalenttorecursiveness.Twopara- digmaticexplications,calculabilityofafunction viaalgorithmsorinalogic,wereconsideredby Church.Ineithercase,thestepstakenindeter- miningfunctionvalueshavetobeeffective;and iftheeffectivenessofstepsis,asChurchputit, interpretedtomeanrecursiveness,thenthe functionisrecursive.Thefundamentalinterpre- tativedifficultyinChurch's"step-by-stepargu- ment"(whichwasturnedintooneofthe "recursivenessconditions"HilbertandBernays usedintheir1939characterizationoffunctions thatcanbeevaluatedaccordingtorules)was bypassedbyTuring.Analyzinghumanmechan- icalcomputations,Turingwasledtofiniteness conditionsthataremotivatedbythehuman computer'ssensorylimitations,butareulti- matelybasedonmemorylimitations.Thenhe showedthatanyfunctioncalculablebyahuman computersatisfyingtheseconditionsisalsocom- putablebyoneofhismachines.BothChurch andGödelfoundTuring'sanalysisconvincing; indeed,Churchwroteina1937reviewofTur- ing^paperthatTuring'snotionmakes"theiden- tificationwitheffectivenessintheordinary(not explicitlydefined)senseevidentimmediately." Thisreflectiveworkofpartlyphilosophicaland partlymathematicalcharacterprovidesoneof thefundamentalnotionsinmathematicallogic. Indeed,itsproperunderstandingiscrucialfor (judging)thephilosophicalsignificanceofcen- tralmetamathematicalresults-likeGödel's incompletenesstheoremsorChurch'stheorem. Theworkisalsocrucialforcomputerscience, artificialintelligence,andcognitivepsychology, providinginthesefieldsabasictheoretical notion.Forexample,Church'sthesisisthecor- nerstoneforNewellandSimon'sdelimitationof theclassofphysicalsymbolsystems,i.e.univer- salmachineswithaparticulararchitecture;see Newell'sPhysicalSymbolSystems(1980).Newell viewsthedelimitation"asthemostfundamental contributionofartificialintelligenceandcom- putersciencetothejointenterpriseofcognitive science."InaturnthathadbeentakenbyTuring in"IntelligentMachinery"(1948)and"Comput- 142 Church-Turingthesis Cicero,MarcusTullius ingMachineryandIntelligence"(1950),Newell pointsoutthebasicrolephysicalsymbolsystems takeoninthestudyolthehumanmind:"the hypothesisisthathumansareinstancesolphys- icalsymbolsystems,and,byvirtueofthis,mind entersintothephysicaluniverse....this hypothesissetsthetermsonwhichwesearchfor ascientifictheoryofmind." Seealsocomputertheory,gödel'sin- COMPLETENESSTHEOREMS,PROOFTHEORY, RECURSIVEFUNCTIONTHEORY.W.S. Church-Turingthesis.Seephilosophyofmind. Cicero,MarcusTullius(106-43b.c),Roman statesman,orator,essayist,andletterwriter.He wasimportantnotsomuchforformulatingindi- vidualphilosophicalargumentsasforexposi- tionsofthedoctrinesofthemajorschoolsof Hellenisticphilosophy,andfor,asheputit, "teachingphilosophytospeakLatin."Thesignif- icanceofthelattercanhardlybeoverestimated. Cicero'scoinageshelpedshapethephilosophical vocabularyoftheLatin-speakingWestwellinto theearlymodernperiod. ThemostcharacteristicfeatureofCicero's thoughtishisattempttounifyphilosophyand rhetoric.Hisfirstmajortrilogy,OntheOrator,On theRepublic,andOntheLaws,presentsavisionof wisestatesmen-philosopherswhosegreatest achievementisguidingpoliticalaffairsthrough rhetoricalpersuasionratherthanviolence.Phi- losophy,Ciceroargues,needsrhetorictoeffectits mostimportantpracticalgoals,whilerhetoricis uselesswithoutthepsychological,moral,and logicaljustificationprovidedbyphilosophy.This combinationofeloquenceandphilosophycon- stituteswhathecallshumanitas—acoinage whoseenduringinfluenceisattestedinlåter revivalsofhumanism-anditaloneprovidesthe foundationforconstitutionalgovernments;itis acquired,moreover,onlythroughbroadtraining inthosesubjectsworthyoffreecitizens(arteslib- erales).Inphilosophyofeducation,thisCicero- nianconceptionofahumaneeducationencom- passingpoetry,rhetoric,history,morals,and politicsenduredasanideal,especiallyforthose convincedthatinstructionintheliberaldisci- plinesisessentialforcitizensiftheirrational autonomyistobeexpressedinwaysthatarecul- turallyandpoliticallybeneficial. AmajoraimofCicero'searlierworksisto appropriateforRomanhighcultureoneof Greece'smostdistinctiveproducts,philosophical theory,andtodemonstrateRomansuperiority. HethusinsiststhatRome'slawsandpolitical institutionssuccessfullyembodythebestin Greekpoliticaltheory,whereastheGreeksthem- selveswereinadequatetothecrucialtaskof puttingtheirtheoriesintopractice.Takingöver theStoicconceptionoftheuniverseasarational whole,governedbydivinereason,hearguesthat humansocietiesmustbegroundedinnatural law.ForCicero,nature'slawpossessesthechar- acteristicsofalegalcode;inparticular,itisfor- mulableinacomparativelyextendedsetofrules againstwhichexistingsocietalinstitutionscanbe measured.Indeed,sincetheysocloselymirror therequirementsofnature,Romanlawsand institutionsfurnishanearlyperfectparadigmfor humansocieties.Cicero'soveralltheory,ifnotits particulardetails,establishedalastingframe- workforanti-positivisttheoriesoflawand morality,includingthoseofAquinas,Grotius, Suårez,andLocke. Thefinaltwoyearsofhislifesawthecreation ofaseriesofdialogue-treatisesthatprovidean encyclopedicsurveyofHellenisticphilosophy. Cicerohimselffollowsthemoderatefallibilismof PhiloofLarissaandtheNewAcademy.Holding thatphilosophyisamethodandnotasetofdog- mas,heendorsesanattitudeofsystematicdoubt. However,unlikeCartesiandoubt,Cicero'sdoes notextendtotherealworldbehindphenomena, sincehedoesnotenvisionthepossibilityofstrict phenomenalism.Nordoeshebelievethatsys- tematicdoubtleadstoradicalskepticismabout knowledge.Althoughnoinfalliblecriterionfor distinguishingtruefromfalseimpressionsis available,someimpressions,heargues,aremore "persuasive"(probabile)andcanbereliedonto guideaction. InAcademicsheoffersdetailedaccountsofHel- lenisticepistemologicaldebates,steeringamid- dlecoursebetweendogmatismandradical skepticism.Asimilarstrategygovernstherestof hislåterwritings.Ciceropresentstheviewsof themajorschools,submitsthemtocriticism,and tentativelysupportsanypositionshefinds"per- suasive."Threeconnectedworks,OnDivination, OnFäte,andOntheNatureoftheGods,surveyEpi- curean,Stoic,andAcademicargumentsabout theologyandnaturalphilosophy.Muchofthe treatmentofreligiousthoughtandpracticeis cool,witty,andskepticallydetached-muchin themannerofeighteenth-centuryphilosophes who,alongwithHume,foundmuchinCiceroto emulate.However,heconcedesthatStoicargu- mentsforprovidenceare"persuasive."Sotooin ethics,hecriticizesEpicurean,Stoic,andPeri- pateticdoctrinesinOnEnds(45)andtheirviews ondeath,pain,irrationalemotions,andhappi- 143 circularity civildisobedience nessinTuseulanDisputations(45).Yet,afinal work,OnDuties,offersapracticalethicalsystem basedonStoicprinciples.Althoughsometimes dismissedastheeclecticismofanamateur, Cicero'smethodofselectivelychoosingfrom whathadbecomeauthoritativeprofessionalsys- temsoftendisplaysconsiderablereflectiveness andoriginality Seealsohellenisticphilosophy,nat- URALLAW,NEWACADEMY,STOICISM.P.Mi. circularity.Seecircularreasoning,definition, DIALLELON. circularreasoning,reasoningthat,whentraced backwardfromitsconclusion,retumstothat startingpoint,asonereturnstoastartingpoint whentracingacircle.Thediscussionofthistopic byRichardWhatley(1787-1863)inhisLogic (1826)setsahighstandardofclarityandpene- tration.Logictextbooksoftenquotethefollow- ingexamplefromWhatley: Toalloweverymananunboundedfreedom ofspeechmustalwaysbe,onthewhole, advantageoustotheState;foritishighlycon- ducivetotheinterestsoftheCommunity,that eachindividualshouldenjoyalibertyper- fectlyunlimited,ofexpressinghissentiments. Thispassageillustrateshowcircularreasoningis lessobviousinalanguage,suchasEnglish,that, inWhatley'swords,is"aboundinginsynony- mousexpressions,whichhavenoresemblance insound,andnoconnectioninetymology."The premiseandconclusiondonotconsistofjustthe samewordsinthesameorder,norcanlogicalor grammaticalprinciplestransformoneintothe other.Rather,theyhavethesamepropositional content:theysaythesamethingindifferent words.Thatiswhyappealingtooneofthemto providereasonforbelievingtheotheramounts togivingsomethingasareasonforitself. Circularreasoningisoftensaidtobegtheques- tion.'Beggingthequestion'andpetitioprincipii aretranslationsofaphraseinAristotlecon- nectedwithagameofformåldisputationplayed inantiquitybutnotinrecenttimes.Themean- ingsof'question'and'begging'donotinany clearwaydeterminethemeaningof'question begging'. Thereisnosimpleargumentformthatalland onlycircularargumentshave.Itisnotlogic,in Whatley'sexampleabove,thatdeterminesthe identityofcontentbetweenthepremiseandthe conclusion.Sometheoristsproposerathermore complicatedformålorsyntacticaccountsofcir- cularity.Othersbelievethatanyaccountofcir- cularreasoningmustrefertothebeliefsofthose whoreason.Whetherornotthefollowingargu- mentaboutartidesinthisdictionaryiscircular dependsonwhythefirstpremiseshouldbe accepted: (1)Theartideoninferencecontainsnosplit infinitives. (2)Theotherartidescontainnosplitinfini- tives. Therefore, (3)Noartidecontainssplitinfinitives. Considertwocases.CaseI:Although(2)sup- ports(1)inductively,both(1)and(2)havesolid outsidesupportindependentofanyprioraccep- tanceof(3).Thisreasoningisnotcircular.Case II:Someonewhoadvancestheargumentaccepts (1)or(2)orboth,onlybecausehebelieves(3). Suchreasoningiscircular,eventhoughneither premiseexpressesjustthesamepropositionas theconclusion.Thequestionremainscontrover- sialwhether,inexplainingcircularity,weshould refertothebeliefsofindividualreasonersoronly tothesurroundingcircumstances. Onepurposeofreasoningistoincreasethe degreeofreasonableconfidencethatonehasin thetruthofaconclusion.Presumingthetruthof aconclusioninsupportofapremisethwartsthis purpose,becausetheinitialdegreeofreasonable confidenceinthepremisecannotthenexceed theinitialdegreeofreasonableconfidenceinthe conclusion. Seealsoinformalfallacy,justifica- tion.D.H.S. citta-mätra,theYogäcäraBuddhistdoctrinethat therearenoextramentalentities,givenclassical expressionbyVasubandhuinthefourthorfifth centurya.d.Theclassicalformofthisdoctrineis avarietyofidealismthatclaims(1)thatacoher- entexplanationofthefactsofexperiencecanbe providedwithoutappealtoanythingextramen- tal;(2)thatnocoherentaccountofwhatextra- mentalentitiesarelikeispossible;and(3)that thereforethedoctrinethatthereisnothingbut mindistobepreferredtoitsrealisticcompetitors. Theclaimandtheargumentwereandarecon- troversialamongBuddhistmetaphysicians.See alsovijnapti.P.J.G. civichumanism.Seeclassicalrepublicanism. civildisobedience,adeliberateviolationofthe law,committedinordertodrawattentiontoor 144 civilrights classicalrepublicanism rectifyperceivedinjusticesinthelaworpolicies ofastate.Illustrativequestionsraisedbythe topicinclude:howaresuchactsjustified,how shouldthelegalsystemrespondtosuchacts whenjustified,andmustsuchactsbedonepub- licly,nonviolently,and/orwithawillingnessto acceptattendantlegalsanctions?Seealsonon- VIOLENCE,POLITICALPHILOSOPHY.P.S. civilrights.Seerights. claimright.Seehohfeld,rights. clairvoyance.Seeparapsychology. Clarke,Samuel(1675-1729),Englishphiloso- pher,preacher,andtheologian.BorninNor- wich,hewaseducatedatCambridge,wherehe cameundertheinfluenceofNewton.Upongrad- uationClarkeenteredtheestablishedchurch, servingforatimeaschaplaintoQueenAnne.He spentthelasttwentyyearsofhislifeasrectorof St.James,Westminster. Clarkewroteextensivelyoncontroversialthe- ologicalandphilosophicalissues-thenatureof spaceandtime,proofsoftheexistenceofGod, thedoctrineoftheTrinity,theincorporealityand naturalimmortalityofthesoul,freedomofthe will,thenatureofmorality,etc.Hismostphilo- sophicalworksarehisBoylelecturesof1704and 1705,inwhichhedevelopedaforcefulversion ofthecosmologicalargumentfortheexistence andnatureofGodandattackedtheviewsof Hobbes,Spinoza,andsomeproponentsofdeism; hiscorrespondencewithLeibniz(1715-16),in whichhedefendedNewton'sviewsofspaceand timeandchargedLeibnizwithholdingviews inconsistentwithfreewill;andhiswritings againstAnthonyCollins,inwhichhedefendeda libertarianviewoftheagentastheundeter- minedcauseoffreeactionsandattackedCollins's argumentsforamaterialisticviewofthemind. IntheseworksClarkemaintainsapositionof extremerationalism,contendingthattheexis- tenceandnatureofGodcanbeconclusively demonstrated,thatthebasicprinciplesofmoral- ityarenecessarilytrueandimmediatelyknow- able,andthattheexistenceofafuturestateof rewardsandpunishmentsisassuredbyour knowledgethatGodwillrewardthemorallyjust andpunishthemorallywicked. Seealsohobbes,leibniz,philosophyof RELIGION,SPINOZA.W.L.R. class,termsometimesusedasasynonymfor 'set'.Whenthetwoaredistinguished,aclassis understoodasacollectioninthelogicalsense, i.e.,astheextensionofaconcept(e.g.theclassof redobjects).Bycontrast,sets,i.e.,collectionsin themathematicalsense,areunderstoodasoccur- ringinstages,whereeachstageconsistsofthe setsthatcanbeformedfromthenon-setsandthe setsalreadyformedatpreviousstages.Whena setisformedatagivenstage,onlythenon-sets andthepreviouslyformedsetsareevencandi- datesformembership,butabsolutelyanything cangainmembershipinaclasssimplybyfalling undertheappropriateconcept.Thus,itisclasses, notsets,thatfigureintheinconsistentprinciple ofunlimitedcomprehension.Insettheory,proper classesarecollectionsofsetsthatareneverformed atanystage,e.g.,theclassofallsets(sincenew setsareformedateachstage,thereisnostageat whichallsetsareavailabletobecollectedintoa set).Seealsosettheory.P.Mad. class,equivalence.Seepartition,relation. class,proper.Seeclass. class,reference.Seeprobability. classicalconditioning.Seeconditioning. classicalliberalism.Seeliberalism. classicalrepublicanism,alsoknownascivic humanism,apoliticaloutlookdevelopedby MachiavelliinRenaissanceItalyandbyJames Harrington(1611-77)inseventeenth-century England,modifiedbyeighteenth-centuryBritish andContinentalwritersandimportantforthe thoughtoftheAmericanfoundingfathers. DrawingonRomanhistorians,Machiavelli arguedthatastatecouldhopeforsecurityfrom theblowsoffortuneonlyifits(male)citizens weredevotedtoitswell-being.Theyshouldtake turnsrulingandbeingruled,bealwaysprepared tofightfortherepublic,andlimittheirprivate possessions.Suchmenwouldpossessawholly secularvirtuappropriatetopoliticalbeings.Cor- ruption,intheformofexcessiveattachmentto privateinterest,wouldthenbethemostserious threattotherepublic.Harrington'sutopian Oceana(1656)portrayedEnglandgovemed undersuchasystem.Opposingtheauthoritarian viewsofHobbes,itdescribedasysteminwhich thewell-to-domalecitizenswouldelectsomeof theirnumbertogovernforlimitedterms.Those governingwouldproposestatepolicies;theoth- erswouldvoteontheacceptabilityofthepro- posals.Agriculturewasthebasisofeconomics, 145 dassparadox closure butthesizeofestateswastobestrictlycon- trolled.Harringtonianismhelpedformtheviews ofthepoliticalpartyopposingthedominance ofthekingandcourt.MontesquieuinFrance drewonciassicalsourcesindiscussingtheimpor- tanceofcivicvirtueanddevotiontothere- public. AlltheseviewswerewellknowntoJefferson, Adams,andotherAmericancolonialandrevo- lutionarythinkers;andsomecontemporary communitariancriticsofAmericanculture returntociassicalrepublicanideas. Seealsomachiavelli,politicalphilos- ophy.J.B.S. classparadox.Seeunexpectedexaminationpara- dox. Cleanthes.Seestoicism. clearanddistinctidea.Seedescartes. ClementofAlexandria(a.d.c.150-c.215),for- mativeteacherintheearlyChristianchurch who,asa"Christiangnostic,"combinedenthu- siasmforGreekphilosophywithadefenseofthe church'sfaith.Heespousedspiritualandintel- lectualascenttowardthatcompletebuthidden knowledgeorgnosisreservedforthetruly enlightened.Clemenfsschooldidnotpractice strictfidelitytotheauthorities,andpossiblythe teachings,oftheinstitutionalchurch,drawing upontheHellenistictraditionsofAlexandria, includingPhiloandMiddlePlatonism.Aswith thelawamongtheJews,so,forClement,phi- losophyamongthepaganswasapedagogical preparationforChrist,inwhomlogos,reason, hadbecomeenfleshed.Philosophersnowshould riseabovetheirinferiorunderstandingtothe perfectknowledgerevealedinChrist.Though hostiletognosticismanditsspeculations, ClementwasthoroughlyHellenizedinoutlook andsometimesguiltyofDocetism,notleastinhis reluetancetoconcedetheutterhumannessof Jesus.Seealsognosticism.A.E.L. Clifford,W(illiam)K(ingdon)(1845-79),British mathematicianandphilosopher.Educatedat King'sCollege,London,andTrinityCollege, Cambridge,hebegangivingpublicleeturesin 1868,whenhewasappointedafellowofTrinity, andin1870becameprofessorofappliedmathe- maticsatUniversityCollege,London.Hisacade- miccareerendedprematurelywhenhediedof tuberculosis.Cliffordisbestknownforhisrigor- ousviewontherelationbetweenbeliefandevi- dence,which,in'TheEthicsofBelief,"hesum- marizedthus:"Itiswrongalways,everywhere, andforanyone,tobelieveanythingoninsuffi- cientevidence."Hegivesthisexample.Imaginea shipownerwhosendstoseaanemigrantship, althoughtheevidenceraisesstrongsuspicionsas tothevessel'sseaworthiness.Ignoringthisevi- dence,heconvinceshimselfthattheship'scondi- tionisgoodenoughand,afteritsinksandallthe passengersdie,collectshisinsurancemoney withoutatraceofguilt.Cliffordmaintainsthat theownerhadnorighttobelieveinthesound- nessoftheship."Hehadacquiredhisbeliefnot byhonestlyearningitinpatientinvestigation, butbystiflinghisdoubts."TherightCliffordis alludingtoismoral,forwhatonebelievesisnota privatebutapublicaffairandmayhavegrave consequencesforothers.Heregardsusas morallyobligedtoinvestigatetheevidencethor- oughlyonanyoccasion,andtowithholdbeliefif evidentialsupportislacking.Thisobligation mustbefulfilledhowevertrivialandinsignificant abeliefmayseem,foraviolationofitmay"leave itsstampuponourcharacterförever."Clifford thusrejectedCatholicism,towhichhehadsub- scribedoriginally,andbecameanagnostic. James'sfamousessay"TheWilltoBelieve"criti- cizesClifford'sview.AccordingtoJames,insuffi- cientevidenceneednotståndinthewayof religiousbelief,forwehavearighttoholdbeliefs thatgobeyondtheevidenceprovidedtheyserve thepursuitofalegitimategoal.Seealsoepiste- mology,evidentialism.M.St. closedformula.Seewell-formedformula. closedloop.Seecybernetics. closedsentence.Seeopenformula. closure.Asetofobjects,O,issaidtoexhibitclo- sureortobeclosedunderagivenoperation,R, providedthatforeveryobject,x,ifxisamem- berofOandxis.R-relatedtoanyobject,y,then yisamemberofO.Forexample,thesetof propositionsisclosedunderdeduetion,forifpisa propositionandpentailsq,i.e.,qisdeducible fromp,thenqisaproposition(simplybecause onlypropositionscanbeentailedbyproposi- tions).Inaddition,manysubsetsofthesetof propositionsarealsoclosedunderdeduetion. Forexample,thesetoftruepropositionsis closedunderdeduetionorentailment.Others arenot.Undermostaccountsofbelief,wemay failtobelievewhatisentailedbywhatwedo,in faet,believe.Thus,ifknowledgeissomeformof 146 Coasetheorem cognitivedissonance true,justifiedbelief,knowledgeisnotclosed underdeduction,forwemayfailtobelievea propositionentailedbyaknownproposition. Nevertheless,thereisarelatedissuethathas beenthesubjectofmuchdebate,namely:Isthe setofjustifiedpropositionsclosedunderdeduc- tion?Asidefromtheobviousimportanceofthe answertothatquestionindevelopingan accountofjustification,therearetwoimportant issuesinepistemologythatalsodependonthe answer. Subtletiesaside,theso-calledGettierproblem dependsinlargepartuponanaffirmativeanswer tothatquestion.For,assumingthataproposi- tioncanbejustifiedandfalse,itispossibleto constructcasesinwhichaproposition,sayp,is justified,false,butbelieved.Now,consideratrue proposition,q,whichisbelievedandentailedby p.Ifjustificationisclosedunderdeduction,then qisjustified,true,andbelieved.Butiftheonly basisforbelievingqisp,itisclearthatqisnot known.Thus,true,justifiedbeliefisnotsuffi- cientforknowledge.Whatresponseisappropri- atetothisproblemhasbeenacentralissuein epistemologysinceE.Gettier'spublicationof"Is JustifiedTrueBeliefKnowledge?"(Analysis, 1963). Whetherjustificationisclosedunderdeduc- tionisalsocrucialwhenevaluatingacommon, traditionalargumentforskepticism.Consider anyperson,S,andletpbeanypropositionordi- narilythoughttobeknowable,e.g.,thatthereis atablebeforeS.Theargumentforskepticism goeslikethis: (1)IfpisjustifiedforS,then,sincepentailsq, whereqis'thereisnoevilgeniusmakingS falselybelievethatp',qisjustifiedforS. (2)Sisnotjustifiedinbelievingq. Therefore,Sisnotjustifiedinbelievingp. Thefirstpremisedependsuponjustification beingclosedunderdeduction. Seealsoepistemiclogic,epistemology, JUSTIFICATION,SKEPTICISM.P.D.K. closure,causal.Seedavidson. Coasetheorem,anon-formalinsightbyRonald Coase(NobelPrizeinEconomics,1991):assum- ingthatthereareno(transaction)costsinvolved inexchangingrightsformoney,thennomatter howrightsareinitiallydistributed,rational agentswillbuyandsellthemsoastomaximize individualreturns.Injurisprudencethispropo- sitionhasbeenthebasisforaclaimabouthow rightsshouldbedistributedevenwhen(asis usual)transactioncostsarehigh:thelawshould conferrightsonthosewhowouldpurchasethem weretheyforsaleonmärketswithouttransac- tioncosts;e.g.,therighttoanindivisible, unsharableresourceshouldbeconferredonthe agentwillingtopaythehighestpriceforit.See alsoPHILOSOPHYOFECONOMICS.A.R. Cockburn,Catherine(Trotter)(1679-1749), Englishphilosopherandplaywrightwhomadea significantcontributiontothedebatesonethical rationalismsparkedbyClarke'sBoylelectures (1704-05).Themajorthemeofherwritingsis thenatureofmoralobligation.Cockburndis- playsaconsistent,non-doctrinairephilosophical position,arguingthatmoraldutyistoberatio- nallydeducedfromthe"natureandfitnessof things"(Remarks,XIAl)andisnotfoundedpri- marilyinexternallyimposedsanctions.Herwrit- ings,publishedanonymously,taketheformof philosophicaldebateswithothers,including SamuelRutherforth,WilliamWarburton,Isaac Watts,FrancisHutcheson,andLordShaftesbury. Herbest-knowninterventionincontemporary philosophicaldebatewasherabledefenseof Locke'sEssayin1702.S.H. coercion.Seefreewillproblem. cogitoargument.Seedescartes. Cogitoergosum(Latin,Tthink,thereforeIam'), thestartingpointofDescartes'ssystemofknowl- edge.InhisDiscourseontheMethod(1637),he observesthattheproposition'Iamthinking, thereforeIexist'(jepense,doncjesuis)is"sofirm andsurethatthemostextravagantsuppositions oftheskepticswereincapableofshakingit."The celebratedphrase,initsbetter-knownLatinver- sion,alsooccursinthePrinciplesofPhilosophy (1644),butisnottobefoundintheMeditations (1641),thoughthelattercontainsthefullest statementofthereasoningbehindDescartes's certaintyofhisownexistence.Seealso DESCARTES.J.C.O. cognitivearchitecture.Seecognitivescience. cognitivedissonance,mentaldiscomfortarising fromconfhctingbeliefsorattitudesheldsimul- taneously.LeonFestinger,whooriginatedthe theoryofcognitivedissonanceinabookofthat title(1957),suggestedthatcognitivedissonance hasmotivationalcharacteristics.Supposeaper- soniscontemplatingmovingtoanewcity.She 147 cognitivemeaning cognitivescience isconsideringbothBirminghamandBoston. Shecannotmovetoboth,soshemustchoose. Dissonanceisexperiencedbythepersonifin choosing,say,Birmingham,sheacquiresknowl- edgeofbadorunwelcomefeaturesof Birminghamandofgoodorwelcomeaspectsof Boston.Theamountofdissonancedependson therelativeintensitiesofdissonantelements. Hence,iftheonlydissonantfactorisherlearn- ingthatBostoniscoolerthanBirmingham,and shedoesnotregardclimateasimportant,she willexperiencelittledissonance.Dissonance mayoccurinseveralsortsofpsychologicalstates orprocesses,althoughthebulkofresearchin cognitivedissonancetheoryhasbeenondisso- nanceinchoiceandonthejustificationandpsy- chologicalaftereffectsofchoice.Cognitive dissonancemaybeinvolvedintwophenomena ofinteresttophilosophers,namely,self-decep- tionandweaknessofwill.Whydoself-deceivers trytogetthemselvestobelievesomethingthat, insomesense,theyknowtobefalse?Onemay resorttoself-deceptionwhenknowledgecauses dissonance.Whydotheweak-willedperform actionstheyknowtobewrong?Onemay becomeweak-willedwhendissonancearises fromtheexpectedconsequencesofdoingthe rightthing.G.A.G. cognitivemeaning.Seemeaning. cognitivepsychology.Seecognitivescience. cognitivepsychotherapy,anexpressionintro- ducedbyBrandtinATheoryoftheGoodandthe Right(1979)torefertoaprocessofassessingand adjustingone'sdesires,aversions,orpleasures (henceforth,"attitudes").Thisprocessiscen- traltoBrandfsanalysisofrationality,and ultimately,tohisviewonthejustificationof morality. Cognitivepsychotherapyconsistsofthe agenfscriticizinghisattitudesbyrepeatedlyrep- resentingtohimself,inanideallyvividwayand atappropriatetimes,allrelevantavailableinfor- mation.Brandtcharacterizesthekeydefiniensas follows:(1)availableinformationis"propositions acceptedbythescienceoftheagenfsday,plus factualpropositionsjustifiedbypubliclyaccessi- bleevidence(includingtestimonyofothers aboutthemselves)andtheprinciplesoflogic"; (2)informationisrelevantprovided,iftheagent weretoreflectrepeatedlyonit,"itwouldmake adifference,"i.e.,wouldaffecttheattitudein question,andtheeffectwouldbeafunctionof itscontent,notanaccidentalbyproduct;(3)rel- evantinformationisrepresentedinanideally vividwaywhentheagentfocusesonitwithmax- imalclarityanddetailandwithnohesitationor doubtaboutitstruth;and(4)repeatedlyandat appropriatetimesrefer,respectively,tothefre- quencyandoccasionsthatwouldresultinthe information'shavingthemaximalattitudinal impact.SupposeMary'sdesiretosmokewere extinguishedbyherbringingtothefocusofher attention,whenevershewasabouttoinhale smoke,somejustifiedbeliefs,saythatsmokingis hazardoustoone'shealthandmaycauselung cancer;Mary'sdesirewouldhavebeenremoved bycognitivepsychotherapy. AccordingtoBrandt,anattitudeisrationalfor apersonprovideditisonethatwouldsurvive,or beproducedby,cognitivepsychotherapy;other- wiseitisirrational.Rationalattitudes,inthis sense,provideabasisformoralnorms.Roughly, thecorrectmoralnormsarethoseofamoral codethatpersonswouldoptforif(i)theywere motivatedbyattitudesthatsurvivetheprocessof cognitivepsychotherapy;and(ii)atthetimeof optingforamoralcode,theywerefullyaware of,andvividlyattentiveto,allavailableinfor- mationrelevanttochoosingamoralcode(fora societyinwhichtheyaretolivefortherestof theirlives).Inthisway,Brandtseeksavalue-free justificationformoralnorms-onethatavoids theproblemsofothertheoriessuchasthosethat makeanappealtointuitions. Seealsoethics,instrumentalism,intu- ition,RATIONALITY.Y.Y. cognitivescience,aninterdisciplinaryresearch dusterthatseekstoaccountforintelligentactiv- ity,whetherexhibitedbylivingorganisms(espe- ciallyadulthumans)ormachines.Hence, cognitivepsychologyandartificialintelligence constituteitscore.Anumberofotherdisciplines, includingneuroscience,linguistics,anthropol- ogy,andphilosophy,aswellasotherfieldsofpsy- chology(e.g.,developmentalpsychology),are moreperipheralcontributors.Thequintessential cognitivescientistissomeonewhoemployscom- putermodelingtechniques(developingcom- puterprogramsforthepurposeofsimulating particularhumancognitiveactivities),butthe broadrangeofdisciplinesthatareatleastperiph- erallyconstitutiveofcognitivesciencehavelent avarietyofresearchstrategiestotheenterprise. Whilethereareafewcommoninstitutionsthat seektounifycognitivescience(e.g.,depart- ments,journals,andsocieties),theproblems investigatedandthemethodsofinvestigation oftenarelimitedtoasinglecontributingdisci- 148 cognitivescience cognitivescience pline.Thus,itismoreappropriatetoviewcogni- tivescienceasacross-disciplinaryenterprise thanasitselfanewdiscipline. Whileinterestincognitivephenomenahas historicallyplayedacentralroleinthevarious disciplinescontributingtocognitivescience,the termproperlyappliestocross-disciplinaryactiv- itiesthatemergedinthe1970s.Duringthepre- cedingtwodecadeseachofthedisciplinesthat becamepartofcogntivesciencegraduallybroke freeofpositivisticandbehavioristicproscriptions thatbarredsystematicinquiryintotheoperation ofthemind.Oneoftheprimaryfactorsthatcat- alyzednewinvestigationsofcognitiveactivities wasChomsky'sgenerativegrammar,whichhe advancednotonlyasanabstracttheoryofthe structureoflanguage,butalsoasanaccountof languageusers'mentalknowledgeoflanguage (theirlinguisticcompetence).Amorefundamen- talfactorwasthedevelopmentofapproachesfor theorizingaboutinformationinanabstractman- ner,andtheintroductionofmachines(comput- ers)thatcouldmanipulateinformation.This gaverisetotheideathatonemightprograma computertoprocessinformationsoastoexhibit behaviorthatwould,ifperformedbyahuman, requireintelligence. Ifonetriedtoformulateaunifyingquestion guidingcognitivescienceresearch,itwould probablybe:Howdoesthecognitivesystem work?Buteventhiscommonquestionisinter- pretedquitedifferentlyindifferentdisciplines. Wecanappreciatethesedifferencesbylooking justatlanguage.Whilepsycholinguists(gener- allypsychologists)seektoidentifytheprocessing activitiesinthemindthatunderlielanguageuse, mostlinguistsfocusontheproductsofthisinter- nalprocessing,seekingtoarticulatetheabstract structureoflanguage.Afrequentgoalofcom- puterscientists,incontrast,hasbeentodevelop computerprogramstoparsenaturallanguage inputandproduceappropriatesyntacticand semanticrepresentations. Thesedifferencesinobjectivesamongthecog- nitivesciencedisciplinescorrelatewithdifferent methodologies.Thefollowingrepresentsomeof themajormethodologicalapproachesofthecon- tributingdisciplinesandsomeoftheproblems eachencounters. Artificialintelligence.Ifthehumancognition systemisviewedascomputational,anaturalgoal istosimulateitsperformance.Thistypically requiresformatsforrepresentinginformationas wellasproceduresforsearchingandmanipulat- ingit.SomeoftheearliestAIprogramsdrewheav- ilyontheresourcesoffirst-orderpredicatecalcu- lus,representinginformationinpropositional formatsandmanipulatingitaccordingtological principles.Formanymodelingendeavors,how- ever,itprovedimportanttorepresentinformation inlarger-scalestructures,suchasframes(Marvin Minsky),schemata(DavidRumelhart),orscripts (RogerSchank),inwhichdifferentpiecesofinfor- mationassociatedwithanobjectoractivitywould bestoredtogether.Suchstructuresgenerally employeddefaultvaluesforspecificslöts(specify- ing,e.g.,thatdeerliveinforests)thatwouldbe partoftherepresentationunlessoverriddenby newinformation(e.g.,thataparticulardeerlives intheSanDiegoZoo).Averyinfluentialalterna- tiveapproach,developedbyAllénNewell, replacesdeclarativerepresentationsofinforma- tionwithproceduralrepresentations,knownas productions.Theseproductionstaketheformof conditionalsthatspecifyactionstobeperformed (e.g.,copyinganexpressionintoworkingmem- ory)ifcertainconditionsaresatisfied(e.g.,the expressionmatchesanotherexpression). Psychology.Whilesomepsychologistsdevelop computersimulations,amorecharacteristic activityistoacquiredetaileddatafromhuman subjectsthatcanrevealthecognitivesystem's actualoperation.Thisisachallengingendeavor. Whilecognitiveactivitiestranspirewithinus, theyfrequentlydosoinsuchasmoothandrapid fashionthatweareunawareofthem.Forexam- ple,wehavelittleawarenessofwhatoccurs whenwerecognizeanobjectasachairor rememberthenameofaclient.Somecognitive functions,though,seemtobetransparentto consciousness.Forexample,wemightapproach alogicproblemsystematically,enumeratingpos- siblesolutionsandevaluatingthemserially. AllénNewellandHerbertSimonhaverefined methodsforexploitingverbalprotocolsobtained fromsubjectsastheysolvesuchproblems.These methodshavebeenquitefruitful,buttheirlimi- tationsmustberespected.Inmanycasesin whichwethinkweknowhowweperformeda cognitivetask,RichardNisbettandTimothyWil- sonhavearguedthatwearemisled,relyingon folktheoriestodescribehowourmindswork ratherthanreportingdirectlyontheiroperation. Inmostcasescognitivepsychologistscannotrely onconsciousawarenessofcognitiveprocesses, butmustproceedasdophysiologiststryingto understandmetabolism:theymustdeviseexper- imentsthatrevealtheunderlyingprocesses operativeincognition.Oneapproachistoseek cluesintheerrorstowhichthecognitivesystem 149 cognitivescience cognitivescience isprone.Sucherrorsmightbemoreeasily accountedforbyonekindofunderlyingprocess thanbyanother.Speecherrors,suchassubsti- tuting'batcad'for'badcat',maybediagnosticof themechanismsusedtoconstructspeech.This approachisoftencombinedwithstrategiesthat seektooverloadordisruptthesystem'snormal operation.Acommontechniqueistohaveasub- jectperformtwotasksatonce-e.g.,readapas- sagewhilewatchingforacoloredspöt.Cognitive psychologistsmayalsorelyontheabilitytodis- sociatetwophenomena(e.g.,obliterateone whilemaintainingtheother)toestablishtheir independence.Othertypesofdatawidelyused tomakeinferencesaboutthecognitivesystem includepattemsofreactiontimes,errorråtes, andprimingeffects(inwhichactivationofone itemfacilitatesaccesstorelateditems).Finally, developmentalpsychologistshavebroughta varietyofkindsofdatatobearoncognitivesci- enceissues.Forexample,patternsofacquisition timeshavebeenusedinamannersimilarto reactiontimepattems,andaccountsoftheori- ginanddevelopmentofsystemsconstrainand elucidatematuresystems. Linguistics.Sincelinguistsfocusonaproduct ofcognitionratherthantheprocessesthatpro- ducetheproduct,theytendtotesttheiranalyses directlyagainstoursharedknowledgeofthat product.Generativelinguistsinthetraditionof Chomsky,forinstance,developgrammarsthat theytestbyprobingwhethertheygeneratethe sentencesofthelanguageandnoothers.While grammarsarecertainlygermanetodeveloping processingmodels,theydonotdirectlydeter- minethestructureofprocessingmodels.Hence, thecentraltaskoflinguisticsisnotcentraltocog- nitivescience.However,Chomskyhasaug- mentedhisworkongrammaticaldescription withanumberofcontroversialclaimsthatare psycholinguisticinnature(e.g.,hisnativismand hisnotionoflinguisticcompetence).Further,an alternativeapproachtoincorporatingpsycholin- guisticconcerns,thecognitivelinguisticsofLakoff andLangacker,hasachievedprominenceasa contributortocognitivescience. Neuroscience.Cognitivescientistshavegener- allyassumedthattheprocessestheystudyare carriedout,inhumans,bythebrain.Until recently,however,neurosciencehasbeenrela- tivelyperipheraltocognitivescience.Inpartthis isbecauseneuroscientistshavebeenchieflycon- cernedwiththeimplementationofprocesses, ratherthantheprocessesthemselves,andinpart becausethetechniquesavailabletoneuroscien- tists(suchassingle-cellrecording)havebeen mostsuitableforstudyingtheneuralimplemen- tationoflower-orderprocessessuchassensa- tion.Aprominentexceptionwastheclassical studiesofbrainlesionsinitiatedbyBrocaand Wernicke,whichseemedtoshowthattheloca- tionoflesionscorrelatedwithdeficitsinproduc- tionversuscomprehensionofspeech.(More recentdatasuggestthatlesionsinBroca'sarea impaircertainkindsofsyntacticprocessing.) However,otherdevelopmentsinneuroscience promisetomakeitsdatamorerelevanttocogni- tivemodelinginthefuture.Theseincludestud- iesofsimplenervoussystems,suchasthatofthe aplysia(agenusofmarinemollusk)byEricKan- del,andthedevelopmentofavarietyoftech- niquesfordeterminingthebrainactivities involvedintheperformanceofcognitivetasks (e.g.,recordingofevokedresponsepotentials överlargerbrainstructures,andimagingtech- niquessuchaspositronemissiontomography). Whileinthefutureneuroscienceislikelytooffer muchricherinformationthatwillguidethe developmentandconstrainthecharacterofcog- nitivemodels,neurosciencewillprobablynot becomecentraltocognitivescience.Itisitselfa rich,multidisciplinaryresearchdusterwhose contributingdisciplinesemployahöstofcompli- catedresearchtools.Moreover,thefocusofcog- nitivesciencecanbeexpectedtoremainon cognition,notonitsimplementation. Sofarcognitivesciencehasbeencharacterized intermsofitsmodesofinquiry.Onecanalso focusonthedomainsofcognitivephenomena thathavebeenexplored.Languagerepresents onesuchdomain.Syntaxwasoneofthefirst domainstoattractwideattentionincognitive science.Forexample,shortlyafterChomsky introducedhistransformationalgrammar,psy- chologistssuchasGeorgeMillersoughtevidence thattransformationsfigureddirectlyinhuman languageprocessing.Fromthisbeginning,a morecomplexbutenduringrelationshipamong linguists,psychologists,andcomputerscientists hasformedaleadingedgeformuchcognitivesci- enceresearch.Psycholinguisticshasmatured; sophisticatedcomputermodelsofnaturallan- guageprocessinghavebeendeveloped;and cognitivelinguistshaveofferedaparticularsyn- thesisthatemphasizessemantics,pragmatics, andcognitivefoundationsoflanguage. Thinkingandreasoning.Theseconstitutean importantdomainofcognitivesciencethatis closelylinkedtophilosophicalinterests.Problem 150 cognitivescience cognitivescience solving,suchasthatwhichfiguresinsolvingpuz- zles,playinggames,orservingasanexpertina domain,hasprovidedaprototypeforthinking. NewellandSimon'sinfluentialworkconstrued problemsolvingasasearchthroughaproblem spaceandintroducedtheideaofheuristics-gen- erallyreliablebutfalliblesimplifyingdevicesto facilitatethesearch.Onearenaforproblemsolv- ing,scientificreasoninganddiscovery,haspartic- ularlyinterestedphilosophers.Artificialintel- ligenceresearcherssuchasSimonandPatrick Langley,aswellasphilosopherssuchasPaul ThagardandLindleyDarden,havedeveloped computerprogramsthatcanutilizethesamedata asthatavailabletohistoricalscientiststodevelop andevaluatetheoriesandplanfutureexperi- ments.Cognitivescientistshavealsosoughtto studythecognitiveprocessesunderlyingthe sortsoflogicalreasoning(bothdeductiveand inductive)whosenormativedimensionshave beenaconcemofphilosophers.PhilipJohnson- Laird,forexample,hassoughttoaccountfor humanperformanceindealingwithsyllogistic reasoningbydescribingaprocessingofcon- structingandmanipulatingmentalmodels.Finally, theprocessofconstructingandusinganalogiesis anotheraspectofreasoningthathasbeenexten- sivelystudiedbytraditionalphilosophersaswell ascognitivescientists. Memory,attention,andlearning.Cognitivesci- entistshavedifferentiatedavarietyoftypesof memory.Thedistinctionbetweenlong-and short-termmemorywasveryinfluentialinthe information-processingmodelsofthe1970s. Short-termmemorywascharacterizedbylim- itedcapacity,suchasthatexhibitedbytheabil- itytoretainaseven-digittelephonenumberfor ashortperiod.Inmuchcognitivesciencework, thenotionofworkingmemoryhassuperseded short-termmemory,butmanytheoristsarereluc- tanttoconstruethisasaseparatememorysys- tem(asopposedtoapartoflong-termmemory thatisactivatedatagiventime).EndelTulving introducedadistinctionbetweensemanticmem- ory(generalknowledgethatisnotspecifictoa timeorplace)andepisodicmemory(memoryfor particularepisodesoroccurrences).Morere- cently,DanielSchacterproposedarelateddis- tinctionthatemphasizesconsciousness:implicit memory(accesswithoutawareness)versus explicitmemory(whichdoesinvolveawareness andissimilartoepisodicmemory).Oneofthe interestingresultsofcognitiveresearchisthedis- sociationbetweendifferentkindsofmemory:a personmighthaveseverelyimpairedmemoryof recenteventswhilehavinglargelyunimpaired implicitmemory.Moregenerally,memory researchhasshownthathumanmemorydoes notsimplystoreawayinformationasinafilé cabinet.Rather,informationisorganizedaccord- ingtopreexistingstructuressuchasscripts,and canbeinfluencedbyeventssubsequenttothe initialstorage.Exactlywhatgetsstoredand retrievedispartlydeterminedbyattention,and psychologistsintheinformation-processingtra- ditionhavesoughttoconstructgeneralcognitive modelsthatemphasizememoryandattention. Finally,thetopicoflearninghasonceagain becomeprominent.Extensivelystudiedbythe behavioristsoftheprecognitiveera,learningwas supersededbymemoryandattentionasa researchfocusinthe1970s.Inthe1980s,artifi- cialintelligenceresearchersdevelopedagrowing interestindesigningsystemsthatcanleam; machinelearningisnowamajorproblemarea inAI.Duringthesameperiod,connectionism arosetoofferanalternativekindoflearning model. Perceptionandmotorcontrol.Perceptualand motorsystemsprovidetheinputsandoutputsto cognitivesystems.Animportantaspectofper- ceptionistherecognitionofsomethingasapar- ticularkindofobjectorevent;thisrequires accessingknowledgeofobjectsandevents.One ofthecentralissuesconcerningperceptionques- tionstheextenttowhichperceptualprocesses areinfluencedbyhigher-levelcognitiveinfor- mation(top-downprocessing)versushowmuch theyaredrivenpurelybyincomingsensory information(bottom-upprocessing).Arelated issueconcernstheclaimthatvisualimageryisa distinctcognitiveprocessandiscloselyrelatedto visualperception,perhapsrelyingonthesame brainprocesses.Anumberofcognitivescience inquiries(e.g.,byRogerShepardandStephen Kosslyn)havefocusedonhowpeopleuseimages inproblemsolvingandhavesoughtevidence thatpeoplesolveproblemsbyrotatingimagesor scanningthem.Thisresearchhasbeenex- tremelycontroversial,asotherinvestigators havearguedagainsttheuseofimagesandhave triedtoaccountfortheperformancedatathat havebeengeneratedintermsoftheuseof propositionallyrepresentedinformation.Finally, adistinctionrecentlyhasbeenproposedbe- tweentheWhatandWheresystems.Allofthe foregoingissuesconcerntheWhatsystem(which recognizesandrepresentsobjectsasexemplarsof categories).TheWheresystem,incontrast,con- cernsobjectsintheirenvironment,andispartic- 151 cognitivescience cognitivescience ularlyadaptedtothedynamicsofmovement. Gibson'secologicalpsychologyisalong-standing inquiryintothisaspectofperception,andwork ontheneuralsubstratesisnowattractingthe interestofcognitivescientistsasweli. Recentdevelopments.Thebreadthofcognitive sciencehasbeenexpandinginrecentyears.In the1970s,cognitivescienceinquiriestendedto focusonprocessingactivitiesofadulthumansor oncomputermodelsofintelligentperformance; thebestworkoftencombinedtheseapproaches. Subsequently,investigatorsexaminedinmuch greaterdetailhowcognitivesystemsdevelop, anddevelopmentalpsychologistshaveincreas- inglycontributedtocognitivescience.Oneofthe surprisingfindingshasbeenthat,contrarytothe claimsofWilliamJames,infantsdonotseemto confronttheworldasa"blooming,buzzingcon- fusion,"butratherrecognizeobjectsandevents quiteearlyinlife.Cognitivesciencehasalso expandedalongadifferentdimension.Until recentlymanycognitivestudiesfocusedonwhat humanscouldaccomplishinlaboratorysettings inwhichtheyperformedtasksisolatedfromreal- lifecontexts.Themotivationforthiswasthe assumptionthatcognitiveprocessesweregen- ericandnotlimitedtospecificcontexts.How- ever,avarietyofinfluences,includingGibsonian ecologicalpsychology(especiallyasinterpreted anddevelopedbyUlricNeisser)andSovietactiv- itytheory,haveadvancedtheviewthatcogni- tionismuchmoredynamicandsituatedin real-worldtasksandenvironmentalcontexts; hence,itisnecessarytostudycognitiveactivities inanecologicallyvalidmanner. Anotherformofexpansionhasresultedfrom achallengetowhathasbeenthedominant architectureformodelingcognition.Anarchitec- turedefinesthebasicprocessingcapacitiesofthe cognitivesystem.Thedominantcognitivearchi- tecturehasassumedthatthemindpossessesa capacityforstoringandmanipulatingsymbols. Thesesymbolscanbecomposedintolarger structuresaccordingtosyntacticrulesthatcan thenbeoperateduponbyformålrulesthatrec- ognizethatstructure.JerryFödorhasreferredto thisviewofthecognitivesystemasthe"lan- guageofthoughthypothesis"andclearlycon- struesitasamodernheirofrationalism.Oneof thebasicargumentsforit,duetoFödorand ZenonPylyshyn,isthatthoughts,likelanguage, exhibitproductivity(theunlimitedcapacityto generatenewthoughts)andsystematicity (exhibitedbytheinherentrelationbetween thoughtssuchas'Joanlovestheflorist'and'The floristlovesJoan').Theyarguethatonlyifthe architectureofcognitionhaslanguagelikecom- positionalstructurewouldproductivityandsys- tematicitybegenericpropertiesandhencenot requirespecialcase-by-caseaccounts.Thechal- lengetothisarchitecturehasarisenwiththe developmentofanalternativearchitecture, knownasconnectionism,paralleldistributedpro- cessing,orneuralnetworkmodeling,whichpro- posesthatthecognitivesystemconsistsofväst numbersofneuronlikeunitsthatexciteor inhibiteachother.Knowledgeisstoredinthese systemsbytheadjustmentofconnection strengthsbetweenprocessingunits;conse- quently,connectionismisamoderndescendant ofassociationism.Connectionistnetworkspro- videanaturalaccountofcertaincognitivephe- nomenathathaveprovenchallengingforthe symbolicarchitecture,includingpatternrecog- nition,reasoningwithsoftconstraints,and learning.Whethertheyalsocanaccountfor productivityandsystematicityhasbeenthesub- jectofdebate. Philosophicaltheorizingaboutthemindhas oftenprovidedastartingpointforthemodeling andempiricalinvestigationsofmoderncognitive science.Theascentofcognitivesciencehasnot meantthatphilosophershaveceasedtoplaya roleinexaminingcognition.Indeed,anumber ofphilosophershavepursuedtheirinquiriesas contributorstocognitivescience,focusingon suchissuesasthepossiblereductionofcognitive theoriestothoseofneuroscience,thestatusof folkpsychologyrelativetoemergingscientific theoriesofmind,themeritsofrationalismver- susempiricism,andstrategiesforaccountingfor theintentionalityofmentalstates.Theinterac- tionbetweenphilosophersandothercognitive scientists,however,isbidirectional,andanum- berofdevelopmentsincognitivescienceprom- isetochallengeormodifytraditionalphilo- sophicalviewsofcognition.Forexample,stud- iesbycognitiveandsocialpsychologistshave challengedtheassumptionthathumanthinking tendstoaccordwiththenormsoflogicanddeci- siontheory.Onavarietyoftaskshumansseem tofollowprocedures(heuristics)thatviolate normativecanons,raisingquestionsabouthow philosophersshouldcharacterizerationality. Anotherareaofempiricalstudythathaschal- lengedphilosophicalassumptionshasbeenthe studyofconceptsandcategorization.Phil- osopherssincePlatohavewidelyassumedthat conceptsofordinarylanguage,suchasred,bird, andjustice,shouldbedefinablebynecessaryand sufficientconditions.Butcelebratedstudiesby 152 cognitivevalue coherencetheoryoftruth EleanorRoschandhercolleaguesindicatedthat manyordinary-languageconceptshadaproto- typestructureinstead.Onthisview,thecategories employedinhumanthinkingarecharacterized byprototypes(theclearestexemplars)anda metricthatgradesexemplarsaccordingtotheir degreeoftypicality.Recentinvestigationshave alsopointedtosignificantinstabilityinconcep- tualstructureandtotheroleoftheoretical beliefsinorganizingcategories.Thisalternative conceptionofconceptshasprofoundimplica- tionsforphilosophicalmethodologiesthatpor- trayphilosophy'stasktobetheanalysisof concepts. Seealsoartificialintelligence,inten- TIONALITY,PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE,PHI- LOSOPHYOFMIND.W.B. cognitivevalue.Seefrege. Cohen,Hermann(1842-1918),GermanJewish philosopherwhooriginatedandled,withPaul Natorp(1854-1924),theMarburgSchoolof neo-Kantianism.HetaughtatMarburgfrom 1876to1912.Cohenwrotecommentarieson KanfsCritiquespriortopublishingSystemder Philosophie(1902-12),whichconsistedofparts onlogic,ethics,andaesthetics.Hedevelopeda Kantianidealismofthenaturalsciences,arguing thatatranscendentalanalysisofthesesciences showsthat"purethought"(hissystemofKant- ianaprioriprinciples)"constructs"their"real- ity."HealsodevelopedKanfsethicsasa democraticsocialistethics.Heendedhiscareerat arabbinicalseminaryinBerlin,writinghisinflu- entialReligionderVernunftausdenQuellendes Judentums("ReligionofReasonoutofthe SourcesofJudaism,"1919),whichexplicated JudaismonthebasisofhisownKantianethical idealism.Cohen'sethical-politicalviewswere adoptedbyKurtEisner(1867-1919),leaderof theMunichrevolutionof1918,andalsohadan impactontherevisionism(oforthodoxMarx- ism)oftheGermanSocialDemocraticParty, whilehisphilosophicalwritingsgreatlyinflu- encedCassirer.Seealsocassirer,kant,neo- KANTIANISM.H.V.d.L. coherencetheoryofjustification.Seecoherent- ISM. coherencetheoryofknowledge.Seecoherentism. coherencetheoryoftruth,theviewthateither thenatureoftruthorthesolecriterionfordeter- miningtruthisconstitutedbyarelationof coherencebetweenthebelief(orjudgment) beingassessedandotherbeliefs(orjudgments). Asaviewofthenatureoftruth,thecoherence theoryrepresentsanalternativetothecorre- spondencetheoryoftruth.Whereasthecorre- spondencetheoryholdsthatabeliefistrue provideditcorrespondstoindependentreality, thecoherencetheoryholdsthatitistruepro- videditståndsinasuitablystrongrelationof coherencetootherbeliefs,sothatthebeliever's totalsystemofbeliefsformsahighlyorperhaps perfectlycoherentsystem.Since,onsuchachar- acterization,truthdependsentirelyontheinter- nalrelationswithinthesystemofbeliefs,sucha conceptionoftruthseemstoleadatoncetoideal- ismasregardsthenatureofreality,anditsmain advocateshavebeenproponentsofabsolute idealism(mainlyBradley,Bosanquet,andBrand Blanshard).Alessexplicitlymetaphysicalver- sionofthecoherencetheorywasalsoheldbycer- tainmembersoftheschooloflogicalpositivism (mainlyOttoNeurathandCarlHempel). Thenatureoftheintendedrelationofcoher- ence,oftencharacterizedmetaphoricallyin termsofthebeliefsinquestionfittingtogetheror dovetailingwitheachother,hasbeenandcon- tinuestobeamatterofuncertaintyandcontro- versy.Despiteoccasionalmisconceptionstothe contrary,itisclearthatcoherenceisintendedto beasubstantiallymoredemandingrelationthan mereconsistency,involvingsuchthingsasinfer- entialandexplanatoryrelationswithinthesys- temofbeliefs.Perfectoridealcoherenceis sometimesdescribedasrequiringthatevery beliefinthesystemofbeliefsentailsalltheoth- ers(thoughitmustberememberedthatthose offeringsuchacharacterizationdonotrestrict entailmentstothosethatareformåloranalytic incharacter).Sinceactualhumansystemsof beliefseeminevitablytofallshortofperfect coherence,howeverthatisunderstood,their truthisusuallyheldtobeonlyapproximateat best,thusleadingtotheabsoluteidealistview thattruthadmitsofdegrees. Asaviewofthecriterionoftruth,thecoher- encetheoryoftruthholdsthatthesolecriterion orstandardfordeterminingwhetherabeliefis trueisitscoherencewithotherbeliefsorjudg- ments,withthedegreeofjustificationvarying withthedegreeofcoherence.Suchaview amountstoacoherencetheoryofepistemicjus- tification.Itwasheldbymostoftheproponents ofthecoherencetheoryofthenatureoftruth, thoughusuallywithoutdistinguishingthetwo viewsveryclearly. Forphilosopherswhoholdbothofthese 153 coherentism coherentism views,thethesisthatcoherenceisthesolecrite- rionoftruthisusuallylogicallyprior,andthe coherencetheoryofthenatureoftruthis adoptedasaconsequence,theciearestargument beingthatoniytheviewthatperfectorideal coherenceisthenatureoftruthcanmakesense oftheappealtodegreesofcoherenceasacrite- rionoftruth. Seealsocoherentism,idealism,truth. L.B. coherentism,inepistemology,atheoryofthe structureofknowledgeorjustifiedbeliefs accordingtowhichallbeliefsrepresenting knowledgeareknownorjustifiedinvirtueof theirrelationstootherbeliefs,specifically,in virtueofbelongingtoacoherentsystemof beliefs.Assumingthattheorthodoxaccountof knowledgeiscorrectatleastinmaintainingthat justifiedtruebeliefisnecessaryforknowledge, wecanidentifytwokindsofcoherencetheories ofknowledge:thosethatarecoherentistmerely invirtueofincorporatingacoherencetheoryof justification,andthosethataredoublycoheren- tistbecausetheyaccountforbothjustification andtruthintermsofcoherence.Whatfollows willfocusoncoherencetheoriesofjustification. Historically,coherentismisthemostsignifi- cantalternativetofoundationalism.Thelatter holdsthatsomebeliefs,basicorfoundational beliefs,arejustifiedapartfromtheirrelationsto otherbeliefs,whileallotherbeliefsderivetheir justificationfromthatoffoundationalbeliefs. Foundationalismportraysjustificationashaving astructurelikethatofabuilding,withcertain beliefsservingasthefoundationsandallother beliefssupportedbythem.Coherentismrejects thisimageandpicturesjustificationashavingthe structureofaraft.Justifiedbeliefs,liketheplanks thatmakeuparaft,mutuallysupportone another.Thispictureofthecoherencetheoryis duetothepositivistOttoNeurath.Amongthe positivists,HempelsharedNeurauVssympathy forcoherentism.Otherdefendersofcoherentism fromthelatenineteenthandearlytwentieth centurieswereidealists,e.g.,Bradley,Bosan- quet,andBrandBlanshard.(Idealistsoftenheld thesortofdoublecoherencetheorymentioned above.) Thecontrastbetweenfoundationalismand coherentismiscommonlydevelopedintermsof theregressargument.Ifweareaskedwhatjus- tifiesoneofourbeliefs,wecharacteristically answerbycitingsomeotherbeliefthatsupports it,e.g.,logicallyorprobabilistically.Ifweare askedaboutthissecondbelief,wearelikelyto citeathirdbelief,andsoon.Therearethree shapessuchanevidentialchainmighthave:it couldgoonforever,ifcouldeventuallyendin somebelief,oritcouldloopbackuponitself,i.e., eventuallycontainagainabeliefthathad occurred"higherup"onthechain.Assuming thatinfinitechainsarenotreallypossible,weare leftwithachoicebetweenchainsthatendand circularchains.Accordingtofoundationalists, evidentialchainsmusteventuallyendwitha foundationalbeliefthatisjustified,ifthebeliefat thebeginningofthechainistobejustified. Coherentistsarethenportrayedasholdingthat circularchainscanyieldjustifiedbeliefs. Thisportrayalis,inaway,correct.Butitisalso misleadingsinceitsuggeststhatthedisagree- mentbetweencoherentismandfoundationalism isbestunderstoodasconcerningonlythestruc- tureofevidentialchains.Talkofevidentialchains inwhichbeliefsthatarefurtherdownonthe chainareresponsibleforbeliefsthatarehigher upnaturallysuggeststheideathatjustasreal chainstransferforces,evidentialchainstransfer justification.Foundationalismthensoundslikea realpossibility.Foundationalbeliefsalreadyhave justification,andevidentialchainsservetopass thejustificationalongtootherbeliefs.Butcoher- entismseemstobeanonstarter,forifnobeliefin thechainisjustifiedtobeginwith,thereisnötn- ingtopassalong.Alteringthemetaphor,we mightsaythatcoherentismseemsaboutaslikely tosucceedasabucketbrigadethatdoesnotend atawell,butsimplymovesaroundinacircle. Thecoherentistseekstodispelthisappearance bypointingoutthattheprimaryfunctionofevi- dentialchainsisnottotransferepistemicstatus, suchasjustification,frombelieftobelief.Indeed, beliefsarenottheprimarylocusofjustification. Rather,itiswholesystemsofbeliefthatarejusti- fiedornotintheprimarysense;individualbeliefs arejustifiedinvirtueoftheirmembershipinan appropriatelystructuredsystemofbeliefs. Accordingly,whatthecoherentistclaimsisthat theappropriatesortsofevidentialchains,which willbecircular-indeed,willlikelycontain numerouscircles-constitutejustifiedsystemsof belief.Theindividualbeliefswithinsuchasystem arethemselvesjustifiedinvirtueoftheirplacein theentiresystemandnotbecausethisstatusis passedontothemfrombeliefsfurtherdown someevidentialchaininwhichtheyfigure.One can,therefore,viewcoherentismwithconsider- ableaccuracyasaversionoffoundationalism thatholdsallbeliefstobefoundational.Fromthis perspective,thedifferencebetweencoherentism andtraditionalfoundationalismhastodowith 154 Coimbracommentaries Collier,Arthur whataccountsfortheepistemicstatusoffounda- tionalbeliefs,withtraditionalfoundationalism holdingthatsuchbeliefscanbejustifiedinvari- ousways,e.g.,byperceptionorreason,while coherentisminsiststhattheonlywaysuchbeliefs canbejustifiedisbybeingamemberofanappro- priatelystructuredsystemofbeliefs. Oneoutstandingproblemthecoherentistfaces istospecifyexactlywhatconstitutesacoherent systemofbeliefs.Coherenceclearlymustinvolve muchmorethanmereabsenceofmutuallycon- tradictorybeliefs.Onewayinwhichbeliefscan belogicallyconsistentisbyconcerningcom- pletelyunrelatedmatters,butsuchaconsistent systemofbeliefswouldnotembodythesortof mutualsupportthatconstitutesthecoreideaof coherentism.Moreover,onemightquestion whetherlogicalconsistencyisevennecessaryfor coherence,e.g.,onthebasisoftheprefacepara- dox.Similarpointscanbemaderegardingefforts tobeginanaccountofcoherencewiththeidea thatbeliefsanddegreesofbeliefmustcorrespond totheprobabilitycalculus.Soalthoughitisdiffi- culttoavoidthinkingthatsuchformålfeatures aslogicalandprobabilisticconsistencyaresignif- icantlyinvolvedincoherence,itisnotclear exactlyhowtheyareinvolved.Anaccountof coherencecanbedrawnmoredirectlyfromthe followingintuitiveidea:acoherentsystemof beliefisoneinwhicheachbeliefisepistemically supportedbytheothers,wherevarioustypesof epistemicsupportarerecognized,e.g.,deductive orinductivearguments,orinferencestothebest explanation.Thereare,however,atleasttwo problemsthissuggestiondoesnotaddress.First, sinceverysmallsetsofbeliefscanbemutually supporting,thecoherentistneedstosaysome- thingaboutthescopeasystemofbeliefsmust havetoexhibitthesortofcoherencerequiredfor justification.Second,giventhepossibilityof smallsetsofmutuallysupportivebeliefs,itis apparentlypossibletobuildasystemofvery broadscopeoutofsuchsmallsetsofmutually supportivebeliefsbymereconjunction,i.e., withoutforginganysignificantsupportrelations amongthem.Yet,sincetheinterrelatednessofall truthsdoesnotseemdiscoverablebyanalyzing theconceptofjustification,thecoherentistcan- notruleoutepistemicallyisolatedsubsystemsof beliefentirely.Sothecoherentistmustsaywhat sortsofisolatedsubsystemsofbeliefarecompat- iblewithcoherence. Thedifficultiesinvolvedinspecifyingamore preciseconceptofcoherenceshouldnotbe pressedtoovigorouslyagainstthecoherentist. Foronething,mostfoundationalistshavebeen forcedtograntcoherenceasignificantrole withintheiraccountsofjustification,sono dialecticaladvantagecanbegainedbypressing them.Moreover,onlyalittlereflectionisneeded toseethatnearlyallthedifficultiesinvolvedin specifyingcoherencearemanifestationswithina specificcontextofquitegeneralphilosophical problemsconcerningsuchmattersasinduction, explanation,theorychoice,thenatureofepis- temicsupport,etc.Theyare,then,problemsthat arefacedbylogicians,philosophersofscience, andepistemologistsquitegenerally,regardlessof whethertheyaresympathetictocoherentism. Coherentismfacesanumberofseriousobjec- tions.Sinceaccordingtocoherentismjustifica- tionisdeterminedsolelybytherelationsamong beliefs,itdoesnotseemtobecapableoftaking usoutsidethecircleofourbeliefs.Thisfactgives risetocomplaintsthatcoherentismcannotallow foranyinputfromexternalreality,e.g.,viaper- ception,andthatitcanneitherguaranteenor evenclaimthatitislikelythatcoherentsystems ofbeliefwillmakecontactwithsuchrealityor containtruebeliefs.Andwhileitiswidely grantedthatjustifiedfalsebeliefsarepossible,it isjustaswidelyacceptedthatthereisanimpor- tantconnectionbetweenjustificationandtruth, aconnectionthatrulesoutaccountsaccordingto whichjustificationisnottruth-conducive.These abstractlyformulatedcomplaintscanbemade morevivid,inthecaseoftheformer,byimagin- ingapersonwithacoherentsystemofbeliefs thatbecomesfrozen,andfailstochangeinthe faceofongoingsensoryexperience;andinthe caseofthelatter,bypointingoutthat,barringan unexpectedaccountofcoherence,itseemsthat awidevarietyofcoherentsystemsofbeliefare possible,systemsthatarelargelydisjointoreven incompatible. Seealsocoherencetheoryoftruth, EPISTEMOLOGY,FOUNDATIONALISM,JUSTIFI- CATION.M.R.D. Coimbracommentaries.Seefonseca. collectiveunconscious.Seejung. collectivity.Seedistribution. Collier,Arthur(1680-1732),Englishphiloso- pher,aWiltshireparishpriestwhoseClavisUni- versalis(1713)defendsaversionofimma- terialismcloselyakintoBerkeley's.Matter,Col- liercontends,"existsin,orindependenceon mind."Heemphaticallyaffirmstheexistenceof bodies,and,likeBerkeley,defendsimmaterial- 155 colligation Collingwood,R(obin)G(eorge) ismastheonlyalternativetoskepticism.Collier grantsthatbodiesseemtobeextemal,buttheir "quasi-externeity"isonlytheeffectofGod'swill. InPartIoftheClavisCollierargues(asBerkeley hadinhisNewTheoryofVision,1709)thatthevis- ibleworldisnotexternal.InPartIIheargues(as BerkeleyhadinthePrinciples,1710,andThree Dialogues,1713)thattheexternalworld"isa beingutterlyimpossible."TwoofCollier'sargu- mentsforthe"intrinsicrepugnancy"ofthe externalworldresembleKanfsfirstandsecond antinomies.Collierargues,e.g.,thatthemater- ialworldisbothfiniteandinfinite;thecontra- dictioncanbeavoided,hesuggests,onlyby denyingitsextemalexistence. SomescholarssuspectthatCollierdeliberately concealedhisdebttoBerkeley;mostaccepthis reportthathearrivedathisviewstenyears beforehepublishedthem.Collierfirstrefersto Berkeleyinletterswrittenin1714-15.InASpec- imenofTruePhilosophy(1730),whereheoffersan immaterialistinterpretationoftheopeningverse ofGenesis,Collierwritesthat"exceptasingle passageortwo"inBerkeley'sDialogues,thereis nootherbook"whichIeverheardof"onthe samesubjectastheClavis.Thisisapuzzling remarkonseveralcounts,onebeingthatinthe PrefacetotheDialogues,Berkeleydescribeshis earlierbooks.Collier'sbiographerreportsseeing amonghispapers(nowlöst)anoutline,dated 1708,on"thequestionofthevisibleworldbeing withoutusornot,"buthesaysnomoreaboutit. ThebiographerconcludesthatCollier'sindepen- dencecannotreasonablybedoubted;perhaps theoutlinewould,ifunearthed,establishthis. Seealsoberkeley.K.P.W. colligation.Seewhewell. Collingwood,R(obin)C(eorge)(1889-1943), Englishphilosopherandhistorian.Hisfather, W.G.Collingwood,JohnRuskin'sfriend,secre- tary,andbiographer,atfirsteducatedhimat homeinConistonandlåtersenthimtoRugby SchoolandthenOxford.Immediatelyupon graduatingin1912,hewaselectedtoafellow- shipatPembrokeCollege;exceptforservice withadmiraltyintelligenceduringWorldWarI, heremainedatOxforduntil1941,whenillness compelledhimtoretire.AlthoughhisAuto- biographyexpressesstrongdisapprovalofthe linesonwhich,duringhislifetime,philosophy atOxforddeveloped,hewasauniversity "insider."In1934hewaselectedtotheWayn- fleteProfessorship,thefirsttobecomevacant afterhehaddoneenoughworktobeaserious candidate.Hewasalsoaleadingarchaeologistof RomanBritain. AlthoughasastudentCollingwoodwasdeeply influencedbythe"realist"teachingofJohnCook Wilson,hestudiednotonlytheBritishidealists, butalsoHegelandthecontemporaryItalian post-Hegelians.Attwenty-three,hepublisheda translationofCroce'sbookonVico'sphilosophy. ReligionandPhilosophy(1916),thefirstofhis attemptstopresentorthodoxChristianityas philosophicallyacceptable,hasbothidealistand CookWilsonianelements.ThereaftertheCook Wilsonianelementsteadilydiminished.InSpecu- lumMentis(1924),heinvestigatedthenatureand ultimateunityofthefourspecial'formsofexpe- rience'-art,religion,naturalscience,andhis- tory-andtheirrelationtoafifthcomprehensive form-philosophy.Whileallfour,hecontended, arenecessarytoafullhumanlifenow,eachisa formoferrorthatiscorrectedbyitslesserro- neoussuccessor.Philosophyiserror-freebuthas nocontentofitsown:"Thetruthisnotsomeper- fectsystemofphilosophy:itissimplythewayin whichallsystems,howeverperfect,collapseinto nothingnessonthediscoverythattheyareonly systems."Somecriticsdismissedthisenterprise asidealist(adescriptionCollingwoodaccepted whenhewrote),buteventhosewhofavoredit weredisturbedbytheapparentskepticismofits result.Ayearlåter,heamplifiedhisviewsabout artinOutlinesofaPhilosophyofArt. SincemuchofwhatCollingwoodwentonto writeaboutphilosophyhasneverbeenpub- lished,andsomeofithasbeennegligently destroyed,histhoughtafterSpeculumMentisis härdtotrace.Itwillnotbedefmitivelyestab- lisheduntilthemorethan3,000pagesofhissur- vivingunpublishedmanuscripts(depositedin theBodleianLibraryin1978)havebeenthor- oughlystudied.Theywerenotavailabletothe scholarswhopublishedstudiesofhisphilosophy asawholeupto1990. Threetrendsinhowhisphilosophydeveloped, however,arediscernible.Thefirstisthatashe continuedtoinvestigatethefourspecialformsof experience,hecametoconsidereachvalidinits ownright,andnotaformoferror.Asearlyas 1928,heabandonedtheconceptionofthehis- toricalpastinSpeculumMentisassimplyaspecta- cle,alientothehistorian'smind;henow proposedatheoryofitasthoughtsexplaining pastactionsthat,althoughoccurringinthepast, canberethoughtinthepresent.Notonlycanthe identicalthought"enacted"atadefinitetimein thepastbe"reenacted"anynumberoftimes after,butitcanbeknowntobesoreenactedif 156 colorrealism combinatorylogic physicalevidencesurvivesthatcanbeshownto beincompatiblewithotherproposedreenact- ments.In1933-34hewroteaseriesoflectures (posthumouslypublishedasTheIdeaoj'Natur-e) inwhichherenouncedhisskepticismabout whetherthequantitativematerialworldcanbe known,andinquiredwhythethreeconstructive periodsherecognizedinEuropeanscientific thought,theGreek,theRenaissance,andthe modern,couldeachadvanceourknowledgeofit astheydid.Finally,in1937,retumingtothephi- losophyofartandtakingfullaccountofCroce's låterwork,heshowedthatimaginationex- pressesemotionandbecomesfalsewhenit counterfeitsemotionthatisnotfelt;thushe transformedhisearliertheoryofartaspurely imaginative.Hislåtertheoriesofartandofhis- toryremainalive;andhistheoryofnature, althoughcorrectedbyresearchsincehisdeath, wasanadvancewhenpublished. Thesecondtrendwasthathisconceptionof philosophychangedashistreatmentofthespe- cialformsofexperiencebecamelessskeptical.In hisbeautifullywrittenEssayonPhilosophical Method(1933),hearguedthatphilosophyhasan object-theensrealissimumastheone,thetrue, andthegood-ofwhichtheobjectsofthespecial formsofexperienceareappearances;butthat implieswhathehadceasedtobelieve,thatthe specialformsofexperienceareformsoferror.In hisPrinciplesofArt(1938)andNewLeviathan (1942)hedenouncedtheidealistprincipleof SpeculumMentisthattoabstractistofalsify.Then, inhisEssayonMetaphysics(1940),hedeniedthat metaphysicsisthescienceofbeingquabeing, andidentifieditwiththeinvestigationofthe "absolutepresuppositions"ofthespecialformsof experienceatdefinitehistoricalperiods. Athirdtrend,whichcametodominatehis thoughtasWorldWarIIapproached,wastosee seriousphilosophyaspractical,andsoashaving politicalimplications.Hehadbeen,likeRuskin, aradicalTory,opposedlesstoliberaloreven somesocialistmeasuresthantothebourgeois ethosfromwhichtheysprang.Recognizing Europeanfascismasthebarbarismitwas,and detestinganti-Semitism,headvocatedananti- fascistforeignpolicyandinterventioninthe Spanishcivilwarinsupportoftherepublic.His lastmajorpublication,TheNewLeviathan, impressivelydefendswhathecalledcivilization againstwhathecalledbarbarism;andalthough itwasneglectedbypoliticaltheoristsafterthe warwaswon,thecollapseofCommunismand theriseofIslamicstatesarewinningitnew readers. Seealsocroce,hegel,idealism,philos- ophyOFHISTORY,WILSON.A.D. colorrealism.Seequalities. combinatorylogic,abranchofformållogicthat dealswithformålsystemsdesignedforthestudy ofcertainbasicoperationsforconstructingand manipulatingfunctionsasrules,i.e.asrulesof calculationexpressedbydefinitions. Thenotionofafunctionwasfundamentalin thedevelopmentofmodernformål(ormathe- matical)logicthatwasinitiatedbyFrege,Peano, Russell,Hilbert,andothers.Fregewasthefirstto introduceageneralizationofthemathematical notionofafunctiontoincludepropositional functions,andheusedthegeneralnotionforfor- mallyrepresentinglogicalnotionssuchasthose ofaconcept,object,relation,generality,and judgment.Frege'sproposaltoreplacethetradi- tionallogicalnotionsofsubjectandpredicateby argumentandfunction,andthustoconceive predicationasfunctionalapplication,marksa turningpointinthehistoryofformållogic.In mostmodernlogicalsystems,thenotationused toexpressfunctions,includingpropositional functions,isessentiallythatusedinordinary mathematics.Asinordinarymathematics,cer- tainbasicnotionsaretakenforgranted,suchas theuseofvariablestoindicateprocessesofsub- stitution. Liketheoriginalsystemsformodernformål logic,thesystemsofcombinatorylogicwere designedtogiveafoundationformathematics. Butcombinatorylogicaroseasanefforttocarry thefoundationalaimsfurtheranddeeper.It undertookananalysisofnotionstakenfor grantedintheoriginalsystems,inparticularof thenotionsofsubstitutionandoftheuseofvari- ables.Inthisrespectcombinatorylogicwascon- ceivedbyoneofitsfounders,H.B.Curry,tobe concernedwiththeultimatefoundationsand withnotionsthatconstitutea"prelogic."Itwas hopedthatananalysisofthisprelogicwoulddis- closethetruesourceofthedifficultiesconnected withthelogicalparadoxes. Theoperationofapplyingafunctiontooneof itsarguments,calledapplication,isaprimitive operationinallsystemsofcombinatorylogic.If/ isafunctionandxapossibleargument,thenthe resultoftheapplicationoperationisdenotedifx). Inmathematicsthisisusuallywrittenf(x),but thenotation(fx)ismoreconvenientincombi- natorylogic.TheGermanlogicianM.Schön- finkel,whostartedcombinatorylogicin1924, observedthatitisnotnecessarytointroduce 157 combinatorylogic combinatorylogic functionsofmorethanonevariable,provided thattheideaofafunctionisenlargedsothat functionscanbeargumentsaswellasvaluesof otherfunctions.AfunctionF(x,y)isrepresented withthefunction/,whichwhenappliedtothe argumentxhas,asavalue,thefunction(fx), which,whenappliedtoy,yieldsF(x,y),i.e.((fx)y) =F(x,y).Itisthereforeconvenienttoomit parentheseswithassociationtotheleftsothat/Xj ■■■xnisusedfor((...(fxl...)xn).Schönfinkel's mainresultwastoshowhowtomaketheclass offunctionsstudiedclosedunderexplicitdefini- tionbyintroducingtwospecificprimitivefunc- tions,thecombinatorsSandK,withtherulesKxy =x,andSxyz=xz(yz).(Toillustratetheeffectof Sinordinarymathematicalnotation,let/andg befunctionsoftwoandonearguments,respec- tively;thenSfgisthefunctionsuchthatSfgx= f(x,g(x)).)Generally,ifa(x,...,xn)isanexpres- sionbuiltupfromconstantsandthevariables shownbymeansoftheapplicationoperation, thenthereisafunctionFconstructedoutofcon- stants(includingthecombinatorsSandK),such thatFx,...x=atx,,...,x).Thisisessentially 1nv1''n'J themeaningofthecombinatorycompletenessofthe theoryofcombinatorsintheterminologyofH. B.CurryandR.Feys,CombinatoryLogic(1958); andH.B.Curry,J.R.Hindley,andJ.RSeldin, CombinatoryLogic,vol.II(1972). ThesystemofcombinatorylogicwithSandK astheonlyprimitivefunctionsisthesimplest equationcalculusthatisessentiallyundecidable. Itisatype-freetheorythatallowstheformation ofthetermff,i.e.self-application,whichhas givenrisetoproblemsofinterpretation.There arealsotypetheoriesbasedoncombinatory logic.Thesystemsobtainedbyextendingthe theoryofcombinatorswithfunctionsrepresent- ingmorefamiliarlogicalnotionssuchasnega- tion,implication,andgenerality,orbyaddinga deviceforexpressinginclusioninlogicalcate- gories,arestudiedinillativecombinatorylogic. Thetheoryofcombinatorsexistsinanother, equivalentform,namelyasthetype-freeX-cal- culuscreatedbyChurchin1932.Likethetheory ofcombinators,itwasdesignedasaformalism forrepresentingfunctionsasrulesofcalculation, anditwasoriginallypartofamoregeneralsys- temoffunctionsintendedasafoundationfor mathematics.TheX-calculushasapplicationasa primitiveoperation,butinsteadofbuildingup newfunctionsfromsomeprimitiveonesby application,newfunctionsarehereobtainedby functionalabstraction.Ifa(x)isanexpressionbuilt upbymeansofapplicationfromconstantsand thevariablex,thena(x)isconsideredtodefinea functiondenotedXx.a(x),whosevalueforthe argumentbisa(b),i.e.(Xx.a(x))b=a(b).The functionXx.a(x)isobtainedfroma(x)byfunc- tionalabstraction.Thepropertyofcombinatory completenessorclosureunderexplicitdefinition ispostulatedintheformoffunctionalabstrac- tion.Thecombinatorscanbedefinedusingfunc- tionalabstraction(i.e.,K=Xx.Xy.xandS= Xx.Xy.Xz.xz(yz)),andconversely,inthetheoryof combinators,functionalabstractioncanbe defined.AdetailedpresentationoftheX-calculus isfoundinH.Barendregt,TheLambdaCalculus, ItsSyntaxandSemantics(1981). Itispossibletorepresenttheseriesofnatural numbersbyasequenceofclosedtermsintheX- calculus.CertainexpressionsintheX-calculus willthenrepresentfunctionsonthenatural numbers,andtheseX-definablefunctionsare exactlythegeneralrecursivefunctionsorthe Turingcomputablefunctions.Theequivalenceof Vdefinabilityandgeneralrecursivenesswasone oftheargumentsusedbyChurchforwhatis knownasChurch'sthesis,i.e.,theidentification oftheeffectivelycomputablefunctionsandthe recursivefunctions.Thefirstproblemaboutre- cursiveundecidabilitywasexpressedbyChurch asaproblemaboutexpressionsintheXcalculus. The^.-calculusthusplayedahistorically importantroleintheoriginaldevelopmentof recursiontheory.Duetotheemphasisincombi- natorylogiconthecomputationalaspectoffunc- tions,itisnaturalthatitsmethodhasbeenfound usefulinprooftheoryandinthedevelopmentof systemsofconstructivemathematics.Forthe samereasonithasfoundseveralapplicationsin computerscienceintheconstructionandanaly- sisofprogramminglanguages.Thetechniquesof combinatorylogichavealsobeenappliedinthe- oreticallinguistics,e.g.inso-calledMontague grammar. Inrecentdecadescombinatorylogic,likeother domainsofmathematicallogic,hasdeveloped intoaspecializedbranchofmathematics,in whichtheoriginalphilosophicalandfounda- tionalaimsandmotivesareoflittleandoftenno importance.Onereasonforthisisthediscovery ofthenewtechnicalapplications,whichwere notintendedoriginally,andwhichhaveturned theinteresttowardseveralnewmathematical problems.Thus,theoriginalmotivesareoften felttobelessurgentandonlyofhistoricalsignif- icance.Anotherreasonforthedeclineofthe originalphilosophicalandfoundationalaims maybeagrowingawarenessinthephilosophy ofmathematicsofthelimitationsofformåland mathematicalmethodsastoolsforconceptual 158 commandtheoryoflaw commentariesonAristotle clarification,astoolsforreaching"ultimatefoun- dations." Seealsochurch'sthesis,computability, PROOFTHEORY,RECURSIVEFUNCTIONTHE- ORY.S.St. commandtheoryoflaw.Seephilosophyoflaw. commentariesonAristotle,thetermcommonly usedfortheGreekcommentariesonAristotle thattakeupabout15,000pagesintheBerlin CommentariainAristotelemGraeca(1882-1909), stillthebasiceditionofthem.Onlyinthe1980s didaprojectbegin,undertheeditorshipof RichardSorabji,ofKing'sCollege,London,to translateatleastthemostsignificantportionsof themintoEnglish.Theyhadremainedthe largestcorpusofGreekphilosophynottranslated intoanymodemlanguage. Mostoftheseworks,especiallythelåter,Neo- platonicones,aremuchmorethansimplecom- mentariesonAristotle.Theyarealsoamodeof doingphilosophy,thefavoredoneatthisstageof intellectualhistory.Theyarethereforeimportant notonlyfortheunderstandingofAristotle,but alsoforboththestudyofthepre-Socraticsand theHellenisticphilosophers,particularlytheSto- ics,ofwhomtheypreservemanyfragments,and lastlyforthestudyofNeoplatonismitself-and, inthecaseofJohnPhiloponus,forstudyingthe innovationsheintroducesintheprocessoftry- ingtoreconcilePlatonismwithChristianity. Thecommentariesmaybedividedintothree maingroups. (1)Thefirstgroupofcommentariesarethose byPeripateticscholarsofthesecondtofourth centuriesa.d.,mostnotablyAlexanderof Aphrodisias(fl.c.200),butalsotheparaphraser Themistius(fl.c.360).Wemustnotomit,how- ever,tonoteAlexander'spredecessorAspasius, authoroftheearliestsurvivingcommentary,one ontheNicomacheanEthics-aworknotcom- mentedonagainuntilthelateByzantineperiod. CommentariesbyAlexandersurviveonthePrior Analytics,Topics,MetaphysicsI-V,OntheSenses,and Meteorologics,andhisnowlöstonesontheCate- gories,OntheSoul,andPhysicshadenormous influenceinlåtertimes,particularlyonSimpli- cius. (2)ByfarthelargestgroupisthatoftheNeo- platonistsuptothesixthcenturya.d.Most importantoftheearliercommentatorsisPor- phyry(232-C.309),ofwhomonlyashortcom- mentaryontheCategoriessurvives,togetherwith anintroduction(Isagoge)toAristotle'slogical works,whichprovokedmanycommentaries itself,andprovedmostinfluentialinboththe Eastand(throughBoethius)intheLatinWest. ThereconcilingofPlatoandAristotleislargely hiswork.HisbigcommentaryontheCategories wasofgreatimportanceinlåtertimes,andmany fragmentsarepreservedinthatofSimplicius.His followerIamblichuswasalsoinfluential,buthis commentariesarelikewiselöst.TheAthenian SchoolofSyrianus(c.375-437)andProclus (410-85)alsocommentedonAristotle,butall thatsurvivesisacommentaryofSyrianuson BooksIII,IV,XIII,andXIVoftheMetaphysics. Itistheearlysixthcentury,however,thatpro- ducesthebulkofoursurvivingcommentaries, originatingfromtheAlexandrianschoolof Ammonius,sonofHermeias(c.435-520),but composedbothinAlexandria,bytheChristian JohnPhiloponus(c.490-575),andin(öratleast from)AthensbySimplicius(writingafter532). MaincommentariesofPhiloponusareonCate- gories,PriorAnalytics,PosteriorAnalytics,OnGener- ationandCorruption,OntheSoulI—II,andPhysics; ofSimpliciusonCategories,Physics,OntheHeavens, and(perhaps)OntheSoul. ThetraditioniscarriedoninAlexandriaby Olympiodorus(c.495-565)andtheChristians Elias(fl.c.540)andDavid(anArmenian,nick- namedtheInvincible,fl.c.575),andfinallyby Stephanus,whowasbroughtbytheemperorto takethechairofphilosophyinConstantinoplein about610.Thesescholarscommentchieflyon theCategoriesandotherintroductorymaterial, butOlympiodorusproducedacommentaryon theMeteorologics. CharacteristicoftheNeoplatonistsisadesire toreconcileAristotlewithPlatonism(arguing, e.g.,thatAristotlewasnotdismissingthePla- tonictheoryofForms),andtosystematizehis thought,thusreconcilinghimwithhimself.They arerespondingtoalongtraditionofcriticism, duringwhichdifficultieswereraisedaboutinco- herencesandcontradictionsinAristotle's thought,andtheyareconcernedtosolvethese, drawingontheircomprehensiveknowledgeof hiswritings.OnlyPhiloponus,asaChristian, dårestocriticizehim,inparticularontheeter- nityoftheworld,butalsoontheconceptofinfin- ity(onwhichheproducesaningenious argument,pickedup,viatheArabs,byBonaven- tureinthethirteenthcentury).TheCategories provesaparticularlyfruitfulbattleground,and muchofthelåterdebatebetweenrealismand nominalismstemsfromargumentsaboutthe propersubjectmatterofthatwork. Theformatofthesecommentariesismostly thatadoptedbyscholarseversince,thatoftaking 159 commentariesonPlato commentariesonPlato onepassage,orlemma,afteranotherofthesource workanddiscussingitfromeveryangle,but therearevariations.Sometimesthegeneralsub- jectmatterisdiscussedfirst,andthendetailsof thetextareexamined;alternatively,thelemmais takeninsubdivisionswithoutanysuchdistinc- tion.Thecommentarycanalsoproceedexplicitly byansweringproblems,oraporiai,whichhave beenraisedbypreviousauthorities.Somecom- mentaries,suchastheshortoneofPorphyryon theCategories,andthatofIamblichus'spupil Dexippusonthesamework,havea"catecheti- cal"form,proceedingbyquestionandanswer.In somecases(aswithWittgensteininmodern times)thecommentariesaresimplytranscrip- tionsbypupilsofthelecturesofateacher.Thisis thecase,forexample,withthesurviving"com- mentaries"ofAmmonius.Onemayalsoindulge insimpleparaphrase,asdoesThemistiuson PosteriorAnalysis,Physics,OntheSoul,andOn theHeavens,butevenhereagooddealofinter- pretationisinvolved,andhisworksremaininter- esting. Animportantoffshootofallthisactivityinthe LatinWestisthefigureofBoethius(c.480-524). ItishewhofirsttransmittedaknowledgeofAris- totelianlogictotheWest,tobecomeanintegral partofmedievalScholasticism.Hetranslated Porphyry'sIsagoge,andthewholeofAristotle's logicalworks.Hewroteadoublecommentaryon theIsagoge,andcommentariesontheCategories andOnInterpretation.Heisdependentultimately onPorphyry,butmoreimmediately,itwould seem,onasourceintheschoolofProclus. (3)Thethirdmajorgroupofcommentaries datesfromthelateByzantineperiod,andseems mainlytoemanatefromacircleofscholars groupedaroundtheprincessAnnaComnenain thetwelfthcentury.Themostimportantfigures hereareEustratius(c.1050-1120)andMichael ofEphesus(originallydatedc.1040,butnow fixedatc.1130).Michaelinparticularseemscon- cernedtocommentonareasofAristotle'sworks thathadhithertoescapedcommentary.He thereforecommentswidely,forexample,on thebiologicalworks,butalsoontheSophistical Refutations.HeandEustratius,andperhapsoth- ers,seemtohavecooperatedalsoonacompos- itecommentaryontheNicomacheanEthics, neglectedsinceAspasius.Thereisalsoevidence oflöstcommentariesonthePoliticsandthe Rhetoric. ThecompositecommentaryontheEthicswas translatedintoLatininthenextcentury,inEng- land,byRobertGrosseteste,butearlierthanthis translationsofthevariouslogicalcommentaries hadbeenmadebyJamesofVenice(fl.c.1130), whomayhaveevenmadetheacquaintanceof MichaelofEphesusinConstantinople.Låterin thatcenturyothercommentarieswerebeing translatedfromArabicversionsbyGerardofCre- mona(d.l187).TheinfluenceoftheGreekcom- mentarytraditionintheWestthusresumedafter thelongbreaksinceBoethiusinthesixthcen- tury,butonlynow,itseemsfairtosay,isthefull significanceofthisenormousbodyofwork becomingproperlyappreciated. Seealsoaristotle,boethius,neopla- TONISM,PORPHYRY.J.M.D. commentariesonPlato,atermdesignatingthe worksinthetraditionofcommentary(hypom- nema)onPlatothatmaygobacktotheOldAcad- emy(CrantorisattestedbyProclustohavebeen thefirsttohave"commented"ontheTimaeus). Moreprobably,thetraditionarisesinthefirst centuryb.c.inAlexandria,wherewefind Eudoruscommenting,again,ontheTimaeus,but possiblyalso(ifthescholarswhoattributetohim theAnonymousTheaetetusCommentaryarecorrect) ontheTheaetetus.ItseemsalsoasiftheStoicPosi- doniuscomposedacommentaryofsomesorton theTimaeus.Thecommentaryform(suchaswe canobserveinthebiblicalcommentariesofPhilo ofAlexandria)owesmuchtotheStoictradition ofcommentaryonHomer,aspracticedbythe second-centuryb.c.SchoolofPergamum.Itwas normaltoselect(usuallyconsecutive)portions oftext(lemmata)forgeneral,andthendetailed, comment,raisingandanswering"problems" (aporiai),refutingone'spredecessors,anddeal- ingwithpointsofbothdoctrineandphilology. Bythesecondcenturya.d.thetraditionofPla- toniccommentarywasfirmlyestablished.We haveevidenceofcommentariesbytheMiddle PlatonistsGaius,Albinus,Atticus,Numenius, andCronius,mainlyontheTimaeus,butalsoon atleastpartsoftheRepublic,aswellasaworkby Atticus'spupilHerpocrationofArgos,intwenty- fourbooks,onPlato'sworkasawhole.These worksarealllöst,butinthesurvivingworksof PlutarchwefindexegesisofpartsofPlato's works,suchasthecreationofthesoulinthe Timaeus(35a-36d).TheLatincommentaryof Calcidius(fourthcenturya.d.)isalsobasically MiddlePlatonic. IntheNeoplatonicperiod(afterPlotinus,who didnotindulgeinformålcommentary,though manyofhisessaysareinfactinformalcommen- taries),wehaveevidenceofmuchmorecom- prehensiveexegeticactivity.Porphyryinitiated thetraditionwithcommentariesonthePhaedo, 160 commission commongood Cratylus,Sophist,Philebus,Parmenides(ofwhich thesurvivinganonymousfragmentofcommen- taryisprobablyapart),andtheTimaeus.Healso commentedonthemythofErintheRepublic.It seemstohavebeenPorphyrywhoisresponsible forintroducingtheallegoricalinterpretationof theintroductoryportionsofthedialogues, thoughitwasonlyhisfollowerIamblichus(who alsocommentedonalltheabovedialogues,as wellastheAkibiadesandthePhaedrus)who introducedtheprinciplethateachdialogue shouldhaveonlyonecentraltheme,orskopos. ThetraditionwascarriedonintheAthenian SchoolbySyrianusandhispupilsHermeias(on thePhaedrus-surviving)andProclus(Akibiades, Cratylus,Timaeus,Parmenides-allsurviving,at leastinpart),andcontinuedinlåtertimesby Damascius(Phaedo,Philebus,Parmenides)and Olympiodorus(Akibiades,Phaedo,Gorgias—also surviving,thoughsometimesonlyintheformof pupils'notes). Thesecommentariesarenotnowtobevalued primarilyasexpositionsofPlato'sthought (thoughtheydocontainusefulinsights,and muchvaluableinformation);theyarebest regardedasoriginalphilosophicaltreatisespre- sentedinthemodeofcommentary,asissomuch oflåterGreekphilosophy,whereitisnotorigi- nalitybutratherfaithfulnesstoaninspiredmas- terandagreattraditionthatisbeingstrivenfor. Seealsomiddleplatonism,neoplaton- ISM,PLATO.J.M.D. commission.Seeactiontheory. commissive.Seespeechacttheory. common-consentargumentsfortheexistenceof God.Seemartineau. commoneffects.See CAUSATION. commongood,anormativestandardinThom- isticandNeo-Thomisticethicsforevaluatingthe justiceofsocial,legal,andpoliticalarrangements, referringtothosearrangementsthatpromotethe fullflourishingofeveryoneinthecommunity. Everygoodcanberegardedasbothagoaltobe soughtand,whenachieved,asourceofhuman fulfillment.Acommongoodisanygoodsought byand/orenjoyedbytwoormorepersons(as friendshipisagoodcommontothefriends);the commongoodisthegoodofa"perfect"(i.e., completeandpoliticallyorganized)humancom- munity-agoodthatisthecommongoalofall whopromotethejusticeofthatcommunity,as wellasthecommonsourceoffulfillmentofall whoshareinthosejustarrangements. 'Common'isananalogicaltermreferringto kindsanddegreesofsharingrangingfrommere similaritytoadeepontologicalcommunion. Thus,anygoodthatisagenuineperfectionof ourcommonhumannatureisacommongood, asopposedtomerelyidiosyncraticorillusory goods.Butgoodsarecommoninadeepersense whenthedegreeofsharingismorethanmerely coincidental:twochildrenengagedinparallel playenjoyagoodincommon,buttheyrealizea commongoodmorefullybyengagingeachother inonegame;similarly,ifeachinagroupwatches thesamegoodmoviealoneathome,theyhave enjoyedagoodincommonbuttheyrealizethis goodatadeeperlevelwhentheywatchthe movietogetherinatheateranddiscussitafter- ward.Inshort,commongoodincludesaggre- gatesofprivate,individualgoodsbuttranscends theseaggregatesbytheuniquefulfillment affordedbymutuality,sharedactivity,andcom- munionofpersons. AstothesourcesinThomisticethicsforthis emphasisonwhatisdeeplysharedöverwhat merelycoincides,thefirstisAristotle'sunder- standingofusassocialandpoliticalanimals: manyaspectsofhumanperfection,onthisview, canbeachievedonlythroughsharedactivities incommunities,especiallythepoliticalcommu- nity.ThesecondisChristianTrinitariantheo- logy,inwhichthesingleGodheadinvolvesthe mysteriouscommunionofthreedivine"per- sons,"theveryexemplarofacommongood; humanpersonhood,byanalogy,issimilarlyper- fectedonlyinarelationshipofsocialcommu- nion. Theachievementofsuchintimatelyshared goodsrequiresverycomplexanddelicate arrangementsofcoordinationtopreventthe exploitationandinjusticethatplagueshared endeavors.Theestablishmentandmaintenance ofthesesocial,legal,andpoliticalarrangements is"the"commongoodofapoliticalsociety, becausetheenjoymentofallgoodsissodepen- dentuponthequalityandthejusticeofthose arrangements.Thecommongoodofthepolitical communityincludes,butisnotlimitedto,pub- liegoods:goodscharacterizedbynon-rivalryand non-excludabilityandwhich,therefore,must generallybeprovidedbypublicinstitutions.By theprincipleofsubsidiarity,thecommongoodis bestpromotedby,inadditiontothestate,many lower-levelnon-publicsocieties,associations, andindividuals.Thus,religiouslyaffiliated schoolseducatingnon-religiousminoritychil- 161 commonnotions completeness drenmightpromotethecommongoodwithout beingpublicgoods. Seealsoaquinas,justice,politicalphi- LOSOPHY,SOCIALPHILOSOPHY,SUBSIDIARITY. J.B.M. commonnotions.Seestoicism. commonsensephilosophy.Seescottishcommon SENSEPHILOSOPHY. commonsensibles.Seearistotle,sensuscom- MUNIS. commonsensism.Seescottishcommonsense PHILOSOPHY. communicationtheory.Seeinformationtheory. communism.Seepoliticalphilosophy. communitarianism.Seepoliticalphilosophy. commutativejustice.Seejustice. compactness.Seededuction. compactnesstheorem,atheoremforfirst-order logic:ifeveryfinitesubsetofagiveninfinitethe- oryTisconsistent,thenthewholetheoryiscon- sistent.Theresultisanimmediateconsequence ofthecompletenesstheorem,forifthetheory werenotconsistent,acontradiction,say'Pand not-P',wouldbeprovablefromit.Buttheproof, beingafinitaryobject,woulduseonlyfinitely manyaxiomsfromT,sothisfinitesubsetofT wouldbeinconsistent. Thisproofofthecompactnesstheoremisvery general,showingthatanylanguagethathasa soundandcompletesystemofinference,where eachruleallowsonlyfinitelymanypremises,sat- isfiesthetheorem.Thisisimportantbecausethe theoremimmediatelyimpliesthatmanyfamiliar mathematicalnotionsarenotexpressibleinthe languageinquestion,notionslikethoseofa finitesetorawell-orderingrelation. Thecompactnesstheoremisimportantfor otherreasonsaswell.Itisthemostfrequently appliedresultinthestudyoffirst-ordermodel theoryandhasinspiredinterestingdevelop- mentswithinsettheoryanditsfoundationsby generatingasearchforinfmitarylanguagesthat obeysomeanalogofthetheorem. Seealsoinfinitarylogic.J.Ba. compatibilism.Seefreewillproblem. competence,linguistic.Seephilosophyoflan- guage. complement.Seerelation. complementarity.Seephilosophyofscience, QUANTUMMECHANICS. complementarydass,theclassofallthingsnotin agivenclass.Forexample,ifCistheclassofall redthings,thenitscomplementaryclassisthe classcontainingeverythingthatisnotred.This latterclassincludesevennon-coloredthings,like numbersandtheclassCitself.Often,thecontext willdeterminealessinclusivecomplementary class.IfBCyl,thenthecomplementofBwith respecttoAisA-B.Forexample,ifAistheclass ofphysicalobjects,andBistheclassofredphys- icalobjects,thenthecomplementofBwith respecttoAistheclassofnon-redphysical objects.Seealsosettheory.P.Mad. complementaryterm.Seecontraposition. complementation.Seenegation. completenegation.Seenecessity,philosophyof mind. completeness,apropertythatsomething-typi- cally,asetofaxioms,alogic,atheory,asetof well-formedformulas,alanguage,orasetof connectives-haswhenitisstrongenoughin somedesirablerespect. (1)AsetofaxiomsiscompleteforthelogicLif everytheoremofLisprovableusingthose axioms. (2)AlogicLhasweaksemanticalcompletenessif everyvalidsentenceofthelanguageofLisathe- oremofL.Lhasstrongsemanticalcompleteness(or isdeductivelycomplete)ifforeverysetTofsen- tences,everylogicalconsequenceofTis deduciblefromTusingL.ApropositionallogicL isHalldén-completeifwheneverAVBisatheo- remofL,whereAandBsharenovariables, eitherAorBisatheoremofL.AndLisPost-com- pleteifIisconsistentbutnostrongerlogicforthe samelanguageisconsistent.Referencetothe "completeness"ofalogic,withoutfurtherqual- ification,isalmostinvariablytoeitherweakor strongsemanticalcompleteness.Onecurious exception:second-orderlogicisoftensaidtobe "incomplete,"wherewhatismeantisthatitis notaxiomatizable. (3)AtheoryTisnegation-complete(oftensim- plycomplete)ifforeverysentenceAofthelan- 162 completeness,combinatory comprehensionschema guageofT,eitherAoritsnegationisprovablein T.AndTisomega-completeifwheneveritisprov- ableinTthatapropertyholdsofeachnatural number0,1,...,itisalsoprovablethatevery numberhas$.(Generalizingonthis,anysetFof well-formedformulasmightbecalledomega completeif(v)/l[v]isdeduciblefromTwhenever A[t]isdeduciblefromTforalltermst,where^[f] istheresultofreplacingallfreeoccurrencesofv inA[v]byt.) (4)AlanguageLisexpressivelycompleteifeach ofagivenclassofitemsisexpressibleinL.Usu- ally,theclassinquestionistheclassof(two- valued)truth-functions.Thepropositional languagewhosesoleconnectivesare~andvis thussaidtobeexpressively(orfunctionally)com- plete,whilethatbuiltupusingvaloneisnot, sinceclassicalnegationisnotexpressibletherein. Hereonemightalsosaythattheset{~,vjis expressively(orfunctionally)complete,while {v}isnot. Seealsogödel'sincompletenesstheo- REMS,SECOND-ORDER STROKE. SHEFFER G.F.S. completeness,combinatory.Seecombinatory LOGIC. completenesstheorem.Seesatisfiable. completesymbol.Seesyncategoremata. complexesignificabile(plural:complexesignifica- bilia),alsocalledcomplexumsignificabile,in medievalphilosophy,whatissignifiedonlybya complexum(astatementordeclarativesentence), byathat-clause,orbyadictum(anaccusative+ infinitiveconstruction,asin:'Iwanthimtogo'). Itisanalogoustothemodernproposition.The doctrineseemstohaveoriginatedwithAdamde Wodehamintheearlyfourteenthcentury,butis usuallyassociatedwithGregoryofRimini slightlylåter.Complexesignificabiliadonotfall underanyoftheAristoteliancategories,andso donot"exist"intheordinaryway.Still,theyare somehowreal.Forbeforecreationnothing existedexceptGod,buteventhenGodknew thattheworldwasgoingtoexist.Theobjectof thisknowledgecannothavebeenGodhimself (sinceGodisnecessary,buttheworld'sexistence iscontingent),andyetdidnot"exist"beforecre- ation.Nevertheless,itwasrealenoughtobean objectofknowledge.Someauthorswhomain- tainedsuchaviewheldthattheseentitieswere notonlysignifiableinacomplexwaybyastate- ment,butwerethemselvescomplexintheir innerstructure;theterm'complexumsignificabile' isuniquetotheirtheories.Thetheoryofcomplexe significabiliawasvehementlycriticizedbylate medievalnominalists.Seealsoabstract ENTITY,PROPOSITION.P.V.S. complexumsignificabile.Seecomplexesignifi- cabile. composition,fallacyof.Seeinformalfallacy. compositionalintention.Seelewis,david. compositionality.Seecognitivescience,philoso- phyOFLANGUAGE. compossible,capableofexistingoroccurring together.E.g.,twoindividualsarecompossible providedtheexistenceofoneofthemiscom- patiblewiththeexistenceoftheother.Interms ofpossibleworlds,thingsarecompossiblepro- videdthereissomepossibleworldtowhichall ofthembelong;otherwisetheyareincompossi- ble.Notallpossibilitiesarecompossible.E.g.,the extinctionoflifeonearthbytheyear3000is possible;soisitscontinuationuntiltheyear 10,000;butsinceitisimpossiblethatbothof thesethingsshouldhappen,theyarenotcom- possible.Leibnizheldthatanynon-actualized possibilitymustbeincompossiblewithwhatis actual.Seealsoprincipleofplenitude. P.Mac. comprehension,asappliedtoaterm,thesetof attributesimpliedbyaterm.Thecomprehension of'square',e.g.,includesbeingfour-sided,hav- ingequalsides,andbeingaplanefigure,among otherattributes.Thecomprehensionofatermis contrastedwithitsextension,whichisthesetof individualstowhichthetermapplies.Thedis- tinctionbetweentheextensionandthecompre- hensionofatermwasintroducedinthe Port-RoyalLogicbyArnauldandPierreNicolein 1662.Currentpracticeistousetheexpression 'intension'ratherthan'comprehension'.Both expressions,however,areinherentlysomewhat vague.Seealsoaxiomofcomprehension. V.K. comprehension,axiomof.Seeaxiomofcompre- hension. comprehension,principleof.Seesettheory. comprehensionschema.Seeset-theoreticpara- doxes. 163 compresence computertheory compresence,anunanalyzablerelationinterms ofwhichRussell,inhislåterwritings(especially inHumanKnowledge:ItsScopeandLimits,1948), tookconcreteparticularobjectstobeanalyzable. Concreteparticularobjectsareanalyzablein termsofcomplexesofqualitiesallofwhose membersarecompresent.Althoughthisrelation canbedefmedonlyostensivelyRussellstates thatitappearsinpsychologyas"simultaneityin oneexperience"andinphysicsas"overlapping inspace-time."Completecomplexesofcompresence arecomplexesofqualitieshavingthefollowing twoproperties:(1)allmembersofthecomplex arecompresent;(2)givenanythingnotamem- berofthecomplex,thereisatleastonemember ofthecomplexwithwhichitisnotcompresent. Hearguesthatthereisstrongempiricalevidence thatnotwocompletecomplexeshavealltheir qualitiesincommon.Finally,space-timepoint- instantsareanalyzedascompletecomplexesof compresence.Concreteparticulars,ontheother hand,areanalyzedasseriesofincompletecom- plexesofcompresencerelatedbycertaincausal laws.Seealsobundletheory,russell. A.C. computability,roughly,thepossibilityofcompu- tationonaTuringmachine.Thefirstconvincing generaldefinition,A.N.Turing's(1936),has beenprovedequivalenttotheknownplausible alternatives,sothattheconceptofcomputabil- ityisgenerallyrecognizedasanabsoluteone. Turing'sdefinitionreferredtocomputationsby imaginarytape-processingmachinesthatwe nowknowtobecapableofcomputingthesame functions(whethersimplesumsandproductsor highlycomplex,esotericfunctions)thatmodern digitalcomputingmachinescouldcomputeif providedwithsufficientstoragecapacity.Inthe form'Anyfunctionthatiscomputableatallis computableonaTuringmachine',thisabsolute- nessclaimiscalledTuring'sthesis.Acomparable claimforAlonzoChurch's(1935)conceptofX- computabilityiscalledChurch'sthesis.Similar thesesareenunciatedforMarkovalgorithms,for S.C.Kleene'snotionofgeneralrecursiveness, etc.Ithasbeenprovedthatthesamefunctions arecomputableinalloftheseways.Thereisno hopeofprovinganyofthosetheses,forsucha proofwouldrequireadefinitionof'com- putable'-adefinitionthatwouldsimplybea furtheriteminthelist,thesubjectofafurther thesis.Butsincecomputationsofnewkinds mightberecognizableasgenuineinparticu- larcases,Turing'sthesisanditsequivalents,if false,mightbedecisivelyrefutedbydiscoveryof aparticularfunction,awayofcomputingit, andaproofthatnoTuringmachinecancom- puteit. Thehaltingproblemfor(say)Turingmachines istheproblemofdevisingaTuringmachinethat computesthefunctionh(m,n)=1ordepend- ingonwhetherornotTuringmachinenumber meverhalts,oncestartedwiththenumbernon itstape.Thisproblemisunsolvable,fora machinethatcomputedhcouldbemodifiedto computeafunction^(«),whichisundefined(the machinegoesintoanendlessloop)whenh(n,n) =1,andotherwiseagreeswithh(n,n).Butthis modifiedmachine-Turingmachinenumberk, say-wouldhavecontradictoryproperties: startedwithkonitstape,itwouldeventually haltifandonlyifitdoesnot.Turingproved unsolvabilityofthedecisionproblemforlogic(the problemofdevisingaTuringmachinethat, appliedtoargumentnumberninlogicalnota- tion,correctlyclassifiesitasvalidorinvalid)by reducingthehaltingproblemtothedecision problem,i.e.,showinghowanysolutiontothe lattercouldbeusedtosolvetheformerproblem, whichweknowtobeunsolvable. Seealsochurch'sthesis,computerthe- ory,TURINGMACHINE.R.J. computability,algorithmic.Seealgorithm. computable.Seeeffectiveprocedure. computational.Seecomputertheory. computationaltheoriesofmind.SeecoGNinvEsci- ENCE. computermodeling.Seecomputertheory. computerprogram.Seecomputertheory. computertheory,thetheoryofthedesign,uses, powers,andlimitsofmodemelectronicdigital computers.Ithasimportantbearingsonphilos- ophy,asmaybeseenfromthemanyphilosoph- icalreferencesherein. Moderncomputersarearadicallynewkindof machine,fortheyareactivephysicalrealizations offormållanguagesoflogicandarithmetic. Computersemploysophisticatedlanguages,and theyhavereasoningpowersmanyordersof magnitudegreaterthanthoseofanyprior machines.Becausetheyarefarsuperiorto humansinmanyimportanttasks,theyhavepro- ducedarevolutioninsocietythatisasprofound astheindustrialrevolutionandisadvancing 164 computertheory computertheory muchmorerapidly.Furthermore,computers themselvesareevolvingrapidly. Whenacomputerisaugmentedwithdevices forsensingandacting,itbecomesapowerful controlsystem,orarobot.Tounderstandthe implicationsofcomputersforphilosophy,one shouldimaginearobotthathasbasicgoalsand volitionsbuiltintoit,includingconflictinggoals andcompetingdesires.Thisconceptfirst appearedinKarelCapek'splayRossum'sUniver- salRobots(1920),wheretheword'robot'origi- nated. Acomputerhastwoaspects,hardwareandpro- gramminglanguages.Thetheoryofeachisrele- vanttophilosophy. TheSoftwareandhardwareaspectsofacom- puteraresomewhatanalogoustothehuman mindandbody.Thisanalogyisespeciallystrong ifwefollowPeirceandconsiderallinformation processinginnatureandinhumanorganisms, notjusttheconscioususeoflanguage.Evolution hasproducedasuccessionoflevelsofsignusage andinformationprocessing:self-copyingchemi- cals,self-reproducingcells,geneticprograms directingtheproductionoforganicforms,chem- icalandneuronalsignalsinorganisms,uncon- scioushumaninformationprocessing,ordinary languages,andtechnicallanguages.Buteach levelevolvedgraduallyfromitspredecessors,so thatthelinebetweenbodyandmindisvague. Thehardwareofacomputeristypicallyorga- nizedintothreegeneralblocks:memory,processor (arithmeticunitandcontrol),andvariousinput- outputdevicesforcommunicationbetween machineandenvironment.Thememorystores thedatatobeprocessedaswellastheprogram thatdirectstheprocessing.Theprocessorhasan arithmetic-logicunitfortransformingdata,anda controlforexecutingtheprogram.Memory, processor,andinput-outputcommunicateto eachotherthroughafastswitchingsystem. Thememoryandprocessorareconstructed fromregisters,adders,switches,cables,andvar- iousotherbuildingblocks.Theseintumare composedofelectroniccomponents:transistors, resistors,andwires.Theinputandoutput devicesemploymechanicalandelectromechan- icaltechnologiesaswellaselectronics.Some input-outputdevicesalsoserveasauxiliary memories;floppydisksandmagnetictapesare examples.Fortheoreticalpurposesitisusefulto imaginethatthecomputerhasanindefmitely expandablestoragetape.Soimagined,acom- puterisaphysicalrealizationofaTuring machine.Theideaofanindefinitelyexpandable memoryissimilartothelogician'sconceptofan axiomaticformållanguagethathasanunlimited numberofproofsandtheorems. TheSoftwareofamodernelectroniccomputer iswritteninahierarchyofprogramminglan- guages.Thehigher-levellanguagesaredesigned forusebyhumanprogrammers,operators,and maintenancepersonnel.The"machinelan- guage"isthebasichardwarelanguage,inter- pretedandexecutedbythecontrol.Itswordsare sequencesofbinarydigitsorbits.Programswrit- teninintermediate-levellanguagesareusedby thecomputertotranslatethelanguagesem- ployedbyhumanusersintothemachinelan- guageforexecution. Aprogramminglanguagehasinstructional meansforcarryingoutthreekindsofoperations: dataoperationsandtransfers,transfersofcontrol fromonepartoftheprogramtotheother, andprogramself-modification.VonNeumann designedthefirstmodernprogramminglan- guage. Aprogramminglanguageisgeneralpurpose, andanelectroniccomputerthatexecutesitcan inprinciplecarryoutanyalgorithmoreffective procedure,includingthesimulationofanyother computer.Thusthemodernelectroniccomputer isapracticalrealizationoftheabstractconceptof auniversalTuringmachine.Whatcanactually becomputedinpracticedepends,ofcourse,on thestateofcomputertechnologyandits resources. Itiscommonforcomputersatmanydifferent spatiallocationstobeinterconnectedintocom- plexnetworksbytelephone,radio,andsatellite communicationsystems.Insofarasusersinone partofthenetworkcancontrolotherparts, eitherlegitimatelyorillegitimately(e.g.,by meansofa"computervirus"),aglobalnetwork ofcomputersisreallyaglobalcomputer.Such västcomputersgreatlyincreasesocietalinterde- pendence,afactofimportanceforsocialphilos- ophy. Thetheoryofcomputershastwobranches,cor- respondingtothehardwareandSoftwareaspects ofcomputers. Thefundamentalconceptofhardwaretheory isthatofafiniteautomaton,whichmaybe expressedeitherasanidealizedlogicalnetwork ofsimplecomputerprimitives,orasthecorre- spondingtemporalsystemofinput,output,and intemalstates. Afiniteautomatonmaybespecifiedasalogi- calnetoftruth-functionalswitchesandsimple memoryelements,connectedtooneanotherby 165 computertheory computertheory idealizedwires.Theseelementsfunctionsyn- chronously,eachwirebeinginabinarystate(0 or1)ateachmomentoftimet=0,1,2,.... Eachswitchingelement(or"gate")executesa simpletruth-functionaloperation(not,or,and, nor,not-and,etc.)andisimaginedtooperate instantaneously(comparethenotionsofsenten- tialconnectiveandtruthtable).Amemoryele- ment(flip-flop,binarycounter,unitdelayline) preservesitsinputbitforoneormoretime-steps. Awell-formednetofswitchesandmemory elementsmaynothavecyclesthroughswitches only,butittypicallyhasfeedbackcyclesthrough memoryelements.Thewiresofalogicalnetare ofthreekinds:input,intemal,andoutput.Cor- respondingly,ateachmomentoftimealogical nethasaninputstate,aninternalstate,andan outputstate.Alogicalnetorautomatonneednot haveanyinputwires,inwhichcaseitisaclosed system. Thecompletehistoryofalogicalnetis describedbyadeterministiclaw:ateachmoment oftimet,theinputandinternalstatesofthenet determineitsoutputstateanditsnextinternal state.Thisleadstotheseconddefinitionof'finite automaton':itisadeterministicfmite-statesys- temcharacterizedbytwotables.Thetransition tablegivesthenextinternalstateproducedby eachpairofinputandinternalstates.Theoutput tablegivestheoutputstateproducedbyeach inputstateandinternalstate. Thestateanalysisapproachtocomputerhard- wareisofpracticalvalueonlyforsystemswitha fewelements(e.g.,abinary-codeddecimal counter),becausethenumberofstatesincreases asapowerofthenumberofelements.Sucha rapidråteofincreaseofcomplexitywithsizeis calledthecombinatorialexplosion,anditapplies tomanydiscretesystems.However,thestate approachtofiniteautomatadoesyieldabstract modelsoflaw-governedsystemsthatareof interesttologicandphilosophy.Acorrectly operatingdigitalcomputerisafiniteautomaton. AlanTuringdefinedthefinitepartofwhatwe nowcallaTuringmachineintermsofstates.It seemsdoubtfulthatahumanorganismhasmore computingpowerthanafiniteautomaton. AclosedfiniteautomatonillustratesNie- tzsche'slawofeternalreturn.Sinceafinite automatonhasafinitenumberofinternalstates, atleastoneofitsinternalstatesmustoccurinfi- nitelymanytimesinanyinfinitestatehistory. Andsinceaclosedfiniteautomatonisdetermin- isticandhasnoinputs,arepeatedstatemustbe followedbythesamesequenceofstateseach timeitoccurs.Hencethehistoryofaclosedfinite automatonisperiodic,asinthelawofeternal return. Idealizedneuronsaresometimesusedasthe primitiveelementsoflogicalnets,anditisplau- siblethatforanybrainandcentralnervoussys- temthereisalogicalnetworkthatbehavesthe sameandperformsthesamefunctions.This showsthecloserelationoffiniteautomatatothe brainandcentralnervoussystem.Theswitches andmemoryelementsofafiniteautomatonmay bemadeprobabilistic,yieldingaprobabilistic automaton.Theseautomataaremodelsofinde- terministicsystems. VonNeumannshowedhowtoextenddeter- ministiclogicalnetstosystemsthatcontainself- reproducingautomata.Thisisaverybasiclogical designrelevanttothenatureoflife. Thepartofcomputerprogrammingtheorymost relevanttophilosophycontainstheanswerto Leibniz'sconjectureconcerninghischaracteristica universalisandcalculusratiocinator.Heheldthat "allourreasoningisnothingbutthejoiningand substitutionofcharacters,whetherthesecharac- tersbewordsorsymbolsorpictures."Hethought thereforethatonecouldconstructauniversal, arithmeticlanguagewithtwopropertiesofgreat philosophicalimportance.First,everyatomic conceptwouldberepresentedbyaprimenum- ber.Second,thetruth-valueofanylogically true-or-falsestatementexpressedinthecharac- teristicauniversaliscouldbecalculatedarithmeti- cally,andsoanyrationaldisputecouldbe resolvedbycalculation.Leibnizexpectedtodo thecomputationbyhandwiththehelpofacal- culatingmachine;todaywewoulddoitonan electroniccomputer.However,weknownow thatLeibniz'sproposedlanguagecannotexist, fornocomputer(orcomputerprogram)cancal- culatethetruth-valueofeverylogicallytrue-or- falsestatementgiventoit.Thisfactfollowsfrom alogicaltheoremaboutthelimitsofwhatcom- puterprogramscando.Let£beamodernelec- troniccomputerwithanindefinitelyexpandable memory,sothatEhasthepowerofauniversal Turingmachine.AndletLbeanyformållan- guageinwhicheveryarithmeticstatementcan beexpressed,andwhichisconsistent.Leibniz's proposedcharacteristicauniversaliswouldbesuch alanguage.Nowacomputerthatisoperating correctlyisanactiveformållanguage,carrying outtheinstructionsofitsprogramdeductively. Accordingly,Gödel'sincompletenesstheorems forformålarithmeticapplytocomputerE.Itfol- lowsfromthesetheoremsthatnoprogramcan enablecomputerEtodecideofanarbitrarystate- 166 computertheory computertheory mentofIwhetherornotthatstatementistrue. Morestrongly,therecannotevenbeaprogram thatwillenableEtoenumeratethetruthsoflan- guageLoneafteranother.ThereforeLeibniz's characteristicauniversaliscannotexist. Electroniccomputersarethefirstactiveor"live" mathematicalsystems.Theyarethelatestaddi- tiontoalonghistoricalseriesofmathematical toolsforinquiry:geometry,algebra,calculusand differentialequations,probabilityandstatistics, andmodernmathematics. Themosteffectiveuseofcomputerprograms istoinstructcomputersintasksforwhichthey aresuperiortohumans.Computersarebeing designedandprogrammedtocooperatewith humanssothatthecalculation,storage,and judgmentcapabilitiesofthetwoaresynthesized. Thepowersofsuchhuman-computercombines willincreaseatanexponentialråteascomputers continuetobecomefaster,morepowerful,and easiertouse,whileatthesametimebecoming smallerandcheaper.Thesocialimplicationsof thisareveryimportant. Themodemelectroniccomputerisanewtool forthelogicofdiscovery(Peirce'sabduction).An inquirer(orinquirers)operatingacomputer interactivelycanuseitasauniversalsimulator, dynamicallymodelingsystemsthataretoocom- plextostudybytraditionalmathematicalmeth- ods,includingnon-linearsystems.Simulationis usedtoexplainknownempiricalresults,andalso todevelopnewhypothesestobetestedbyobser- vation.Computermodelsandsimulationsare uniqueinseveralways:complexity,dynamism, controllabilityandvisualpresentability.These propertiesmakethemimportantnewtoolsfor modelingandtherebyrelevanttosomeimpor- tantphilosophicalproblems. Ahuman-computercombineisespecially suitedforthestudyofcomplexholisticandhier- archicalsystemswithfeedback(ef.cybernetics), includingadaptivegoal-directedsystems.Ahier- archical-feedbacksystemisadynamicstrueture organizedintoseverallevels,withthecom- poundsofonelevelbeingtheatomsorbuilding blocksofthenexthigherlevel,andwithcyclic pathsofinfluenceoperatingbothonand betweenlevels.Forexample,acomplexhuman institutionhasseverallevels,andthepeopleinit arethemselveshierarchicalorganizationsofself- copyingchemicals,cells,organs,andsuchsys- temsasthepulmonaryandthecentralnervous system. Thebehaviorsofthesesystemsareingeneral muchmorecomplexthan,e.g.,thebehaviorsof traditionalsystemsofmechanics.Contrastan organism,society,orecologywithourplanetary systemascharacterizedbyKeplerandNewton. Simpleformulas(ellipses)describetheorbitsof theplanets.Morebasically,theplanetarysystem isstableinthesensethatasmallperturbationof itproducesarelativelysmallvariationinitssub- sequenthistory.Incontrast,asmallchangein thestateofaholistichierarchicalfeedbacksys- temoftenamplifiesintoaverylargedifferencein behavior,aconcernofchaostheory.Forthisrea- sonitishelpfultomodelsuchsystemsonacom- puterandrunsamplehistories.Theoperator searchesforrepresentativecases,interesting phenomena,andgeneralprinciplesofoperation. Thehuman-computermethodofinquiry shouldbeausefultoolforthestudyofbiological evolution,theactualhistoricaldevelopmentof complexadaptivegoal-directedsystems.Evolu- tionisalogicalandcommunicationprocessas wellasaphysicalandchemicalprocess.Butevo- lutionisstatisticalratherthandeterministic, becauseasingletemporalstateofthesystem resultsinaprobabilisticdistributionofhistories, ratherthaninasinglehistory.Thegeneticoper- atorsofmutationandcrossover,e.g.,areproba- bilisticoperators.Butthoughitisstochastic, evolutioncannotbeunderstoodintermsoflim- itingrelativefrequencies,fortheimportant developmentsaretherepeatedemergenceof newphenomena,andtheremaybenoevolu- tionaryconvergencetowardafinalstateorlimit. Rather,tounderstandevolutiontheinvestigator mustsimulatethestatisticalspectraofhistories coveringcriticalstagesoftheprocess. Manyimportantevolutionaryphenomena shouldbestudiedbyusingsimulationalongwith observationandexperiment.Evolutionhaspro- ducedasuccessionoflevelsoforganization:self- copyingchemicals,self-reproducingcells, communitiesofcells,simpleorganisms,haploid sexualreproduetion,diploidsexualitywith geneticdominanceandrecessiveness,organisms composedoforgans,societiesoforganisms, humans,andsocietiesofhumans.Mostofthese systemsarecomplexhierarchicalfeedbacksys- tems,anditisofinteresttounderstandhowthey emergedfromearliersystems.Also,theinterac- tionofcompetitionandcooperationatallstages ofevolutionisanimportantsubject,ofrelevance tosocialphilosophyandethics. Somebasicepistemologicalandmetaphysical conceptsenterintocomputermodeling.Amodel isawell-developedconceptofitsobject,repre- sentingcharacteristicslikestruetureandfunc- 167 Comte,Auguste Comte,Auguste tion.Amodelissimilartoitsobjectinimportant respects,butsimpler;inmathematicalterminol- ogy,amodelishomomorphictoitsobjectbutnot isomorphictoit.However,itisoftenusefulto thinkofamodelasisomorphictoanembedded subsystemofthesystemitmodels.Forexample,a gasisacomplicatedsystemofmicrostatesofpar- ticles,butthesemicrostatescanbegroupedinto macrostates,eachwithapressure,volume,and temperaturesatisfyingthegaslawPV=kT.The derivationofthislawfromthedetailedmechan- icsofthegasisareductionoftheembeddedsub- systemtotheunderlyingsystem.Inmanycases itisadequatetoworkwiththesimplerembed- dedsubsystem,butinothercasesonemustwork withthemorecomplexbutcompleteunderlying system. Thelawofanembeddedsubsystemmaybe differentinkindfromthelawoftheunderlying system.Consider,e.g.,amachinetossingacoin randomly.Thesequenceoftossesobeysasimple probabilitylaw,whilethecomplexunderlying mechanicalsystemisdeterministic.Therandom sequenceoftossesisaprobabilisticsystem embeddedinadeterministicsystem,andamath- ematicalaccountofthisembeddingrelationcon- stitutesareductionoftheprobabilisticsystemto adeterministicsystem.Comparethecompati- bilisfsclaimthatfreechoicecanbeembeddedin adeterministicsystem.Comparealsoapseudo- randomsequence,whichisadeterministic sequencewithadequaterandomnessforagiven (finite)simulation.Notefinallythattheproba- bilisticsystemofquantummechanicsunderlies thedeterministicsystemofmechanics. Thewaysinwhichmodelsareusedbygoal- directedsystemstosolveproblemsandadaptto theirenvironmentsarecurrentlybeingmodeled byhuman-computercombines.Sincecomputer Softwarecanbeconvertedintohardware,suc- cessfulsimulationsofadaptiveusesofmodels couldbeincorporatedintothedesignofarobot. Humanintentionalityinvolvestheuseofa modelofoneselfinrelationtoothersandthe environment.Aproblem-solvingrobotusing suchamodelwouldconstituteanimportantstep towardarobotwithfullhumanpowers. Theseconsiderationsleadtothecentralthesisof thephilosophyoflogicalmechanism:afinitedeter- ministicautomatoncanperformallhumanfunc- tions.Thisseemsplausibleinprinciple(andis treatedindetailinMerrileeSalmon,ed.,The PhilosophyofLogicalMechanism:EssaysinHonorof ArthurW.Burks,1990).Adigitalcomputerhasrea- soningandmemorypowers.Robotshavesensory inputsforcollectinginformationfromtheenvi- ronment,andtheyhavemovingandacting devices.Toobtainarobotwithhumanpowers,one wouldneedtoputtheseabilitiesunderthedirec- tionofasystemofdesires,purposes,andgoals. Logicalmechanismisaformofmechanismor materialism,butdiffersfromtraditionalformsof thesedoctrinesinitsrelianceonthelogicalpowers ofcomputersandthelogicalnatureofevolution anditsproducts.Themoderncomputerisakindof complexhierarchicalphysicalsystem,asystem withmemory,processor,andcontrolthatemploys ahierarchyofprogramminglanguages.Humans arecomplexhierarchicalsystemsdesignedbyevo- lution-withstructurallevelsofchemicals,cells, organs,andsystems(e.g.,circulatory,neural, immune)andlinguisticlevelsofgenes,enzymes, neuralsignals,andimmunerecognition.Tradi- tionalmaterialistsdidnothavethismodelofa computernorthecontemporaryunderstandingof evolution,andnevergaveanadequateaccountof logicandreasoningandsuchphenomenaasgoal- directednessandself-modeling. Seealsoartificialintelligence,cyber- NETICS,DETERMINISM,GÖDEl/SINCOMPLETE- NESSTHEOREMS,SELF-REPRODUCINGAUTOM- ATON,TURINGMACHINE.A.W.B. Comte,Auguste(1798-1857),Frenchphiloso- pherandsociologist,thefounderofpositivism. HewaseducatedinParisat1'ÉcolePolytech- nique,wherehebrieflytaughtmathematics.He sufferedfromamentalillnessthatoccasionally interruptedhiswork. Inconformitywithempiricism,Comteheld thatknowledgeoftheworldarisesfromobser- vation.Hewentbeyondmanyempiricists,how- ever,indenyingthepossibilityofknowledgeof unobservablephysicalobjects.Heconceivedof positivismasamethodofstudybasedonobser- vationandrestrictedtotheobservable.He appliedpositivismchieflytoscience.Heclaimed thatthegoalofscienceisprediction,tobeaccom- plishedusinglawsofsuccession.Explanation insofarasattainablehasthesamestructureas prediction.Itsubsumeseventsunderlawsofsuc- cession;itisnotcausal.InfluencedbyKant,he heldthatthecausesofphenomenaandthe natureofthings-in-themselvesarenotknow- able.Hecriticizedmetaphysicsforungrounded speculationaboutsuchmatters;heaccuseditof notkeepingimaginationsubordinatetoobserva- tion.Headvancedpositivismforallthesciences butheldthateachsciencehasadditionalspecial methods,andhaslawsnotderivablebyhuman intelligencefromlawsofothersciences.Hecor- respondedextensivelywithJ.S.Mill,who 168 conative conceptualism encouragedhisworkanddiscusseditinAuguste ComteandPositivism(1865).Twentieth-century logicalpositivismwasinspiredbyComte'sideas. Comtewasafounderofsociology,whichhe alsocalledsocialphysics.Hedividedthescience intotwobranches-staticsanddynamicsdealing respectivelywithsocialorganizationandsocial development.Headvocatedahistoricalmethod ofstudyforbothbranches.Asalawofsocial development,heproposedthatallsocietiespass throughthreeintellectualstages,firstinterpret- ingphenomenatheologically,thenmetaphysi- cally,andfinallypositivistically.Thegeneralidea thatsocietiesdevelopaccordingtolawsofnature wasadoptedbyMarx. Comte'smostimportantworkishissix-vol- umeCoursdephilosophiepositive(CourseinPositive Philosophy,1830-42).Itisanencyclopedictreat- mentofthesciencesthatexpoundspositivism andculminatesintheintroductionofsociology. Seealsoempiricism,logicalpositivism. P.We. conative.Seevolition. conceivability,capabilityofbeingconceivedor imagined.Thus,goldenmountainsareconceiv- able;roundsquares,inconceivable.AsDescartes pointedout,thesortofimaginabilityrequiredis nottheabilitytoformmentalimages.Chil- iagons,Cartesianminds,andGodareallcon- ceivable,thoughnoneofthesecanbepictured "inthemind'seye."Historicalreferencesinclude Anselm'sdefinitionofGodas"abeingthan whichnonegreatercanbeconceived"and Descartes'sargumentfordualismfromthecon- ceivabilityofdisembodiedexistence.Severalof Hume'sargumentsrestuponthemaximthat whateverisconceivableispossible.Heargued, e.g.,thataneventcanoccurwithoutacause, sincethisisconceivable,andhiscritiqueof inductionreliesontheinferencefromthecon- ceivabilityofachangeinthecourseofnatureto itspossibility.Inresponse,Reidmaintainedthat toconceiveismerelytounderstandthemeaning ofaproposition.Reidarguedthatimpossibilities areconceivable,sincewemustbeabletounder- standfalsehoods.Manysimplyequateconceiv- abilitywithpossibility,sothattosaysomething isconceivable(orinconceivable)justistosay thatitispossible(orimpossible).Suchusageis controversial,sinceconceivabilityisbroadlyan epistemologicalnotionconcemingwhatcanbe thought,whereaspossibilityisametaphysical notionconcerninghowthingscanbe. Thesamecontroversycanariseregardingthe compossible,orco-possible,wheretwostatesof affairsarecompossibleprovideditispossiblethat theybothobtain,andtwopropositionsarecom- possibleprovidedtheirconjunctionispossible. Alternatively,twothingsarecompossibleifand onlyifthereisapossibleworldcontainingboth. Leibnizheldthattwothingsarecompossiblepro- videdtheycanbeascribedtothesamepossible worldwithoutcontradiction."Therearemany possibleuniverses,eachcollectionofcompossi- blesmakingoneofthem."Othershaveargued thatnon-contradictionissufficientforneither possibilitynorcompossibility. Theclaimthatsomethingisinconceivableis usuallymeanttosuggestmorethanmerelyan inabilitytoconceive.Itistosaythattryingto conceiveresultsinaphenomenallydistinctive mentalrepugnance,e.g.whenoneattemptsto conceiveofanobjectthatisredandgreenall överatonce.Onthisusagetheinconceivable mightbeequatedwithwhatonecan"justsee" tobeimpossible.Therearetworelatedusagesof 'conceivable':(1)notinconceivableinthesense justdescribed;and(2)suchthatonecan"just see"thatthethinginquestionispossible.Gold- bach'sconjecturewouldseemaclearexampleof somethingconceivableinthefirstsense,butnot thesecond. Seealsoleibniz,necessity,possible worlds.P.Ti. concept.Seeconceptualism. concept,denoting.Seerussell. concept,theoretical.Seetheoreticalterm. conceptualanalysis.Seeanalysis. conceptualimmediacy.Seeimmediacy. conceptualism,theviewthattherearenouni- versalsandthatthesupposedclassificatoryfunc- tionofuniversalsisactuallyservedbyparticular conceptsinthemind.Auniversalisaproperty thatcanbeinstantiatedbymorethanoneindi- vidualthing(orparticular)atthesametime;e.g., theshapeofthispage,ifidenticalwiththeshape ofthenextpage,willbeonepropertyinstanti- atedbytwodistinctindividualthingsatthesame time.Ifviewedaslocatedwherethepagesare, thenitwouldbeimmanent.Ifviewedasnothav- ingspatiotemporallocationitself,butonlybear- ingaconnection,usuallycalledinstantiationor exemplification,tothingsthathavesuchlocation, thentheshapeofthispagewouldbetranscendent 169 conceptualpolarity Condillac,ÉtienneBonnotde andpresumablywouldexistevenifexemplified bynothing,asPlatoseemstohaveheld.Thecon- ceptualistrejectsbothviewsbyholdingthatuni- versalsaremerelyconcepts.Mostgenerally,a conceptmaybeunderstoodasaprincipleofclas- sification,somethingthatcanguideusindeter- miningwhetheranentitybelongsinagivenclass ordoesnot.Ofcourse,propertiesunderstoodas universalssatisfytriviallythisdefinitionand thusmaybecalledconcepts,asindeedtheywere byFrege.Buttheconceptualisticsubstantive viewsofconceptsarethatconceptsare(i)men- talrepresentations,oftencalledideas,servingtheir classificatoryfunctionpresumablybyresembling theentitiestobeclassified;or(2)brainstatesthat servethesamefunctionbutpresumablynotby resemblance;or(3)generalwords(adjectives, commonnouns,verbs)orusesofsuchwords,an entity'sbelongingtoacertainclassbeingdeter- minedbytheapplicabilitytotheentityofthe appropriateword;or(4)abilitiestoclassifycor- rectly,whetherornotwiththeaidofanitem belongingunder(1),(2),or(3).Thetraditional conceptualistholds(1).Defendersof(3)would bemoreproperlycallednominalists.Inwhich- everwayconceptsareunderstood,andregard- lessofwhetherconceptualismistrue,theyare obviouslyessentialtoourunderstandingand knowledgeofanything,evenatthemostbasic levelofcognition,namely,recognition.Theclas- sicworkonthetopicisThinkingandExperience (1954)byH.H.Price,whoheld(4).Seealso METAPHYSICS,PLATO,PROPERTY.P.Bu. conceptualpolarity.Seepolarity. conceptualpriority.Seedependence. conceptualrolesemantics.Seemeaning,philoso- PHYOFMIND. conceptualroletheoryofmeaning.Seemeaning. conceptualtruth.Seeanalytic-syntheticdis- TINCTION. conciliarism.Seegerson. concilience.Seewhewell. conclusiveevidence.Seeevidence. conclusivejustification.Seejustification. concomitantvariation,methodof.Seemill's METHODS. concrescence.Seewhitehead. concreteuniversal.Seehegel. concretion,principleof.Seewhitehead. concretism.Seereism. concurrentcause.Seecausation. concursusdei,God'sconcurrence.Thenotion derivesfromatheoryfrommedievalphilosoph- icaltheology,accordingtowhichanycaseofcau- sationinvolvingcreatedsubstancesrequires boththeexerciseofgenuinecausalpowers inherentincreaturesandtheexerciseofGod's causalactivity.Inparticular,aperson'sactions aretheresultoftheperson'scausalpowers,often includingthepowersofdeliberationandchoice, andGod'scausalendorsement.Divineconcur- rencemaintainsthatthenatureofGod'sactivity ismoredeterminatethansimplyconservingthe createdworldinexistence.Althoughdivinecon- currenceagreeswithoccasionalisminholding God'spowertobenecessaryforanyeventto occur,itdivergesfromoccasionalisminsofarasit regardscreaturesascausallyactive.Seealso OCCASIONALISM.W.E.M. Condillac,ÉtienneBonnotde(1714-80),French philosopher,anempiricistwhowasconsidered thegreatanalyticalmindofhisgeneration.Close toRousseauandDiderot,hestayedwithinthe church.Heisclosely(perhapsexcessively)iden- tifiedwiththeimageofthestatuethat,inthe Trattedessensations(TreatiseonSensePerception, 1754),heendowswiththefivesensestoexplain howperceptionsareassimilatedandproduce understanding(ef.alsohisTreatiseontheOrigins ofHumanKnowledge,1746).Hemaintainsacriti- caldistancefromprecursors:headoptsLocke's tabularasabutfromhisfirstworktoLogique (Logic,1780)insistsonthecreativeroleofthe mindasitanalyzesandcomparessenseimpres- sions.HisTraitédesanimaux(TreatiseonAnimals, 1755),whichincludesaproofoftheexistenceof God,considerssensatecreaturesratherthan Descartes'sanimauxmachinesandseesGodonly asafinalcause.HereshapesLeibniz'smonadsin theMonadologie(Monadology,1748,rediscovered in1980).IntheLanguedescalculs(Languageof Numbers,1798)heproposesmathematicsasa modelofclearanalysis. Theoriginoflanguageandcreationofsymbols eventuallybecamehismajorconcern.Hisbreak withmetaphysicsintheTraitédessystémes(Trea- 170 condition conditioning tiseonSystems,1749)hasbeenoveremphasized, butCondillacdoesreplacerationalconstructs withsenseexperienceandreflection.Hisempiri- cismhasbeenmistakenformaterialism,hisclear analysisforsimplicity.The"ideologues,"Destutt deTracyandLaromiguiére,foundLockeinhis writings.Jeffersonadmiredhim.MainedeBiran, whilecritical,wasindebtedtohimforconcepts ofperceptionandtheself;Cousindislikedhim; Saussuresawhimasaforerunnerinthestudyof theoriginsoflanguage. Seealsoleibniz,locke,sensationalism. O.A.H. condition,astateofaffairsor"waythingsare," mostcommonlyreferredtoinrelationtosome- thingthatimpliesorisimpliedbyit.Letp,q,and rbeschematiclettersfordeclarativesentences; andletP,Q,andRbecorrespondingnominaliza- tions;e.g.,ifpis'snowiswhite',thenPwouldbe 'snow'sbeingwhite'.Pcanbeanecessaryorsuf- ficientconditionofQinanyofseveralsenses.In theweakestsensePisasufficientconditionofQ iff(ifandonlyif):ifpthenq(orifPisactualthen Qisactual)-wheretheconditionalistoberead as"material,"asamountingmerelytonot-(p& not-q).AtthesametimeQisanecessarycondi- tionofPiff:ifnot-qthennot-p.ItfollowsthatP isasufficientconditionofQiffQisanecessary conditionofP.Strongersensesofsufficiencyand ofnecessityaredefinable,intermsofthisbasic sense,asfollows:Pisnomologicallysufficient(nec- essary)forQiffitfollowsfromthelawsofnature, butnotwithoutthem,thatifpthenq(thatifq thenp).Pisalethicallyormetaphysicallysufficient (necessary)forQiffitisalethicallyormetaphys- icallynecessarythatifpthenq(thatifqthenp). However,itisperhapsmostcommonofallto interpretconditionsintermsofsubjunctivecon- ditionals,insuchawaythatPisasufficientcon- ditionofQiffPwouldnotoccurunlessQ occurred,or:ifPshouldoccur,Qwould;andPis anecessaryconditionofQiffQwouldnotoccur unlessPoccurred,or:ifQshouldoccur,Pwould. Seealsocausation,property,stateof AFFAIRS.E.S. conditional,acompoundsentence,suchas'if Abecalls,thenBenanswers,'inwhichonesen- tence,theantecedent,isconnectedtoasecond, theconsequent,bytheconnective'if...then'. Propositions(statements,etc.)expressedbycon- ditionalsarecalledconditionalpropositions(state- ments,etc.)and,byellipsis,simplyconditionals. Theambiguityoftheexpression'if...then' givesrisetoasemanticclassificationofcondi- tionalsintomaterialconditionals,causalcondi- tionals,counterfactualconditionals,andsoon. Intraditionallogic,conditionalsarecalledhypo- theticals,andinsomeareasofmathematical logicconditionalsarecalledimplications.Faith- fulanalysisofthemeaningsofconditionalscon- tinuestobeinvestigatedandintenselydisputed. Seealsocorrespondingconditional, COUNTERFACTUALS,IMPLICATION,PROPOSI- TION,TRUTHTABLE.J.Cor. conditional,material.Seecounterfactuals,im- PLICATION. conditional,strict.Seecounterfactuals,impli- CATION. conditionalprobability.Seeprobability. conditionalproof.(1)Theargumentform'Bfol- lowsfromA;therefore,ifAthenB'andargu- mentsofthisform.(2)Theruleofinferencethat permitsonetoinferaconditionalgivenaderiva- tionofitsconsequentfromitsantecedent.Thisis alsoknownastheruleofconditionalprooforD- introduction.G.F.S. conditionalproposition.Seeconditional,con- VERSE,COUNTERFACTUALS. conditioning,aformofassociativelearningthat occurswhenchangesinthoughtorbehaviorare producedbytemporalrelationsamongevents.It iscommontodistinguishbetweentwotypesof conditioning;one,classicalorPavlovian,inwhich behaviorchangeresultsfromeventsthatoccur beforebehavior;theother,operantorinstrumen- tal,inwhichbehaviorchangeoccursbecauseof eventsafterbehavior.Roughly,classicallyand operantlyconditionedbehaviorcorrespondto theeveryday,folk-psychologicaldistinction betweeninvoluntaryandvoluntaryorgoal- directedbehavior.Inclassicalconditioning,stim- ulioreventselicitaresponse(e.g.,salivation); neutralstimuli(e.g.,adinnerbell)gaincontrol överbehaviorwhenpairedwithstimulithat alreadyelicitbehavior(e.g.,theappearanceof dinner).Thebehaviorisinvoluntary.Inoperant conditioning,stimulioreventsreinforcebehav- iorafterbehavioroccurs;neutralstimuligain powertoreinforcebybeingpairedwithactual reinforcers.Here,occasionsinwhichbehavioris reinforcedserveasdiscriminativestimuli-evok- ingbehavior.Operantbehaviorisgoal-directed, ifnotconsciouslyordeliberately,thenthrough thebondbetweenbehaviorandreinforcement. 171 conditiiosinequanon confirmation Thus,thearrangementofcondimentsatdinner mayserveasthediscriminativestimulusevoking therequest"Pleasepassthesalt,"whereassay- ing"Thankyou"mayreinforcethebehaviorof passingthesalt. Itisnoteasytointegrateconditioningphe- nomenaintoaunifiedtheoryofconditioning. Sometheoristscontendthatoperantcondition- ingisreallyclassicalconditioningveiledbysub- tletemporalrelationsamongevents.Other theoristscontendthatoperantconditioning requiresmentalrepresentationsofreinforcers anddiscriminativestimuli.B.F.Skinner(1904- 90)arguedinWaldenTwo(1948)thatastute, benevolentbehavioralengineerscanandshould useconditioningtocreateasocialutopia. Seealsoredintegration.G.A.G. conditiosinequanon(Latin,'aconditionwith- outwhichnot'),anecessarycondition;some- thingwithoutwhichsomethingelsecouldnotbe orcouldnotoccur.Forexample,beingaplane figureisaconditiosinequanonforbeingatrian- gle.Sometimesthephraseisusedemphatically asasynonymforanunconditionedpresupposi- tion,beitforanactiontostartoranargument togetgoing.I.Bo. Condorcet,Marquisde,titleofMarie-Jean- Antoine-NicolasdeCaritat(1743-94),French philosopherandpoliticaltheoristwhocon- tributedtotheEncyclopediaandpioneeredthe mathematicalanalysisofsocialinstitutions. AlthoughprominentintheRevolutionarygov- ernment,hewasdenouncedforhispolitical viewsanddiedinprison. Condorcetdiscoveredthevotingparadox, whichshowsthatmajoritarianvotingcanpro- ducecyclicalgrouppreferences.Suppose,for instance,thatvotersA,B,andCrankproposalsx, y,andzasfollows:A:xyz,B:yzx,andC:zxy.Then inmajoritarianvotingxbeatsyandybeatsz,but zinturnbeatsx.Sotheresultinggroupprefer- encesarecyclical.Thediscoveryofthisproblem helpedinitiatesocialchoicetheory,whichevalu- atesvotingsystems.Condorcetarguedthatany satisfactoryvotingsystemmustguaranteeselec- tionofaproposalthatbeatsallrivalsinmajori- tariancompetition.Suchaproposaliscalleda Condorcetwinner.Hisjurytheoremsaysthatifvot- ersregistertheiropinionsaboutsomematter, suchaswhetheradefendantisguilty,andthe probabilitiesthatindividualvotersarerightare greaterthanV2,equal,andindependent,thenthe majorityvoteismorelikelytobecorrectthanany individual'sorminority'svote. CondorcefsmainworksareEssaisur1'applica- tionde1'analyseälaprobabilitédesdécisionsrendues alapluralitédesvoix(EssayontheApplicationof AnalysistotheProbabilityofDécisionsReachedbya MajorityofVotes,1785);andaposthumoustrea- tiseonsocialissues,Esquissed'untableauhis- toriquedesprogrésde1'esprithumain(Sketchfora HistoricalPictureoftheProgressoftheHumanMind, 1795). Seealsoprobability,socialchoicethe- ory,VOTINGPARADOX.P.We. Condorcetwinner.Seecondorcet. confirmation,anevidentialrelationbetweenevi- denceandanystatement(especiallyascientific hypothesis)thatthisevidencesupports.Itis essentialtodistinguishtwodistinct,andfunda- mentallydifferent,meaningsoftheterm:(1)the incrementalsense,inwhichapieceofevidence contributesatleastsomedegreeofsupporttothe hypothesisinquestion-e.g.,findingafinger- printofthesuspectatthesceneofthecrime lendssomeweighttothehypothesisthatthesus- pectisguilty;and(2)theabsolutesense,inwhich abodyofevidenceprovidesstrongsupportfor thehypothesisinquestion-e.g.,acasepre- sentedbyaprosecutormakingitpracticallycer- tainthatthesuspectisguilty.Ifonethinksof confirmationintermsofprobability,thenevi- dencethatincreasestheprobabilityofahypothe- sisconfirmsitincrementally,whereasevidence thatrendersahypothesishighlyprobableconfirms itabsolutely. Ineachofthetwoforegoingsensesonecan distinguishthreetypesofconfirmation:(i)qual- itative,(ii)quantitative,and(iii)comparative.(i) Bothexamplesintheprecedingparagraphillus- tratequalitativeconfirmation,fornonumerical valuesofthedegreeofconfirmationweremen- tioned.(ii)Ifagambler,uponlearningthatan opponentholdsacertaincard,assertsthather chanceofwinninghasincreasedfrom2hto%, theclaimisaninstanceofquantitativeincre- mentalconfirmation.Ifaphysicianstatesthat, onthebasisofanX-ray,theprobabilitythatthe patienthastuberculosisis.95,thatclaimexem- plifiesquantitativeabsoluteconfirmation.Inthe incrementalsense,anycaseofquantitativecon- firmationinvolvesadifferencebetweentwoprob- abilityvalues;intheabsolutesense,anycaseof quantitativeconfirmationinvolvesonlyoneprob- abilityvalue.(iii)Comparativeconfirmationin theincrementalsensewouldbeillustratedifan investigatorsaidthatpossessionofthemurder weaponweighsmoreheavilyagainstthesuspect 172 confirmation,degreeof Confucianism thandoesthefingerprintfoundatthesceneof thecrime.Comparativeconfirmationinthe absolutesensewouldoccurifaprosecutor claimedtohavestrongcasesagainsttwosuspects thoughttobeinvolvedinacrime,butthatthe caseagainstoneisstrongerthanthatagainstthe other. Evengivenrecognitionoftheforegoingsix varietiesofconfirmation,thereisstillconsider- ablecontroversyregardingitsanalysis.Some authorsclaimthatquantitativeconfirmation doesnotexist;onlyqualitativeand/orcompara- tiveconfirmationarepossible.Someauthors maintainthatconfirmationhasnothingtodo withprobability,whereasothers-knownas Bayesians-analyzeconfirmationexplicitlyin termsofBayes'stheoreminthemathematical calculusofprobability.Amongthosewhooffer probabilisticanalysestherearedifferencesasto whichinterpretationofprobabilityissuitablein thiscontext.Popperadvocatesaconceptofcor- roborationthatdiffersfundamentallyfromcon- firmation. Many(realorapparent)paradoxesofconfir- mationhavebeenposed;themostfamousisthe paradoxoftherävens.Itisplausibletosupposethat 'Allrävensareblack'canbeincrementallycon- firmedbytheobservationofoneofitsinstances, namely,ablackcrow.However,'Allrävensare black'islogicallyequivalentto'Allnon-black thingsarenon-ravens.'Byparityofreasoning, aninstanceofthisstatement,namely,anynon- blacknon-raven(e.g.,awhiteshoe),should incrementallyconfirmit.Moreover,theequiva- lencecondition-whateverconfirmsahypothesis mustequallyconfirmanystatementlogically equivalenttoit-seemseminentlyreasonable. Theresultappearstofacilitateindooromithol- ogy,fortheobservationofawhiteshoewould seemtoconfirmincrementallythehypothesis thatallrävensareblack.Manyattemptedreso- lutionsofthisparadoxcanbefoundintheliter- ature. Seealsotestability,verificationism. w.c.s. confirmation,degreeof.Seecarnap. confirmation,paradoxesof.Seeconfirmation. confirmationalholism.SeepHiLosopHYofscience. Confucianism,aChineseschoolofthoughtand setofmoral,ethical,andpoliticalteachingsusu- allyconsideredtobefoundedbyConfucius. BeforethetimeofConfucius(sixth-fifthcentury b.c),asocialgroup,theJu(literally,'weaklings' or'foundlings'),existedwhosememberswere ritualistsandsometimesalsoteachersbyprofes- sion.Confuciusbelongedtothisgroup;but althoughheretainedtheinterestinrituals,he wasalsoconcernedwiththethenchaoticsocial andpoliticalsituationandwiththesearchfor remedies,whichhebelievedtolieintherestora- tionandmaintenanceofcertaintraditionalval- uesandnorms.Låterthinkerswhoprofessedto befollowersofConfuciussharedsuchconcern andbeliefand,althoughtheyinterpretedand developedConfucius'steachingsindifferent ways,theyareoftenregardedasbelongingtothe sameschoolofthought,traditionallyreferredto byChinesescholarsasJu-chia,ortheschoolof theJu.Theterm'Confucianism'isusedtorefer tosomeoralloftherangeofphenomenainclud- ingthewayoflifeoftheJuasagroupofritual- ists,theschoolofthoughtreferredtoasJu-chia, theethical,social,andpoliticalidealsadvocated bythisschoolofthought(whichincludebutgo wellbeyondthepracticeofrituals),andthe influenceofsuchidealsontheactualsocialand politicalorderandthelifeoftheChinese. Asaschoolofthought,Confucianismischar- acterizedbyacommonethicalidealwhich includesanaffectiveconcernforalllivingthings, varyingindegreeandnaturedependingonhow suchthingsrelätetooneself;areverentialatti- tudetowardothersmanifestedintheobservance offormålrulesofconductsuchasthewayto receiveguests;anabilitytodeterminetheproper courseofconduct,whetherthiscallsforobser- vanceoftraditionalnormsordeparturefrom suchnorms;andafirmcommitmenttoproper conductsothatoneisnotswayedbyadversecir- cumstancessuchaspovertyordeath.Everyone issupposedtohavetheabilitytoattainthisideal, andpeopleareurgedtoexerciseconstantvigi- lanceövertheircharactersothattheycantrans- formthemselvestoembodythisidealfully.Inthe politicalrealm,arulerwhoembodiestheideal willcareaboutandprovideforthepeople,who willbeattractedtohim;themoralexamplehe setswillhaveatransformingeffectonthepeo- ple. DifferentConfucianthinkershavedifferent conceptionsofthewaytheethicalidealmaybe justifiedandattained.Mencius(fourthcentury b.c.)regardedtheidealasafullrealizationof certainincipientmoralinclinationssharedby humanbeings,andemphasizedtheneedto reflectonandfullydevelopsuchinclinations. HsiinTzu(thirdcenturyb.c.)regardeditasa wayofoptimizingthesatisfactionofpresocial 173 Confucius connected humandesires,andemphasizedtheneedto learnthenormsgoverningsocialdistinctionsand letthemtransformandregulatethepursuitof satisfactionofsuchdesires.Differentkindsof Confucianthoughtcontinuedtoevolve,yielding suchmajorthinkersasTungChung-shu(second centuryb.c.)andHanYii(a.d.768-824).Han YiiregardedMenciusasthetruetransmitterof Confucius'steachings,andthisviewbecame generallyaccepted,largelythroughtheeffortsof ChuHsi(1130-1200).TheMencianformof Confucianthoughtcontinuedtobedevelopedin differentwaysbysuchmajorthinkersasChuHsi, WangYang-ming(1472-1529),andTaiChen (1723-77),whodifferedconcerningthewayto attaintheConfucianidealandthemetaphysics undergirdingit.Despitethesedivergentdevel- opments,Confuciuscontinuedtoberevered withinthistraditionofthoughtasitsfirstand mostimportantthinker,andtheConfucian schoolofthoughtcontinuedtoexertgreatinflu- enceonChineselifeandonthesocialandpolit- icalorderdowntothepresentcentury. Seealsochuhsi,mencius,wangyang- ming.K.-l.S. Confucius,alsoknownasK'ungCh'iu,K'ung Tzu,KungFu-tzu(sixth-fifthcenturyb.c),Chi- nesethinkerusuallyregardedasfounderofthe Confucianschoolofthought.Histeachingsare recordedintheLunYtiorAnalects,acollectionof sayingsbyhimandbydisciples,andofconver- sationsbetweenhimandhisdisciples.Hishigh- estethicalidealisjen(humanity,goodness), whichincludesanaffectiveconcernforthewell- beingofothers,desirableattributes(e.g.filial piety)withinfamilial,social,andpoliticalinsti- tutions,andotherdesirableattributessuchas yung(courage,bravery).Animportantpartof theidealisthegeneralobservanceofIi(rites), thetraditionalnormsgoverningconduct betweenpeoplerelatedbytheirdifferentsocial positions,alongwithacriticalreflectiononsuch normsandapreparednesstoadaptthemtopre- sentcircumstances.Humanconductshouldnot bedictatedbyfixedrules,butshouldbesensitive torelevantconsiderationsandshouldaccord withyi(rightness,duty).Otherimportantcon- ceptsincludeshu(consideration,reciprocity), whichinvolvesnotdoingtoanotherwhatone wouldnothavewisheddonetooneself,and chung(loyalty,commitment),interpretedvari- ouslyasacommitmenttotheexerciseofshu,to thenormsofIi,ortoone'sdutiestowardsuperi- orsandequals.Theidealofjeniswithinthereach ofall,andoneshouldconstantlyreflectonone's characterandcorrectone'sdeficiencies.Jenhas transformativepowersthatshouldideallybethe basisofgovernment;arulerwithjenwillcare aboutandprovideforthepeople,whowillbe attractedtohim,andthemoralexamplehesets willinspirepeopletoreformthemselves.See alsoCONFUCIANISM,JEN,LI2.K.-l.S. congruence.Seelewis,c.i. conjecture.Seepopper. conjunction,thelogicaloperationonapairof propositionsthatistypicallyindicatedbythe coordinatingconjunction'and'.Thetruthtable forconjunctionis Q P-and-Q T T F T F T T F F F Besides'and',othercoordinatingconjunctions, including'but','however','moreover',and 'although',canindicatelogicalconjunction,as canthesemicolon';'andthecomma','.Seealso TRUTHTABLE.R.W.B. conjunctionelimination.(1)Theargumentform 'AandB;therefore,A(orB)'andargumentsof thisform.(2)Theruleofinferencethatpermits onetoinfereitherconjunctfromaconjunction. Thisisalsoknownastheruleofsimplificationor a-elimination.Seealsoconjunction.G.F.S. conjunctionintroduction.(1)Theargument form'A,B;therefore,AandB'andargumentsof thisform.(2)Theruleofinferencethatpermits onetoinferaconjunctionfromitstwocon- juncts.Thisisalsoknownastheruleofconjunc- tionintroduction,a-introduction,oradjunction.See alsoconjunction.G.F.S. conjunctivenormalform.Seenormalform. connected,saidofarelationRwhere,foranytwo distinctelementsxandyofthedomain,eitherxRy oryRx.Rissaidtobestronglyconnectedif,forany twoelementsxandy,eitherxRyoryRx,evenifx andyareidentical.Giventhedomarnofpositive integers,forinstance,therelations;herePristhe finitistproofpredicateforT,sisafinitistically meaningfulstatement,and's'itstranslationinto thelanguageofT.Ifonecouldestablishfinitisti- callytheconsistencyofT,onecouldbesure-on finitistgrounds-thatTisareliableinstrument fortheproofoffinitiststatements. Therearemanyexamplesofsignificantrela- tiveconsistencyproofs:(i)non-Euclideangeom- etryrelativetoEuclidean,Euclideangeometry relativetoanalysis;(ii)settheorywiththeaxiom ofchoicerelativetosettheory(withoutthe axiomofchoice),settheorywiththenegationof theaxiomofchoicerelativetosettheory;(iii) classicalarithmeticrelativetointuitionistic arithmetic,subsystemsofclassicalanalysisrela- tivetointuitionistictheoriesofconstructiveordi- nals.Themathematicalsignificanceofrelative consistencyproofsisoftenbroughtoutbysharp- eningthemtoestablishconservativeextension results;thelattermaythenensure,e.g.,thatthe theorieshavethesameclassofprovablytotal functions.Theinitialmotivationforsuchargu- mentsis,however,frequentlyphilosophical:one wantstoguaranteethecoherenceoftheoriginal theoryonanepistemologicallydistinguished basis. Seealsocantor,completeness,gödel/s INCOMPLETENESSTHEOREMS,HILBERT'SPRO- GRAM,PROOFTHEORY.W.S. consistency,axiomof.Seeaxiomofconsistency. consistency,semantic.Seeconsistency. consistency,syntactic.Seeconsistency. Constant,Benjamin,infull,Henri-Benjamin ConstantdeRebecque(1767-1830),Swiss-born defenderofliberalismandpassionateanalystof FrenchandEuropeanpolitics.Hewelcomedthe FrenchRevolutionbutnottheReignofTerror, theviolenceofwhichheavoidedbyacceptinga lowlydiplomaticpostinBraunschweig(1787- 94).In1795hereturnedtoPariswithMadame deStaélandintervenedinparliamentary debates.Hispamphletsopposedbothextremes, theJacobinandtheBonapartist.Impressedby Rousseau'sSocialContract,hecametofearthat likeNapoleon'sdictatorship,the"generalwill" couldthreatencivilrights.Hehadfirstwelcomed Napoleon,butturnedagainsthisautocracy.He favoredparliamentarydemocracy,separationof churchandstate,andabillofrights.Thehigh pointofhispoliticalcareercamewithmember- shipintheTribunat(1800-02),aconsultative chamberappointedbytheSenate. HiscentristpositionisevidentinthePrincipes depolitique(1806-10).Hadnotrepublicanterror beenasdestructiveastheEmpire?Inchapters 16-17,Constantopposesthelibertyofthe ancientsandthatofthemoderns.Heassumes thattheGreekworldwasgiventowar,and thereforestrengthened"politicalliberty"that favörsthestateövertheindividual(thelibertyof theancients).Fundamentallyoptimistic,he believedthatwarwasathingofthepast,and thatthemodernworldneedstoprotect"civillib- erty,"i.e.thelibertyoftheindividual(theliberty ofthemoderns).ThegreatmeritofConstanfs comparisonistheanalysisofhistoricalforces,the theorythatgovernmentsmustsupportcurrent needsanddonotdependondeterministicfactors suchasthesizeofthestate,itsformofgovern- ment,geography,climate,andrace.Herehecon- tradictsMontesquieu. Theoppositionbetweenancientandmodern libertyexpressesaradicalliberalismthatdidnot seemtofitFrenchpolitics.However,itwasthe beginningoftheliberaltradition,contrasting politicallibertyintheserviceofthestatewiththe civillibertyofthecitizen(ef.MilFsOnLiberty, 1859,andBerlin'sTwoConceptsofLiberty,1958). Principesremainedinmanuscriptuntil1861;the scholarlyeditionsofÉtienneHofmann(1980) arefarmorerecent.HofmanncallsPrincipesthe essentialtextbetweenMontesquieuandToc- queville.ItwastranslatedintoEnglishasCon- stant,PoliticalWritings(ed.BiancamariaFontana, 1988and1997). ForcedintoretirementbyNapoleon,Constant wrotehisliterarymasterpieces,Adolpheandthe diaries.HecompletedthePrincipes,thentumed toDelareligion(6vols.),whichheconsideredhis supremeachievement. Seealsomontesquieu,politicalphilos- OPHY,POSITIVEANDNEGATIVEFREEDOM. O.A.H. constant,logical.Seelogicalconstant. constantconjunction.Seecausation,hume. constantsumgame.Seecametheory. constative.Seespeechacttheory. constitution,arelationbetweenconcreteparticu- 178 constitutiveprinciple contextualism lärs(includingobjectsandevents)andtheirparts, accordingtowhichatsometimet,aconcretepar- ticularissaidtobeconstitutedbythesumofits partswithoutnecessarilybeingidenticalwiththat sum.Forinstance,atsomespecifictimet,Mt. Everestisconstitutedbythevariouschunksof rockandothermatterthatformEverestatt, thoughattEverestwouldstillhavebeenEverest evenif,contrarytofact,someparticularrockthat ispartofthesumhadbeenabsent.Hence, althoughMt.Everestisnotidenticaltothesumof itsmaterialpartsatt,itisconstitutedbythem.The relationofconstitutionfiguresimportantlyin recentattemptstoarticulateanddefendmeta- physicalphysicalism(naturalism).Tocapturethe ideathatallthatexistsisultimatelyphysical,we maysaythatatthelowestlevelofreality,thereare onlymicrophysicalphenomena,governedbythe lawsofmicrophysics,andthatallotherobjects andeventsareultimatelyconstitutedbyobjects andeventsatthemicrophysicallevel.Seealso IDENTITY,MORALREALISM,NATURALISM, PHYSICALISM,REDUCTION.M.C.T constitutiveprinciple.Seekant. construct.Seelogicalconstruction,opera- TIONALISM. construct,hypothetical.Seeoperationalism. constructionism,social.Seesocialconstruc- tivism. constructivedilemma.Seedilemma. constructiveempiricism.Seesocialconstruc- TIVISM. constructivism,ethical.Seeethicalconstruc- TIVISM. constructivism,mathematical.Seephilosophyof MATHEMATICS. constructivism,social.Seesocialconstruc- tivism. consubstantiation.Seetransubstantiation. containment.Seekant. content.Seeindexical,philosophyofmind. content,factual.Seeanalytic-syntheticdistinc- TION. content,latent.Seefreud. content,manifest.Seefreud. content,narrow.Seephilosophyofmind. content,propositional.Seecircularreasoning. content,wide.Seephilosophyofmind. contentexternalism.Seephilosophyofmind. contextprinciple.Seefrege. contextualdefinition.Seedefinition. contextualism,theviewthatinferentialjustifica- tionalwaystakesplaceagainstabackgroundof beliefsthatarethemselvesinnowayevidentially supported.Theviewhasnotoftenbeende- fendedbyname,butDewey,Popper,Austin,and Wittgensteinarearguablyamongitsnotable exponents.Asthislistperhapssuggests,contex- tualismiscloselyrelatedtothe"relevantalter- natives"conceptionofjustification,accordingto whichclaimstoknowledgearejustifiednotby rulingoutanyandeverylogicallypossibleway inwhichwhatisassertedmightbefalseorinad- equatelygrounded,butbyexcludingcertain especiallyrelevantalternativesorepistemic shortcomings,thesevaryingfromonecontextof inquirytoanother. Formally,contextualismresemblesfounda- tionalism.Butitdiffersfromtraditional,orsub- stantive,foundationalismintwocrucial respects.First,foundationalisminsiststhatbasic beliefsbeself-justifyingorintrinsicallycredible. True,forcontemporaryfoundationalists,this intrinsiccredibilityneednotamounttoincorri- gibility,asearliertheoriststendedtosuppose: butsomedegreeofintrinsiccredibilityisindis- pensableforbasicbeliefs.Second,substantive foundationaltheoriesconfineintrinsiccredibil- ity,hencethestatusofbeingepistemologically basic,tobeliefsofsomefairlynarrowlyspecified kind(s).Bycontrast,contextualistsrejectall formsofthedoctrineofintrinsiccredibility,and inconsequenceplacenorestrictionsonthe kindsofbeliefsthatcan,inappropriatecircum- stances,functionascontextuallybasic.They regardthisasastrengthoftheirposition,since explaininganddefendingattributionsofintrin- siccredibilityhasalwaysbeenthefoundational- ist'smainproblem. Contextualismisalsodistinctfromthecoher- encetheoryofjustification,foundationalism's 179 contiguity Continentalphilosophy traditionalrival.Coherencetheoristsareassus- piciousascontextualistsofthefoundationalisfs specifiedkindsofbasicbeliefs.Butcoherentists reactbyproposingaradicallyholisticmodelof inferentialjustification,accordingtowhicha beliefbecomesjustifiedthroughincorporation intoasuitablycoherentoverallsystemofbeliefs or"totalview."Therearemanywell-known problemswiththisapproach:thecriteriaof coherencehaveneverbeenveryclearlyarticu- lated;itisnotclearwhatsatisfyingsuchcriteria hastodowithmakingourbeliefslikelytobe true;andsinceitisdoubtfulwhetheranyonehas averyclearpictureofhissystemofbeliefsasa whole,toinsistthatjustificationinvolvescom- paringthemeritsofcompetingtotalviewsseems tosubjectordinaryjustificatorypracticesto severeidealization.Contextualism,invirtueof itsformålaffinitywithfoundationalism,claimsto avoidallsuchproblems. Foundationalistsandcoherentistsareaptto respondthatcontextualismreapsthesebenefits byfailingtoshowhowgenuinelyepistemicjus- tificationispossible.Contextualism,theycharge, isfinallyindistinguishablefromtheskeptical viewthat"justification"dependsonunwar- rantedassumptions.Evenif,incontext,theseare pragmaticallyacceptable,epistemicallyspeaking theyarestilljustassumptions. Thisobjectionraisesthequestionwhether contextualistsmeantoanswerthesameques- tionsasmoretraditionaltheorists,oranswer theminthesameway.Traditionaltheoriesof justificationareframedsoastorespondtohighly generalskepticalquestions-e.g.,arewejustified inanyofourbeliefsabouttheexternalworld?It maybethatcontextualisttheoriesare(orshould be)advanced,notasdirectanswerstoskepti- cism,butinconjunctionwithattemptstodiag- noseordissolvetraditionalskepticalproblems. Contextualistsneedtoshowhowandwhytra- ditionaldemandsfor"global"justificationmis- fire,iftheydo.Iftraditionalskepticalproblems aretakenatfacevalue,itisdoubtfulwhether contextualismcananswerthem. Seealsocoherentism,epistemology, FOUNDATIONALISM,JUSTIFICATION.M.W. contiguity.Seeassociationism. continence.Seeakrasia. Continentalphilosophy,thegraduallychanging spectrumofphilosophicalviewsthatinthe twentiethcenturydevelopedinContinental Européandthatarenotablydifferentfromthe variousformsofanalyticphilosophythatduring thesameperiodflourishedintheAnglo-Ameri- canworld.ImmediatelyafterWorldWarIIthe expressionwasmoreorlesssynonymouswith 'phenomenology'.Thelatterterm,alreadyused earlierinGermanidealism,receivedacom- pletelynewmeaningintheworkofHusserl. Låteronthetermwasalsoapplied,oftenwith substantialchangesinmeaning,tothethought ofagreatnumberofotherContinentalphiloso- pherssuchasScheler,AlexanderPfander,Hed- wigConrad-Martius,NicolaiHartmann,and mostphilosophersmentionedbelow.ForHusserl theaimofphilosophyistopreparehumankind foragenuinelyphilosophicalformoflife,inand throughwhicheachhumanbeinggiveshim-or herselfarulethroughreason.SincetheRenais- sance,manyphilosophershavetriedinvainto materializethisaim.InHusserl'sview,therea- sonwasthatphilosophersfailedtousethe properphilosophicalmethod.Husserl'sphenom- enologywasmeanttoprovidephilosophywith themethodneeded. AmongthosedeeplyinfluencedbyHusserl's ideastheso-calledexistentialistsmustbemen- tionedfirst.If'existentialism'isconstrued strictly,itrefersmainlytothephilosophyof SartreandBeauvoir.Inaverybroadsenseit referstotheideasofanentiregroupofthinkers influencedmethodologicallybyHusserlandin contentbyMarcel,Heidegger,Sartre,orMer- leau-Ponty.Inthiscaseoneoftenspeaksofexis- tentiellphenomenology. WhenHeidegger'sphilosophybecamebetter knownintheAnglo-Americanworld,'Conti- nentalphilosophy'receivedagainanewmean- ing.FromHeidegger'sfirstpublication,Beingand Time(1927),itwasclearthathisconceptionof phenomenologydiffersfromthatofHusserlin severalimportantrespects.Thatiswhyhequal- ifiedthetermandspökeofhermeneutiephenome- nologyandclarifiedtheexpressionbyexamining the"original"meaningoftheGreekwordsfrom whichthetermwasformed.Inhisviewphe- nomenologymusttry"toletthatwhichshows itselfbeseenfromitselfintheverywayinwhich itshowsitselffromitself."Heideggerappliedthe methodfirsttothemodeofbeingofmanwith theaimofapproachingthequestionconcerning themeaningofbeingitselfthroughthisphe- nomenologicalinterpretation.Ofthosewho tooktheirpointofdeparturefromHeidegger,but alsotriedtogobeyondhim,Gadamerand Ricoeurmustbementioned. ThestructuralistmovementinFranceadded anotherconnotationto'Continentalphiloso- 180 Continentalrationalism contingent phy'.Thetermstructuralismaboveallreferstoan activity,awayofknowing,speaking,andacting thatextendsöveranumberofdistinguished domarnsofhumanactivity:linguistics,aesthet- ics,anthropology,psychology,psychoanalysis, mathematics,philosophyofscience,andphilos- ophyitself.Structuralism,whichbecameafash- ioninParisandlåterinWesternEuropé generally,reacheditshighpointontheConti- nentbetween1950and1970.Itwasinspiredby ideasfirstformulatedbyRussianformalism (1916-26)andCzechstructuralism(1926-40), butalsobyideasderivedfromtheworksofMarx andFreud.InFranceFoucault,Barthes, Althusser,andDerridaweretheleadingfigures. Structuralismisnotanewphilosophicalmove- ment;itmustbecharacterizedbystructuralist activity,whichismeanttoevokeevernew objects.Thiscanbedoneinaconstructiveanda reconstructivemanner,butthesetwowaysof evokingobjectscanneverbeseparated.One findstheconstructiveaspectprimarilyinstruc- turalistaestheticsandlinguistics,whereasthe reconstructiveaspectismoreapparentinphilo- sophicalreflectionsuponthestructuralistactiv- ity.InfluencedbyNietzscheanideas,struc- turalismlåterdevelopedinanumberofdirec- tions,includingpoststructuralism;inthiscontext theworksofGillesDeleuze,Lyotard,Irigaray, andKristevamustbementioned. After1970'Continentalphilosophy'received againanewconnotation:deconstruction.At firstdeconstructionpresenteditselfasareac- tionagainstphilosophicalhermeneutics,even thoughbothdeconstructionandhermeneutics claimtheirorigininHeidegger'sreinterpretation ofHusserl'sphenomenology.Theleading philosopherofthemovementisDerrida,whoat firsttriedtothinkalongphenomenologicaland structuralistlines.Derridaformulatedhis"final" viewinalinguisticformthatisbothcomplex andsuggestive.Itisnoteasyinafewsentences tostatewhatdeconstructionis.Generallyspeak- ingonecansaythatwhatisbeingdeconstructed istexts;theyaredeconstructedtoshowthat thereareconflictingconceptionsofmeaningand implicationineverytextsothatitisneverpos- sibledefinitivelytoshowwhatatextreally means.Derrida'sowndeconstructiveworkis concernedmainlywithphilosophicaltexts, whereasothersapplythe"method"predomi- nantlytoliterarytexts.Whataccordingto Derridadistinguishedphilosophyisitsreluc- tancetofacethefactthatit,too,isaproductof linguisticandrhetoricalfigures.Deconstruction isherethatprocessofclosereadingthatfocuses onthoseelementswherephilosophersintheir worktrytoeraseallknowledgeofitsownlin- guisticandrhetoricaldimensions.Ithasbeen saidthatifconstructiontypifiesmodernthink- ing,thendeconstructionisthemodeofthinking thatradicallytriestoovercomemodernity.Yet thisviewissimplistic,sinceonealsodecon- structsPlatoandmanyotherthinkersand philosophersofthepremodernage. Peopleconcernedwithsocialandpoliticalphi- losophywhohavesoughtaffiliationwithConti- nentalphilosophyoftenappealtotheso-called criticaltheoryoftheFrankfurtSchoolingeneral, andtoHabermas'stheoryofcommunicative actioninparticular.Habermas'sview,likethe positionoftheFrankfurtSchoolingeneral,is philosophicallyeclectic.Ittriestobringintohar- monyideasderivedfromKant,Germanideal- ism,andMarx,aswellasideasfromthe sociologyofknowledgeandthesocialsciences. Habermasbelievesthathistheorymakesitpos- sibletodevelopacommunicationcommunity withoutalienationthatisguidedbyreasonin suchawaythatthecommunitycanståndfreely inregardtotheobjectivelygivenreality.Critics havepointedoutthatinordertomakethisthe- oryworkHabermasmustsubstantiateanumber ofassumptionsthatuntilnowhehasnotbeen abletojustify. Seealsoanalyticphilosophy,decon- struction,EXISTENTIALISM,PHENOMENOL- OGY,SARTRE,STRUCTURALISM.J.J.K. Continentalrationalism.Seerationalism. contingent,neitherimpossiblenornecessary; i.e.,bothpossibleandnon-necessary.Themodal propertyofbeingcontingentisattributabletoa proposition,stateofaffairs,event,or-more debatably-anobject.Muddlesabouttherela- tionshipbetweenthisandothermodalproper- tieshaveaboundedeversinceAristotle,who initiallyconflatedcontingencywithpossibility butlåterrealizedthatsomethingthatispossible mayalsobenecessary,whereassomethingthat iscontingentcannotbenecessary.Eventoday manyphilosophersarenotclearaboutthe "opposition"betweencontingencyandneces- sity,mistakenlysupposingthemtobecontradic- torynotions(probablybecausewithinthe domainoftruepropositionsthecontingentand thenecessaryareindeedbothexclusiveand exhaustiveofoneanother).Butthecontradic- toryof'necessary'is'non-necessary';thatof 'contingent'is'non-contingent',asthefollow- ingextendedmodalsquareofoppositionshows: 181 contingentbeing contractananism Xisnon-contingent Xisimpossible implies Xisnon-necessary Xiscontingent Theselogicosyntacticalrelationshipsarepre- servedthroughvarioussemanticalinterpreta- tions,suchasthoseinvolving:(a)thelogical modalities(propositionPislogicallycontingent justwhenPisneitheralogicaltruthnoralogi- calfalsehood);(b)thecausalorphysicalmodal- ities(stateofaffairsoreventEisphysically contingentjustwhenEisneitherphysicallynec- essarynorphysicallyimpossible);and(c)the deonticmodalities(actAismorallyindetermi- natejustwhenAisneithermorallyobligatory normorallyforbidden). Innoneofthesecasesdoes'contingent'mean 'dependent/asinthephrase'iscontingentupon'. Yetjustsuchanotionofcontingencyseemstofea- tureprominentlyincertainformulationsofthe cosmologicalargument,allcreatedobjectsbeing saidtobecontingentbeingsandGodalonetobea necessaryornon-contingentbeing.Conceptual clarityisnotfurtheredbyassimilatingthissenseof 'contingent'totheothers. Seealsomodallogic,necessity.R.D.B. contingentbeing.Seephilosophyofreligion. contingentliar.Seesemanticparadoxes. contingents,future.Seefuturecontingents. continuant.Seetimeslice. continuity,bodily.Seepersonalidentity. continuity,psychological.Seepersonalidentity. continuity,spatiotemporal.Seespatiotemporal continuity. continuumhypothesis.Seecantor,continuum problem. continuumproblem,anopenquestionthatarose inCantor'stheoryofinfinitecardinalnumbers. Bydefinition,twosetshavethesamecardinal numberifthereisaone-to-onecorrespondence betweenthem.Forexample,thefunctionthat sendsto0,1to2,2to4,etc,showsthatthe setofevennaturalnumbershasthesamecardi- nalnumberasthesetofallnaturalnumbers, namelyKQ.ThatNQisnottheonlyinfinitecardi- nalfollowsfromCantor'stheorem:thepowersetof anyset(i.e.,thesetofallitssubsets)hasagreater cardinalitythanthesetitself.So,e.g.,thepower setofthenaturalnumbers,i.e.,thesetofallsets ofnaturalnumbers,hasacardinalnumber greaterthanHQ.Thefirstinfinitenumbergreater thanKQisNx;thenextafterthatisK2,andsoon. Whenarithmeticaloperationsareextended intotheinfinite,thecardinalnumberofthe powersetofthenaturalnumbersturnsouttobe 2K0.ByCantor'stheorem,2N0mustbegreater thanK;theconjecturethatitisequaltoKjis Cantor'scontinuumhypothesis(insymbols,CHor 2H0=Kj).Since2N0isalsothecardinalityofthe setofpointsonacontinuousline,CHcanalsobe statedinthisform:anyinfinitesetofpointsona linecanbebroughtintoone-to-onecorrespon- denceeitherwiththesetofnaturalnumbersor withthesetofallpointsontheline. CantorandothersattemptedtoproveCH, withoutsuccess.Itlåterbecameclear,duetothe workofGödelandCohen,thattheirfailurewas inevitable:thecontinuumhypothesiscanneither beprovednordisprovedfromtheaxiomsofset theory(ZFC).Thequestionofitstruthorfalse- hood-thecontinuumproblem-remainsopen. Seealsocantor,infinity,settheory. P.Mad. contractarianism,afamilyofmoralandpolitical theoriesthatmakeuseoftheideaofasocialcon- tract.Traditionallyphilosophers(suchasHobbes andLocke)usedthesocialcontractideatojus- tifycertainconceptionsofthestate.Inthetwen- tiethcenturyphilosopherssuchasJohnRawls haveusedthesocialcontractnotiontodefine anddefendmoralconceptions(bothconceptions ofpoliticaljusticeandindividualmorality),often (butnotalways)doingsoinadditiontodevel- opingsocialcontracttheoriesofthestate.The term'contractarian'mostoftenappliestothis secondtypeoftheory. Therearetwokindsofmoralargumentthat thecontractimagehasspawned,thefirstrooted inHobbesandthesecondrootedinKant. Hobbesiansstartbyinsistingthatwhatisvaluable iswhatapersondesiresorprefers,notwhathe oughttodesireorprefer(fornosuchprescrip- tivelypowerfulobjectexists);andrationalaction isactionthatachievesormaximizesthesatisfac- 182 contractananism contractananism tionofdesiresorpreferences.Theygoontoinsist thatmoralactionisrationalforapersontoper- formifandonlyifsuchactionadvancesthesatis- factionofhisdesiresorpreferences.Andthey arguethatbecausemoralactionleadstopeaceful andharmoniouslivingconducivetothesatisfac- tionofalmosteveryone'sdesiresorpreferences, moralactionsarerationalforalmosteveryone andthus"mutuallyagreeable."ButHobbesians believethat,toensurethatnocooperativeperson becomesthepreyofimmoralaggressors,moral actionsmustbetheconventionalnormsina community,sothateachpersoncanexpectthatif shebehavescooperatively,otherswilldosotoo. Theseconventionsconstitutetheinstitutionof moralityinasociety. SotheHobbesianmoraltheoryiscommittedto theideathatmoralityisahuman-madeinstitu- tion,whichisjustifiedonlytotheextentthatit effectivelyfurthershumaninterests.Hobbesians explaintheexistenceofmoralityinsocietyby appealingtotheconvention-creatingactivitiesof humanbeings,whilearguingthatthejustifkation ofmoralityinanyhumansocietydependsupon howwellitsmoralconventionsserveindividu- als'desiresorpreferences.Byconsidering"what wecouldagreeto"ifwereappraisedandredidthe cooperativeconventionsinoursociety,wecan determinetheextenttowhichourpresentcon- ventionsare"mutuallyagreeable"andsoratio- nalforustoacceptandacton.Thus,Hobbesians invokebothactualagreements(orrather,con- ventions)andhypotheticalagreements(which involveconsideringwhatconventionswouldbe "mutuallyagreeable")atdifferentpointsintheir theory;theformerarewhattheybelieveour morallifeconsistsin;thelatterarewhatthey believeourmorallifeshouldconsistin-i.e.,what ouractualmorallifeshouldmodel.Sothenotion ofthecontractdoesnotdojustificationalworkby itselfm.theHobbesianmoraltheory:thistermis usedonlymetaphorically.Whatwe"couldagree to"hasmoralforcefortheHobbesiansnot becausemake-believepromisesinhypothetical worldshaveanybindingforcebutbecausethis sortofagreementisadevicethat(merely)reveals howtheagreed-uponoutcomeisrationalforall ofus.Inparticular,thinkingabout"whatwe couldallagreeto"allowsustoconstructadeduc- tionofpracticalreasontodeterminewhatpoli- ciesaremutuallyadvantageous. Thesecondkindofcontractariantheoryis derivedfromthemoraltheorizingofKant.Inhis låterwritingsKantproposedthatthe"idea"of the"OriginalContract"couldbeusedtodeter- minewhatpoliciesforasocietywouldbejust. WhenKantasks"Whatcouldpeopleagreeto?," heisnottryingtojustifyactionsorpoliciesby invoking,inanyliteralsense,theconsentofthe people.Onlytheconsentofrealpeoplecanbe legitimating,andKanttalksabouthypothetical agreementsmadebyhypotheticalpeople.Buthe doesbelievethesemake-believeagreements havemoralforceforusbecausetheprocessby whichthesepeoplereachagreementismorally revealing. Kanfscontractingprocesshasbeenfurther developedbysubsequentphilosophers,suchas Rawls,whoconcentratesondefiningthehypo- theticalpeoplewhoaresupposedtomakethis agreementsothattheirreasoningwillnotbetar- nishedbyimmorality,injustice,orprejudice, thusensuringthattheoutcomeoftheirjoint deliberationswillbemorallysound.Thosecon- tractarianswhodisagreewithRawlsdefinethe contractingpartiesindifferentways,therebyget- tingdifferentresults.TheKantians'socialcon- tractisthereforeadeviceusedintheirtheorizing torevealwhatisjustorwhatismoral.Solike Hobbesians,theircontracttalkisreallyjustaway ofreasoningthatallowsustoworkoutconcep- tualanswerstomoralproblems.Butwhereasthe Hobbesians'useofcontractlanguageexpresses thefactthat,ontheirview,moralityisahuman inventionwhich(ifitiswellinvented)oughtto bemutuallyadvantageous,theKantians'useof thecontractlanguageismeanttoshowthat moralprinciplesandconceptionsareprovable theoremsderivedfromamorallyrevealingand authoritativereasoningprocessor"moralproof procedure"thatmakesuseofthesocialcontract idea. Bothkindsofcontractariantheoryareindi- vidualistic,inthesensethattheyassumethat moralandpoliticalpoliciesmustbejustifiedwith respectto,andanswertheneedsof,individuals. Accordingly,thesetheorieshavebeencriticized bycommunitarianphilosophers,whoarguethat moralandpoliticalpoliciescanandshouldbe decidedonthebasisofwhatisbestforacom- munity.Theyarealsoattackedbyutilitarianthe- orists,whosecriterionofmoralityisthe maximizationoftheutilityofthecommunity, andnotthemutualsatisfactionoftheneedsor preferencesofindividuals.Contractariansre- spondthatwhereasutilitarianismfailstotake seriouslythedistinctionbetweenpersons,con- tractariantheoriesmakemoralandpoliticalpoli- ciesanswerabletothelegitimateinterestsand needsofindividuals,which,contrathecommu- nitarians,theytaketobethestartingpointof moraltheorizing. 183 contradiction conventionalism Seealsokant,politicalphilosophy, SOCIALCONTRACT,SOCIALPHILOSOPHY. J.Ham. contradiction.Seetruthtable. contradiction,pragmatic.Seepragmaticcontra- diction. contradiction,principleof.Seeprincipleofcon- tradiction. contradictories.Seesquareofopposition. contraposition,theimmediatelogicaloperation onanycategoricalpropositionthatisaccom- plishedbyfirstformingthecomplementsofboth thesubjecttermandthepredicatetermofthat propositionandtheninterchangingthesecom- plementedterms.Thus,contrapositionapplied tothecategoricalproposition'Allcatsarefelines' yields'Allnon-felinesarenon-cats',where'non- feline'and'non-cat'are,respectivelythecom- plements(orcomplementaryterms)of'feline' and'cat'.Theresultofapplyingcontrapositionto acategoricalpropositionissaidtobethecontra- positiveofthatproposition.Seealsosquareof OPPOSITION,SYLLOGISM.R.W.B. contrapositive.Seecontraposition. contraries,anypairofpropositionsthatcannot bothbetruebutcanbothbefalse;derivatively, anypairofpropertiesthatcannotbothapplytoa thingbutthatcanbothfailtoapplytoathing. Thusthepropositions'Thisobjectisredallöver' and'Thisobjectisgreenallöver'arecontraries, asarethepropertiesofbeingredallöverand beinggreenallöver.Traditionally,itwasconsid- eredthatthecategoricalA-proposition'AllS'sare P's'andthecategoricalE-proposition'NoS'sare P's'werecontraries;butaccordingtoDeMorgan andmostsubsequentlogicians,thesetwopropo- sitionsarebothtruewhentherearenoS'satall, sothatmodernlogiciansdonotusuallyregard thecategoricalA-andE-propositionsasbeing truecontraries.Seealsoexistentialimport, SQUAREOFOPPOSITION,SYLLOGISM.R.W.B. contrary-to-dutyimperative.Seedeonticpara- doxes. contrary-to-factconditional.Seecounterfactu- ALS. contravalid,designatingapropositionPinalog- icalsystemsuchthateverypropositioninthe systemisaconsequenceofP.Inmostofthetyp- icalandfamiliarlogicalsystems,contravalidity coincideswithself-contradictoriness.Seealso IMPLICATION.R.W.B. contributivevalue.Seevalue. contributoryvalue.Seevalue. control,anapparentlycausalphenomenon closelyakintopowerandimportantforsuchtop- icsasintentionalaction,freedom,andmoral responsibility.Dependinguponthecontrolyou hadövertheevent,yourfmdingafriend'sstolen carmayormaynotbeanintentionalaction,afree action,oranactionforwhichyoudeservemoral credit.Controlseemstobeacausalphenomenon. Trytoimaginecontrollingacar,say,withoutcaus- inganything.Ifyoucausenothing,youhaveno effectonthecar,andonedoesnotcontrolathing onwhichonehasnoeffect.Butcontrolneednot becausallydeterministic.Evenifagenuineran- domizerinyourcar'ssteeringmechanismgives youonlya99percentchanceofmakingturnsyou trytomake,youstillhaveconsiderablecontrolin thatsphere.Somephilosophersclaimthatwe havenocontrolöveranythingifcausaldetermin- ismistrue.Thatclaimisfalse.Whenyoudrive yourcar,younormallyareincontrolofitsspeed anddirection,evenifourworldhappenstobe deterministic.Seealsodeterminism,free WILLPROBLEM,POWER.A.R.M. convention.Seelewis,david. conventionalimplicature.Seeimplicature. conventionalism,thephilosophicaldoctrinethat logicaltruthandmathematicaltrutharecreated byourchoices,notdictatedorimposedonusby theworld.Thedoctrineisamorespecificversion ofthelinguistictheoryoflogicalandmathemati- caltruth,accordingtowhichthestatementsof logicandmathematicsaretruebecauseoftheway peopleuselanguage.Ofcourse,anystatement owesitstruthtosomeextenttofactsaboutlin- guisticusage.Forexample,'Snowiswhite'istrue (inEnglish)becauseofthefactsthat(1)'snow' denotessnow,(2)'iswhite'istrueofwhitethings, and(3)snowiswhite.Whatthelinguistictheory assertsisthatstatementsoflogicandmathematics owetheirtruthentirelytothewaypeopleuselan- guage.Extralinguisticfactssuchas(3)arenotrel- evanttothetruthofsuchstatements.Which aspectsoflinguisticusageproducelogicaltruth 184 conventionalism,ethical conversationalimplicature andmathematicaltruth?Theconventionalist answeris:certainlinguisticconventions.These conventionsaresaidtoincluderulesofinference, axioms,anddefinitions. Theideathatgeometricaltruthistruthwecre- atebyadoptingcertainconventionsreceived supportbythediscoveryofnon-Euclidean geometries.Priortothisdiscovery,Euclidean geometryhadbeenseenasaparadigmofapri- oriknowledge.Thefurtherdiscoverythatthese alternativesystemsareconsistentmadeEuclid- eangeometryseemrejectablewithoutviolating rationality.WhetherweadopttheEuclideansys- temoranon-Euclideansystemseemstobea matterofourchoicebasedonsuchpragmatic considerationsassimplicityandconvenience. Movingtonumbertheory,conventionalism receivedaprimafaciesetbackbythediscovery thatarithmeticisincompleteifconsistent.Forlet Sbeanundecidablesentence,i.e.,asentencefor whichthereisneitherproofnordisproof.Sup- poseSistrue.Inwhatconventionsdoesitstruth consist?Notaxioms,rulesofinference,anddef- initions.Forifitstruthconsistedintheseitemsit wouldbeprovable.SupposeSisnottrue.Then itsnegationmustbetrue.Inwhatconventions doesitstruthconsist?Again,noanswer.It appearsthatifSistrueoritsnegationistrueand ifneitherSnoritsnegationisprovable,thennot allarithmetictruthistruthbyconvention.A responsetheconventionalistcouldgiveisthat neitherSnoritsnegationistrueifSisundecid- able.Thatis,theconventionalistcouldclaimthat arithmetichastruth-valuegaps. Astologic,alltruthsofclassicallogicareprov- ableand,unlikethecaseofnumbertheoryand geometry,axiomsaredispensable.Rulesofinfer- encesuffice.Aswithgeometry,therearealter- nativestoclassicallogic.Theintuitionist,e.g., doesnotaccepttherule'Fromnot-not-^infer A'.Evendetachment-'FromA,ifAthenB,infer B'-isrejectedinsomemultivaluedsystemsof logic.Thesefactssupporttheconventionalist doctrinethatadoptinganysetofrulesofinfer- enceisamatterofourchoicebasedonpragmatic considerations.But(theanti-conventionalist mightrespond)considerasimplelogicaltruth suchas'IfTomistall,thenTomistall'.Granted thatthisisprovablebyrulesofinferencefrom theemptysetofpremises,whydoesitfollowthat itstruthisnotimposedonusbyextralinguistic factsaboutTom?IfTomistallthesentenceistrue becauseitsconsequentistrue.IfTomisnottall thesentenceistruebecauseitsantecedentis false.Ineithercasethesentenceowesitstruthto factsaboutTom. Seealsomany-valuedlogic,philoso- PHYOFLOGIC,PHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICS, POINCARÉ.C.S. conventionalism,ethical.Seerelativism. conventionalism,geometric.Seepoincaré. conventionalsign.Seetheoryofsigns. conventionT,acriterionofmaterialadequacy(of proposedtruthdefinitions)discovered,formally articulated,adopted,andsonamedbyTarskiin connectionwithhis1929definitionoftheconcept oftruthinaformalizedlanguage.ConventionTis oneofthemostimportantofseveralindependent proposalsTarskimadeconcerningphilosophically soundandlogicallyprecisetreatmentofthecon- ceptoftruth.Variousoftheseproposalshavebeen criticized,butconventionThasremainedvirtu- allyunchallengedandisregardedalmostasan axiomofanalyticphilosophy.Tosaythatapro- poseddefinitionofanestablishedconceptismate- riallyadequateistosaythatitis"neithertoobroad nortoonarrow,"i.e.,thattheconceptitcharacter- izesiscoextensivewiththeestablishedconcept. Since,asTarskiemphasized,formanyformalized languagestherearenocriteriaoftruth,itwould seemthattherecanbenogeneralcriterionof materialadequacyoftruthdefinitions.ButTarski brilliantlyfinessedthisobstaclebydiscovering aspecificationthatisfulfilledbytheestablished correspondenceconceptoftruthandthathas thefurtherpropertythatanytwoconceptsfulfill- ingitarenecessarilycoextensive.Basically,con- ventionTrequiresthattobemateriallyadequate aproposedtruthdefinitionmustimplyallof theinfinitelymanyrelevantTarskianbicondition- als;e.g.,thesentence'Someperfectnumberis odd'istrueifandonlyifsomeperfectnumberis odd.Looselyspeaking,aTarskianbiconditional forEnglishisasentenceobtainedfromtheform 'Thesentenceistrueifandonlyif' byfillingtherightblankwithasentenceand fillingtheleftblankwithanameofthesentence. Tarskicalledthesebiconditionals"equivalences oftheformT"andreferredtotheformas a"scheme."Låterwritersalsorefertotheform as"schemaT."Seealsoformålseman- TICS,GÖDEL'SINCOMPLETENESSTHEOREMS, MATERIALADEQUACY,SATISFACTION,TARSKI, TRUTH.J.Cor. convergence.Seephilosophyofscience. conversationalimplicature.Seeimplicature. 185 converse Cordemoy,Géraudde converse.(1)Narrowly,theresultoftheimme- diatelogicaloperationcalledconversiononany categoricalproposition,accomplishedbyinter- changingthesubjecttermandthepredicateterm ofthatproposition.Thus,theconverseofthecat- egoricalproposition'Allcatsarefelines'is'All felinesarecats'.(2)Morebroadly,theproposi- tionobtainedfromagiven'if...then...'(con- ditional)propositionbyinterchangingthe antecedentandtheconsequentclauses,i.e.,the propositionsfollowingthe'ifandthe'then', respectively;also,theargumentobtainedfrom anargumentoftheform'P;thereforeQ'byinter- changingthepremiseandtheconclusion.See alsoRELATION.R.W.B. converse,outerandinner,respectively,theresult of"converting"thetwo"terms"ortherelation verbofarelationalsentence.Theouterconverse of'AbehelpsBen'is'BenhelpsAbe'andthe innerconverseis'AbeishelpedbyBen'.Insim- ple,oratomic,sentencestheouterandinnercon- versesexpresslogicallyequivalentpropositions, andthusinthesecasesnoinformationalambigu- ityarisesfromtheadjunctionof'andconversely' or'butnotconversely',despitethefaetthatsuch adjunctiondoesnotindicatewhich,ifeither,of thetwoconversesintendedismeant.However, incomplex,orquantified,relationalsentences suchas'Everyintegerprecedessomeinteger' genuineinformationalambiguityisproduced. Undernormalinterpretationsoftherespective sentences,theouterconverseexpressesthefalse propositionthatsomeintegerprecedesevery integer,theinnerconverseexpressesthetrue propositionthateveryintegerisprecededby someinteger.Morecomplicatedconsiderations applyincasesofquantifieddoublyrelationalsen- tencessuchas'Everyintegerprecedeseveryinte- gerexceedingit'.Theconceptofscopeexplains suchstrueturalambiguity:inthesentence'Every integerprecedessomeintegerandconversely', 'conversely'takenintheoutersensehaswide scope,whereastakenintheinnersenseithas narrowscope.Seealsoambiguity,converse, RELATION,SCOPE.J.Cor. conversedomain.Seerelation. converserelation.Seerelation. conversion.Seeconverse. Conway,Anne(c.1630-79),Englishphilosopher whosePrincipiaphilosophiaeantiquissimaeetrecen- tissimae(1690;Englishtranslation,ThePrinciples oftheMostAncientandModernPhilosophy,1692) proposesamonisticontologyinwhichallcreated thingsaremodesofonespiritualsubstanceerna- natingfromGod.Thissubstanceismadeupofan infinitenumberofhierarchicallyarrangedspir- its,whichshecallsmonads.Matteriscongealed spirit.Motionisconceivednotdynamicallybut vitally.LadyConway'sschemeentailsamoral explanationofpainandthepossibilityofuni- versalsalvation.Sherepudiatesthedualismof bothDescartesandherteacher,HenryMore,as wellasthematerialismofHobbesandSpinoza. Theworkshowstheinfluenceofcabalismand affinitieswiththethoughtofthementorofher lastyears,FrancisMercuriusvanHelmont, throughwhomherphilosophybecameknown toLeibniz.S.H. CookWilson,John.Seewilson. coordinationproblem.Seesocialchoicetheory. coordinativedefinition.Seedefinition. Copernicanrevolution.Seekant. copula,inlogic,aformoftheverb'tobe'that joinssubjectandpredicateinsingularandcate- goricalpropositions.In'Georgeiswealthy'and 'Swansarebeautiful',e.g.,'is'and'are',respec- tively,arecopulas.Notalloccurrencesofforms of'be'countascopulas.Insentencessuchas 'Thereare51states','are'isnotacopula,sinceit doesnotjoinasubjectandapredicate,butoccurs simplyasapartofthequantifierterm'thereare'. Seealsodefinition,intension,meaning. V.K. copulatio.Seeproprietatesterminorum. Cordemoy,Géraudde(1626-84),French philosopherandmemberoftheCartesian school.HismostimportantworkishisLedis- cernementducorpsetde1'åmeensixdiscours,pub- lishedin1666andreprinted(underslightly differenttitles)anumberoftimesthereafter. AlsoimportantaretheDiscoursphysiquedela parole(1668),aCartesiantheoryoflanguageand communication;andUnelettreécriteäunscavant religieux(1668),adefenseofDescartes'sortho- doxyoncertainquestionsinnaturalphilosophy. CordemoyalsowroteahistoryofFrance,left incompleteathisdeath. LikeDescartes,Cordemoyadvocatedamech- anisticphysicsexplainingphysicalphenomena intermsofsize,shape,andlocalmotion,and 186 cornerquotes counterfactuals heldthatmindsareincorporealthinkingsub- stances.LikemostCartesians,Cordemoyalso advocatedaversionofoccasionalism.Butunlike otherCartesians,hearguedforatomismand admittedthevoid.Theseinnovationswerenot welcomedbyothermembersoftheCartesian school.ButCordemoyisoftencitedbyiater thinkers,suchasLeibniz,asanimportantseven- teenth-centuryadvocateofatomism.Seealso occasionalism.D.Garb. cornerquotes.Seecorners. corners,alsocalledcornerquotes,quasi-quotes, anotationaldevice(i1)introducedbyQuine (MathematicalLogic,1940)toprovideaconve- nientlybriefwayofspeakinggenerallyabout unspecifiedexpressionsofsuchandsuchkind. Forexample,alogicianmightwantaconve- nientlybriefwayofsayinginthemetalanguage thattheresultofwritingawedge'v'(thedyadic logicalconnectiveforatruth-functionaluseof 'or')betweenanytwowell-formedformulas (wffs)intheobjectlanguageisitselfawff.Sup- posingtheGreekletters'ty'and'\|/'availablein themetalanguageasvariablesrangingöverwffs intheobjectlanguage,itistemptingtothinkthat theformationrulestatedabovecanbesuccinctly expressedsimplybysayingthatiftyand\|/are wffs,then'tyv\|/'isawff.Butthiswillnotdo,for 'tyv\|/'isnotawff.Rather,itisahybridexpres- sionoftwovariablesofthemetalanguageanda dyadiclogicalconnectiveoftheobjectlanguage. Theproblemisthatputtingquotationmarks aroundtheGreeklettersmerelyresultsindesig- natingthoselettersthemselves,not,asdesired, indesignatingthecontextoftheunspecified wffs.Quine'sdeviceofcornersallowsoneto transcendthislimitationofstraightquotation sincequasi-quotation,e.g.,i—tyv\\t—i,amountsto quotingtheconstantcontextualbackground,'# v#',andimaginingtheunspecifiedexpressions tyand\|/writtenintheblänks.Seealsouse- MENTIONDISTINCTION.R.F.G. correctivejustice.Seejustice. correlativity.Seepolarity,rights. correspondencetheoryoftruth.Seetruth. correspondingconditional(ofagivenargument), anyconditionalwhoseantecedentisa(logical) conjunctionofallofthepremisesoftheargu- mentandwhoseconsequentistheconclusion. Thetwoconditionals,'ifAbeisBenandBenis wise,thenAbeiswise'and'ifBeniswiseandAbe isBen,thenAbeiswise',arethetwocorrespond- ingconditionalsoftheargumentwhosepremises are'AbeisBen'and'Beniswise'andwhosecon- clusionis'Abeiswise'.Foraone-premiseargu- ment,thecorrespondingconditionalisthe conditionalwhoseantecedentisthepremiseand whoseconsequentistheconclusion.Thelimiting casesoftheemptyandinfinitepremisesetsare treatedindifferentwaysbydifferentlogicians; onesimpletreatmentconsiderssucharguments aslackingcorrespondingconditionals. Theprincipleofcorrespondingconditionalsisthat inorderforanargumenttobevaliditisneces- saryandsufficientforallitscorrespondingcon- ditionalstobetautological.Thecommonlyused expression'thecorrespondingconditionalofan argument'isalsousedwhentwofurtherstipula- tionsareinforce:first,thatanargumentiscon- struedashavingan(ordered)sequenceof premisesratherthanan(unordered)setof premises;second,thatconjunctionisconstrued asapolyadicoperationthatproducesinaunique wayasinglepremisefromasequenceof premisesratherthanasadyadicoperationthat combinespremisestwobytwo.Underthesestip- ulationstheprincipleofthecorrespondingcondi- tionalisthatinorderforanargumenttobevalid itisnecessaryandsufficientforitscorresponding conditionaltobevalid.Theseprinciplesare closelyrelatedtomodusponens,toconditional proof,andtotheso-calleddeductiontheorem. Seealsoargument,conditional,con- ditionalPROOF,LIMITINGCASE,MODUS PONENS,PROPOSITION,TAUTOLOGY.J.Cor. corrigibility.Seeprivilegedaccess. cosmologicalargument.Seephilosophyofreli- gion. cosmology.Seemetaphysics. cost-benefitanalysis.Seedecisiontheory. countable.Seesettheory. counterdomain.Seerelation. counterexample.Seecounterinstance. counterfactualanalysisofcausation.Seecausa- counterfactuals,alsocalledcontrary-to-factcon- ditionals,subjunctiveconditionalsthatpresup- 187 counterfactuals counterfactuals posethefalsityoftheirantecedents,suchas'If HitlerhadinvadedEngland,Germanywould havewon'and'IfIwereyou,I'drun'. Conditionals(orhypotheticalstatements)are compoundstatementsoftheform'Ifp,(then)q', orequivalently'qifp''.Componentpisdescribed astheantecedent(protasis)andqastheconse- quent(apodosis).Aconditionallike'IfOswald didnotkillKennedy,thensomeoneelsedid'is calledindicative,becauseboththeantecedent andconsequentareintheindicativemood.One like'IfOswaldhadnotkilledKennedy,then someoneelsewouldhave'issubjunctive.Many subjunctiveandallindicativeconditionalsare open,presupposingnothingabouttheante- cedent.Unlike'IfBobhadwon,he'dberich', neither'IfBobshouldhavewon,hewould berich'nor'IfBobwon,heisrich'impliesthat Bobdidnotwin.Counterfactualspresuppose, ratherthanassert,thefalsityoftheirante- cedents.'IfReaganhadbeenpresident,hewould havebeenfamous'seemsinappropriateandout ofplace,butnotfalse,giventhatReaganwas president.Thedifferencebetweencounterfac- tualandopensubjunctivesislessimportantlog- icallythanthatbetweensubjunctivesand indicatives.Whereastheindicativeconditional aboutKennedyistrue,thesubjunctiveisproba- blyfalse.Replace'someone'with'noone'and thetruth-valuesreverse. Themostinterestinglogicalfeatureofcoun- terfactualsisthattheyarenottruth-functional. Atruth-functionalcompoundisonewhose truth-valueiscompletelydeterminedinevery possiblecasebythetruth-valuesofitscompo- nents.Forexample,thefalsityof'ThePresident isagrandmother'and'ThePresidentischildless' logicallyentailsthefalsityof'ThePresidentisa grandmotherandchildless':allconjunctions withfalseconjunctsarefalse.Butwhereas'Ifthe Presidentwereagrandmother,thePresident wouldbechildless'isfalse,othercounterfactuals withequallyfalsecomponentsaretrue,suchas 'IfthePresidentwereagrandmother,thePresi- dentwouldbeamother'.Thetruth-valueofa counterfactualisdeterminedinpartbythespe- cificcontentofitscomponents.Thispropertyis sharedbyindicativeandsubjunctivecondition- alsgenerally,ascanbeseenbyvaryingtheword- ingoftheexample.Inmarkedcontrast,the materialconditional,pDq,ofmodernlogic, definedasmeaningthateitherpisfalseorqis true,iscompletelytruth-functional.'ThePresi- dentisagrandmotherZ>ThePresidentischild- less'isjustastrueas'ThePresidentisa grandmotherDThePresidentisamother'. Whilestrongerthanthematerialconditional,the counterfactualisweakerthanthestrictcondi- tional,p-äq,ofmodernmodallogic,whichsays thatpZ>qisnecessarilytrue.'Iftheswitchhad beenflipped,thelightwouldbeon'mayinfact betrueeventhoughitispossiblefortheswitch tohavebeenflippedwithoutthelighfsbeingon becausethebulbcouldhaveburnedout. Thefactthatcounterfactualsareneitherstrict normaterialconditionalsgeneratedtheproblem ofcounterfactualconditionals(raisedbyChisholm andGoodman):Whatarethetruthconditionsof acounterfactual,andhowaretheydetermined byitscomponents?Accordingtothe"metalin- guistic"approach,whichresemblesthededuc- tive-nomologicalmodelofexplanation,a counterfactualistruewhenitsantecedentcon- joinedwithlawsofnatureandstatementsofback- groundconditionslogicallyentailsitsconsequent. Onthisaccount,'Iftheswitchhadbeenflipped thelightwouldbeon'istruebecausethestate- mentthattheswitchwasflipped,plusthelaws ofelectricityandstatementsdescribingthecon- ditionandarrangementofthecircuitry,entail thatthelightison.Themainproblemistospec- ifywhichfactsare"fixed"foranygivencounter- factualandcontext.Thebackgroundconditions cannotincludethedenialsoftheantecedentor theconsequent,eventhoughtheyaretrue,nor anythingelsethatwouldnotbetrueifthe antecedentwere.Counteridenticals,whose antecedentsassertidentities,highlightthediffi- culty:thebackgroundfor'IfIwereyou,I'drun' mustincludefactsaboutmycharacterandyour situation,butnotviceversa.Counterlegalslike 'Newton'slawswouldfailifplanetshadrectan- gularorbits',whoseantecedentsdenylawsof nature,showthateventhesetoflawscannotbe all-inclusive. Anotherleadingapproach(pioneeredby RobertC.StalnakerandDavidK.Lewis)extends thepossibleworldssemanticsdevelopedfor modallogic,sayingthatacounterfactualistrue whenitsconsequentistrueinthenearestpossible worldinwhichtheantecedentistrue.Thecoun- terfactualabouttheswitchistrueonthisaccount providedaworldinwhichtheswitchwasflipped andthelightisonisclosertotheactualworld thanoneinwhichtheswitchwasflippedbutthe lightisnoton.Themainproblemistospecify whichworldisnearestforanygivencounterfac- tualandcontext.Thedifferencebetweenindica- tiveandsubjunctiveconditionalscanbe accountedforintermsofeitheradifferentsetof backgroundconditionsoradifferentmeasureof nearness. 188 counteridenticals Cournot,Antoine-Augustin Counterfactualsturnupinavarietyofphilo- sophicalcontexts.Todistinguishlawslike'All copperconducts'fromequallytruegeneraliza- tionslike'Everythinginmypocketconducts', somehaveobservedthatwhileanythingwould conductifitwerecopper,noteverythingwould conductifitwereinmypocket.Andtohavea dispositionlikesolubility,itdoesnotsufficetobe eitherdissolvingornotinwater:itmustinaddi- tionbetruethattheobjectwoulddissolveifit wereinwater.Ithassimilarlybeensuggested thatoneeventisthecauseofanotheronlyifthe latterwouldnothaveoccurrediftheformerhad not;thatanactionisfreeonlyiftheagentcould orwouldhavedoneotherwiseifhehadwanted to;thatapersonisinaparticularmentalstateonly ifhewouldbehaveincertainwaysgivencertain stimuli;andthatanactionisrightonlyifacom- pletelyrationalandfullyinformedagentwould chooseit. Seealsocausation,possibleworlds. W.A.D. counteridenticals.Seecounterfactuals. counterinstance,alsocalledcounterexample.(1) Aparticularinstanceofanargumentformthathas alltruepremisesbutafalseconclusion,thereby showingthattheformisnotuniversallyvalid.The argumentform'pvq,~pI:.~q',forexample,is showntobeinvalidbythecounterinstance'Grass iseitherredorgreen;Grassisnotred;Therefore, grassisnotgreen'.(2)Aparticularfalseinstanceof astatementform,whichdemonstratesthatthe formisnotalogicaltruth.Acounterinstanceto theform'(pvq)Dp',forexample,wouldbethe statementTfgrassiseitherredorgreen,thengrass isred'.(3)Aparticularexamplethatdemonstrates thatauniversalgeneralizationisfalse.Theuniver- salstatement'AlllargecitiesintheUnitedStates areeastoftheMississippi'isshowntobefalseby thecounterinstanceofSanFrancisco,whichisa largecityintheUnitedStatesthatisnoteastofthe Mississippi.V.K. counterparttheory,atheorythatanalyzesstate- mentsaboutwhatispossibleandimpossiblefor individuals(statementsofderemodality)in termsofwhatholdsofcounterpartsofthoseindi- vidualsinotherpossibleworlds,athing'scoun- terpartsbeingindividualsthatresembleit withoutbeingidenticalwithit.(Thename 'counterparttheory'wascoinedbyDavidLewis, thetheory'sprincipalexponent.)Whereassome theoriesanalyze'Mrs.Simpsonmighthavebeen queenofEngland'asTnsomepossibleworld, Mrs.SimpsonisqueenofEngland',counterpart theoryanalyzesitasTnsomepossibleworld,a counterpartofMrs.Simpsonisqueenof(acoun- terpartof)England'.Thechiefmotivationfor counterparttheoryisacombinationoftwo views:(a)deremodalityshouldbegivenapossi- bleworldsanalysis,and(b)eachactualindivid- ualexistsonlyintheactualworld,andhence cannotexistwithdifferentpropertiesinother possibleworlds.Counterparttheoryprovidesan analysisthatallows'Mrs.Simpsonmighthave beenqueen'tobetruecompatiblywith(a)and (b).ForMrs.Simpson'scounterpartsinother possibleworlds,inthoseworldswheresheher- selfdoesnotexist,mayhaveregalpropertiesthat theactualMrs.Simpsonlacks.Counterpartthe- oryisperhapsprefiguredinLeibniz'stheoryof possibility.Seealsocounterfactuals,pos- sibleworlds.P.Mac. countnoun,anounthatcanoccursyntactically (a)withquantifiers'each','every','many','few', 'several',andnumerals;(b)withtheindefinite artide,'a(n)';and(c)inthepluralform.Thefol- lowingareexamplesofcountnouns(CNs), pairedwithsemanticallysimilarmässnouns (MNs):'eachdollar/silver','onecomposition/ music','abed/furniture','instructions/advice'. MNsbutnotCNscanoccurwiththequantifiers 'much'and'little':'muchpoetry/poem(s)','lit- tlebread/loaf.BothCNsandMNsmayoccur with'all','most',and'some'.Semantically,CNs butnotMNsreferdistributively,providinga countingcriterion.Itmakessensetoaskhow manyCNs?:'Howmanycoins/gold?'MNsbut notCNsrefercollectively.Itmakessensetoask howmuchMN?:'Howmuchgold/coins?' Oneproblemisthatthesesyntacticand semanticcriteriayielddifferentclassifications; anotherproblemistoprovidelogicalformsand truthconditionsforsentencescontainingmäss nouns. Seealsodistribution,meaning,sortal PREDICATE.W.K.W. courage.Seecardinalvirtues. Cournot,Antoine-Augustin(1801-77),French mathematicianandeconomist.Acriticalrealist inscientificandphilosophicalmatters,hewasa conservativeinreligionandpolitics.His ResearchesintotheMathematicalPrinciplesoftheThe- oryofWealth(1838),thoughafiascoatthetime, pioneeredmathematicaleconomics.Cournot upheldapositionmidwaybetweenscienceand metaphysics.Hisphilosophyrestsonthreebasic 189 Cousin,Victor coveringlawmodel concepts:order,chance,andprobability.The ExpositionoftheTheoryofChancesandProbabilities (1843)focusesonthecalculusofprobability, unfoldsatheoryofchanceoccurrences,anddis- tinguishesamongobjective,subjective,and philosophicalprobability.TheEssayontheFoun- dationsofKnowledge(1861)definesscienceaslog- icallyorganizedknowledge.Cournotdeveloped aprobabilistepistemology,showedtherelevance ofprobabilismtothescientificstudyofhuman acts,andfurtherassumedtheexistenceofa providentialandcomplexorderundergirding theuniverse.Materialism,Vitalism,Rationalism (1875)acknowledgestransrationalismand makesroomforfinality,purpose,andGod. J.L.S. Cousin,Victor(1792-1867),Frenchphilosopher whosetouttomergetheFrenchpsychological traditionwiththepragmatismofLockeand CondillacandtheinspirationoftheScottish (Reid,Stewart)andGermanidealists(Kant, Hegel).HisearlycoursesattheSorbonne(1815- 18),on"absolute"valuesthatmightovercome materialismandskepticism,arousedimmense enthusiasm.Thecourseof1818,DuVrai,duBeau etduBien(OftheTrue,theBeautiful,andtheGood), ispreservedintheAdolpheGarniereditionof studentnotes(1836);otherearlytextsappeared intheFragmentsphilosophiques(Philosophical Fragments,1826).Dismissedfromhisteaching postasaliberal(1820),arrestedinGermanyat therequestoftheFrenchpoliceanddetainedin Berlin,hewasreleasedafterHegelintervened (1824);hewasnotreinstateduntil1828.Under Louis-Philippe,herosetohighesthonors, becameministerofeducation,andintroduced philosophyintothecurriculum.Hiseclecticism, transformedintoaspiritualismandcultofthe "justemilieu,"becametheofficialphilosophy. Cousinrewrotehisworkaccordinglyandeven succeededinhavingDMVrai(thirdedition,1853) removedfromthepapalindex.In1848hewas forcedtoretire.Heisnotedforhiseducational reforms,asahistorianofphilosophy,andforhis translations(Proclus,Plato),editions(Descartes), andportraitsofladiesofseventeenth-century society.O.A.H. Couturat,Louis(1868-1914),Frenchphiloso- pherandlogicianwhowroteonthehistoryof philosophy,logic,philosophyofmathematics, andthepossibilityofauniversallanguage. CouturatrefutedRenouvier'sfinitismandadvo- catedanactualinfiniteinTheMathematicalInfi- nite(1896).Hearguedthattheassumptionof infinitenumberswasindispensabletomaintain thecontinuityofmagnitudes.Hesawaprecur- sorofmodernlogisticinLeibniz,basinghisinter- pretationofLeibnizontheDiscourseon MetaphysicsandLeibniz'scorrespondencewith Amauld.Hisepoch-makingLeibniz'sLogic(1901) describesLeibniz'smetaphysicsaspanlogism. CouturatpublishedastudyonKanfsmathe- maticalphilosophy(RevuedeMétaphysique, 1904),anddefendedPeano'slogic,Whitehead's algebra,andRussell'slogisticinTheAlgebraof Logic(1905).HealsocontributedtoAndré Lalande'sVocabulairetechniqueetcritiquedela philosophie(1926).J.-L.S. coveringlawmodel,theviewofscientificexpla- nationasadeductiveargumentwhichcontains non-vacuouslyatleastoneuniversallawamong itspremises.Thenamesofthisviewinclude 'Hempel'smodel','Hempel-Oppenheim(HO) model','Popper-Hempelmodel','deductive- nomological(D-N)model',andthe'subsump- tiontheory'ofexplanation.Theterm'covering lawmodelofexplanation'wasproposedby WilliamDray. Thetheoryofscientificexplanationwasfirst developedbyAristotle.Hesuggestedthatscience proceedsfrommereknowingthattodeeper knowingwhybygivingunderstandingofdiffer- entthingsbythefourtypesofcauses.Answers towhy-questionsaregivenbyscientificsyllo- gisms,i.e.,bydeductiveargumentswith premisesthatarenecessarilytrueandcausesof theirconsequences.Typicalexamplesarethe "subsumptive"argumentsthatcanbeexpressed bytheBarbarasyllogism: Allrävensareblack. Jackisaräven. Therefore,Jackisblack. Plantscontainingchlorophyllaregreen. Grasscontainschlorophyll. Therefore,grassisgreen. Inmodernlogicalnotation, Vx(Fx-^Gx) Fa Ga Vx(Fx— Vx(Hx- >Gx) *Fx) Vx(Hx-^Gx). Anexplanatoryargumentwaslåtercalledin Greeksynthesis,inLatincompositioordemonstratio propterquid.Aftertheseventeenthcentury,the 190 coveringlawmodel coveringlawmodel terms'explication'and'explanation'became commonlyused. Thenineteenth-centuryempiricistsaccepted Hume'scriticismofAristotelianessencesand necessities:alawofnatureisanextensional statementthatexpressesauniformity,i.e.,acon- stantconjunctionbetweenproperties('Allswans arewhite')ortypesofevents('Lightningis alwaysfollowedbythunder').Still,they acceptedthesubsumptiontheoryofexplanation: "Anindividualfactissaidtobeexplainedby pointingoutitscause,thatis,bystatingthelaw orlawsofcausation,ofwhichitsproductionis aninstance,"and"alaworuniformityinnature issaidtobeexplainedwhenanotherlaworlaws arepointedout,ofwhichthatlawitselfisbuta case,andfromwhichitcouldbededuced"(J.S. Mill).Ageneralmodelofprobabilisticexplana- tion,withdeductiveexplanationasaspecific case,wasgivenbyPeircein1883. Amodernformulationofthesubsumption theorywasgivenbyHempelandPaulOppen- heimin1948bythefollowingschemaofD-N explanation: (statementsofantecedentconditionsk logicat deduction i,,L2Lr (generallawsorlawlikesentences) Explanans descriptionoftheempirical phenomenontobeexplained /Explanandum ExplanandumEishereasentencethatdescribes aknownparticulareventorfact(singularexpla- nation)oruniformity(explanationoflaws). Explanationisanargumentthatanswersan explanation-seekingwhy-question'WhyE7by showingthatEisnomicallyexpectableonthe basisofgenerallaws(r>1)andantecedentcon- ditions.Therelationbetweentheexplanansand theexplanandumislogicaldeduction.Explana- tionisdistinguishedfromotherkindsofscientific systematization(prediction,postdiction)that shareitslogicalcharacteristics-aviewoften calledthesymmetrythesisregardingexplanation andprediction-bythepresuppositionthatthe phenomenonEisalreadyknown.Thisalsosep- aratesexplanationsfromreason-seekingargu- mentsthatanswerquestionsoftheform'What reasonsarethereforbelievingthatE?'Hempel andOppenheimrequiredthattheexplanans haveempiricalcontent,i.e.,betestablebyexper- imentorobservation,anditmustbetrue.Ifthe strongconditionoftruthisdropped,wespeakof potentialexplanation. Dispositionalexplanations,fornon-probabilis- ticdispositions,canbeformulatedintheD-N model.Forexample,letHx='xishitbyham- mer',Bx='xbreaks',andDx='xisfragile'.Then theexplanationwhyapieceofglasswasbroken mayrefertoitsfragilityanditsbeinghit: Vx(Hx->(Dx->Bx)) Hab-Da Ba ItiseasytofindexamplesofHOexplanations thatarenotsatisfactory:self-explanations ('Grassisgreen,becausegrassisgreen'),expla- nationswithtooweakpremises('Johndied, becausehehadaheartattackorhisplane crashed'),andexplanationswithirrelevant information('Thisstuffdissolvesinwater, becauseitissugarproducedinFinland'). Attemptsatfindingnecessaryandsufficientcon- ditionsinsyntacticandsemantictermsfor acceptableexplanationshavenotledtoany agreement.TheHOmodelalsoneedstheaddi- tionalAristotelianconditionthatcausalexplana- tionisdirectedfromcausestoeffects.Thisis shownbySylvainBromberger'sflagpoleexam- ple:thelengthofaflagpoleexplainsthelength ofitsshadow,butnotviceversa.MichaelScriven hasarguedagainstHempelthatexplanationsof particulareventsshouldbegivenbysingular causalstatements'i?becauseC".However,areg- ularitytheory(Humeanorstrongerthan Humean)ofcausalityimpliesthatthetruthof suchasingularcausalstatementpresupposesa universallawoftheform'EventsoftypeCare universallyfollowedbyeventsoftype£". TheHOversionofthecoveringlawmodelcan begeneralizedinseveraldirections.The explanansmaycontainprobabilisticorstatistical laws.Theexplanans-explanandumrelationmay beinductive(inthiscasetheexplanationitselfis inductive).Thisgivesusfourtypesofexplana- tions:deductive-universal(i.e.,D-N),deductive- probabilistic,inductive-universal,andinductive- probabilistic(I-P).Hempel's1962modelforI-P explanationcontainsaprobabilisticcoveringlaw P(G/F)=r,whereristhestatisticalprobabilityof GgivenF,andrinbracketsistheinductiveprob- abilityoftheexplanandumgiventheexplanans: P(G/F)=r Fa Ga [r] Theexplanation-seekingquestionmaybeweak- enedfrom'WhynecessarilyE7to'Howpossibly E7.Inacorrectiveexplanation,theexplanatory answerpointsoutthattheexplanandumsen- 191 Craigreduct creationism tenceEisnotstrictlytrue.Thisisthecasein approximateexplanation(e.g.,Newton'stheory entailsacorrectedformofGalileo'sandKepler's laws). Seealsocausation,explanation,grue PARADOX,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE.I.N. Craigreduct.Seecraig'sinterpolationtheorem. Craig'sinterpolationtheorem,atheoremforfirst- orderlogic:ifasentence\|/offirst-orderlogic entailsasentence9thereisan"interpolant,"a sentenceinthevocabularycommonto9and \|/thatentails9andisentailedby\|/.Originally, WilliamCraigprovedhistheoremin1957asa lemma,togiveasimplerproofofBeth'sdefin- abilitytheorem,buttheresultnowståndsonits own.Inabstractmodeltheory,logicsforwhich aninterpolationtheoremholdsaresaidtohave theCraiginterpolationproperty.Craig'sinterpo- lationtheoremshowsthatfirst-orderlogicis closedunderimplicitdefinability,sothatthecon- ceptsembodiedinfirst-orderlogicareallgiven explicitly. Inthephilosophyofscienceliterature'Craig's theorem'usuallyreferstoanotherresultof Craig's:thatanyrecursivelyenumerablesetof sentencesoffirst-orderlogiccanbeaxiomatized. Thishasbeenusedtoarguethattheoretical termsareinprincipleeliminablefromempirical theories.Assumingthatanempiricaltheorycan beaxiomatizedinfirst-orderlogic,i.e.,thatthere isarecursivesetoffirst-ordersentencesfrom whichalltheoremsofthetheorycanbeproven, itfollowsthatthesetofconsequencesofthe axiomsinan"observational"sublanguageisa recursivelyenumerableset.Thus,byCraig'sthe- orem,thereisasetofaxiomsforthissubtheory, theCraig-reduct,thatcontainsonlyobservation terms.Interestingly,theCraig-reducttheory maybesemanticallyweaker,inthesensethatit mayhavemodelsthatcannotbeextendedtoa modelofthefulltheory.Theexistenceofsucha modelwouldprovethatthetheoreticalterms cannotallbedefinedonthebasisoftheobserva- tionalvocabularyonly,aresultrelatedtoBeth's definabilitytheorem. Seealsobeth'sdefinabilitytheorem, PROOFTHEORY.Z.G.S. Craig'stheorem.Seecraig'sinterpolationtheo- rem. CratesofThebes.Seecynics. CratestheCynic.Seecynics. CratylusofAthens.Seeheraclitus. CratylusZeyl.Seepre-socratics. creationexnihilo,theactofbringingsomething intoexistencefromnothing.Accordingtotradi- tionalChristiantheology,Godcreatedtheworld exnihilo.Tosaythattheworldwascreatedfrom nothingdoesnotmeanthattherewasaprior non-existentsubstanceoutofwhichitwasfash- ioned,butratherthattherewasnotanythingout ofwhichGodbroughtitintobeing.However, someofthepatristicsinfluencedbyPlotinus, suchasGregoryofNyssa,apparentlyunderstood creationexnihilotobeanemanationfromGod accordingtowhichwhatiscreatedcomes,not fromnothing,butfromGodhimself.Notevery- thingthatGodmakesneedbecreatedexnihilo; orif,asinGenesis2:1,19,Godmadeahuman beingandanimalsfromtheground,apreviously existingmaterial,Goddidnotcreatethemfrom nothing.Regardlessofhowbodiesaremade, orthodoxtheologyholdsthathumansoulsare createdexnihilo;theopposingview,Iraducianism, holdsthatsoulsarepropagatedalongwithbod- ies.Seealsogregoryofnyssa,philosophy OFRELIGION,PLOTINUS.E.R.W. creationism,acceptanceoftheearlychaptersof Genesistakenliterally.Genesisclaimsthatthe universeandallofitslivingcreaturesincluding humanswerecreatedbyGodinthespaceofsix days.Theneedtofindsomewayofreconciling thisstorywiththeclaimsofscienceintensifiedin thenineteenthcentury,withthepublicationof Darwin'sOriginofSpecies(1859).IntheSouthern statesoftheUnitedStates,theindigenousform ofevangelicalProtestantChristianitydeclared totaloppositiontoevolutionism,refusingany attemptatreconciliation,andaffirmingtotal commitmenttoaliteral"creationist"readingof theBible.Becauseofthis,certainstatespassed lawsbanningtheteachingofevolutionism.More recently,literalistshavearguedthattheBiblecan begivenfullscientificbacking,andtheyhave thereforearguedthat"Creationscience"may properlybetaughtinstate-supportedschoolsin theUnitedStateswithoutviolationofthecon- stitutionalseparationofchurchandstate.This claimwaschallengedinthestateofArkansasin 1981,andultimatelyrejectedbytheU.S. SupremeCourt. Thecreationismdisputehasraisedsomeissues ofphilosophicalinterestandimportance.Most obviously,thereisthequestionofwhatconsti- tutesagenuinescience.Isthereanadequatecri- 192 creationism,theological critenon terionofdemarcationbetweenscienceandnon- science,andwillitputevolutionismontheone sideandcreationismontheother?Some philosophers,arguinginthespiritofKarlPopper, thinkthatsuchacriterioncanbefound.Others arenotsosure;andyetothersthinkthatsome suchcriterioncanbefound,butshowscreation- ismtobegenuinescience,albeitalreadyproven false. Philosophersofeducationhavealsotakenan interestincreationismandwhatitrepresents.If onegrantsthateventhemostorthodoxscience maycontainavaluecomponent,reflectingand influencingitspractitioners'culture,thenteach- ingasubjectlikebiologyalmostcertainlyisnot anormativelyneutralenterprise.Inthatcase, withoutnecessarilyconcedingtothecreationist anythingaboutthetruenatureofscienceorval- ues,perhapsonemustagreethatsciencewithits teachingisnotsomethingthatcanandshouldbe setapartfromtherestofsociety,asanentirely distinctphenomenon. Seealsodarwinism,philosophyofbiol- ogy,PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION,PHILOSOPHY OFSCIENCE,TESTABILITY.M.Ru. creationism,theological.Seepreexistence. credibility.Seecarnap. Crescas,Hasdai(d.1412),SpanishJewish philosopher,theologian,andstatesman.Hewas awell-knownrepresentativeoftheJewishcom- munityinbothBarcelonaandSaragossa.Fol- lowingthedeathofhissonintheanti-Jewish riotsof1391,hewroteachronicleofthemas- sacres(publishedasanappendixtoIbnVerga, ShevetYehudah,ed.M.Wiener,1855).Crescas's devotiontoprotectingSpanishJewryinatime whenconversionwasencouragedisdocu- mentedinoneextantwork,theRefutationof ChristianDogmas(1397-98),foundinthe1451 HebrewtranslationofJosephibnShemTov(Bit- tul'Iqqareyha-Nosrim).Hismajorphilosophical work,OrAdonai(TheLightoftheLord),was intendedasthefirstofatwo-partprojectthat wastoincludehisownmoreextensivesystem- atizationofhalakha(Jewishlaw)aswellasacri- tiqueofMaimonides'work.Butthissecondpart, "LampoftheDivineCommandment,"wasnever written. OrAdonaiisaphilosophico-dogmaticresponse toandattackontheAristoteliandoctrinesthat CrescassawasathreattotheJewishfaith,doc- trinesconcerningthenatureofGod,space,time, place,freewill,andinfmity.Fortheologicalrea- sonsheattemptstorefutebasictenetsinAris- totelianphysics.Heoffers,e.g.,acritiqueofAris- totle'sargumentsagainsttheexistenceofa vacuum.TheAristotelianviewoftimeisrejected aswell.Time,likespace,isthoughtbyCrescasto beinfinite.Furthermore,itisnotanaccidentof motion,butratherexistsonlyinthesoul.In defendingthefundamentaldoctrinesofthe Torah,Crescasmustaddressthequestiondis- cussedbyhispredecessorsMaimonidesandGer- sonides,namelythatofreconcilingdivine foreknowledgewithhumanfreedom.Unlike thesetwothinkers,Crescasadoptsaformof determinism,arguingthatGodknowsboththe possibleandwhatwillnecessarilytakeplace.An actiscontingentwithrespecttoitself,andnec- essarywithrespecttoitscausesandGod's knowledge.Tobewilledfreely,then,isnotforan acttobeabsolutelycontingent,butratherforit tobe"willedinternally"asopposedto"willed externally." ReactionstoCrescas'sdoctrinesweremixed. IsaacAbrabanel,despitehisrespectforCrescas's piety,rejectedhisviewsaseither"unintelligible" or"simple-minded."Ontheotherhand,Gio- vanniPicodellaMirandolaappealstoCrescas's critiqueofAristotelianphysics;JudahAbra- banel'sDialoguesofLovemaybeseenasaccom- modatingCrescas'smetaphysicalviews;and Spinoza'snotionsofnecessity,freedom,and extensionmaywellbeinfluencedbythedoc- trinesofOrAdonai. Seealsogersonides,maimonides. T.M.R. criteriologicalconnection.Seecriterion. criteriology.Seemercier. criterion,broadly,asufficientconditionforthe presenceofacertainpropertyorforthetruthof acertainproposition.Generally,acriterionneed besufficientmerelyinnormalcircumstances ratherthanabsolutelysufficient.Typically,acri- terionissalientinsomeway,oftenbyvirtueof beinganecessaryconditionaswellasasufficient one.Thepluralform,'criteria',iscommonly usedforasetofsinglynecessaryandjointlysuf- ficientconditions.Asetoftruthconditionsissaid tobecriterialforthetruthofpropositionsofa certainform.Aconceptualanalysisofaphilo- sophicallyimportantconceptmaytaketheform ofaproposedsetoftruthconditionsforparadig- maticpropositionscontainingtheconceptin question.Philosophershaveproposedcriteriafor suchnotionsasmeaningfulness,intentionality, 193 criterion,problemofthe CriticalRealism knowledge,justification,justice,rightness,and identity(includingpersonalidentityandevent identity),amongmanyothers. Thereisaspecialuseoftheterminconnection withWittgenstein'swell-knownremarkthat"an 'innerprocess'ståndsinneedofoutwardcrite- ria,"e.g.,moansandgroansforachesandpains. Thesuggestionisthatacriteriologicalconnectionis neededtoforgeaconceptuallinkbetweenitems ofasortthatareintelligibleandknowableto itemsofasortthat,butfortheconnection, wouldnotbeintelligibleorknowable.Amere symptomcannotprovidesuchaconnection,for establishingacorrelationbetweenasymptom andthatforwhichitisasymptompresupposes thatthelatterisintelligibleandknowable.One objectiontoacriteriologicalview,whetherabout achesorquarks,isthatitclasheswithrealism aboutentitiesofthesortinquestionandlapses into,asthecasemaybe,behaviorismorinstru- mentalism.Foritseemsthattopositacriterio- logicalconnectionistosupposethatthenature andexistenceofentitiesofagivensortcan dependontheconditionsfortheirintelligibility orknowability,andthatistoputtheepistemo- logicalcartbeforetheontologicalhorse. Seealsoproblemofthecriterion. K.B. criterion,problemofthe.Seeproblemofthecri- terion. Criticalidealism.Seekant. criticallegalstudies,alooseassemblageoflegal writingsandthinkersintheUnitedStatesand GreatBritainsincethemid-1970sthataspireto ajurisprudenceandapoliticalideology.Likethe Americanlegalrealistsofthe1920sandf930s, thejurisprudentialprogramislargelynegative, consistinginthediscoveryofsupposedcontra- dictionswithinboththelawasawholeandareas oflawsuchascontractsandcriminallaw.The jurisprudentialimplicationderivedfromsuch supposedcontradictionswithinthelawisthat anydecisioninanycasecanbedefendedasfol- lowinglogicallyfromsomeauthoritativepropo- sitionsoflaw,makingthelawcompletely withoutguidanceinparticularcases.Alsolike theAmericanlegalrealists,thepoliticalideology ofcriticallegalstudiesisvaguelyleftist,embrac- ingthecommunitariancritiqueofliberalism. Communitariansfaultliberalismforitsalleged overemphasisonindividualrightsandindividual welfareattheexpenseoftheintrinsicvalueof certaincollectivegoods.Giventhecognitiverel- ativismofmanyofitspractitioners,criticallegal studiestendsnottoaspiretohaveanythingthat couldbecalledatheoryofeitherlaworofpoli- tics.Seealsojurisprudence,philosophyof LAW,POLITICALPHILOSOPHY.M.S.M. criticalphilosophy.Seebroad,kant. CriticalRealism,aphilosophythatatthehighest levelofgeneralitypurportstointegratetheposi- tiveinsightsofbothNewRealismandidealism. NewRealismwasthefirstwaveofrealisticreac- tiontothedominantidealismofthenineteenth century.Itwasaversionofimmediateanddirect realism.Initsattempttoavoidanyrepresenta- tionalismthatwouldleadtoidealism,thistradi- tionidentifiedtheimmediatedataofcon- sciousnesswithobjectsinthephysicalworld. Thereisnointermediarybetweentheknower andtheknown.Thisheroictourdeforce founderedonthephenomenaoferror,illusion, andperceptualvariation,andgaverisetoasuc- cessorrealism-CriticalRealism-thatacknowl- edgedthemediationof"themental"inour cognitivegraspofthephysicalworld. 'CriticalRealism'wasthetitleofaworkinepis- temologybyRoyWoodSellars(1916),butits moregeneralusetodesignatethebroadermove- mentderivesfromthe1920cooperativevolume, EssaysinCriticalRealism:ACooperativeStudyofthe ProblemofKnowledge,containingpositionpapers byDurantDrake,A.O.Lovejoy,J.B.Pratt,A.K. Rogers,C.A.Strong,GeorgeSantayana,andRoy WoodSellars.WithNewRealism,Critical Realismmaintainsthattheprimaryobjectof knowledgeistheindependentphysicalworld, andthatwhatisimmediatelypresenttocon- sciousnessisnotthephysicalobjectassuch,but somecorrespondingmentalstatebroadlycon- strued.WhereasbothNewRealismandidealism grewoutoftheconvictionthatanysuchmedi- atedaccountofknowledgeisuntenable,theCrit- icalRealistsfeltthatonlyifknowledgeofthe externalworldisexplainedintermsofaprocess ofmentalmediation,canerror,illusion,andper- ceptualvariationbeaccommodated.Onecould fashionanaccountofmentalmediationthatdid notinvolvethepitfallsofLockeanrepresenta- tionalismbycarefullydistinguishingbetweenthe objectknownandthementalstatethrough whichitisknown. TheCriticalRealistsdifferedamongthem- selvesbothepistemologicallyandmetaphysi- cally.Themediatingelementsincognitionwere variouslyconstruedasessences,ideas,orsense- data,andthepreciseroleoftheseitemsincogni- 194 criticaltheory Croce,Benedetto tionwasagainvariouslyconstrued.Metaphysi- callysomeweredualistswhosawknowledgeas unexplainableintermsofphysicalprocesses, whereasothers(principallySantayanaand Sellars)werematerialistswhosawcognitionas simplyafunctionofconsciousbiologicalsystems. Thepositionofmostlastinginfluencewasproba- blythatofSellarsbecausethattorchwastaken upbyhisson,Wilfrid,whoseverysophisticated developmentofitwasquiteinfluential. Seealsoidealism;metaphysicalreal- ism;newrealism;perception;sellars, wilfrid.c.f.d. criticaltheory,anysocialtheorythatisatthe sametimeexplanatorynormative,practical,and self-reflexive.Thetermwasfirstdevelopedby Horkheimerasaself-descriptionoftheFrankfurt SchoolanditsrevisionofMarxism.Itnowhasa widersignificancetoincludeanycritical,theoret- icalapproach,includingfeminismandliberation philosophy.Whentheymakeclaimstobescien- tific,suchapproachesattempttogiverigorous explanationsofthecausesofoppression,suchas ideologicalbeliefsoreconomicdependence; theseexplanationsmustinturnbeverifiedby empiricalevidenceandemploythebestavailable socialandeconomictheories.Suchexplanations arealsonormativeandcritical,sincetheyimply negativeevaluationsofcurrentsocialpractices. Theexplanationsarealsopractical,inthatthey provideabetterself-understandingforagents whomaywanttoimprovethesocialconditions thatthetheorynegativelyevaluates.Such changegenerallyaimsat"emancipation,"and theoreticalinsightempowersagentstoremove limitstohumanfreedomandthecausesof humansuffering.Finally,thesetheoriesmust alsobeself-reflexive:theymustaccountfortheir ownconditionsofpossibilityandfortheirpoten- tiallytransformativeeffects.Theserequirements contradictthestandardaccountofscientificthe- oriesandexplanations,particularlypositivism anditsseparationoffaetandvalue.Forthisrea- son,themethodologicalwritingsofcriticaltheo- ristsoftenattackpositivismandempiricismand attempttoconstruetalternativeepistemologies. Criticaltheoristsalsorejectrelativism,sincethe eulturalrelativityofnormswouldunderminethe basisofcriticalevaluationofsocialpracticesand emancipatorychange. Thedifferencebetweencriticalandnon-criti- caltheoriescanbeillustratedbycontrastingthe MarxianandMannheimiantheoriesofideology. WhereasMannheim'stheorymerelydescribes relationsbetweenideasofsocialconditions, Marx'stheorytriestoshowhowcertainsocial practicesrequirefalsebeliefsaboutthembytheir participants.Marx'stheorynotonlyexplains whythisisso,italsonegativelyevaluatesthose practices;itispracticalinthatbydisillusioning participants,itmakesthemcapableoftransfor- mativeaction.Itisalsoself-reflexive,sinceit showswhysomepracticesrequireillusionsand othersdonot,andalsowhysocialcrisesandcon- flictswillleadagentstochangetheircircum- stances.Itisscientific,inthatitappealsto historicalevidenceandcanberevisedinlightof bettertheoriesofsocialaction,language,and rationality.Marxalsoclaimedthathistheorywas superiorforitsspecial"dialecticalmethod,"but thisisnowdisputedbymostcriticaltheorists, whoincorporatemanydifferenttheoriesand methods.Thisbroaderdefinitionofcriticalthe- ory,however,leavesagapbetweentheoryand practiceandplacesanextraburdenoncriticsto justifytheircriticaltheorieswithoutappealto suchnotionsasinevitablehistoricalprogress. Thisproblemhasmadecriticaltheoriesmore philosophicalandconcernedwithquestionsof justification. SeealsoFrankfurtschool,logical POSITIVISM,MANNHEIM,RELATIVISM.J.Bo. Croce,Benedetto(1866-1952),Italianphiloso- pher.HewasbornatPescasseroli,intheAbruzzi, andafter1886livedinNaples.Hebriefly attendedtheUniversityofRomeandwasledto studyHerbarfsphilosophy.In1904hefounded theinfluentialjournalLacritica.In1910hewas madelifememberoftheItaliansenate.Earlyin hiscareerhebefriendedGiovanniGentile,but thisfriendshipwasbreachedbyGentile'sFas- cism.DuringtheFascistperiodandWorldWarII Crocelivedinisolationasthechiefanti-fascist thinkerinItaly.Helåterbecamealeaderofthe Liberalpartyandattheageofeightyfoundedthe InstituteforHistoricalStudies. Crocewasaliteraryandhistoricalscholarwho joinedhisgreatinterestinthesefieldstophilos- ophy.Hisbest-knownworkintheEnglish- speakingworldisAestheticasScienceofExpression andGeneralLinguistic(1902).Thiswasthefirst partofhis"PhilosophyofSpirit";thesecondwas hisLogic(1905),thethirdhistheoryofthePrac- tical(1909),andthefourthhisHistoriography (1917).CrocewasinfluencedbyHegelandthe HegelianaestheticianFrancescoDeSanctis (1817-83)andbyVico'sconceptionsofknowl- edge,history,andsociety.HewroteThePhiloso- phyofGiambattistaVico(1911)andafamous commentaryonHegel,WhatIsLivingandWhatIs 195 crucialexperiment Crusius,ChristianAugust DeadinthePhilosophyofHegel(1907),inwhichhe advancedhisconceptionofthe"dialecticofdis- tincts"asmorefundamentalthantheHegelian dialecticofopposites. Croceheldthatphilosophyalwayssprings fromtheoccasion,aviewperhapsrootedinhis concretestudiesofhistory.Heacceptedthegen- eralHegelianidentificationofphilosophywith thehistoryofphilosophy.Hisphilosophyorigi- natesfromhisconceptionofaesthetics.Central tohisaestheticsishisviewofintuition,which evolvedthroughvariousstagesduringhiscareer. Heregardsaestheticexperienceasaprimitive typeofcognition.Intuitioninvolvesanaware- nessofaparticularimage,whichconstitutesa non-conceptualformofknowledge.Artisthe expressionofemotionbutnotsimplyforitsown sake.Theexpressionofemotioncanproduce cognitiveawarenessinthesensethatthepartic- ularintuitedasanimagecanhaveacosmic aspect,sothatinittheuniversalhumanspiritis perceived.Suchperceptionispresentespecially inthemasterpiecesofworldliterature.Croce's conceptionofaesthetichasconnectionswith Kanfs"intuition"(Anschauung)andtoanextent withVico'sconceptionofaprimordialformof thoughtbasedinimagination(fantasia). Croce'sphilosophicalidealismincludesfully developedconceptionsoflogic,science,law,his- tory,politics,andethics.Hisinfluencetodatehas beenlargelyinthefieldofaestheticsandinhis- toricistconceptionsofknowledgeandculture. HisrevivalofVicohasinspiredawholeschoolof Vicoscholarship.Croce'sconceptionofa"Phi- losophyofSpirit"showeditwaspossibleto developapost-Hegelianphilosophythat,with Hegel,takes"thetruetobethewhole"butwhich doesnotsimplyimitateHegel. Seealsoaesthetics,hegel,kant,vico. D.P.V. crucialexperiment,ameansofdecidingbetween rivaltheoriesthat,providingparallelexplana- tionsoflargeclassesofphenomena,cometobe placedatissuebyasinglefact.Forexample,the Newtonianemissiontheorypredictsthatlight travelsfasterinwaterthaninair;accordingto thewavetheory,lighttravelsslowerinwater thaninair.DominiqueFrancoisAragoproposed acrucialexperimentcomparingtherespective velocities.LeonFoucaultthendevisedanappa- ratustomeasurethespeedoflightinvarious mediaandfoundalowervelocityinwaterthan inair.AragoandFoucaultconcludedforthe wavetheory,believingthattheexperiment refutedtheemissiontheory.Otherexamples includeGalileo'sdiscoveryofthephasesofVenus (PtolemaicversusCopernicanastronomy),Pas- cal'sPuy-de-Dömeexperimentwiththebarom- eter(vacuistsversusplenists),Fresnel'spre- dictionofaspötoflightincircularshadows(par- ticleversuswaveoptics),andEddington'smea- surementofthegravitationalbendingoflight raysduringasolareclipse(Newtonianversus Einsteiniangravitation).Atissueincrucial experimentsisusuallyanovelprediction. ThenotionseemstoderivefromFrancis Bacon,whoseNewOrganon(1620)discussesthe "InstanceoftheFingerpost(Instantia-låter experimentum—crucis),"atermborrowedfrom thepostsetupatcrossroadstoindicateseveral directions.Crucialexperimentswereempha- sizedinearlynineteenth-centuryscientific methodology-e.g.,inJohnF.Herschel'sAPre- liminaryDiscourseontheStudyofNaturalPhilosophy (1830).Duhemarguedthatcrucialexperiments resemblefalsedilemmas:hypothesesinphysics donotcomeinpairs,sothatcrucialexperiments cannottransformoneofthetwointoademon- stratedtruth.DiscussingFoucaulfsexperiment, Duhemaskswhetherwedåreassertthatno otherhypothesisisimaginableandsuggeststhat insteadoflightbeingeitherasimpleparticleor wave,lightmightbesomethingelse,perhapsa disturbancepropagatedwithinadielectric medium,astheorizedbyMaxwell.Inthetwen- tiethcentury,crucialexperimentsandnovelpre- dictionsfiguredprominentlyintheworkofImre Lakatos(1922-74).Agreeingthatcrucialexper- imentsareunabletooverthrowtheories,Lakatos acceptedthemasretroactiveindicationsofthe fertilityorprogressofresearchprograms. Seealsobacon,francis;confirmation; duhem;philosophyofscience.R.Ar. Crusius,ChristianAugust(1715-75),German philosopher,theologian,andadevoutLutheran pastorwhobelievedthatreligionwasendan- geredbytherationalistviewsespeciallyofWolff. Hedevotedhisconsiderablephilosophicalpow- erstoworkingoutacuteandoftendeepcriti- cismsofWolffanddevelopingacomprehensive alternativetotheWolffiansystem.Hismain philosophicalworkswerepublishedinthe 1740s.Inhisunderstandingofepistemologyand logicCrusiusbrokewithmanyoftheassump- tionsthatallowedWolfftoarguefromhowwe thinkofthingstohowthingsare.Forinstance, Crusiustriedtoshowthatthenecessityincausal connectionisnotthesameaslogicalnecessity. HerejectedtheLeibnizianviewthatthisworldis probablythebestpossibleworld,andhecriti- 196 Cudworth,Damaris curve-fittingproblem cizedtheWolffianviewoffreedomofthewillas merelyaconcealedspiritualmechanism. HisethicsstressedourdependenceonGodand hiscommands,asdidthenaturallawtheoryof Pufendorf,buthedevelopedtheviewinsome strikinglyoriginalways.Rejectingvoluntarism, CrusiusheldthatGod'scommandstaketheform ofinnateprinciplesofthewill(nottheunder- standing).Everyonealikecanknowwhatthey are,so(contraWolff)thereisnoneedformoral experts.Andtheycarrytheirownmotivational forcewiththem,sothereisnoneedforexternal sanctions.Wehaveobligationsofprudencetodo whatwillforwardourownends;buttrueobliga- tion,theobligationofvirtue,arisesonlywhenwe actsimplytocomplywithGod'slaw,regardlessof anyendsofourown.Inthisdistinctionbetween twokindsofobligation,asinmanyofhisother views,Crusiusplainlyanticipatedmuchthat Kantcametothink.Kantwhenyoungreadand admiredhiswork,anditismainlyforthisreason thatCrusiusisnowremembered. Seealsokant,naturallaw,pufendorf. J.B.S. Cudworth,Damaris,LadyMasham(1659- 1708),Englishphilosopherandauthoroftwo treatisesonreligion,ADiscourseConcerningthe LoveofGod(1690)andOccasionalThoughtsinRef erencetoaVirtuousChristianLife(1705).Thefirst arguesagainsttheviewsoftheEnglishMale- branchian,JohnNorris;thesecond,ostensibly abouttheimportanceofeducationforwomen, arguesfortheneedtoestablishnaturalreligion onrationalprinciplesandexplorestheplaceof revealedreligionwithinarationalframework. CudworuVsreputationisfoundedonherlong friendshipwithJohnLocke.Hercorrespondence withhimisalmostentirelypersonal;shealso enteredintoabriefbutphilosophicallyinterest- ingexchangeofletterswithLeibniz.Seealso LOCKE,MALEBRANCHE.M.At. Cudworth,Ralph.SeeCambridgeplatonists, hylozoism. culturalrelativism.Seerelativism. Culverwel,Nathaniel.SeeCambridgeplatonists. Cumberland,Richard(1631-1718),English philosopherandbishop.HewroteaLatinTreatise oftheLawsofNature(1672),translatedtwiceinto EnglishandonceintoFrench.AdmiringGrotius, CumberlandhopedtorefuteHobbesintheinter- estsofdefendingChristianmoralityandreligion. Herefusedtoappealtoinnateideasandapriori argumentsbecausehethoughtHobbesmustbe attackedonhisownground.Henceheoffereda reductiveandnaturalisticaccountofnaturallaw. Theonebasicmorallawofnatureisthatthepur- suitofthegoodofallrationalbeingsisthebest pathtotheagenfsowngood.Thisistruebecause Godmadenaturesothatactionsaidingothers arefollowedbybeneficialconsequencestothe agent,whilethoseharmfultoothersharmthe agent.Sincethenaturalconsequencesofactions providesanctionsthat,onceweknowthem,will makeusactforthegoodofothers,wecancon- cludethatthereisadivinelawbywhichweare obligatedtoactforthecommongood.Andallthe otherlawsofnaturefollowfromthebasiclaw. Cumberlandrefusedtodiscussfreewill,thereby suggestingaviewofhumanactionasfullydeter- minedbynaturalcauses.Ifonhistheoryitisa blessingthatGodmadenature(including humans)toworkasitdoes,thereligiousreader mustwonderifthereisanyroleleftforGodcon- cerningmorality.Cumberlandisgenerally viewedasamajorforerunnerofutilitarianism. Seealsogrotius,hobbes,naturallaw. J.B.S. cumhocergopropterhoc.Seeinformalfal- lacy. CursusConinbricensis.Seefonseca. curve-fittingproblem,theproblemofmaking predictionsfrompastobservationsbyfitting curvestothedata.Curvefittinghastwosteps: first,selectafamilyofcurves;then,findthebest- fittingcurvebysomestatisticalcriterionsuchas themethodofleastsquares(e.g.,choosethe curvethathastheleastsumofsquareddevia- tionsbetweenthecurveanddata).Themethod wasfirstproposedbyAdrianMarieLegendre (1752-1833)andCarlFriedrichGauss(1777- 1855)intheearlynineteenthcenturyasaway ofinferringplanetarytrajectoriesfromnoisy data. Moregenerally,curvefittingmaybeusedto constructlow-levelempiricalgeneralizations. Forexample,supposethattheidealgaslaw,P= nkT,ischosenastheformofthelawgoverning thedependenceofthepressurePontheequilib- riumtemperatureTofafixedvolumeofgas, wherenisthemolecularnumberperunitvol- umeandkisBoltzmann'sconstant(auniversal constantequalto1.3804X10-16erg°C-!. Whentheparameternkisadjustable,thelaw specifiesafamilyofcurves-oneforeachnumer- 197 Cusa cut-eliminationtheorem icalvalueoftheparameter.Curvefittingmaybe usedtodeterminethebest-fittingmemberofthe family,therebyeffectingameasurementofthe theoreticalparameter,nk. Best-fittingstraightline passingthroughtheorigin Thephilosophicallyvexingproblemishowto justifytheinitialchoiceoftheformofthelaw. Ontheonehand,onemightchooseaverylarge, complexfamilyofcurves,whichwouldensure excellentätwithanydataset.Theproblemwith thisoptionisthatthebest-fittingcurvemayover- fitthedata.Iftoomuchattentionispaidtothe randomelementsofthedata,thenthepredic- tivelyusefultrendsandregularitieswillbe missed.Ifitlookstoogoodtobetrue,itprobably is.Ontheotherhand,simplerfamiliesruna greaterriskofmakinggrosslyfalseassumptions aboutthetrueformofthelaw.Intuitively,the solutionistochooseasimplefamilyofcurvesthat maintainsareasonabledegreeoffit.Thesimplic- ityofafamilyofcurvesismeasuredbythe paucityofparameters.Theproblemistosayhow andwhysuchatrade-offbetweensimplicityand goodnessoffitshouldbemade. Whenatheorycanaccommodaterecalcitrant dataonlybytheadhoc-i.e.,improperlymoti- vated-additionofnewtermsandparameters, studentsofsciencehavelongfeltthatthesubse- quentincreaseinthedegreeoffitshouldnot countinthetheory'sfavör,andsuchadditions aresometimescalledadhochypotheses.The best-knownexampleofthissortofadhoc hypothesizingistheadditionofepicyclesupon epicyclesintheplanetaryastronomiesof PtolemyandCopernicus.Thisisanexamplein whichagaininfitneednotcompensateforthe lossofsimplicity. Contemporaryphilosopherssometimesfor- mulatethecurve-fittingproblemdifferently. Theyoftenassumethatthereisnonoiseinthe data,andspeakoftheproblemofchoosing amongdifferentcurvesthatfitthedataexactly. Thentheproblemistochoosethesimplestcurve fromamongallthosecurvesthatpassthrough everydatapoint.Theproblemisthatthereisno universallyacceptedwayofdefiningthesimplic- ityofsinglecurves. Nomatterhowtheproblemisformulated,itis widelyagreedthatsimplicityshouldplaysome roleintheorychoice.Rationalistshavechampi- onedthecurve-fittingproblemasexemplifying theunderdeterminationoftheoryfromdataand theneedtomakeaprioriassumptionsaboutthe simplicityofnature.Thosephilosopherswho thinkthatwehavenosuchaprioriknowledge stillneedtoaccountfortherelevanceofsimplic- itytoscience. Whewelldescribedcurvefittingasthecolliga- tionoffactsinthequantitativesciences,andthe agreementinthemeasuredparameters(coeffi- cients)obtainedbydifferentcolligationsoffacts astheconsilienceofinductions.Differentcolli- gationsoffacts(sayonthesamegasatdifferent volumeorforothergases)mayyieldgoodagree- mentamongindependentlymeasuredvaluesof parameters(likethemoleculardensityofthegas andBoltzmann'sconstant).Byidentifyingdiffer- entparametersfoundtoagree,weconstrainthe formofthelawwithoutappealingtoapriori knowledge(goodnewsforempiricism).Butthe accompanyingincreaseinunificationalsowors- enstheoveralldegreeoffit.Thus,thereisalso theproblemofhowandwhyweshouldtradeoff unificationwithtotaldegreeoffit. Statisticiansoftenrefertoafamilyofhypothe- sesasamodel.Arapidlygrowingliteratureinsta- tisticsonmodelselectionhasnotyetproduced anyuniversallyacceptedformulafortradingoff simplicitywithdegreeoffit.However,thereis wideagreementamongstatisticiansthatthe paucityofparametersistheappropriatewayof measuringsimplicity. Seealsoexplanation,philosophyof SCIENCE,WHEWELL.M.R.F. Cusa.Seenicholasofcusa. Cusanus.Seenicholasofcusa. cut,Dedekind.SeeDEDEKiND. cut-eliminationtheorem,atheoremstatingthat acertaintypeofinferencerule(includingarule thatcorrespondstomodusportens)isnotneeded inclassicallogic.Theideawasanticipatedby J.Herbrand;thetheoremwasprovedby G.GentzenandgeneralizedbyS.Kleene. Gentzenformulatedasequentcalculus-i.e.,a deductivesystemwithrulesforstatementsabout derivability.Itincludesarulethatwehere expressas'From(ChD,M)and(M,ChD),infer (ChD)'or'GiventhatCyieldsDorM,andthat CplusMyieldsD,wemayinferthatCyieldsD'. 198 cybernetics cybernetics Thisiscalledthecutrulebecauseitcutsoutthe middleformulaM.Gentzenshowedthathis sequentcalculusisanadequateformalizationof thepredicatelogic,andthatthecutrulecanbe eliminated;anythingprovablewithitcanbe provedwithoutit.Oneimportantconsequence ofthisisthat,ifaformulaFisprovable,then thereisaproofofFthatconsistssolelyofsub- formulasofF.Thisfactsimplifiesthestudyof provability.Gentzen'smethodologyapplies directlytoclassicallogicbutcanbeadaptedto manynonclassicallogics,includingsomeintu- itionisticlogics.Ithasledtosomeimportantthe- oremsaboutconsistency,andhasilluminated theroleofauxiliaryassumptionsinthederiva- tionofconsequencesfromatheory.Seealso CONSISTENCY,PROOFTHEORY.D.H. cybernetics(coinedbyNorbertWienerin1947 fromGreekkubernetes,'helmsman'),thestudyof thecommunicationandmanipulationofinfor- mationinserviceofthecontrolandguidanceof biological,physical,orchemicalenergysystems. Historically,cyberneticshasbeenintertwined withmathematicaltheoriesofinformation (communication)andcomputation.Todescribe thecyberneticpropertiesofsystemsorprocesses requireswaystodescribeandmeasureinforma- tion(reduceuncertainty)abouteventswithin thesystemanditsenvironment.Feedbackand feedforward,thebasicingredientsofcybernetic processes,involveinformation-aswhatisfed forwardorbackward-andarebasictoprocesses suchashomeostasisinbiologicalsystems, automationinindustry,andguidancesystems. Ofcourse,theirmostcomprehensiveapplica- tionistothepurposivebehavior(thought)of cognitivelygoal-directedsystemssuchasour- selves. Feedbackoccursinclosed-loop,asopposedto open-loop,systems.Actually,'open-loop'isa misnomer(involvingnoloop),butithasbecome entrenched.Thestandardexampleofanopen- loopsystemisthatofplacingaheaterwithcon- stantoutputinaclosedroomandleavingit switchedon.Roomtemperaturemayacciden- tallyreach,butmayalsodramaticallyexceed,the temperaturedesiredbytheoccupants.Sucha heatingsystemhasnomeansofcontrollingitself toadapttorequiredconditions. Incontrast,thestandardclosed-loopsystem incorporatesafeedbackcomponent.Attheheart ofcyberneticsistheconceptofcontrol.Acon- trolledprocessisoneinwhichanendstatethat isreacheddependsessentiallyonthebehaviorof thecontrollingsystemandnotmerelyonits externalenvironment.Thatis,controlinvolves partialindependenceforthesystem.Acontrol systemmaybepicturedashavingbothaninner andouterenvironment.Theinnerenvironment consistsoftheinternaleventsthatmakeupthe system;theouterenvironmentconsistsof eventsthatcausallyimpingeonthesystem, threateningdisruptionandlossofsystem integrityandstability.Forasystemtomaintain itsindependenceandidentityinthefaceoffluc- tuationsinitsexternalenvironment,itmustbe abletodetectinformationaboutthosechanges intheexternalenvironment.Informationmust passthroughtheinterfacebetweeninnerand outerenvironments,andthesystemmustbe abletocompensateforfluctuationsoftheouter environmentbyadjustingitsowninnerenvi- ronmentalvariables.Otherwise,disturbancesin theouterenvironmentwillovercomethesys- tem-bringingitsinnerstatesintoequilibrium withtheouterstates,therebylosingitsidentity asadistinct,independentsystem.Thisis nowheremorecertainthanwiththehomeosta- ticsystemsofthebody(fortemperatureorblood sugarlevels). Controlintheattainmentofgoalsisaccom- plishedbyminimizingerror.Negativefeedback,or informationabouterror,isthedifference betweenactivityasystemactuallyperforms (output)andthatactivitywhichisitsgoaltoper- form(input).Thestandardexampleofcontrol incorporatingnegativefeedbackisthethermo- staticallycontrolledheatingsystem.Theactual roomtemperature(systemoutput)carriesinfor- mationtothethermostatthatcanbecompared (viagoal-statecomparator)tothedesiredtem- peraturefortheroom(input)asembodiedinthe set-pointonthethermostat;acorrectioncan thenbemadetominimizethedifference (error)-thefumaceturnsonoroff. Positivefeedbacktendstoamplifythevalueof theoutputofasystem(orofasystemdistur- bance)byaddingthevalueoftheoutputtothe systeminputquantity.Thus,thesystemaccen- tuatesdisturbancesand,ifunchecked,willeven- tuallypassthebrinkofinstability.Supposethat asroomtemperaturerisesitcausesthethermo- staticset-pointtoriseindirectproportiontothe riseintemperature.Thiswouldcausethefur- nacetocontinuetooutputheat(possiblywith disastrousconsequences).Manybiologicalmal- adieshavejustthischaracteristic.Forexample, severelossofbloodcausesinabilityoftheheart topumpeffectively,whichcauseslossofarterial pressure,which,inturn,causesreducedflowof bloodtotheheart,reducingpumpingefficiency. 199 Cynics Cyrenaics Cognitivelygoal-directedsystemsarealso cyberneticsystems.Purposiveattainmentofa goalbyagoal-directedsystemmusthave(at least):(1)aninternalrepresentationofthegoal stateofthesystem(adetectorforwhetherthe desiredstateisactual);(2)afeedbackloopby whichinformationaboutthepresentstateofthe systemcanbecomparedwiththegoalstateas internallyrepresentedandbymeansofwhichan errorcorrectioncanbemadetominimizeany difference;and(3)acausaldependencyofsys- temoutputupontheerror-correctionprocessof condition(2)(todistinguishgoalsuccessfrom fortuitousgoalsatisfaction). Seealsocomputertheory,information THEORY,SYSTEMSTHEORY.F.A. Cynics,aclassicalGreekphilosophicalschool characterizedbyasceticismandemphasisonthe sufficiencyofvirtueforhappiness(eudaimonia), boldnessinspeech,andshamelessnessinaction. TheCynicswerestronglyinfluencedbySocrates andwerethemselvesanimportantinfluenceon Stoicethics. AnancienttraditionlinkstheCynicstoAntis- thenes(c.445-c.360b.c),anAthenian.He foughtbravelyinthebattleofTanagraand claimedthathewouldnothavebeensocoura- geousifhehadbeenbornoftwoAthenians insteadofanAthenianandaThracianslave.He studiedwithGorgias,butlåterbecameaclose companionofSocratesandwaspresentat Socrates'death.Antistheneswasproudestofhis wealth,althoughhehadnomoneybecausehe wassatisfiedwithwhathehadandhecouldlive inwhatevercircumstanceshefoundhimself. HerehefollowsSocratesinthreerespects.First, Socrateshimselflivedwithadisregardforplea- sureandpain-e.g.,walkingbarefootinsnow. Second,Socratesthinksthatineverycircum- stanceavirtuouspersonisbetteroffthananon- virtuousone;AntisthenesanticipatestheStoic developmentofthistotheviewthatvirtueissuf- ficientforhappiness,becausethevirtuousper- sonusesproperlywhateverispresent.Third, bothSocratesandAntisthenesstressthatthe soulismoreimportantthanthebody,and neglectthebodyforthesoul.Unlikethelåter Cynics,however,bothSocratesandAntisthenes doacceptpleasurewhenitisavailable.Antis- thenesalsodoesnotfocusexclusivelyonethics; hewroteonothertopics,includinglogic.(He supposedlytoldPlatothathecouldseeahorse butnothorseness,towhichPlatorepliedthathe hadnotacquiredthemeanstoseehorseness.) DiogenesofSinope(c.400-c.325b.c.)contin- uedtheemphasisonself-sufficiencyandonthe soul,buttookthedisregardforpleasuretoasceti- cism.(Accordingtoonestory,PlatocalledDio- genes"Socratesgonemad.")HecametoAthens afterbeingexiledfromSinope,perhapsbecause thecoinagewasdefaced,eitherbyhimselforby others,underhisfather'sdirection.Hetook 'defacethecoinage!'asamotto,meaningthat thecurrentstandardswerecorruptandshould bemarkedascorruptbybeingdefaced;his refusaltolivebythemwashisdefacingthem.For example,helivedinawinecask,atewhatever scrapshecameacross,andwroteapprovinglyof cannibalismandincest.Onestoryreportsthathe carriedalightedlampinbroaddaylightlooking foranhonesthuman,probablyintendingtosug- gestthatthepeoplehedidseeweresocorrupted thattheywerenolongerreallypeople.Heappar- entlywantedtoreplacethedebasedstandardsof customwiththegenuinestandardsofnature- butnatureinthesenseofwhatwasminimally requiredforhumanlife,whichanindividual humancouldachieve,withoutsociety.Because ofthis,hewascalledaCynic,fromtheGreek wordkuon(dog),becausehewasasshamelessas adog. Diogenes'mostfamoussuccessorwasCrates (fl.c.328-325b.c).HewasaBoeotian,from Thebes,andrenouncedhiswealthtobecomea Cynic.Heseemstohavebeenmorepleasant thanDiogenes;accordingtosomereports,every Athenianhousewasopentohim,andhewas evenregardedbythemasahouseholdgod.Per- hapsthemostfamousincidentinvolvingCrates ishismarriagetoHipparchia,whotookupthe Cynicwayoflifedespiteherfamily'sopposition andinsistedthateducatingherselfwasprefer- abletoworkingaloom.LikeDiogenes,Crates emphasizedthathappinessisself-sufficiency,and claimedthatasceticismisrequiredforself-suffi- ciency;e.g.,headvisesusnottopreferoystersto lentils.Hearguesthatnooneishappyifhappi- nessismeasuredbythebalanceofpleasureand pain,sinceineachperiodofourlivesthereis morepainthanpleasure. Cynicismcontinuedtobeactivethroughthe thirdcenturyb.c,andreturnedtoprominence inthesecondcenturya.d.afteranapparent decline. Seealsoeudaimonism,socrates,sto- ICISM,VIRTUEETHICS.H.A.I. Cyrenaics,aclassicalGreekphilosophicalschool thatbeganshortlyafterSocratesandlastedfor severalcenturies,notedespeciallyforhedonism. AncientwriterstracetheCyrenaicsbacktoAris- 200 Czolbe,Heinrich Czolbe,Heinrich tippusofCyrene(fifth-fourthcenturyb.c),an associateofSocrates.AristippuscametoAthens becauseofSocrates'fameandlåtergreatly enjoyedtheluxuryofcourtlifeinSicily.(Some peopleascribethefoundingoftheschooltohis grandchildAristippus,becauseofanancient reportthattheelderAristippussaidnothingclear aboutthehumanend.)TheCyrenaicsinclude Aristippus'schildArete,herchildAristippus (taughtbyArete),Hegesius,Anniceris,and Theodorus.Theschoolseemstohavebeen supersededbytheEpicureans.NoCyrenaicwrit- ingssurvive,andthereportswedohaveare sketchy. TheCyrenaicsavoidmathematicsandnatural philosophy,preferringethicsbecauseofitsutil- ity.(Accordingtothem,notonlywillstudying naturenotmakeusvirtuous,italsowon'tmake usstrongerorricher.)Somereportsclaimthat theyalsoavoidlogicandepistemology.Butthis isnottrueofalltheCyrenaics:accordingtoother reports,theythinklogicandepistemologyare useful,considerarguments(andalsocauses)as topicstobecoveredinethics,andhaveanepis- temology.Theirepistemologyisskeptical.We canknowonlyhowweareaffected;wecan know,e.g.,thatwearewhitening,butnotthat whateveriscausingthissensationisitselfwhite. ThisdiffersfromProtagoras'stheory;unlikePro- tagorastheCyrenaicsdrawnoinferencesabout thethingsthataffectus,claimingonlythatexter- nalthingshaveanaturethatwecannotknow. But,likeProtagoras,theCyrenaicsbasetheir theoryontheproblemofconflictingappear- ances.Giventheirepistemology,ifhumans oughttoaimatsomethingthatisnotawayof beingaffected(i.e.,somethingthatisimmedi- atelyperceivedaccordingtothem),wecannever knowanythingaboutit.Unsurprisingly,then, theyclaimthattheendisawayofbeingaffected; inparticular,theyarehedonists.Theendofgood actionsisparticularpleasures(smoothchanges), andtheendofbadactionsisparticularpains (roughchanges).Thereisalsoanintermediate class,whichaimsatneitherpleasurenorpain. Mereabsenceofpainisinthisintermediateclass, sincetheabsenceofpainmaybemerelyastatic state.PleasureforAristippusseemstobethesen- sationofpleasure,notincludingrelatedpsychic states.Weshouldaimatpleasure(althoughnot everyonedoes),asisclearfromournaturally seekingitaschildren,beforeweconsciously chooseto.Happiness,whichisthesumofthe particularpleasuressomeoneexperiences,is choiceworthyonlyfortheparticularpleasures thatconstituteit,whileparticularpleasuresare choiceworthyforthemselves.Cyrenaics,then, arenotconcernedwithmaximizingtotalplea- sureöveralifetime,butonlywithparticular pleasures,andsotheyshouldnotchoosetogive upparticularpleasuresonthechanceofincreas- ingthetotal. LåterCyrenaicsdivergeinimportantrespects fromtheoriginalCyrenaichedonism,perhapsin responsetothedevelopmentofEpicurus'sviews. Hegesiasclaimsthathappinessisimpossible becauseofthepainsassociatedwiththebody, andsothinksofhappinessastotalpleasure minustotalpain.Heemphasizesthatwisepeo- pleactforthemselves,anddeniesthatpeople actuallyactforsomeoneelse.Anniceris,onthe otherhand,claimsthatwisepeoplearehappy eveniftheyhavefewpleasures,andsoseemsto thinkofhappinessasthesumofpleasures,and notastheexcessofpleasuresöverpains. Annicerisalsobeginsconsideringpsychicplea- sures:heinsiststhatfriendsshouldbevaluednot onlyfortheirutility,butalsoforourfeelings towardthem.Weshouldevenacceptlosingplea- surebecauseofafriend,eventhoughpleasureis theend.Theodorusgoesastepbeyond Anniceris.Heclaimsthattheendofgoodactions isjoyandthatofbadactionsisgrief.(Surpris- ingly,hedeniesthatfriendshipisreasonable, sincefoolshavefriendsonlyforutilityandwise peopleneednofriends.)Heevenregardsplea- sureasintermediatebetweenpracticalwisdom anditsopposite.Thisseemstoinvolveregarding happinessastheend,notparticularpleasures, andmayinvolvelosingparticularpleasuresfor long-termhappiness. Seealsoeudaimonism,hedonism,socra- tes.H.A.I. Czolbe,Heinrich(1819-73),Germanphiloso- pher.HewasborninDanzigandtrainedinthe- ologyandmedicine.HismainworksareNeue DarstellungdesSensualismus("NewExpositionof Sensualism,"1855),EntstehungdesSelbstbewusst- seins("OriginofSelf-Consciousness,"1856),Die GrenzenundderUrsprungdermenschlichenEr- kenntnis("TheLimitsandOriginofHuman Knowledge,"1865),andaposthumouslypub- lishedstudy,GrundzilgederextensionalenErkennt- nistheorie(1875). Czolbeproposedasensualistictheoryof knowledge:knowledgeisacopyoftheactual, andspatialextensionisascribedeventoideas. Spaceisthesupportofallattributes.Hislåter workdefendedanon-reductivematerialism. Czolbemadetherejectionofthesupersensuous acentralprincipleanddefendedaradical"sen- 201 Czolbe,Heinrich Czolbe,Heinrich sationalism."Despitethis,hedidnotpresenta dogmaticmaterialism,butcasthisphilosophyin hypotheticalform. Inhisstudyoftheoriginofself-consciousness Czolbeheldthatdissatisfactionwiththeactual worldgeneratessupersensuousideasand brandedthisattitudeas"immoral."Heexcluded supematuralphenomenaonthebasisnotof physiologicalorscientificstudiesbutofa"moral feelingofdutytowardsthenaturalworld-order andcontentmentwithit."Thesamevaluation ledhimtopostulatetheeternalityofterrestrial life.NietzschewasfamiliarwithCzolbe'sworks andincorporatedsomeofhisthemesintohis philosophy. Seealsosensationalism. G.J.S. 202 D cTAilly,Pierre(1350-1420),FrenchOckhamist philosopher,prelate,andwriter.Educatedatthe CollegedeNavarre,hewaspromotedtodoctor intheSorbonnein1380,appointedchancellorof ParisUniversityin1389,consecratedbishopin 1395,andmadeacardinalin1411.Hewasinflu- encedbyJohnofMirecourfsnominalism.He taughtGerson.AttheCouncilofConstance (1414-18),whichcondemnedHuss'steachings, d'Aillyupheldthesuperiorityofthecouncilöver thepope(conciliarism).Therelationofastrology tohistoryandtheologyfiguresamonghispri- maryinterests.His1414TractatusdeConcordia astronomicaepredictedthe1789FrenchRevolu- tion.HecomposedaDeanima,acommentaryon Boethius'sConsolationofPhilosophy,andanother onPeterLombard'sSentences.Hisearlylogical work,ConceptsandInsolubles(c.1472),waspar- ticularlyinfluential.Inepistemology,d'Aillycon- tradistinguished"naturallight"(indubitable knowledge)fromreason(relativeknowledge), andemphasizedthereaftertheuncertaintyof experimentalknowledgeandthemereprobabil- ityoftheclassical"proofs"ofGod'sexistence.His doctrineofGoddifferentiatesGod'sabsolute power(potentiaabsoluta)fromGod'sordained poweronearth(potentiaordinata).Histheology anticipatedfideism(Deumessesolafidetenetur),his ethicsthespiritofProtestantism,andhissacra- mentologyLutheranism.J.-L.S. cTAIembert,JeanLeRond(1717-83),French mathematician,philosopher,andEncyclopedist. AccordingtoGrimm,d'Alembertwastheprime luminaryofthephilosophicparty.Anaban- doned,illegitimatechild,henonetheless receivedanoutstandingeducationatthe JansenistCollegedesQuatre-NationsinParis.He readlawforawhile,triedmedicine,andsettled onmathematics.In1743,hepublishedan acclaimedTreatiseofDynamics.Subsequently,he joinedtheParisAcademyofSciencesandcon- tributeddecisiveworksonmathematicsand physics.In1754,hewaselectedtotheFrench Academy,ofwhichhelåterbecamepermanent secretary.InassociationwithDiderot,he launchedtheEncyclopedia,forwhichhewrote theepoch-makingDiscourspréliminaire(1751) andnumerousentriesonscience.Unwillingto compromisewiththecensorship,heresignedas coeditorin1758. IntheDiscourspréliminaire,d'Alembertspeci- fiedthedivisionsofthephilosophicaldiscourse onman:pneumatology,logic,andethics.Con- trarytoChristianphilosophies,helimitedpneu- matologytotheinvestigationofthehumansoul. Prefiguringpositivism,hisEssayontheElementsof Philosophy(1759)definesphilosophyasacom- parativeexaminationofphysicalphenomena. InfluencedbyBacon,Locke,andNewton, d'Alembert'sepistemologyassociatesCartesian psychologywiththesensoryoriginofideas. Thoughassumingtheuniversetoberationally ordered,hediscardedmetaphysicalquestionsas inconclusive.Thesubstance,ortheessence,of soulandmatter,isunknowable.Agnosticism ineluctablyarisesfromhisempiricallybasednat- uralism.D'Alembertisprominentlyfeaturedin D'Alembert'sDream(1769),Diderofsdialogical apologyformaterialism. Seealsoencyclopedia.J.-L.S. Damascene,John.Seejohnofdamascus. Damascius(c.462-c.550),GreekNeoplatonist philosopher,lastheadoftheAthenianAcademy beforeitsclosurebyJustinianina.d.529.Born probablyinDamascus,hestudiedfirstinAlexan- dria,andthenmovedtoAthensshortlybefore Proclus'sdeathin485.HereturnedtoAlexan- dria,whereheattendedthelecturesofAmmo- nius,butcamebackagaintoAthensinaround 515,toassumetheheadshipoftheAcademy. Aftertheclosure,heretiredbrieflywithsome otherphilosophers,includingSimplicius,toPer- sia,butleftafteraboutayear,probablyforSyria, wherehedied. Hecomposedmanyworks,includingalifeof hismasterIsidorus,whichsurvivesintruncated form;commentariesonAristotle'sCategories,On theHeavens,andMeteorologicsI(alllöst);com- mentariesonPlato'sAlcibiades,Phaedo,Philebus, andParmenides,whichsurvive;andasurviving treatiseOnFirstPrinciples.Hisphilosophicalsys- temisafurtherelaborationofthescholasticNeo- platonismofProclus,exhibitingagreat proliferationofmetaphysicalentities. Seealsoneoplatonism.J.M.D. 203 Danto,ArthurColeman Darwinism Danto,ArthurColeman(b.1924),American philosopherofartandarthistorywhohasalso contributedtothephilosophiesofhistory,action, knowledge,science,andmetaphilosophy.Among hisinfluentialstudiesinthehistoryofphilosophy arebooksonNietzsche,Sartre,andIndian thought. Dantoarrivesathisphilosophyofartthrough his"methodofindiscemibles,"whichhasgreatly influencedcontemporaryphilosophicalaesthet- ics.Accordingtohismetaphilosophy,genuine philosophicalquestionsarisewhenthereisathe- oreticalneedtodifferentiatetwothingsthatare perceptuallyindiscernible-suchasprudential actionsversusmoralactions(Kant),causal chainsversusconstantconjunctions(Hume), andperfectdreamsversusreality(Descartes). Applyingthemethodtothephilosophyofart, Dantoaskswhatdistinguishesanartwork,such asWarhol'sBrittaBox,fromitsperceptuallyindis- cernible,real-worldcounterparts,suchasBrillo boxesbyProctorandGamble.Hisanswer-his partialdefinitionofart-isthatxisaworkofart onlyif(1)xisaboutsomethingand(2)xembod- iesitsmeaning(i.e.,discoversamodeofpresen- tationintendedtobeappropriatetowhatever subjectxisabout).Thesetwonecessarycondi- tions,Dantoclaims,enableustodistinguish betweenartworksandrealthings-between Warhol'sBrilloBoxandProctorandGamble's. However,criticshavepointedoutthatthese conditionsfail,sincerealBrilloboxesareabout something(Brillo)aboutwhichtheyembodyor conveymeaningsthroughtheirmodeofpresen- tation(viz.,thatBrilloisclean,fresh,anddyna- mic).Moreover,thisisnotanisolatedexample. Danto'stheoryofartconfrontssystematicdifficul- tiesindifferentiatingrealculturalartifacts,suchas industrialpackages,fromartworksproper. Inadditiontohisphilosophyofart,Dantopro- posesaphilosophyofarthistory.LikeHegel, Dantomaintainsthatarthistory-asadevelop- mental,progressiveprocess-hasended.Danto believesthatmodemarthasbeenprimarily reflexive(i.e.,aboutitself);ithasattemptedto useitsownformsandstrategiestodisclosethe essentialnatureofart.Cubismandabstract expressionism,forexample,exhibitsalientlythe two-dimensionalnatureofpainting.Witheach experiment,modernarthasgottenclosertodis- closingitsownessence.But,Dantoargues,with workssuchasWarhol'sBrilloBox,artistshave takenthephilosophicalprojectofself-definition asfarastheycan,sinceonceanartistlikeWarhol hasshownthatartworkscanbeperceptually indiscerniblefrom''realthings"and,therefore, canlooklikeanything,thereisnothingfurther thattheartistquaartistcanshowthroughthe mediumofappearancesaboutthenatureofart. Thetaskofdefiningartmustbereassignedto philosopherstobetreateddiscursively,andart history-asthedevelopmental,progressivenar- rativeofself-definition-ends. Sincethatturnofeventswasputativelypre- cipitatedbyWarholinthe1960s,Dantocallsthe presentperiodofartmaking"post-historical."As anartcriticforTheNation,hehasbeenchroni- clingitsvicissitudesforadecadeandahalf.Some dissenters,nevertheless,havebeenunhappy withDanto'sclaimthatarthistoryhasended because,theymaintain,hehasfailedtodemon- stratethattheonlyprospectsforadevelopmen- tal,progressivehistoryofartresideintheproject oftheself-definitionofart. Seealsoaesthetics.N.C. Darwin,Charles.Seedarwinism. Darwinism,theviewthatbiologicalspecies evolveprimarilybymeansofchancevariation andnaturalselection.Althoughseveralimpor- tantscientistspriortoCharlesDarwin(1809-82) hadsuggestedthatspeciesevolveandhadpro- videdmechanismsforthatevolution,Darwin wasthefirsttosetouthismechanisminsufficient detailandprovideadequateempiricalground- ing.EventhoughDarwinpreferredtotalkabout descentwithmodification,thetermthatrapidly cametocharacterizehistheorywasevolution. AccordingtoDarwin,organismsvarywith respecttotheircharacteristics.Inalitterofpup- pies,somewillbebigger,somewillhavelonger hair,somewillbemoreresistanttodisease,etc. Darwintermedthesevariationschance,not becausehethoughtthattheywereinanysense "uncaused,"buttorejectanygeneralcorrelation betweenthevariationsthatanorganismmight needandthoseitgets,asLamarckhadproposed. Instead,successivegenerationsoforganisms becomeadaptedtotheirenvironmentsinamore roundaboutway.Variationsoccurinalldirec- tions.Theorganismsthathappentopossessthe characteristicsnecessarytosurviveandrepro- duceproliferate.Thosethatdonoteitherdieor leavefeweroffspring. BeforeDarwin,anadaptationwasanytrait thatfitsanorganismtoitsenvironment.After Darwin,thetermcametobelimitedtojustthose usefultraitsthatarosethroughnaturalselection. Forexample,thesuturesintheskullsofmam- malsmakeparturitioneasier,buttheyarenot adaptationsinanevolutionarysensebecause 204 Darwinism Darwinism theyaroseinancestorsthatdidnotgivebirthto liveyoung,asisindicatedbythesesamesutures appearingintheskullsofegg-layingbirds. Becauseorganismsareintegratedsystems,Dar- winthoughtthatadaptationshadtoarise throughtheaccumulationofnumerous,small variations.Asaresult,evolutionisgradual.Dar- winhimselfwasunsureabouthowprogressive biologicalevolutionis.Organismscertainly becomebetteradaptedtotheirenvironments throughsuccessivegenerations,butasfastas organismsadapttotheirenvironments,their environmentsarelikelytochange.Thus,Dar- winianevolutionmaybegoal-directed,butdif- ferentspeciespursuedifferentgoals,andthese goalskeepchanging. Becausehereditywassoimportanttohisthe- oryofevolution,Darwinsupplementeditwitha theoryofheredity-pangenesis.Accordingtothis theory,thecellsthroughoutthebodyofan organismproducenumeroustinygemmulesthat findtheirwaytothereproductiveorgansofthe organismtobetransmittedinreproduction.An offspringreceivesvariablenumbersofgemmules fromeachofitsparentsforeachofitscharacter- istics.Forinstance,themaleparentmightcon- tribute214gemmulesforlengthofhairtoone offspring,121toanother,etc,whilethefemale parentmightcontribute54gemmulesforlength ofhairtothefirstoffspringand89tothesecond. Asaresult,characterstendtoblend.Darwineven thoughtthatgemmulesthemselvesmightmerge, buthedidnotthinkthatthemergingofgem- muleswasanimportantfactorintheblendingof characters.Numerousobjectionswereraisedto Darwin'stheoryinhisday,andoneofthemost tellingstemmedfromhisadoptingablending theoryofinheritance.Asfastasnaturalselection biasesevolutioninaparticulardirection,blend- inginheritanceneutralizesitseffects.Darwin's opponentsarguedthateachspecieshaditsown rangeofvariation.Naturalselectionmightbias theorganismsbelongingtoaspeciesinaparticu- lardirection,butasaspeciesapproacheditslim- itsofvariation,additionalchangewouldbecome moredifficult.Somespecialmechanismwas neededtoleapöverthedeep,thoughpossibly narrow,chasmsthatseparatespecies. Becauseabeliefinbiologicalevolution becamewidespreadwithinadecadeorsoafter thepublicationofDarwin'sOriginofSpeciesin 1859,thetendencyistothinkthatitwasDar- win^viewofevolutionthatbecamepopulär. Nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth.Dar- win^contemporariesfoundhistheorytoomate- rialisticandhaphazardbecausenosupernatural orteleologicalforceinfluencedevolutionary development.Darwin'scontemporarieswere willingtoacceptevolution,butnotthesort advocatedbyDarwin.AlthoughDarwinviewed theevolutionofspeciesonthemodelofindivid- ualdevelopment,hedidnotthinkthatitwas directedbysomeinternalforceorinducedina Lamarckianfashionbytheenvironment.Most Darwiniansadoptedjustsuchaposition.They alsoarguedthatspeciesariseinthespaceofasin- glegenerationsothattheboundariesbetween speciesremainedasdiscreteasthecreationists hadmaintained.Idealmorphologistsevenelim- inatedanygenuinetemporaldimensiontoevo- lution.Insteadtheyviewedtheevolutionof speciesinthesameatemporalwaythatmathe- maticiansviewthetransformationofanellipse intoacircle.TherevolutionthatDarwininsti- gatedwasinmostrespectsnon-Darwinian.By theturnofthecentury,Darwinismhadgoneinto adecidedeclipse. Darwinhimselfremainedfairlyopenwith respecttothemechanismsofevolution.For example,hewaswillingtoacceptaminorrolefor Lamarckianformsofinheritance,andhe acknowledgedthatonoccasionanewspecies mightarisequiterapidlyonthemodelofthe Anconsheep.Severalofhisfollowerswereless flexible,rejectingallformsofLamarckianinheri- tanceandinsistingthatevolutionarychangeis alwaysgradual.EventuallyDarwinismbecame identifiedwiththeviewsoftheseneo-Darwin- ians.Thus,whenMendeliangeneticsburstonthe sceneattheturnofthecentury,opponentsof Darwinisminterpretedthisnewparticulatethe- oryofinheritanceasbeingincompatiblewith Darwin'sblendingtheory.Thedifferencebetween Darwin'stheoryofpangenesisandMendelian genetics,however,didnotconcemtheexistence ofhereditaryparticles.Gemmuleswereaspartic- ulateasgenes.Thedifferencelayinnumbers. AccordingtoearlyMendelians,eachcharacteris controlledbyasinglepairofgenes.Insteadof receivingavariablenumberofgemmulesfrom eachparentforeachcharacter,eachoffspringgets asinglegenefromeachparent,andthesegenesdo notinanysenseblendwitheachother.Blueeyes remainasblueaseverfromgenerationtogenera- tion,evenwhenthegeneforblueeyesresides oppositethegeneforbrowneyes. Asthenatureofhereditywasgradually workedout,biologistsbegantorealizethata Darwinianviewofevolutioncouldbecombined withMendeliangenetics.Initially,thefounders ofthislåterstageinthedevelopmentofneo- Darwinismexhibitedconsiderablevariationin 205 Darwinism,social Davidson,Donald theirbeliefsabouttheevolutionaryprocess,but astheystrovetoproduceasingle,syntheticthe- ory,theytendedtobecomemoreDarwinian thanDarwinhadbeen.Althoughtheyacknowl- edgedthatotherfactors,suchastheeffectsof smallnumbers,mightinfluenceevolution,they emphasizedthatnaturalselectionisthesole directiveforceinevolution.Italonecould explainthecomplexadaptationsexhibitedby organisms.Newspeciesmightarisethroughthe isolationofafewfounderorganisms,butfroma populationalperspective,evolutionwasstill gradual.Newspeciesdonotariseinthespaceof asinglegenerationbymeansof"hopefulmon- sters"oranyotherdevelopmentalmeans.Nor wasevolutioninanysensedirectionalorpro- gressive.Certainlineagesmightbecomemore complexforawhile,butatthissametime,oth- erswouldbecomesimpler.Becausebiological evolutionissoopportunistic,thetreeoflifeis highlyirregular.Buttheunitedfrontpresented bytheneo-Darwinianswasinpartanillusion. Differencesofopinionpersisted,forinstance överhowheterogeneousspeciesshouldbe. Nosoonerdidneo-Darwinismbecomethe dominantviewamongevolutionarybiologists thanvoicesofdissentwereraised.Currently, almosteveryaspectoftheneo-Darwinianpara- digmisbeingchallenged.Nooneproposesto rejectnaturalism,butthosewhoviewthem- selvesasopponentsofneo-Darwinismurgemore importantrolesforfactorstreatedasonlyminor bytheneo-Darwinians.Forexample,neo- Darwiniansviewselectionasbeingextremely sharp-sighted.Anyinferiororganism,nomatter howslightlyinferior,issuretobeeliminated. Nearlyallvariationsaredeleterious.Currently evolutionists,eventhosewhoconsiderthem- selvesDarwinians,acknowledgethatahighper- centageofchangesatthemolecularlevelmaybe neutralwithrespecttosurvivalorreproduction. Oncurrentestimates,över95percentofan organism'sgenesmayhavenofunctionatall. Disagreementalsoexistsabouttheleveloforga- nizationatwhichselectioncanoperate.Some evolutionarybiologistsinsistthatselection occursprimarilyatthelevelofsinglegenes,while othersthinkthatitcanhaveeffectsathigherlev- elsoforganization,certainlyattheorganismic level,possiblyatthelevelofentirespecies.Some biologistsemphasizetheeffectsofdevelopmental constraintsontheevolutionaryprocess,while othershavediscoveredunexpectedmechanisms suchasmoleculardrive.Howmuchofthiscon- ceptualvariationwillbecomeincorporatedinto Darwinismremainstobeseen. Seealsomechanisticexplanation, MENDEL,PHILOSOPHYOFBIOLOGY,TELEOL- ogy.D.L.H. Darwinism,social.Seesocialbiology. Dasein.Seeheidegger. David.Seecommentariesonaristotle. Davidson,Donald(b.1917),Americanmeta- physicianandphilosopherofmindandlan- guage.Hisviewsontherelationshipbetweenour conceptionsofourselvesaspersonsandascom- plexphysicalobjectshavehadanenormous impactoncontemporaryphilosophy.Davidson regardsthemind-bodyproblemastheproblem oftherelationbetweenmentalandphysical events;hisdiscussionsofexplanationassume thattheentitiesexplainedareevents;causation isarelationbetweenevents;andactionisa speciesofevents,sothateventsaretheverysub- jectmatterofactiontheory.Hiscentralclaim concerningeventsisthattheyareconcretepar- ticulars-unrepeatableentitieslocatedinspace andtime.Hedoesnottakeforgrantedthat eventsexist,butarguesfortheirexistenceand forspecificclaimsastotheirnature. In"TheIndividuationofEvents"(inEssayson ActionsandEvents,1980),Davidsonarguesthata satisfactorytheoryofactionmustrecognizethat wetalkofthesameactionunderdifferent descriptions.Wemustthereforeassumetheexis- tenceofactions.Hisstrongestargumentfor theexistenceofeventsderivesfromhismost originalcontributiontometaphysics,theseman- ticmethodoftruth(EssaysonActionsandEvents, pp.105-80;EssaysonTruthandInterpretation, 1984,pp.199-214).Theargumentisbasedona distinctivetraitoftheEnglishlanguage(onenot obviouslysharedbysignalsystemsinlowerani- mals),namely,itsproductivityofcombinations. Welearnmodesofcompositionaswellaswords andarethuspreparedtoproduceandrespondto complexexpressionsneverbeforeencountered. Davidsonargues,fromsuchconsiderations,that ourveryunderstandingofEnglishrequiresas- sumingtheexistenceofevents. TounderstandDavidson'srathercomplicated viewsabouttherelationshipsbetweenmindand body,considerthefollowingclaims: (1)Thementalandthephysicalaredistinct. (2)Thementalandthephysicalcausallyinter- act. (3)Thephysicaliscausallyclosed. 206 deBeauvoir,Simone decisiontheory (1)saysthatnomentaleventisaphysicalevent; (2),thatsomementaleventscausephysical eventsandviceversa;and(3),thatallthecauses ofphysicaleventsarephysicalevents.Ifmental eventsaredistinctfromphysicaleventsand sometimescausethem,thenthephysicalisnot causallyclosed.Thedilemmaposedbytheplau- sibilityofeachoftheseclaimsandbytheirappar- entincompatibilityjustisthetraditionalmind- bodyproblem. Davidson'sresolutionconsistsofthreetheses: (4)Therearenostrictpsychologicalorpsy- chophysicallaws;infact,allstrictlaws areexpressibleinpurelyphysicalvocabu- lary. (5)Mentaleventscausallyinteractwithphys- icalevents. (6)Eventccauseseventeonlyifsomestrict causallawsubsumescande. Itiscommonlyheldthatapropertyexpressedby MisreducibletoapropertyexpressedbyP (whereMandParenotlogicallyconnected)only ifsomeexceptionlesslawlinksthem.So,given (4),mentalandphysicalpropertiesaredistinct. (6)saysthatccauseseonlyiftherearesingular descriptions,DofcandD'ofe,anda"strict" causallaw,L,suchthatLand'Doccurred'entail 'DcausedD".(6)andthesecondpartof(4)entail thatphysicaleventshaveonlyphysicalcauses andthatalleventcausationisphysically grounded. Giventheparallelbetween(l)-(3)and(4)- (6),itmayseemthatthelatter,too,areincom- patible.ButDavidsonshowsthattheyallcanbe trueif(andonlyif)mentaleventsareidentical tophysicalevents.Letussaythataneventeisa physicaleventifandonlyifesatisfiesabasic physicalpredicate(thatis,aphysicalpredicate appearingina"strict"law).Sinceonlyphysical predicates(orpredicatesexpressingproperties reducibletobasicphysicalproperties)appearin "strict"laws,everyeventthatentersintocausal relationssatisfiesabasicphysicalpredicate.So, thosementaleventswhichenterintocausalrela- tionsarealsophysicalevents.Still,theanom- alousmonistiscommittedonlytoapartial endorsementof(1).Thementalandphysicalare distinctinsofarastheyarenotlinkedbystrict law-buttheyarenotdistinctinsofarasmental eventsareinfactphysicalevents. Seealsoactiontheory,causallaw, EVENT,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,SUPERVE- NIENCETRUTH.E.L. deBeauvoir,Simone.Seeexistentialism. decidability,asapropertyofsets,theexistenceof aneffectiveprocedure(a"decisionprocedure") which,whenappliedtoanyobject,determines whetherornottheobjectbelongstotheset.A theoryorlogicisdecidableifandonlyiftheset ofitstheoremsis.Decidabilityisprovedby describingadecisionprocedureandshowing thatitworks.Thetruthtablemethod,forexam- ple,establishesthatclassicalpropositionallogicis decidable.Toprovethatsomethingisnotdecid- ablerequiresamoreprecisecharacterizationof thenotionofeffectiveprocedure.Usingonesuch characterization(forwhichthereisampleevi- dence),Churchprovedthatclassicalpredicate logicisnotdecidable.Seealsochurch'sthe- SIS,TRUTHTABLE,TURINGMACHINE. S.T.K. decidable.Seedecidability. decisiontheory,thetheoryofrationaldecision, oftencalled"rationalchoicetheory"inpolitical scienceandothersocialsciences.Thebasicidea (probablyPascal's)waspublishedattheendof Arnaud'sPort-RoyalLogic(1662):"Tojudgewhat onemustdotoobtainagoodoravoidanevilone mustconsidernotonlythegoodandtheevilin itselfbutalsotheprobabilityofitshappeningor nothappening,andviewgeometricallythepro- portionthatallthesethingshavetogether." Wheregoodsandevilsaremonetary,Daniel Bernoulli(1738)spelledtheideaoutintermsof expectedUtilitiesasfiguresofmeritforactions, holdingthat"intheabsenceoftheunusual,the utilityresultingfromafixedsmallincreasein wealthwillbeinverselyproportionaltothe quantityofgoodspreviouslypossessed."This wasmeanttosolvetheSt.Petersburgparadox: Petertossesacoin...untilitshouldland "heads"[ontoss«]....HeagreestogivePaul oneducatifhegets"heads"ontheveryfirst throw[and]witheachadditionalthrowthe numberofducatshemustpayisdoubled.... Althoughthestandardcalculationshowsthat thevalueofPaul'sexpectation[oigain]isinfi- nitelygreat[i.e.,thesumofallpossiblegains Xprobabilities,2"/2XW],ithas...tobe admittedthatanyfairlyreasonableman wouldsellhischance,withgreatpleasure,for twentyducats. InthiscasePaul'sexpectationofutilityis indeedfiniteonBemoulli'sassumptionof inverseproportionality;butasKarlMenger observed(1934),Bernoulli'ssolutionfailsifpay- offsaresolargethatUtilitiesareinverselypropor- 207 decisiontheory decisiontheory tionaltoprobabilities;thenonlyboundednessof utilityscalesresolvestheparadox. Bernoulli'sideaofdiminishingmarginalutil- ityofwealthsurvivedintheneoclassicaltextsof W.S.Jevons(f871),AlfredMarshall(1890),and A.C.Pigou(1920),wherepersonalutilityjudg- mentwasunderstoodtocausepreference.Butin the1930s,operationalisticargumentsofJohn HicksandR.G.D.Allénpersuadedeconomists thatonthecontrary,(1)utilityisnocausebuta description,inwhich(2)thenumbersindicate preferenceorderbutnotintensity.IntheirThe- oryofGamesandEconomicBehavior(1946),John vonNeumannandOskarMorgensternundid(2) bypushing(1)further:ordinalpreferences amongriskyprospectswerenowseentobe describableon"interval"scalesofsubjectiveutil- ity(liketheFahrenheitandCelsiusscalesfor temperature),sothatonceUtilities,e.g.,and1, areassignedtoanyprospectandanypreferred one,Utilitiesofallprospectsaredeterminedby overallpreferencesamonggambles,i.e.,proba- bilitydistributionsöverprospects.Thus,theutil- itymidpointbetweentwoprospectsismarkedby thedistributionassigningprobabilityV2toeach. Infact,Ramseyhaddonethatandmoreina little-noticedessay("TruthandProbability," 1931)teasingsubjectiveprobabilitiesaswellas Utilitiesoutofordinalpreferencesamonggam- bles.InaformindependentlyinventedbyL.J. Savage(FoundationsofStatistics,1954),this approachisnowwidelyacceptedasabasisfor rationaldecisionanalysis.The1968bookofthat titlebyHowardRaiffabecameatheoreticalcen- terpieceofM.B.A.curricula,whosegraduates diffuseditthroughindustry,government,and themilitaryinasimplifiedformatfordefensible decisionmaking,namely,"cost-benefitanaly- ses,"substitutingexpectednumbersofdollars, deaths,etc,forpreference-basedexpectedUtili- ties. Socialchoiceandgroupdecisionformthe nativegroundofinterpersonalcomparisonof personalUtilities.Thus,JohnC.Harsanyi(1955) provedthatif(1)individualandsocialprefer- encesallsatisfythevonNeumann-Morgenstern axioms,and(2)societyisindifferentbetween twoprospectswheneverallindividualsare,and (3)societyprefersoneprospecttoanother wheneversomeonedoesandnobodyhasthe oppositepreference,thensocialUtilitiesare expressibleassumsofindividualUtilitieson intervalscalesobtainedbystretchingorcom- pressingtheindividualscalesbyamountsdeter- minedbythesocialpreferences.Arguably,the theoremshowshowtoderiveinterpersonal comparisonsofindividualpreferenceintensities fromsocialpreferenceorderingsthatarethought totreatindividualpreferencesonapar.Some- whatearlier,KennethArrowhadwrittenthat "interpersonalcomparisonofUtilitieshasno meaningand,infact,thereisnomeaningrele- vanttowelfareeconomicsinthemeasurability ofindividualutility"(SocialChoiceandIndividual Values,1951)-apositionlåterabandoned(P. LaslettandW.G.Runciman,eds.,Philosophy,Pol- iticsandSociety,1967).Arrow's"impossibilitythe- orem"isillustratedbycyclicpreferences (observedbyCondorcetin1785)amongcandi- datesA,B,Cofvoters1,2,3,whorankthem ABC,BCA,CAB,respectively,indecreasing orderofpreference,sothatmajorityruleyields intransitivepreferencesforthegroupofthree,of whomtwo(1,3)preferAtoBandtwo(1,2)pre- ferBtoCbuttwo(2,3)preferCtoA.Ingeneral, thetheoremdeniesexistenceoftechnically democraticschemesforformingsocialprefer- encesfromcitizens'preferences.Aclauseten- dentiouslycalled"independenceofirrelevant alternatives"inthedefinitionof'democratic' rulesoutappealtopreferencesamongnon-can- didatesasawaytoformsocialpreferences amongcandidates,thusrulingouttheprefer- encesamonggamblesusedinHarsanyi'stheo- rem.(SeeJohnBroome,WeighingGoods,1991, forfurtherinformationandreferences.) Savagederivedtheagent'sprobabilitiesfor statesaswellasUtilitiesforconsequencesfrom preferencesamongabstractacts,representedby deterministicassignmentsofconsequencesto states.Anact'splaceinthepreferenceordering isthenreflectedbyitsexpectedutility,aprobabil- ity-weightedaverageoftheUtilitiesofitsconse- quencesinthevariousstates.Savage'sstatesand consequencesformeddistinctsets,withevery assignmentofconsequencestostatesconstitut- inganact.WhileRamseyhadalsotakenactsto befunctionsfromstatestoconsequences,he tookconsequencestobepropositions(setsof states),andassignedUtilitiestostates,notcon- sequences.Afurtherstepinthatdirectionrep- resentsacts,too,bypropositions(seeEthan Bolker,FunctionsResemblingQuotientsofMeasures, UniversityMicrofilms,1965;andRichard Jeffrey,TheLogicofDecision,1965,1990).Bolker's representationtheoremstatesconditionsunder whichpreferencesbetweentruthofpropositions determineprobabilitiesandUtilitiesnearly enoughtomakethepositionofapropositionin one'spreferencerankingreflectits"desirability," i.e.,one'sexpectationofutilityconditionally onit. 208 decisiontree deconstruction Alongsidesuchbasicpropertiesastransitivity andconnexity,aworkhorseamongSavage's assumptionswasthe"sure-thingprinciple": Preferencesamongactshavingthesamecon- sequencesincertainstatesareunaffectedby arbitrarychangesinthoseconsequences. Thisimpliesthatagentsseestatesasprobabilis- ticallyindependentofacts,andthereforeimplies thatanactcannotbepreferredtoonethatdom- inatesitinthesensethatthedominantact'scon- sequencesineachstatehaveUtilitiesatleastas greatastheother's.Unlikethesurethingprin- ciple,theprinciple'Choosesoastomaximize CEU(conditionalexpectationofutility)'ratio- nalizesactionaimingtoenhanceprobabilitiesof preferredstatesofnature,asinquittingciga- rettestoincreaselifeexpectancy.ButasNozick pointedoutin1969,thereareproblemsin whichchoiceworthinessgoesbydominance ratherthanCEU,aswhenthesmoker(likeR.A. Fisherin1959)believesthatthestatisticalasso- ciationbetweensmokingandlungcancerisdue toageneticallele,possessorsofwhicharemore likelythanotherstosmokeandtocontractlung cancer,althoughamongthemsmokersarenot especiallylikelytocontractlungcancer.Insuch ("Newcomb")problemschoicesareineffectual signsofconditionsthatagentswouldpromoteor preventiftheycould.Causaldecisiontheories modifytheCEUformulatoobtainfiguresof meritdistinguishingcausalefficacyfromeviden- tiarysignificance-e.g.,replacingconditional probabilitiesbyprobabilitiesofcounterfactual conditionals;orformingaweightedaverageof CEU'sunderallhypothesesaboutcauses,with agents'unconditionalprobabilitiesofhypothe- sesasweights;etc. Mathematicalstatisticiansleeryofsubjective probabilityhavecultivatedAbrahamWald'sThe- oryofStatisticalDecisionFunctions(1950),treating statisticalestimation,experimentaldesign,and hypothesistestingaszero-sum"gamesagainst nature."Foranaccountoftheoppositeassimila- tion,ofgametheorytoprobabilisticdecisionthe- ory,seeSkyrms,DynamicsofRationalDeliberation (1990). The"preferencelogics"ofSörenHalidén,The Logicof'Better'(1957),andG.H.vonWright,The LogicofPreference(1963),sidestepprobability. Thus,Halidénholdsthatwhentruthofpispre- ferredtotruthofq,falsityofqmustbepreferred tofalsityofp,andvonWright(withAristotle) holdsthat''thisismorechoiceworthythanthat ifthisischoiceworthywithoutthat,butthatis notchoiceworthywithoutthis"(TopicsIII,118a). Bothprinciplesfailintheabsenceofspecial probabilisticassumptions,e.g.,equiprobabilityof pwithq. Receivedwisdomcountsdecisiontheory clearlyfalseasadescriptionofhumanbehavior, seeingitsproperstatusasnormative.Butsome, notablyDavidson,seethetheoryasconstitutive oftheveryconceptofpreference,sothat,e.g., preferencescannomorebeintransitivethan propositionscanbeatoncetrueandfalse. Seealsoempiricaldecisiontheory, GAMETHEORY,RATIONALITY,SOCIALCHOICE THEORY.R.J. decisiontree.Seedecisiontheory. decliningmarginalutility.Seeutilitarianism. decomposability.Seemodularity. deconstruction,ademonstrationoftheincom- pletenessorincoherenceofaphilosophicalposi- tionusingconceptsandprinciplesofargument whosemeaninganduseislegitimatedonlyby thatphilosophicalposition.Adeconstructionis thusakindofintemalconceptualcritiquein whichthecriticimplicitlyandprovisionally adherestothepositioncriticized.Theearlywork ofDerridaisthesourceofthetermandprovides paradigmcasesofitsreferent. Thatdeconstructionremainswithintheposi- tionbeingdiscussedfollowsfromafundamental deconstructiveargumentaboutthenatureof languageandthought.Derrida'searliestdecon- structionsargueagainstthepossibilityofaninte- riör"language"ofthoughtandintentionsuch thatthesensesandreferentsoftermsaredeter- minedbytheirverynature.Suchtermsare "meanings"orlogoi.Derridacallsaccountsthat presupposesuchmagicalthought-terms"logo- centric."Heclaims,followingHeidegger,thatthe conceptionofsuchlogoiisbasictotheconcepts ofWesternmetaphysics,andthatWesternmeta- physicsisfundamentaltoourculturalpractices andlanguages.Thusthereisno"ordinarylan- guage"uncontaminatedbyphilosophy.Logoi groundallouraccountsofintention,meaning, truth,andlogicalconnection.Versionsoflogoiin thehistoryofphilosophyrangefromPlato's Formsthroughtheself-interpretingideasofthe empiriciststoHusserl'sintentionalentities. ThusDerrida'sfullestdeconstructionsareof textsthatgiveexplicitaccountsoflogoi,espe- ciallyhisdiscussionofHusserlinSpeechandPhe- nomena.There,Derridaarguesthatmeanings thatarefullypresenttoconsciousnessarein 209 Dedekind,Richard Dedekind,Richard principleimpossible.Theideaofameaningisthe ideaofarepeatableideality.But"repeatability" isnotafeaturethatcanbepresent.Someanings, assuch,cannotbefullybeforethemind.Self- interpretinglogoiareanincoherentsupposition. Withoutlogoi,thoughtandintentionare merelywordlikeandhavenointrinsicconnec- tiontoasenseorareferent.Thus"meaning" restsonconnectionsofallkindsamongpiecesof languageandamongourlinguisticinteractions withtheworld.Withoutlogoi,nospecialclassof connectionsisspecifically"logical."Roughly speaking,DerridaagreeswithQuinebothonthe natureofmeaningandontherelatedviewthat "ourtheory"cannotbeabandonedallatonce. Thusaphilosophermustbyandlargethink aboutalogocentricphilosophicaltheorythathas shapedourlanguageintheverylogocentric termsthatthattheoryhasshaped.Thusdecon- structionisnotanexcisionofcriticizeddoctrines, butamuchmorecomplicated,self-referential relationship. Deconstructiveargumentsworkoutthecon- sequencesoftherebeingnothinghelpfullybet- terthanwords,i.e.,ofthoroughgoingnom- inalism.AccordingtoDerrida,withoutlogoifun- damentalphilosophicalcontrastslosetheirprin- cipledfoundations,sincesuchcontrastsimplic- itlypositonetermasalogosrelativetowhichthe othersideisdefective.Withoutlogos,manycon- trastscannotbemadetofunctionasprinciplesof thesortoftheoryphilosophyhassought.Thus thecontrastsbetweenmetaphoricalandliteral, rhetoricandlogic,andothercentralnotionsof philosophyareshownnottohavethefounda- tionthattheirusepresupposes. Seealsoheidegger,husserl,meaning, PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE.S.C.W. Dedekind,Richard(1831-1916),Germanmath- ematician,oneofthemostimportantfiguresin themathematicalanalysisoffoundationalques- tionsthattookplaceinthelatenineteenthcen- tury.Philosophically,threethingsareinteresting aboutDedekind'swork:(1)theinsistencethat thefundamentalnumericalsystemsofmathe- maticsmustbedevelopedindependentlyofspa- tiotemporalorgeometricalnotions;(2)the insistencethatthenumberssystemsrelyoncer- tainmentalcapacitiesfundamentaltothought, inparticularonthecapacityofthemindto"cre- ate";and(3)therecognitionthatthis"creation" is"creation"accordingtocertainkeyproperties, propertiesthatcarefulmathematicalanalysis revealsasessentialtothesubjectmatter.(1)isa concernDedekindsharedwithBolzano,Cantor, Frege,andHilbert;(2)setsDedekindapartfrom Frege;and(3)representsadistinctiveshift towardthelåteraxiomaticpositionofHilbert andsomewhatawayfromtheconcernwiththe individualnatureofthecentralabstractmathe- maticalobjectswhichisacentralconcernof Frege.MuchofDedekind'spositionissketched intheHabilitationsredeof1854,theprocedure therebeingappliedinoutlinetotheextensionof thepositivewholenumberstotheintegers,and thentotherationalfield.However,thetwo worksbestknowntophilosophersarethemono- graphsonirrationalnumbers(Stetigkeitundirra- tionaleZahlen,1872)andonnaturalnumbers (WassindundwassollendieZahlen?,1888),both ofwhichpursuetheprocedureadvocatedin 1854.Inbothwefindan"analysis"designedto uncovertheessentialpropertiesinvolved,fol- lowedbya"synthesis"designedtoshowthat therecanbesuchsystems,thisthenfollowedby a"creation"ofobjectspossessingtheproperties andnothingmore. Inthe1872work,Dedekindsuggeststhatthe essenceofcontinuityintherealsisthatwhen- everthelineisdividedintotwohalvesbyacut, i.e.,intotwosubsetsAlandA2suchthatifpG AjandqGA2,thenpp,thenqG A2aswell,thenthereisrealnumberrwhich "produces"thiscut,i.e.,suchthatAl=[p;pBisderivablewithoutthe assumptionofA:insymbols,ifTU[A]hBthen TK4—>5.Thethoughtisthat,forexample,if Socratesismortalisderivablefromtheassump- tionsAllmenaremortalandSocratesisaman,then IfSocratesisamanheismortalisderivablefromAll menaremortal.Likewise,Ifallmenaremortalthen SocratesismortalisderivablefromSocratesisaman. Ingeneral,thedeductiontheoremisasignificant resultonlyforaxiomaticorHilbert-styleformu- lationsoflogic.Inmostnaturaldeductionfor- mulationsaruleofconditionalproofexplicitly licensesderivationsofA—>BfromTU{^4},andso thereisnothingtoprove.Seealsodeduction. S.T.K. deductiveclosure.Seeclosure. deductivecompleteness.Seecompleteness. deductiveexplanation.Seecoveringlawmodel. deductivejustification.Seejustification. deductive-nomologicalmodel.Seecoveringlaw MODEL. deepstructure.Seegrammar,philosophyoflan- GUAGE,TRANSFORMATIONRULE. defaultlogic,aformålsystemforreasoningwith defaults,developedbyRaymondReiterin1980. Reiter'sdefaultshavetheform'P:MQl,..., MQn/R',read'IfPisbelievedandQ1...Qnare consistentwithone'sbeliefs,thenRmaybe believed'.Whetherapropositionisconsistent withone'sbeliefsdependsonwhatdefaultshave alreadybeenapplied.GiventhedefaultsP:MQ/Q andR:M~QI~Q,andthefactsPandR,applying thefirstdefaultyieldsQwhileapplyingthesec- onddefaultyields~Q.Soapplyingeitherdefault blockstheother.Consequently,adefaulttheory mayhaveseveraldefaultextensions. NormaldefaultshavingtheformP.MQ/Q,use- fulforrepresentingsimplecasesofnonmonoto- nicreasoning,areinadequateformorecomplex cases.Reiterproducesareasonablycleanproof theoryfornormaldefaulttheoriesandproves thateverynormaldefaulttheoryhasanexten- sion. Seealsodefeasibility,non-monotonic logic.D.N. defeasibility,apropertythatrules,principles, arguments,orbitsofreasoninghavewhenthey mightbedefeatedbysomecompetitor.Forexam- ple,theepistemicprinciple'Objectsnormally havethepropertiestheyappeartohave'orthe normativeprinciple'Oneshouldnotlie'are defeated,respectively,whenperceptionoccurs underunusualcircumstances(e.g.,undercol- oredlights)orwhenthereissomeoverriding moralconsideration(e.g.,topreventmurder). Apparentlydeclarativesentencessuchas'Birds typicallyfly'canbetakeninpartasexpressing defeasiblerules:takesomething'sbeingabirdas evidencethatitflies.Defeasibleargumentsand reasoninginherittheirdefeasibilityfromtheuse ofdefeasiblerulesorprinciples. Recentanalysesofdefeasibilityincludecir- cumscriptionanddefaultlogic,whichbelongto thebroadercategoryofnon-monotoniclogic. Therulesinseveraloftheseformålsystemscon- tainspecialantecedentconditionsandarenot trulydefeasiblesincetheyapplywhenevertheir conditionsaresatisfied.Rulesandargumentsin othernon-monotonicsystemsjustifytheircon- clusionsonlywhentheyarenotdefeatedby someotherfact,rule,orargument.JohnPollock distinguishesbetweenrebnttingandnnderciitting defeaters.'Snowisnotnormallyred'rebuts(in appropriatecircumstances)theprinciple'Things thatlookrednormallyarered',whileTfthe availablelightisred,donotusetheprinciplethat thingsthatlookrednormallyarered'only undercutstheembeddedrule.Pollockhasinfru- 212 defeatofreasons definition encedmostotherworkonformålsystemsfor defeasiblereasoning. Seealsodefaultlogic,epistemology, NON-MONOTONICLOGIC.D.N. defeatofreasons.Seeepistemology,justifica- tion. definiendum(plural:definienda),theexpression thatisdefinedinadefinition.Theexpressionthat givesthedefinitionisthedefiniens(plural: definientia).Inthedefinition father,maleparent, 'father'isthedefiniendumand'maleparent'is thedefiniens.Inthedefinition'Ahumanbeingis arationalanimal','humanbeing'isthedefinien- dumand'rationalanimal'isthedefiniens. Similartermsareusedinthecaseofconceptual analyses,whethertheyaremeanttoprovidesyn- onymsornot;'definiendum'for'analysandum' and'definiens'for'analysans'.In'xknowsthatp ifandonlyifitistruethatp,xbelievesthatp,and x'sbeliefthatpisproperlyjustified','xknowsthat p'istheanalysandumand'itistruethatp,x believesthatp,andx'sbeliefthatpisproperlyjus- tified'istheanalysans.Seealsoanalysis,def- inition,MEANING.T.Y. definiens.Seedefiniendum. definist,someonewhoholdsthatmoralterms, suchas'right',andevaluativeterms,suchas 'good'-inshort,normativeterms-aredefinable innon-moral,non-evaluative(i.e.,non-norma- tive)terms.WilliamFrankenaoffersabroader accountofadefinistasonewhoholdsthateth- icaltermsaredefinableinnon-ethicalterms. Thiswouldallowthattheyaredefinableinnon- ethicalbutevaluativeterms-say,'right'in termsofwhatisnon-morallyintrinsicallygood. Definistswhoarealsonaturalistsholdthatmoral termscanbedefinedbytermsthatdenotenat- uralproperties,i.e.,propertieswhosepresence orabsencecanbedeterminedbyobservational means.Theymightdefine'good'as'whatcon- ducestopleasure'.Definistswhoarenotnatu- ralistswillholdthatthetermsthatdothe definingdonotdenotenaturalproperties, e.g.,that'right'means'whatiscommandedby God'.Seealsoethics,moore,naturalism. B.R. definistfallacy.Seemoore. definitedescription.Seetheoryofdescriptions. definitedescriptionoperator.SeeAppendixof SpecialSymbols. definition,specificationofthemeaningor,alter- natively,conceptualcontent,ofanexpression. Forexample,'periodoffourteendays'isadefin- itionof'fortnight'.Definitionshavetraditionally beenjudgedbyruleslikethefollowing: (1)Adefinitionshouldnotbetoonarrow. 'Unmarriedadultmalepsychiatrist'istoo narrowadefinitionfor'bachelor',forsome bachelorsarenotpsychiatrists.'Having vertebraeandaliver'istoonarrowfor 'vertebrate',for,eventhoughallactual vertebratethingshavevertebraeanda liver,itispossibleforavertebratethingto lackaliver. (2)Adefinitionshouldnotbetoobroad. 'Unmarriedadult'istoobroadadefinition for'bachelor',fornotallunmarriedadults arebachelors.'Featherlessbiped'istoo broadfor'humanbeing',foreventhough allactualfeatherlessbipedsarehuman beings,itispossibleforafeatherlessbiped tobenon-human. (3)Thedefiningexpressioninadefinition should(ideally)exactlymatchthedegree ofvaguenessoftheexpressionbeing defined(exceptinaprecisingdefinition). 'Adultfemale'for'woman'doesnotvio- latethisrule,but'femaleatleasteighteen yearsold'for'woman'does. (4)Adefinitionshouldnotbecircular.If'desir- able'defines'good'and'good'defines 'desirable',thesedefinitionsarecircular. Definitionsfallintoatleastthefollowing kinds: analyticaldefinition:definitionwhosecorre- spondingbiconditionalisanalyticorgives ananalysisofthedefiniendum:e.g.,'female fox'for'vixen',wherethecorresponding biconditional'Foranyx,xisavixenifand onlyifxisafemalefox'isanalytic;'truein allpossibleworlds'for'necessarilytrue', wherethecorrespondingbiconditional'For anyP,PisnecessarilytrueifandonlyifPis trueinallpossibleworlds'givesananalysis ofthedefiniendum. contextualdefinition:definitionofanexpression asitoccursinalargerexpression:e.g.,Tfit isnotthecasethatQ,thenP'contextually defines'unless'asitoccursin'PunlessQ'; 'ThereisatleastoneentitythatisFandis identicalwithanyentitythatisF'contex- 213 definition definition tuallydefines'exactlyone'asitoccursin 'ThereisexactlyoneF'.Recursivedefini- tions(seebelow)areanimportantvariety ofcontextualdefinition.Anotherimpor- tantapplicationofcontextualdefinitionis Russell'stheoryofdescriptions,which defines'the'asitoccursincontextsofthe form'Theso-and-soissuch-and-such'. coordinativedefinition:definitionofatheoretical termbynon-theoreticalterms:e.g.,'the forty-millionthpartofthecircumferenceof theearth'for'meter'. definitionbygenusandspecies:Whenanexpres- sionissaidtobeapplicabletosomebutnot allentitiesofacertaintypeandinapplica- bletoallentitiesnotofthattype,thetype inquestionisthegenus,andthesubtypeof allandonlythoseentitiestowhichthe expressionisapplicableisthespecies:e.g., inthedefinition'rationalanimal'for 'human',thetypeanimalisthegenusand thesubtypehumanisthespecies.Each speciesisdistinguishedfromanyotherof thesamegenusbyapropertycalledthedif ferentia. definitioninuse:specificationofhowanexpres- sionisusedorwhatitisusedtoexpress: e.g.,'utteredtoexpressastonishment'for 'mygoodness'.Wittgensteinemphasized theimportanceofdefinitioninuseinhis usetheoryofmeaning. definitionpergenusetdifferentiam:definitionby genusanddifference;sameasdefinitionby genusandspecies. explicitdefinition:definitionthatmakesitclear thatitisadefinitionandidentifiesthe expressionbeingdefinedassuch:e.g., 'Father'means'maleparenf;'Foranyx,x isafatherbydefinitionifandonlyifxisa maleparenf. implicitdefinition:definitionthatisnotan explicitdefinition. lexicaldefinition:definitionofthekindcom- monlythoughtappropriatefordictionary definitionsofnaturallanguageterms, namely,aspecificationoftheirconven- tionalmeaning. nominaldefinition:definitionofanoun(usually acommonnoun),givingitslinguistic meaning.Typicallyitisintermsof macrosensiblecharacteristics:e.g.,'yellow malleablemetal'for'gold'.Lockespökeof nominalessenceandcontrasteditwithreal essence. ostensivedefinition:definitionbyanexamplein whichthereferentisspecifiedbypointing orshowinginsomeway:e.g.,"'Red'isthat color,"wheretheword'that'isaccompa- niedwithagesturepointingtoapatchof coloredcloth;"'Pain'meansthis,"where 'this'isaccompaniedwithaninsertionofa pinthroughthehearer'sskin;"'Kangaroo' appliestoallandonlyanimalslikethat," where'that'isaccompaniedbypointingto aparticularkangaroo. persuasivedefinition:definitiondesignedtoaffect orappealtothepsychologicalstatesofthe partytowhomthedefinitionisgiven,so thataclaimwillappearmoreplausibleto thepartythanitis:e.g.,'self-serving manipulator'for'politician',wherethe claiminquestionisthatallpoliticiansare immoral. precisingdefinition:definitionofavagueexpres- sionintendedtoreduceitsvagueness:e.g., 'snakelongerthanhalfameterandshorter thantwometers'for'snakeofaverage length';'havingassetstenthousandtimes themedianfigure'for'wealthy'. prescriptivedefinition:stipulativedefinitionthat, inarecommendatoryway,givesanew meaningtoanexpressionwithapreviously establishedmeaning:e.g.,'malewhosepri- marysexualpreferenceisforothermales' for'gay'. realdefinition:specificationofthemetaphysi- callynecessaryandsufficientconditionfor beingthekindofthinganoun(usuallya commonnoun)designates:e.g.,'element withatomicnumber79'for'gold'.Locke spökeofrealessenceandcontrasteditwith nominalessence. recursivedefinition(alsocalledinductivedefini- tionanddefinitionbyrecursion):definition inthreeclausesinwhich(1)theexpression definedisappliedtocertainparticularitems (thebaseclause);(2)aruleisgivenfor reachingfurtheritemstowhichtheexpres- sionapplies(therecursive,orinductive, clause);and(3)itisstatedthattheexpres- sionappliestonothingelse(theclosure clause).E.g.,'John'sparentsareJohn'san- cestors;anyparentofJohn'sancestoris John'sancestor;nothingelseisJohn's ancestor'.Bythebaseclause,John'smother andfatherareJohn'sancestors.Thenbythe recursiveclause,John'smother'sparents andJohn'sfather'sparentsareJohn's ancestors;soaretheirparents,andsoon. Finally,bythelast(closure)clause,these peopleexhaustJohn'sancestors.Thefol- lowingdefinesmultiplicationintermsof 214 definition,contextual degreeofunsolvability addition:'0Xn=0.(m+l)Xn=(mXn) +n.Nothingelseistheresultofmultiplying integers'.Thebaseclausetellsus,e.g.,that X4=0.Therecursiveclausetellsus,e.g., that(0+1)X4=(0X4)+4.Wethen knowthat1X4=0+4=4.Likewise,e.g., 2X4=(l+l)X4=(lX4)+4=4+ 4=8. stipulativedefinition:definitionregardlessofthe ordinaryorusualconceptualcontentofthe expressiondefined.Itpostulatesacontent, ratherthanaimingtocapturethecontent alreadyassociatedwiththeexpression.Any explicitdefinitionthatintroducesanew expressionintothelanguageisastipulative definition:e.g.,"Forthepurposeofourdis- cussion'existent'means'perceivable'"; "By'zoobeedoobah'weshallmean'vain millionairewhoisaddictedtoalcohol'." synonymousdefinition:definitionofaword(or otherlinguisticexpression)byanother wordsynonymouswithit:e.g.,'buy'for 'purchase';'madness'for'insanity'. Seealsoanalysis,essentialism,mean- ING,PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE,THEORYOF DESCRIPTIONS.TY. definition,contextual.Seedefinition. definition,explicit.Seebeth'sdefinabilitytheo- REM,DEFINITION. definition,implicit.Seebeth'sdefinabilitytheo- REM. definitioninuse.Seedefinition,logicalcon- STRUCTION. deflationarytheoryoftruth.Seephilosophyof language,truth. degeneratecase,anexpressionusedmoreorless looselytoindicateanindividualorclassthatfalls outsideofagivenbackgroundclasstowhichitis otherwiseverycloselyrelated,ofteninvirtueof anorderingofamorecomprehensiveclass.A degeneratecaseofoneclassisoftenalimiting caseofamorecomprehensiveclass.Rest(zero velocity)isadegeneratecaseofmotion(positive velocity)whilebeingalimitingcaseofvelocity. Thecircleisadegeneratecaseofanequilateral andequiangularpolygon.Intechnicalorscien- tificcontexts,theconventionaltermforthe backgroundclassisoften"stretched"tocover otherwisedegeneratecases.Afigurecomposed oftwointersectinglinesisadegeneratecaseof hyperbolainthesenseofsyntheticgeometry,but itisalimitingcaseofhyperbolainthesenseof analyticgeometry.Thenullsetisadegenerate caseofsetinanoldersensebutalimitingcaseof setinamodernsense.Alinesegmentisadegen- eratecaseofrectanglewhenrectanglesare orderedbyratiooflengthtowidth,butitisnot alimitingcaseundertheseconditions.Seealso BORDERLINECASE,LIMITINGCASE.J.Cor. degree,alsocalledarity,adicity,informållan- guages,apropertyofpredicateandfunction expressionsthatdeterminesthenumberofterms withwhichtheexpressioniscorrectlycombined toyieldawell-formedexpression.Ifanexpres- sioncombineswithasingletermtoformawell- formedexpression,itisofdegreeone(monadic, singulary).Expressionsthatcombinewithtwo termsareofdegreetwo(dyadic,binary),andsoon. Expressionsofdegreegreaterthanorequalto twoarepolyadic.Theformationrulesofafor- malizedlanguagemusteffectivelyspecifythe degreesofitsprimitiveexpressionsaspartofthe effectivedeterminationoftheclassofwell- formedformulas.Degreeiscommonlyindicated byanattachedsuperscriptconsistingofanAra- bicnumeral.Formalizedlanguageshavebeen studiedthatcontainexpressionshavingvariable degree(orvariableadicity)andthatcanthuscom- binewithanyfinitenumberofterms.Anabstract relationthatwouldbeappropriateasextension ofapredicateexpressionissubjecttothesame terminology,andlikewiseforfunctionexpres- sionsandtheirassociatedfunctions.Seealso FORMÅLLANGUAGE,MATHEMATICALFUNC- TION,PROPERTY.C.A.A. degreeofbelief.Seebayesianrationality. degreeofbelief.Seeprobability. degreeofconfirmation.Seecarnap. degreeofunsolvability,amaximalsetofequally complexsetsofnaturalnumbers,withcompar- ativecomplexityofsetsofnaturalnumberscon- struedasrecursion-theoreticreducibilityor- dering.Recursiontheoristsinvestigatevarious notionsofreducibilitybetweensetsofnatural numbers,i.e.,variouswaysoffillinginthefol- lowingschematicdefinition.ForsetsAandBof naturalnumbers:AisreducibletoBiff(ifand onlyif)thereisanalgorithmwherebyeach membershipquestionaboutA(e.g.,'17GA?') couldbeansweredallowingconsultationofan 215 deism deMaistre,Joseph-Marie "oracle"thatwouldcorrectlyanswereachmem- bershipquestionaboutB.Thisdoesnotpresup- posethatthereisa"real"oracleforB;the motivatingideaiscounterfactual:Aisreducible toBiff:ifmembershipquestionsaboutBwere decidablethenmembershipquestionsaboutA wouldalsobedecidable.Ontheotherhand,the mathematicaldefinitionsofnotionsofreducibil- ityinvolvenosubjunctiveconditionalsorother intensionalconstructions.Thenotionofre- ducibilityisdeterminedbyconstraintsonhow thealgorithmcouldusetheoracle.Imposingno constraintsyieldsT-reducibility('TforTuring), themostimportantandmoststudiednotionof reducibility. Fixinganotionrofreducibility:Aisr-equiva- lenttoBiffAisr-reducibletoBandBisr- reducibletoA.Ifr-reducibilityistransitive, r-equivalenceisanequivalencerelationonthe classofsetsofnaturalnumbers,onereflectinga notionofequalcomplexityforsetsofnatural numbers.Adegreeofunsolvabilityrelativetor (anr-degree)isanequivalenceclassunderthat equivalencerelation,i.e.,amaximalclassofsets ofnaturalnumbersanytwomembersofwhich arer-equivalent,i.e.,amaximalclassofequally complex(inthesenseofr-reducibility)setsof naturalnumbers.Ther-reducibility-orderingof setsofnaturalnumberstransferstother- degrees:fordandd'r-degrees,letdBisatheorem,sotoois(p&OiAl&... &OiAn)DOiB. Seealsodeonticparadoxes,formål LOGIC,MODALLOGIC.J.E.T. deonticoperator.Seedeonticlogic. deonticparadoxes,theparadoxesofdeontic logic,whichtypicallyariseasfollows:acertain setofEnglishsentencesaboutobligationorper- missionappearslogicallyconsistent,butwhen thesesamesentencesarerepresentedinapro- posedsystemofdeonticlogictheresultisafor- mallyinconsistentset.Toillustrate,a formulationisprovidedbelowofhowtwoof theseparadoxesbesetstandarddeonticlogic. Thecontrary-to-dutyimperativeparadox,made famousbyChisholm(Analysis,1963),arisesfrom juxtaposingtwoapparenttruths:first,someofus sometimesdowhatweshouldnotdo;andsec- ond,whensuchwrongfuldoingsoccuritisoblig- atorythatthebest(orabetter)bemadeofan unfortunatesituation.Considerthisscenario.Art andBillshareanapartment.Fornogoodreason ArtdevelopsastronganimositytowardBill.One eveningArt'sanimositytakesöver,andhesteals Bill'svaluablelithographs.Artislåterfoundout, apprehended,andbroughtbeforeSue,theduly electedlocalpunishment-and-awardsofficial.An inquiryrevealsthatArtisahabitualthiefwitha historyofunremittingparoleviolation.Inthis situation,itseemsthat(l)-(4)arealltrue(and hencemutuallyconsistent): (1)ArtstealsfromBill. (2)IfArtstealsfromBill,Sueoughttopunish ArtforstealingfromBill. (3)ItisobligatorythatifArtdoesnotsteal fromBill,Suedoesnotpunishhimfor stealingfromBill. (4)ArtoughtnottostealfromBill. Turningtostandarddeonticlogic,orSDL,letsstånd for'ArtstealsfromBill'andletpståndfor'Sue punishesArtforstealingfromBill'.Then(1)-(4) aremostnaturallyrepresentedinSDLasfollows: (la)s. (2a)sDOp. (3a)0(~sD (4a)O~s. P)- Ofthese,(la)and(2a)entailOpbypropositional logic;next,giventheSDLaxiomO(ADB)D(OA DOB),(3a)impliesO~sDO~p;butthelatter, takeninconjunctionwith(4a),entailsO~pby propositionallogic.InthecombinationofOp,O ~p,andtheaxiomOAD~O~A,ofcourse,we haveaformallyinconsistentset. Theparadoxoftheknower,firstpresentedby LennartÅqvist(Nous,1967),isgeneratedby theseapparenttruths:first,someofussome- timesdowhatweshouldnotdo;andsecond, therearethosewhoareobligatedtoknowthat suchwrongfuldoingsoccur.Considerthefol- lowingscenario.Jonesworksasasecurityguard atalocalstore.Oneevening,whileJonesison duty,Smith,adisgruntledformeremployeeout forrevenge,setsthestoreonfirejustafewyards awayfromJones'sworkstation.Hereitseems that(l)-(3)arealltrue(andthusjointlyconsis- tent): (1)SmithsetthestoreonfirewhileJoneswas onduty. (2)IfSmithsetthestoreonfirewhileJones wasonduty,itisobligatorythatJones knowsthatSmithsetthestoreonfire. (3)Smithoughtnotsetthestoreonfire. Independently,asaconsequenceoftheconcept ofknowledge,thereistheepistemictheorem that (4)ThestatementthatJonesknowsthat Smithsetthestoreonfireentailsthestate- mentthatSmithsetthestoreonfire. Next,withinSDL(1)and(2)surelyappearto imply: (5)ItisobligatorythatJonesknowsthatSmith setthestoreonfire. But(4)and(5)togetheryield (6)Smithoughttosetthestoreonfire, giventheSDLtheoremthatifADBisatheo- rem,soisOADOB.Andthereinresidesthepara- dox:notonlydoes(6)appearfalse,the conjunctionof(6)and(3)isformallyinconsis- tentwiththeSDLaxiomOAD~O~A. Theoverwhelmingverdictamongdeontic logiciansisthatSDLgenuinelysuccumbstothe 220 deontologicalethics dependence deonticparadoxes.Butitiscontroversialwhat otherapproachisbestfollowedtoresolvethese puzzles.Twoofthemostattractiveproposalsare Castaneda'stwo-sortedsystem(Thinkingand Doing,1975),andtheagent-and-timerelativized approachofFredFeldman(PhilosophicalPerspec- tives,1990). Seealsodeonticlogic,formållogic, MORALDILEMMA, DOXES. SET-THEORETICPARA- J.E.T. deontologicalethics.Seeethics. deontologism,epistemic.SeeEPisTEMicdeontolo- GISM. dependence,inphilosophy,arelationofoneof threemaintypes:epistemicdependence,or dependenceintheorderofknowing;conceptual dependence,ordependenceintheorderof understanding;andontologicaldependence,or dependenceintheorderofbeing.Whenarela- tionofdependencerunsinonedirectiononly, wehavearelationofpriority.Forexample,if wholesareontologicallydependentontheir parts,butthelatterintumarenotontologically dependentontheformer,onemaysaythatparts areontologicallypriortowholes.Thephrase 'logicalpriority'usuallyreferstopriorityofone ofthethreevarietiestobediscussedhere. Epistemicdependence.Tosaythatthefactsin someclassBareepistemicallydependentonthe factsinsomeotherclassAistosaythis:onecan- notknowanyfactinBunlessoneknowssome factinAthatservesasone'sevidenceforthefact inB.Forexample,itmightbeheldthattoknow anyfactaboutone'sphysicalenvironment(e.g., thatthereisafireinthestove),onemustknow (asevidence)somefactsaboutthecharacterof one'sownsensoryexperience(e.g.,thatoneis feelingwarmandseeingflames).Thiswouldbe tomaintainthatfactsaboutthephysicalworld areepistemicallydependentonfactsaboutsen- soryexperience.Ifoneheldinadditionthatthe dependenceisnotreciprocal-thatonecan knowfactsaboutone'ssensoryexperiencewith- outknowingasevidenceanyfactsaboutthe physicalworld-onewouldbemaintainingthat theformerfactsareepistemicallypriortothelat- terfacts.Otherplausible(thoughsometimesdis- puted)examplesofepistemicpriorityarethe following:factsaboutthebehaviorofothersare epistemicallypriortofactsabouttheirmental states;factsaboutobservableobjectsareepis- temicallypriortofactsabouttheinvisibleparti- clespostulatedbyphysics;andsingularfacts (e.g.,thiscrowisblack)areepistemicallypriorto generalfacts(e.g.,allcrowsareblack). Isthereaclassoffactsonwhichallothersepis- temicallydependandthatdependonnofurther factsinturn-abottomstoryintheedificeof knowledge?Somefoundationalistssayyes, positingalevelofbasicorfoundationalfactsthat areepistemicallypriortoallothers.Empiricists areusuallyfoundationalistswhomaintainthat thebasiclevelconsistsoffactsaboutimmediate sensoryexperience.Coherentistsdenytheneed foraprivilegedstråtumoffactstogroundthe knowledgeofallothers;ineffect,theydenythat anyfactsareepistemicallypriortoanyothers. Instead,allfactsareonapar,andeachisknown invirtueofthewayinwhichitfitsinwithallthe rest. Sometimesitappearsthattwopropositionsor classesofthemeachepistemicallydependonthe otherinaviciousway-toknowA,youmustfirst knowB,andtoknowB,youmustfirstknowA. Wheneverthisisgenuinelythecase,weareina skepticalpredicamentandcannotknoweither proposition.Forexample,Descartesbelieved thathecouldnotbeassuredofthereliabilityof hisowncognitionsuntilheknewthatGodexists andisnotadeceiver;yethowcouldheever cometoknowanythingaboutGodexceptby relyingonhisowncognitions?Thisisthefamous problemoftheCartesiancircle.Anotherexam- pleistheproblemofinductionassetforthby Hume:toknowthatinductionisalegitimate modeofinference,onewouldfirsthavetoknow thatthefuturewillresemblethepast;butsince thelatterfactisestablishableonlybyinduction, onecouldknowitonlyifonealreadyknewthat inductionislegitimate.Solutionstotheseprob- lemsmustshowthatcontrarytofirstappear- ances,thereisawayofknowingoneofthe problematicpropositionsindependentlyofthe other. Conceptualdependence.TosaythatB'sare conceptuallydependenton^4'smeansthatto understandwhataBis,youmustunderstand whatanAis,orthattheconceptofaBcanbe explainedorunderstoodonlythroughthecon- ceptofanA.Forexample,itcouldplausiblybe claimedthattheconceptunclecanbeunderstood onlyintermsoftheconceptmale.Empiricists typicallymaintainthatweunderstandwhatan externalthinglikeatreeoratableisonlyby knowingwhatexperiencesitwouldinduceinus, sothattheconceptsweapplytophysicalthings dependontheconceptsweapplytoourexperi- 221 dependence,causal depiction ences.Theytypicallyalsomaintainthatthis dependenceisnotreciprocal,sothatexperiential conceptsareconceptuallypriortophysicalcon- cepts. Someempiricistsarguefromthethesisofcon- ceptualpriorityjustcitedtothecorresponding thesisofepistemicpriority-thatfactsabout experiencesareepistemicallypriortofactsabout externaiobjects.Turningthetables,somefoesof empiricismmaintainthattheconceptualpriority istheotherwayabout:thatwecandescribeand understandwhatkindofexperienceweare undergoingonlybyspecifyingwhatkindof objecttypicallycausesit("ifsasmelllikethatof pinemulch").Sometimestheyofferthisasarea- sonfordenyingthatfactsaboutexperiencesare epistemicallypriortofactsaboutphysicalobjects. Bothsidesinthisdisputeassumethatarelation ofconceptualpriorityinonedirectionexcludesa relationofepistemicpriorityintheopposite direction.Butwhycouldn'titbethecaseboth thatfactsaboutexperiencesareepistemically priortofactsaboutphysicalobjectsandthatcon- ceptsofphysicalobjectsareconceptuallypriorto conceptsofexperiences?Howthevariouskinds ofpriorityanddependenceareconnected(e.g., whetherconceptualpriorityimpliesepistemic priority)isamatterinneedoffurtherstudy. Ontologicaldependence.Tosaythatentitiesof onesort(theB's)areontologicallydependenton entitiesofanothersort(theA's)meansthis:noB canexistunlesssome^4exists;i.e.,itislogicallyor metaphysicallynecessarythatifanyBexists, someAalsoexists.Ontologicaldependencemay beeitherspecific(theexistenceofanyBdepend- ingontheexistenceofaparticular^4)orgeneric (theexistenceofanyBdependingmerelyonthe existenceofsomeAorother).IfB'sareontologi- callydependentonA's,butnotconverselywe maysaythat^4'sareontologicallypriortoB's.The traditionalnotionofsubstanceisoftendefinedin termsofontologicalpriority-substancescan existwithoutotherthings,asAristotlesaid,but theotherscannotexistwithoutthem. Leibnizbelievedthatcompositeentitiesare ontologicallydependentonsimple(i.e.,partiess) entities-thatanycompositeobjectexistsonly becauseithascertainsimpleelementsthatare arrangedinacertainway.BerkeleyJ.S.Mlll, andotherphenomenalistshavebelievedthat physicalobjectsareontologicallydependenton sensoryexperiences-thattheexistenceofa tableoratreeconsistsintheoccurrenceofsen- soryexperiencesincertainorderlypatterns. Spinozabelievedthatallfinitebeingsareonto- logicallydependentonGodandthatGodisonto- logicallydependentonnothingfurther;thus God,beingontologicallypriortoeverythingelse, isinSpinoza'sviewtheonlysubstance. Sometimestherearedisputesaboutthedirec- tioninwhicharelationshipofontologicalprior- ityruns.Somephilosophersholdthatexten- sionlesspointsarepriortoextendedsolids,oth- ersthatsolidsarepriortopoints;somesaythat thingsarepriortoevents,othersthateventsare priortothings.Inthefaceofsuchdisagreement, stillotherphilosophers(suchasGoodman)have suggestedthatnothingisinherentlyorabso- lutelypriortoanythingelse:^4'smaybepriorto B'sinoneconceptualscheme,B'stoA'sin another,andtheremaybenosayingwhich schemeiscorrect.Whetherrelationshipsofpri- orityholdabsolutelyoronlyrelativetoconcep- tualschemesisoneissuedividingrealistsand anti-realists. Seealsofoundationalism,idealism, METAPHYSICALREALISM,PHENOMENALISM, SUBSTANCE,SUPERVENIENCE.J.V.C. dependence,causal.Seecausation. dependence,epistemic.Seedependence. dependence,ontological.Seedependence. dependentbeauty.Seebeauty. depiction,pictorialrepresentation,alsosome- timescalled"iconicrepresentation."Linguistic representationisconventional:itisonlyby virtueofaconventionthattheword'cats'refers tocats.Apictureofacat,however,seemstorefer tocatsbyotherthanconventionalmeans;for viewerscancorrectlyinterpretpictureswithout specialtraining,whereaspeopleneedspecial trainingtolearnlanguages.Thoughsome philosophers,suchasGoodman(Languagesof Art),denythatdepictioninvolvesanon-con- ventionalelement,mostareconcernedtogive anaccountofwhatthisnon-conventionalele- mentconsistsin.Someholdthatitconsistsin resemblance:picturesrefertotheirobjectspartly byresemblingthem.Objectionstothisarethat anythingresemblesanythingelsetosome degree;andthatresemblanceisasymmetricand reflexiverelation,whereasdepictionisnot. Otherphilosophersavoiddirectappealtoresem- blance:RichardWollheim(PaintingasanArt) arguesthatdepictionholdsbyvirtueofthe intentionaldeploymentofthenaturalhuman capacitytoseeobjectsinmarkedsurfaces;and 222 dere Descartes,René KendallWalton(MimesisasMake-Believe)argues thatdepictionholdsbyvirtueofobjectsserving aspropsinreasonablyrichandvividvisual gamesofmake-believe.Seealsomimesis, peirce.B.Ga. dere.Seededicto. derenecessity.Seenecessity. derivation.Seededuction. derivationallogicism.Seelogicism. Derrida,Jacques(b.1930),Frenchphilosopher, authorofdeconstructionism,andleadingfigure inthepostmodernmovement.Postmodern thoughtseekstomovebeyondmodernismby revealinginconsistenciesoraporiaswithinthe WesternEuropeantraditionfromDescartesto thepresent.Theseaporiasarelargelyassociated withonto-theology,atermcoinedbyHeidegger tocharacterizeamannerofthinkingaboutbeing andtruththatultimatelygroundsitselfina conceptionofdivinity.Deconstructionisthe methodologyofrevelation:ittypicallyinvolves seekingoutbinaryoppositionsdefinedinterde- pendentlybymutualexclusion,suchasgood andevilortrueandfalse,whichfunctionas foundingtermsformodernthought.Theonto- theologicalmetaphysicsunderlyingmodernism isametaphysicsofpresence:tobeistobepres- ent,finallytobeabsolutelypresenttothe absolute,thatis,tothedivinitywhoseownbeing isconceivedaspresencetoitself,asthecoinci- denceofbeingandknowingintheBeingthat knowsallthingsandknowsitselfasthereason forthebeingofallthatis.Divinitythusfunctions asthemeasureoftruth.Theaporiahere, revealedbydeconstruction,isthatthismod- ernistmeasureoftruthcannotmeetitsown measure:thecoincidenceofwhatisandwhatis knownisanimpossibilityforfiniteintellects. MajorinfluencesonDerridaincludeHegel, Freud,Heidegger,Sartre,Saussure,andstruc- turalistthinkerssuchasLévi-Strauss,butitwas hisearlycritiqueofHusserl,inIntroductiona "UOriginedelagéometrie"deHusserl(1962),that gainedhimrecognitionasacriticofthephe- nomenologicaltraditionandsettheconceptual frameworkforhislåterwork.Derridasoughtto demonstratethattheoriginofgeometry,con- ceivedbyHusserlastheguidingparadigmfor Westernthought,wasasupratemporalidealof perfectknowingthatservesasthegoalofhuman knowledge.Thustheoriginofgeometryisinsep- arablefromitsendortelos,athoughtthatDer- ridalåtergeneralizesinhisdeconstructionofthe notionoforiginassuch.Hearguesthatthisideal cannotberealizedintime,hencecannotbe groundedinlivedexperience,hencecannot meetthe"principleofprinciples"Husserldesig- natedastheprimecriterionforphenomenology, theprinciplethatallknowingmustgrounditself inconsciousnessofanobjectthatiscoinciden- tallyconsciousofitself.Thisrevelationofthe aporiaatthecoreofphenomenologyinparticu- larandWesternthoughtingeneralwasnotyet labeledasadeconstruction,butitestablishedthe formålstructurethatguidedDerrida'slåter deconstructiverevelationsofthemetaphysicsof presenceunderlyingthemodernisminwhich Westernthoughtculminates. Seealsodeconstruction,heidegger, PHENOMENOLOGY,POSTMODERN.M.C.D. Descartes,René(1596-1650),Frenchphiloso- pherandmathematician,afounderofthe"mod- ernage"andperhapsthemostimportantfigure intheintellectualrevolutionoftheseventeenth centuryinwhichthetraditionalsystemsof understandingbasedonAristotlewerechal- lengedand,ultimately,overthrown.Hisconcep- tionofphilosophywasall-embracing:iten- compassedmathematicsandthephysicalsci- encesaswellaspsychologyandethics,anditwas basedonwhatheclaimedtobeabsolutelyfirm andreliablemetaphysicalfoundations.His approachtotheproblemsofknowledge,cer- tainty,andthenatureofthehumanmindplayed amajorpartinshapingthesubsequentdevelop- mentofphilosophy. Lifeandworks.Descarteswasbominasmall townnearToursthatnowbearshisname.He wasbroughtupbyhismaternalgrandmother (hismotherhavingdiedsoonafterhisbirth),and attheageoftenhewassenttotherecently foundedJesuitcollegeofLaFlécheinAnjou, whereheremainedasaboardingpupilfornine years.AtLaFléchehestudiedclassicalliterature andtraditionalclassics-basedsubjectssuchas historyandrhetoricaswellasnaturalphiloso- phy(basedontheAristoteliansystem)andthe- ology.HelåterwroteofLaFléchethathe consideredit"oneofthebestschoolsinEuropé," butthat,asregardsthephilosophyhehad learnedthere,hesawthat"despitebeingculti- vatedformanycenturiesbythebestminds,it containednopointwhichwasnotdisputedand hencedoubtful." Atagetwenty-two(havingtakenalawdegree 223 Descartes,René Descartes,René atPoitiers),Descartessetoutonaseriesoftrav- elsinEuropé,"resolving,"ashelåterputit,"to seeknoknowledgeotherthanthatwhichcould befoundeitherinmyselforthegreatbookofthe world."Themostimportantinfluenceofthis earlyperiodwasDescartes'sfriendshipwiththe DutchmanIsaacBeeckman,whoawakenedhis lifelonginterestinmathematics-asciencein whichhediscernedprecisionandcertaintyofthe kindthattrulymeritedthetitleofscientia (Descartes'stermforgenuinesystematicknowl- edgebasedonreliableprinciples).Aconsiderable portionofDescartes'senergiesasayoungman wasdevotedtopuremathematics:hisessayon Geometry(publishedin1637)incorporated resultsdiscoveredduringthe1620s.Buthealso sawmathematicsasthekeytomakingprogress intheappliedsciences;hisearliestwork,the CompendiumMusicae,writtenin1618anddedi- catedtoBeeckman,appliedquantitativeprinci- plestothestudyofmusicalharmonyand dissonance.Moregenerally,Descartessawmath- ematicsasakindofparadigmforallhuman understanding:"thoselongchainscomposedof verysimpleandeasyreasonings,whichgeome- terscustomarilyusetoarriveattheirmostdiffi- cultdemonstrations,gavemeoccasionto supposethatallthethingswhichfallwithinthe scopeofhumanknowledgeareinterconnected inthesameway"(DiscourseontheMethod,PartII). Inthecourseofhistravels,Descartesfound himselfcloseted,onNovember10,1619,ina "stove-heatedroom"inatowninsouthernGer- many,whereafteradayofintensemeditation, hehadaseriesofvividdreamsthatconvinced himofhismissiontofoundanewscientificand philosophicalsystem.AfterreturningtoParisfor atime,heemigratedtoHollandin1628,where hewastolive(thoughwithfrequentchangesof address)formostoftherestofhislife.By1633 hehadreadyatreatiseoncosmologyand physics,LeMonde;buthecautiouslywithdrew theworkfrompublicationwhenheheardofthe condemnationofGalileobytheInquisitionfor rejecting(asDescarteshimselfdid)thetradi- tionalgeocentrictheoryoftheuniverse.Butin 1637Descartesreleasedforpublication,in French,asampleofhisscientificwork:three essaysentitledtheOptics,Meteorology,andGeome- try.Prefacedtothatselectionwasanautobio- graphicalintroductionentitledDiscourseonthe Methodofrightlyconductingone'sreasonandreach- ingthetruthinthesciences.Thiswork,which includesdiscussionofanumberofscientific issuessuchasthecirculationoftheblood,con- tains(inPartIV)asummaryofDescartes'sviews onknowledge,certainty,andthemetaphysical foundationsofscience.Criticismsofhisargu- mentshereledDescartestocomposehisphilo- sophicalmasterpiece,theMeditationsonFirst Philosophy,publishedinLatinin1641-adra- maticaccountofthevoyageofdiscoveryfrom universaldoubttocertaintyofone'sownexis- tence,andthesubsequentstruggletoestablish theexistenceofGod,thenatureandexistenceof theexternalworld,andtherelationbetween mindandbody.TheMeditationsarousedenor- mousinterestamongDescartes'scontempo- raries,andsixsetsofobjectionsbycelebrated philosophersandtheologians(includingMer- senne,Hobbes,Arnauld,andGassendi)were publishedinthesamevolumeasthefirstedition (aseventhset,bytheJesuitPierreBourdin,was includedinthesecondeditionof1642). Afewyearslåter,Descartespublished,in Latin,amammothcompendiumofhismeta- physicalandscientificviews,thePrinciplesofPhi- losophy,whichhehopedwouldbecomea universitytextbooktorivalthestandardtexts basedonAristotle.Inthelåter1640s,Descartes becameinterestedinquestionsofethicsandpsy- chology,partlyasaresultofacutequestions abouttheimplicationsofhissystemraisedby PrincessElizabethofBohemiainalongandfruit- fulcorrespondence.Thefruitsofthisinterest werepublishedin1649inalengthyFrenchtrea- tiseentitledThePassionsoftheSoul.Thesame year,Descartesaccepted(aftermuchhesitation) aninvitationtogotoStockholmtogivephilo- sophicalinstructiontoQueenChristinaofSwe- den.Hewasrequiredtoprovidetutorialsatthe royalpalaceatfiveo'clockinthemorning,and thestrainofthisbreakinhishabits(hehad maintainedthelifelongcustomoflyinginbed lateintothemorning)ledtohiscatchingpneu- monia.Hediedjustshortofhisfifty-fourthbirth- day. TheCartesiansystem.Inacelebratedsimile, Descartesdescribedthewholeofphilosophyas likeatree:therootsaremetaphysics,thetrunk physics,andthebranchesarethevariouspartic- ularsciences,includingmechanics,medicine, andmorals.Theanalogycapturesatleastthree importantfeaturesoftheCartesiansystem.The firstisitsinsistenceontheessentialunityof knowledge,whichcontrastsstronglywiththe Aristotelianconceptionofthesciencesasaseries ofseparatedisciplines,eachwithitsownmeth- odsandstandardsofprecision.Thesciences,as Descartesputitinanearlynotebook,areall "linkedtogether"inasequencethatisinprinci- 224 Descartes,René Descartes,René pleassimpleandstraightforwardastheseriesof numbers.Thesecondpointconveyedbythetree simileistheutilityofphilosophyforordinaryliv- ing:thetreeisvaluedforitsfruits,andtheseare gathered,Descartespointsout,"notfromthe rootsorthetrunkbutfromtheendsofthe branches"-thepracticalsciences.Descartesfre- quentlystressesthathisprincipalmotivationis notabstracttheorizingforitsownsake:inplace ofthe"speculativephilosophytaughtinthe Schools,"wecanandshouldachieveknowledge thatis"usefulinlife"andthatwillonedaymake us"mastersandpossessorsofnature."Third,the likeningofmetaphysicsor"firstphilosophy"to therootsofthetreenicelycapturestheCartesian beliefinwhathascometobeknownasfounda- tionalism-theviewthatknowledgemustbe constructedfromthebottomup,andthatnötn- ingcanbetakenasestablisheduntilwehave gonebacktofirstprinciples. Doubtandthefoundationsofbelief.In Descartes'scentralworkofmetaphysics,theMed- itations,hebeginshisconstructionprojectby observingthatmanyofthepreconceivedopin- ionshehasacceptedsincechildhoodhave turnedouttobeunreliable;soitisnecessary, "onceinalifetime"to"demolisheverythingand startagain,rightfromthefoundations." Descartesproceeds,inotherwords,byapplying whatissometimescalledhismethodofdoubt, whichisexplainedintheearlierDiscourseonthe Method:"SinceInowwishedtodevotemyself solelytothesearchfortruth,Ithoughtitneces- saryto...rejectasifabsolutelyfalseeverything inwhichonecouldimaginetheleastdoubt,in ordertoseeifIwasleftbelievinganythingthat wasentirelyindubitable."IntheMeditationswe findthismethodappliedtoproduceasystematic critiqueofpreviousbeliefs,asfollows.Anything basedonthesensesispotentiallysuspect,since "Ihavefoundbyexperiencethatthesenses sometimesdeceive,anditisprudentneverto trustcompletelythosewhohavedeceivedus evenonce."Evensuchseeminglystraightfor- wardjudgmentsas"Iamsittingherebythefire" maybefalse,sincethereisnoguaranteethatmy presentexperienceisnotadream.Thedream argument(asithascometobecalled)leaves intactthetruthsofmathematics,since"whether Iamawakeorasleeptwoandthreemakefive"; butDescartesnowproceedstointroduceaneven moreradicalargumentfordoubtbasedonthe followingdilemma.Ifthereisanomnipotent God,hecouldpresumablycausemetogowrong everytimeIcounttwoandthree;if,ontheother hand,thereisnoGod,thenIowemyoriginsnot toapowerfulandintelligentcreator,buttosome randomseriesofimperfectcauses,andinthis casethereisevenlessreasontosupposethatmy basicintuitionsaboutmathematicsarereliable. BytheendoftheFirstMeditation,Descartes findshimselfinamorassofwholesaledoubt, whichhedramatizesbyintroducinganimagi- narydemon"oftheutmostpowerandcunning" whoissystematicallydeceivinghiminevery possibleway.EverythingIbelievein-"thesky, theearthandallextemalthings"-mightbeillu- sionsthatthedemonhasdevisedinordertotrick me.Yetthisveryextremityofdoubt,when pushedasfarasitwillgo,yieldsthefirstindu- bitabletruthintheCartesianquestforknowl- edge-theexistenceofthethinkingsubject."Let thedemondeceivemeasmuchashemay,hecan neverbringitaboutthatIamnothing,solongas IthinkIamsomething....Iam,Iexist,iscer- tain,asoftenasitisputforwardbymeorcon- ceivedinthemind."Elsewhere,Descartes expressesthiscogitoargumentinthefamous phrase"Cogitoergosum"("Iamthinking,there- foreIexist"). Havingestablishedhisownexistence,Des- cartesproceedsintheThirdMeditationtomake aninventoryoftheideashefindswithinhim, amongwhichheidentifiestheideaofa supremelyperfectbeing.Inamuchcriticized causalargumenthereasonsthattherepresenta- tionalcontent(or"objectivereality")ofthisidea issogreatthatitcannothaveoriginatedfrom insidehisown(imperfect)mind,butmusthave beenplantedinhimbyanactualperfect being-God.TheimportanceofGodinthe Cartesiansystemcanscarcelybeoverstressed. Oncethedeity'sexistenceisestablished, Descartescanproceedtoreinstatehisbeliefin theworldaroundhim:sinceGodisperfect,and hencewouldnotsystematicallydeceive,the strongpropensityhehasgivenustobelievethat manyofourideascomefromexternalobjects must,ingeneral,besound;andhencetheexter- nalworldexists(SixthMeditation).Moreimpor- tantstill,Descartesusesthedeitytosetupa reliablemethodforthepursuitoftruth.Human beings,sincetheyarefiniteandimperfect,often gowrong;inparticular,thedatasuppliedbythe sensesisoften,asDescartesputsit,"obscureand confused."Buteachofuscannonethelessavoid error,providedweremembertowithholdjudg- mentinsuchdoubtfulcasesandconfineour- selvestothe"clearanddistinct"perceptionsof thepureintellect.AreliableintellectwasGod's gifttoman,andifweuseitwiththegreatestpos- 225 Descartes,René Descartes,René siblecare,wecanbesureofavoidingerror (FourthMeditation). Inthiscentralpartofhisphilosophy,Descartes followsinalongtraditiongoingbacktoAugus- tine(withitsultimaterootsinPlato)thatinthe firstplaceisskepticalabouttheevidenceofthe sensesasagainstthemorereliableabstractper- ceptionsoftheintellect,andinthesecondplace seessuchintellectualknowledgeasakindofillu- minationderivedfromahighersourcethan man'sownmind.Descartesfrequentlyusesthe ancientmetaphorofthe"naturallight"or"light ofreason"toconveythisnotionthatthefunda- mentalintuitionsoftheintellectareinherently reliable.Thelabel'rationalist',whichisoften appliedtoDescartesinthisconnection,canbe misleading,sincehecertainlydoesnotrelyon reasonalone:inthedevelopmentofhisscientific theoriesheallowsaconsiderableroletoempiri- calobservationinthetestingofhypothesesand intheunderstandingofthemechanismsof nature(his"vortextheory"ofplanetaryrevolu- tionsisbasedonobservationsofthebehaviorof whirlpools). Whatistrue,nonetheless,isthatthefunda- mentalbuildingblocksofCartesianscienceare theinnateideas(chieflythoseofmathematics) whosereliabilityDescartestakesasguaranteed bytheirhavingbeenimplantedinthemindby God.Butthisinturngivesrisetoamajorprob- lemfortheCartesiansystem,whichwasfirst underlinedbysomeofDescartes'scontempo- raries(notablyMersenneandArnauld),and whichhascometobeknownastheCartesiancir- cle.Ifthereliabilityoftheclearanddistinctper- ceptionsoftheintellectdependsonour knowledgeofGod,thenhowcanthatknowl- edgebeestablishedinthefirstplace?Ifthe answeristhatwecanproveGod'sexistencefrom premisesthatweclearlyanddistinctlyperceive, thenthisseemscircular;forhowareweentitled, atthisstage,toassumethatourclearanddistinct perceptionsarereliable?Descartes'sattemptsto dealwiththisproblemarenotentirelysatisfac- tory,buthisgeneralanswerseemstobethat therearesomepropositionsthataresosimple andtransparentthat,solongaswefocuson them,wecanbesureoftheirtruthevenwithout adivineguarantee. Cartesianscienceanddualism.Thescientific systemthatDescarteshadworkedonbeforehe wrotetheMeditationsandthatheelaboratedin hislåterwork,thePrinciplesofPhilosophy, attemptswhereverpossibletoreducenatural phenomenatothequantitativedescriptionsof arithmeticandgeometry:"myconsiderationof matterincorporealthings,"hesaysinthePrin- ciples,"involvesabsolutelynothingapartfrom divisions,shapesandmotions."Thisconnects withhismetaphysicalcommitmenttorelying onlyonclearanddistinctideas.Inplaceofthe elaborateapparatusoftheScholastics,withits plethoraof"substantialforms"and"realquali- ties,"Descartesproposestomathematicizesci- ence.Thematerialworldissimplyanindefinite seriesofvariationsintheshape,size,andmotion ofthesingle,simple,homogeneousmatterthat hetermsresextensa("extendedsubstance"). Underthiscategoryheincludesallphysicaland biologicalevents,evencomplexanimalbehav- ior,whichheregardsassimplytheresultof purelymechanicalprocesses(fornon-human animalsasmechanicalautomata,seeDiscourse, PartV). Butthereisoneclassofphenomenathatcan- not,onDescartes'sview,behandledinthisway, namelyconsciousexperience.Thought,hefre- quentlyasserts,iscompletelyaliento,and incompatiblewith,extension:itoccupiesno space,isunextendedandindivisible.Hence Descartesputsforwardadualistictheoryofsub- stance:inadditiontotheresextensathatmakes upthematerialuniverse,thereisrescogitans,or thinkingsubstance,whichisentirelyindepen- dentofmatter.Andeachconsciousindividualis auniquethinkingsubstance:"ThisT'-thatis, thesoul,bywhichIamwhatIam,isentirelydis- tinctfromthebody,andwouldnotfailtobe whatitisevenifthebodydidnotexist." Descartes'sargumentsfortheincorporealityof thesoulwerechallengedbyhiscontemporaries andhavebeenheavilycriticizedbysubsequent commentators.IntheDiscourseandtheSecond Meditation,helaysgreatstressonhisabilityto formaconceptionofhimselfasanexistingsub- ject,whileatthesametimedoubtingtheexis- tenceofanyphysicalthing;butthis,asthecritics pointedout,seemsinadequatetoestablishthe conclusionthatheisarescogitans-abeing whosewholeessenceconsistssimplyinthought. Imaybeabletoimaginemyselfwithoutabody, butthishardlyprovesthatIcouldinrealityexist withoutone(seefurthertheSynopsistothe Meditations).Afurtherproblemisthatourevery- dayexperiencetestifiestothefactthatweare notincorporealbeings,butverymuchcreatures offleshandblood."Natureteachesmebythe sensationsofpain,hunger,thirstandsoon," DescartesadmitsintheSixthMeditation,"thatI amnotmerelypresentinmybodyasasailoris presentinaship,butthatIamveryclosely 226 description,definite desire-beliefmodel joinedandasitwereintermingledwithit."Yet howcananincorporealsoulinteractwiththe bodyinthisway?Inhislåterwritings,Descartes speaksofthe"unionofsoulandbody"asa "primitivenotion"(seeletterstoElizabethof May21andJune28,1643);bythisheseemsto havemeantthat,justasthereareproperties (suchaslength)thatbelongtobodyalone,and properties(suchasunderstanding)thatbelong tomindalone,sothereareitemssuchassensa- tionsthatareirreduciblypsychophysical,and thatbelongtomeinsofarasIamanembodied consciousness.Theexplanationofsuchpsy- chophysicaleventswasthetaskDescartesset himselfinhislastwork,ThePassionsoftheSoul; herehedevelopedhistheorythatthepineal glandinthebrainwasthe"seatofthesoul," wheredatafromthesenseswerereceived(via thenervoussystem),andwherebodilymove- mentswereinitiated.Butdespitethewealthof physiologicaldetailDescartesprovides,thecen- tralphilosophicalproblemsassociatedwithhis dualisticaccountofhumansashybridentities madeupofphysicalbodyandimmaterialsoul are,bycommonconsent,notproperlysorted out. Influence.Despitethephilosophicaldifficulties thatbesettheCartesiansystem,Descartes's visionofaunifiedunderstandingofrealityhas retainedapowerfulholdonscientistsand philosopherseversince.Hisinsistencethatthe pathtoprogressinsciencelayinthedirectionof quantitativeexplanationshasbeensubstantially vindicated.Hisattempttoconstructasystemof knowledgebystartingfromthesubjective awarenessoftheconsciousselfhasbeenequally important,ifonlybecausesomuchoftheepis- temologyofourowntimehasbeenareaction againsttheautocentricperspectivefromwhich Descartesstartsout.AsfortheCartesiantheory ofthemind,itisprobablyfairtosaythatthe dualisticapproachisnowwidelyregardedas raisingmoreproblemsthanitsolves.But Descartes'sinsistencethatthephenomenaof consciousexperiencearerecalcitranttoexplana- tioninpurelyphysicaltermsremainsdeeply influential,andthedusterofprofoundproblems thatheraisedaboutthenatureofthehuman mindanditsrelationtothematerialworldare stillveryfarfrombeingadequatelyresolved. Seealsocogitoergosum,foundation- ALISM,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,RATIONALISM. J.COT. description,definite.Seetheoryofdescriptions. description,knowledgeby.Seeknowledgeby ACQUAINTANCE. description,state.Seecarnap. description,structure.Seecarnap. descriptions,theoryof.Seetheoryofdescrip- tions. descriptiveemergence.Seemethodologicalho- lism. descriptiveemergentism.Seeholism. descriptiveindividualism.Seeholism. descriptivemeaning.Seeemotivism,meaning. descriptivemetaphysics.Seemetaphysics. descriptiverelativism.Seerelativism. descriptivism,thethesisthatthemeaningofany evaluativestatementispurelydescriptiveorfac- tual,i.e.,determined,apartfromitssyntactical features,entirelybyitstruthconditions.Non- descriptivism(ofwhichemotivismandpre- scriptivismarethemainvarieties)istheview thatthemeaningoffull-bloodedevaluative statementsissuchthattheynecessarilyexpress thespeaker'ssentimentsorcommitments.Non- naturalism,naturalism,andsupernaturalismare descriptivistviewsaboutthenatureoftheprop- ertiestowhichthemeaningrulesrefer.Descrip- tivismisrelatedtocognitivismandmoral realism.Seealsoemotivism,ethics. B.W.H. descriptivisttheoryofnames.Seecausaltheory OFPROPERNAMES. dese.Seededicto,knowledgedere. desert.Seemeritarian. design,argumentfrom.Seephilosophyofreli- gion. designator,rigid.Seemeaning. desire,extrinsic.Seeextrinsicdesire. desire,intrinsic.Seeextrinsicdesire. desire-beliefmodel.Seeintention,motivation. 227 destructivedilemma determinism destructivedilemma.Seedilemma. detachment,ruleof.Seelotteryparadox,modus ponens. determinable,ageneralcharacteristicorprop- ertyanalogoustoagenusexceptthatwhilea propertyindependentofagenusdifferentiatesa speciesthatfallsunderthegenus,nosuchinde- pendentpropertydifferentiatesadeterminate thatfallsunderthedeterminable.Thecolorblue, e.g.,isadeterminatewithrespectofthedeter- minablecolor:thereisnopropertyFindepen- dentofcolorsuchthatacolorisblueifandonly ifitisF.Incontrast,thereisaproperty,having equalsides,suchthatarectangleisasquareifand onlyifithasthisproperty.Squareisaproperly differentiatedspeciesofthegenusrectangle. W.E.Johnsonintroducestheterms'determi- nate'and'determinable'inhisLogic,PartI, Chapter11.Hisaccountofthisdistinctiondoes notcloselyresemblethecurrentunderstanding sketchedabove.Johnsonwantstoexplainthe differencesbetweenthesuperficiallysimilar'Red isacolor'and'Platoisaman'.Heconcludesthat thelatterreallypredicatessomething,humanity, ofPlato;whiletheformerdoesnotreallypredi- cateanythingofred.Colorisnotreallyaprop- erty(oradjective,asJohnsonputsit).The determinatesred,blue,andyellowaregrouped togethernotbecauseofapropertytheyhavein commonbutbecauseofthewaystheydiffer fromeachother.Determinatesunderthesame determinablearerelatedtoeachother(andare thuscomparable)inwaysinwhichtheyarenot relatedtodeterminatesunderotherdeter- minables.Determinatesbelongingtodifferent determinables,suchascolorandshape,are incomparable. 'Moredeterminate'isoftenusedinterchange- ablywith'morespecific'.Manyphilosophers, includingJohnson,holdthatthecharactersof thingsareabsolutelydeterminateorspecific. Spellingoutwhatthisclaimmeansleadsto anotherprobleminanalyzingtherelation betweendeterminateanddeterminable.By whatprinciplecanweexcluderedandroundasa determinateofredandredasadeterminateofred orround? Seealsojohnson,property.D.H.S. determinate.Seedeterminable. determinism,theviewthateveryeventorstate ofaffairsisbroughtaboutbyantecedentevents orstatesofaffairsinaccordancewithuniversal causallawsthatgoverntheworld.Thus,thestate oftheworldatanyinstantdeterminesaunique future,andthatknowledgeofallthepositionsof thingsandtheprevailingnaturalforceswould permitanintelligencetopredictthefuturestate oftheworldwithabsoluteprecision.Thisview wasadvancedbyLaplaceintheearlynineteenth century;hewasinspiredbyNewton'ssuccessat integratingourphysicalknowledgeoftheworld. Contemporarydeterministsdonotbelievethat Newtonianphysicsisthesupremetheory.Some donotevenbelievethatalltheorieswillsomeday beintegratedintoaunifiedtheory.Theydo believethat,foreachevent,nomatterhowpre- ciselydescribed,thereissometheoryorsystemof lawssuchthattheoccurrenceofthateventunder thatdescriptionisderivablefromthoselaws togetherwithinformationaboutthepriorstateof thesystem.Somedeterministsformulatethe doctrinesomewhatdifferently:(a)everyevent hasasufficientcause;(b)atanygiventime,given thepast,onlyonefutureispossible;(c)given knowledgeofallantecedentconditionsandall lawsofnature,anagentcouldpredictatany giventimetheprecisesubsequenthistoryofthe universe.Thus,deterministsdenytheexistence ofchance,althoughtheyconcedethatourigno- ranceofthelawsorallrelevantantecedentcon- ditionsmakescertaineventsunexpectedand, therefore,apparentlyhappen"bychance." Theterm'determinism'isalsousedinamore generalwayasthenameforanymetaphysical doctrineimplyingthatthereisonlyonepossible historyoftheworld.Thedoctrinedescribed aboveisreallyscientificorcausaldeterminism,for itgroundsthisimplicationonageneralfact aboutthenaturalorder,namely,itsgovernance byuniversalcausallaw.Butthereisalsotheolog- icaldeterminism,whichholdsthatGoddeter- mineseverythingthathappensorthat,sinceGod hasperfectknowledgeabouttheuniverse,only thecourseofeventsthatheknowswillhappen canhappen.Andthereislogicaldeterminism, whichgroundsthenecessityofthehistorical orderonthelogicaltruththatallpropositions, includingonesaboutthefuture,areeithertrue orfalse.Fatalism,theviewthatthereareforces (e.g.,thestarsorthefätes)thatdetermineall outcomesindependentlyofhumaneffortsor wishes,isclaimedbysometobeaversionof determinism.Butothersdenythisontheground thatdeterministsdonotrejecttheefficacyof humaneffortordesire;theysimplybelievethat effortsanddesires,whicharesometimeseffec- tive,arethemselvesdeterminedbyantecedent factors(asinacausalchainofevents). 228 determinism,härd Dewey,John Sincedeterminismisauniversaldoctrine,it embraceshumanactionsandchoices.Butif actionsandchoicesaredetermined,thensome concludethatfreewillisanillusion.Forthe actionorchoiceisaninevitableproductof antecedentfactorsthatrenderedalternatives impossible,eveniftheagenthaddeliberated aboutoptions.Anomniscientagentcouldhave predictedtheactionorchoicebeforehand.This conflictgeneratestheproblemoffreewilland determinism. Seealsocomputertheory,freewill PROBLEM,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE.B.B. determinism,härd.Seefreewillproblem. determinism,historical.Seemarxism. determinism,linguistic.Seelinguisticrelativity. determinism,principleof.Seemill'smethods. determinism,soft.Seefreewillproblem. deterministicautomaton.Seecomputertheory. deterministiclaw.Seecausallaw. deterrence.Seejustwartheory,punishment. deviantcausalchain.Seewaywardcausalchain. deviantlogic.Seephilosophyoflogic. Dewey,John(1859-1952),Americanphiloso- pher,socialcritic,andtheoristofeducation.Dur- inganerawhenphilosophywasbecoming thoroughlyprofessionalized,Deweyremaineda publicphilosopherhavingaprofoundinterna- tionalinfluenceonpoliticsandeducation.His careerbeganinauspiciouslyinhisstudentdays attheUniversityofVermontandthenasahigh schoolteacherbeforehewentontostudyphi- losophyatthenewlyformedJohnsHopkinsUni- versity.TherehestudiedwithPeirce,G.S.Hall, andG.S.Morris,andwasprofoundlyinfluenced bytheversionofHegelianidealismpropounded byMorris.Afterreceivinghisdoctoratein1884, DeweymovedtotheUniversityofMichigan whereherejoinedMorris,whohadrelocated there.AtMichiganhehadasacolleaguethe youngsocialpsychologistG.H.Mead,anddur- ingthisperiodDeweyhimselfconcentratedhis writinginthegeneralareaofpsychology.In 1894heacceptedanappointmentaschairofthe DepartmentofPhilosophy,Psychology,andEdu- cationattheUniversityofChicago,bringing Meadwithhim.AtChicagoDeweywasinstru- mentalinfoundingthefamouslaboratory school,andsomeofhismostimportantwritings oneducationgrewoutofhisworkinthatexper- imentalschool.In1904heleftChicagofor ColumbiaUniversity,wherehejoinedF.J.E. Woodbridge,founderofTheJournalofPhilosophy. HeretiredfromColumbiain1930butremained activeinbothphilosophyandpublicaffairsuntil hisdeathin1952.Överhislongcareerhewasa prolificspeakerandwriter,asevidencedbyalit- eraryoutputofförtybooksandöversevenhun- dredartides. Philosophy.Atthehighestlevelofgenerality Dewey'sphilosophicalorientationcanbechar- acterizedasakindofnaturalisticempiricism,and thetwomostfundamentalnotionsinhisphilos- ophycanbegleanedfromthetitleofhismost substantialbook,ExperienceandNature(1925). Hisconceptofexperiencehaditsorigininhis Hegelianbackground,butDeweydivesteditof mostofitsspeculativeexcesses.Heclearlycon- ceivedofhimselfasanempiricistbutwascareful todistinguishhisnotionofexperiencebothfrom thatoftheidealisttraditionandfromtheempiri- cismoftheclassicalBritishvariety.Theidealists hadsostressedthecognitivedimensionofexpe- riencethattheyoverlookedthenon-cognitive, whereashesawtheBritishvarietyasinappro- priatelyatomisticandsubjectivist.Incontrastto theseDeweyfashionedanotionofexperience whereinaction,enjoyment,andwhathecalled "undergoing"wereintegratedandequallyfun- damental.Thefeltimmediacyofexperience (whathegenerallycharacterizedasitsaesthetic quality)wasbasicandirreducible.Hethensitu- atedcognitiveexperienceagainstthisbroader backgroundasarisingfromandconditionedby thismorebasicexperience.Cognitiveexperience wastheresultofinquiry,whichwasviewedasa processarisingfromafeltdifficultywithinour experience,proceedingthroughthestageofcon- ceptualelaborationofpossibleresolutions,toa finalreconstructionoftheexperiencewherein theinitialfragmentedsituationistransformed intoaunifiedwhole.Cognitiveinquiryisthis mediatingprocessfromexperiencetoexperi- ence,andknowledgeiswhatmakespossiblethe finalmoreintegratedexperience,whichDewey termeda"consummation." Onthisviewknowingisakindofdoing,and thecriterionofknowledgeis"warrantedasserta- bility."Onthefirstpoint,Deweyfeltthatoneof thecardinalerrorsofphilosophyfromPlatoto 229 Dewey,John Dewey,John themodemperiodwaswhathecalled"thespec- tatortheoryofknowledge."Knowledgehad beenviewedasakindofpassiverecordingof factsintheworldandsuccesswasseenasamat- terofthecorrespondenceofourbeliefstothese antecedentfacts.Tothecontrary,Deweyviewed knowingasaconstructiveconceptualactivity thatanticipatedandguidedouradjustmentto futureexperientiaiinteractionswithourenvi- ronment.Itwaswiththisconstructiveandpur- posiveviewofthinkinginmindthatDewey dubbedhisgeneralphilosophicalorientation instrumentalism.Conceptsareinstrumentsfor dealingwithourexperiencedworld.Thefunda- mentalcategoriesofknowledgearetobefunc- tionallyunderstood,andtheclassicaldualismsof philosophy(mind-body,means-end,fact- value)areultimatelytobeovercome. Thepurposeofknowingistoeffectsomealter- ationintheexperientiaisituation,andforthis purposesomecognitiveproposalsaremoreeffec- tivethanothers.Thisisthecontextinwhich "truth"isnormallyinvoked,andinitsstead Deweyproposed"warrantedassertability."He eschewedthenotionoftruth(eveninitsless dangerousadjectivalandadverbialforms,'true' and'truly')becausehesawitastoosuggestiveof astaticandfinalizedcorrespondencebetween twoseparateorders.Successfulcognitionwas reallyamoredynamicmatterofapresentreso- lutionofaproblematicsituationresultingina reconstructedexperienceorconsummation. "Warrantedassertability"wasthesuccesschar- acterization,havingtheappropriatelynormative connotationwithouttheexcessmetaphysical baggage. Dewey'snotionofexperienceisintimatelytied tohisnotionofnature.Hedidnotconceiveof natureas"the-world-as-it-would-be-indepen- dent-of-human-experience"butratherasa developingsystemofnaturaltransactionsadmit- tingofatripartitedistinctionbetweenthe physicochemicallevel,thepsychophysicallevel, andthelevelofhumanexperiencewiththe understandingthatthiscategorizationwasnotto beconstruedasimplyinganysharpdiscontinu- ities.Experienceitself,then,isoneofthelevels oftransactioninnatureandisnotreducibleto theotherforms.Themoreaustere,"scientific" representationsofnatureas,e.g.,apurely mechanicalsystem,Deweyconstruedasmerely usefulconceptualizationsforspecificcognitive purposes.Thisenabledhimtodistinguishhis "naturalism,"whichhesawasakindofnon- reductiveempiricism,from"materialism," whichhesawasakindofreductiverationalism. DeweyandSantayanahadanongoingdialogue onpreciselythispoint. Dewey'sviewwasalsonaturalistictothe degreethatitadvocatedtheuniversalscopeof scientificmethod.Influencedinthisregardby Peirce,hesawscientificmethodnotasrestricted toaspecificspherebutsimplyasthewaywe oughttothink.Thestructureofallreflective thoughtisfuture-orientedandinvolvesamove- mentfromtherecognitionandarticulationof afeltdifficulty,throughtheelaborationof hypothesesaspossibleresolutionsofthediffi- culty,tothestageofverificationorfalsification. Thespecificsciences(physics,biology,psychol- ogy)investigatethedifferentlevelsoftransac- tionsinnature,butthescientificmannerof investigationissimplyageneralizedsophistica- tionofthestructureofcommonsenseandhas nointrinsicrestriction. Deweyconstruednatureasanorganicunity notmarkedbyanyradicaldiscontinuitiesthat wouldrequiretheintroductionofnon-natural categoriesornewmethodologicalstrategies.The sharpdualismsofmindandbody,theindividual andthesocial,thesecularandthereligious,and mostimportantly,factandvalue,heviewedas conceptualconstructsthathavefaroutlivedtheir usefulness.Theinheriteddualismshadtobe overcome,particularlytheonebetweenfactand valueinasmuchasitfunctionedtoblocktheuse ofreasonastheguideforhumanaction.Onhis viewpeoplenaturallyhavevaluesaswellas beliefs.Givenhumannature,therearecertain activitiesandstatesofaffairsthatwenaturally prize,enjoy,andvalue.Thehumanproblemis thatthesearenotalwayseasytocomebynorare theyalwayscompatible.Weareforcedtodeal withtheproblemofwhatwereallywantand whatweoughttopursue.Deweyadvocatedthe extensionofscientificmethodtothesedomains. Thedeliberativeprocessculminatinginapracti- caljudgmentisnotunlikethedeliberative processculminatinginfactualbelief.Bothkinds ofjudgmentcanberesponsibleorirresponsible, rightorwrong.Thisdeliberativesenseofevalu- ationasaprocesspresupposesthemorebasic senseofevaluationconcerningthosedimensions ofhumanexperienceweprizeandlindfulfilling. Heretoothereisadimensionofappropriateness, onegroundedinthekindofbeingsweare, wherethe'we'includesoursocialhistoryand development.OnthisissueDeweyhadavery Greekview,albeitonetransposedintoamodern evolutionaryperspective.Fundamentalques- tionsofvalueandhumanfulfillmentultimately bearonourconceptionofthehumancommu- 230 dharma d'Holbach,Paul-Henri-Dietrich nity,andthisinturnleadshimtotheissuesof democracyandeducation. Societyandeducation.Theidealsocialorderfor Deweyisastructurethatallowsmaximumself- developmentofallindividuals.Itfostersthefree exchangeofideasanddecidesonpoliciesina mannerthatacknowledgeseachperson'scapacity effectivelytoparticipateinandcontributetothe directionofsociallife.Therespectaccordedtothe dignityofeachcontributestothecommonwel- fareofall.Deweyfoundtheclosestapproximation tothisidealindemocracybuthedidnotidentify contemporarydemocracieswiththisideal.Hewas notcontenttoemployoldformsofdemocracyto dealwithnewproblems.Consistentwithinstru- mentalism,hemaintainedthatweshouldbecon- stantlyrethinkingandreworkingourdemocratic institutionsinordertomakethemevermore responsivetochangingtimes.Thisconstant rethinkingplacedaconsiderablepremiumon intelligence,andthisunderscoredtheimportance ofeducationfordemocracy. Deweyisprobablybestknownforhisviewson education,butthecentralityofhistheoryofedu- cationtohisoverallphilosophyisnotalways appreciated.Thefundamentalaimofeducation forhimisnottoconveyinformationbutto developcriticalmethodsofthought.Educationis future-orientedandthefutureisuncertain; hence,itisparamounttodevelopthosehabitsof mindthatenableusadequatelytoassessnewsit- uationsandtoformulatestrategiesfordealing withtheproblematicdimensionsofthem.Thisis nottosuggestthatweshouldturnourbackson thepast,becausewhatweasapeoplehave alreadylearnedprovidesouronlyguidefor futureactivity.Butthepastisnottobevalued foritsownsakebutforitsroleindevelopingand guidingthosecriticalcapacitiesthatwillenable ustodealwithourever-changingworldeffec- tivelyandresponsibly. Withtheadventoftheanalytictraditionasthe dominantstyleofphilosophizinginAmerica, Dewey'sthoughtfelloutoffavör.Abouttheonly arenasinwhichitcontinuedtoflourishwere schoolsofeducation.However,withtherecent revivalofageneralpragmaticorientationinthe personsofQuine,Putnam,andRorty,among others,thespiritofDewey'sphilosophyisfre- quentlyinvoked.Holism,anti-foundationalism, contextualism,functionalism,theblurringofthe linesbetweenscienceandphilosophyand betweenthetheoreticalandthepractical-all centralthemesinDewey'sphilosophy-have becomefashionable.Neo-pragmatismisacon- temporarycatchphrase.Deweyis,however, morefrequentlyinvokedthanread,andeven theDeweythatisinvokedisatruncatedversion ofthehistoricalfigurewhoconstructedacom- prehensivephilosophicalvision. Seealsoinstrumbntalism,peirce,prag- matism.C.F.D. dharma,inHinduismandespeciallyintheearly literatureoftheVedas,acosmicrulegiving thingstheirnatureoressence,orinthehuman context,asetofdutiesandrulestobeperformed orfollowedtomaintainsocialorder,promote generalwell-being,andberighteous.Pursuitof dharmawasconsideredoneofthefourfunda- mentalpursuitsoflife,thethreeothersbeing thoseofwealth(artha),pleasure(kärna),and spiritualliberation(moksha).IntheBhagavad Gita,dharmawasmadefamousassvadharma, meaningone'sassigneddutiesbasedonone's natureandabilitiesratherthanonbirth.The HindulawgiverManu(whoprobablylived betweenthethirdcenturyb.c.andthefirstcen- turya.d.)codifiedthedharmicdutiesbasedona fourfoldorderofsocietyandprovidedconcrete guidancetopeopleindischargingtheirsocial obligationsbasedontheirrolesandstationsin life.EventhoughManu,liketheGita,heldthat one'sdutiesandobligationsshouldfitone's natureratherthanbedeterminedbybirth,the dharma-orientedHindusocietywaseventually characterizedbyarigidcastestructureandalim- itedroleforwomen.Seealsobhagavadgita. D.K.C. Dharmakirti(seventhcenturya.d.),Indian YogäcäraBuddhistphilosopherandlogician.His worksincludePramänavärttika("Explanationof theTouchstones"),amajorworkinlogicand epistemology;andNyäyabindu,anintroduction tohisviews.InSantänäntara-siddhi("Establish- mentoftheExistenceofOtherMinds")he defendshisperceptualidealismagainstthe chargeofsolipsism,claimingthathemayaslegit- imatelyusetheargumentfromanalogyforthe existenceofothers(drawinginferencesfrom apparentlyintelligentbehaviorstointelligences thatcausethem)ashisperceptualrealistoppo- nents.HecriticizedNyäyatheisticarguments.He exercisedastronginfluenceonlåterIndianwork inlogic.K.E.Y. d'Holbach,Paul-Henri-Dietrich,Baron(1723- 89),Frenchphilosopher,aleadingmaterialist andprolificcontributortotheEncyclopedia.He 231 diagonalization dialectic wasbornintheRhenishPalatinate,settledin Franceatanearlyage,andreadlawatLeiden. Afterinheritinganuncle'swealthandtitle,he becameasolicitorattheParis"Parlement"and aregularhöstofphilosophicaldinnersattended bytheEncyclopedistsandviskorsofrenown (Gibbon,Hume,Smith,Sterne,Priestley, Beccaria,Franklin).Knowledgeableinchem- istryandmineralogyandfluentinseverallan- guages,hetranslatedGermanscientificworks andEnglishanti-Christianpamphletsinto French. Basically,d'Holbachwasasyntheticthinker, powerfulthoughnotoriginal,whosystematized andradicalizedDiderofsnaturalism.Alsodraw- ingonHobbes,Spinoza,Locke,Hume,Buffon, Helvétius,andLaMettrie,histreatiseswereso irreligiousandanticlericalthattheywerepub- lishedabroadanonymouslyorpseudonymously: ChristianityUnveiled(1756),TheSacredContagion (1768),CriticalHistoryofJesus(1770),TheSocial System(1773),andUniversalMoral(1776).His masterpiece,theSystemofNature(1770),a "Lucretian"compendiumofeighteenth-century materialism,evenshockedVoltaire.D'Holbach derivedeverythingfrommatterandmotion,and uphelduniversalnecessity.Theself-sustaining lawsofnaturearenormative.Materialrealityis thereforecontrastedtometaphysicaldelusion, self-interesttoalienation,andearthlyhappiness tootherworldlyoptimism.Morevindictivethan Toland's,d'Holbach'sunmitigatedcritiqueof ChristianityanticipatedFeuerbach,Strauss, Marx,andNietzsche.Hediscreditedsupernat- uralrevelation,theism,deism,andpantheismas mythological,censuredChristianvirtuesas unnatural,brandedpietyasfanatical,andstig- matizedclericalignorance,immorality,and despotism.Assumingthatscienceliberatesman fromreligioushegemony,headvocatedsensory andexperimentalknowledge.Believingthat societyandeducationformman,heunfoldeda mechanisticanthropology,aeudaimonistic morality,andasecular,utilitariansocialand politicalprogram. Seealsoencyclopedia,philosophyof MIND.J.-L.S. diagonalization.Seediagonalprocedure. diagonalprocedure,amethod,originatedby Cantor,forshowingthatthereareinfinitesets thatcannotbeputinone-to-onecorrespon- dencewiththesetofnaturalnumbers(i.e.,enu- merated).Forexample,themethodcanbeused toshowthatthesetofrealnumbersxinthe interval;therefore not-Aornot-Candarelikewiseinstancesof modusfoliensinthatspecialcase.Adilemmain whichthedisjunctivepremiseisfalseiscom- monlyknownasafalsedilemma.Seealso MORALDILEMMA.G.F.S. dilemma,moral.Seemoraldilemma. Dilthey,Wilhelm(1833-1911),Germanphiloso- pherandhistorianwhosemainprojectwasto establishtheconditionsofhistoricalknowledge, muchasKanfsCritiqueofPureReasonhadforour knowledgeofnature.Hestudiedtheology,his- tory,andphilosophyatHeidelbergandBerlin andin1882acceptedthechairearlierheldby HegelattheUniversityofBerlin. Dilthey'sfirstattemptatacritiqueofhistorical reasonisfoundintheIntroductiontotheHuman Sciences(1883),thelastintheFormationoftheHis- toricalWorldintheHumanSciences(1910).Heis alsoarecognizedcontributortohermeneutics, literarycriticism,andworldviewtheory.HisLife ofSchleiermacherandessaysontheRenaissance, Enlightenment,andHegelaremodelworksof Geistesgeschichte,inwhichphilosophicalideasare analyzedinrelationtotheirsocialandcultural milieu. Diltheyholdsthatlifeistheultimatenexusof realitybehindwhichwecannotgo.Lifeis viewed,notprimarilyinbiologicaltermsasin NietzscheandBergson,butasthehistoricaltotal- ityofhumanexperience.Thebasiccategories wherebywereflectonlifeprovidetheback- groundfortheepistemologicalcategoriesofthe sciences.AccordingtoDilthey,Aristotle'scate- goryofactingandsufferingisrootedinpresci- entificexperience,whichisthenexplicatedas thecategoryofefficacyorinfluence(Wirkung)in thehumansciencesandasthecategoryofcause (Ursache)inthenaturalsciences.Ourunder- standingofinfluenceinthehumansciencesis lessremovedfromthefullrealityoflifethanare thecausalexplanationsarrivedatinthenatural sciences.Tothisextentthehumansciencescan claimapriorityöverthenaturalsciences. Whereaswehavedirectaccesstotherealele- mentsofthehistoricalworld(psychophysical humanbeings),theelementsofthenatural worldaremerelyhypotheticalentitiessuchas atoms.Thenaturalsciencesdealwithouter experiences,whilethehumansciencesarebased oninnerexperience.Innerexperienceisreflex- iveandimplicitlyself-aware,butneednotbe introspectiveorexplicitlyself-conscious.Infact, weoftenhaveinnerexperiencesofthesame objectsthatouterexperienceisabout.Anouter experienceofanobjectfocusesonitsphysical properties;aninnerexperienceofitonourfelt responsestoit.Alivedexperience(Erlebnis)ofit includesboth. Thedistinctionbetweenthenaturalandthe humansciencesisalsorelatedtothemethod- ologicaldifferencebetweenexplanationand understanding.Thenaturalsciencesseekcausal explanationsofnature-connectingthediscrete representationsofouterexperiencethrough hypotheticalgeneralizations.Thehumansci- encesaimatanunderstanding(Verstehen)that articulatesthetypicalstructuresoflifegivenin livedexperience.Findinglivedexperiencetobe inherentlyconnectedandmeaningful,Dilthey opposedtraditionalatomisticandassociationist psychologiesanddevelopedadescriptivepsy- chologythatHusserlrecognizedasanticipating phenomenologicalpsychology. InIdeas(1894)Diltheyarguedthatdescriptive psychologycouldprovideaneutralfoundation fortheotherhumansciences,butinhislåter 235 diminishedcapacity diminishedcapacity hermeneuticalwritings,whichinfluencedHei- deggerandHans-GeorgGadamer,herejectedthe possibilityofafoundationaldisciplineor method.IntheFormation,heassertedthatallthe humansciencesareinterpretiveandmutually dependent.Hermeneuticallyconceived,under- standingisaprocessofinterpretingthe"objecti- ficationsoflife,"theexternalexpressionsof humanexperienceandactivity.Theunderstand- ingofothersismediatedbythesecommonobjec- tificationsandnotimmediatelyavailable throughempathy(Einfiihlung).Moreover,to fullyunderstandmyselfImustinterpretthe expressionsofmylifejustasIinterpretthe expressionsofothers. Whereasthenaturalsciencesaimatever broadergeneralizations,thehumansciences placeequalweightonunderstandingindividual- ityanduniversality.Diltheyregardedindividuals aspointsofintersectionofthesocialandcultural systemsinwhichtheyparticipate.Anypsycho- logicalcontributiontounderstandinghumanlife mustbeintegratedintothismorepublicframe- work.Althoughuniversallawsofhistoryare rejected,particularhumansciencescanestablish uniformitieslimitedtospecificsocialandcultural systems. Inasetofsketches(1911)supplementingthe Formation,Diltheyfurtherdevelopedthecate- goriesoflifeinrelationtothehumansciences. Afteranalyzingformålcategoriessuchasthe part-wholerelationsharedbyallthesciences, hedistinguishedtherealcategoriesofthehuman sciencesfromthoseofthenaturalsciences.The mostimportanthumansciencecategoriesare value,purpose,andmeaning,buttheybyno meansexhausttheconceptsneededtoreflecton theultimatesenseofourexistence.Suchreflec- tionreceivesitsfullestexpressioninaworldview (Weltanschauung),suchastheworldviewsdevel- opedinreligion,art,andphilosophy.Aworld- viewconstitutesanoverallperspectiveonlife thatsumsupwhatweknowabouttheworld, howweevaluateitemotionally,andhowwe respondtoitvolitionally.SinceDiltheydistin- guishedthreeexclusiveandrecurrenttypesof worldviewnaturalism(e.g.,Democritus,Hume), theidealismoffreedom(e.g.,Socrates,Kant), andobjectiveidealism(e.g.,Parmenides,He- gel)-heisoftenregardedasarelativist.But Diltheythoughtthatboththenaturalandthe humansciencescouldintheirseparateways attainobjectivetruththroughapropersenseof method.Metaphysicalformulationsofworld- viewsarerelativeonlybecausetheyattemptan impossiblesynthesisofalltruth. Seealsoeinfuhlung,erlebnis,hegel, HERMENEUTICS,NIETZSCHE,PHILOSOPHYOF HISTORY.R.A.M. diminishedcapacity,alegaldefensetocriminal liabilitythatexistsintwodistinctforms:(1)the mensreavariant,inwhichadefendantusesevi- denceofmentalabnormalitytocastdoubtonthe prosecution'sassertionthat,atthetimeofthe crime,thedefendantpossessedthementalstate criteria,themensrea,requiredbythelegaldefin- itionoftheoffensecharged;and(2)thepartial responsibilityvariant,inwhichadefendantuses evidenceofmentalabnormalitytosupporta claimthat,evenifthedefendanfsmentalstate satisfiedthemensreacriteriafortheoffense,the defendanfsresponsibilityforthecrimeisdimin- ishedandthusthedefendantshouldbecon- victedofalessercrimeand/oralessersentence shouldbeimposed.Thementalabnormalitymay beproducedbymentaldisorder,intoxication, trauma,orothercauses.Themensreavariantis notadistinctexcuse:adefendantissimplyargu- ingthattheprosecutioncannotprovethedefi- nitional,mentalstatecriteriaforthecrime. Partialresponsibilityisanexcuse,butunlikethe similar,completeexcuseoflegalinsanity,partial responsibilitydoesnotproducetotalacquittal; rather,adefendanfsclaimisforreducedpun- ishment.Adefendantmayraiseeitherorboth variantsofdiminishedcapacityandtheinsanity defenseinthesamecase. Forexample,acommondefinitionoffirst- degreemurderrequirestheprosecutiontoprove thatadefendantintendedtokillanddidsoafter premeditation.Adefendantchargedwiththis crimemightraisebothvariantsasfollows.To denytheallegationofpremeditation,adefen- dantmightclaimthatthekillingoccurred instantaneouslyinresponsetoa"commandhal- lucination."Ifbelieved,adefendantcannotbe convictedofpremeditatedhomicide,butcanbe convictedofthelessercrimeofsecond-degree murder,whichtypicallyrequiresonlyintent. Andevenadefendantwhokilledintentionally andpremeditatedlymightclaimpartialrespon- sibilitybecausethepsychoticmentalstateren- deredtheagenfsreasonsforactionnon- culpablyirrational.Inthiscase,eitherthedegree ofcrimemightbereducedbyoperationofthe partialexcuse,ratherthanbynegationofdefin- itionalmensrea,oradefendantmightbecon- victedoffirst-degreemurderbutgivenalesser penalty. IntheUnitedStatesthemensreavariantexists inabouthalfthejurisdictions,althoughitsscope 236 diminishedresponsibility directrealism isusuallylimitedinvariousways,primarilyto avoidadefendanfsbeingacquittedandfreedif mentalabnormalitynegatedallthedefinitional mentalstatecriteriaofthecrimecharged.In Englishlaw,themensreavariantexistsbutislim- itedbythetypeofevidenceusabletosupportit. NoAmericanjurisdictionhasadoptedadistinct, straightforwardpartialresponsibilityvariant,but variousanalogousdoctrinesandproceduresare widelyaccepted.Forexample,partialresponsi- bilitygroundsboththedoctrinethatintentional killingshouldbereducedfrommurdertovolun- tarymanslaughterifadefendantacted"inthe heatofpassion"uponlegallyadequateprovoca- tion,andthesentencingjudge'sdiscretionto awardadecreasedsentencebasedonadefen- danfsmentalabnormality.Inadditiontosuch partialresponsibilityanalogues,England,Wales, andScotlandhavedirectlyadoptedthepartial responsibilityvariant,termed"diminished responsibility,"butitappliesonlytoprosecutions formurder."Diminishedresponsibility"reduces aconvictiontoalessercrime,suchas manslaughterorculpablehomicide,forbehavior thatwouldotherwiseconstitutemurder. Seealsofreewillproblem,mensrea, PHILOSOPHYOFLAW.S.J.M. diminishedresponsibility.Seediminishedcapac- Dingansich.Seekant. DiodorosCronos.Seemegarians. DiogenesLaertius.Seedoxographers,vague- ness. DiogenesofApollonia.Seepre-socratics. Diogenesoflonoanda.Seeepicureanism. DiogenestheCynic.Seecynics. directdiscourse.Seeindirectdiscourse. directintention.Seeintention. directionoffit,ametaphorthatderivesfroma storyinAnscombe'sIntention(1957)abouta detectivewhofollowsashopperaroundtown makingalistofthethingsthattheshopperbuys. AsAnscombenotes,whereasthedetective'slist hastomatchthewaytheworldis(eachofthe thingstheshopperbuysmustbeonthedetec- tive^list),theshopper'slistissuchthattheworld hastofitwithit(eachofthethingsonthelistare thingsthathemustbuy).Themetaphorisnow standardlyusedtodescribethedifferencebe- tweenkindsofspeechact(assertionsversus commands)andmentalstates(beliefsversus desires).Forexample,beliefsaresaidtohavethe world-to-minddirectionoffitbecauseitisinthe natureofbeliefsthattheircontentsaresupposed tomatchtheworld:falsebeliefsaretobeaban- doned.Desiresaresaidtohavetheopposite mind-to-worlddirectionoffitbecauseitisinthe natureofdesiresthattheworldissupposedto matchtheircontents.Thisissoatleasttothe extentthattheroleofanunsatisfieddesirethat theworldbeacertainwayistopromptbehavior aimedatmakingtheworldthatway.Seealso ANSCOMBE,BELIEF,MOTIVATION.M.Sm. directknowledge.Seebasingrelation. directpassions.Seehume. directrealism,thetheorythatperceivingisepis- temicallydirect,unmediatedbyconsciousor unconsciousinference.Directrealismisdistin- guished,ontheonehand,fromindirect,orrep- resentative,realism,theviewthatperceptual awarenessofmaterialobjectsismediatedbyan awarenessofsensoryrepresentations,and,on theotherhand,fromformsofphenomenalism thatidentifymaterialobjectswithstatesofmind. Itmightbethoughtthatdirectrealismisincom- patiblewithcausaltheoriesofperception.Such theoriesinvokecausalchainsleadingfrom objectsperceived(causes)toperceptualstatesof perceivers(effects).Sinceeffectsmustbedistinct fromcauses,therelationbetweenaninstanceof perceivingandanobjectperceived,itwould seem,cannotbedirect.This,however,confuses epistemicdirectnesswithcausaldirectness.A directrealistneedonlybecommittedtothefor- mer.Inperceivingatomatotobered,thecon- tentofmyperceptualawarenessisthetomato's beingred.Ienterthisstateasaresultofacom- plexcausalprocess,perhaps.Butmyperception maybedirectinthesensethatitisunmediated byanawarenessofarepresentationalsensory statefromwhichIamledtoanawarenessofthe tomato.Perceptualerror,andmoreparticularly, hallucinationsandillusions,areusuallythought toposespecialdifficultiesfordirectrealists.My hallucinatingaredtomato,forinstance,isnot mybeingdirectlyawareofaredtomato,sinceI mayhallucinatethetomatoevenwhennoneis present.Perhaps,then,myhallucinatingared tomatoispartlyamatterofmybeingdirectly 237 directreference disposition awareofaround,redsensoryrepresentation. Andifmyawarenessinthiscaseisindistin- guishablefrommyperceptionofanactualred tomato,whynotsupposethatIamawareofa sensoryrepresentationintheveridicalcaseas well?Adirectrealistmayrespondbydenying thathallucinationsareinfactindistinguishable fromveridicalperceivingsörbycallingintoques- tiontheclaimthat,ifsensoryrepresentationsare requiredtoexplainhallucinations,theyneedbe postulatedintheveridicalcase.Seealsoper- ception,PHENOMENALISM.J.F.H. directreference.Seecausaltheoryofproper names. directsense.Seeobliquecontext. discourseethics.Seehabermas. discretetime.Seetime. disembodiment,theimmaterialstateofexistence ofapersonwhopreviouslyhadabody.Disem- bodimentisthustobedistinguishedfromnon- embodimentorimmateriality.Godandängels,if theyexist,arenon-embodied,orimmaterial.By contrast,ifhumanbeingscontinuetoexistafter theirbodiesdie,thentheyaredisembodied.As thisexamplesuggests,disembodimentistypi- callydiscussedinthecontextofimmortalityor survivalofdeath.Itpresupposesaviewaccord- ingtowhichpersonsaresoulsorsomesortof immaterialentitythatiscapableofexistingapart fromabody.Whetheritispossibleforaperson tobecomedisembodiedisamatterofcontro- versy.Mostphilosopherswhobelievethatthisis possibleassumethatadisembodiedpersonis conscious,butitisnotobviousthatthisshould bethecase.Seealsopersonalidentity,phi- LOSOPHYOFMIND,PLATO,SURVIVAL. E.R.W. disjoint.Seesettheory. disjunction.Seedisjunctiveproposition,syllo- gism. disjunctionelimination.(1)Theargumentform 'AorB,ifAthenC,ifBthenC;therefore,Cand argumentsofthisform.(2)Theruleofinference thatpermitsonetoinferCfromadisjunction togetherwithderivationsofCfromeachofthe disjunctsseparately.Thisisalsoknownasthe ruleofdisjunctiveeliminationorV-elimination.See alsoDISJUNCTIVEPROPOSITION.G.F.S. disjunctionintroduction.(1)Theargumentform 'A(orB);therefore,AorB'andargumentsofthis form.(2)Theruleofinferencethatpermitsone toinferadisjunctionfromeitherofitsdisjuncts. ThisisalsoknownastheruleofadditionorV- introduction.Seealsodisjunctiveproposi- tion.G.F.S. disjunctivenormalform.Seenormalform. disjunctiveproposition,apropositionwhose mainpropositionaloperator(mainconnective) isthedisjunctionoperator,i.e.,thelogicaloper- atorthatrepresents'and/or'.Thus,'(P-and/or- Q)-and-i?'isnotadisjunctiveproposition becauseitsmainconnectiveistheconjunction operation,but'P-and/or-(Q-and-P)'isdisjunc- tive.R.W.B. disjunctivesyllogism.Seesyllogism. disposition,atendencyofanobjectorsystemto actorreactincharacteristicwaysincertainsitu- ations.Fragility,solubility,andradioactivityare typicalphysicaldispositions;generosityandirri- tabilityaretypicaldispositionsofpersons.For behaviorism,functionalism,andsomeformsof materialism,mentalevents,suchastheoccur- renceofanidea,andstatessuchasbeliefs,are alsodispositions.Hypotheticalorconditional statementsareimpliedbydispositionalclaims andcapturetheirbasicmeaning:theglasswould shatterifsuitablystruck;leftundisturbed,a radiumatomwillprobablydecayinacertain time;etc.Theseareusuallytakenassubjunctive ratherthanmaterialconditionals(toavoidprob- lemslikehavingtocountassolubleanythingnot immersedinwater).Thecharacteristicmodeof actionorreaction-shattering,decaying,etc.-is termedthedisposition'smanifestationordisplay. Butitneednotbeobservable.Fragilityisaregu- laroruniversaldisposition;asuitablystruckglass invariablyshatters.Radioactivityisvariableor probabilistic;radiummayormaynotdecayina certainsituation.Dispositionsmayalsobemulti- trackormultiplymanifested,ratherthansingle-track orsinglymanifested:likehardnessorelasticity, theymayhavedifferentmanifestationsindiffer- entsituations. InTheConceptofMind(1949)Rylearguedthat thereisnothingmoretodispositionalclaims thantheirassociatedconditionals:dispositional propertiesarenotoccurrent;topossessadisposi- tionalpropertyisnottoundergoanyepisodeor occurrence,ortobeinaparticularstate.(Cou- pledwithapositivistrejectionofunobservables, 238 dispositionalbelief dividedline andaconceptionofmentalepisodesandstates asdispositions,thissupportstheviewofbehav- iorismthatsuchepisodesandstatesarenothing butdispositionstoobservablebehavior.)Bycon- trast,realismholdsthatdispositionaltalkisalso aboutactualoroccurrentpropertiesorstates, possiblyunknownorunobservable.Inparticu- lar,itisaboutthebasesofdispositionsinintrin- sicpropertiesorstates:fragilityisbasedin molecularstructure,radioactivityinnuclear structure.Adisposition'sbasisisviewedasat leastpartlythecauseofitsmanifestation.Some philosophersholdthatthebasesarecategorical, notdispositional(D.M.Armstrong,AMaterialist TheoryofMind,1968).Others,notablyPopper, holdthatallpropertiesaredispositional. Seealsobehaviorism,counterfactu- ALS,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,PHILOSOPHYOF SCIENCE,PROPENSITY,STATE.D.S. dispositionalbelief.Seebelief. dispositionalstate.Seestate. dispositionaltheoryofmeaning.Seemeaning. dispositionaltheoryofmemory.Seememory. dispositiontobelieve.Seebelief. disquotationtheoryoftruth.Seetruth. distinction,formål.Seefundamentumdivisionis. distinction,mental.Seefundamentumdivisionis. distinction,real.Seefundamentumdivisionis. distribution,thepropertyofstandingforevery individualdesignatedbyaterm.TheLatinterm distributiooriginatedinthetwelfthcentury;it wasappliedtotermsaspartofatheoryofrefer- ence,anditmayhavesimplyindicatedtheprop- ertyofatermprefixedbyauniversalquantifier. Theterm'dog'in'Everydoghashisday'isdis- tributed,becauseitsupposedlyreferstoevery dog.Incontrast,thesametermin'Adogbitthe mailman'isnotdistributedbecauseitrefersto onlyonedog.Intime,theideaofdistribution cametobeusedonlyasaheuristicdevicefor determiningthevalidityofcategoricalsyllo- gisms:(1)everytermthatisdistributedina premisemustbedistributedintheconclusion; (2)themiddletermmustbedistributedatleast once. Mostexplanationsofdistributioninlogictext- booksareperfunctory;anditisstipulatedthat thesubjecttermsofuniversalpropositionsand thepredicatetermsofnegativepropositionsare distributed.ThisisintuitiveforA-propositions, e.g.,'Allhumansaremortal';thepropertyof beingmortalisdistributedövereachhuman.The ideaofdistributionisnotintuitivefor,say,the predicatetermofO-propositions.Accordingto thedoctrine,thesentence'Somehumansarenot selfish'saysineffectthatifalltheselfishthings arecomparedwithsomeselecthuman(onethat isnotselfish),therelationofidentitydoesnot holdbetweenthathumanandanyoftheselfish things.Noticethattheideaofdistributionisnot mentionedinthisexplanation.Theideaofdis- tributioniscurrentlydisreputable,mostlybe- causeofthecriticismsofGeachinReferenceand Generality(1968)anditsirrelevancetostandard semantictheories. Therelatedterm'distributively'means'ina mannerdesignatingeveryiteminagroupindi- vidually',andisusedincontrastwith'collec- tively'.Thesentence'Therocksweighed100 pounds'isambiguous.If'rocks'istakendistrib- utively,thenthesentencemeansthateachrock weighed100pounds.If'rocks'istakencollec- tively,thenthesentencemeansthatthetotal weightoftherockswas100pounds. Seealsosyllogism.A.P.M. distributivejustice.Seejustice. distributivelaws,thelogicalprinciples /1a(BvC)=^aB)v(AvC| and Av(BAC)=(AvB)A(AvC). Conjunctionisthussaidtodistributeöverdis- junctionanddisjunctionöverconjunction.See alsoDEMORGAN'SLAWS.G.F.S. distributively.Seedistribution. dividedline,oneofthreeanalogies(withthesun andcave)offeredinPlato'sRepublic(VI,509d- 51le)asapartialexplanationoftheGood. Socratesdividesalineintotwounequalseg- ments:thelongerrepresentstheintelligible worldandtheshorterthesensibleworld.Then eachofthesegmentsisdividedinthesamepro- portion.Socratesassociatesfourmentalstates withthefourresultingsegments(beginningwith theshortest):eikasia,illusionortheapprehen- sionofimages;pistis,beliefinordinaryphysical objects;dianoia,thesortofhypotheticalreason- 239 divineattributes divinecommandethics ingengagedinbymathematicians;andnoesis, rationalascenttothefirstprincipleoftheGood bymeansofdiaiectic.Seealsoplato,socra- tes.W.J.P. divineattributes,propertiesofGod;especially, thosepropertiesthatareessentialanduniqueto God.Amongpropertiestraditionallytakentobe attributesofGod,omnipotence,omniscience, andomnibenevolencearenaturallytakento meanhaving,respectively,power,knowledge, andmoralgoodnesstothemaximumdegree. HereGodisunderstoodasaneternal(orever- lasting)beingofimmensepower,knowledge, andgoodness,whoisthecreatorandsustainer oftheuniverseandisworthyofhumanworship. Omnipotenceismaximalpower.Somephiloso- phers,notablyDescartes,havethoughtthat omnipotencerequirestheabilitytodoabsolutely anything,includingthelogicallyimpossible. Mostclassicaltheists,however,understood omnipotenceasinvolvingvästpowers,while neverthelessbeingsubjecttoarangeoflimita- tionsofability,includingtheinabilitytodowhat islogicallyimpossible,theinabilitytochangethe pastortodothingsincompatiblewithwhathas happened,andtheinabilitytodothingsthatcan- notbedonebyabeingwhohasotherdivine attributes,e.g.,tosinortolie. Omniscienceisunlimitedknowledge.According tothemoststraightforwardaccount,omni- scienceisknowledgeofalltruepropositions.But theremaybereasonsforrecognizingalimitation ontheclassoftruepropositionsthatabeingmust knowinordertobeomniscient.Forexample,if therearetruepropositionsaboutthefuture, omnisciencewouldthenincludeforeknowledge. Butsomephilosophershavethoughtthatfore- knowledgeofhumanactionsisincompatible withthoseactionsbeingfree.Thishasledsome todenythattherearetruthsaboutthefutureand otherstodenythatsuchtruthsareknowable.In thelattercase,omnisciencemightbetakentobe knowledgeofallknowabletruths.OrifGodis eternalandiftherearecertaintensedortempo- rallyindexicalpropositionsthatcanbeknown onlybysomeonewhoisintime,thenomni- sciencepresumablydoesnotextendtosuch propositions.Itisamatterofcontroversy whetheromniscienceincludesmiddleknowl- edge,i.e.,knowledgeofwhatanagentwoulddo ifother,counterfactual,conditionswereto obtain.Sincerecentcriticsofmiddleknowledge (incontrasttoBånezandothersixteenth-cen- turyDominicanopponentsofMolina)usually denythattherelevantcounterfactualcondition- alsallegedtobetheobjectofsuchknowledgeare true,denyingthepossibilityofmiddleknowl- edgeneednotrestricttheclassoftrueproposi- tionsabeingmustknowinordertobe omniscient.Finally,althoughtheconceptof omnisciencemightnotitselfconstrainhowan omniscientbeingacquiresitsknowledge,itis usuallyheldthatGod'sknowledgeisneither inferential(i.e.,derivedfrompremisesorevi- dence)nordependentuponcausalprocesses. Omnibenevolenceis,literally,completedesirefor good;lessstrictly,perfectmoralgoodness.Tradi- tionallyithasbeenthoughtthatGoddoesnot merelyhappentobegoodbutthathemustbeso andthatheisunabletodowhatiswrong. AccordingtotheformerclaimGodisessentially good;accordingtothelatterheisimpeccable.Itis amatterofcontroversywhetherGodisperfectly goodinvirtueofcomplyingwithanexternal moralstandardorwhetherhehimselfsetsthe standardforgoodness. DivinesovereigntyisGod'sruleöverallofcre- ation.AccordingtothisdoctrineGoddidnot merelycreatetheworldandthenletitrunonits own;hecontinuestogovernitincompletedetail accordingtohisgoodplan.Sovereigntyisthus relatedtodivineprovidence.Adifficultquestion ishowtoreconcilearobustviewofGod'scon- troloftheworldwithlibertarianfreewill. Aseity(orperseity)iscompleteindependence. Inastraightforwardsense,Godisnotdependent onanyoneoranythingforhisexistence.Accord- ingtostrongerinterpretationofaseity,Godis completelyindependentofeverythingelse, includinghisproperties.Thisviewsupportsa doctrineofdivinesimplicityaccordingtowhich Godisnotdistinctfromhisproperties. Simplicityisthepropertyofhavingnopartsof anykind.Accordingtothedoctrineofdivine simplicity,Godnotonlyhasnospatialortempo- ralparts,butthereisnodistinctionbetweenGod andhisessence,betweenhisvariousattributes (inhimomniscienceandomnipotence,e.g.,are identical),andbetweenGodandhisattributes. AttributingsimplicitytoGodwasstandardin medievaltheology,butthedoctrinehasseemed tomanycontemporaryphilosopherstobebaf- fling,ifnotincoherent. Seealsodescartes,divineforeknowl- edge,MIDDLEKNOWLEDGE,MOLINA,PHILOS- OPHYOFRELIGION.E.R.W. divinecommandethics,anethicaltheory accordingtowhichpartorallofmorality 240 divinecommandtheory divineforeknowledge dependsuponthewillofGodaspromulgatedby divinecommands.Thistheoryhasanimportant placeinthehistoryofChristianethics.Divine commandtheoriesareprominentinthe FranciscanethicsdevelopedbyJohnDuns ScotusandWilliamOckham;theyarealso endorsedbydisciplesofOckhamsuchasd'Ailly, Gerson,andGabrielBiel;bothLutherand Calvinadoptdivinecommandethics;andin modernBritishthought,importantdivinecom- mandtheoristsincludeLocke,Berkeleyand Paley.Divinecommandtheoriesaretypically offeredasaccountsofthedeontologicalpartof moralitywhichconsistsofmoralrequirements (obligation),permissions(rightness),andprohi- bitions(wrongness).Onadivinecommandcon- ception,actionsforbiddenbyGodaremorally wrongbecausetheyarethusforbidden,actions notforbiddenbyGodaremorallyrightbecause theyarenotthusforbidden,andactionscom- mandedbyGodaremorallyobligatorybecause theyarethuscommanded. ManyChristiansfinddivinecommandethics attractivebecausetheethicsofloveadvocatedin theGospelsmakeslovethesubjectofacom- mand.Matthew22:37-40recordsJesusassay- ingthatwearecommandedtoloveGodandthe neighbor.AccordingtoKierkegaard,thereare tworeasonstosupposethatChristianloveof neighbormustbeanobligationimposedby divinecommand:first,onlyanobligatorylove canbesufficientlyextensivetoembraceevery- one,evenone'senemies;second,onlyanoblig- atorylovecanbeinvulnerabletochangesinits objects,alovethataltersnotwhenitalteration finds. Thechiefobjectiontothetheoryisthatdepen- denceondivinecommandswouldmakemoral- ityunacceptablyarbitrary.Accordingtodivine commandethics,murderwouldnotbewrongif Goddidnotexistorexistedbutfailedtoforbidit. Perhapsthestrongestreplytothisobjection appealstothedoctrinesofGod'snecessaryexis- tenceandessentialgoodness.Godcouldnotfail toexistandbegood,andsoGodcouldnotfailto forbidmurder.Inshort,divinecommandsare notarbitraryfiats. Seealsoethics,locke,ockham.P.L.Q. divinecommandtheory.Seedivinecommand ETHICS,ETHICS. divineforeknowledge,God'sknowledgeofthe future.Itappearstobeastraightforwardconse- quenceofGod'somnisciencethathehasknowl- edgeofthefuture,forpresumablyomniscience includesknowledgeofalltruthsandthereare truthsaboutthefuture.Moreover,divinefore- knowledgeseemstoberequiredbyorthodox religiouscommitmenttodivineprophecyand divineprovidence.Intheformercase,Godcould notreliablyrevealwhatwillhappenifhedoes knowwhatwillhappen.Andinthelattercase, itisdifficulttoseehowGodcouldhaveaplanfor whathappenswithoutknowingwhatthatwill be.Aproblemarises,however,inthatithas seemedtomanythatdivineforeknowledgeis incompatiblewithhumanfreeaction.Some philosophers(notablyBoethius)havereasoned asfollows:IfGodknowsthatapersonwilldoa certainaction,thenthepersonmustperform thataction,butifapersonmustperforman action,thepersondoesnotperformtheaction freely.SoifGodknowsthatapersonwillper- formanaction,thepersondoesnotperformthe actionfreely.Thisreasonforthinkingthatdivine foreknowledgeisincompatiblewithhumanfree actioncommitsasimplemodalfallacy.What mustbethecaseistheconditionalthatifGod knowsthatapersonwillperformanactionthen thepersonwillinfactperformtheaction.But whatisrequiredtoderivetheconclusionisthe implausibleclaimthatfromtheassumptionthat Godknowsthatapersonwillperformanaction itfollowsnotsimplythatthepersonwillperform theactionbutthatthepersonmustperformit. Perhapsotherattemptstodemonstratethe incompatibility,however,arenotaseasilydis- missed.Oneresponsetotheapparentdilemmais tosaythattherereallyarenosuchtruthsabout thefuture,eithernoneatallornoneabout events,likefuturefreeactions,thatarenot causallynecessitatedbypresentconditions. Anotherresponseistoconcedethatthereare truthsaboutthefuturebuttodenythattruths aboutfuturefreeactionsareknowable.Inthis caseomnisciencemaybeunderstoodasknowl- edge,notofalltruths,butofallknowabletruths. Athird,andhistoricallyimportant,responseisto holdthatGodiseternalandthatfromhisper- spectiveeverythingispresentandthusnot future.Theseresponsesimplicitlyagreethat divineforeknowledgeisincompatiblewith humanfreedom,buttheyprovidedifferent accountsofomniscienceaccordingtowhichit doesnotincludeforeknowledge,or,atanyråte, notforeknowledgeoffuturefreeactions.See alsoDIVINEATTRIBUTES,FREEWILLPROB- LEM,MIDDLEKNOWLEDGE,PHILOSOPHYOF RELIGION.E.R.W. 241 divinesovereignty doublenegation,lawof divinesovereignty.Seedivineattributes. division,fallacyof.Seeinformalfallacy. D-Nmodel.Seecoveringlawmodel. DoctorIrrefragabilis.SeeAlexanderofhales. DoctorMirabilis.Seebacon,roger. doctrineofinfiniteanalysis.Seeleibniz. doctrineofminuteperceptions.Seeleibniz. doctrineofthemean.Seearistotle,chung-yung. Dodgson,CharlesLutwidge.Seecarroll. dogmatism.Seeskeptics. domain,ofascience,theclassofindividualsthat constituteitssubjectmatter.Zoology,number theory,andplanegeometryhaveastheirrespec- tivedomarnstheclassofanimals,theclassofnat- uralnumbers,andtheclassofplanefigures.In PosteriorAnalytics76b10,Aristotleobservesthat eachsciencepresupposesitsdomain,itsbasic concepts,anditsbasicprinciples.Inmodernfor- malizationsofascienceusingastandardfirst- orderformållanguage,thedomainofthescience isoften,butnotalways,takenastheuniverseof theintendedinterpretationorintendedmodel, i.e.astherangeofvaluesoftheindividualvari- ables.Seealsoaxiomaticmethod,formal- IZATION,FORMÅLLOGIC,MODELTHEORY, ONTOLOGICALCOMMITMENT,UNIVERSEOF DISCOURSE,VARIABLE.J.Cor. dominance,principleof.Seenewcombsparadox. dominate.Seeschröder-bernsteintheorem. donkeysentences,sentencesexemplifiedby 'Everymanwhoownsadonkeybeatsit','Ifa manownsadonkey,hebeatsit',andsimilar forms,whichhaveposedlogicalpuzzlessince medievaltimesbutwerenotedmorerecentlyby Geach.Atissueisthelogicalformofsuchsen- tences-specifically,thecorrectconstrualofthe pronoun'it'andtheindefinitenounphrase'a donkey'.Translationsintopredicatelogicbythe usualstrategyofrenderingtheindefiniteasexis- tentialquantificationandthepronounasa boundvariable(ef.'Johnownsadonkeyand beatsit'—>(3x)(xisadonkey&Johnownsx& Johnbeatsx))areeitherill-formedorhavethe wrongtruthconditions.Withauniversalquan- tifier,thelogicalformcarriesthecontroversial implicationthateverydonkey-owningman beatseverydonkeyheowns.Effortstoresolve theseissueshavespawnedmuchsignificant researchinlogicandlinguisticsemantics.See alsoLOGICALFORM.R.E.W. doomsdayargument,anargument(associated chieflywiththemathematicianBrandonCarter andthephilosopherJohnLeslie)purportingto show,byappealtoBayes'stheorem(andBayes's rule),thatwhateverantecedentprobabilitywe mayhaveassignedtothehypothesisthathuman lifewillendrelativelysoonismagnified,perhaps greatly,uponourlearning(ornoticing)thatwe areamongthefirstfewscorethousandsofmil- lionsofhumanbeingstoexist.SeeLeslie'sThe EndoftheWorld:TheScienceandEthicsofHuman Extinction(1996). Theargumentisbasedonanallegedlyclose analogybetweenthequestionoftheprobability ofimminenthumanextinctiongivenourordinal locationinthetemporalswathofhumanityand thefactthatthereader'snamebeingamongthe firstfewdrawnrandomlyfromanurnmay greatlyenhanceforthereadertheprobability thattheurncontainsfairlyfewnamesrather thanverymany. Seealsobayesianrationality,bayes's THEOREM,PROBABILITY.D.A.J. dotnotation.Seelogicalnotation. doubleaspecttheory.Seephilosophyofmind. doubleeffect,principleof.Seeprincipleofdou- bleEFFECT. doublenegation.(1)Theprinciple,alsocalledthe lawofdoublenegation,thateverypropositionis logicallyequivalenttoitsdoublenegation.Thus, thepropositionthatRogerisarabbitisequiva- lenttothepropositionthatRogerisnotnotarab- bit.Thelawholdsinclassicallogicbutnotfor certainnon-classicalconceptsofnegation.In intuitionistlogic,forexample,aproposition implies,butneednotbeimpliedby,itsdouble negation.(2)Theruleofinference,alsocalled theruleofdoublenegation,thatpermitsoneto inferthedoublenegationofAfromA,andvice versa.Seealsoformållogic.G.RS. doublenegation,lawof.Seedoublenegation. 242 doubletruth dravyasat doubletruth,thetheorythatathingcanbetrue inphilosophyoraccordingtoreasonwhileits oppositeistrueintheologyoraccordingtofaith. Itservesasaresponsetoconflictsbetweenrea- sonandfaith.Forexample,ononeinterpreta- tionofAristotle,thereisonlyonerational humansoul,whereas,accordingtoChristian theology,therearemanyrationalhumansouls. Thetheoryofdoubletruthwasattributedto AverroesandtoLatinAverroistssuchasSigerof BrabantandBoethiusofDaciabytheiroppo- nents,butitisdoubtfulthattheyactuallyheldit. Averroesseemstohaveheldthatasingletruthis scientificallyformulatedinphilosophyandalle- goricallyexpressedintheology.LatinAverroists apparentlythoughtthatphilosophyconcerns whatwouldhavebeentruebynaturalnecessity absentspecialdivineintervention,andtheology dealswithwhatisactuallytruebyvirtueofsuch intervention.Onthisview,therewouldhave beenonlyonerationalhumansoulifGodhad notmiraculouslyintervenedtomultiplywhatby naturecouldnotbemultiplied.Nooneclearly endorsedtheviewthatrationalhumansoulsare bothonlyoneandalsomanyinnumber.See alsoAVERROES,SIGEROFBRABANT.P.L.Q. doubt,methodic.Seedescartes. downwardsaturatedset.Seehintikkaset. doxa.SeeDoxASTic. doxastic(fromGreekdoxa,'belief'),oforper- tainingtobelief.Adoxasticmentalstate,for instance,isorincorporatesabelief.Doxastic statesofmindaretobedistinguished,ontheone hand,fromsuchnon-doxasticstatesasdesires, sensations,andemotions,and,ontheother hand,fromsubdoxasticstates.Byextension,a doxasticprincipleisaprinciplegoverningbelief. Adoxasticprinciplemightsetoutconditions underwhichanagenfsformingorabandoning abeliefisjustified(epistemicallyorotherwise). Seealsoreasonsforbelief.J.F.H. doxasticholism.Seeholism. doxasticvoluntarism.Seevoluntarism. doxographers,compilersofandcommentators ontheopinionsofancientGreekphilosophers. 'Doxographers'isanEnglishtranslationofthe modernLatintermcoinedbyHermannDielsfor thetitleofhisworkDoxographiGraeci(1879). HereDielsassembledaseriesofGreektextsin whichtheviewsofGreekphilosophersfromthe archaictotheHellenisticeraaresetoutinarela- tivelyschematicway.Inalengthyintroduction Dielsreconstructedthehistoryofthewritingof theseopinions,thedoxography;thisreconstruc- tionisnowastandardpartofthehistoriography ofancientphilosophy.Thedoxographyitselfis importantbothasasourceofinformationfor earlyGreekphilosophyandalsobecauselåter writers,ancient,medieval,andmodem,often reliedonitratherthanprimarymaterials.The crucialtextforDiels'sreconstructionwasthe bookPhysicalOpinionsofthePhilosophers(Placita Philosophorum),traditionallyascribedtoPlutarch butnolongerthoughttobebyhim.Thework liststheviewsofvariousphilosophersand schoolsundersubjectheadingssuchas"WhatIs Nature?"and"OntheRainbow."Outofthis workandothersDielsreconstructedaCollectionof OpinionsthatheascribedtoAetius(a.d.c.100),a personmentionedbyTheodoret(fifthcentury) astheauthorofsuchawork.DielstookAetius's ultimatesourcetobeTheophrastus,whowrotea morediscursivePhysicalOpinions.BecauseAetius mentionstheviewsofHellenisticphilosophers writingafterTheophrastus,Dielspostulatedan intermediatesource,whichhecalledtheVetusta Placita(c.100b.c).Themostaccessibledoxo- graphicalmaterialisintheLivesandOpinionsof EminentPhilosophersbyDiogenesLaertius(a.d. c.200),whois,however,mainlyinterestedin biography.Hearrangesphilosophersbyschools andtreatseachschoolchronologically.LM. dravya,inIndianphilosophies,substance.In Nyäya-Vaishesikaalllivingandnon-livingthings aresubstances,possessorsofqualities(gunås) andcausesofeffects.Substancescomeinnine varieties:earth,air,fire,water,ether,time,space, minds,andbodies.ForJainism,therearesix typesofsubstances:theprinciplesofmotionand rest,space,time,minds,andbodies.Each(except time)isextendedandeach(exceptbodies)is immaterial.Visistadvaita,claimingsixsortsof substance,includesGodasasubstance,asdoes Dvaita,onwhichallothersubstancesdependfor existence.Typically,schoolsofBuddhismdeny thatthereareanysubstances,holdingthatwhat appeartobesuchareonlybundlesofeventsor states.K.E.Y. dravyasat(Sanskrit,'existenceasathing'or, moreloosely,'primaryexistence'),acategory usedbyIndianBuddhistscholarstolabelthe 243 dreamargument dualism mostbasickindofexistencethatentitiescan have.Itwasusuallyopposedtoprajnaptisat, 'existenceasadesignation'or'secondaryexis- tence'.AccordingtomostvarietiesofBuddhist metaphysics,anythingthatcanbeanobjectof thoughtordesignationmustexistinsomesense; butsomethingsexistprimarily,really,intheir ownright(dravya-sat),whileothersexistonlyas objectsoflinguisticreference(prajnaptisat).An exampleofthefirstkindwouldbeamomentof physicalform;anexampleofthesecondkind wouldbeanordinaryobjectsuchasapot,since thisiscomposedofaseriesofexistentsofthefirst kind.P.J.G. dreamargument.Seedescartes. Dretske,Fred(b.1932),Americanphilosopher bestknownforhisexternalisticrepresentational naturalismaboutexperience,belief,perception, andknowledge.EducatedatPurdueUniversity andtheUniversityofMinnesota,hehastaught attheUniversityofWisconsin(1960-88)and StanfordUniversity(1988-98). InSeeingandKnowing(1969)Dretskedevelops anaccountofnon-epistemicseeing,denyingthat seeingisbelieving-thatforasubjectStoseea dog,say,Smustapplyaconcepttoit(dog,ani- mal,furry).ThedogmustlooksomewaytoS(S mustvisuallydifferentiatethedog,butneednot conceptuallycategorizeit).Thiscontrastswith epistemicseeing,whereforStoseethatadogis beforehim,Swouldhavetobelievethatitisadog. InKnowledgeandtheFlowofinformation(1981), amind-independentobjectivesenseof'informa- tion'isappliedtopropositionalknowledgeand beliefcontent."Information"replacedDretske's earliernotionofa"conclusivereason"(1971). Knowingthatprequireshavingatruebelief causedorcausallysustainedbyaneventthatcar- riestheinformationthatp.Also,thesemantic contentofabeliefisidentifiedwiththemostspe- cificdigitallyencodedpieceofinformationto whichitbecomesselectivelysensitiveduringa periodoflearning. InExplainingBehavior(1988),Dretske's accountofrepresentation(andmisrepresenta- tion)takesonateleologicalflavor.Thesemantic meaningofastructureisnowidentifiedwithits indicatorfunction.Astructurerecruitedfora causalroleofindicatingF's,andsustainedinthat causalrolebythisability,comestomean F-therebyprovidingacausalroleforthecon- tentofcognitivestates,andavoidingepiphenom- enalismaboutsemanticcontent. InNaturalizingtheMind(1995),Dretske'sthe- oryofmeaningisappliedtotheproblemsofcon- sciousnessandqualia.Hearguesthattheempir- icallysignificantfeaturesofconsciousexperience areexhaustedbytheirfunctional(andhence representational)rolesofindicatingexternal sensibleproperties.Herejectstheviewsthatcon- sciousnessiscomposedofahigher-orderhierar- chyofmentalstatesandthatqualiaaredueto intrinsic,non-representationalfeaturesofthe underlyingphysicalsystems. Dretskeisalsoknownforhiscontributionson thenatureofcontrastivestatements,lawsof nature,causation,andepistemicnon-closure, amongothertopics. Seealsoinformationtheory,natural- ism,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,QUALIA.F.A. dual-aspecttheory.Seephilosophyofmind. dual-attributetheory.Seephilosophyofmind. dualism,theviewthatrealityconsistsoftwo disparateparts.Thecruxofdualismisanappar- entlyunbridgeablegapbetweentwoincommen- surableordersofbeingthatmustbereconciledif ourassumptionthatthereisacomprehensible universeistobejustified.Dualismisexhibitedin thepre-Socraticdivisionbetweenappearance andreality;Plato'srealmofbeingcontaining eternalIdeasandrealmofbecomingcontaining changingthings;themedievaldivisionbetween finitemanandinfiniteGod;Descartes'ssub- stancedualismofthinkingmindandextended matter;Hume'sseparationoffactfromvalue; Kanfsdivisionbetweenempiricalphenomena andtranscendentalnoumena;theepistemologi- caldouble-aspecttheoryofJamesandRussell, whopostulateaneutralsubstancethatcanbe understoodinseparatewayseitherasmindor brain;andHeidegger'sseparationofbeingand timethatinspiredSartre'scontrastofbeingand nothingness.Thedoctrineoftwotruths,the sacredandtheprofaneorthereligiousandthe secular,isadualisticresponsetotheconflict betweenreligionandscience. Descartes'sdualismistakentobethesourceof themind-bodyproblem.Ifthemindisactive unextendedthinkingandthebodyispassive unthinkingextension,howcantheseessentially unlikeandindependentlyexistingsubstances interactcausally,andhowcanmentalideasrep- resentmaterialthings?How,inotherwords,can themindknowandinfluencethebody,andhow canthebodyaffectthemind?Descartessaid mindandbodyinteractandthatideasrepresent materialthingswithoutresemblingthem,but 244 dualism,Cartesian Duhem,Pierre-Maurice-Marie couldnotexplainhow,andconcludedmerely thatGodmakesthesethingshappen.Proposed dualistsolutionstothemind-bodyproblemare Malebranche'soccasionalism(mindandbodydo notinteractbutGodmakesthemappearto); Leibniz'spreestablishedharmonyamongnon- interactingmonads;andSpinoza'sproperty dualismofmutuallyexclusivebutparallelattrib- utesexpressingtheonesubstanceGod.Recent mind-bodydualistsarePopperandJohnC. Eccles.Monisticalternativestodualisminclude Hobbes'sviewthatthementalismerelythe epiphenomenaofthematerial;Berkeley'sview thatmaterialthingsarecollectionsofmental ideas;andthecontemporarymaterialistviewof Smart,Armstrong,andPaulandPatricia Churchlandthatthemindisthebrain.Aclassic treatmentofthesemattersisArthurO.Lovejoy's TheRevoltAgainstDualism. Dualismisrelatedtobinarythinking,i.e.,to systemsofthoughtthataretwo-valued,suchas logicinwhichtheoremsarevalidorinvalid,epis- temologyinwhichknowledgeclaimsaretrueor false,andethicsinwhichindividualsaregoodor badandtheiractionsarerightorwrong.InThe QuestforCertainty,Deweyfindsthatallmodern problemsofphilosophyderivefromdualistic oppositions,particularlybetweenspiritand nature.LikeHegel,heproposesasynthesisof oppositionsseenasthesesversusantitheses. Recentattacksontheviewthatdualisticdivi- sionscanbeexplicitlydescribedormaintained havebeenmadebyWittgenstein,whooffers insteadaclassificationschemebasedonoverlap- pingfamilyresemblances;byQuine,whocasts doubtonthedivisionbetweenanalyticorformål truthsbasedonmeaningsandsyntheticor empiricaltruthsbasedonfacts;andbyDerrida, whochallengesourabilitytodistinguishbe- tweenthesubjectiveandtheobjective.But despitetheextremelydifficultproblemsposedby ontologicaldualism,anddespitethecogencyof manyargumentsagainstdualisticthinking, Westernphilosophycontinuestobepredomi- nantlydualistic,aswitnessedbytheindispens- ableuseoftwo-valuedmatrixesinlogicand ethicsandbytheintractableproblemofrender- ingmentalintentionsintermsofmaterialmech- anismsorviceversa. Seealsometaphysics,philosophyof MIND.R.A.W. dualism,Cartesian.Seedualism,philosophyof mind. dualism,ethical.Seezoroastrianism. Ducasse,C(urt)J(ohn)(1881-1969),French- bornAmericanphilosopherofmindandaes- thetician.HearrivedintheUnitedStatesin 1900,receivedhisPh.D.fromHarvard(1912), andtaughtattheUniversityofWashington (1912-26)andBrownUniversity(1926-58). HismostimportantworkisNature,Mindand Death(1951).Thekeytohisgeneraltheoryisa non-Humeanviewofcausation:therelationof causingistriadic,involving(i)aninitialevent, (ii)thesetofconditionsunderwhichitoccurs, and(iii)aresultingevent;theinitialeventisthe cause,theresultingeventistheeffect.Onthe basisofthisviewheconstructedatheoryofcat- egories-anexplicationofsuchconceptsasthose ofsubstance,property,mind,matter,andbody. Amongthetheseshedefendedwerethatminds aresubstances,thattheycausallyinteractwith bodies,andthathumanbeingsarefreedespite everyevenfshavingacause. InACriticalExaminationoftheBeliefinaLifeafter Death(1961),heconcludedthat"thebalanceof theevidencesofarobtainedisonthesideof... survival."LikeSchopenhauer,whomhe admired,Ducassewasreceptivetothereligious andphilosophicalwritingsoftheFarEast.He wrotewithremarkableobjectivityonthephilo- sophicalproblemsassociatedwithso-calledpara- normalphenomena. Ducasse'sepistemologicalviewsaredeveloped inTruth,KnowledgeandCausation(1968).Hesets fortharealistictheoryofperception(hesays, aboutsense-qualities,"Berkeleyisrightandthe realistsarewrong"and,ofmaterialthings,"the realistsarerightandBerkeleyiswrong").He providestheclassicalformulationofthe"adver- bialtheory"orsense-qualities,accordingto whichsuchqualitiesarenotobjectsofexperience orawarenessbutwaysofexperiencingorofbeing aware.Onedoesnotperceivearedmaterial objectbysensingaredsense-datum;forthen perceivingwouldinvolvethreeentities-(i)the perceivingsubject,(ii)theredsense-datum,and (iii)theredmaterialobject.Butonemayper- ceivearedmaterialobjectbysensingredly;then theonlyentitiesinvolvedare(i)theperceiving subjectand(ii)thematerialobject.Ducasse observesthat,analogously,althoughitmaybe naturaltosay"dancingawaltz,"itwouldbe moreaccuratetospeakof"dancingwaltzily." Seealsoperception,philosophyof MIND.R.M.C. duck-rabbit.Seefigure-ground. Duhem,Pierre-Maurice-Marie(1861-1916), 245 Duhem-Quinethesis Duhem-Quinethesis Frenchphysicistwhowroteextensivelyonthe historyandphilosophyofscience.LikeGeorg Helm,WilhelmOstwald,andothers,hewasan energeticist,believinggeneralizedthermody- namicstobethefoundationofallofphysicsand chemistry.Duhemspenthiswholescientificlife advancingenergetics,fromhisfaileddissertation inphysics(aversionofwhichwasacceptedasa dissertationinmathematics),publishedasLe potentielthermodynamique(1886),tohismature treatise,Traitéd'énergétique(1911).Hisscientific legacyincludestheGibbs-DuhemandDuhem- Margulesequations.Possiblybecausehiswork wasconsideredthreateningbytheParisiansci- entificestablishmentorbecauseofhisright-wing politicsandferventCatholicism,henever obtainedthepositionhemeritedintheintellec- tualworldofParis.Hetaughtattheprovincial universitiesofLille,Rennes,and,finally,Bor- deaux. Duhem'sworkinthehistoryandphilosophyof sciencecanbeviewedasadefenseoftheaims andmethodsofenergetics;whateverDuhem's initialmotivation,hishistoricalandphilosophi- calworktookonalifeofitsown.Topicsofinter- esttohimincludedtherelationbetweenhistory ofscienceandphilosophyofscience,thenature ofconceptualchange,thehistoricalstructureof scientificknowledge,andtherelationbetween scienceandreligion.Duhemwasananti-atomist (oranti-Cartesian);inthecontemporarydebates aboutlightandmagnetism,Duhem'santi-atom- iststancewasalsodirectedagainsttheworkof Maxwell.AccordingtoDuhem,atomistsresolve thebodiesperceivedbythesensesintosmaller, imperceptiblebodies.Theexplanationofobserv- ablephenomenaisthenreferredtotheseimper- ceptiblebodiesandtheirmotions,suitably combined.Duhem'srejectionofatomismwas basedonhisinstrumentalism(orfictionalism): physicaltheoriesarenotexplanationsbutrepre- sentations;theydonotrevealthetruenatureof matter,butgivegeneralrulesofwhichlawsare particularcases;theoreticalpropositionsarenot trueorfalse,butconvenientorinconvenient.An importantreasonfortreatingphysicsasnon- explanatorywasDuhem'sclaimthatthereis generalconsensusinphysicsandnoneinmeta- physics-thushisinsistenceontheautonomyof physicsfrommetaphysics.Buthealsothought thatscientificrepresentationsbecomemorecom- pleteövertimeuntiltheygainthestatusofanat- uralclassification.Accordingly,Duhemattacked theuseofmodelsbysomescientists,e.g.Faraday andMaxwell.Duhem'srejectionofatomismwas coupledwitharejectionofindudivism,thedoc- trinethattheonlyphysicalprinciplesaregeneral lawsknownthroughinduction,basedonobser- vationoffacts.Duhem'srejectionformsaseries ofthesescollectivelyknownastheDuhemthesis: experimentsinphysicsareobservationsof phenomenaaccompaniedbyinterpretations; physiciststhereforedonotsubmitsingle hypotheses,butwholegroupsofthem,tothe controlofexperiment;thus,experimentalevi- dencealonecannotconclusivelyfalsifyhypothe- ses.Forsimilarreasons,Duhemrejectedthe possibilityofacrucialexperiment.Inhishistori- calstudies,Duhemarguedthattherewereno abruptdiscontinuitiesbetweenmedievaland earlymodernscience-theso-calledcontinuity thesis;thatreligionplayedapositiveroleinthe developmentofscienceintheLatinWest;and thatthehistoryofphysicscouldbeseenasa cumulativewhole,definingthedirectionin whichprogresscouldbeexpected. Duhem'sphilosophicalworkswerediscussed bythefoundersoftwentieth-centuryphilosophy ofscience,includingMach,Poincaré,themem- bersoftheViennaCircle,andPopper.Arevival ofinterestinDuhem'sphilosophybeganwith Quine'sreferencein1953totheDuhemthesis (alsoknownastheDuhem-Quinethesis).Asa result,Duhem'sphilosophicalworksweretrans- latedintoEnglish-asTheAimandStructureof PhysicalTheory(1954)andToSavethePhenomena (1969).Bycontrast,fewofDuhem'sextensive historicalworks—Lesoriginesdelastatique(2 vols.,1906-08),ÉtudessurLeonarddeVind(3 vols.,1906-13),andSystémedumonde(10vols., 1913-59),e.g.-havebeentranslated,withfive volumesoftheSystémedumondeactuallyremain- inginmanuscriptformuntil1954-59.Unlikehis philosophicalwork,Duhem'shistoricalwork wasnotsympatheticallyreceivedbyhisinfluen- tialcontemporaries,notablyGeorgeSarton.His supposedmainconclusionswererejectedbythe nextgenerationofhistoriansofscience,who presentedmodernscienceasdiscontinuouswith thatoftheMiddleAges.Thisviewwasechoedby historicallyorientedphilosophersofscience who,fromtheearly1960s,emphasizeddiscon- tinuitiesasarecurrentfeatureofchangeinsci- ence-e.g.KuhninTheStructureofScientific Revolutions(1962). Seealsocrucialexperiment,mach,phi- losophyOFSCIENCE,quine,viennacircle. R.Ar. Duhem-Quinethesis.Seeduhem. 246 Duhemthesis DunsScotus,John Duhemthesis.Seeduhem. Dummett,MichaelA.E.(b.1925),British philosopheroflanguage,logic,andmathematics, notedforhissympathyformetaphysicalanti- realismandforhisexpositionofthephilosophy ofFrege.Dummettregardsallegiancetotheprin- cipleofbivalenceasthehallmarkofarealistatti- tudetowardanyfieldofdiscourse.Thisisthe principlethatanymeaningfulassertoricsen- tencemustbedeterminatelyeithertrueorelse false,independentlyofanyone'sabilitytoascer- tainitstruth-valuebyrecoursetoappropriate empiricalevidenceormethodsofproof.Accord- ingtoDummett,thesentencesofanylearnable languagecannothaveverification-transcendent truthconditionsandconsequentlyweshould querytheintelligibilityofcertainstatementsthat realistsregardasmeaningful.Onthesegrounds, hecallsintoquestionrealismaboutthepastand realisminthephilosophyofmathematicsinsev- eralofthepapersintwocollectionsofhisessays, TruthandOtherEnigmas(1978)andTheSeasof Language(1993). InTheLogicalBasisofMetaphysics(1991), Dummettmakesclearhisviewthatthefunda- mentalquestionsofmetaphysicshavetobe approachedthroughthephilosophyoflanguage, andmorespecificallythroughthetheoryof meaning.HerehisphilosophicaldebtstoFrege andWittgensteinaremanifest.Dummetthas beentheworld'sforemostexpositorandcham- pionofFrege'sphilosophy,aboveallintwo highlyinfluentialbooks,Frege:Philosophyof Language(1973)andFrege:PhilosophyofMathe- matics(1991).ThisisdespitethefactthatFrege himselfadvocatedaformofPlatonisminseman- ticsandthephilosophyofmathematicsthatis quiteatoddswithDummetfsownanti-realist inclinations.Itwouldappear,however,from whatDummettsaysinOriginsofAnalytical Philosophy(1993),thatheregardsFrege'sgreat achievementasthatofhavingpresagedthe"lin- guisticturn"inphilosophythatwastoseeits mostvaluablefruitinthelåterworkof Wittgenstein.Wittgenstein'sprinciplethatgrasp ofthemeaningofalinguisticexpressionmustbe exhaustivelymanifestedbytheuseofthat expressionisonethatunderliesDummetfsown approachtomeaningandhisanti-realistlean- ings.Inlogicandthephilosophyofmathematics thisisshowninDummetfssympathyforthe intuitionisticapproachofBrouwerandHeyting, whichinvolvesarepudiationofthelawof excludedmiddle,assetforthinDummetfsown bookonthesubject,ElementsofIntuitionism (1977). Seealsobrouwer,mathematicalintu- itionism,METAPHYSICALREALISM,WITTGEN- STEIN.E.J.L. dunamis,alsodynamis(Greek,'power','capac- ity'),asusedbypre-SocraticssuchasAnaxi- manderandAnaxagoras,oneoftheelementary character-powers,suchasthehotorthecold, fromwhichtheybelievedtheworldwascon- structed.Plato'searlytheoryofFormsborrowed fromtheconceptofcharacter-powersascauses presentinthings;courage,e.g.,istreatedinthe Lachesasapowerinthesoul.Aristotlealsoused thewordinthissensetoexplaintheoriginsof theelements.IntheMetaphysics(especiallyBook IX),Aristotleuseddunamisinadifferentsenseto mean'potentiality'incontrastto'actuality' (energeiaorentelecheia).Intheearliersenseof dunamis,matteristreatedaspotentiality,inthat ithasthepotentialtoreceiveformandsobe actualizedasaconcretesubstance.Inthelåter Aristoteliansenseofdunamis,dormantabilities aretreatedaspotentialities,anddunamisisto energeiaassleepingistowaking,orhavingsight toseeing.Seealsoaristotle,energeia. P.Wo. DunsScotus,John(1266-1308),ScottishFran- ciscanmetaphysicianandphilosophicaltheolo- gian.HelecturedatOxford,Paris,andCologne, wherehediedandhisremainsarestillvener- ated. ModifyingAvicenna'sconceptionofmeta- physicsasthescienceofbeingquabeing,butuni- vocallyconceived,DunsScotusshoweditsgoal wastodemonstrateGodastheInfiniteBeing (revealedtoMosesasthe"Iamwhoam"),whose creativewillisthesourceoftheworld'scontin- gency.OutofloveGodfashionedeachcreature withaunique"haecceity"orparticularityfor- mallydistinctfromitsindividualizednature. Descriptivelyidenticalwithothersofitskind, thisnature,conceivedinabstractionfromhaec- ceity,isbothobjectivelyrealandpotentiallyuni- versal,andprovidesthebasisforscientific knowledgethatPeircecalls"Scotisticrealism." DunsScotusbroughtmanyofAugustine's insights,treasuredbyhisFranciscanpredeces- sors,intothemainstreamoftheAristotelianism ofhisday.Theirnotionofthewill's"supersuffi- cientpotentiality"forself-determinationhe showedcanbereconciledwithAristotle'snotion ofan"activepotency,"ifonerejectsthecontro- 247 Dutchbook duty versialprinciplethat"whateverismovedis movedbyanother."Paradoxically,Aristotle'scri- teriaforrationalandnon-rationalpotencies provetherationalityofthewill,nottheintellect, forheclaimedthatonlyrationalfacultiesareable toactinoppositewaysandarethusthesourceof creativityinthearts.Ifso,thenintellect,withbut onemodeofactingdeterminedbyobjectiveevi- dence,isnon-rational,andsoisclassedwith activepotenciescalledcollectively"nature." Onlythewill,acting''withreason,"isfreetowill ornillthisorthat.Thus"nature"and"will"rep- resentDunsScotus'sprimarydivisionofactive potencies,correspondingroughlytoAristotle's dichotomyofnon-rationalandrational.Original tooishisdevelopmentofAnselm'sdistinctionof thewill'stwofoldinclinationor"affection":one fortheadvantageous,theotherforjustice.The firstendowsthewillwithan"intellectual appetite"forhappinessandactualizationofself orspecies;thesecondsuppliesthewill'sspecific differencefromothernaturalappetites,givingit aninnatedesiretolovegoodsobjectivelyaccord- ingtotheirintrinsicworth.Guidedbyrightrea- son,this"affectionforjustice"inclinesthewillto actethically,givingitacongenitalfreedomfrom theneedalwaystoseektheadvantageous.Both naturalaffectionscanbesupernaturalized,the "affectionforjustice"bycharity,incliningusto loveGodaboveallandforhisownsake;theaffec- tionfortheadvantageousbythevirtueofhope, incliningustoloveGodasourultimategoodand futuresourceofbeatitude. Anotherinfluentialpsychologicaltheoryis thatofintuitiveintellectualcognition,orthe simple,non-judgmentalawarenessofahere- and-nowexistentialsituation.Firstdevelopedas anecessarytheologicalconditionfortheface-to- facevisionofGodinthenextlife,intellectual intuitionisneededtoexplainourcertaintyof primarycontingenttruths,suchas"Ithink,""I choose,"etc,andourawarenessofexistence. UnlikeOckham,DunsScotusnevermadeintel- lectualintuitionthebasisforhisepistemology, norbelieveditputsoneindirectcontactwith anyextramentalsubstancematerialorspiritual, forinthislife,atleast,ourintellectworks throughthesensoryimagination.Intellectual intuitionseemstobethatindistinctperipheral auraassociatedwitheachdirectsensory-intel- lectualcognition.Weknowofitexplicitlyonly inretrospectwhenweconsiderthenecessary conditionsforintellectualmemory.Itcontinued tobeatopicofdiscussionanddisputedownto thetimeofCalvin,who,influencedbytheSco- tistJohnMajor,usedanauditoryratherthana visualsensemodelofintellectualintuitionto explainour"experienceofGod." Seealsoaugustine,avicbnna,ockham. A.B.W. Dutchbook,abetorcombinationofbets wherebythebettorisboundtosufferanetloss regardlessoftheoutcome.Asimpleexample wouldbeabetonapropositionpatoddsof3:2 combinedwithabetonnot-patthesameodds, thetotalamountofmoneyatstakeineachbet beingfivedollars.Underthisarrangement,ifp turnedouttobetrueonewouldwintwodollars bythefirstbetbutlosethreedollarsbythesec- ond,andifpturnedouttobefalseonewould wintwodollarsbythesecondbetbutlosethree dollarsbythefirst.Hence,whateverhappened, onewouldloseadollar.Seealsoprobability. R.Ke. Dutchbookargument,theargumentthata rationalperson'sdegreesofbeliefmustconform totheaxiomsoftheprobabilitycalculus,since otherwise,bytheDutchbooktheorem,he wouldbevulnerabletoaDutchbook.R.Ke. Dutchbooktheorem,thepropositionthatany- onewho(a)countsabetonapropositionpas fairiftheoddscorrespondtohisdegreeofbelief thatpistrueandwho(b)iswillingtomakeany combinationofbetshewouldregardindividu- allyasfairwillbevulnerabletoaDutchbook providedhisdegreesofbeliefdonotconformto theaxiomsoftheprobabilitycalculus.Thus,any- oneofwhom(a)and(b)aretrueandwhose degreeofbeliefinadisjunctionoftwoincom- patiblepropositionsisnotequaltothesumofhis degreesofbeliefinthetwopropositionstaken individuallywouldbevulnerabletoaDutch book.R.Ke. duty,whatapersonisobligatedorrequiredtodo. Dutiescanbemoral,legal,parental,occupa- tional,etc,dependingontheirfoundationsor grounds.Becauseadutycanhaveseveraldiffer- entgrounds,itcanbe,say,bothmoralandlegal, thoughitneednotbeofmorethanonetype.Nat- uraldutiesaremoraldutiespeoplehavesimplyin virtueofbeingpersons,i.e.,simplyinvirtueof theirnature.Thereisaprimafaciedutytodo somethingifandonlyifthereisanappropriate basisfordoingthatthing.Forinstance,aprima faciemoraldutywillbeoneforwhichthereisa moralbasis,i.e.,somemoralgrounds.Thiscon- 248 duVair,Guillaume Dworkin,RonaldM. trastswithanall-things-consideredduty,which isadutyonehasiftheappropriategroundsthat supportitoutweighanythatcountagainstit. Negativedutiesaredutiesnottodocertain things,suchastokillorharm,whilepositiveduties aredutiestoactincertainways,suchastorelieve sufferingorbringaid.Whilethequestionofpre- ciselyhowtodrawthedistinctionbetweenneg- ativeandpositivedutiesisdisputed,itisgen- erallythoughtthattheviolationofanegative dutyinvolvesanagenfscausingsomestateof affairsthatisthebasisoftheaction'swrongness (e.g.,harm,death,orthebreakingofatrust), whereastheviolationofapositivedutyinvolves anagenfsallowingthosestatesofaffairstooccur orbebroughtabout. Imperfectdutiesare,inKanfswords,"duties whichallowleewayintheinterestofinclina- tion,"i.e.,thatpermitonetochooseamongsev- eralpossiblewaysoffulfillingthem.Perfectduties donotallowthatleeway.Thus,thedutytohelp thoseinneedisanimperfectdutysinceitcanbe fulfilledbyhelpingthesick,thestarving,the oppressed,etc,andifonechoosestohelp,say, thesick,onecanchoosewhichofthesickto help.However,thedutytokeepone'spromises andthedutynottoharmothersareperfect dutiessincetheydonotallowonetochoose whichpromisestokeeporwhichpeoplenotto harm.Mostpositivedutiesareimperfect;most negativeones,perfect. Seealsodeonticlogic,kant,rights, ross.B.R. duVair,Guillaume(1556-1621),Frenchphi- losopher,bishop,andpoliticalfigure.DuVairand JustusLipsiuswerethetwomostinfluential propagatorsofneo-Stoicisminearlymodem Europé.DuVair'sSaintePhilosophie("HolyPhi- losophy,"1584)andhisshorterPhilosophiemorale desStoiques("MoralPhilosophyoftheStoics," 1585),weretranslatedandfrequentlyreprinted. ThelatterpresentsEpictetusinaformusableby ordinarypeopleintroubledtimes.Wearetofol- lownatureandliveaccordingtoreason;weare nottobeupsetbywhatwecannotcontrol;virtue isthegood.DuVairinserts,moreover,adis- tinctlyreligiousnote.Wemustbepious,accept ourlotasGod'swill,andconsidermoralityobe- diencetohiscommand.DuVairthusChristian- izedStoicism,makingitwidelyacceptable.By teachingthatreasonaloneenablesustoknow howweoughttolive,hebecameafounderof modernrationalisminethics.Seealsoethics, HUMANNATURE,STOICISM.J.B.S. DvaitaVedanta,avarietyofHinduismaccording towhichBrahmanisanindependentlyexisting, omnipotent,omniscientpersonaldeity.InDvaita Vedanta,Brahmaneverlastinglysustainsinexis- tenceaworldofmindsandphysicalthingswith- outtheirbeingproperlyviewedasthebodyof Brahman,sincethiswouldmistakenlysuggest thatBrahmanislimitedandcanbeaffectedin waysanalogoustothoseinwhichhumanbeings arelimitedandcanbeaffectedbytheirbodies. TheUpanishadictextsconcerningtheindividual Äman'sidentitytoBrahman,andallthingsbeing inBrahman,areunderstoodasassertingdepen- denceonBrahmanandresemblancetoBrahman ratherthannumericalidentitywithBrahman. Eachpersonisheldtohavehisorherown essence(ef.themedievalScholasticnotionofa haecceity)andaccordinglysomearedestinedfor enlightenment,someforendlesstransmigration, andsomeformisery.K.E.Y. Dworkin,RonaldM.(b.1931),Americanjurist, politicalphilosopher,andacentralcontributorto recentlegalandpoliticaltheory.Hehasservedas professorofjurisprudence,UniversityofOxford (1969-98),professoroflaw,NewYorkUniver- sity(1975-),andQuainProfessorofJurispru- dence,UniversityCollege,London(1998-).He wasthefirstsignificantcriticofHarfspositivist analysisoflawasbasedonadeterminablesetof socialrules.Dworkinarguesthatthelawcon- tainslegalprinciplesaswellaslegalrules.Legal principlesarestandardsphrasedgenerally(e.g., 'Nooneshallprofitfromhisownwrong');they donothaveaformål"pedigree,"butarerequire- mentsofmorality.Nonetheless,courtsare obligedtoapplysuchprinciples,andthushave nolawmakingdiscretion.Judiciallyenforceable legalrightsmustderivefromantecedentpolitical rights.Dworkincharacterizesrightsaspolitical "trumps"-hencehistitleTakingRightsSeriously (2ded.,1978),whichcollectsthepapersthat defendtheviewssketched. Dworkinpostulatesanidealizedjudge, Hercules,whocaninvariablydeterminewhat rightsarelegallyenforceable.Dworkindenies anymetaphysicalcommitmentsthereby,and emphasizesinsteadtheconstruetiveandinter- pretivenatureofbothadjudicationandlegalthe- ory.Theseargumentsaremadeinpaperscol- lectedinAMatterofPrinciple(1985).Law'sEmpire (1986)systematizeshisview.Hepresentstherea theoryof"lawasintegrity."Thecourfsobligation istomakethecommunity'slawthebestitcanbe byfindingdecisionsthatbestätbothinstitutional 249 Dyad dynamiclogic historyandmoralprinciple.Herculesalwaysbest determinesthebestfit. Dworkinhasalsocontributedtosubstantive politicaltheory.Hedefendsaformofliberalism thatmakesequalityasprominentasliberty.His accountofequalityisfoundinanumberofinde- pendentpapers;see,e.g.,"FoundationsofLib- eralEquality"TannerLeduresonHumanValuesXI (i990).Dworkinhasappliedhisliberaltheoryin twoways.Hehascontinuallyactedasacritical watchdogoftheU.S.SupremeCourt,assessing decisionsfortheiradherencetotheidealsof principle,respectforequalityandachievement ofbestfit.Someoftheseessaysareinthetwocol- lectionsmentioned;themostrecentareinFree- dom'sLaw(1996).Life'sDominion(1993)derives fromtheseidealsanaccountofabortionand euthanasia. Dworkin'sphilosophizinghasaconceptual richnessandrhetoricallirethat,whennot whollyundercontrol,givehistheoreticalposi- tionsaproteanqualityatthelevelofdetail. Nonetheless,theideasthatadjudicationshould beprincipledandenforcerights,andthatweall deserveequaldignityandrespect,exercisea powerfulfascination. Seealsoeuthanasia,hart,jurispru- DENCE,LEGALPOSITIVISM,MORALSTATUS, NATURALLAW,POLITICALPHILOSOPHY, RIGHTS.R.A.Sh. Dyad.Seeacademy. dynamiclogic,abranchoflogicinwhich,in additiontotheusualcategoryofformulasinter- pretableaspropositions,thereisacategoryof expressionsinterpretableasactions.Dynamic logic(originallycalledthemodallogicofpro- grams)emergedinthelate1970sasonestepin alongtraditionwithintheoreticalcomputersci- enceaimedatprovidingawaytoformalizethe analysisofprogramsandtheiraction.Aparticu- larconcernherewasprogramverification:what canbesaidoftheeffectofaprogramifstartedat acertainpoint?Tothisendoperators[a]and wereintroducedwiththefollowingintu- itivereadings:[a]Atomean'aftereveryterminat- ingcomputationaccordingtoaitisthecasethat A'andAtomean'aftersometerminating computationaccordingtoaitisthecasethatA'. Thelogicoftheseoperatorsmaybeseenasagen- eralizationofordinarymodallogic:wheremodal logichasoneboxoperator□andonediamond operator0,dynamiclogichasoneboxoperator [a]andonediamondoperatorforevery programexpressionainthelanguage. Inpossibleworldssemanticsformodallogica modelisatriple(U,R,V)whereUisauniverse ofpoints,Rabinaryrelation,andVavaluation assigningtoeachatomicformulaasubsetofU. Indynamiclogic,amodelisatriple(U,R,V) whereUandVareasbeforebutRisafamilyof binaryrelationsR(a),oneforeveryprogram expressionainthelanguage.Writing'NxA', wherexisapointinU,for'Aistrueatx'(inthe modelinquestion),wehavethefollowingchar- acteristictruthconditions(truth-functional compoundsareevaluatedbytruthtables,asin modallogic): \=xPifandonlyifxisapointinV(P), wherePisanatomicformula, Nx[a]^4ifandonlyif,forally,ifxisR(a)- relatedtoythenNyA, \=xifandonlyif,forsomey,xis i?(a)-relatedtoyandNyA. Traditionally,dynamiclogicwillcontain machineryforrenderingthethreeregularoper- atorsonprograms:'+'(sum),';'(composition), and'*'(Kleene'sståroperation),aswellasthe testoperator'?',which,operatingonaproposi- tion,willyieldaprogram.Theactiona+Pcon- sistsincarryingoutaorcarryingoutP;theaction a;Pinfirstcarryingouta,thencarryingoutP;the actiona*incarryingoutasomefinitenumberof times(notexcluding0);theaction?Ainverify- ingthatA.Onlystandardmodelsreflectthese intuitions: R(a+P)=R(a)UR(P), i?(a;P)=R(a)IR(P), R(a*)=(R(a))*, R(?A)=l(x,x):\=xA] (where'*'istheancestralstår) Thesmallestpropositionaldynamiclogic (PDL)isthesetofformulastrueateverypointin everystandardmodel.Notethatdynamiclogic analyzesnon-deterministicaction-thisisevi- dentatthelevelofatomicprograms%whereR(%) isarelation,notnecessarilyafunction,andalso inthedefinitionsofR(a+P)andR(a*). Dynamiclogichasbeenextendedinvarious ways,e.g.,tofirst-andsecond-orderpredicate logic.Furthermore,justasdeonticlogic,tense logic,etc,arereferredtoasmodallogicinthe widesense,soextensionsofdynamiclogicinthe narrowsensesuchasprocesslogicareoften looselyreferredtoasdynamiclogicinthewide sense. 250 dynamis dynamism Thephilosophicalinterestindynamiclogic restswiththeexpectationthatitwillprovea fruitfulinstrumentforanalyzingtheconceptof actioningeneral:asuccessfulanalysiswouldbe valuableinitselfandwouldalsoberelevantto otherdisciplinessuchasdeonticlogicandthe logicofimperatives. Seealsocomputertheory,deontic LOGIC,MODALLOGIC.K.Seg. dynamis.Seedunamis,energeia. dynamism.Seeboscovich. 251 E Eckhart,Johannes,calledMeisterEckhart (c.1260-1328),Germanmystic,theologian,and preacher.EckhartenteredtheDominicanorder earlyandbegananacademiccircuitthattook himseveraltimestoParisasastudentandmas- teroftheologyandthatinitiatedhimintoways ofthinkingmuchinfluencedbyAlbertusMagnus andThomasAquinas.AtParis,Eckhartwrotethe requiredcommentaryontheSentencesofPeter Lombardandfinishedforpublicationatleast threeformåldisputations.Buthehadalready heldofficewithintheDominicans,andhecon- tinuedtoalternateworkasadministratörandas teacher.Eckhartpreachedthroughoutthese years,andhecontinuedtowritespiritualtrea- tisesinthevemacular,ofwhichthemostimpor- tantistheBookofDivineConsolation(1313/1322). OnlyaboutathirdofEckharfsmainprojectin Latin,theOpustripartitum,seemsevertohave beencompleted. Beginningintheearly1320s,questionswere raisedaboutEckharfsorthodoxy.Thequestions centeredonwhatwascharacteristicofhisteach- ing,namelytheemphasisonthesoul'sattaining "emptiness"soasto"givebirthtoGod."Thesoul isennobledbyitsemptying,anditcanbeginto "labor"withGodtodeliverasparkthatenacts themiraculousunion-and-differenceoftheir love.Afterbeingacquittedofheresyonce, Eckhartwascondemnedon108propositions drawnfromhiswritingsbyacommissionat Cologne.Thecondemnationwasappealedto theHolySee,butin1329Eckhartwasthere judged"probablyheretical"on17of28propo- sitionsdrawnfrombothhisacademicandpop- ulärworks.Thecondemnationclearlylimited Eckharfsexplicitinfluenceintheology,though hewasdeeplyappropriatednotonlybymystics suchasJohannesTaulerandHenrySuso,butby churchfiguressuchasNicholasofCusaand MartinLuther.Hehassincebeentakenupby thinkersasdifferentasHegel,Fichte,and Heidegger. Seealsoalbertusmagnus,aquinas, PETERLOMBARD.M.D.J. eclecticism.Seecousin. Eco,Umberto(b.1932),Italianphilosopher, intellectualhistorian,andnovelist.Aleadingfig- ureinthefieldofsemiotics,thegeneraltheoryof signs.Ecohasdevotedmostofhisvästproduc- tiontothenotionofinterpretationanditsrolein communication. Inthe1960s,buildingontheideathatan activeprocessofinterpretationisrequiredtotake anysignasasign,hepioneeredreader-oriented criticism(TheOpenWork,1962,1976;TheRoleof theReader,1979)andchampionedaholisticview ofmeaning,holdingthatalloftheinterpretens beliefs,i.e.,hisencyclopedia,arepotentiallyrele- vanttowordmeaning.Inthe1970s,equally influencedbyPeirceandtheFrenchstructural- ists,heofferedaunifiedtheoryofsigns(ATheory ofSemiotics,1976),aimingatgroundingthestudy ofcommunicationingeneral.Heopposedthe ideaofcommunicationasanaturalprocess, steeringamiddlewaybetweenrealismandideal- ism,particularlyoftheSapir-Whorfvariety.The issueofrealismloomslargealsoinhisrecent work.InTheLimitsofInterpretation(1990)and InterpretationandÖverinterpretation(1992),he attacksdeconstructionism.KantandthePlatypus (1997)defendsa"contractarian"formofrealism, holdingthatthereader'sinterpretation,driven bythePeirceanregulativeideaofobjectivityand collaboratingwiththespeaker'sunderdeter- minedintentions,isneededtofixreference. Inhishistoricalessays,rangingfrommedieval aesthetics(TheAestheticsofThomasAquinas,1956) totheattemptsatconstructingartificialand"per- fect"languages(TheSearchforthePerfectLanguage, 1993)tomedievalsemiotics,hetracestheorigins ofsomecentralnotionsincontemporaryphilos- ophyoflanguage(e.g.,meaning,symbol,deno- tation)andsuchrecentconcernsasthelanguage ofmindandtranslation,tolargerissuesinthe historyofphilosophy. Allhisnovelsarepervadedbyphilosophical queries,suchasIstheworldanorderedwhole? (TheNameoftheRose,1980),andHowmuch interpretationcanonetoleratewithoutfalling preytosomeconspiracysyndrome?(Foucaults Pendulum,1988).Everywhere,heengagesthe readerinthegameof(controlled)interpreta- tions. Seealsodeconstruction,meaning, SEMIOSIS,STRUCTURALISM.M.Sa. 252 ecofeminism Edwards,Jonathan ecofeminism.Seeenvironmentalphilosophy. economics,philosophyof.Seephilosophyofeco- NOMICS. economics,welfare.Seephilosophyofeconom- ics. education,philosophyof.Seephilosophyofedu- CATION. eduction,theprocessofinitialclarification,asof aphenomenon,text,orargument,thatnormally takesplacepriortologicalanalysis.Outofthe fluxofvagueandconfusedexperiencescertain characteristicsaredrawnintosomekindoforder orintelligibilityinorderthatattentioncanbe focusedonthem(Aristotle,PhysicsI).Thesechar- acteristicsoftenarelatent,hidden,orimplicit. Thenotionoftenisusedwithreferencetotexts aswellasexperience.Thusitbecomesclosely relatedtoexegesisandhermeneutics,tendingto bereservedforthesortsofclarificationthatpre- cedeformålorlogicalanalyses.Seealso HERMENEUTICS.F.S. Edwards,Jonathan(f703-58),Americanphi- losopherandtheologian.Hewaseducatedat Yale,preachedinNewYorkCity,andin1729 assumedaCongregationalpastorateinNorth- ampton,Massachusetts,wherehebecamea leaderintheGreatAwakening.Becauseofadis- putewithhisparishionersöverqualificationsfor communion,hewasforcedtoleavein1750.In 1751,hetookchargeofcongregationsinStock- bridge,afrontiertownsixtymilestothewest.He waselectedthirdpresidentofPrincetonin1757 (butdiedshortlyafterinauguration). EdwardsdeeplyinfluencedCongregational andPresbyteriantheologyinAmericaforövera century,buthadlittleimpactonphilosophy. Interestinhimrevivedinthemiddleofthe twentiethcentury,firstamongliteraryscholars andtheologiansandlåteramongphilosophers. WhilemostofEdwards'spublishedworkdefends thePuritanversionofCalvinistorthodoxy,his notebooksrevealaninterestinphilosophical problemsfortheirownsake.Althoughhewas indebtedtoContinentalrationalistslikeMale- branche,totheCambridgePlatonists,andespe- ciallytoLocke,hisowncontributionsare sophisticatedandoriginal. ThedoctrineofGod'sabsolutesovereigntyis explicatedbyoccasionalism,asubjectiveideal- ismsimilartoBerkeley's,andphenomenalism. AccordingtoEdwards,whatare"vulgarly" calledcausalrelationsaremereconstantcon- junctions.Tmecausesnecessitatetheireffects. SinceGod'swillalonemeetsthiscondition,God istheonlytruecause.Heisalsotheonlytrue substance.Physicalobjectsarecollectionsof ideasofcolor,shape,andother"corporeal"qual- ities.Finitemindsareseriesof"thoughts"or "perceptions."Anysubstanceunderlyingper- ceptions,thoughts,and"corporealideas"must besomethingthat"subsistsbyitself,stånds underneath,andkeepsup"physicalandmental qualities.Astheonlythingthatdoesso,Godis theonlyrealsubstance.Astheonlytruecause andtheonlyrealsubstance,Godis"ineffect beingingeneral." Godcreatestocommunicatehisglory.Since God'sinternalgloryisconstitutedbyhisinfinite knowledgeof,loveof,anddelightinhimselfas thehighestgood,his"communicationadextra" consistsintheknowledgeof,loveof,andjoyin himselfwhichhebestowsuponcreatures.The essenceofGod'sintemalandexternalgloryis "holiness"or"truebenevolence,"adisinterested loveofbeingingeneral(i.e.,ofGodandthe beingsdependentonhim).Holinessconstitutes "truebeauty,"adivinesplendororradianceof which"secondary"(ordinary)beautyisan imperfectimage.Godisthussupremelybeauti- fulandtheworldissuffusedwithhisloveliness. VindicationsofCalvinistconceptionsofsin andgracearefoundinFreedomoftheWill(1754) andOriginalSin(1758).Theformerincludes sophisticateddefensesoftheologicaldetermin- ismandcompatibilism.Thelattercontainsargu- mentsforoccasionalismandinterestingdiscus- sionsofidentity.Edwardsthinksthatnatural lawsdeterminekindsorspecies,andkindsor speciesdeterminecriteriaofidentity.Sincethe lawsofnaturedependonGod's"arbitrary"deci- sion,Godestablishescriteriaofidentity.Hecan thus,e.g.,constituteAdamandhisposterityas "onething." Edwards'sreligiousepistemologyisdeveloped inATreatiseConcerningReligiousAffections(1746) andOntheNatureofTrueVirtue(1765).Thecon- versionexperienceinvolvestheacquisitionofa "newsenseoftheheart."Itscoreisthemind's apprehensionofa"newsimpleidea,"theideaof "truebeauty."Thisideaisneededtoproperly understandtheologicaltruths. TrueVirtuealsoprovidesthefullestaccountof Edwards'sethics-amoralsensetheorythat identifiesvirtuewithbenevolence.Although indebtedtocontemporarieslikeHutcheson, Edwardscriticizestheirattemptstoconstruct ethicsonsecularfoundations.Truebenevolence 253 effectiveprocedure egocentricpredicament embracesbeingingeneral.SinceGodis,ineffect, beingingeneral,itsessenceistheloveofGod.A loverestrictedtofamily,nation,humanity,or other"privatesystems"isaformofself-love. Seealsoberkeley,calvin,freewill PROBLEM,MORALSENSETHEORY,OCCASION- alism.W.J.Wa. effectiveprocedure,astep-by-steprecipefor computingthevaluesofafunction.Itdetermines whatistobedoneateachstep,withoutrequir- inganyingenuityofanyone(oranymachine) executingit.Theinputandoutputoftheproce- dureconsistofitemsthatcanbeprocessed mechanically.Idealizingalittle,inputsandout- putsareoftentakentobestringsonafinite alphabet.Itiscustomarytoextendthenotionto proceduresformanipulatingnaturalnumbers, viaacanonicalnotation.Eachnumberisassoci- atedwithastring,itsnumeral.Typicalexamples ofeffectiveproceduresarethestandardgrade schoolproceduresforaddition,multiplication, etc.Onecanexecutetheprocedureswithout knowinganythingaboutthenaturalnumbers. Theterm'mechanicalprocedure'or'algorithm' issometimesalsoused.Afunction/iscom- putableifthereisaneffectiveprocedureAthat computes/.Foreveryminthedomainoff,ifA weregivenmasinput,itwouldproducef(m)as output.Turingmachinesaremathematicalmod- elsofeffectiveprocedures.Church'sthesis,or Turing'sthesis,isthatafunctioniscomputable providedthereisaTuringmachinethatcom- putesit.Inotherwords,foreveryeffectivepro- cedure,thereisaTuringmachinethatcomputes thesamefunction.Seealsochurch'sthesis, COMPUTERTHEORY,TURINGMACHINE. S.Sha. efficaciousgrace.SeeARNAULD. efficientcause.Seearistotle. effluences.Seedemocritus. effluxes,theoryof.Seedemocritus. ego.Seefreud. ego,empirical.Seekant. ego,transcendental.Seekant. egocentricparticular,awordwhosedenotation isdeterminedbyidentityofthespeakerand/or thetime,place,andaudienceofhisutterance. Examplesaregenerallythoughttoinclude'I,' 'you','here','there','this','that','now','past', 'present',and'future'.Theterm'egocentricpar- ticular'wasintroducedbyRussellinAnInquiry intoMeaningandTruth(1940).Inanearlierwork, "ThePhilosophyofLogicalAtomism"(Monist, 1918-19),Russellcalledsuchwords"emphatic particulars." Someimportantquestionsariseregardingego- centricparticulars.Aresomeegocentricparticu- larsmorebasicthanotherssothattherestcanbe correctlydefinedintermsofthembuttheycan- notbecorrectlydefinedintermsoftherest?Rus- sellthoughtallegocentricparticularscanbe definedby'this';T',forexample,hasthesame meaningas'thebiographytowhichthis belongs',where'this'denotesasense-datum experiencedbythespeaker.Yet,atthesame time,'this'canbedefinedbythecombination 'whatI-nownotice'.Mustweuseatleastsome egocentricparticularstogiveacompletedescrip- tionoftheworld?Ourabilitytodescribethe worldfromaspeaker-neutralperspective,sothat thedenotationsofthetermsinourdescription areindependentofwhen,where,andbywhom theyareused,dependsonourabilitytodescribe theworldwithoutusingegocentricparticulars. Russellheldthategocentricparticularsarenot neededinanypartofthedescriptionofthe world. Seealsocausaltheoryofproper names,indexical,token-reflexive. P.Mar. egocentricpredicament,eachperson'sappar- entlyproblematicpositionasanexperiencing subject,assumingthatallourexperiencesarepri- vateinthatnooneelsecanhavethem.Twoprob- lemsconcemourabilitytogainempirical knowledge.First,itishärdtoseehowwegain empiricalknowledgeofwhatothersexperience, ifallexperienceisprivate.Wecannothavetheir experiencetoseewhatitislike,foranyexperi- encewehaveisourexperienceandsonottheirs. Second,itishärdtoseehowwegainempirical knowledgeofhowtheextemalworldis,inde- pendentlyofourexperience.Allourempirically justifiedbeliefsseemtorestultimatelyonwhatis giveninexperience,andiftheempiricallygiven isprivate,itseemsitcanonlysupportjustified beliefsabouttheworldasweexperienceit.A thirdmajorproblemconcemsourabilitytocom- municatewithothers.Itishärdtoseehowwe describetheworldinalanguageothersunder- stand.Wegivemeaningtosomeofourwordsby definingthembyotherwordsthatalreadyhave 254 egoism Einfuhlung meaning,andthisprocessofdefinitionappearsto endwithwordswedefineostensively;i.e.,we usethemtonamesomethinggiveninexperi- ence.Ifexperiencesareprivate,nooneelsecan graspthemeaningofourostensiveiydefined wordsoranywordsweusethemtodefine.No oneelsecanunderstandourattemptstodescribe theworld.Seealsoprivatelanguageargu- ment,PROBLEMOFOTHERMINDS.P.Mar. egoism,anyviewthat,inacertainway,makes theselfcentral.Thereareseveraldifferentver- sionsofegoism,allofwhichhavetodowithhow actionsrelätetotheself.Ethicalegoismistheview thatpeopleoughttodowhatisintheirownself- interest.Psychologicalegoismisaviewaboutpeo- ple^motives,inclinations,ordispositions.One statementofpsychologicalegoismsaysthat,asa matteroffact,peoplealwaysdowhatthey believeisintheirself-interestand,human naturebeingwhatitis,theycannotdoother- wise.Anothersaysthatpeopleneverdesireany- thingforitsownsakeexceptwhattheybelieve isintheirownself-interest. Altruismistheoppositeofegoism.Anyethical viewthatimpliesthatpeoplesometimesoughtto dowhatisintheinterestofothersandnotin theirself-interestcanbeconsideredaformof ethicalaltruism.Theviewthat,humannature beingwhatitis,peoplecandowhattheydonot believetobeintheirself-interestmightbecalled psychologicalaltruism.Differentspeciesofethical andpsychologicalegoismresultfromdifferent interpretationsofself-interestandofactingfrom self-interest,respectively.Somepeoplehavea broadconceptionofactingfromself-interest suchthatpeopleactingfromadesiretohelpoth- erscanbesaidtobeactingoutofself-interest, providedtheythinkdoingsowillnot,onbal- ance,takeawayfromtheirowngood.Others haveanarrowerconceptionofactingfromself- interestsuchthatoneactsfromself-interestonly ifoneactsfromthedesiretofurtherone'sown happinessorgood.Butleridentifiedself-love withthedesiretofurtherone'sownhappinessor goodandself-interestedactionwithactionper- formedfromthatdesirealone.Sinceweobvi- ouslyhaveotherparticulardesires,suchasthe desiresforhonor,forpower,forrevenge,andto promotethegoodofothers,heconcludedthat psychologicalegoismwasfalse.Peoplewitha broaderconceptionofactingfromself-interest wouldaskwhetheranyonewiththoseparticular desireswouldactonthemiftheybelievedthat, onbalance,actingonthemwouldresultinaloss ofhappinessorgoodforthemselves.Ifsome would,thenpsychologicalegoismisfalse,butif, givenhumannatureasitis,noonewould,itis trueevenifself-loveisnottheonlysourceof motivationinhumanbeings. Justastherearebroaderandnarrowercon- ceptionsofactingfromself-interest,thereare broaderandnarrowerconceptionsofself-inter- estitself,aswellassubjectiveandobjectivecon- ceptionsofself-interest.Subjectiveconceptions reläteaperson'sself-interestsolelytothesatis- factionofhisdesiresortowhatthatperson believeswillmakehislifegobestforhim.Objec- tiveconceptionsseeself-interest,atleastinpart, asindependentoftheperson'sdesiresand beliefs.Someconceptionsofself-interestarenar- rowerthanothers,allowingthatthesatisfaction ofonlycertaindesiresisinaperson'sself-inter- est,e.g.,desireswhosesatisfactionmakesthat person'slifegobetterforher.Andsomeconcep- tionsofself-interestcountonlythesatisfaction ofidealizeddesires,onesthatsomeonewould haveafterreflectionaboutthenatureofthose desiresandwhattheytypicallyleadto,asfur- theringaperson'sself-interest. Seealsobutler,ethics,motivational INTERNALISM,REASONSFORACTION.B.R. egoisticconsequentialism.Seeconsequentialism. eideticintuition.Seehusserl. eidos.Seearistotle,husserl. EightfoldPath.Seebuddhism. eikasia.Seedividedline. Einfuhlung(German,'feelinginto'),empathy.In contrasttosympathy,whereone'sidentityispre- servedinfeelingwithorfortheother,inempa- thyorEinfuhlungonetendstoloseoneselfinthe other.TheconceptofEinfuhlungreceiveditsclas- sicalformulationintheworkofTheodorLipps, whocharacterizeditasaprocessofinvoluntary, innerimitationwherebyasubjectidentifies throughfeelingwiththemovementofanother body,whetheritbetherealleapofadanceror theillusoryupwardliftofanarchitecturalcol- umn.Completeempathyisconsideredtobeaes- thetic,providinganon-representationalaccess tobeauty. Husserlusedaphenomenologicallypurified conceptofEinfuhlungtoaccountforthewaythe selfdirectlyrecognizestheother.Husserl'sstu- dentEdithSteindescribedEinfuhlungasablind 255 Einstein,Albert Einstein,Albert modeofknowledgethatreachestheexperience oftheotherwithoutpossessingit. EinfuhlungisnottobeequatedwithVerstehen orhumanunderstanding,which,asDilthey pointedout,requirestheuseofalione'smental powers,andcannotbereducedtoameremode offeeling.Tounderstandisnottoapprehend somethingempatheticallyastheprojectedlocus ofanactualexperience,buttoapperceivethe meaningofexpressionsofexperienceinrelation totheircontext.Whereasunderstandingis reflective,empathyisprereflective. Seealsodilthey,husserl,verstehen. R.A.M. Einstein,Albert(1879-1955),German-born Americanphysicist,founderofthespecialand generaltheoriesofrelativityandafundamental contributortoseveralbranchesofphysicsandto thephilosophicalanalysisandcritiqueofmod- ernphysics,notablyofrelativityandthequan- tumtheory.EinsteinwasawardedtheNobel Prizeforphysicsin1922,"especiallyforhisdis- coveryofthelawofthephotoelectriceffect." BorninUlmintheGermanstateofWiirttem- berg,EinsteinstudiedphysicsatthePolytechnic inZiirich,Switzerland.HewascalledtoBerlinas directoroftheKaiserWilhelmInstitutefor Physics(1914)atthepeakoftheGermanultra- nationalismthatsurroundedWorldWarI.His reactionwastocirculateaninternationalist "ManifestotoEuropeans"andtopursueZionist andpacifistprograms.Followingthedramatic confirmationofthegeneraltheoryofrelativity (1919)Einsteinbecameanintemational celebrity.Thisfamealsomadehimthefrequent targetofGermananti-Semites,who,duringone notableepisode,describedthetheoryofrelativ- ityas"aJewishfraud."In1933EinsteinleftGer- manyfortheInstituteforAdvancedStudyin Princeton.Althoughhislifewasalwayscentered onscience,hewasalsoengagedinthepolitics andcultureofhistimes.Hecarriedonanexten- sivecorrespondence(whosepublicationwillrun toöverförtyvolumes)withbothfamousand ordinarypeople,includingsignificantphilosoph- icalcorrespondencewithCassirer,Reichenbach, MoritzSchlick,andothers.Despitereservations överlogicalpositivism,hewassomethingofa patronofthemovement,helpingtosecureaca- demicpositionsforseveralofitsleadingfigures. In1939Einsteinsignedaletterdraftedbythe nuclearphysicistLeoSzilardinformingPresident Rooseveltabouttheprospectsforharnessing atomicenergyandwarningoftheGerman effortstomakeabomb.Einsteindidnotfurther participateinthedevelopmentofatomic weapons,andlåterwasinfluentialinthemove- mentagainstthem.In1952hewasoffered,and declined,thepresidencyofIsrael.Hediedstill workingonaunifiedfieldtheory,andjustasthe foundersofthePugwashmovementfornuclear disarmamentadoptedamanifestohehad cosignedwithRussell. Einstein'sphilosophicalthinkingwasinflu- encedbyearlyexposuretoKantandlåterstudy ofHumeandMach,whoseimpactshowsinthe operationalismusedtotreattimeinhisfamous 1905paperonspecialrelativity.Thatworkalso displaysapassionforunityinsciencecharacter- isticofnearlyallhisphysicalthinking,andthat mayrelätetothemonismofSpinoza,aphiloso- pherwhomhereadandreread.Einstein'sown understandingofrelativitystressedtheinvari- anceofthespace-timeintervalandpromoted realismwithregardtothestructureofspace- time.RealismalsoshowsupinEinstein'swork onBrownianmotion(1905),whichwasexplic- itlymotivatedbyhislong-standinginterestin demonstratingtherealityofmolecules(and atoms),andintherealisttreatmentoflight quantainhisanalysis(1905)ofthephotoelectric effect.Whilehepioneeredthedevelopmentof statisticalphysics,especiallyinhisseminalinves- tigationsofquantumphenomena(1905-25),he neverbrokewithhisbeliefindeterminismasthe onlytrulyfundamentalapproachtophysical processes.Hereagainoneseesanaffinitywith Spinoza.RealismanddeterminismbroughtEin- steinintoconflictwiththenewquantumtheory (1925-26),whoseobserverdependenceand "flightintostatistics"convincedhimthatitcould notconstitutegenuinelyfundamentalphysics. Althoughinfluentialinitsdevelopment,he becamethetheory'sforemostcritic,nevercon- tributingtoitsrefinementbutturninginsteadto theprogramofunifyingtheelectromagneticand gravitationalfieldsintoonegrand,deterministic synthesisthatwouldsomehowmakeroomfor quantumeffectsaslimitingorsingularcases.Itis generallyagreedthathisunifiedfieldprogram wasnotsuccessful,althoughhisvisioncontinues toinspireotherunificationprograms,andhis criticalassessmentsofquantummechanicsstill challengetheinstrumentalismassociatedwith thetheory. Einstein'sphilosophicalreflectionsconstitute animportantchapterintwentieth-century thought.Heunderstoodrealismaslessameta- physicaldoctrinethanamotivationalprogram, andhearguedthatdeterminismwasafeatureof theoriesratherthananaspectoftheworld 256 elanvital ellipsis directly.Alongwiththeunityofscience,other centralthemesinhisthinkingincludehisrejec- tionofinductivismandhisespousalofholism andconstructivism(orconventionalism),em- phasizingthatmeanings,concepts,andtheories arefreecreations,notlogicallyderivablefrom experiencebutsubjectrathertooverallcriteria ofcomprehensibility,empiricaladequacy,and logicalsimplicity.Holismisalsoapparentinhis acuteanalysisofthetestabilityofgeometryand hisrejectionofPoincaré'sgeometricconvention- alism. Seealsodeterminism,fieldtheory, QUANTUMMECHANICS,RELATIVITY,UNITYOF SCIENCE.A.F. elanvital.Seebergson. EleaticSchool,strictly,twofifth-centuryb.c. Greekphilosophers,ParmenidesandZenoof Elea.(TheIonianGreekcolonyofEleaorHyele insouthernItalybecameVeliainRomantimes andretainsthatnametoday.)Aplayfulremark byPlatoinSophist242dgaverisetothenotion thatXenophanesofColophon,whowasactivein southernItalyandSicily,wasParmenides' teacher,hadanticipatedParmenides'views,and foundedtheEleaticSchool.Moreover,Melissus ofSamosand(accordingtosomeancient sources)eventheatomistphilosopherLeucippus ofAbderacametoberegardedas"Eleatics,"in thesenseofsharingfundamentalviewswith ParmenidesandZeno.Inthebroadandtradi- tionaluseoftheterm,theEleaticSchoolcharac- teristicallyholdsthat"allisone"andthatchange andpluralityareunreal.Sostated,theSchool's positionisrepresentedbestbyMelissus.Seealso MELISSUSOFSAMOS,PARMENIDES,XENO- PHANES.A.P.D.M. elementaryequivalence.Seecategoricaltheory. elementaryquantificationtheory.Seeformål LOGIC. elenchus,across-examinationorrefutation.Typ- icallyinPlato'searlydialogues,Socrateshasa conversationwithsomeonewhoclaimstohave somesortofknowledge,andSocratesrefutesthis claimbyshowingtheinterlocutorthatwhathe thinksheknowsisinconsistentwithhisother opinions.Thisrefutationiscalledanelenchus.It isnotentirelynegative,forawarenessofhisown ignoranceissupposedtospurtheinterlocutorto furtherinquiry,andtheconceptsandassump- tionsemployedintherefutationsserveasthe basisforpositivePlatonictreatmentsofthesame topic.Incontrast,sophisticelenchiaremerely eristic:theyaimsimplyattherefutationofan opponentbyanymeans.Thus,Aristotlecallsfål- ladesthatonlyappeartoberefutations"sophis- ticalelenchi."Seealsosocrates.E.C.H. Elias.Seecommentariesonaristotle. eliminability,Ramsey.Seebeth'sdefinabilitythe- OREM. eliminativeinduction.Seeinduction. eliminativematerialism.Seephilosophyofmind. eliminativism.Seefolkpsychology. ElizabethofBohemia(1618-80),German Princesswhosephilosophicalreputationrestson hercorrespondencewithDescartes.Themost heavilydiscussedportionofthiscorrespondence focusesontherelationshipbetweenthemind andthebodyandonDescartes'sclaimthatthe mind-bodyunionisasimplenotion.Herdiscus- sionsoffreewillandofthenatureofthesover- eigngoodalsohavephilosophicalinterest.See alsoDESCARTES,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND. M.At. ellipsis,anexpression(spökenorwritten)from whichsemanticallyorsyntacticallyessential materialhasbeendeleted,usuallyforconcise- ness.Ellipticalsentencesareoftenusedto answerquestionswithoutrepeatingmaterial occurringinthequestions.Forexample,the word'Lincoln'maybeananswertothequestion oftheauthorshipoftheGettysburgAddressorto thequestionofthebirthplaceofGeorgeBoole. Thesingleword'Lincoln'canbeseenasanellip- ticalnamewhenusedasanellipsisof'Abraham Lincoln',anditcanbeseenasanellipticalsen- tencewhenusedasanellipsisfor'AbrahamLin- colnwrotetheGettysburgAddress'.Other typicalellipticalsentencesare:'Abeisafatherof two[children]','Benarrivesattwelve[noon]'.A typicalellipsisthatoccursindiscussionofellipses involvescitingtheellipticalsentenceswiththe deletedmaterialaddedinbrackets(oftenwith 'se'or'scilicet')insteadofalsopresentingthe completesentence.Ellipsisalsooccursabovethe sententiallevel,e.g.wherewell-knownpremises areomittedinthecourseofargumentation.The word'enthymeme'designatesanellipticalargu- mentexpressionfromwhichoneormore premise-expressionshavebeendeleted.The 257 emanationism Emerson,RalphWaldo expression'ellipticambiguity'designatesambi- guityarisingfromellipsis.Seealsoambiguity, ARGUMENT,LOGICALFORM.J.Cor. emanationism,adoctrineabouttheoriginand ontologicalstructureoftheworld,mostfre- quentlyassociatedwithPlotinusandotherNeo- platonists,accordingtowhicheverythingelse thatexistsisanemanationfromaprimordial unity,calledbyPlotinus"theOne."Thefirst productofemanationfromtheOneisIntelli- gence(nom),arealmresemblingPlato'sworldof Forms.FromIntelligenceemanatesSoul (psuche),conceivedasanactiveprinciplethat imposes,insofarasthatispossible,therational structureofIntelligenceonthematterthat emanatesfromSoul.Theprocessofemanationis typicallyconceivedtobenecessaryandtimeless: althoughSoul,forinstance,proceedsfromIntel- ligence,thenotionofprocessionisoneoflogical dependenceratherthantemporalsequence.The Oneremainsunaffectedandundiminishedby emanation:PlotinuslikenstheOnetothesun, whichnecessarilyemitslightfromitsnaturally infiniteabundancewithoutsufferingchangeor lossofitsownsubstance.Althoughemanation- isminfluencedsomeJewish,Christian,and Islamicthinkers,itwasincompatiblewiththose theisticdoctrinesofdivineactivitythatmain- tainedthatGod'screativechoiceandtheworld thuscreatedwerecontingent,andthatGodcan, ifhechooses,interactdirectlywithindividual creatures.Seealsoplotinus.W.E.M. embodiment,thebodilyaspectsofhumansubjec- tivity.Embodimentisthecentralthemein Europeanphenomenology,withitsmostexten- sivetreatmentintheworksofMauriceMerleau- Ponty.Merleau-Ponty'saccountofembodiment distinguishesbetween"theobjectivebody," whichisthebodyregardedasaphysiological entity,and"thephenomenalbody,"whichisnot justsomebody,someparticularphysiological entity,butmy(oryour)bodyasI(oryou)experi- enceit.Ofcourse,itispossibletoexperience one'sownbodyasaphysiologicalentity.Butthis isnottypicallythecase.Typically,Iexperience mybody(tacitly)asaunifiedpotentialorcapac- ityfordoingthisandthat-typingthissentence, scratchingthatitch,etc.Moreover,thissensethat Ihaveofmyownmotorcapacities(expressed, say,asakindofbodilyconfidence)doesnot dependonanunderstandingofthephysiological processesinvolvedinperformingtheactionin question. Thedistinctionbetweentheobjectiveandphe- nomenalbodyiscentraltounderstandingthe phenomenologicaltreatmentofembodiment. Embodimentisnotaconceptthatpertainstothe bodygraspedasaphysiologicalentity.Ratherit pertainstothephenomenalbodyandtotherole itplaysinourobject-directedexperiences. Seealsomerleau-ponty,phenomenol- ogy.D.Le. emergence.Seemethodologicalholism. emergentism,descriptive.Seeholism. emergentmaterialism.Seephilosophyofmind. Emersonianperfectionism.Seecavell. Emerson,RalphWaldo(1803-82),American philosophicalessayist,lecturer,andpoet,alead- ingfigureinthetranscendentalistmovement.He wasborninBostonandeducatedatHarvard.As ayoungmanhetaughtschoolandservedasa Unitarianminister(1826-32).Afterheresigned hispastoratein1832,hetraveledtoEuropéto visitColeridge,Carlyle,andWordsworth.Upon hisreturn,hesettledinConcord,Massachusetts, andbegananewasapubliclecturer,essayist,and culturalcritic.Allthewhilehemaintaineda voluminouscorrespondenceandkeptadetailed, evocativejournal.Mostofthismaterialhasbeen published,anditcastsconsiderablelightonthe depthofhisthought,attimesmoresothanhis publicpresentationsandbooks. Hislifewaspockmarkedbypersonaltragedies, notablythedeathofhisfatherwhenEmerson waseight;thedeathofhisfirstwife,Ellen,after twoyearsofmarriage;andthedeathofhisold- estson,Waldo,attheageoffive.Suchafflictions beliethecommonlyheldassumptionthatEmer- sonwasathinkerwhodidnotfacethe intractableproblemofevil.Tothecontrary,his writingsshouldbereadasacontinuingstruggle torendertherichestpossibleversionofoursitu- ation,giventhat"thingsareinthesaddleand ridemankind." AlthoughEmersondidnotwriteasystematic workinphilosophy,heunquestionablybe- queathedanimportantphilosophicalvisionand countlessphilosophicalpieces.Beginningwith hisconcentrationonthemotifofnature,its embracingquality,andtherhythmsofourinex- tricablepresencewithinitsactivities,Emerson detailsthe"compensatory"ebbandflowofthe humanjourney.Thehumansoulandnatureare relatedas"print"to"seal,"andyetnatureisnot alwaysbeneficent.Inhisessay"Compensation," 258 emotion emotion Emersonwritesthat"thevalueoftheuniverse continuestothrowitselfintoeverypoint.Ifthe goodisthere,soistheevil;iftheaffinity,sothe repulsion,iftheforce,sothelimitation." Aftertheacclaimgiventhepublicationof Emerson'sfirstbook,Nature(i836),hebeganto gatherhispubliclectures,apresentational mediumatwhichhewasriveting,convincing, andinspiring.In1841Emersonpublishedhis Essays-FirstSeries,whichincludedthelovely piece"Circles,"whereinhefollowstheblunt maxim"wegrizzleeveryday"withthehealing affirmationthat"lifeisaseriesofsurprises."This volumealsocontains"Self-Reliance,"which furnishedamottofortheself-proclaimingintre- pidityofnineteenth-centuryAmericanindivid- ualism. TheenthusiasticresponsetoEmerson'sessays enabledhimtopublishthreeadditionalcollec- tionswithinthedecade:Essays-SecondSeries (1844),Nature,AddressesandLectures(1849),and RepresentativeMen(1850).Thesebooksandtheir successorscontainedlectures,orations,poems, andaddressesöverawiderangeoftopics,philo- sophical,personal,characterological,travel,his- torical,andliterary.Emerson'sproseisswift, clear,andepigrammatic,likeaseriesofwritten stochasticprobes,resultinginaYankeecrazy quilt,munificentofshapeandcolor.Emerson spöketobeheardandwrotetoberead,especially bytheoftendenigrated"common"person.In fact,duringEmerson'sEuropeanlecturetourin 1848,alettertoaLondonnewspaperrequested loweringtheadmissionpricesothatpoorerpeo- plecouldattend,for"tomisshimistolosean importantpartoftheNineteenthCentury." Emerson'sdeeplydemocraticattitudehada reflectivephilosophicalbase.Hebelievedthat ordinaryexperiencewasepiphanicifwebut openourselvestoitsvirtuallyinfinitemessages. DespitehisBrahmanicappearanceand demeanor,Emersonwasincontinuoustouch withordinarythings.Hewrote,"Ourchiefexpe- rienceshavebeencasual."Hisbeliefintheexplo- siveandpedagogicalcharacterofordinary experienceisespeciallypresentinhisinfluential oration"TheAmericanScholar."Aftercriticizing Americanthoughtasthoroughlyderivative,he plotstheinfluencesnecessarytogenerateagen- uinescholar,paramountamongthemnature andthelearningofthepast,thoughhecautions usnottobetrappedinexcessiveretrospectionat theexpenseof"anoriginalrelationtotheuni- verse."Itishisdiscussionof"action"asthethird influenceonthescholarthatenableshimtopro- jecthiscleareststatementofhisunderlying philosophicalcommitment.Withoutaction, "thoughtcanneverripenintotruth,"moreover, "thinkingisapartialact,"whereaslivingisa "totalact."Expresslyopposedtoanyformofpsy- chological,religious,philosophical,orbehavioral dualism,hecounselsusthatthespiritualisnot setapart,beyondreachofthosewhotoilinthe everyday.Rather,themostprofoundmeanings ofthehumancondition,"lurk"inthe"com- mon,"the"low,"the"familiar,"the"today." TheinfluenceofthethoughtofEmerson reachesacrossclass,caste,genre,andpersuasion. ThinkersasdiverseasJames,Nietzsche,Whit- man,Proust,GertrudeStein,RobertFrost,Frank LloydWright,FrederickLawOlmsted,andWal- laceStevensareamongthosedeeplyindebtedto Emerson.Yet,itwasDeweywhobestcaught theenduringbequestofEmerson,writingof"the finalwordofEmerson'sphilosophy,[as]the identityofBeing,unqualifiedandimmutable, withcharacter." Seealsotranscendentalism.J.J.M. emotion,asconceivedbyphilosophersandpsy- chologists,anyofseveralgeneraltypesofmen- talstates,approximatelythosethathadbeen called"passions"byearlierphilosophers,suchas DescartesandHume.Anger,e.g.,isoneemotion, fearasecond,andjoyathird.Anemotionmay alsobeacontent-specifictype,e.g.,fearofan earthquake,oratokenofanemotiontype,e.g., Mary'spresentfearthatanearthquakeisimmi- nent. Thevariousstatestypicallyclassifiedasemo- tionsappeartobelinkedtogetheronlybyover- lappingfamilyresemblancesratherthanbyaset ofnecessaryandsufficientconditions.Thusan adequatephilosophicalorpsychological"theory ofemotion"shouldprobablybeafamilyoftheo- ries.Eventolabelthesestates"emotions" wronglysuggeststhattheyareallmarkedby emotion,intheoldersenseofmentalagitation(a metaphoricalextensionoftheoriginalsense,agi- tatedmotion).Apersonwhois,e.g.,pleasedor sadaboutsomethingisnottypicallyagitated.To speakofanger,fear,joy,sadness,etc,collectively as"theemotions"fosterstheassumption(which Jamessaidhetookforgranted)thattheseare justqualitativelydistinctfeelingsofmentalagita- tion.Thisexaggeratestheimportanceofagitation andneglectsthecharacteristicdifferences,noted byAristotle,Spinoza,andothers,inthetypesof situationsthatevokethevariousemotions. Oneimportantfeatureofmostemotionsis capturedbytheoldercategoryofpassions,inthe senseof'waysofbeingactedupon'.Inmanylan- 259 emotions,theseven emotivism guagesnearlyallemotionadjectivesarederived fromparticiples:e.g.,theEnglishwords 'amused','annoyed','ashamed','astonished', 'delighted','embarrassed','excited','frightened', 'horrified','irritated','pleased','terrified','sur- prised','upsef,and'worried'.Whenweare,e.g., embarrassed,somethingactsonus,i.e.,embar- rassesus:typically,somesituationorfactof whichweareaware,suchasourhavingon unmatchedshoes.Tocallembarrassmentapas- sioninthesenseofawayofbeingactedupon doesnotimplythatweare"passive"withrespect toit,i.e.,havenocontrolöverwhetheragiven situationembarrassesusandthusnoresponsi- bilityforourembarrassment. Notonlysituationsandfactsbutalsopersons may"do"somethingtous,asinloveandhate, andmerepossibilitiesmayhaveaneffectonus,as infearandhope.Thepossibilityemotionsare sometimescharacterizedas"forward-looking," andemotionsthatareresponsestoactualsitua- tionsorfactsaresaidtobe"backward-looking." Thesetemporalcharacterizationsareinaccurate andmisleading.Onemaybefearfulorhopeful thatacertaineventoccurredinthepast,pro- videdoneisnotcertainastowhetheritoccurred; andonemaybe,e.g.,embarrassedaboutwhatis goingtooccur,providedoneiscertainitwill occur. Invariouspassionstheeffectonusmay includeinvoluntaryphysiologicalchanges,feel- ingsofagitationduetoarousaloftheautonomic nervoussystem,characteristicfacialexpressions, andinclinationstowardintentionalaction(or inaction)thatariseindependentlyofanyratio- nalwarrant.Phenomenologically,however, theseeffectsdonotappeartoustobealienand non-rational,likemuscularspasms.Ratherthey seemanintegralpartofourperceptionofthesit- uationas,e.g.,anembarrassingsituation,orone thatwarrantsourembarrassment. Seealsojames-langetheory,philoso- PHYOFMIND.R.M.G. emotions,theseven.Seekoreanphilosophy. emotions,thesix.Seech'ing. emotiveconjugation,ahumorousverbalconju- gation,designedtoexposéandmockfirst-person bias,inwhichostensiblythesameactionis describedinsuccessivelymorepejorativeterms throughthefirst,second,andthirdpersons(e.g., "Iamfirm,Youarestubborn,Heisapig-headed fool"). ThisexamplewasusedbyRussellinthecourse ofaBBCRadio"Brains'Trust"discussionin 1948.ItwaspopularizedlåterthatyearwhenThe NewStatesmanranacompetitionforotherexam- ples.An"unprecedentedresponse"broughtin 2,000entries,including:"Iamwellinformed, Youlistentogossip,Hebelieveswhathereadsin thepaper";and"IwenttoOxford,Youwentto Cambridge,HewenttotheLondonSchoolof Economics"(RussellwaseducatedatCambridge andlåtertaughtthere). Seealsorussell.N.G. emotivemeaning.Seeemotivism,meaning. emotivism,anoncognitivistmetaethicalview opposedtocognitivism,whichholdsthatmoral judgmentsshouldbeconstruedasassertions aboutthemoralpropertiesofactions,persons, policies,andotherobjectsofmoralassessment, thatmoralpredicatespurporttorefertoproper- tiesofsuchobjects,thatmoraljudgments(orthe propositionsthattheyexpress)canbetrueor false,andthatcognizerscanhavethecognitive attitudeofbelieftowardthepropositionsthat moraljudgmentsexpress.Noncognitivism deniestheseclaims;itholdsthatmoraljudg- mentsdonotmakeassertionsorexpresspropo- sitions.Ifmoraljudgmentsdonotexpress propositions,theformercanbeneithertruenor false,andmoralbeliefandmoralknowledgeare notpossible.Theemotivistisanoncognitivist whoclaimsthatmoraljudgments,intheirpri- marysense,expresstheappraiser'sattitudes- approvalordisapproval-towardtheobjectof evaluation,ratherthanmakeassertionsabout thepropertiesofthatobject. Becauseemotivismtreatsmoraljudgmentsas theexpressionsoftheappraiser'sproandcon attitudes,itissometimesreferredtoastheboo- hurrahtheoryofethics.Emotivistsdistinguish theirthesisthatmoraljudgmentsexpressthe appraiser'sattitudesfromthesubjectivistclaim thattheystateorreporttheappraiser'sattitudes (thelatterviewisaformofcognitivism).Some versionsofemotivismdistinguishbetweenthis primary,emotivemeaningofmoraljudgments andasecondary,descriptivemeaning.Initspri- mary,emotivemeaning,amoraljudgment expressestheappraiser'sattitudestowardthe objectofevaluationratherthanascribingprop- ertiestothatobject.Butsecondarily,moraljudg- mentsrefertothosenon-moralpropertiesofthe objectofevaluationinvirtueofwhichthe appraiserhasandexpressesherattitudes.SoifI judgethatyouractoftortureiswrong,myjudg- menthastwocomponents.Itsprimary,emotive 260 empathicsolipsism Empedocles senseistoexpressmydisapprovalofyouract.Its secondary,descriptivesenseistodenotethose non-moralpropertiesofyouractuponwhichI basemydisapproval.Thesearepresumablythe verypropertiesthatmakeitanactoftorture- roughly,acausingofintensepaininorderto punish,coerce,oraffordsadisticpleasure. Bymakingemotivemeaningprimary,emo- tivistsclaimtopreservetheunivocityofmoral languagebetweenspeakerswhoemploydiffer- entcriteriaofapplicationfortheirmoralterms. Also,bystressingtheintimateconnectionbe- tweenmoraljudgmentandtheagenfsnon-cog- nitiveattitudes,emotivistsclaimtocapturethe motivationalpropertiesofmoraljudgment. Someemotivistshavealsoattemptedtoaccount forascriptionsoftruthtomoraljudgmentsby acceptingtheredundancyaccountofascriptions oftruthasexpressionsofagreementwiththe originaljudgment.Theemotivistmustthinkthat suchascriptionsoftruthtomoraljudgments merelyreflecttheascriber'sagreementinnon- cognitiveattitudewiththeattitudeexpressedby theoriginaljudgment. Criticsofemotivismchallengethesealleged virtues.Theyclaimthatmoralagreementneed nottrackagreementinattitude;therecanbe moraldisagreementwithoutdisagreementin attitude(betweenmoralistswithdifferentmoral views),anddisagreementinattitudewithout moraldisagreement(betweenmoralistsand immoralists).Bydistinguishingbetweenthe meaningofmoraltermsandspeakers'beliefs abouttheextensionofthoseterms,criticsclaim thatwecanaccountfortheunivocityofmoral termsinspiteofmoraldisagreementwithout introducingaprimaryemotivesenseformoral terms.Criticsalsoallegethattheemotivistanaly- sisofmoraljudgmentsastheexpressionofthe appraiser'sattitudesprecludesrecognizingthe possibilityofmoraljudgmentsthatdonot engageorreflecttheattitudesoftheappraiser. Forinstance,itisnotclearhowemotivismcan accommodatetheamoralist-onewhorecog- nizesmoralrequirementsbutisindifferentto them.Criticsalsochargeemotivismwithfailure tocapturethecognitiveaspectsofmoraldis- course.Becauseemotivismisatheoryabout moraljudgmentorassertion,itisdifficultforthe emotivisttogiveasemanticanalysisofmoral predicatesinunassertedcontexts,suchasinthe antecedentsofconditionalmoraljudgments (e.g.,"Ifhedidwrong,thenheoughttobepun- ished").Finally,onemightwanttorecognizethe truthofsomemoraljudgments,perhapsinorder tomakeroomforthepossibilityofmoralmis- takes.Ifso,thenonemaynotbesatisfiedwith theemotivisfsappealtoredundancyordisquo- tationalaccountsoftheascriptionoftruth. EmotivismwasintroducedbyAyerinLan- guage,Truth,andLogic(2ded.,1946)andrefined byC.L.StevensoninFactsandValues(1963)and EthicsandLanguage(1944). Seealsocognitivism,ethicalobjectiv- ISM,METAETHICS,MORALSKEPTICISM,NIHIL- ISM,NONCOGNITIVISM,PRESCRIPTIVISM. D.O.B. empathicsolipsism.Seesolipsism. empathy,imaginativeprojectionintoanother person'ssituation,especiallyforvicariouscap- tureofitsemotionalandmotivationalqualities. ThetermisanEnglishrendering(bytheAnglo- AmericanpsychologistE.G.Titchener,1867- 1927)oftheGermanEinfiihlung,madepopulär byTheodoreLipps(1851-1914),whichalsocov- eredimaginativeidentificationwithinanimate objectsofaestheticcontemplation.Under'sym- pathy',manyaspectswereearlierdiscussedby Hume,AdamSmith,andotherScottishphiloso- phers.Empathyhasbeenconsideredaprecondi- tionofethicalthinkingandamajorcontributor tosocialbondingandaltruism,mentalstateattri- bution,languageuse,andtranslation. Therelevantspectrumofphenomenain- cludesautomaticandoftensubliminalmotor mimicryoftheexpressionsormanifestationsof another'srealorfeignedemotion,pain,orplea- sure;emotionalcontagion,bywhichone "catches"another'sapparentemotion,often unconsciouslyandwithoutreferencetoitscause or"object";consciousandunconsciousmimicry ofdirectionofgaze,withconsequenttransferof attentionfromtheother'sresponsetoitscause; andconsciousorunconsciousrole-taking, whichreconstructsinimagination(withor withoutimagery)aspectsoftheother'ssituation astheother"perceives"it. Seealsoeinfuhlung,emotion,expres- sionTHEORYOFART,HUME,PROBLEMOF OTHERMINDS,SIMULATIONTHEORY,SMITH, VERSTEHEN.R.M.G. Empedocles(c.495-c.435b.c),Greekpre- Socraticphilosopherwhocreatedaphysicalthe- oryinresponsetoParmenideswhilein- corporatingPythagoreanideasofthesoulinto hisphilosophy.FollowingParmenidesinhis rejectionofcoming-to-beandperishing,he accountedforphenomenalchangebypositing fourelements(his"roots,"rizomata),earth, 261 empirical empincism water,air,andfire.Whentheymixtogetherin setproportionstheycreatecompoundsub- stancessuchasbloodandbone.Twoforcesact ontheelements,LoveandStrife,theformer joiningthedifferentelements,thelatterseparat- ingthem.Inhiscyclicalcosmogonythefourele- mentscombinetoformtheSphere,acompletely homogeneoussphericalbodypermeatedby Love,which,shatteredbyStrife,growsintoa cosmoswiththeelementsformingdistinctcos- micmassesofearth,water(theseas),air,and fire.ThereiscontroversyöverwhetherEmpedo- clespositsoneortwoperiodswhenlivingthings existinthecycle.(Ononeviewtherearetwo periods,betweenwhichintervenesastageof completeseparationoftheelements.)Empedo- clesacceptsthePythagoreanviewofreincarna- tionofsouls,seeinglifeaspunishmentforan originalsinandrequiringtheexpiationofapious andphilosophicallife.Thustheexileandreturn oftheindividualsoulreflectsinthemicrocosm thecosmicmovementfromharmonytodivision toharmony.Empedocles'fourelementsbecame standardinnaturalphilosophydowntotheearly modernera,andAristotlerecognizedhisLove andStrifeasanearlyexpressionoftheefficient cause.Seealsopythagoras.D.W.G. empirical.Seeapriori. empiricaldecisiontheory,thescientificstudyof humanjudgmentanddecisionmaking.Agrow- ingbodyofempiricalresearchhasdescribedthe actuallimitationsoninductivereasoning.By contrast,traditionaldecisiontheoryisnorma- tive;thetheoryproposesidealproceduresfor solvingsomeclassofproblems. Thedescriptivestudyofdecisionmakingwas pioneeredbyfiguresincludingAmosTversky, DanielKahneman,RichardNisbett,andLee Ross,andtheirempiricalresearchhasdocu- mentedthelimitationsandbiasesofvarious heuristics,orsimplerulesofthumb,routinely usedinreasoning.Therepresentativeness heuristicisaruleofthumbusedtojudgeproba- bilitiesbasedonthedegreetowhichoneclass represents(orresembles)anotherclass.For example,weassumethatbasketballplayershave a"hothand"duringaparticulargame-produc- inganuninterruptedstringofsuccessful shots-becauseweunderestimatetherelative frequencywithwhichsuchsuccessfulrunsoccur intheentirepopulationofthatplayer'srecord. Theavailabilityheuristicisaruleofthumbthat usestheeasewithwhichaninstancecomesto mindasanindexoftheprobabilityofanevent. Sucharuleisunreliablewhensalienceinmem- orymisleads;forexample,mostpeople(incor- rectly)råtedeathbysharkattackasmore probablethandeathbyfallingairplaneparts. (Foranoverview,seeD.Kahneman,P.Slovic, andA.Tversky,eds.,JudgmentUnderUncertainty: HeuristicsandBiases,1982.) Thesebiases,foundinlaypeopleandstatistical expertsalike,haveanaturalexplanationon accountssuchasHerbertSimon's(1957)concept of"boundedrationality."Accordingtothisview, thelimitationsonourdecisionmakingarefixed inpartbyspecificfeaturesofourpsychological architecture.Thisarchitectureplacesconstraints onsuchfactorsasprocessingspeedandinforma- tioncapacity,andthisintumproducespre- dictable,systematicerrorsinperformance.Thus, ratherthanproposinghighlyidealizedrules appropriatetoanomniscientLaplaceangenius- morecharacteristicoftraditionalnormative approachestodecisiontheory-empiricaldeci- siontheoryattemptstoformulateadescriptively accurate,andthuspsychologicallyrealistic, accountofrationality. Evenifcertainsimplerulescan,inparticular settings,outperformotherstrategies,itisstill importanttounderstandthecausesofthesys- tematicerrorswemakeontasksperfectlyrepre- sentativeofroutinedecisionmaking.Oncethe contextisspecified,empiricaldecision-making researchallowsustostudybothdescriptivedeci- sionrulesthatwefollowspontaneouslyandnor- mativerulesthatweoughttofollowupon reflection. Seealsobayesianrationality,decision THEORY,HEURISTICS.J.D.T. empiricalego.Seekant. empiricalmeaning.Seemeaning. empiricalprobability.Seeprobability. empiricism(fromempiric,'doctorwhorelieson practicalexperience',ultimatelyfromGreek empeiria,'experience'),atypeoftheoryinepis- temology,thebasicideabehindallexamplesof thetypebeingthatexperiencehasprimacyin humanknowledgeandjustifiedbelief.Because empiricismisnotasingleviewbutatypeofview withmanydifferentexamples,itisappropriate tospeaknotjustofempiricismbutofempiri- cisms.Perhapsthemostfundamentaldistinction tobedrawnamongthevariousempiricismsis thatbetweenthoseconsistingofsomeclaim aboutconceptsandthoseconsistingofsome 262 empiricism,constructive enantiamorphs claimaboutbeliefs-callthese,respectively,con- cept-empiricismsandbelief-empiricisms. Concept-empiricismsallbeginbysinglingout thoseconceptsthatapplytosomeexperienceor other;theconceptofdizziness,e.g.,appliestothe experienceofdizziness.Andwhatisthen claimedisthatallconceptsthathumanbeingsdo andcanpossesseitherapplytosomeexperience thatsomeonehashad,orhavebeenderived fromsuchconceptsbysomeone'sperformingon thoseconceptsoneoranothersuchmentaloper- ationascombination,distinction,andabstrac- tion.Howexactlymyconceptsareandmustbe relatedtomyexperienceandtomyperformance ofthosementaloperationsaremattersonwhich concept-empiricistsdiffer;mostifnotallwould grantweeachacquiremanyconceptsbylearn- inglanguage,anditdoesnotseemplausibleto holdthateachconceptthusacquiredeither appliestosomeexperiencethatonehasoneself hadorhasbeenderivedfromsuchbyoneself. Butthoughconcept-empiricistsdisagreecon- cerningtheconditionsforlinguisticacquisition ortransmissionofaconcept,whatunitesthem, torepeat,istheclaimthatallhumanconcepts eitherapplytosomeexperiencethatsomeone hasactuallyhadortheyhavebeenderivedfrom suchbysomeone'sactuallyperformingonthose thementaloperationsofcombination,distinc- tion,andabstraction.Mostconcept-empiricists willalsosaysomethingmore:thattheexperi- encemusthaveevokedtheconceptintheperson havingtheexperience,orthatthepersonhaving theexperiencemusthaverecognizedthatthecon- ceptappliestohisorherexperience,orsome- thingofthatsort. Whatunitesallbelief-empiricistsistheclaim thatforone'sbeliefstopossessoneoranother truth-relevantmerit,theymustberelatedinone oranotherwaytosomeone'sexperience.Belief- empiricismsdifferfromeachother,foronething, withrespecttothemeritconcerningwhichthe claimismade.Somebelief-empiricistsclaimthat abeliefdoesnothavethestatusofknowledge unlessithastherequisiterelationtoexperience; someclaimthatabelieflackswarrantunlessit hasthatrelation;othersclaimthatabeliefisnot permissiblyheldunlessitståndsinthatrelation; andyetothersclaimthatitisnotaproperlyscien- tificbeliefunlessitståndsinthatrelation.And noteventhislistexhauststhepossibilities. Belief-empiricismsalsodifferwithrespectto thespecificrelationtoexperiencethatissaidto benecessaryforthemeritinquestiontobepres- ent.Somebelief-empiricistshold,forexample, thatabeliefispermissiblyheldonlyifitspropo- sitionalcontentiseitherareportoftheperson's presentorrememberedexperience,orthebelief isheldonthebasisofsuchbeliefsandisproba- blewithrespecttothebeliefsonthebasisof whichitisheld.Kant,bycontrast,heldthe ratherdifferentviewthatifabeliefistoconsti- tute(empirical)knowledge,itmustinsomeway beaboutexperience. Third,belief-empiricismsdifferfromeach otherwithrespecttothepersontowhoseexpe- rienceabeliefmustståndintherelationspeci- fiedifitistopossessthemeritspecified.Itneed notalwaysbeanexperienceofthepersonwhose beliefisbeingconsidered.Itmightbeanexperi- enceofsomeonegivingtestimonyaboutit. Itshouldbeobviousthataphilosophermight wellacceptonekindofempiricismwhilereject- ingothers.Thustoaskphilosopherswhether theyareempiricistsisaquestionvoidforvague- ness.ItisregularlysaidofLockethathewasan empiricist;andindeed,hewasaconcept-empiri- cistofacertainsort.Butheembracednoversion whatsoeverofbelief-empiricism. Uptothispoint,'experience'hasbeenused withoutexplanation.Butanyoneacquainted withthehistoryofphilosophywillbeawarethat differentphilosopherspickoutdifferentphe- nomenawiththeword;andevenwhenthey pickoutthesamephenomenon,theyhavedif- ferentviewsastothestructureofthephenome- nonthattheycall'experience.'Thedifferences onthesemattersreflectyetmoredistinctions amongempiricismsthanhavebeendelineated above. Seealsoepistemology,logicalposi- TIVISM,RATIONALISM.N.P.W. empiricism,constructive.Seesocialconstruc- TIVISM. empiricism,British.Seerationalism. empiricism,logical.Seelogicalpositivism. enantiamorphs(fromGreekenantios,'opposite', andmorphe,'form'),objectswhoseshapesdiffer asdothoseofarightandlefthand.Oneofapair ofenantiamorphscanbemadetolookidentical inshapetotheotherbyviewingitinamirrorbut notmerelybychangingitsspatialorientation. Enantiamorphsfigureprominentlyinthework ofKant,whoarguedthattheexistenceofenan- tiamorphicpairsentailedthatLeibnizianrela- tionaltheoriesofspaceweretoberejectedin favörofNewtonianabsolutisttheories,that somefactsaboutspacecouldbeapprehended 263 encrateia energeia onlyby"pureintuition,"andthatspacewas mind-dependent.Seealsokant,leibniz. R.Ke. encrateia.Seeakrasia. Encyclopedia,inFrench,Encyclopédie;fullEnglish title:Encyclopedia,oraDescriptiveDictionaryofthe Sciences,ArtsandTrades.Launchedin1747bythe ParisianpublisherLeBreton,whohadsecured d'Alembert'sandDiderofseditorship,theEncy- clopediawasgraduallyreleasedfrom1751to 1772,despiteatemporaryrevocationofitsroyal privilege.Comprisingseventeenfoliovolumesof 17,818artidesandelevenfoliovolumesof2,885 plates,theworkrequiredastaffof272contribu- tors,writers,andengravers.Itincorporatedthe accumulatedknowledgeandrationalist,secular- istviewsoftheFrenchEnlightenmentandpre- scribedeconomic,social,andpoliticalreforms. Enormouslysuccessful,theworkwasreprinted withrevisionsfivetimesbefore1789. Contributionsweremadebythephilosophes Voltaire,Rousseau,Montesquieu,d'Holbach, Naigeon,andSaint-Lambert;thewritersDuclos andMarmontel;thetheologiansMorelletand Målet;enlightenedclerics,e.g.Raynal;explor- ers,e.g.LaCondamine;naturalscientists,e.g. Daubenton;physicians,e.g.Bouillet;theecono- mistsTurgotandQuesnay;engineers,e.g.Per- ronet;horologists,e.g.Berthoud;andscoresof otherexperts. "ThepurposeofanEncyclopedia,"wrote Diderot,"istocollecttheknowledgedispersedon thesurfaceoftheearth,andtounfolditsgeneral system"("Encyclopedia,"Vol.5,1755).The Encyclopediaofferedtheeducatedreaderacom- prehensive,systematic,anddescriptivereposi- toryofcontemporaryliberalandmechanicalarts. D'AlembertandDiderotdevelopedasensation- alistepistemology("PreliminaryDiscourse") undertheinfluenceofLockeandCondillac.They compiledandrationallyclassifiedexistingknowl- edgeaccordingtothenoeticprocess(memory, imagination,andreason).Basedontheassump- tionoftheunityoftheoryandpraxis,their approachwaspositivisticandutilitarian. TheEncyclopedistsvindicatedexperimental reasonandtheruleofnature,fosteredtheprac- ticeofcriticism,andstimulatedthedevelopment ofnewsciences.Inreligiousmatters,theyculti- vatedambiguitytoescapecensorship.Whereas mostcontributorsheldeitherconciliatoryor orthodoxpositions,d'Alembert,Diderot,and d'Holbachbarelyconcealedtheirnaturalisticand atheisticopinions.Theirradicalismwasperva- sive.Supematuralism,obscurantism,andfanati- cismwereamongtheEncyclopedists'favorite targets.Theyidentifiedreligionwithsuperstition andtheologywithblackmagic;assertedthe superiorityofnaturalmoralityövertheological ethics;demandedreligioustoleration;andcham- pionedhumanrights.Theyinnovativelyre- tracedthehistoricalconditionsofthedevelop- mentofmodernphilosophy.Theyfurthermore pioneeredideasontradeandindustryandantic- ipatedtherelevanceofhistoriography,sociology, economics,andlinguistics. Asthemostambitiousandexpansiverefer- enceworkofitstime,theEncyclopediacrystal- lizedtheconfidenceoftheeighteenth-century bourgeoisieinthecapacityofreasontodis- peltheshadowsofignoranceandimprovesoci- ety. Seealsod'alembert,d'holbach, DIDEROT,VOLTAIRE.J.-L.S. Encyclopedists.Seeencyclopedia. endinitself.Seekant. endurance.Seeperdurance. energeia,GreektermcoinedbyAristotleand oftentranslatedas'activity','actuality',andeven 'act',butmoreliterallyrendered'(astateof) functioning'.SinceforAristotlethefunctionof anobjectisitstelosoraim,energeiacanalsobe describedasanentelecheiaorrealization(another coinedtermheusesinterchangeablywith energeia).Sounderstood,itcandenoteeither(a) something'sbeingfunctional,thoughnotinuse atthemoment,and(b)something'sactually functioning,whichAristotledescribesasa"first realization"and"secondrealization"respec- tively(OntheSoulII.5).Ingeneral,everyenergeia iscorrelativetosomedunamis,acapabilityor powertofunctioninacertainway,andinthe centralbooksoftheMetaphysicsAristotleusesthe linkagebetweenthesetwoconceptstoexplain therelationofformtomatter.Healsodistin- guishesbetweenenergeiaandkinttsis(changeor motion)(MetaphysicsIX.6;NicomacheanEthics X.4).Akinesisisdefinedbyreferencetoitster- minus(e.g.,learninghowtomultiply)andisthus incompleteatanypointbeforereachingitscon- clusion.Anenergeia,incontrast,isastatecom- pleteinitself(e.g.,seeing).Thus,Aristotlesays thatatanytimethatIamseeing,itisalsotrue thatIhaveseen;butitisnottruethatatanytime IamlearningthatIhavelearned.InGreek,this differenceisnotsomuchoneoftenseasof 264 energeticism Engels,Friedrich aspect:theperfecttensemarksa"perfect"or completestate,andnotnecessarilyprioractivity. Seealsoaristotle.V.C. energeticism,alsocalledenergetismorenergism, thedoctrinethatenergyisthefundamentalsub- stanceunderlyingallchange.Itsmostprominent championwasthephysicalchemistWilhelm Ostwald(1853-1932).Inhisaddress"DieUber- windungdeswissenschaftlichenMaterialismus" ('TheConquestofScientificMaterialism"), deliveredatLtibeckin1895,Ostwaldchastised theatomic-kinetictheoryaslackingprogressand claimedthataunifiedscience,energetics,could bebasedsolelyontheconceptofenergy.Many ofOstwald'scriticismsofmaterialismandmech- anisticreductionismderivedfromMach.Ost- wald'sattemptstodeducethefundamental equationsofthermodynamicsandmechanics fromtheprinciplesofenergyconservationand transformationwereindebtedtothewritingsof GeorgHelm(1874-1919),especiallyDieLehre vonEnergie("TheLawsofEnergy,"1887)andDie Energetik("Energetics,"1898).Ostwalddefended Helm'sfactorizationthesisthatallchangesin energycanbeanalyzedasaproductofintensity andcapacityfactors.Thefactorizationthesisand theattempttoderivemechanicsandthermody- namicsfromtheprinciplesofenergeticswere subjectedtodevastatingcriticismsbyBoltzmann andMaxPlanck.Boltzmannalsocriticizedthe dogmatismofOstwald'srejectionoftheatomic- kinetictheory.Ostwald'sprogramtounifythe sciencesunderthebannerofenergeticswithered inthefaceofthesecriticisms.Seealsoboltz- mann,MACH,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE.M.C. energetism,energism.Seeenergeticism. Engels,Friedrich(1820-95),Germansocialist andeconomistwho,withMarx,wasthefounder ofwhatlåterwascalledMarxism.Whetherthere aresignificantdifferencesbetweenMarxand Engelsisaquestionmuchindisputeamong scholarsofMarxism.Certainlytherearediffer- encesinemphasis,buttherewasalsoadivision oflaborbetweenthem.Engels,andnotMarx, presentedaMarxistaccountofnaturalscience andintegratedDarwinianelementsinMarxian theory.Buttheyalsocoauthoredmajorworks, includingTheHolyFamily,TheGermanIdeology (1845),andTheCommunistManifesto(1848). Engelsthoughtofhimselfasthejuniorpartner intheirlifelongcollaboration.Thatjudgmentis correct,butEngels'sworkisbothsignificantand moreaccessiblethanMarx's.Hegavepopulär articulationsoftheircommonviewsinsuch booksasSocialism:UtopianandScientificandAnti- Dilhring(1878).Hiswork,morethanMarx's, wastakenbytheSecondInternationalandmany subsequentMarxistmilitantstobedefmitiveof Marxism.OnlymuchlåterwithsomeWestern Marxisttheoreticiansdidhisinfluencedecline. Engels'sfirstmajorwork,TheConditionofthe WorkingClassinEngland(1845),vividlydepicted workers'lives,misery,andsystematicexploita- tion.Buthealsosawtheworkingclassasanew forcecreatedbytheindustrialrevolution,andhe developedanaccountofhowthisnewforce wouldleadtotherevolutionarytransformation ofsociety,includingcollectiveownershipand controlofthemeansofproductionandarational orderingofsociallife;allthiswouldsupersede thewasteanddisparityofhumanconditionsthat hetooktobeinescapableundercapitalism. TheGermanIdeology,jointlyauthoredwith Marx,firstarticulatedwhatwaslåtercalledhis- toricalmaterialism,aconceptioncentralto Marxisttheory.Itistheviewthattheeconomic structureofsocietyisthefoundationofsociety; astheproductiveforcesdevelop,theeconomic structurechangesandwiththatpolitical,legal, moral,religious,andphilosophicalideaschange accordingly.Untiltheconsolidationofsocialism, societiesaredividedintoantagonisticclasses,a person'sclassbeingdeterminedbyherrelation- shiptothemeansofproduction.Thedominant ideasofasocietywillbestronglyconditionedby theeconomicstructureofthesocietyandserve theclassinterestsofthedominantclass.The socialconsciousness(therulingideology)willbe thatwhichanswerstotheinterestsofthedomi- nantclass. Fromthe1850son,Engelstookanincreasing interestinconnectinghistoricalmaterialismwith developmentsinnaturalscience.Thisworktook definitiveforminhisAnti-Dilhring,thefirstgen- eralaccountofMarxism,andinhisposthu- mouslypublishedDialecticsofNature.(Anti- Dilhringalsocontainshismostextensivediscus- sionofmorality.)Itwasintheseworksthat Engelsarticulatedthedialecticalmethodanda systematiccommunistworldviewthatsoughtto establishthattherewerenotonlysociallaws expressingempiricalregularitiesinsocietybut alsouniversallawsofnatureandthought.These dialecticallaws,Engelsbelieved,revealthatboth natureandsocietyareinacontinuousprocessof evolutionarythoughconflict-ladendevelop- ment. Engelsshouldnotbeconsideredprimarily,ifat all,aspeculativephilosopher.LikeMarx,hewas 265 Enlightenment ensrationis criticalofandironicalaboutspeculativephiloso- phyandwasacentralfigureinthesocialistmove- ment.Whilealwaysconcemedthathisaccount bewarrantedlyassertible,Engelssoughttomake itnotonlytrue,butalsoafinelytunedinstru- mentofworking-classemancipationwhich wouldleadtoaworldwithoutclasses. Seealsomarxism,politicalphilosophy. K.N. Enlightenment,alateeighteenth-centuryinter- nationalmovementinthought,withimportant socialandpoliticalramifications.TheEnlighten- mentisatonceastyle,anattitude,atemper- critical,secular,skeptical,empirical,andpracti- cal.Itisalsocharacterizedbycorebeliefsin humanrationality,inwhatittooktobe"nature," andinthe"naturalfeelings"ofmankind.Fourof itsmostprominentexemplarsareHume, ThomasJefferson,Kant,andVoltaire. TheEnlightenmentbeliefinhumanrational- ityhadseveralaspects.(1)Humanbeingsare freetotheextentthattheiractionsarecarried outforareason.Actionspromptedbytraditional authority,whetherreligiousorpolitical,are thereforenotfree;liberationrequiresweakening ifnotalsooverthrowofthisauthority.(2) Humanrationalityisuniversal,requiringonly educationforitsdevelopment.Invirtueoftheir commonrationality,allhumanbeingshavecer- tainrights,amongthemtherighttochooseand shapetheirindividualdestinies.(3)Afinalaspect ofthebeliefinhumanrationalitywasthatthe trueformsofallthingscouldbediscovered, whetheroftheuniverse(Newton'slaws),ofthe mind(associationistpsychology),ofgoodgov- ernment(theU.S.Constitution),ofahappylife (which,likegoodgovernment,was"balanced"), orofbeautifularchitecture(Palladio'sprinci- ples).TheEnlightenmentwaspreeminentlya "formalist"age,andprose,notpoetry,wasitspri- marymeansofexpression. TheEnlightenmentthoughtofitselfasa returntotheclassicalideasoftheGreeksand (moreespecially)theRomans.Butinfactitpro- videdonesourceoftherevolutionsthatshook EuropéandAmericaattheendoftheeighteenth century,anditlaidtheintellectualfoundations forboththegenerallyscientificworldviewand theliberaldemocraticsociety,which,despitethe manyattacksmadeonthem,continuetofunc- tionasculturalideals. Seealsohume,kant,liberalism,locke, VOLTAIRE.G.G.B. ensase(Latin,'abeingfromitself),abeingthat iscompletelyindependentandself-sufficient. SinceeverycreaturedependsatleastuponGod foritsexistence,onlyGodcouldbeensase.In fact,onlyGodis,andhemustbe.ForifGod dependedonanyotherbeing,hewouldbe dependentandhencenotself-sufficient.Tothe extentthattheontologicalargumentisplausible, itdependsonconceivingofGodasensase.In otherwords,Godasensaseisthegreatestcon- ceivablebeing.Theideaofensaseisveryimpor- tantintheMonologionandProslogionofAnselm, invariousworksofDunsScotus,andlåter Scholasticthought. Ensaseshouldbedistinguishedfromensexse, accordingtoAnselminMonologion.Ensaseis fromitselfandnot"outofitself."Inotherwords, ensasedoesnotdependuponitselfforitsown existence,becauseitissupposedtobedependent onabsolutelynothing.Further,ifensase dependeduponitself,itwouldcauseitselfto exist,andthatisimpossible,accordingto medievalandScholasticphilosophers,whotook causalitytobeirreflexive.(Itisalsotransitiveand asymmetric.)Hence,themedievalideaofensase shouldnotbeconfusedwithSpinoza'sideaof causasui. LåterScholasticsoftencoinedabstracttermsto designatethepropertyorentitythatmakes somethingtobewhatitis,inanalogywithform- ing,say,'rigidity'from'rigid'.TheLatinterm 'aseitas'isformedfromtheprepositionalphrase in'ensase'inthisway;'aseitas'istranslatedinto Englishas'aseity'.Abetter-knownexampleof forminganabstractnounfromaconcreteword is'haecceitas'(thisness)from'haec'(this). Seealsoanselm,divineattributes, DUNSSCOTUS,PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION. A.RM. ensexse.Seeensase. ensoi.Seesartre. ensperaccidens.Seeperaccidens. ensperfectissimo.Seeensrealissimum. ensrationis(Latin,'abeingofreason'),athing dependentforitsexistenceuponreasonor thought;sometimesknownasanintentional being.Ensrationisisthecontrastingtermfora realbeing(resorensinreextraanimam),suchas anindividualanimal.Realbeingsexistindepen- dentlyofthoughtandarethefoundationfor truth.Abeingofreasondependsuponthought orreasonforitsexistenceandisaninventionof 266 ensrealissimum entropy themind,evenifithasafoundationinsomereal being.(Thisconceptionrequirestheideathat therearedegreesofbeing.)Twokindsofentia rationisaredistinguished:thosewithafounda- tioninrealityandthosewithoutone.Theobjects oflogic,whichincludegeneraandspecies,e.g., animalandhuman,respectively,areentiarationis thathaveafoundationinreality,butare abstractedfromit.Incontrast,mythicandfic- tionalobjects,suchasachimeraorPegasus,have nofoundationinreality.Blindnessanddeafness arealsosometimescalledentiarationis.Seealso AQUINAS,SUÅREZ.A.RM. ensrealissimum(Latin,'mostrealbeing'),an informaltermforGodthatoccursrarelyin Scholasticphilosophers.WithinKanfsphiloso- phy,ithasatechnicalsense.Itisanextensionof Baumgarten'sideaofensperfectissimum(most perfectbeing),abeingthathasthegreatestnum- berofpossibleperfectionstothegreatestdegree. SinceensperfectissimumreferstoGodasthesum ofallpossibilitiesandsinceactualityisgreater thanpossibility,accordingtoKant,theideaof Godasthesumofallactualities,thatis,ensrealis- simum,isapreferabletermforGod. Kantthinksthathumanknowledgeis"con- strained"toposittheideaofanecessarybeing. Thenecessarybeingthathasthebestclaimto necessityisonethatiscompletelyuncondi- tioned,thatis,dependentonnothing;thisisens realissimum.Hesometimesexplicatesitinthree ways:asthesubstratumofallrealities,asthe groundofallrealities,andasthesumofallreal- ities.Ensrealissimumisnonethelessempirically invalid,sinceitcannotbeexperiencedby humans.Itissomethingidealforreason,notreal inexperience. AccordingtoKant,theontologicalargument beginswiththeconceptofensrealissimumand concludesthatanexistingobjectfallsunderthat concept(CritiqueofPureReason,BookII,chap- ter3). Seealsobaumgarten,kant.A.P.M. entailment.Seeimplication. entelechy(fromGreekentelecheia),actuality. Aristotle,whocoinedbothterms,treatsen- telecheiaasanearsynonymofenergeiawhenitis usedinthissense.EntelecheiafiguresinAristotle's definitionofthesoulasthefirstactualityofthe naturalbody(OntheSoulII.l).Thisisexplained byanalogywithknowledge:firstactualityisto knowledgeassecondactualityistotheactiveuse ofknowledge. 'Entelechy'isalsoatechnicalterminLeibniz fortheprimitiveactiveforceineverymonad, whichiscombinedwithprimarymatter,and fromwhichtheactiveforce,visviva,issomehow derived. ThevitalistphilosopherHansDrieschusedthe Aristotelianterminhisaccountofbiology.Life, heheld,isanentelechy;andanentelechyisa substantialentity,ratherlikeamind,thatcon- trolsorganicprocesses. Seealsoenergeia,philosophyofbiol- ogy.P.Wo. enthymeme,anincompletelystatedsyllogism, withonepremise,oreventheconclusion,omit- ted.Thetermsometimesdesignatesincom- pletelystatedargumentsofotherkinds.Weare expectedtosupplythemissingpremiseordraw theconclusionifitisnotstated.Theresultissup- posedtobeasyllogisticinference.Forexample: 'Hewilleventuallygetcaught,forheisathief; or'Hewilleventuallybecaught,forallhabitual thievesgetcaught'.Thisnotionofenthymemeas anincompletelystatedsyllogismhasalongtra- ditionanddoesnotseeminconsistentwithAris- totle'sowncharacterizationofit.Thus,Peterof Spainopenlydeclaresthatanenthymemeisan argumentwithasinglepremisethatneedstobe reducedtosyllogism.ButPeteralsopointsout thatAristotlespökeofenthymemeas"beingof ycosandsignum,"andheexplainsthatycoshere means'probableproposition'whilesignum expressesthenecessityofinference.'P,therefore Q'isanycosinthesenseofapropositionthat appearstobetruetoallortomany;butinsofar asPhasvirtuallyadoublepower,thatofitself andofthepropositionunderstoodalongwithit, itisbothprobableanddemonstrative,albeit fromadifferentpointofview.Seealsosyllo- gism.I.Bo. entity,abstract.Seeabstractentity. entity,theoretical.Seetheoreticalterm. entrenchment.Seegoodman. entropy,inphysics,ameasureofdisorder;in informationtheory,ameasureof"information" inatechnicalsense. Instatisticalphysicsthenumberofmicrostates accessibletothevariousparticlesofalargesys- temofparticlessuchasacabbageortheairina roomisrepresentedasii.Accessiblemicrostates mightbe,forinstance,energylevelsthevarious particlescanreach.Onecangreatlysimplifythe 267 envelopeparadox environmentalphilosophy statementofcertainlawsofnaturebyintroduc- ingalogarithmicmeasureoftheseaccessible microstates.Thismeasure,calledentropy,is definedbytheformula:S(Entropy)=df.k(lnQ), wherekisBoltzmann'sconstant.Whenthe entropyofasystemincreases,thesystem becomesmorerandomanddisordered,inthe sensethatalargernumberofmicrostatesbecome availableforthesystem'sparticlestoenter. Ifalargephysicalsystemwithinwhich exchangesofenergyoccurisisolated,exchang- ingnoenergywithitsenvironment,theentropy ofthesystemtendstoincreaseandnever decreases.Thisresultofstatisticalphysicsispart ofthesecondlawofthermodynamics.Inreal, evolvingphysicalsystemseffectivelyisolated fromtheirenvironments,entropyincreasesand thusaspectsofthesystem'sorganizationthat dependupontherebeingonlyalimitedrangeof accessiblemicrostatesarealtered.Forexample,a cabbagetotallyisolatedinacontainerwould decayascomplicatedorganicmoleculeseventu- allybecameunstructuredinthecourseofongo- ingexchangesofenergyandattendantentropy increases. Ininformationtheory,astateoreventissaid tocontainmoreinformationthanasecondstate oreventiftheformerstateislessprobableand thusinasensemoresurprisingthanthelatter. Otherplausibleconstraintssuggestalogarithmic measureofinformationcontent.SupposeXisa setofalternativepossiblestates,x,andp(x.)is theprobabilityofeachx.GX.Ifstatex.has occurredtheinformationcontentofthatoccur- renceistakentobe-log2p(x.).Thisfunction increasesastheprobabilityofx.decreases.Ifitis unknownwhichx.willoccur,itisreasonableto representtheexpectedinformationcontentofX asthesumoftheinformationcontentsofthe alternativestatesx.weightedineachcasebythe probabilityofthestate,giving: -2p(x,)log2p(x,). XjeX ThisiscalledtheShannonentropy. BothShannonentropyandphysicalentropy canbethoughtofaslogarithmicmeasuresofdis- array.Butthisstatementtradesonabroad understandingof'disarray'.Acloserelationship betweenthetwoconceptsofentropyshouldnot beassumed. Seealsoinformationtheory,philoso- phyOFSCIENCE.T.H. envelopeparadox,anapparentparadoxindeci- siontheorythatrunsasfollows.Youareshown twoenvelopes,MandN,andarereliably informedthateachcontainssomefinitepositive amountofmoney,thattheamountinone unspecifiedenvelopeistwicetheamountinthe unspecifiedother,andthatyoumaychooseonly one.CalltheamountinM'm'andthatinN'n'. Itmightseemthat:thereisahalfchancethatm =Inandahalfchancethatm=n/2,sothatthe "expectedvalue"ofmis(V2)(2n)+(%)(h/2)= 1.25m,sothatyoushouldpreferenvelopeM.But bysimilarreasoningitmightseemthatthe expectedvalueofnis1.25m,sothatyoushould preferenvelopeN.Seealsodecisiontheory. D.A.J. environmentalethics.Seeenvironmentalphilos- ophy. environmentalphilosophy,thecriticalstudyof conceptsdefiningrelationsbetweenhuman beingsandtheirnon-humanenvironment. Environmentalethics,amajorcomponentof environmentalphilosophy,addressesthenor- mativesignificanceoftheserelations.Therele- vanceofecologicalrelationstohumanaffairshas beenrecognizedatleastsinceDarwin,butthe growingsenseofhumanresponsibilityfortheir deterioration,reflectedinbookssuchasRachel Carson'sSilentSpring(1962)andPeterSinger's AnimalLiberation(1975),haspromptedthe recentupsurgeofinterest. Environmentalphilosophershaveadduceda widevarietyofhumanattitudesandpracticesto accountfortheperceiveddeterioration,includ- ingreligiousandscientificattitudes,socialinsti- tutions,andindustrialtechnology.Proposed remediestypicallyurgeareorientationornew "ethic"thatrecognizes"intrinsicvalue"inthe naturalworld.Examplesincludethe"landethic" ofAldoLeopold(1887-1948),whichpictures humansasbelongingto,ratherthanowning,the bioticcommunity("theland");deepecology,a stancearticulatedbytheNorwegianphilosopher ArneNaess(b.1912),whichadvocatesformsof identificationwiththenon-humanworld;and ecofeminism,whichrejectsprevailingattitudes tothenaturalworldthatareperceivedaspatri- archal. Attheheartofenvironmentalethicsliesthe attempttoarticulatethebasisofconcernforthe naturalworld.Itencompassesglobalaswellas localissues,andconsidersthelonger-termeco- logical,andevenevolutionary,fäteofthehuman andnon-humanworld.Manyofitspractitioners questiontheanthropocentricclaimthathuman beingsaretheexclusiveorevencentralfocusof 268 epapogé Epicureanism ethicalconcem.Inthusextendingboththescope andthegroundsofconcem,itpresentsachal- lengetothestanceofconventionalinterhuman ethics.Itdebateshowtobalancetheclaimsof presentandfuture,humanandnon-human, sentientandnon-sentient,individualsand wholes.Itinvestigatestheprospectsforasus- tainablerelationshipbetweeneconomicand ecologicalsystems,andpursuestheimplications ofthisrelationshipwithrespecttosocialjustice andpoliticalinstitutions.Besidesalsoengaging metaethicalquestionsabout,forexample,the objectivityandcommensurabilityofvalues, environmentalphilosophersareledtoconsider thenatureandsignificanceofenvironmental changeandtheontologicalstatusofcollective entitiessuchasspeciesandecosystems.Inamore traditionalvein,environmentalphilosophy revivesmetaphysicaldebatessurroundingthe perennialquestionof"man'splaceinnature," andfindsbothprecedentandinspirationinear- lierphilosophiesandcultures. Seealsoappliedethics,ethics,femi- nism,NATURALISM,VALUE.A.Ho. epapoge,Greektermfor'induction'.Especiallyin thelogicofAristotle,epagogeisopposedtoargu- mentbysyllogism.Aristotledescribesitas"a movefromparticularstotheuniversal."E.g., premisesthattheskillednavigatöristhebest navigatör,theskilledcharioteerthebestchario- teer,andtheskilledphilosopherthebestphiloso- phermaysupporttheconclusionbyepagogethat thoseskilledinsomethingareusuallythebestat it.Aristotlethoughtitmorepersuasiveand clearerthanthesyllogisticmethod,sinceitrelies onthesensesandisavailabletoallhumans.The termwaslåterappliedtodialecticalarguments intendedtotrapopponents.R.C. epicheirema,apolysyllogisminwhicheach premiserepresentsanenthymematicargument; e.g.,'Aliecreatesdisbelief,becauseitisanasser- tionthatdoesnotcorrespondtotruth;flatteryis alie,becauseitisaconsciousdistortionoftruth; therefore,flatterycreatesdisbelief.Eachpremise constitutesanenthymematicsyllogism.Thus, thefirstpremisecouldbeexpandedintothefol- lowingfull-fledgedsyllogism:'Everyassertion thatdoesnotcorrespondtotruthcreatesdisbe- lief;alieisanassertionthatdoesnotcorrespond totruth;thereforealiecreatesdisbelief.We couldlikewiseexpandthesecondpremiseand offeracompleteargumentforit.Epicheirema canthusbeapowerfultoolinoralpolemics, especiallywhenonearguesregressively,first statingtheconclusionwithasketchofsupportin termsofenthymemes,andthen-ifchallenged todoso-expandinganyoralloftheseen- thymemesintostandardcategoricalsyllogisms. Seealsosyllogism.I.Bo. Epictetus.Seestoicism. Epicureanism,oneofthethreeleadingmove- mentsconstitutingHellenisticphilosophy.Itwas foundedbyEpicurus(341-271b.c),together withhisclosecolleaguesMetrodorus(c.331- 278),Hermarchus(Epicurus'ssuccessorashead oftheAthenianschool),andPolyaenus(d.278). HesetupEpicureancommunitiesatMytilene, Lampsacus,andfinallyAthens(306b.c),where hisschooltheGardenbecamesynonymouswith Epicureanism.Thesegroupssetouttolivethe idealEpicureanlife,detachedfrompoliticalsoci- etywithoutactivelyopposingit,anddevoting themselvestophilosophicaldiscussionandthe cultoffriendship.Theircorrespondencewas anthologizedandstudiedasamodelofthephilo- sophicallifebylåterEpicureans,forwhomthe writingsofEpicurusandhisthreecofounders, knowncollectivelyas"theMen,"heldavirtually biblicalstatus. Epicuruswrotevoluminously,butallthatsur- vivesarethreebriefepitomes(theLetterto Herodotusonphysics,theLettertoPythocleson astronomy,etc,andtheLettertoMenoeceuson ethics),agroupofmaxims,andpapyrusfrag- mentsofhismagnumopusOnNature.Other- wise,wearealmostentirelydependenton secondarycitations,doxography,andthewrit- ingsofhislåterfollowers. TheEpicureanphysicaltheoryisatomistic, developedoutofthefifth-centurysystemof Democritus.Perseexistentsaredividedintobod- iesandspace,eachoftheminfmiteinquantity. Spaceis,orincludes,absolutevoid,without whichmotionwouldbeimpossible,whilebodyis constitutedoutofphysicallyindivisibleparticles, "atoms."Atomsarethemselvesfurtheranalyz- ableassetsofabsolute"minima,"theultimate quantaofmagnitude,positedbyEpicurustocir- cumventtheparadoxesthatZenoofEleahad derivedfromthehypothesisofinfinitedivisibil- ity.Atomsthemselveshaveonlytheprimary propertiesofshape,size,andweight.Allsec- ondaryproperties,e.g.color,aregeneratedoutof atomiccompounds;giventheirdependentsta- tus,theycannotbeaddedtothelistofperseexis- tents,butitdoesnotfollow,astheskeptical traditioninatomismhadheld,thattheyarenot realeither.Atomsareinconstantrapidmotion, 269 Epicureanism Epicureanism atequalspeed(sinceinthepurevoidthereis nötningtoslowthemdown).Stabilityemergesas anoverallpropertyofcompounds,whichlarge groupsofatomsformbysettlingintoregularpat- ternsofcomplexmotion,governedbythethree motiveprinciplesofweight,collisions,anda minimalrandommovement,the"swerve," whichinitiatesnewpatternsofmotionand blocksthedangerofdeterminism.Ourworld itself,likethecountlessotherworlds,issucha compound,accidentallygeneratedandoffinite duration.Thereisnodivinemindbehindit,or behindtheevolutionoflifeandsociety:thegods aretobeviewedasidealbeings,modelsofthe Epicureangoodlife,andthereforeblissfully detachedfromouraffairs. Canonic,theEpicureantheoryofknowledge, restsontheprinciplethat"allsensationsare true."Denialofempiricalcognitionisarguedto amounttoskepticism,whichisintumrejectedas aself-refutingposition.Sensationsarerepresen- tationally(notpropositionally)true.Inthepara- digmcaseofsight,thinfilmsofatoms(Greek eidola,Latinsimulacra)constantlyfloodoffbodies, andoureyesmechanicallyreportthosethat reachthem,neitherembroideringnorinterpret- ing.Inferencefromtheseguaranteed(photo- graphic,asitwere)datatothenatureofexternal objectsthemselvesinvolvesjudgment,andthere aloneerrorcanoccur.Sensationsthusconstitute oneofthethree"criteriaoftruth,"alongwith feelings,acriterionofvaluesandintrospective information,andprolepseis,ornaturallyacquired genericconceptions.Onthebasisofsenseevi- dence,weareentitledtoinferthenatureofmi- croscopicorremotephenomena.Celestialphe- nomena,e.g.,cannotberegardedasdivinelyen- gineered(whichwouldconflictwiththeprolepsis ofthegodsastranquil),andexperiencesupplies plentyofmodelsthatwouldaccountforthem naturalistically.Suchgroundsamounttoconsis- tencywithdirectlyobservedphenomena,and arecalledoukantimarturesis("lackofcounterevi- dence").Paradoxically,whenseveralalternative explanationsofthesamephenomenonpassthis test,allmustbeaccepted:althoughonlyoneof themcanbetrueforeachtokenphenomenon, theothers,giventheirintrinsicpossibilityandthe spatialandtemporalinfmityoftheuniverse, mustbetruefortokensofthesametypeelse- where.Fortunately,whenitcomestothebasic tenetsofphysics,itisheldthatonlyonetheory passesthistestofconsistencywithphenomena. Epicureanethicsishedonistic.Pleasureisour innatenaturalgoal,towhichallothervalues, includingvirtue,aresubordinated.Painisthe onlyevil,andthereisnointermediatestate.Phi- losophy'staskistoshowhowpleasurecanbe maximized,asfollows:Bodilypleasurebecomes moresecureifweadoptasimplewayoflifethat satisfiesonlyournaturalandnecessarydesires, withthesupportoflike-mindedfriends.Bodily pain,wheninevitable,canbeoutweighedby mentalpleasure,whichexceedsitbecauseitcan rangeöverpast,present,andfuture.Thehighest pleasure,whetherofsoulorbody,isasatisfied state,"katastematicpleasure."Thepleasuresof stimulation("kineticpleasures"),including thoseresultingfromluxuries,canvarythisstate, buthavenoincrementalvalue:strivingtoaccu- mulatethemdoesnotincreaseoverallpleasure, butdoesincreaseourvulnerabilitytofortune. Ourprimaryaimshouldinsteadbetominimize pain.Thisisachievedforthebodythroughasim- plewayoflife,andforthesoulthroughthestudy ofphysics,whichachievestheultimatekatas- tematicpleasure,"freedomfromdisturbance" (ataraxia),byeliminatingthetwomainsources ofhumananguish,thefearsofthegodsandof death.Itteachesus(a)thatcosmicphenomena donotconveydivinethreats,(b)thatdeathis meredisintegrationofthesoul,withhellanillu- sion.Tofearourownfuturenon-existenceisas irrationalastoregretthenon-existencewe enjoyedbeforewewereborn.Physicsalso teachesushowtoevadedeterminism,which wouldtummoralagentsintomindlessfatalists: theswervedoctrinesecuresindeterminism,as doesthelogicaldoctrinethatfuture-tensed propositionsmaybeneithertruenorfalse.The Epicureanswerethefirstexplicitdefendersof freewill,althoughwelackthedetailsoftheir positiveexplanationofit.Finally,althoughEpi- cureangroupssoughttooptoutofpubliclife, theytookakeenandrespectfulinterestincivic justice,whichtheyanalyzednotasanabsolute value,butasacontractbetweenhumansto refrainfromharmfulactivityongroundsofutil- ity,perpetuallysubjecttorevisioninthelightof changingcircumstances. Epicureanismenjoyedwidespreadpopularity, butunlikeitsgreatrivalStoicismitneverentered theintellectualbloodstreamoftheancient world.Itsstancesweredismissedbymanyas philistine,especiallyitsrejectionofallcultural activitiesnotgearedtotheEpicureangoodlife. Itwasalsoincreasinglyviewedasatheistic,and itsascetichedonismwasmisrepresentedascrude sensualism(hencethemodernuseof'epicure'). Theschoolneverthelesscontinuedtoflourish downtoandwellbeyondtheendoftheHel- lenisticage.Inthefirstcenturyb.c.itsexponents 270 Epicurus epistemiclogic includedPhilodemus,whosefragmentarilysur- vivingtreatiseOnSignsatteststosophisticated debatesoninductionbetweenStoicsandEpi- cureans,andLucretius,theRomanauthorofthe greatEpicureandidacticpoemOntheNatureof Things.Inthesecondcenturya.d.anotherEpi- curean,DiogenesofOenoanda,hadhisphilo- sophicalwritingsengravedonstoneinapublic colonnade,andpassageshavesurvived.There- afterEpicureanism'sprominencedeclined.Seri- ousinterestinitwasrevivedbyRenaissance humanists,anditsatomismwasanimportant influenceonearlymodernphysics,especially throughGassendi. Seealsodoxographers,hellenisticphi- losophy.D.N.S. Epicurus.Seeepicureanism. Epimenidesparadox.Seesemanticparadoxes. epiphenomenalism.Seephilosophyofmind. episodic.Seedisposition. episteme.Seearistotle. epistemic.Seeperception. epistemicaccessibility.Seeepistemology. epistemiccertainty.Seecertainty. epistemicdeontologism,aduty-basedviewofthe natureofepistemicjustification.Acentralcon- cernofepistemologyistoaccountforthedistinc- tionbetweenjustifiedandunjustifiedbeliefs. Accordingtoepistemicdeontologism,thecon- ceptofjustificationmaybeanalyzedbyusing,in aspecificsenserelevanttothepursuitofknowl- edge,termssuchas'ought','obligatory','permis- sible',and'forbidden'.AsubjectSisjustifiedin believingthatpprovidedSdoesnotviolateany epistemicobligations-thosethatarisefromthe goalofbelievingwhatistrueandnotbelieving whatisfalse.Equivalently,Sisjustifiedinbeliev- ingthatpprovidedbelievingpis-fromthepoint ofviewtakeninthepursuitoftruth-permissible forS.Amongcontemporaryepistemologists,this viewisheldbyChisholm,LaurenceBonJour, andCarlGinet.Itssignificanceistwofold.Ifjusti- ficationisafunctionofmeetingobligations,then itis,contrarytosomeversionsofnaturalistic epistemology,normative.Second,ifthenormativ- ityofjustificationisdeontological,thefactors thatdeterminewhetherabeliefisjustifiedmust beinternaltothesubjecfsmind.Criticsofepis- temicdeontologism,mostconspicuouslyAlston, contendthatbeliefisinvoluntaryandthuscan- notbeaproperobjectofobligations.If,e.g.,one islookingoutthewindowandnoticesthatitis raining,oneispsychologicallyforcedtobelieve thatitisraining.Deontologistscanreplytothis objectionbyrejectingitsunderlyingpremise: epistemicobligationsrequirethatbeliefbevol- untary.Alternatively,theymayinsistthatbelief isvoluntaryafterall,andthussubjecttoepis- temicobligations,forthereisameansbywhich onecanavoidbelievingwhatoneoughtnotto believe:weighingtheevidence,ordeliberation.See alsoEPISTEMOLOGY,JUSTIFICATION.M.St. epistemicdependence.Seedependence. epistemicholism.Seeholism. epistemicimmediacy.Seeimmediacy. epistemicjustification.Seeepistemology. epistemiclogic,thelogicalinvestigationofepis- temicconceptsandstatements.Epistemiccon- ceptsincludetheconceptsofknowledge, reasonablebelief,justification,evidence,cer- tainty,andrelatednotions.Epistemiclogicis usuallytakentoincludethelogicofbeliefordox- asticlogic. Muchoftherecentworkonepistemiclogicis basedontheviewthatitisabranchofmodal logic.Intheearly1950svonWrightobserved thattheepistemicnotionsverified(knowntobe true),undecided,andfalsifiedarerelatedtoeach otherinthesamewayasthealethicmodalities necessary,contingent,andimpossible,andbehave logicallyinanalogousways.Thisanalogyisnot surprisinginviewofthefactthatthemeaningof modalconceptsisoftenexplainedepistemically. Forexample,inthe1890sPeircedefinedinfor- mationalpossibilityasthat"whichinagiven(state of)informationisnotperfectlyknownnottobe true,"andcalledinformationallynecessary"that whichisperfectlyknowntobetrue." Themodallogicofepistemicanddoxasticcon- ceptswasstudiedsystematicallybyHintikkain hispioneeringKnowledgeandBelief(\962),which appliedtotheconceptsofknowledgeandbelief thesemanticalmethod(themethodofmodal sets)thathehadusedearlierfortheinvestiga- tionofmodallogic.Inthisapproach,thetruthof thepropositionthataknowsthatp(brieflyKp) inapossibleworld(orsituation)uistakento meanthatpholdsinallepistemicalternativesof 271 epistemicoperator epistemicregressargument u;theseareunderstoodasworldscompatible withwhataknowsatu.Iftherelationofepis- temicalternativenessisreflexive,theprinciple 'Kp—>p'(onlywhatisthecasecanbeknown)is valid,andtheassumptionthatthealternative- nessrelationistransitivevalidatestheso-called KK-thesis,'Kp—>KKp'(ifaknowsthatp,a knowsthataknowsthatp);thesetwoassump- tionstogethermakethelogicofknowledgesim- ilartoanS4-typemodallogic.Iftheknowledge operatorKaandthecorrespondingepistemic possibilityoperatorPareaddedtoquantification theorywithidentityitbecomespossibletostudy theinterplaybetweenquantifiersandepistemic operatorsandthebehaviorofindividualtermsin epistemiccontexts,andanalyzesuchlocutionsas 'aknowswho(what)b(someF)is'.Theprob- lemsofepistemiclogicinthisareaarepartofthe generalproblemofgivingacoherentsemantical accountofpropositionalattitudes. Ifapropositionpistrueinallepistemicalter- nativesofagivenworld,soarealllogicalconse- quencesofp;thusthepossible-worldssemantics ofepistemicconceptsoutlinedaboveleadstothe resultthatapersonknowsalllogicalconse- quencesofwhatheknows.Thisisaparadoxical conclusion;itiscalledtheproblemoflogical omniscience.Thesolutionofthisproblem requiresadistinctionbetweendifferentlevelsof knowledge-forexample,betweentacitand explicitknowledge.Amorerealisticmodelof knowledgecanbeobtainedbysupplementing thebasicpossible-worldsaccountbyananalysis oftheprocessesbywhichtheimplicitknowledge canbeactivatedandmadeexplicit. Modalepistemiclogicshavefoundfruitful applicationsintherecentworkonknowledge representationandinthelogicandsemanticsof questionsandanswersinwhichquestionsare interpretedasrequestsforknowledgeor"epis- temicimperatives." Seealsoepistemology,kk-thesis, MODALLOGIC.R.Hi. epistemicoperator.Seeoperator. epistemicpermissibility.Seeepistemology. epistemicpossibility.Seeepistemiclogic. epistemicprinciple,aprincipleofrationality applicabletosuchconceptsasknowledge,justi- fication,andreasonablebelief.Epistemicprinci- plesincludetheprinciplesofepistemiclogicand principlesthatrelätedifferentepistemicconcepts tooneanother,orepistemicconceptstonon- epistemicones(e.g.,semanticconcepts).Epis- temicconceptsincludetheconceptsofknowl- edge,reasonablebelief,justification,(epistemic) probability,andotherconceptsthatareusedfor thepurposeofassessingthereasonablenessof beliefsandknowledgeclaims.Epistemicprinci- plescanbeformulatedasprinciplesconcerning beliefsystemsorinformationsystems,i.e.,systems thatcharacterizeaperson'spossibledoxasticstate atagiventime;abeliefsystemmaybeconstrued asasetof(accepted)propositionsorasasystem ofdegreesofbelief.Itispossibletodistinguishtwo kindsofepistemicprinciples:(a)principlescon- cerningtherationalityofasinglebeliefsystem, and(b)principlesconcerningtherationalchanges ofbelief.Theformerincludetherequirementsof coherenceandconsistencyforbeliefs(andfor probabilities);suchprinciplesmaybesaidtocon- cernthestaticsofbeliefsystems.Thelatterprin- ciplesincludevariousprinciplesofbeliefrevision andadjustment,i.e.,principlesconcerningthe dynamicsofbeliefsystems.Seealsoclosure, KK-THESIS.R.Hi. epistemicpriority.Seedependence. epistemicprivacy,therelationapersonhastoa propositionwhenonlythatpersoncanhave directornon-inferentialknowledgeofthe proposition.Itiswidelythoughtthatpeople haveepistemicprivacywithrespecttoproposi- tionsaboutcertainoftheirownmentalstates. Accordingtothisview,apersoncanknow directlythathehascertainthoughtsorfeelings orsensoryexperiences.Perhapsotherscanalso knowthatthepersonhasthesethoughts,feel- ings,orexperiences,butiftheycanitisonlyas aresultofinferencefrompropositionsaboutthe person'sbehaviororphysicalcondition.See alsoINFERENTIALKNOWLEDGE,PRIVILEGED access.R.Fe. epistemicprobability.Seeprobability. epistemicrationality.Seeirrationality. epistemicregressargument,anargument,origi- natinginAristotle'sPosteriorAnalytics,aimingto showthatknowledgeandepistemicjustification haveatwo-tierstructureasdescribedbyepis- temicfoundationalism.Itlendsitselftothefol- lowingoutlineregardingjustification.Ifyou haveanyjustifiedbelief,thisbeliefoccursinan evidentialchainincludingatleasttwolinks:the supportinglink(i.e.,theevidence)andthesup- portedlink(i.e.,thejustifiedbelief).Thisdoes 272 epistemics epistemology notmean,however,thatallevidenceconsistsof beliefs.Evidentialchainsmightcomeinany offourkinds:circularchains,endlesschains, chainsendinginunjustifiedbeliefs,andchains anchoredinfoundationalbeliefsthatdonot derivetheirjustificationfromotherbeliefs.Only thefourth,foundationalistkindisdefensibleas groundingknowledgeandepistemicjustifica- tion. Couldalljustificationbeinferential?Abelief, BI,isinferentiallyjustifiedwhenitowesitsjusti- fication,atleastinpart,tosomeotherbelief,B2. WhencethejustificationforB2?IfB2owesits justificationtoBl,wehaveatroublesomecircle. HowcanB2yieldjustification(orevidence)for Bl,ifB2owesitsevidentialstatustoBl?Onthe otherhand,ifB2owesitsjustificationtoanother belief,B3,andB3owesitsjustificationtoyet anotherbelief,B4,andsoonadinfinitum,we haveatroublesomeendlessregressofjustifica- tion.Sucharegressseemstodelivernotactual justification,butatbestmerelypotentialjustifi- cation,forthebeliefatitshead.Actualfinite humans,furthermore,seemnottobeableto comprehend,ortopossess,allthestepsofaninfi- niteregressofjustification.Finally,ifB2isitself unjustified,itevidentlywillbeunabletoprovide justificationforBl.Itseems,then,thatthestruc- tureofinferentialjustificationdoesnotconsistof eithercircularjustification,endlessregressesof justification,orunjustifiedstarter-beliefs. Wehavefoundationalism,then,asthemost viableaccountofevidentialchains,solongaswe understanditasthestructuralviewthatsome beliefsarejustifiednon-inferentially(i.e.,with- outderivingjustificationfromotherbeliefs),but cannonethelessprovidejustificationforother beliefs.Moreprecisely,ifwehaveanyjustified beliefs,wehavesomefoundational,non-infer- entiallyjustifiedbeliefs.Thisregressargument needssomerefmementbeforeitsfullforcecan beappreciated.Withsuitablerefmement,how- ever,itcanseriouslychallengesuchalternatives tofoundationalismascoherentismandcontex- tualism.Theregressargumenthasbeenakey motivationforfoundationalisminthehistoryof epistemology. Seealsocoherentism,epistemology, FOUNDATIONALISM.P.K.M. epistemics.Seegoldman. epistemicvirtue.Seevirtueepistemology. epistemology(fromGreekepisteme,'knowledge', andlogos,'explanation'),thestudyofthenature ofknowledgeandjustification;specifically,the studyof(a)thedefiningfeatures,(b)thesub- stantiveconditionsorsources,and(c)thelimits ofknowledgeandjustification.Thelatterthree categoriesarerepresentedbytraditionalphilo- sophicalcontroversyövertheanalysisofknowl- edgeandjustification,thesourcesofknowledge andjustification(e.g.,rationalismversusempiri- cism),andtheviabilityofskepticismabout knowledgeandjustification. Kindsofknowledge.Knowledgecanbeeither explicitortacit.Explicitknowledgeisself-con- sciousinthattheknowerisawareoftherelevant stateofknowledge,whereastacitknowledgeis implicit,hiddenfromself-consciousness.Much ofourknowledgeistacit:itisgenuinebutweare unawareoftherelevantstatesofknowledge, evenifwecanachieveawarenessuponsuitable reflection.Inthisregard,knowledgeresembles manyofourpsychologicalstates.Theexistence ofapsychologicalstateinapersondoesnot requiretheperson'sawarenessofthatstate, althoughitmayrequiretheperson'sawareness ofanobjectofthatstate(suchaswhatissensed orperceived). Philosophershaveidentifiedvariousspeciesof knowledge:forexample,propositionalknowl- edge(thatsomethingisso),non-propositional knowledgeofsomething(e.g.,knowledgeby acquaintance,orbydirectawareness),empirical (aposteriori)propositionalknowledge,non- empirical(apriori)propositionalknowledge, andknowledgeofhowtodosomething.Philo- sophicalcontroversyhasarisenöverdistinctions betweensuchspecies,forexample,över(i)the relationsbetweensomeofthesespecies(e.g., doesknowing-howreducetoknowledge-that?), and(ii)theviabilityofsomeofthesespecies (e.g.,istherereallysuchathingas,orevena coherentnotionof,aprioriknowledge?).Apri- maryconcernofclassicalmodernphilosophy,in theseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies,was theextentofouraprioriknowledgerelativeto theextentofouraposterioriknowledge.Such rationalistsasDescartes,Leibniz,andSpinoza contendedthatallgenuineknowledgeofthereal worldisapriori,whereassuchempiricistsas Locke,Berkeley,andHumearguedthatallsuch knowledgeisaposteriori.InhisCritiqueofPure Reason(1781),Kantsoughtagrandreconcilia- tion,aimingtopreservethekeylessonsofboth rationalismandempiricism. Sincetheseventeenthandeighteenthcen- turies,aposterioriknowledgehasbeenwidely regardedasknowledgethatdependsforitssup- 273 epistemology epistemology portinggroundonsomespecificsensoryorper- ceptualexperience;andaprioriknowledgehas beenwidelyregardedasknowledgethatdoesnot dependforitssupportinggroundonsuchexpe- rience.Kantandothershaveheldthatthesup- portinggroundforaprioriknowledgecomes solelyfrompurelyintellectualprocessescalled "purereason"or"pureunderstanding."Knowl- edgeoflogicalandmathematicaltruthstypically servesasastandardcaseofaprioriknowledge, whereasknowledgeoftheexistenceorpresence ofphysicalobjectstypicallyservesasastandard caseofaposterioriknowledge.Amajortaskfor anaccountofaprioriknowledgeistheexplana- tionofwhattherelevantpurelyintellectual processesare,andofhowtheycontributeto non-empiricalknowledge.Ananalogoustaskfor anaccountofaposterioriknowledgeisthe explanationofwhatsensoryorperceptualexpe- rienceisandhowitcontributestoempirical knowledge.Morefundamentally,epistemolo- gistshavesoughtanaccountofpropositional knowledgeingeneral,i.e.,anaccountofwhatis commontoaprioriandaposterioriknowledge. EversincePlato'sMenoandTheaetetus(c.400 b.c),epistemologistshavetriedtoidentifythe essential,definingcomponentsofknowledge. Identifyingthesecomponentswillyieldan analysisofknowledge.Aprominenttraditional view,suggestedbyPlatoandKantamongothers, isthatpropositionalknowledge(thatsomething isso)hasthreeindividuallynecessaryandjointly sufficientcomponents:justification,truth,and belief.Onthisview,propositionalknowledgeis, bydefinition,justifiedtruebelief.Thisisthetri- partitedefinitionthathascometobecalledthe standardanalysis.Wecanclarifyitbyattending brieflytoeachofitsthreeconditions. Thebeliefcondition.Thisrequiresthatanyone whoknowsthatp(where'p'ståndsforany propositionorstatement)mustbelievethatp.If, therefore,youdonotbelievethatmindsare brains(say,becauseyouhavenotconsideredthe matteratall),thenyoudonotknowthatminds arebrains.Aknowermustbepsychologically relatedsomehowtoapropositionthatisan objectofknowledgeforthatknower.Proponents ofthestandardanalysisholdthatonlybeliefcan providetheneededpsychologicalrelation. Philosophersdonotshareauniformaccountof belief,butsomeconsiderationssupplycommon ground.Beliefsarenotactionsofassentingtoa proposition;theyratheraredispositionalpsy- chologicalstatesthatcanexistevenwhen unmanifested.(Youdonotceasebelievingthat 2+2=4,forexample,wheneveryouratten- tionleavesarithmetic.)Ourbelievingthatp seemstorequirethatwehaveatendencytoassent topincertainsituations,butitseemsalsotobe morethanjustsuchatendency.Whatelse believingrequiresremainshighlycontroversial amongphilosophers. Somephilosophershaveopposedthebelief conditionofthestandardanalysisontheground thatwecanaccept,orassentto,aknownpropo- sitionwithoutactuallybelievingit.Theycontend thatwecanacceptapropositionevenifwefail toacquireatendency,requiredbybelieving,to acceptthatpropositionincertainsituations.On thisview,acceptanceisapsychologicalactthat doesnotentailanydispositionalpsychological state,andsuchacceptanceissufficienttorelätea knowerpsychologicallytoaknownproposition. Howeverthisviewfares,oneunderlyingas- sumptionofthestandardanalysisseemscorrect: ourconceptofknowledgerequiresthata knowerbepsychologicallyrelatedsomehowtoa knownproposition.Barringthatrequirement, weshallbehärdputtoexplainhowknowerspsy- chologicallypossesstheirknowledgeofknown propositions. Evenifknowledgerequiresbelief,beliefthatp doesnotrequireknowledgethatp,sincebelief cantypicallybefalse.Thisobservation,familiar fromPlato'sTheaetetus,assumesthatknowledge hasatruthcondition.Onthestandardanalysis, ifyouknowthatp,thenitistruethatp.If,there- fore,itisfalsethatmindsarebrains,thenyoudo notknowthatmindsarebrains.Itisthusmis- leadingtosay,e.g.,thatastronomersbefore Copernicusknewthattheearthisflat;atbest, theyjustifiablybelievedthattheyknewthis. Thetruthcondition.Thisconditionofthestan- dardanalysishasnotattractedanyseriouschal- lenge.Controversyöverithasfocusedinsteadon Pilate'svexingquestion:Whatistruth?This questionconcernswhattruthconsistsin,notour waysoffindingoutwhatistrue.Influential answerscomefromatleastthreeapproaches: truthascorrespondence(i.e.,agreement,of somespecifiedsort,betweenapropositionand anactualsituation);truthascoherence(i.e., interconnectednessofapropositionwithaspec- ifiedsystemofpropositions);andtruthasprag- maticcognitivevalue(i.e.,usefulnessofa propositioninachievingcertainintellectual goals).Withoutassessingtheseprominent approaches,weshouldrecognize,inaccordwith thestandardanalysis,thatourconceptofknowl- edgeseemstohaveafactualrequirement:we 274 epistemology epistemology genuinelyknowthatponlyifitisthecasethatp. Thepertinentnotionof"itsbeingthecase"seems equivalenttothenotionof"howrealityis"or "howthingsreallyare."Thelatternotionseems essentiaitoournotionofknowledge,butisopen tocontroversyöveritsexplication. Thejustificationcondition.Knowledgeisnot simplytruebelief.Sometruebeliefsaresup- portedonlybyluckyguessworkandhencedo notqualifyasknowledge.Knowledgerequires thatthesatisfactionofitsbeliefconditionbe "appropriatelyrelated"tothesatisfactionofits truthcondition.Thisisonebroadwayofunder- standingthejustificationconditionofthestan- dardanalysis.Morespecifically,wemightsay thataknowermusthaveadequateindicationthat aknownpropositionistrue.Ifweunderstand suchadequateindicationasasortofevidence indicatingthatapropositionistrue,wehave reachedthetraditionalgeneralviewofthejusti- ficationcondition:justificationasevidence. Questionsaboutjustificationattractthelion's shareofattentionincontemporaryepistemol- ogy.Controversyfocusesonthemeaningof'jus- tification'aswellasonthesubstantiveconditions forabeliefsbeingjustifiedinawayappropriate toknowledge. Currentdebatesaboutthemeaningof'justifi- cation'revolvearoundthequestionwhether, andifsohow,theconceptofepistemic(knowl- edge-relevant)justificationisnormative.Since the1950sChisholmhasdefendedthefollowing deontological(obligation-oriented)notionof justification:theclaimthataproposition,p,is epistemicallyjustifiedforyoumeansthatitisfalse thatyououghttorefrainfromacceptingp.In otherterms,tosaythatpisepistemicallyjustified istosaythatacceptingpisepistemicallypermissi- ble-atleastinthesensethatacceptingpiscon- sistentwithacertainsetofepistemicrules.This deontologicalconstrualenjoyswiderepresenta- tionincontemporaryepistemology.Anormative construalofjustificationneednotbedeontolog- ical;itneednotusethenotionsofobligationand permission.Alston,forinstance,hasintroduced anon-deontologicalnormativeconceptofjusti- ficationthatreliesmainlyonthenotionofwhat isepistemicallygoodfromtheviewpointofmaxi- mizingtruthandminimizingfalsity.Alstonlinks epistemicgoodnesstoabeliefsbeingbasedon adequategroundsintheabsenceofoverriding reasonstothecontrary. Someepistemologistsshunnormativecon- strualsofjustificationassuperfluous.Onenote- worthyviewisthat'epistemicjustification' meanssimply'evidentialsupport'ofacertain sort.Tosaythatpisepistemicallyjustifiableto someextentforyouis,onthisview,justtosay thatpissupportabletosomeextentbyyour overallevidentialreasons.Thisconstrualwillbe non-normativesolongasthenotionsofsup- portabilityandanevidentialreasonarenon- normative.Somephilosophershavetriedto explicatethelatternotionswithoutrelyingon talkofepistemicpermissibilityorepistemic goodness.Wecanunderstandtherelevant notionof"support"intermsofnon-normative notionsofentailmentandexplanation(or, answeringwhy-questions).Wecanunderstand thenotionofan"evidentialreason"viathe notionofapsychologicalstatethatcanståndin acertaintruth-indicatingsupportrelationto propositions.Forinstance,wemightregardnon- doxasticstatesof"seemingtoperceive"some- thing(e.g.,seemingtoseeadictionaryhere)as foundationaltruthindicatorsforcertainphysi- cal-objectpropositions(e.g.,thepropositionthat thereisadictionaryhere),invirtueofthose statesbeingbestexplainedbythosepropositions. Ifanythingresemblingthisapproachsucceeds, wecangetbywithouttheaforementionednor- mativenotionsofepistemicjustification. Foundationalismversuscoherentism.Talkof foundationaltruthindicatorsbringsustoakey controversyöverjustification:Doesepistemic justification,andthusknowledge,havefounda- tions,andifso,inwhatsense?Thisquestioncan beclarifiedastheissuewhethersomebeliefscan notonly(a)havetheirepistemicjustification non-inferentially(i.e.,apartfromevidentialsup- portfromanyotherbeliefs),butalso(b)provide epistemicjustificationforalljustifiedbeliefsthat lacksuchnon-inferentialjustification.Founda- tionalismgivesanaffirmativeanswertothis issue,andisrepresentedinvaryingwaysby,e.g., Aristotle,Descartes,Russell,C.I.Lewis,and Chisholm. Foundationalistsdonotshareauniformac- countofnon-inferentialjustification.Somecon- struenon-inferentialjustificationasself-)usti- fication.Othersrejectliteralself-justification forbeliefs,andarguethatfoundationalbeliefs havetheirnon-inferentialjustificationinvirtue ofevidentialsupportfromthedeliverancesof wow-beliefpsychologicalstates,e.g.,perception ("seem-ing-to-perceive"states),sensation("seem- ing-to-sense"states),ormemory("seeming-to- remember"states).Stillothersunderstandnon- inferentialjustificationintermsofabeliefsbeing "reliablyproduced,"i.e.,causedandsustainedby 275 epistemology epistemology somenon-beliefbelief-producingprocessor source(e.g.,perception,memory,introspection) thattendstoproducetrueratherthanfalsebeliefs. Thislastviewtakesthecausalsourceofabeliefto becrucialtoitsjustification.UnlikeDescartes, contemporaryfoundationalistsclearlyseparate claimstonon-inferential,foundationaljustifica- tionfromclaimstocertainty.Theytypicallysettle foramodestfoundationalismimplyingthat foundationalbeliefsneednotbeindubitableor infallible.Thiscontrastswiththeradicalfounda- tionalismofDescartes. Thetraditionalcompetitortofoundationalism isthecoherencetheoryofjustification,i.e.,epis- temiccoherentism.Thisisnotthecoherencedef- initionoftruth;itratheristheviewthatthe justificationofanybeliefdependsonthatbeliefs havingevidentialsupportfromsomeotherbelief viacoherencerelationssuchasentailmentor explanatoryrelations.Notableproponentsin- cludeHegel,Bosanquet,andSellars.Apromi- nentcontemporaryversionofepistemiccoher- entismstatesthatevidentialcoherencerelations amongbeliefsaretypicallyexplanatoryrelations. Theroughideaisthatabeliefisjustifiedforyou solongasiteitherbestexplains,orisbest explainedby,somememberofthesystemof beliefsthathasmaximalexplanatorypowerfor you.Contemporarycoherentismisuniformly systemicorholistic;itfindstheultimatesource ofjustificationinasystemofinterconnected beliefsorpotentialbeliefs. Oneproblemhastroubledallversionsof coherentismthataimtoexplainempiricaljusti- fication:theisolationargument.Accordingtothis argument,coherentismentailsthatyoucanbe epistemicallyjustifiedinacceptinganempirical propositionthatisincompatiblewith,oratleast improbablegiven,yourtotalempiricalevidence. Thekeyassumptionofthisargumentisthatyour totalempiricalevidenceincludesK0«-beliefsen- soryandperceptualawareness-states,suchas yourfeelingpainoryourseemingtoseesome- thing.Thesearenotbelief-states.Epistemic coherentism,bydefinition,makesjustificationa functionsolelyofcoherencerelationsbetween propositions,suchaspropositionsonebelieves oraccepts.Thus,suchcoherentismseemstoiso- latejustificationfromtheevidentialimportof non-beliefawareness-states.Coherentistshave triedtohandlethisproblem,butnoresolution enjoyswideacceptance. Causalandcontextualisttheories.Somecon- temporaryepistemologistsendorsecontextual- ismregardingepistemicjustification,aviewsug- gestedbyDewey,Wittgenstein,andKuhn, amongothers.Onthisview,alljustifiedbeliefs dependfortheirevidentialsupportonsome unjustifiedbeliefsthatneednojustification.In anycontextofinquiry,peoplesimplyassume (theacceptabilityof)somepropositionsasstart- ingpointsforinquiry,andthese"contextually basic"propositions,thoughlackingevidential support,canserveasevidentialsupportforother propositions.Contextualistsstressthatcontextu- allybasicpropositionscanvaryfromcontextto context(e.g.,fromtheologicalinquirytobiolog- icalinquiry)andfromsocialgrouptosocial group.Themainproblemforcontextualists comesfromtheirviewthatWKJustifiedassump- tionscanprovideepistemicjustificationforother propositions.Weneedapreciseexplanationof howanunjustifiedassumptioncanyieldeviden- tialsupport,howanon-probablebeliefcanmake anotherbeliefprobable.Contextualistshavenot givenauniformexplanationhere. Recentlysomeepistemologistshaverecom- mendedthatwegiveupthetraditionalevidence conditionforknowledge.Theyrecommendthat weconstruethejustificationconditionasacausal condition.Roughly,theideaisthatyouknow thatpifandonlyif(a)youbelievethatp,(b)p istrue,and(c)yourbelievingthatpiscausally producedandsustainedbythefactthatmakesp true.Thisisthebasisofthecausaltheoryofknow- ing,whichcomeswithvaryingdetails.Anysuch causaltheoryfacesseriousproblemsfromour knowledgeofuniversalpropositions.Evidently, weknow,forinstance,thatalldictionariesare producedbypeople,butourbelievingthatthisis soseemsnottobecausallysupportedbythefact thatalldictionariesarehumanlyproduced.Itis notclearthatthelatterfactcausallyproducesany beliefs. Anotherproblemisthatcausaltheoriestypi- callyneglectwhatseemstobecrucialtoany accountofthejustificationcondition:there- quirementthatjustificationalsupportforabelief beaccessible,insomesense,tothebeliever.The roughideaisthatonemustbeabletoaccess,or bringtoawareness,thejustificationunderlying one'sbeliefs.Thecausaloriginsofabeliefare,of course,oftenverycomplexandinaccessibletoa believer.Causaltheoriesthusfaceproblemsfrom anaccessibilityrequirementonjustification. Internalismregardingjustificationpreservesan accessibilityrequirementonwhatconfersjustifi- cation,whereasepistemicexternalismrejectsthis requirement.Debatesöverinternalismandex- 276 epistemology epistemology ternalismaboundincurrentepistemology,but internalistsdonotyetshareauniformdetailed accountofaccessibility. TheGettierproblem.Thestandardanalysisof knowledge,howeverelaborated,facesadevas- tatingchallengethatinitiallygaverisetocausal theoriesofknowledge:theGettierproblem.In 1963EdmundGettierpublishedahighlyinflu- entialchallengetotheviewthatifyouhavea justifiedtruebeliefthatp,thenyouknowthatp. HereisoneofGettier'scounterexamplestothis view:Smithisjustifiedinbelievingthefalse propositionthat(i)JonesownsaFord.Onthe basisof(i),Smithinfers,andthusisjustifiedin believing,that(ii)eitherJonesownsaFordor BrownisinBarcelona.Asithappens,Brownis inBarcelona,andso(ii)istrue.So,although Smithisjustifiedinbelievingthetrueproposition (ii),Smithdoesnotknow(ii). Gettier-stylecounterexamplesarecaseswherea personhasjustifiedtruebeliefthatpbutlacks knowledgethatp.TheGettierproblemisthe problemoffindingamodificationof,oranalter- nativeto,thestandardanalysisthatavoidsdiffi- cultiesfromGettier-stylecounterexamples.The controversyövertheGettierproblemishighly complexandstillunsettled.Manyepistemolo- giststakethelessonofGettier-stylecounterex- amplestobethatpropositionalknowledge requiresafourthcondition,beyondthejustifica- tion,truth,andbeliefconditions.Nospecific fourthconditionhasreceivedoverwhelming acceptance,butsomeproposalshavebecome prominent.Theso-calleddefeasibilitycondition, e.g.,requiresthatthejustificationappropriateto knowledgebe"undefeated"inthegeneralsense thatsomeappropriatesubjunctiveconditional concerningdefeatersofjustificationbetrueof thatjustification.Forinstance,onesimpledefea- sibilityfourthconditionrequiresofSmiuVs knowingthatpthattherebenotrueproposition, q,suchthatifqbecamejustifiedforSmith,p wouldnolongerbejustifiedforSmith.Soif Smithknows,onthebasisofhisvisualpercep- tion,thatMaryremovedbooksfromthelibrary, thenSmith'scomingtobelievethetrueproposi- tionthatMary'sidenticaltwinremovedbooks fromthelibrarywouldnotunderminethejusti- ficationforSmith'sbeliefconcerningMaryher- self.Adifferentapproachshunssubjunctivecon- ditionalsofthatsort,andcontendsthatproposi- tionalknowledgerequiresjustifiedtruebelief thatissustainedbythecollectivetotalityof actualtruths.Thisapproachrequiresadetailed accountofwhenjustificationisunderminedand restored. TheGettierproblemisepistemologicallyim- portant.Onebranchofepistemologyseeksapre- ciseunderstandingofthenature(e.g.,the essentialcomponents)ofpropositionalknowl- edge.Ourhavingapreciseunderstandingof propositionalknowledgerequiresourhavinga Gettier-proofanalysisofsuchknowledge. Epistemologiststhusneedadefensiblesolution totheGettierproblem,howevercomplexthat solutionis. Skepticism.Epistemologistsdebatethelimits, orscope,ofknowledge.Themorerestrictedwe takethelimitsofknowledgetobe,themore skepticalweare.Twoinfluentialtypesofskepti- cismareknowledgeskepticismandjustificationskep- ticism.Unrestrictedknowledgeskepticismim- pliesthatnooneknowsanything,whereasunre- strictedjustificationskepticismimpliesthemore extremeviewthatnooneisevenjustifiedin believinganything.Someformsofskepticismare strongerthanothers.Knowledgeskepticismin itsstrongestformimpliesthatitisimpossiblefor anyonetoknowanything.Aweakerformwould denytheactualityofourhavingknowledge,but leaveopenitspossibility.Manyskepticshave restrictedtheirskepticismtoaparticulardomain ofsupposedknowledge:e.g.,knowledgeofthe externalworld,knowledgeofotherminds, knowledgeofthepastorthefuture,orknowl- edgeofunperceiveditems.Suchlimitedskepti- cismismorecommonthanunrestricted skepticisminthehistoryofepistemology. Argumentssupportingskepticismcomein manyforms.Oneofthemostdifficultistheprob- lemofthecriterion,aversionofwhichhasbeen statedbythesixteenth-centuryskepticMon- taigne:"Toadjudicate[betweenthetrueandthe false]amongtheappearancesofthings,weneed tohaveadistinguishingmethod;tovalidatethis method,weneedtohaveajustifyingargument; buttovalidatethisjustifyingargument,weneed theverymethodatissue.Andthereweare, goingroundonthewheel."Thislineofskeptical argumentoriginatedinancientGreece,with epistemologyitself.Itforcesustofacethisques- tion:Howcanwespecifywhatweknowwithout havingspecifiedhowweknow,andhowcanwe specifyhowweknowwithouthavingspecified whatweknow?Isthereanyreasonablewayout ofthisthreateningcircle?Thisisoneofthemost difficultepistemologicalproblems,andacogent epistemologymustofferadefensiblesolutionto 277 epistemology,evolutionary Erasmus,Desiderius it.Contemporaryepistemologystilllacksa widelyacceptedreplytothisurgentproblem. Seealsoapriori,cohbrentism,founda- TIONALISM,JUSTIFICATION,PERCEPTION, SKEPTICISM,TRUTH.P.K.M. epistemology,evolutionary.Seeevolutionaryepis- temology. epistemology,genetic.Seepiaget. epistemology,naturalistic.Seenaturalisticepis- temology. episyllogism.Seepolysyllogism. epoché.Seehusserl,phenomenology. E-proposition.Seesyllogism. epsilon.SeeAppendixofSpecialSymbols. equipollence,termusedbySextusEmpiricusto expresstheviewthatthereareargumentsof equalstrengthonallsidesofanyquestionand thatthereforeweshouldsuspendjudgmenton everyquestionthatcanberaised.Seealsosex- tusEMPIRICUS.R.P. equipossible.Seeequiprobable. equiprobable,havingthesameprobability. Sometimesusedinthesamewayas'equipossi- ble',thetermisassociatedwithLaplace's(the "classical")interpretationofprobability,where theprobabilityofaneventistheratioofthe numberofequipossibilitiesfavorabletothe eventtothetotalnumberofequipossibilities.For example,theprobabilityofrollinganevennum- berwitha"fair"six-sideddieisV2-therebeing threeequipossibilities(2,4,6)favorabletoeven, andsixequipossibilities(1,2,3,4,5,6)inall(and Ve=V2).Theconceptisnowgenerallythought nottobewidelyapplicabletotheinterpretation ofprobability,sincenaturalequipossibilitiesare notalwaysathand(asinassessingtheprobabil- ityofathermonuclearwartomorrow).Seealso PROBABILITY.E.Ee. equivalence,mutualinferability.Thefollowing aremainkinds:twostatementsarematerially equivalentprovidedtheyhavethesametruth- value,andlogicallyequivalentprovidedeach canbededucedfromtheother;twosentencesor wordsareequivalentinmeaningprovidedthey canbesubstitutedforeachotherinanycontext withoutalteringthemeaningofthatcontext.In truth-functionallogic,twostatementsarelogi- callyequivalentiftheycanneverhavetruth- valuesdifferentfromeachother.Inthissenseof 'logicallyequivalent'alltautologiesareequiva- lenttoeachotherandallcontradictionsare equivalenttoeachother.Similarly,inexten- sionalsettheory,twoclassesareequivalentpro- videdtheyhavethesamenumbers,sothatall emptyclassesareregardedasequivalent.Ina non-extensionalsettheory,classeswouldbe equivalentonlyiftheirconditionsofmember- shipwerelogicallyequivalentorequivalentin meaning.R.P. equivalence,behavioral.Seeturingmachine. equivalenceclass.Seepartition,relation. equivalencecondition.Seeconfirmation. equivalencerelation.Seepartition,relation. equivocation,theuseofanexpressionintwoor moredifferentsensesinasinglecontext.For example,in'Theendofanythingisitsperfection. Buttheendoflifeisdeath;sodeathistheper- fectionoflife',theexpression'end'isfirstused inthesenseof'goalorpurpose,'butinitssecond occurrence'end'means'termination.'Theuseof thetwosensesinthiscontextisanequivocation. Wherethecontextinwhichtheexpressionused isanargument,thefallacyofequivocationmay becommitted.Seealsoinformalfallacy. W.K.W. equivocation,fallacyof.Seeinformalfallacy. Er,mythof.Seemythofer. Erasmus,Desiderius(14667-1536),Dutch scholarandphilosopherwhoplayedanimpor- tantroleinRenaissancehumanism.LikehisItal- ianforerunnersPetrarch,ColuccioSalutati, LorenzoValla,LeonardoBruni,andothers,Eras- musstressedwithinphilosophyandtheologythe functionofphilologicalprecision,grammatical correctness,andrhetoricalelegance.Butfor Erasmusthevirtuesofbonaeliteraraewhichare cultivatedbythestudyofauthorsofLatinand Greekantiquitymustbedecisivelylinkedwith Christianspirituality.Erasmushasbeencalled (byHuizinga)thefirstmodernintellectual becausehetriedtoinfluenceandreformthe mentalityofsocietybyworkingwithinthe shadowofecclesiasticalandpoliticalleaders.He 278 Erfahrung eristic becameoneofthefirsthumaniststomakeeffi- cientuseofthethennewmediumofprinting. Hiswritingsembracevariousforms,including diatribe,oration,locution,comment,dialogue, andletter. AfterstudyinginChristianschoolsandliving foratimeinthemonasteryofSteynnearGoudain theNetherlands,Erasmusworkedfordifferent patrons.Hegainedapostassecretarytothebishop ofKamerijk,duringwhichtimehewrotehisfirst publishedbook,theAdagia(firstedition1500),a collectionofannotatedLatinadages.Erasmuswas anadvisertotheEmperorCharlesV,towhomhe dedicatedhisInstitutioprincipiichristiani(1516). AfterstudiesattheUniversityofParis,where heattendedlecturesbythehumanistFaber Stapulensis,Erasmuswasputintouchbyhis patronLordMountjoywiththeBritishhumanists JohnColetandThomasMore.Erasmusledarest- lesslife,residinginseveralEuropeancitiesinclud- ingLondon,Louvain,Basel,Freiburg,Bologna, Turin(wherehewasawardedadoctorateofthe- ologyin1506),andRome. Byusingthemeansofmodernphilology, whichledtotheidealofthebonaeliterarae,Eras- mustriedtoreformtheChristian-influenced mentalityofhistimes.InspiredbyValla'sAnno- tationestotheNewTestament,hecompleteda newLatintranslationoftheNewTestament, editedthewritingsoftheearlychurchfathers, especiallySt.Hieronymus,andwroteseveral commentariesonpsalms.Hetriedtoregenerate thespiritofearlyChristianitybylayingbareits originalsenseagainstthebackgroundofscholas- ticinterpretation.Inhisview,theritualsofthe existingchurchblockedthedevelopmentofan authenticChristianspirituality.ThoughErasmus sharedwithLutheracriticalapproachtoward theexistingchurch,hedidnotsidewiththe Reformation.HisDiatribedeliberoarbitrio(1524), inwhichhepleadedforthefreewillofman,was answeredbyLuther'sDeservoarbitrio. ThehistoricallymostinfluentialbooksofEras- muswereEnchirionmilitischristiani(1503),in whichheattackedhirelingsandsoldiers;the EncomiummoriaeidestLausstultitiae(1511),a satireonmodemlifeandtheecclesiasticalpillars ofsociety;andthesketchesofhumanlife,the Colloquia(firstpublishedin1518,oftenenlarged until1553).InthesmallbookQuerelapacis (1517),herejectedtheideologyofjustifiedwars propoundedbyAugustineandAquinas.Against themadnessofwarErasmusappealedtothe virtuesoftolerance,friendliness,andgentleness. Allthesevirtueswereforhimtheessenceof Christianity. Seealsohumanism;more,thomas.H.P. Erfahrung,GermantermtranslatedintoEnglish, especiallysinceKant,as'experience'.Kantdoes notuseitasatechnicalterm;rather,itindicates thatwhichrequiresexplanationthroughmore preciselydrawntechnicaldistinctionssuchas thoseamong'sensibility','understanding',and 'reason'.Intheearlytwentiethcentury,Husserl sometimesdistinguishesbetweenErfahrungand Erlebnis,theformerindicatingexperienceas capableofbeingthematizedandmethodically describedoranalyzed,thelatterexperienceas "livedthrough"andneverfullyavailableto analysis.Suchadistinctionoccasionallyreap- pearsinlåtertextsofphenomenologyandexis- tentialism.Seealsoerlebnis.J.RSu. Erigena,JohnScotus,alsocalledJohntheScot, Eriugena,andScottigena(c.810-77),Irish-born scholarandtheologian.Hetaughtgrammarand dialecticsatthecourtofCharlestheBaldnear Laonfrom845on.Inacontroversyin851,John arguedthattherewasonlyonepredestination, togood,sinceevilwasstrictlynothing.Thusno oneiscompelledtoevilbyGod'sforeknowledge, since,strictlyspeaking,Godhasnoforeknowl- edgeofwhatisnot.Buthisrelianceondialectic, hisOrigenistconceptionoftheworldasaplace ofeducationrepairingthedamagedonebysin, hisinterestincosmology,andhisperceivedPela- giantendenciesexcitedopposition.Attackedby PrudentiusofTroyesandFloresofLyons,hewas condemnedatthecouncilsofValencia(855)and Långres(859).Charlescommissionedhimto translatetheworksofPseudo-Dionysiusandthe AmbiguaofMaximustheConfessorfromthe Greek.Theseworksopenedupanewworld,and Johnfollowedhistranslationswithcommen- tariesontheGospelofJohnandPseudo-Diony- sius,andthenhischiefwork,theDivisionof NatureorPeriphyseon(826-66),intheNeopla- tonictradition.Hetreatstheuniverseasapro- cessionfromGod,everythingrealinnature beingatraceofGod,andthenareturntoGod throughthepresenceofnatureinhumanreason andman'sunionwithGod.Johnheldthatthe natureofmanisnotdestroyedbyunionwith God,thoughitisdeified.Hewascondemnedfor pantheismatParisin1210.J.Lo. eristic,theartofcontroversy,ofteninvolvingfal- laciousbutpersuasivereasoning.Theancient Sophistsbroughtthisarttoahighlevelto achievetheirpersonalgoal.Theymayhave foundtheirmaterialinthe"encounters"inthe 279 Erklärung erotetic lawcourtsaswellasindailylife.Toenhanceper- suasiontheyendorsedtheuseofunsoundprin- ciplessuchashastygeneralizations,faulty analogies,illegitimateappealtoauthoritythe posthocergopropterhoc(i.e.,"afterthis,therefore becauseofthis")andotherpresumedprinciples. Aristotleexposederisticargumentationinhis SophkticalRefutations,whichitselfdrawsexam- plesfromPiato'sEuthydemus.Fromthislatter workcomesthefamousexample:"Thatdogisa fatherandthatdogishis,thereforethatdogishis father'.Whatisperhapsworsethanitsobvious invalidityisthattheargumentissuperficially similartoasoundargumentsuchas'Thisisa tableandthisisbrown,thereforethisisabrown table'.IntheSophkticalRefutationsAristotle undertakestofindproceduresfordetectionof badargumentsandtoproposerulesforcon- structingsoundarguments.Seealsodialec- TIC,INFORMALFALLACY,SYLLOGISM.I.Bo. Erklärung.Seeverstehen. Erlebnis,Germantermforexperienceusedin latenineteenth-andearlytwentieth-century Germanphilosophy.Erlebnisdenotesexperience inallitsdirectimmediacyandlivedfullness.It contrastswiththemoretypicalGermanword Erfahrung,denotingordinaryexperienceas mediatedthroughintellectualandconstructive elements.Asimmediate,Erlebniseludesconcep- tualization,inboththelivedpresentandthe interiorityofexperience.Asdirect,Erlebnisis alsodisclosiveandextraordinary:itreveals somethingrealthatotherwiseescapesthinking. Typicalexamplesincludeart,religion,andlove, allofwhichalsoshowtheanti-rationalistand polemicalusesoftheconcept.Itisespeciallypop- uläramongtheRomanticmysticslikeNovalis andtheanti-rationalistsNietzscheandBergson, aswellasinphenomenology,Lebensphilosophie, andexistentialism. Asusedinpost-HegelianGermanphilosophy, thetermdescribestwoaspectsofsubjectivity. Thefirstconcernstheepistemologyofthe humansciencesandofphenomenology.Against naturalismandobjectivism,philosophersappeal totheineliminable,subjectivequalitiesofexpe- riencetoarguethatinterpretersmustunder- stand"whatitisliketobe"someexperiencing subject,fromtheinside.Theseconduseofthe termistodenoteextraordinaryandinteriör experienceslikeart,religion,freedom,andvital energy.Inbothcases,itisunclearhowsuch experiencecouldbeidentifiedorknowninits immediacy,andmuchrecentGermanthought, suchasHeideggerandhermeneutics,rejectsthe concept. Seealsoerfahrung,existentialism,phe- nomenology.J.Bo. Eros,theGreekgodoferoticlove.Eroscameto besymbolicofvariousaspectsoflove,first appearinginHesiodinoppositiontoreason.In general,however,EroswasseenbyGreeks(e.g., Parmenides)asaunifyingforce.InEmpedocles, itisoneoftwoexternalforcesexplainingthehis- toryofthecosmos,theotherbeingStrife.These forcesresemblethe"hiddenharmony"ofHera- clitus. TheSymposiumofPlatoisthebest-known ancientdiscussionofEros,containingspeeches fromvariousstandpoints-mythical,sophistic, etc.Socratessayshehaslearnedfromthepriest- essDiotimaofanoblerformofErosinwhich sexualdesirecanbedevelopedintothepursuit ofunderstandingtheFormofbeauty. ThecontrastbetweenagapeandErosisfound firstinDemocritus.Thisbecameimportantin Christianaccountsoflove.InNeoplatonism, ErosreferredtothemysticalunionwithBeing soughtbyphilosophers.Eroshasbecomeimpor- tantrecentlyintheworkofContinentalwriters. Seealsoagape.R.C. erotetic,inthestrictsense,pertainingtoques- tions.Eroteticlogicisthelogicofquestions.Dif- ferentconceptionsofquestionsyielddifferent kindsoferoteticlogic.APlatonisticapproach holdsthatquestionsexistindependentlyof interrogatives.ForP.Tichy,aquestionisafunc- tiononpossibleworlds,therightanswerbeing thevalueofthefunctionattheactualworld. Eroteticlogicisthelogicofsuchfunctions.Inthe epistemic-imperativeapproach(ofL.Åqvist, Hintikka,etal.),onebeginswithasystem forepistemicsentencesandembedsthisinasys- temforimperativesentences,thusobtaining sentencesoftheform'makeitthecasethatI know...'andcomplexcompoundsofsuchsen- tences.Certainonesofthesearedefinedtobe interrogatives.Theneroteticlogicisthelogic ofepistemicimperativesandtheconditionsfor satisfactionoftheseimperatives.Intheab- stractinterrogativeapproach(ofN.Belnap, T.Kubiriski,andmanyothers),onechoosescer- taintypesofexpressiontoserveasinterroga- tives,and,foreachtype,specifieswhat expressionscountasanswersofvariouskinds (direct,partial,...).Onthisapproachwemay saythatinterrogativesexpressquestions,orwe mayidentifyquestionswithinterrogatives,in 280 errortheory essentialism whichcasetheonlymeaningthataninterroga- tivehasisthatithastheanswersthatitdoes. Eitherway,theemphasisisoninterrogatives, anderoteticlogicisthelogicofsystemsthatpro- videinterrogativesandspecifyanswerstothem. Inthebroadsense,'erotetic'designateswhat pertainstoutterance-and-response.Inthissense eroteticlogicisthelogicoftherelationsbetween (1)sentencesofmanykindsand(2)theexpres- sionsthatcountasappropriaterepliestothem. Thisincludesnotonlytherelationsbetween questionandanswerbutalso,e.g.,between assertionandagreementordenial,command andreportofcomplianceorrefusal,and(for manytypesofsentenceS)betweenSandvari- ouscorrectiverepliestoS(e.g.,denialofthepre- suppositionofS).Eroteticlogicsmaydifferinthe classofsentencestreated,thetypesofresponse countedasappropriate,theassignmentofother content(presupposition,projection,etc),and otherdetails.Seealsodeonticlogic,epis- TEMICLOGIC,MODALLOGIC.D.H. errortheory.Seemoralrealism. Espritmovement.Seefrenchpersonalism. Esseestpercipi.Seeberkeley. essence.Seeessentialism. essence,nominal.Seeessentialism. essence,real.Seeessentialism. essentialism,ametaphysicaltheorythatobjects haveessencesandthatthereisadistinction betweenessentialandnon-essentialoracciden- talpredications.Differentissueshave,however, beencentralindebatesaboutessencesand essentialpredicationindifferentperiodsinthe historyofphilosophy.Inourownday,itiscom- mitmenttothenotionofderemodalitythatis generallytakentorenderatheoryessentialist; butintheessentialisttraditionstemmingfrom Aristotle,discussionsofessenceandessential predicationfocusonthedistinctionbetween whatanobjectisandhowitis.AccordingtoAris- totle,theuniversalsthatanordinaryobject instantiatesincmdesomethatmarkitoutas whatitisandothersthatcharacterizeitinsome waybutdonotfigureinanaccountofwhatitis. IntheCategories,hetellsusthatwhiletheformer aresaidof'theobject,thelatteraremerelypresent init;andinotherwritings,hedistinguishes betweenwhathecallskathhautoorpersepred- ications(wheretheseincludethepredicationof what-universals)andkåtasumbebekosorperacci- denspredications(wheretheseincludethepred- icationofhow-universals).Heconcedesthat universalspredicatedofanobjectkathhautoare necessarytothatobject;butheconstruesthe necessityhereasderivative.Itisbecauseauni- versalmarksoutanentity,x,aswhatxisand henceunderliesitsbeingthethingthatitisthat theuniversalisnecessarilypredicatedofx. Theconceptofdefinitioniscriticallyinvolved inAristotle'sessentialism.First,itisthekind- infimaspecies-underwhichanobjectfallsorone oftheitems(genusordifferentia)includedinthe definitionofthatkindthatispredicatedofthe objectkathhauto.But,second,Aristotle'snotion ofanessencejustisthenotionoftheontological correlateofadefinition.Theterminhiswritings wetranslateas'essence'istheexpressiontotiein einai(thewhatitistobe).Typically,theexpres- sionisfollowedbyasubstantivalexpressionin thedativecase,sothattheexpressionsdenoting essencesarephraseslike'thewhatitistobefor ahorse'and'thewhatitistobeforanoaktree'; andAristotletellsusthat,foranykind,K,the whatitistobeforaKjustisthatwhichweiden- tifywhenweprovideacompleteandaccurate definitionofK. Now,Aristotleholdsthatthereisdefinition onlyofuniversals;andthiscommitshimtothe viewthattherearenoindividualessences. Althoughheconcedesthatwecanprovidedefi- nitionsofuniversalsfromanyofhislistoften categories,hegivesprideofplacetotheessences ofuniversalsfromthecategoryofsubstance. Substance-universalscanbeidentifiedwithout referencetoessencesfromothercategories,but theessencesofqualities,quantities,andother non-substancescanbedefinedonlybyreference totheessencesofsubstances.Inhisearlywrit- ings,Aristotletookthefamiliarparticularsof commonsense(thingsliketheindividualman andhorseofCategoriesV)tobetheprimarysub- stances;andinthesewritingsitistheessences weisolatebydefmingthekindsorspeciesunder whichfamiliarparticularsfallthatareconstrued asthebasicorparadigmaticessences.However, inlåterwritings,whereordinaryparticularsare takentobecomplexesofmatterandform,itis thesubstantialformsoffamiliarparticularsthat aretheprimarysubstances,sotheiressencesare theprimaryorbasicessences;andacentral themeinAristotle'smostmaturewritingsisthe ideathattheprimarysubstancesandtheir essencesarenecessarilyoneandthesamein number. 281 essentialism essentialism Theconceptionofessenceastheontologi- calcorrelateofadefinition-oftencalledquid- dity-persiststhroughoutthemedievaltradi- tion;andinearlymodemphilosophy,theidea thattheidentityofanobjectisconstitutedby whatitisplaysanimportantroleinContinental rationalistthinkers.Indeed,inthewritingsof Leibniz,wefindthemostextremeversionoftra- ditionalessentialism.WhereasAristotlehadheld thatessencesareinvariablygeneral,Leibniz insistedthateachindividualhasanessence peculiartoit.Hecalledtheessenceassociated withanentityitscompleteindividualconcept; andhemaintainedthattheindividualconcept somehowentailsallthepropertiesexemplified bytherelevantindividual.Accordingly,Leibniz believedthatanomniscientbeingcould,foreach possibleworldandeachpossibleindividual,infer fromtheindividualconceptofthatindividual thewholerangeofpropertiesexemplifiedbythat individualinthatpossibleworld.But,then,from theperspectiveofanomniscientbeing,allofthe propositionsidentifyingthepropertiestheindi- vidualactuallyexhibitswouldexpresswhat Aristotlecalledkathhautopredications.Leibniz, ofcourse,deniedthatourperspectiveisthatof anomniscientbeing;wefailtograspindividual essencesintheirfullness,sofromourperspec- tive,thedistinctionbetweenessentialandacci- dentalpredicationsholds. Whileclassicalrationalistsespousedathor- oughgoingessentialism,theAristotleliancon- ceptionsofessenceanddefinitionwerethe repeatedtargetsofattacksbyclassicalBritish empiricists.Hobbes,e.g.,foundthenotionof essencephilosophicallyuselessandinsistedthat definitionmerelydisplaysthemeaningsconven- tionallyassociatedwithlinguisticexpressions. Locke,ontheotherhand,continuedtospeak ofessences;buthedistinguishedbetweenreal andnominalessences.Ashesawit,thefamiliar objectsofcommonsensearecollectionsof copresentsensibleideastowhichweattachasin- glenamelike'man'or'horse'.Identifyingthe ideasconstitutiveoftherelevantcollectiongives usthenominalessenceofamanorahorse.Locke didnotdenythatrealessencesmightunderlie suchcollections,butheinsistedthatitisnominal ratherthanrealessencestowhichwehaveepis- temicaccess.Hume,inturn,endorsedtheidea thatfamiliarobjectsarecollectionsofsensible ideas,butrejectedtheideaofsomeunderlying realessencetowhichwehavenoaccess;andhe implicitlyreinforcedtheHobbesiancritiqueof Aristotelianessenceswithhisattackontheidea ofderenecessities.Sodefinitionmerelyexpresses themeaningsweconventionallyassociatewith words,andtheonlynecessityassociatedwith definitionislinguisticorverbalnecessity. Fromitsorigins,thetwentieth-centuryana- lytictraditionendorsedtheclassicalempiricist critiqueofessencesandtheHumeanviewthat necessityismerelylinguistic.Indeed,eventhe Humeanconcessionthatthereisaspecialclassof statementstrueinvirtueoftheirmeaningscame intoquestioninthefortiesandfifties,when philosopherslikeQuinearguedthatitisimpos- sibletoprovideanoncircularcriterionfordistin- guishinganalyticandsyntheticstatements.Soby thelate1950s,ithadbecometheconventional wisdomofphilosophersintheAnglo-American traditionthatboththenotionofarealessence andthederivativeideathatsomeamongthe propertiestrueofanobjectareessentialtothat objectarephilosophicaldeadends.Butöverthe pastthreedecades,developmentsintheseman- ticsofmodallogichavecalledintoquestiontra- ditionalempiricistskepticismaboutessenceand modalityandhavegivenrisetoarebirthof essentialism.Inthelatefiftiesandearlysixties, logicians(likeKripke,Hintikka,andRichard Montague)showedhowformåltechniquesthat haveastheirintuitivecoretheLeibnizianidea thatnecessityistruthinallpossibleworlds enableustoprovidecompletenessproofsfora wholerangeofnonequivalentmodallogics. Metaphysiciansseizedontheintuitionsunderly- ingtheseformålmethods.Theyproposedthat wetakethepictureofalternativepossibleworlds seriouslyandclaimedthatattributionsofdedicto modality(necessityandpossibilityastheyapply topropositions)canbeunderstoodtoinvolve quantificationöverpossibleworlds.Thus,tosay thataproposition,p,isnecessaryistosaythatfor everypossibleworld,W,pistrueinW;andtosay thatpispossibleistosaythatthereisatleastone possibleworld,W,suchthatpistrueinW. Thesemetaphysicianswentontoclaimthat theframeworkofpossibleworldsenablesusto makesenseofderemodality.Whereasdedicto modalityattachéstopropositionstakenasa whole,anascriptionofderemodalityidentifies themodalstatusofanobjecfsexemplificationof anattribute.Thus,wespeakofSocratesasbeing necessarilyoressentiallyrational,butonlycon- tingentlysnub-nosed.Intuitively,theessential propertiesofanobjectarethoseitcouldnothave lacked;whereasitscontingentpropertiesare propertiesitexemplifiesbutcouldhavefailedto exemplify.The"friendsofpossibleworlds" insistedthatwecanmakeperfectlygoodsenseof thisintuitivedistinctionifwesaythatanobject, 282 essentialism,mereological ethicalconstructivism x,exhibitsaproperty,P,essentiallyjustincasex exhibitsPintheactualworldandineverypos- sibleworldinwhichxexistsandthatxexhibits PmerelycontingentlyjustincasexexhibitsPin theactualworld,butthereisatleastonepossi- bleworld,W,suchthatxexistsinWandfailsto exhibitPinW. Notonlyhavetheseneo-essentialistsinvoked theLeibnizianconceptionofalternativepossible worldsincharacterizingthederemodalities, manyhaveendorsedLeibniz'sideathateach objecthasanindividualessenceorwhatissome- timescalledahaecceity.Aswehaveseen,theintu- itiveideaofanindividualessenceistheideaofa propertyanobjectexhibitsessentiallyandthat nootherobjectcouldpossiblyexhibit;andcon- temporaryessentialistshavefleshedoutthis intuitivenotionbysayingthataproperty,P,is thehaecceityorindividualessenceofanobject, x,justincase(1)xexhibitsPintheactualworld andinallworldsinwhichxexistsand(2)there isnopossibleworldwhereanobjectdistinctfrom xexhibitsP.Andsomedefendersofindividual essences(likePlantinga)havefollowedLeibniz inholdingthatthehaecceityofanobjectpro- videsacompleteconceptofthatobject,aprop- ertysuchthatitentails,foreverypossibleworld, W,andeveryproperty,P,eithertheproposition thattheobjectinquestionhasPinWorthe propositionthatitfailstohavePinW.Accord- ingly,theyagreethatanomniscientbeingcould inferfromtheindividualessenceofanobjecta completeaccountofthehistoryofthatobjectin eachpossibleworldinwhichitexists. Seealsoaristotle,definition,haecce- ity,MODALLOGIC,NECESSITY,POSSIBLE WORLDS.M.J.L. essentialism,mereological.Seehaecceity,mere- OLOGY. essentialproperty.Seeproperty. eternalrecurrence.Seeeternalreturn. eternalreturn,thedoctrinethatthesameevents, occurringinthesamesequenceandinvolving thesamethings,haveoccurredinfinitelymany timesinthepastandwilloccurinfinitelymany timesinthefuture.Attributedmostnotablyto theStoicsandNietzsche,thedoctrineisanti- theticaltophilosophicalandreligiousviewpoints thatclaimthattheworldorderisunique,con- tingentinpart,anddirectedtowardsomegoal. TheStoicsinterpreteternalreturnastheconse- quenceofperpetualdivineactivityimposing exceptionlesscausalprinciplesontheworldina supremelyrational,providentialway.Theworld, beingthebestpossible,canonlyberepeatedend- lessly.TheStoicsdonotexplainwhythebest worldcannotbeeverlasting,makingrepetition unnecessary.ItisnotclearwhetherNietzsche assertedeternalreturnasacosmologicaldoctrine oronlyasathoughtexperimentdesignedtocon- frontonewiththeauthenticityofone'slife: wouldoneaffirmthatlifeevenifonewerecon- signedtoliveitöveragainwithoutend?On eitherinterpretation,Nietzsche'sversion,like theStoicversion,stressestheinexorabilityand necessaryinterconnectednessofallthingsand events,althoughunliketheStoicversion,it rejectsdivineprovidence.Seealsonietzsche, STOICISM. W.E.M. eternalreturn,Iawof.Seecomputertheory. eternity.Seedivineattributes. ethicalabsolutism.Seerelativism. ethicalconstructivism,aformofanti-realism aboutethicswhichholdsthattherearemoral factsandtruths,butinsiststhatthesefactsand truthsareinsomewayconstitutedbyordepen- dentonourmoralbeliefs,reactions,orattitudes. Forinstance,anidealobservertheorythatrep- resentsthemoralrightnessandwrongnessofan actintermsofthemoralapprovalanddisap- provalthatanappraiserwouldhaveundersuit- ablyidealizedconditionscanbeunderstoodasa formofethicalconstructivism.Anotherformof constructivismidentifiesthetruthofamoral beliefwithitsbeingpartoftheappropriatesys- temofbeliefs,e.g.,ofasystemofmoralandnon- moralbeliefsthatisinternallycoherent.Sucha viewwouldmaintainacoherencetheoryof moraltruth.Moralrelativismisaconstructivist viewthatallowsforapluralityofmoralfactsand truths.Thus,iftheidealizingconditionsappealed toinanidealobservertheoryallowthatdiffer- entappraiserscanhavedifferentreactionstothe sameactionsunderidealconditions,thenthat idealobservertheorywillbeaversionofmoral relativismaswellasofethicalconstructivism.Or, ifdifferentsystemsofmoralbeliefssatisfythe appropriateepistemicconditions(e.g.are equallycoherent),thenthetruthorfalsityof particularmoralbeliefswillhavetoberelativized todifferentmoralsystemsorcodes.Seealso ETHICALOBJECTIVISM,ETHICS,IDEALOB- SERVER,RELATIVISM.D.O.B. 283 ethicalconventionalism ethics ethicalconventionalism.Seerelativism. ethicaldualism.Seezoroastrianism. ethicalegoism.Seeegoism. ethicaleudaimonism.Seeeudaimonism. ethicalhedonism.Seehedonism. ethicalintuitionism.Seeethics. ethicalnaturalism.Seeethics,moralrealism, naturalism. ethicalnihilism.Seerelativism. ethicalobjectivism,theviewthattheobjectsof themostbasicconceptsofethics(whichmaybe supposedtobevalues,obligations,duties, oughts,rights,orwhatnot)exist,orthatfacts aboutthemhold,objectivelyandthatsimilarly wordedethicalstatementsbydifferentpersons makethesamefactualclaims(andthusdonot concernmerelythespeaker'sfeelings).Tosay thatafactisobjective,orthatsomethinghas objectiveexistence,isusuallytosaythatitshold- ingorexistenceisnotderivativefromitsbeing thoughttoholdorexist.(IntheScholasticter- minologystillcurrentintheseventeenthcentury 'objective'hadthemoreorlesscontrarymean- ingofhavingstatusonlyasanobjectofthought.) Incontrast,fact,orathing'sexistence,issubjec- tiveifitholdsorexistsonlyinthesensethatitis thoughttoholdorexist,orthatitismerelyacon- venienthumanpositforpracticalpurposes.A factholds,oranobjectexists,intersubjectivelyif somehowitsacknowledgmentisbindingonall thinkingsubjects(orallsubjectsinsomespeci- fiedgroup),althoughitdoesnotholdorexist independentlyoftheirthinkingaboutit.Some thinkerssupposethatintersubjectivityisallthat caneverproperlybemeantbyobjectivity. Objectivismmaybenaturalistornon-natural- ist.Thenaturalistobjectivistbelievesthatvalues, duties,orwhateverarenaturalphenomena detectablebyintrospection,perception,orscien- tificinference.Thusvaluesmaybeidentified withcertainempiricalqualitiesof(anybody's) experience,ordutieswithempiricalfactsabout theeffectsofaction,e.g.aspromotingorhinder- ingsocialcohesion.Thenon-naturalistobjec- tivist(eschewingwhatMoorecalledthe naturalisticfallacy)believesthatvaluesorobliga- tions(orwhateveritemshethinksmostbasicin ethics)existindependentlyofanybeliefabout them,butthattheirexistenceisnotamatterof anyordinaryfactdetectableintheaboveways butcanberevealedtoethicalintuitionasstand- inginanecessary(butnotanalytic)relationto naturalphenomena. 'Ethicalsubjectivism'usuallymeansthedoc- trinethatethicalstatementsaresimplyreports onthespeaker'sfeelings(though,confusingly enough,suchstatementsmaybeobjectivelytrue orfalse).Perhapsitoughttomeanthedoctrine thatnothingisgoodorbadbutthinkingmakes itso.Attitudetheoriesofmorality,forwhich suchstatementsexpress,ratherthanreport upon,thespeaker'sfeelings,arealso,despitethe objectionsoftheirproponents,sometimescalled subjectivist. Inamorepopulärusageanobjectivematterof factisoneonwhichallreasonablepersonscan beexpectedtoagree,whileamatterissubjective ifvariousalternativeopinionscanbeacceptedas reasonable.Whatissubjectiveinthissensemay bequiteobjectiveinthemorephilosophical senseinquestionabove. Seealsoethics,moore,moralrealism. T.L.S.S. ethicalpragmatism.Seemoralepistemology. ethicalrelativism.Seerelativism. ethicalskepticism.Seerelativism. ethics,thephilosophicalstudyofmorality.The wordisalsocommonlyusedinterchangeably with'morality'tomeanthesubjectmatterofthis study;andsometimesitisusedmorenarrowlyto meanthemoralprinciplesofaparticulartradi- tion,group,orindividual.Christianethicsand AlbertSchweitzer'sethicsareexamples.Inthis artidethewordwillbeusedexclusivelytomean thephilosophicalstudy. Ethics,alongwithlogic,metaphysics,and epistemology,isoneofthemainbranchesofphi- losophy.Itcorresponds,inthetraditionaldivi- sionofthefieldintoformål,natural,andmoral philosophy,tothelastofthesedisciplines.Itcan inturnbedividedintothegeneralstudyofgood- ness,thegeneralstudyofrightaction,applied ethics,metaethics,moralpsychology,andthe metaphysicsofmoralresponsibility.Thesedivi- sionsarenotsharp,andmanyimportantstudies inethics,particularlythosethatexamineor developwholesystemsofethics,areinterdivi- sional.Nonetheless,theyfacilitatetheidentifica- tionofdifferentproblems,movements,and schoolswithinthediscipline. 284 ethics ethics Thefirsttwo,thegeneralstudyofgoodness andthegeneralstudyofrightaction,constitute themainbusinessofethics.Correlatively,its principalsubstantivequestionsarewhatendswe ought,asfullyrationalhumanbeings,tochoose andpursueandwhatmoralprinciplesshould governourchoicesandpursuits.Howthese questionsarerelatedisthediscipline'sprincipal structuralquestion,andstructuraldifferences amongsystemsofethicsreflectdifferentanswers tothisquestion.Incontemporaryethics,the studyofstructurehascomeincreasinglytothe före,especiallyasapreliminarytothegeneral studyofrightaction.Inthenaturalorderof exposition,however,thesubstantivequestions comefirst. Goodnessandthequestionofends.Philoso- phershavetypicallytreatedthequestionofthe endsweoughttopursueinoneoftwoways: eitherasaquestionaboutthecomponentsofa goodlifeorasaquestionaboutwhatsortsof thingsaregoodinthemselves.Onthefirstway oftreatingthequestion,itisassumedthatwe naturallyseekagoodlife;hence,determiningits componentsamountstodetermining,relativeto ourdesireforsuchalife,whatendsweoughtto pursue.Onthesecondway,nosuchassumption abouthumannatureismade;ratheritis assumedthatwhateverisgoodinitselfisworth choosingorpursuing.Thefirstwayoftreating thequestionleadsdirectlytothetheoryof humanwell-being.Thesecondwayleads directlytothetheoryofintrinsicvalue. Thefirsttheoryoriginatedinancientethics, andeudaimoniawastheGreekwordforitssub- ject,awordusuallytranslated'happiness,'but sometimestranslated'flourishing'inorderto makethequestionofhumanwell-beingseem moreamatterofhowwellapersonisdoingthan howgoodheisfeeling.Thesealtemativesreflect thedifferentconceptionsofhumanwell-being thatinformthetwomajorviewswithinthethe- ory:theviewthatfeelinggoodorpleasureisthe essenceofhumanwell-beingandtheviewthat doingwellorexcellingatthingsworthdoingis itsessence.Thefirstviewishedonisminitsclas- sicalform.Itsmostfamousexponentamongthe ancientswasEpicurus.Thesecondviewisper- fectionism,aviewthatiscommontoseveral schoolsofancientethics.Itsadherentsinclude Plato,Aristotle,andtheStoics.Amongthemod- erns,thebest-knowndefendersofclassicalhedo- nismandperfectionismarerespectivelyJ.S.Mill andNietzsche. Althoughthesetwoviewsdifferontheques- tionofwhathumanwell-beingessentiallycon- sistsin,neithertherebydeniesthattheother's answerhasaplaceinagoodhumanlife.Indeed, maturestatementsofeachtypicallyassignthe other'sansweranancillaryplace.Thus,hedo- nism,asexpoundedbyEpicurus,takesexcelling atthingsworthdoing-exercisingone'sintellec- tualpowersandmoralvirtuesinexemplaryand fruitfulways,e.g.-asthetriedandtruemeans toexperiencinglife'smostsatisfyingpleasures. Andperfectionism,asdevelopedinAristotle's ethics,underscorestheimportanceofpleasure- thedeepsatisfactionthatcomesfromdoingan importantjobwell,e.g.-asanaturalconcomi- tantofachievingexcellenceinthingsthatmat- ter.Thetwoviews,asexpressedinthesemature statements,differnotsomuchinthekindsof activitiestheytaketobecentraltoagoodlifeas inthewaystheyexplainthegoodnessofsucha life.Thechiefdifferencebetweenthem,then,is philosophicalratherthanprescriptive. Thesecondtheory,thetheoryofintrinsic value,alsohasrootsinancientethics,specifi- cally,Plato'stheoryofForms.ButunlikePlato's theory,thebasictenetsofwhichincludecertain doctrinesabouttherealityandtranscendenceof value,thetheoryofintrinsicvalueneithercon- tainsnorpresupposesanymetaphysicaltheses. Atissueinthetheoryiswhatthingsaregoodin themselves,andonecantakeapositiononthis issuewithoutcommittingoneselftoanythesis abouttherealityorunrealityofgoodnessor aboutitstranscendenceorimmanence.Alistof thedifferentthingsphilosophershaveconsid- eredgoodinthemselveswouldincludelife,hap- piness,pleasure,knowledge,virtue,friendship, beauty,andharmony.Thelistcouldeasilybe extended. Aninterestinwhatconstitutesthegoodness ofthevariousitemsonthelisthasbrought philosopherstofocusprimarilyonthequestion ofwhethersomethingunitesthem.Theoppos- ingviewsonthisquestionaremonismandplu- ralism.Monistsaffirmthelisfsunity;pluralists denyit.Plato,forinstance,wasamonist.He heldthatthegoodnessofeverythinggoodin itselfconsistedinharmonyandthereforeeach suchthingoweditsgoodnesstoitsbeinghar- monious.Alternatively,somephilosophershave proposedpleasureasthesoleconstituentof goodness.Indeed,conceivingofpleasureasa particularkindofexperienceorstateofcon- sciousness,theyhaveproposedthiskindof experienceastheonlythinggoodinitselfand characterizedallothergoodthingsasinstru- mentallygood,asowingtheirgoodnesstotheir 285 ethics ethics beingsourcesofpleasure.Thus,hedonismtoo canbeaspeciesofmonism. Inthiscase,though,onemustdistinguish betweentheviewthatitisone'sownexperi- encesofpleasurethatareintrinsicallygoodand theviewthatanyone'sexperiencesofpleasure, indeed,anysentientbeing'sexperiencesofplea- sure,areintrinsicallygood.Theformeriscalled (bySidgwick)egoistichedonism,thelatteruni- versalhedonism.Thisdistinctioncanbemade general,asadistinctionbetweenegoisticand universalviewsofwhatisgoodinitselfor,as philosophersnowcommonlysay,between agent-relativeandagent-neutralvalue.Assuch, itindicatesasignificantpointofdisagreementin thetheoryofintrinsicvalue,adisagreementin whichtheseemingarbitrarinessandblindnessof egoismmakeithardertodefend.Indrawingthis conclusion,however,onemustbecarefulnotto mistaketheseegoisticviewsforviewsinthethe- oryofhumanwell-being,foreachsetofviews representsasetofalternativeanswerstoadif- ferentquestion.Onemustbecareful,inother words,nottoinferfromthegreaterdefensibility ofuniversalismvis-å-visegoismthatuniversal- ismisthepredominantviewinthegeneralstudy ofgoodness. Rightaction.Thegeneralstudyofrightaction concernstheprinciplesofrightandwrongthat governourchoicesandpursuits.Inmodern ethicstheseprinciplesaretypicallygivenajural conception.Accordingly,theyareunderstoodto constituteamoralcodethatdefinesthedutiesof menandwomenwholivetogetherinfellow- ship.Thisconceptionofmoralprinciplesis chieflyduetotheinfluenceofChristianityinthe West,thoughsomeofitselementswerealready presentinStoicethics.Itsascendancyinthegen- eralstudyofrightactionputsthetheoryofduty atthecenterofthatstudy. Thetheoryhastwoparts:thesystematicexpo- sitionofthemoralcodethatdefinesourduties; anditsjustification.Thefirstpart,whenfully developed,presentscompleteformulationsof thefundamentalprinciplesofrightandwrong andshowshowtheyyieldallmoralduties.The standardmodelisanaxiomaticsysteminmath- ematics,thoughsomephilosophershavepro- posedatechnicalsystemofanappliedscience, suchasmedicineorstrategy,asanalternative. Thesecondpart,ifsuccessful,establishesthe authorityoftheprinciplesandsovalidatesthe code.Variousmethodsandcriteriaofjustifica- tionarecommonlyused;nosingleoneiscanon- ical.Successinestablishingtheprinciples' authoritydependsonthesoundnessoftheargu- mentthatproceedsfromwhatevermethodor criterionisused. Onetraditionalcriterionisimplicitintheidea ofanaxiomaticsystem.Onthiscriterion,the fundamentalprinciplesofrightandwrongare authoritativeinvirtueofbeingself-evident truths.Thatis,theyareregardedascomparable toaxiomsnotonlyinbeingthefirstprinciplesof adeductivesystembutalsoinbeingprinciples whosetruthcanbeseenimmediatelyupon reflection.Useofthiscriteriontoestablishthe principles'authorityisthehallmarkofintuition- ism.Onceoneofthedominantviewsinethics,its positioninthedisciplinehasnowbeenseriously erodedbyastrong,twentieth-centurytideof skepticismaboutallclaimsofself-evidence. Currently,themostinfluentialmethodofjus- tificationconsistentwithusingthemodelofan axiomaticsystemtoexpoundthemoralityof rightandwrongdrawsonthejuralconceptionof itsprinciples.Onthismethod,theprinciplesare interpretedasexpressionsofalegislativewill, andaccordinglytheirauthorityderivesfromthe sovereigntyofthepersonorcollectivewhose willtheyaretakentoexpress.Theoldestexam- pleofthemethod'suseisthedivinecommandthe- ory.Onthistheory,moralprinciplesaretakento belawsissuedbyGodtohumanity,andtheir authoritythusderivesfromGod'ssupremacy. ThetheoryistheoriginalChristiansourceofthe principles'juralconception.Theriseofsecular thoughtsincetheEnlightenmenthas,however, limiteditsappeal.Låterexamples,whichcon- tinuetoattractbroadinterestanddiscussion,are formalismandcontractarianism. FormalismisbestexemplifiedinKanfsethics. Ittakesamoralprincipletobeapreceptthatsat- isfiestheformålcriteriaofauniversallaw,andit takesformålcriteriatobethemarksofpurerea- son.Consequently,moralprinciplesarelawsthat issuefromreason.AsKantputsit,theyarelaws thatwe,asrationalbeings,givetoourselvesand thatregulateourconductinsofarasweengage eachother'srationalnature.Theyarelawsfora republicofreasonor,asKantsays,akingdomof endswhoselegislaturecomprisesallrational beings.Throughthisideal,Kantmakesintelligi- bleandforcefultheotherwiseobscurenotion thatmoralprinciplesderivetheirauthorityfrom thesovereigntyofreason. Contractarianismalsodrawsinspirationfrom Kanfsethicsaswellasfromthesocialcontract theoriesofLockeandRousseau.Itsfullestand mostinfluentialstatementappearsintheworkof Rawls.Onthisview,moralprinciplesrepresent 286 ethics ethics theidealtermsofsocialcooperationforpeople wholivetogetherinfellowshipandregardeach otherasequals.Specifically,theyaretakentobe theconditionsofanidealagreementamongsuch people,anagreementthattheywouldadoptif theymetasanassemblyofequalstodecidecol- lectivelyonthesocialarrangementsgoverning theirrelationsandreachedtheirdecisionasa resultofopendebateandrationaldeliberation. Theauthorityofmoralprinciplesderives,then, fromthefairnessoftheproceduresbywhichthe termsofsocialcooperationwouldbearrivedat inthishypotheticalconstitutionalconvention andtheassumptionthatanyrationalindividual whowantedtolivepeaceablywithothersand whoimaginedhimselfapartytothisconvention would,inviewofthefairnessofitsprocedures, assenttoitsresults.Itderives,thatis,fromthe hypotheticalconsentofthegoverned. Philosopherswhothinkofamoralcodeonthe modelofatechnicalsystemofanappliedscience useanentirelydifferentmethodofjustification. Intheirview,justastheprinciplesofmedicine representknowledgeabouthowbesttopromote health,sotheprinciplesofrightandwrongrep- resentknowledgeabouthowbesttopromotethe endsofmorality.Thesephilosophers,then,have ateleologicalconceptionofthecode.Ourfunda- mentaldutyistopromotecertainends,andthe principlesofrightandwrongorganizeanddirect oureffortsinthisregard.Whatjustifiestheprin- ciples,onthisview,isthattheendstheyserve aretherightonestopromoteandtheactions theyprescribearethebestwaystopromote them.Theprinciplesareauthoritative,inother words,invirtueofthewisdomoftheirprescrip- tions. Differentteleologicalviewsinthetheoryof dutycorrespondtodifferentanswerstotheques- tionofwhattherightendstopromoteare.The mostcommonanswerishappiness;andthemain divisionamongthecorrespondingviewsmirrors thedistinctioninthetheoryofintrinsicvalue betweenegoismanduniversalism.Thus,egoism anduniversalisminthetheoryofdutyhold, respectively,thatthefundamentaldutyof moralityistopromote,asbestasonecan,one's ownhappinessandthatitistopromote,asbest asonecan,thehappinessofhumanity.Thefor- merisethicalegoismandisbasedontheidealof rationalself-love.Thelatterisutilitarianismand isbasedontheidealofrationalbenevolence. Ethicalegoism'smostfamousexponentsinmod- ernphilosophyareHobbesandSpinoza.Ithas hadfewdistinguisheddefenderssincetheirtime. BenthamandJ.S.Millheadthelistofdistin- guisheddefendersofutilitarianism.Theview continuestobeenormouslyinfluential. Ontheseteleologicalviews,answerstoques- tionsabouttheendsweoughttopursuedeter- minetheprinciplesofrightandwrong.Put differently,thegeneralstudyofrightaction,on theseviews,issubordinatetothegeneralstudy ofgoodness.Thisisoneofthetwoleading answerstothestructuralquestionabouthowthe twostudiesarerelated.Theotheristhatthegen- eralstudyofrightactionistosomeextentinde- pendentofthegeneralstudyofgoodness.On viewsthatrepresentthisanswer,someprinciples ofrightandwrong,notablyprinciplesofjustice andhonesty,prescribeactionseventhoughmore evilthangoodwouldresultfromdoingthem. Theseviewsaredeontological.Fiatjustitiaruat coelumcapturestheirspirit.Theopposition betweenteleologyanddeontologyinethics underliesmanyofthedisputesinthegeneral studyofrightaction. Theprincipalsubstantiveandstructuralques- tionsofethicsarisenotonlywithrespecttothe conductofhumanlifegenerallybutalsowith respecttospecificwalksoflifesuchasmedicine, law,journalism,engineering,andbusiness.The examinationofthesequestionsinrelationtothe commonpracticesandtraditionalcodesofsuch professionsandoccupationshasresultedinthe specialstudiesofappliedethics.Inthesestudies, ideasandtheoriesfromthegeneralstudiesof goodnessandrightactionareappliedtoparticu- larcircumstancesandproblemsofsomeprofes- sionoroccupation,andstandardphilosophical techniquesareusedtodefine,clarify,andorga- nizetheethicalissuesfoundinitsdomain.In medicine,inparticular,whererapidadvancesin technologycreate,overnight,novelethicalprob- lemsonmattersoflifeanddeath,thestudyof biomedicalethicshasgeneratedsubstantial interestamongpractitionersandscholarsalike. Metaethics.Toalargeextent,thegeneralstud- iesofgoodnessandrightactionandthespecial studiesofappliedethicsconsistinsystematizing, deepening,andrevisingourbeliefsabouthow weoughttoconductourlives.Atthesametime, itischaracteristicofphilosophers,whenreflect- ingonsuchsystemsofbelief,toexaminethe natureandgroundsofthesebeliefs.Theseques- tions,whenaskedaboutethicalbeliefs,define thefieldofmetaethics.Therelationofthisfieldto theotherstudiesiscommonlyrepresentedby takingtheotherstudiestoconstitutethefieldof ethicsproperandthentakingmetaethicstobe thestudyoftheconcepts,methodsofjustifica- 287 ethics ethics tion,andontologicalassumptionsofthefieldof ethicsproper. Accordingly,metaethicscanproceedfrom eitheraninterestintheepistemologyofethicsor aninterestinitsmetaphysics.Onthefirst approach,thestudyfocusesonquestionsabout thecharacterofethicalknowledge.Typically,it concentratesonthesimplestethicalbeliefs,such as'Stealingiswrong'and'Itisbettertogivethan toreceive',andproceedsbyanalyzingthecon- ceptsinvirtueofwhichthesebeliefsareethical andexaminingtheirlogicalbasis.Onthesecond approach,thestudyfocusesonquestionsabout theexistenceandcharacterofethicalproperties. Typically,itconcentratesonthemostgeneral ethicalpredicatessuchasgoodnessandwrong- fulnessandconsiderswhethertheretrulyare ethicalpropertiesrepresentedbythesepredi- catesand,ifso,whetherandhowtheyareinter- wovenintothenaturalworld.Thetwo approachesarecomplementary.Neitherdomi- natestheother. Theepistemologicalapproachiscomparative. Itlookstothemostsuccessfulbranchesof knowledge,thenaturalsciencesandpuremath- ematics,forparadigms.Theformersuppliesthe paradigmofknowledgethatisbasedonobser- vationofnaturalphenomena;thelattersupplies theparadigmofknowledgethatseemingly resultsfromthesheerexerciseofreason.Under theinfluenceoftheseparadigms,threedistinct viewshaveemerged:naturalism,rationalism, andnoncognitivism. Naturalismtakesethicalknowledgetobe empiricalandaccordinglymodelsitonthepara- digmofthenaturalsciences.Ethicalconcepts,on thisview,concernnaturalphenomena.Ratio- nalismtakesethicalknowledgetobeaprioriand accordinglymodelsitontheparadigmofpure mathematics.Ethicalconcepts,onthisview,con- cernmoralityunderstoodassomethingcom- pletelydistinctfrom,thoughapplicableto, naturalphenomena,somethingwhosecontent andstructurecanbeapprehendedbyreason independentlyofsensoryinputs.Noncogni- tivism,inoppositiontotheseotherviews,denies thatethicsisagenuinebranchofknowledgeor takesittobeabranchofknowledgeonlyina qualifiedsense.Ineithercase,itdeniesthat ethicsisproperlymodeledonscienceormathe- matics.Onthemostextremeformofnoncogni- tivism,therearenogenuineethicalconcepts; wordslike'right','wrong','good',and'evil'have nocognitivemeaningbutratherservetovent feelingsandemotions,toexpressdecisionsand commitments,ortoinfluenceattitudesanddis- positions.Onlessextremeforms,thesewords aretakentohavesomecognitivemeaning,but conveyingthatmeaningisheldtobedecidedly secondarytothepurposesofventingfeelings, expressingdecisions,orinfluencingattitudes. Naturalismiswellrepresentedintheworkof Mill;rationalismintheworksofKantandthe intuitionists.Andnoncognitivism,whichdidnot emergeasadistinctiveviewuntilthetwentieth century,ismostpowerfullyexpoundedinthe worksofC.L.StevensonandHare.Itscentral tenets,however,wereanticipatedbyHume, whoseskepticalattacksonrationalismsetthe agendaforsubsequentworkinmetaethics. Themetaphysicalapproachiscenteredonthe questionofobjectivity,thequestionofwhether ethicalpredicatesrepresentrealpropertiesofan externalworldormerelyapparentorinvented properties,propertiesthatowetheirexistenceto theperception,feeling,orthoughtofthosewho ascribethem.Twoviewsdominatethisap- proach.Thefirst,moralrealism,affirmsthereal existenceofethicalproperties.Ittakesthemto inhereintheextemalworldandthustoexist independentlyoftheirbeingperceived.For moralrealism,ethicsisanobjectivediscipline,a disciplinethatpromisesdiscoveryandconfirma- tionofobjectivetruths.Atthesametime,moral realistsdifferfundamentallyonthequestionof thecharacterofethicalproperties.Some,suchas PlatoandMoore,regardthemaspurelyintel- lectiveandthusirreduciblydistinctfromempir- icalproperties.Others,suchasAristotleand Mill,regardthemasempiricalandeither reducibletooratleastsupervenientonother empiricalproperties.Thesecondview,moralsub- jectivism,deniestherealexistenceofethical properties.Onthisview,topredicate,say,good- nessofapersonistoimposesomefeeling, impulse,orotherstateofmindontotheworld, muchasoneprojectsanemotionontoone'scir- cumstanceswhenonedescribesthemasdelight- fulorsad.Ontheassumptionofmoralsub- jectivism,ethicsisnotasourceofobjective truth.Inancientphilosophy,moralsubjectivism wasadvancedbysomeoftheSophists,notably Protagoras.Inmodernphilosophy,Hume expoundeditintheeighteenthcenturyand Sartreinthetwentiethcentury. Regardlessofapproach,one(andperhapsthe central)problemofmetaethicsishowvalueis relatedtofact.Ontheepistemologicalapproach, thisproblemiscommonlyposedasthequestion ofwhetherjudgmentsofvaluearederivable fromstatementsoffact.Or,tobemoreexact,can therebealogicallyvalidargumentwhosecon- 288 ethics,autonomyof ethics,deontological clusionisajudgmentofvalueandallofwhose premisesarestatementsoffact?Onthemeta- physicalapproach,theproblemiscommonly posedasthequestionofwhethermoralpredi- catesrepresentpropertiesthatareexplicableas complexesofempiricalproperties.Atissue,in eithercase,iswhetherethicsisanautonomous discipline,whetherthestudyofmoralvaluesand principlesistosomedegreeindependentofthe studyofobservablepropertiesandevents.Aneg- ativeanswertothesequestionsaffirmsthe autonomyofethics;apositiveanswerdenies ethics'autonomyandimpliesthatitisabranch ofthenaturalsciences. Moralpsychology.Eventhosewhoaffirmthe autonomyofethicsrecognizethatsomefacts, particularlyfactsofhumanpsychology,bearon thegeneralstudiesofgoodnessandrightaction. Noonemaintainsthatthesestudiesfloatfreeof allconceptionofhumanappetiteandpassionor thattheypresupposenoaccountofthehuman capacityforvoluntaryaction.Itisgenerallyrec- ognizedthatanadequateunderstandingof desire,emotion,deliberation,choice,volition, character,andpersonalityisindispensabletothe theoreticaltreatmentofhumanwell-being, intrinsicvalue,andduty.Investigationsintothe natureofthesepsychologicalphenomenaare thereforeanessential,thoughauxiliary,partof ethics.Theyconstitutetheadjunctfieldofmoral psychology. Oneareaofparticularinterestwithinthisfield isthestudyofthosecapacitiesbyvirtueofwhich menandwomenqualifyasmoralagents,beings whoareresponsiblefortheiractions.Thisstudy isespeciallyimportanttothetheoryofdutysince thattheory,inmodernphilosophy,characteristi- callyassumesastrongdoctrineofindividual responsibility.Thatis,itassumesprinciplesof culpabilityforwrongdoingthatrequire,ascon- ditionsofjustifiedblame,thattheactofwrong- doingbeone'sownandthatitnotbedone innocently.Onlymoralagentsarecapableof meetingtheseconditions.Andthepresumption isthatnormal,adulthumanbeingsqualifyas moralagentswhereassmallchildrenandnon- humananimalsdonot.Thestudythenfocuses onthosecapacitiesthatdistinguishtheformer fromthelatterasresponsiblebeings. Themainissueiswhetherthepowerofreason aloneaccountsforthesecapacities.Ononeside oftheissuearephilosopherslikeKantwhohold thatitdoes.Reason,intheirview,isboththe pilotandtheengineofmoralagency.Itnotonly guidesonetowardactionsinconformitywith one'sduty,butitalsoproducesthedesiretodo one'sdutyandcaninvestthatdesirewith enoughstrengthtooverruleconflictingimpulses ofappetiteandpassion.Ontheothersideare philosophers,suchasHumeandMill,whotake reasontobeoneofseveralcapacitiesthatconsti- tutemoralagency.Ontheirview,reasonworks strictlyintheserviceofnaturalandsublimated desires,fears,andaversionstoproduceintelli- gentaction,toguideitspossessortowardthe objectsofthosedesiresandawayfromthe objectsofthosefears.Itcannot,however,by itselforiginateanydesireorfear.Thus,thedesire toactrightly,theaversiontoactingwrongly, whichareconstituentsofmoralagency,arenot productsofreasonbutareinsteadacquired throughsomemechanicalprocessofsocializa- tionbywhichtheirobjectsbecomeassociated withtheobjectsofnaturaldesiresandaversions. Ononeview,then,moralagencyconsistsinthe powerofreasontogovernbehavior,andbeing rationalisthussufficientforbeingresponsiblefor one'sactions.Ontheotherview,moralagency consistsinseveralthingsincludingreason,but alsoincludingadesiretoactrightlyandanaver- siontoactingwronglythatoriginateinnatural desiresandaversions.Onthisview,toberespon- sibleforone'sactions,onemustnotonlybe rationalbutalsohavecertaindesiresandaver- sionswhoseacquisitionisnotguaranteedbythe maturationofreason.Withinmoralpsychology, onecardinaltestoftheseviewsishowwellthey canaccommodateandexplainsuchcommon experiencesofmoralagencyasconscience, weakness,andmoraldilemma. Atsomepoint,however,theviewsmustbe testedbyquestionsaboutfreedom.Foronecan- notberesponsibleforone'sactionsifoneisinca- pableofactingfreely,whichistosay,ofone's ownfreewill.Thecapacityforfreeactionisthus essentialtomoralagency,andhowthiscapacity istobeexplained,whetheritfitswithinadeter- ministicuniverse,andifnot,whetherthenotion ofmoralresponsibilityshouldbejettisoned,are amongthedeepestquestionsthatthestudentof moralagencymustface.Whatismore,theyare notquestionstowhichmoralpsychologycan fumishanswers.Atthispoint,ethicsdescends intometaphysics. Seealsobioethics,contractarianism, HEDONISM,JUSTICE,MORALITY,NATURAL- ISM,PERFECTIONISM,UTILITARIANISM.J.D. ethics,autonomyof.Seeethics. ethics,deontological.Seeethics. 289 ethics,divinecommand Euclideangeometry ethics,divinecommand.Seedivinecommand ETHICS. ethics,environmental.Seeenvironmentalphilos- ophy. ethics,evolutionary.Seephilosophyofbiology. ethics,teleological.Seeethics. ethicsofbelief.Seeclifford. ethicsofIove.Seedivine COMMANDETHICS. ethnography,anopen-endedfamilyoftech- niquesthroughwhichanthropologistsinvesti- gatecultures;also,theorganizeddescriptionsof otherculturesthatresultfromthismethod.Cul- turalanthropology-ethnology-isbasedprimar- ilyonfieldworkthroughwhichanthropologists immersethemselvesinthelifeofalocalculture (village,neighborhood)andattempttodescribe andinterpretaspectsoftheculture.Careful observationisonecentraltoolofinvestigation. Throughittheanthropologistcanobserveand recordvariousfeaturesofsociallife,e.g.trading practices,farmingtechniques,ormarriage arrangements.Asecondcentraltoolistheinter- view,throughwhichtheresearcherexploresthe beliefsandvaluesofmembersofthelocalcul- ture.Toolsofhistoricalresearch,includingpar- ticularlyoralhistory,arealsoofusein ethnography,sincetheculturalpracticesofinter- estoftenderivefromaremotepointintime.See alsoETHNOLOGY.D.E.L. ethnology,thecomparativeandanalytical studyofcultures;culturalanthroplogy.Anthro- pologistsaimtodescribeandinterpretaspectsof thecultureofvarioussocialgroups-e.g.,the hunter-gatherersoftheKalahari,ricevillagesof theChineseCantonDelta,oracommunityof physicistsatLivermoreLaboratory.Topicsofpar- ticularinterestincludereligiousbeliefs,linguis- ticpractices,kinshiparrangements,marriage patterns,farmingtechnology,dietarypractices, genderrelations,andpowerrelations.Cultural anthropologyisgenerallyconceivedasanempir- icalscience,andthisraisesseveralmethodologi- calandconceptualdifficulties.Firstistheroleof theobserver.Theinjectionofanalienobserver intothelocalcultureunavoidablydisturbsthat culture.Second,thereistheproblemofintelligi- bilityacrossculturalsystems-radicaltranslation. Onegoalofethnographicresearchistoarriveat aninterpretationofasetofbeliefsandvalues thatarethoughttoberadicallydifferentfromthe researcher'sownbeliefsandvalues;butifthisis so,thenitisquestionablewhethertheycanbe accuratelytranslatedintotheresearcher'scon- ceptualscheme.Third,thereistheproblemof empiricaltestingofethnographicinterpreta- tions.Towhatextentdoempiricalprocedures constraintheconstructionofaninterpretationof agivenculturalmilieu?Finally,thereistheprob- lemofgeneralizability.Towhatextentdoesfield- workinonelocationpermitanthropologiststo generalizetoalargercontext-othervillages,the dispersedethnicgrouprepresentedbythisvil- lage,orthisvillageatothertimes?Seealso ETHNOGRAPHY,PHILOSOPHYOFTHESOCIAL SCIENCES.D.E.L. ethnomethodology,aphenomenologicalap- proachtointerpretingeverydayactionand speechinvarioussocialcontexts.Derivedfrom phenomenologicalsociologyandintroducedby HaroldGarfinkel,themethodaimstoguide researchintomeaningfulsocialpracticesas experiencedbyparticipants.Amajorobjectiveof themethodistointerprettherulesthatunderlie everydayactivityandthusconstitutepartofthe normativebasisofagivensocialorder.Research fromthisperspectivegenerallyfocusesonmun- danesocialactivities-e.g.,psychiatristsevaluat- ingpatients'filés,jurorsdeliberatingondefen- dants'culpability,orcoronersjudgingcausesof death.Theinvestigatorthenattemptstorecon- structanunderlyingsetofrulesandadhocpro- ceduresthatmaybetakentohaveguidedthe observedactivity.Theapproachemphasizesthe contextualityofsocialpractice-therichnessof unspokensharedunderstandingsthatguideand orientparticipants'actionsinagivenpracticeor activity.Seealsoverstehen.D.E.L. Eucken,Rudolf.Seelebensphilosophie. Euclid.Seeeuclideangeometry. Euclideangeometry,theversionofgeometrythat includesamongitsaxiomstheparallelaxiom, whichassertsthat,givenalineLinaplane,there existsjustonelineintheplanethatpasses throughapointnotonLbutnevermeetsL.The phrase'Euclideangeometry'refersbothtothe doctrineofgeometrytobefoundinEuclid'sEle- ments(fourthcenturyb.c.)andtothemathe- maticaldisciplinethatwasbuiltonthisbasis afterward.Inordertopresentpropertiesofrec- tilinearandcurvilinearcurvesintheplaneand solidsinspace,Euclidsoughtdefinitions,axioms, 290 eudaimonia EudoxusofCnidus andpostulatestogroundthereasoning.Someof hisassumptionsbelongedmoretotheunderly- inglogicthantothegeometryitself.Ofthe specificallygeometricalaxioms,theleastself-evi- dentstatedthatonlyonelinepassesthrougha pointinaplaneparalleltoanon-coincidentline withinit,andmanyeffortsweremadetoprove itfromtheotheraxioms.Notableforayswere madebyG.Saccheri,J.Playfair,andA.M. Legendre,amongothers,toputforwardresults logicallycontradictorytotheparallelaxiom(e.g., thatthesumoftheanglesbetweenthesidesofa triangleisgreaterthan180°)andthusstanding ascandidatesforfalsehood;however,noneof themledtoparadox.Nordidlogicallyequivalent axioms(suchasthattheanglesumequals180°) seemtobemoreorlessevidentthantheaxiom itself.Thenextstagesofthislineofreasoningled tonon-Euclideangeometry. Fromthepointofviewoflogicandrigor, Euclidwasthoughttobeanapotheosisofcer- taintyinhumanknowledge;indeed,'Euclidean' wasalsousedtosuggestcertainty,withoutany particularconcernwithgeometry.Ironically, investigationsundertakeninthelatenineteenth centuryshowedthat,quiteapartfromtheques- tionoftheparallelaxiom,Euclid'ssystemactu- allydependedonmoreaxiomsthanhehad realized,andthatfillingallthegapswouldbea formidabletask.Pioneeringworkdoneespe- ciallybyM.PaschandG.Peanowasbroughtto aclimaxin1899byHilbert,whoproducedwhat washopedtobeacompleteaxiomsystem.(Even thentheaxiomofcontinuityhadtowaitforthe secondedition!)Theendeavorhadconse- quencesbeyondtheEuclideanremit;itwasan importantexampleofthegrowthofaxiomatiza- tioninmathematicsasawhole,anditledHilbert himselftoseethatquestionsliketheconsistency andcompletenessofamathematicaltheorymust beaskedatanotherlevel,whichhecalledmeta- mathematics.Italsogavehisworkaformalist character;hesaidthathisaxiomatictalkof points,lines,andplanescouldbeofother objects. WithintheEuclideanrealm,attentionhas falleninrecentdecadesupon"neo-Euclidean" geometries,inwhichtheparallelaxiomisupheld butadifferentmetricisproposed.Forexample, givenaplanartriangleABC,theEuclideandis- tancebetweenAandBisthehypotenuseAB;but the"rectangulardistance"AC+CBalsosatisfies thepropertiesofametric,andageometrywork- ingwithitisveryusefulin,e.g.,economicgeog- raphy,asanyonewhodrivesaroundacitywill readilyunderstand. Seealsonon-euclideangeometry,phi- LOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICS.I.G.-G. eudaimonia.Seearistotle,eudaimonism. eudaimonism(fromGreekeudaimonia,'happi- ness','flourishing'),theethicaldoctrinethat happinessistheultimatejustificationformoral- ity.TheancientGreekphilosopherstypically begintheirethicaltreatiseswithanaccountof happiness,andthenarguethatthebestwayto achieveahappylifeisthroughthecultivation andexerciseofvirtue.Mostofthemmakevirtue orvirtuousactivityaconstituentofthehappy life;theEpicureans,however,construehappi- nessintermsofpleasure,andtreatvirtueasa meanstotheendofpleasantliving.Ethical eudaimonismissometimescombinedwithpsy- chologicaleudaimonism-i.e.,theviewthatall free,intentionalactionisaimedultimatelyatthe agenfshappiness.Acommonfeatureofancient discussionsofethics,andonedistinguishing themfrommostmoderndiscussions,istheview thatanagentwouldnotberationallyjustifiedin acourseofactionthatpromisedlesshappiness thansomealternativeopentohim.Henceit seemsthatmostoftheancienttheoriesareforms ofegosim.Buttheancienttheoriesdifferfrom modernversionsofegoismsince,accordingto theancients,atleastsomeofthevirtuesaredis- positionstoactfromprimarilyother-regarding motives:althoughtheagenfshappinessisthe ultimatejustificationofvirtuousaction,itisnot necessarilywhatmotivatessuchaction.Since happinessisregardedbymostoftheancientsas theultimateendthatjustifiesouractions,their ethicaltheoriesseemteleological;i.e.,rightor virtuousactionisconstruedasactionthatcon- tributestoormaximizesthegood.Butappear- ancesareagainmisleading,fortheancients typicallyregardvirtuousactionasalsovaluable foritsownsakeandhenceconstitutiveofthe agenfshappiness.Seealsoegoism,ethics, HEDONISM,UTILITARIANISM.D.T.D. EudoxusofCnidus(c.408-c.355b.c),Greek astronomerandmathematician,astudentof Plato.Hecreatedatestoftheequalityoftwo ratios,inventedthemethodofexhaustionfor calculatingareasandvolumeswithincurved boundaries,andintroducedanastronomicalsys- temconsistingofhomocentriccelestialspheres. Thissystemviewsthevisibleuniverseasasetof twenty-sevenspherescontainedoneinsidethe otherandeachconcentrictotheearth.Every celestialbodyislocatedontheequatorofanideal 291 Eulerdiagram event spherethatrevolveswithuniformspeedonits axis.Thepolesareembeddedinthesurfaceof anothersphere,whichalsorevolvesuniformly aroundanaxisinclinedataconstantangleto thatofthefirstsphere.Inthiswayenough spheresareintroducedtocapturetheapparent motionsofallheavenlybodies.Aristotleadopted thesystemofhomocentricspheresandprovided aphysicalinterpretationforitinhiscosmology. R.E.B. Eulerdiagram,alogicdiagraminventedbythe mathematicianEulerthatrepresentsstandard formstatementsinsyllogisticlogicbytwocircles andasyllogismbythreecircles.Inmodernadap- tationsofEulerdiagrams,distributedtermsare representedbycompletecirclesandundistrib- utedtermsbypartialcircles(circlesegmentsor circlesmadewithdottedlines): A:Every5isP\(v)', E:No5isP(1)(?) I:Some5isP■'S$P) O:SomeSisnotP($([?) A':sisP E':sisnotP C)^(i^(B —>C)),whichrelevancelogiciansholdtobefal- laciouswhen'—>'isreadas'entails'.(3)Indis- cussionsofpropositionalattitudeverbs,the principlethatfrom'aVsthatbisa(n)§'onemay infer'aVs-hoodofb',whereVhasitsrelational (transparent)sense.Forexample,exportation (insense3)takesonefrom'Ralphbelievesthat Ortcuttisaspy'to'Ralphbelievesspyhoodof Ortcutt',wherein'Ortcutt'cannowbereplaced byaboundvariabletoyield'(3x)(Ralphbelieves spyhoodofx)'.Seealsoquantifyingin,rel- evancelogic.G.F.S. expressibilitylogicism.Seelogicism. expressionism.Seeexpressiontheoryofart. expressiontheoryofart,atheorythatdefinesart astheexpressionoffeelingsoremotion(some- timescalledexpressionisminart).Suchtheories firstacquiredmajorimportanceinthenine- teenthcenturyinconnectionwiththeriseof Romanticism.Expressiontheoriesareasvarious asthedifferentviewsaboutwhatcountsas expressingemotion.Therearefourmainvari- ants. (1)Expressionascommunication.Thisrequires thattheartistactuallyhavethefeelingsthatare expressed,whentheyareinitiallyexpressed. Theyare"embodied"insomeexternalform,and therebytransmittedtotheperceiver.LeoTolstoy (1828-1910)heldaviewofthissort. (2)Expressionasintuition.Anintuitionisthe apprehensionoftheunityandindividualityof something.Anintuitionis"inthemind,"and hencetheartworkisalso.Croceheldthisview, andinhislåterworkarguedthattheunityofan intuitionisestablishedbyfeeling. (3)Expressionasclarification.Anartiststartsout withvague,undefinedfeelings,andexpressionis aprocessofcomingtoclarify,articulate,and understandthem.ThisviewretainsCroce'sidea thatexpressionisintheartisfsmind,aswellas 299 expressivecompleteness externalism hisviewthatweareallartiststothedegreethat wearticulate,clarify,andcometounderstand ourownfeelings.Collingwoodheldthisview. (4)Expressionasapropertyoftheobject.Foran artworktobeanexpressionofemotionisforit tohaveagivenstructureorform.SuzanneK. Langer(1895-1985)arguedthatmusicandthe otherarts"presented"orexhibitedstructuresor formsoffeelingingeneral. Seealsoaesthetics,institutionalthe- ORYOFART.S.L.F. expressivecompleteness.Seecompleteness. expressivemeaning.Seemeaning. extension.Seeintension. extensionalism,afamilyofontologiesandse- mantictheoriesrestrictedtoexistententities. Extensionalistontologydeniesthatthedomain ofanytruetheoryneedstoincludenon-exis- tents,suchasfictional,imaginary,andimpossi- bleobjectslikePegasusthewingedhorseor roundsquares.Extensionalistsemanticsreduces meaningandtruthtoset-theoreticalrelations betweentermsinalanguageandtheexistent objects,standardlyspatiotemporalandabstract entities,thatbelongtotheterm'sextension.The extensionofanameistheparticularexistent denotedbythename;theextensionofapredi- cateisthesetofexistentobjectsthathavethe propertyrepresentedbythepredicate.Thesen- tence'Allwhalesaremammals'istrueinexten- sionalistsemanticsprovidedtherearenowhales thatarenotmammals,noexistentobjectsinthe extensionofthepredicate'whale'thatarenot alsointheextensionof'mammal'.Linguistic contextsareextensionalif:(i)theymakerefer- enceonlytoexistentobjects;(ii)theysupport substitutionofcodesignativeterms(referringto thesamething),oroflogicallyequivalentpropo- sitions,salvaveritate(withoutlossoftruth- value);and(iii)itislogicallyvalidtoexistentially quantify(concludethatThereexistsanobjectsuch that...etc.)objectsreferredtowithinthecon- text.Contextsthatdonotmeettheserequire- mentsareintensional,non-extensional,or referentiallyopaque. Theimplicationsofextensionalism,associated withtheworkofFrege,Russell,Quine,and mainstreamanalyticphilosophy,aretolimitits explanationsofmindandmeaningtoexistent objectsandmaterial-mechanicalpropertiesand relationsdescribableinanexclusivelyexten- sionalidiom.Extensionalistsemanticsmusttry toanalyzeawayapparentreferencestonon- existentobjects,or,asinRussell'sextensionalist theoryofdefinitedescriptions,toclassifyallsuch predicationsasfalse.Extensionalistontologyin thephilosophyofmindmusteliminateorreduce propositionalattitudesordedictomentalstates, expressedinanintensionalidiom,suchas 'believesthat','fearsthat', andthelike,usuallyinfavörofextensionalchar- acterizationsofneurophysiologicalstates. Whetherextensionalistphilosophycansatisfy theseexplanatoryobligations,asthethesisof extensionalitymaintains,iscontroversial. Seealsoabstractentity,intensional- ITY,PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE,RUSSELL, THEORYOFDESCRIPTIONS,TRUTH.D.J. extensionality,axiomof.Seesettheory. extensionalitythesis.Seeextensionalism. extensiveabstraction.Seewhitehead. extensivemagnitude.Seemagnitude. externalism,theviewthatthereareobjective reasonsforactionthatarenotdependentonthe agenfsdesires,andinthatsenseexternaltothe agent.Intemalism(aboutreasons)istheview thatreasonsforactionmustbeinternalinthe sensethattheyaregroundedinmotivational factsabouttheagent,e.g.herdesiresandgoals. ClassicinternalistssuchasHumedenythatthere areobjectivereasonsforaction.Forinstance, whetherthefactthatanactionwouldpromote healthisareasontodoitdependsonwhether onehasadesiretobehealthy.Itmaybeareason forsomeandnotforothers.Thedoctrineis henceaversionofrelativism;afactisareason onlyinsofarasitissoconnectedtoanagenfs psychologicalstatesthatitcanmotivatethe agent.Bycontrast,externalistsholdthatnotall reasonsdependontheintemalstatesofparticu- laragents.Thusanexternalistcouldholdthat promotinghealthisobjectivelygoodandthatthe factthatanactionwouldpromoteone'shealthis areasontoperformitregardlessofwhetherone desireshealth. Thisdisputeiscloselytiedtothedebateöver motivationalinternalism,whichmaybecon- ceivedastheviewthatmoralbeliefs(for instance)are,byvirtueofentailingmotivation, internalreasonsforaction.Thosewhoreject motivationalinternalismmusteitherdenythat 300 externalism,content extrinsicrelation (sound)moralbeliefsalwaysprovidereasonsfor actionorholdthattheyprovideextemalrea- sons. Seealsoethics,motivationalinternal- ISM,RELATIVISM.W.T. externalism,content.Seephilosophyofmind. externalism,epistemological.Seeepistemology. externalism,motivational.Seemotivationalin- TERNALISM. externalnegation.Seenegation. externalreason.Seeexternalism. externalrelation.Seerelation. exteroception.Seeperception. extrasensoryperception.Seeparapsychology. extrinsicdesire,adesireofsomethingforitscon- ducivenesstosomethingelsethatonedesires. Extrinsicdesiresaredistinguishedfromintrinsic desires,desiresofitemsfortheirownsake,oras ends.Thus,anindividualmightdesirefinancial securityextrinsically,asameanstoherhappi- ness,anddesirehappinessintrinsically,asan end.Somedesiresaremixed:theirobjectsare desiredbothforthemselvesandfortheircon- ducivenesstosomethingelse.Jacquesmay desiretojog,e.g.,bothforitsownsake(asan end)andforthesakeofhishealth.Adesireis stridlyintrinsicifandonlyifitsobjectisdesired foritselfalone.Adesireisstridlyextrinsicifand onlyifitsobjectisnotdesired,evenpartly,forits ownsake.(Desiresfor"goodnews"-e.g.,a desiretohearthatone'schildhassurvivedacar accident-aresometimesclassifiedasextrinsic desires,eveniftheinformationisdesiredonly becauseofwhatitindicatesandnotforany instrumentalvaluethatitmayhave.) Desiresofeachkindhelptoexplainaction. Owingpartlytoamixeddesiretoentertaina friend,Marthamightacquireavarietyofextrin- sicdesiresforactionsconducivetothatgoal.Less happily,intrinsicallydesiringtoberidofhis toothache,Georgemightextrinsicallydesireto scheduleadentalappointment.Ifallgoeswell forMarthaandGeorge,theirdesireswillbesat- isfied,andthatwillbedueinparttotheeffects ofthedesiresupontheirbehavior. Seealsoactiontheory,intention, MOTIVATIONALEXPLANATION,VALUE. A.R.M. extrinsicproperty.Seerelation. extrinsicrelation.Seerelation. 301 F fa,Chinesetermfor(1)astandard,model,par- adigm,orexemplar;(2)properprocedure, behavior,ortechnique;(3)aruleorlaw;(4) dharma.Amentalimage(yi)ofacircle,acom- pass,andaparticularcirclecaneachserveasa faforidentifyingcircles.Thesage-kings,their institutions,andtheirbehaviorareallfafor rulerstoemulate.Methodsofgoveming(e.g.,by rewardandpunishment)arefa.Explicitlawsor bureaucraticrulesarealsofa.(SeeMoTzu, "DialecticalChapters,"andKuanTzu,chapter6, "SevenStandards.")Aftertheintroductionof BuddhismtoChina,faisusedtotranslate 'dharma'.Seealsobuddhism,dharma,mo tzu.B.W.V.N. fa-chia.Seechineselegalism. fact.Seestateofaffairs. facticity.Seeheidegger,sartre. factualcontent.Seeanalytic-syntheticdistinc- tion. fact-valuedistinction,theapparentlyfundamen- taldifferencebetweenhowthingsareandhow theyshouldbe.Thatpeopleobeythelaw(oract honestlyordesiremoney)isonething;thatthey shouldisquiteanother.Thefirstisamatterof fact,thesecondamatterofvalue. Humeisusuallycreditedwithdrawingthedis- tinctionwhenhenoticedthatonecannot uncontroversiallyinferan'oughffroman'is' (theis-oughtgap).Fromthefact,say,thatan actionwouldmaximizeoverallhappiness,we cannotlegitimatelyinferthatitoughttobe done-withouttheintroductionofsome(sofar suppressed)evaluativepremise.Wecouldsecure theinferencebyassumingthatoneoughtalways todowhatmaximizesoverallhappiness.But thatassumptionisevidentlyevaluative.Andany otherpremisethatmightlinkthenon-evaluative premisestoanevaluativeconclusionwouldlook equallyevaluative.Nomatterhowdetailedand extensivethenon-evaluativepremises,itseems noevaluativeconclusionfollows(directlyandas amatteroflogic).Somehaverepliedthatatleast afewnon-evaluativeclaimsdoentailevaluative ones.Totakeonepopulärexample,fromthefact thatsomepromisewasmade,wemight(it appears)legitimatelyinferthatitoughttobe kept,otherthingsequal-andthiswithoutthe introductionofanevaluativepremise.Yetmany arguethattheinferencefails,orthatthepremise isactuallyevaluative,orthattheconclusionis not. Humehimselfwasbothböldandbriefabout thegap'ssignificance,claimingsimplythatpay- ingattentiontoit"wou'dsubvertallthevulgär systemsofmorality,andletussee,thatthedis- tinctionofviceandvirtueisnotfoundedmerely ontherelationsofobjects,norisperceiv'dby reason"(TreatiseofHumanNature).Othershave beenmoreexpansive.Moore,forinstance,in effectrelieduponthegaptoestablish(viathe openquestionargument)thatanyattemptto defineevaluativetermsusingnon-evaluative oneswouldcommitthenaturalisticfallacy. Moore'smaintargetwasthesuggestionthat 'good'means"pleasant"andthefallacy,inthis context,issupposedtobemisidentifyinganeval- uativeproperty,beinggood,withanaturalprop- erty,beingpleasant.Assumingthatevaluative termshavemeaning,Mooreheldthatsome couldbedefinedusingothers(hethought,e.g., that'right'couldbedefinedas"productiveofthe greatestpossiblegood")andthattherest,though meaningful,mustbeindefinabletermsdenoting simple,non-natural,properties.Accepting Moore'suseoftheopenquestionargumentbut rejectingbothhisnon-naturalismandhis assumptionthatevaluativetermsmusthave (descriptive)meaning,emotivistsandprescrip- tivists(e.g.Ayer,C.L.Stevenson,andHare) arguedthatevaluativetermshavearoleinlan- guageotherthantodenoteproperties.Accord- ingtothem,theprimaryroleofevaluative languageisnottodescribe,buttoprescribe.The logicalgapbetween'is'and'ought',theyargue, establishesboththedifferencebetweenfactand valueandthedifferencebetweendescribing (howthingsare)andrecommending(howthey mightbe).Somenaturalists,though,acknowl- edgethegapandyetmaintainthattheevalua- tiveclaimsnonethelessdorefertonatural properties.Intheprocesstheydenytheontolog- icalforceoftheopenquestionargumentand 302 facultypsychology fallibilism treatevaluativeclaimsasdescribingaspecial classoffacts. Seealsoethics,moore,moralrealism. G.S.-M. facultypsychology,theviewthatthemindisa collectionofdepartmentsresponsiblefordistinct psychologicalfunctions.Relatedtofacultypsy- chologyisthedoctrineoflocalizationoffunc- tion,whereineachfacultyhasaspecificbrain location.Facultypsychologiesopposetheoriesof mindasaunitywithonefunction(e.g.,those ofDescartesandassociationism)orasaunity withvariouscapabilities(e.g.,thatofOckham), andopposetherelatedholisticdistributionist ormass-actiontheoryofthebrain.Faculty psychologybeganwithAristotle,whodivided thehumansoulintofivespecialsenses,three innersenses(commonsense,imagination,memory) andactiveandpassivemind.IntheMiddleAges (e.g.,Aquinas)Aristotle'sthreeinnersenses weresubdivied,creatingmoreelaboratelistsof fivetoseveninwardwits.Islamicphysician- philosopherssuchasAvicennaintegrated AristotelianfacultypsychologywithGalenic medicinebyproposingbrainlocationsforthe faculties. Twoimportantdevelopmentsinfacultypsy- chologyoccurredduringtheeighteenthcentury. First,ScottishphilosophersledbyReiddevel- opedaversionoffacultypsychologyopposedto theempiricistandassociationistpsychologiesof LockeandHume.TheScotsproposedthat humanswereendowedbyGodwithasetoffac- ultiespermittingknowledgeoftheworldand morality.TheScottishsystemexertedconsider- ableinfluenceintheUnitedStates,whereitwas widelytaughtasamoral,character-buildingdis- cipline,andinthenineteenthcenturythis"Old Psychology"opposedtheexperimental"New Psychology."Second,despitethenbeingcalleda charlatan,FranzJosephGäll(1758-1828)laid thefoundationformodernneuropsychologyin hisworkonlocalizationoffunction.Gäll rejectedexistingfacultypsychologiesasphilo- sophical,unbiological,andincapableofaccount- ingforeverydaybehavior.Gällproposedan innovativebehavioralandbiologicallistoffac- ultiesandbrainlocalizationsbasedoncompara- tiveanatomy,behaviorstudy,andmea- surementsofthehumanskull.Today,faculty psychologysurvivesintraitandinstincttheories ofpersonality,Fodor'stheorythatmentalfunc- tionsareimplementedbyneurologically"encap- sulated"organs,andlocalizationisttheoriesof thebrain. Seealsoaristotle,philosophyofmind, PHILOSOPHYOFPSYCHOLOGY.T.H.L. faith.Seebadfaith,philosophyofreligion. fallacy.Seeformålfallacy,informalfallacy. fallacyofaccent.Seeinformalfallacy. fallacyofaccident.Seeinformalfallacy. fallacyofaffirmingtheconsequent.Seeformål fallacy. fallacyofcomposition.Seeinformalfallacy. fallacyofdenyingtheantecedent.Seeformålfal- lacy. fallacyofdivision.Seeinformalfallacy. fallacyofequivocation.Seeinformalfallacy. fallacyoffalsecause.Seeinformalfallacy. fallacyoffourterms.Seesyllogism. fallacyofhastygeneralization.Seeinformalfal- lacy. fallacyofirrelevantconclusion.Seeinformalfal- lacy. fallacyofmanyquestions.Seeinformalfallacy. fallacyofmisplacedconcreteness.Seewhitehead. fallacyofsecundumquid.Seeinformalfallacy. fallibilism,thedoctrine,relativetosomesignifi- cantclassofbeliefsorpropositions,thattheyare inherentlyuncertainandpossiblymistaken.The mostextremeformofthedoctrineattributes uncertaintytoeverybelief;morerestrictedforms attributeittoallempiricalbeliefsortobeliefs concerningthepast,thefuture,otherminds,or theexternalworld.Mostcontemporaryphiloso- phersrejectthedoctrineinitsextremeform, holdingthatbeliefsaboutsuchthingsasele- mentarylogicalprinciplesandthecharacterof one'scurrentfeelingscannotpossiblybemis- taken. Philosopherswhorejectfallibilisminsome formgenerallyinsistthatcertainbeliefsareana- lyticallytrue,self-evident,orintuitivelyobvious. Thesemeansofsupportingtheinfallibilityof 303 falsecause,fallacyof Fechner,GustavTheodor somebeliefsarenowgenerallydiscredited.W.V. Quinehascastseriousdoubtontheverynotion ofanalytictruth,andtheappealtoself-evidence orintuitiveobviousnessisopentothecharge thatthosewhoofficiallyacceptitdonotalways agreeonwhatisthusevidentorobvious(there isnoobjectivewayofidentifyingit),andthat beliefssaidtobeself-evidenthavesometimes beenprovedfalse,thecausalprincipleandthe axiomofabstraction(insettheory)beingstrik- ingexamples.Inadditiontoemphasizingthe evolutionoflogicalandmathematicalprinciples, fallibilistshavesupportedtheirpositionmainly byarguingthattheexistenceandnatureof mind-independentobjectscanlegitimatelybe ascertainedonlybeexperimentalmethodsand thatsuchmethodscanyieldconclusionsthatare, atbest,probableratherthancertain.B.A. falsecause,fallacyof.Seeinformalfallacy. falseconsciousness,(1)lackofclearawarenessof thesourceandsignificanceofone'sbeliefsand attitudesconcerningsociety,religion,orvalues; (2)objectionableformsofignoranceandfalse belief;(3)dishonestformsofself-deception. Marxists(ifnotMarx)usetheexpressionto explainandcondemnillusionsgeneratedby unfaireconomicrelationships.Thus,workers whoareunawareoftheiralienation,and"happy homemakers"whoonlydimlysensetheir dependencyandquietdesperation,aremolded intheirattitudesbyeconomicpowerrelation- shipsthatmakethestatusquoseemnatural, therebyeclipsingtheirlong-termbestinterests. Again,religionisconstruedasaneconomically drivenideologythatfunctionsasan"opiate" blockingclearawarenessofhumanneeds. Collingwoodinterpretsfalseconsciousnessas self-corruptinguntruthfulnessindisowning one'semotionsandideas(ThePrinciplesofArt, 1938).Seealsobadfaith,existentialism. M.W.M. falsedilemma.Seedilemma. falsepleasure,pleasuretakeninsomethingfalse. IfitisfalsethatJonesishonest,butSmith believesJonesishonestandispleasedthatJones ishonest,thenSmith'spleasureisfalse.Ifplea- sureisconstruedasanintentionalattitude,then thetruthorfalsityofapleasureisafunctionof whetheritsintentionalobjectobtains.Onthis view,S'sbeingpleasedthatpisatruepleasureif anonlyifSispleasedthatpandpistrue.S'sbeing pleasedthatpisafalsepleasureifandonlyifSis pleasedthatpandpisfalse.Alternatively,Plato usestheexpression'falsepleasure'toreferto thingssuchasthecessationofpainorneutral statesthatareneitherpleasantnorpainfulthata subjectconfuseswithgenuineortruepleasures. Thus,beingreleasedfromtightshacklesmight mistakenlybethoughtpleasantwhenitismerely thecessationofapain.Seealsohedonism, VALUE.N.M.L. falsifiability.Seepopper,testability. falsification.Seepopper. falsum.SeeAppendixofSpecialSymbols. familyresemblance.Seewittgenstein. Fång,ThoméH.(1899-1976),Chinesephiloso- pherofculture.EducatedattheUniversityof NankingandtheUniversityofWisconsin,hehad anearlyinterestinDewey'spragmatism,but returnedtotheidealsofChinesephilosophydur- ingWorldWarII.Hehadagrandphilosophical scheme,alwaysdiscussingissuesfromacompar- ativeviewpointthroughperspectivesofancient Greek,modernEuropean,Chinese,andIndian thought.Heexertedaprofoundinfluenceon youngerphilosophersinTaiwanafter1949.See alsoCHINESEPHILOSOPHY.S.-h.L. FäräbI,al-.Seeal-färäbI. fascism.Seepoliticalphilosophy. fatalism.Seefreewillproblem. feature-placingdiscourse.Seestrawson. Fechner,GustavTheodor(1801-87),German physicistandphilosopherwhoseElementederPsy- chophysik(1860;Englishtranslation,1966)inau- guratedexperimentalpsychology.Obsessedwith themind-bodyproblem,Fechneradvancedan identitytheoryinwhicheveryobjectisboth mentalandphysical,andinsupportinvented psychophysics-the"exactscienceofthefunc- tionalrelations...betweenmindandbody." Fechnerbeganwiththeconceptofthelimen,or sensorythreshold.Theabsolutethresholdisthe stimulusstrength(R,Reiz)neededtocreatea conscioussensation(S),andtherelativethreshold isthestrengththatmustbeaddedtoastimulus forajustnoticeabledifference(jnd)tobeperceived. E.H.Weber(1795-1878)hadshownthatacon- stantratioheldbetweenrelativethresholdand 304 Fechner'slaw feministphilosophy stimulusmagnitude,Weber'slaw:AR/R=k.By experimentallydeterminingjnd'sforpairsof stimulusmagnitudes(suchasweights),Fechner formulatedhis"functionalrelation,"S=klogR, Fechner'slaw,anidentityequationofmindand matter.Låterpsychophysicistsreplaceditwitha powerlaw,R=kS",wherendependsonthekind ofstimulus.Theimportanceofpsychophysicsto psychologyconsistedinitsshowingthatquan- tificationofexperiencewaspossible,anditspro- vidingageneralparadigmforpsychological experimentationinwhichcontrolledstimulus conditionsaresystematicallyvariedandeffects observed.Inhislåteryears,Fechnerbroughtthe experimentalmethodtobearonaesthetics (VorschulederAesthetik,1876).T.H.L. Fechner'slaw.Seefechner. feedback.Seecybernetics. feedforward.Seecybernetics. felicificcalculus.Seebentham. felicityconditions.Seespeechacttheory. feministepistemology,epistemologyfromafem- inistperspective.Itinvestigatestherelevance thatthegenderoftheinquirer/knowerhasto epistemicpractices,includingthetheoretical practiceofepistemology.Itistypifiedbothby themesthatareexclusivelyfeministinthatthey couldariseonlyfromacriticalattentiontogen- der,andbythemesthatarenon-exclusivelyfem- inistinthattheymightarisefromother politicizingtheoreticalperspectivesbesidesfem- inism. Acentral,exclusivelyfeministthemeisthe relationbetweenphilosophicalconceptionsof reasonandculturalconceptionsofmasculinity. Hereahistoriciststancemustbeadopted,sothat philosophyisconceivedastheproductofhistor- icallyandculturallysituated(hencegendered) authors.Thisstancebringscertainpatternsof intellectualassociationintoview-patterns,per- haps,ofalignmentbetweenphilosophicalcon- ceptionsofreasonascontrastedwithemotionor intuition,andculturalconceptionsofmasculin- ityascontrastedwithfemininity. Acentral,non-exclusivelyfeministtheme mightbecalled"social-ism"inepistemology.It hastwomaintributaries:politicalphilosophy,in theformofMarx'shistoricalmaterialism;and philosophyofscience,intheformofeither QuineannaturalismorKuhnianhistoricism.The firsthasresultedinfeministstandpointtheory, whichadaptsanddevelopstheMarxianideathat differentsocialgroupshavedifferentepistemic standpoints,wherethematerialpositioningof oneofthegroupsissaidtobestowanepistemic privilege.Thesecondhasresultedinfeminist workinphilosophyofsciencewhichtriesto showthatnotonlyepistemicvaluesbutalso non-epistemic(e.g.gendered)valuesareof necessitysometimesaninfluenceinthegenera- tionofscientifictheories.Ifthiscanbeshown, thenanimportantfeministprojectsuggests itself:toworkoutarationaleforregulatingthe influenceofthesevaluessothatsciencemaybe moreself-transparentandmoreresponsible. Byattemptingtorevealtheepistemological implicationsofthefactthatknowersare diverselysituatedinsocialrelationsofidentity andpower,feministepistemologyrepresentsa radicalizinginnovationintheanalytictradition, whichhastypicallyassumedanasocialconcep- tionoftheepistemicsubject,andofthephiloso- pher. Seealsoepistemology,feministphilos- ophy,KUHN,MARXISM,QUINE.M.F. feministphilosophy,adiscussionofphilosophical concernsthatrefusestoidentifythehuman experiencewiththemaleexperience.Writing fromavarietyofperspectives,feministphiloso- pherschallengeseveralareasoftraditionalphi- losophyonthegroundsthattheyfail(1)totake seriouslywomen'sinterests,identities,and issues;and(2)torecognizewomen'swaysof being,thinking,anddoingasvaluableasthoseof men. Feministphilosophersfaulttraditionalmeta- physicsforsplittingtheselffromtheotherand themindfromthebody;forwonderingwhether "otherminds"existandwhetherpersonaliden- titydependsmoreonmemoriesoronphysical characteristics.Becausefeministphilosophers rejectallformsofontologicaldualism,theystress thewaysinwhichindividualsinterpenetrate eachother'spsychesthroughempathy,andthe waysinwhichthemindandbodycoconstitute eachother. BecauseWesternculturehasassociatedratio- nalitywith"masculinity"andemotionalitywith "femininity,"traditionalepistemologistshave oftenconcludedthatwomenarelesshuman thanmen.Forthisreason,feministphilosophers arguethatreasonandemotionaresymbiotically related,coequalsourcesofknowledge.Feminist philosophersalsoarguethatCartesianknowl- edge,forallitscertaintyandclarity,isverylim- 305 feministphilosophy feministphilosophy ited.Peoplewanttoknowmorethanthatthey exist;theywanttoknowwhatotherpeopleare thinkingandfeeling. Feministphilosophersalsoobservethattradi- tionalphilosophyofscienceisnotasobjectiveas itclaimstobe.Whereastraditionalphilosophers ofscienceoftenassociatescientificsuccesswith scientists'abilitytocontrol,rule,andotherwise dominatenature,feministphilosophersofsci- enceassociatescientificsuccesswithscientists' abilitytolistentonature'sself-revelations.Since itwillinglyyieldsabstracttheorytothetesti- monyofconcretefact,asciencethatlistensto whatnaturesaysisprobablymoreobjectivethan onethatdoesnot. Feministphilosophersalsocriticizetraditional ethicsandtraditionalsocialandpoliticalphilos- ophy.Rulesandprincipleshavedominatedtra- ditionalethics.Whetheragentsseektomaximize utilityfortheaggregateordotheirdutyforthe sakeofdutytheymeasuretheirconductagainst asetofuniversal,abstract,andimpersonal norms.Feministphilosophersoftencallthistra- ditionalviewofethicsa"justice"perspective, contrastingitwitha"care"perspectivethat stressesresponsibilitiesandrelationshipsrather thanrightsandrules,andthatattendsmoretoa moralsituation'sparticularfeaturesthantoits generalimplications. Feministsocialandpoliticalphilosophyfocus onthepoliticalinstitutionsandsocialpractices thatperpetuatewomen'ssubordination.The goalsoffeministsocialandpoliticalphilosophy are(1)toexplainwhywomenaresuppressed, repressed,and/oroppressedinwaysthatmen arenot;and(2)tosuggestmorallydesirableand politicallyfeasiblewaystogivewomenthesame justice,freedom,andequalitythatmenhave. Liberalfeministsbelievethatbecausewomen havethesamerightsasmendo,societymust providewomenwiththesameeducationaland occupationalopportunitiesthatmenhave. Marxistfeministsbelievethatwomencannotbe men'sequalsuntilwomenentertheworkforce enmasseanddomesticworkandchildcareare socialized.Radicalfeministsbelievethatthefun- damentalcausesofwomen'soppressionaresex- ual.Itiswomen'sreproductiveroleand/ortheir sexualrolethatcausestheirsubordination. Unlesswomensettheirownreproductivegoals (childlessnessisalegitimatealternativetomoth- erhood)andtheirownsexualagendas(lesbian- ism,autoeroticism,andcelibacyarealternatives toheterosexuality),womenwillremainlessthan free.Psychoanalyticfeministsbelievethat women'ssubordinationistheresultofearly- childhoodexperiencesthatcausethemto overdeveloptheirabilitiestorelätetootherpeo- pleontheonehandandtounderdeveloptheir abilitiestoassertthemselvesasautonomous agentsontheother.Women'sgreateststrength, acapacityfordeeprelationships,mayalsobe theirgreatestweakness:atendencytobecon- trolledbytheneedsandwantsofothers.Finally, existentialistfeministsclaimthattheultimate causeofwomen'ssubordinationisontological. WomenaretheOther;menaretheSelf.Until womendefinethemselvesintermsofthem- selves,theywillcontinuetobedefinedinterms ofwhattheyarenot:men. Recently,socialistfeministshaveattemptedto weavethesedistinctivestrandsoffeministsocial andpoliticalthoughtintoatheoreticalwhole. Theyarguethatwomen'sconditionisoverdeter- minedbythestructuresofproduction,repro- ductionandsexuality,andthesocializationof children.Women'sstatusandfunctioninallof thesestructuresmustchangeiftheyareto achievefullliberation.Furthermore,women's psychesmustalsobetransformed.Onlythenwill womenbeliberatedfromthekindofpatriarchal thoughtsthatunderminetheirself-conceptand makethemalwaystheOther. Interestingly,thesocialistfeministeffortto establishaspecificallyfeministstandpointthat representshowwomenseetheworldhasnot gonewithoutchallenge.Postmodernfeminists regardthiseffortasaninstantiationofthekind oftypicallymalethinkingthattellsonlyone storyaboutreality,truth,knowledge,ethics,and politics.Forpostmodernfeminists,suchastory isneitherfeasiblenordesirable.Itisnotfeasible becausewomen'sexperiencesdifferacrossclass, racial,andculturallines.Itisnotdesirable becausethe''One"andthe"True"arephilo- sophicalmythsthattraditionalphilosophyuses tosilencethevoicesofthemany.Feministphi- losophymustbemanyandnotOnebecause womenaremanyandnotOne.Themorefemi- nistthoughts,thebetter.Byrefusingtocenter, congeal,andcementseparatethoughtsintoa unifiedandinflexibletruth,feministphiloso- pherscanavoidthepitfallsoftraditionalphilos- ophy. Asattractiveasthepostmodernfeminist approachtophilosophymaybe,somefeminist philosophersworrythatanoveremphasisondif- ferenceandarejectionofunitymayleadtointel- lectualaswellaspoliticaldisintegration.If feministphilosophyistobewithoutanystand- pointwhatsoever,itbecomesdifficulttoground claimsaboutwhatisgoodforwomeninparticu- 306 Ferguson,Adam Fichte,JohannGottlieb larandforhumanbeingsingeneral.Itisamajor challengetocontemporaryfeministphilosophy, therefore,toreconcilethepressuresfordiversity anddifferencewiththoseforintegrationand commonality. Seealsoethics,existentialism,marx- ism,POLITICALPHILOSOPHY,POSTMODERN. R.T. Ferguson,Adam(1723-1816),Scottishphiloso- pherandhistorian.Hismainthemewastherise andfallofvirtueinindividualsandsocieties.In hismostimportantwork,AnEssayontheHistory ofCivilSociety(1766),hearguedthathumanhap- piness(ofwhichvirtueisaconstituent)isfound inpursuingsocialgoodsratherthanprivateends. Fergusonthoughtthatignoringsocialgoodsnot onlypreventedsocialprogressbutledtomoral corruptionandpoliticaldespotism.Tosupport thisheusedclassicaltextsandtravelers'writings toreconstructthehistoryofsocietyfrom"rade nations"throughbarbarismtocivilization.This allowedhimtoexpresshisconcernforthedan- gerofcorruptioninherentintheincreasingself- interestmanifestedintheincipientcommercial civilizationofhisday.Heattemptedtosystem- atizehismoralphilosophyinThePrinciplesof MoralandSocialScience(1792).J.W.A. Fermafslasttheorem.Seechoicesequence. Feuerbach,LudwigAndreas(1804-72),German materialistphilosopherandcriticofreligion.He providedthemajorlinkbetweenHegel's absoluteidealismandsuchlåtertheoriesofhis- toricalmaterialismasthoseofMarxandother "young(ornew)Hegelians."Feuerbachwas bominBavariaandstudiedtheology,firstatHei- delbergandthenBerlin,wherehecameunder thephilosophicalinfluenceofHegel.Hereceived hisdoctoratein1828and,afteranearlypublica- tionseverelycriticalofChristianity,retiredfrom officialGermanacademiclife.Intheyears between1836and1846,heproducedsomeof hismostinfluentialworks,whichinclude "TowardsaCritiqueofHegel'sPhilosophy" (1839),TheEssenceofChristianity(1841),Princi- plesofthePhilosophyoftheFuture(1843),andThe EssenceofReligion(1846).Afterabriefcollabora- tionwithMarx,heemergedasapopulärcham- pionofpoliticalliberalismintherevolutionary periodof1848.Duringthereactionthatfol- lowed,heagainleftpubliclifeanddieddepen- dentuponthesupportoffriends. Feuerbachwaspivotalintheintellectualhis- toryofthenineteenthcenturyinseveral respects.First,afterahalf-centuryofmetaphys- icalsystemconstructionbytheGermanidealists, Feuerbachrevived,inanewform,theoriginal Kantianprojectofphilosophicalcritique.How- ever,whereasKanthadtried"tolimitreasonin ordertomakeroomforfaith,"Feuerbachsought todemystifybothfaithandreasoninfavörofthe concreteandsituatedexistenceofembodied humanconsciousness.Second,his"method"of "transformatorycriticism"-directed,inthefirst instance,atHegel'sphilosophicalpronounce- ments-wasadoptedbyMarxandhasretained itsphilosophicalappeal.Briefly,itsuggestedthat "Hegelbestoodonhisfeet"by"inverting"the subjectandpredicateinHegel'sidealisticpro- nouncements.Oneshould,e.g.,rewrite"The individualisafunctionoftheAbsolute"as"The Absoluteisafunctionoftheindividual."Third, FeuerbachassertedthatthephilosophyofGer- manidealismwasultimatelyanextenuationof theology,andthattheologywasmerelyreligious consciousnesssystematized.Butsincereligion itselfprovestobemerelya"dreamofthehuman mind,"metaphysics,theology,andreligioncan bereducedto"anthropology,"thestudyofcon- creteembodiedhumanconsciousnessandits culturalproducts. ThephilosophicalinfluenceofFeuerbach flowsthroughMarxintovirtuallyalllåterhis- toricalmaterialistpositions;anticipatestheexis- tentialistconcernwithconcreteembodied humanexistence;andservesasaparadigmfor alllåterapproachestoreligiononthepartofthe socialsciences. Seealsohegel,kant,marx,marxism. J.P.Su. Fichte,JohannGottlieb(1762-1814),German philosopher.Hewasaproponentofanuncom- promisingsystemoftranscendentalidealism,the Wissenschaftslehre,whichplayedakeyroleinthe developmentofpost-Kantianphilosophy.Born inSaxony,FichtestudiedatJenaandLeipzig.The writingsofKantledhimtoabandonmetaphysi- caldeterminismandtoembracetranscendental idealismas"thefirstsystemofhumanfreedom." Hisfirstbook,VersucheinerKritikallerOffenbarung ("AttemptataCritiqueofallRevelations,"1792), earnedhimareputationasabrilliantexponentof Kantianism,whilehisearlypoliticalwritings securedhimareputationasaJacobin. InspiredbyReinhold,Jacobi,Maimon,and Schulze,Fichterejectedthe"letter"ofKantian- ismand,inthelecturesandwritingsheproduced atJena(1794-99),advancedanew,rigorously systematicpresentationofwhathetooktobeits 307 Fichte,JohannGottlieb Fichte,JohannGottlieb "spirit."HedispensedwithKanfsthings-in- themselves,theoriginaldualityoffaculties,and thedistinctionbetweenthetranscendentalaes- theticandthetranscendentalanalytic.By emphasizingtheunityoftheoreticalandpracti- calreasoninawayconsistentwith"theprimacy ofpracticalreason,"Fichtesoughttoestablish theunityofthecriticalphilosophyaswellasof humanexperience. InUeberdenBegriffderWissenschaftslehre("On theConceptoftheWissenschaftslehre,"1794)he explainedhisconceptionofphilosophyas"the scienceofscience,"tobepresentedinadeduc- tivesystembasedonaself-evidentfirstprinciple. Thebasic"foundations"ofthissystem,which FichtecalledWissenschaftslehre(theoryofsci- ence),wereoutlinedinhisGrundlagedergesamten Wissenschaftslehre("FoundationsoftheEntire Wissenschaftslehre,"1794-95)andGrundrijider EigentilmlichenderWissenschaftslehreinRilcksicht aufdastheoretischeVermögen("OutlineoftheDis- tinctiveCharacteroftheWissenschaftslehrewith respecttotheTheoreticalFaculty,"1795)and then,substantiallyrevised,inhislecturesonWis- senschaftslehrenovamethodo(1796-99). The"foundational"portionoftheWissen- schaftslehrelinksouraffirmationoffreedomtoour experienceofnaturalnecessity.Beginningwith theformer("theIsimplypositsitself"),itthen demonstrateshowafreelyself-positingsubject mustbeconsciousnotonlyofitself,butalsoof "representationsaccompaniedbyafeelingof necessity"andhenceofanobjectiveworld. Fichteinsistedthattheessenceofselfhoodliesin anactivepositingofitsownself-identityand hencethatself-consciousnessisanauto-produc- tiveactivity:aTathandlungor"fact/act."However, theIcanposititselfonlyaslimited;inorderforthe originallypositedactof"sheerself-positing"to occur,certainothermentalactsmustoccuras well,actsthroughwhichtheIpositsforitselfan objective,spatiotemporalworld,aswellasa moralrealmoffree,rationalbeings.TheIfirst positsitsownlimitedconditionintheformof "feeling"(occasionedbyaninexplicableAnstobor "check"uponitsownpracticalstriving),thenasa "sensation,"thenasan"intuition"ofathing,and finallyasa"concept."Thedistinctionbetween theIandthenot-Iarisesonlyinthesereiterated actsofself-positing,acompletedescriptionof whichthusamountstoa"geneticdeduction"of thenecessaryconditionsofexperience.Freedom istherebyshowntobepossibleonlyinthecon- textofnaturalnecessity,whereitislimitedand finite.Atthesametime"ourfreedomisatheo- reticaldeterminingprincipleofourworld." Thoughitmustposititsfreedom"absolutely"- i.e.,schlechthinor"fornoreason"-agenuinely freeagentcanexistonlyasafiniteindividual endlesslystrivingtoovercomeitsownlimits. Afterestablishingits"foundations,"Fichte extendedhisWissenschaftslehreintosocialand politicalphilosophyandethics.Subjectivityitself isessentiallyintersubjective,inasmuchasonecan beempiricallyconsciousofoneselfonlyasone individualamongmanyandmustthuspositthe freedomofothersinordertopositone'sown freedom.Butforthistooccur,thefreedomof eachindividualmustbelimited;indeed,"the conceptofrightorjustice(Recht)isnothingother thantheconceptofthecoexistenceofthefree- domofseveralrational/sensuousbeings."The GrundlagedesNaturrechts("FoundationsofNat- uralRight,"1796-97)examineshowindividual freedommustbeexternallylimitedifacommu- nityoffreeindividualsistobepossible,and demonstratesthatajustpoliticalorderisa demandofreasonitself,since"theconceptof justiceorrightisaconditionofself-conscious- ness.""Naturalrights"arethusentirelyinde- pendentofmoralduties.Unlikepolitical philosophy,whichpurelyconcernsthepublic realm,ethics,whichisthesubjectofDasSystem derSittenlehre("TheSystemofEthicalTheory," 1798),concernstheinnerrealmofconscience.It viewsobjectsnotasgiventoconsciousnessbutas producedbyfreeaction,andconcernsnotwhatis, butwhatoughttobe.Thetaskofethicsistoindi- catetheparticulardutiesthatfollowfromthe generalobligationtodetermineoneselffreely (thecategoricalimperative). BeforeFichtecouldextendtheWissenschafts- lehreintothephilosophyofreligion,hewas accusedofatheismandforcedtoleaveJena.The celebratedcontroversyöverhisallegedatheism (theAtheismusstreit)wasprovokedby"Ueberden GrundunseresGlaubensineinergöttlicheWel- tregierung"("OntheBasisofourBeliefina DivineGovernanceoftheWorld,"1798),in whichhesharplydistinguishedbetweenphilo- sophicalandreligiousquestions.Whiledefend- ingourrighttoposita"moralworldorder," Fichteinsistedthatthisorderdoesnotrequirea personaldeityor"morallawgiver." AftermovingtoBerlin,Fichte'sfirstconcern wastorebutthechargeofatheismandtoreply totheindictmentofphilosophyas"nihilism" advancedinJacobi'sOpenLettertoFichte(1799). ThiswasthetaskofDieBestimmungdesMenschen ("TheVocationofMan,"1800).Duringthe Frenchoccupation,hedeliveredRedenandie deutscheNation("AddressestotheGerman 308 Ficino,Marsilio fieldtheory Nation,"1808),whichproposedaprogramof nationaleducationandattemptedtokindleGer- manpatriotism.Theotherpublicationsofhis Berlinyearsincludeaforayintopoliticalecon- omy,DergeschlosseneHandelstaat('TheClosed CommercialState,"1800);aspeculativeinter- pretationofhumanhistory,DieGrundzugedes gegenwärtigesZeitalters("TheCharacteristicsof thePresentAge,"1806);andamysticallytinged treatiseonsalvation,DieAnweisungzumseligen Leben("GuidetotheBlessedLife,"1806).In unpublishedprivatelectureshecontinuedto developradicallynewversionsoftheWis- senschaftslehre. Fichte'ssubstantialinfluencewasnotlimited tohiswell-knowninfluenceonSchellingand Hegel(bothofwhomcriticizedthe"subjec- tivism"oftheearlyWissenschaftslehre).Heisalso importantinthehistoryofGermannationalism andprofoundlyinfluencedtheearlyRomantics, especiallyNovalisandSchlegel.Recentdecades haveseenrenewedinterestinFichte'stranscen- dentalphilosophy,expeciallythelåter,unpub- lishedversionsoftheWissenschaftslehre.This century'smostsignificantcontributiontoFichte studies,however,istheongoingpublicationof thefirstcriticaleditionofhiscompleteworks. Seealsohegel,idealism,kant.D.Br. Ficino,Marsilio(1433-99),ItalianNeoplatonic philosopherwhoplayedaleadingroleinthecul- turallifeofFlorence.Ordainedapriestin1473, hehopedtodrawpeopletoChristbymeansof Platonism.ItwasthroughFicino'stranslation andcommentariesthattheworksofPlatofirst becameaccessibletotheLatin-speakingWest, buttheimpactofPlato'sworkwasconsiderably affectedbyFicino'sotherinterests.Heaccepted NeoplatonicinterpretationsofPlato,including thoseofPlotinus,whomhetranslated;andhe sawPlatoastheheirofHermesTrismegistus,a mythicalEgyptiansageandsupposedauthorof thehermeticcorpus,whichhetranslatedearlyin hiscareer.Heembracedthenotionofapriscathe- ologia,anancientwisdomthatencapsulated philosophicandreligioustruth,washandedon toPlato,andwaslåtervalidatedbytheChristian revelation.Themostpopulärofhisoriginal workswasThreeBooksonLife(1489),whichcon- tainsthefullestRenaissanceexpositionofathe- oryofmagic,basedmainlyonNeoplatonic sources.Hepostulatedalivingcosmosinwhich theWorld-Soulislinkedtotheworld-bodyby spirit.Thisrelationshipismirroredinman, whosespirit(orastralbody)linkshisbodyand soul,andtheresultingcorrespondencebetween microcosmandmacrocosmallowsbothman's controlofnaturalobjectsthroughmagicandhis ascenttoknowledgeofGod.Otherpopulär workswerehiscommentaryonPlato'sSympo- sium(1469),whichpresentsatheoryofPlatonic love;andhisPlatonicTheology(1474),inwhich hearguesfortheimmortalityofthesoul.See alsoNEOPLATONISM.EJ.A. fiction,inthewidestusage,whatevercontrasts withwhatisamatteroffact.Asappliedtoworks offiction,however,thisisnottheappropriate contrast.Foraworkoffiction,suchasahistori- calnovel,mightturnouttobetrueregardingits historicalsubject,withoutceasingtobefiction. Thecorrectcontrastoffictionistonon-fiction.If aworkoffictionmightturnouttobetrue,how is'fiction'bestdefined?Accordingtosome philosophers,suchasSearle,thewriterofnon- fictionperformsillocutionaryspeechacts,such asassertingthatsuch-and-suchoccurred, whereasthewriteroffictioncharacteristically onlypretendstoperformtheseillocutionaryacts. Othersholdthatthecoreideatowhichappeal shouldbemadeisthatofmaking-believeor imaginingcertainstatesofaffairs.KendallWal- ton(MimesisasMake-Believe,1990),forinstance, holdsthataworkoffictionistobeconstruedin termsofapropwhosefunctionistoservein gamesofmake-believe.Bothkindsoftheory allowforthepossibilitythataworkoffiction mightturnouttobetrue.Seealsoaesthetics, IMAGINATION,PHILOSOPHYOFLITERATURE, SPEECHACTTHEORY.B.Ga. fiction,logical.Seelogicalconstruction. fictionalism.Seeduhem. fideism.Seeevid ENTIALISM. "Fido"-Fidotheoryofmeaning.Seemeaning. field(ofarelation).Seerelation. fieldtheory,atheorythatproceedsbyassigning valuesofphysicalquantitiestothepointsof space,orofspace-time,andthenlaysdownlaws relatingthesevalues.Forexample,afieldtheory mightsupposeavalueformatterdensity,ora temperatureforeachspace-timepoint,andthen relätethesevalues,usuallyintermsofdifferen- tialequations.Intheseexamplesthereisatleast thetacitassumptionofaphysicalsubstancethat Ullstherelevantregionofspace-time.Butno suchassumptionneedbemade.Forinstance,in 309 figure figure-ground Maxwell'stheoryoftheelectromagneticfield, eachpointofspace-timecarriesavalueforan electricandamagneticfield,andthesevaluesare thengovernedbyMaxwelfsequations.Ingen- eralrelativity,thegeometry(e.g.,thecurvature) ofspace-timeisitselftreatedasafield,withlaw- likeconnectionswiththedistributionofenergy andmatter. Formulationintermsofafieldtheoryresolves theproblemofactionatadistancethatsoexer- cisedNewtonandhiscontemporaries.Weoften takecausalconnectiontorequirespatialconti- guity.Thatis,foroneentitytoactcausallyon another,thetwoentitiesneedtobecontiguous. ButinNewton'sdescriptiongravitationalattrac- tionactsacrossspatialdistances.Similarly,in electrostaticsthemutualrepulsionofelectric chargesisdescribedasactingacrossspatialdis- tances.InthetimesofbothNewtonandMaxwell numerouseffortstounderstandsuchactionata distanceintermsofsomespace-fillingmediating substanceproducednoviabletheory.Fieldthe- oriesresolvetheperplexity.Byattributingvalues ofphysicalquantitiesdirectlytothespace-time pointsonecandescribegravitation,electrical andmagneticforces,andotherinteractions withoutactionatadistanceoranyintervening physicalmedium.Onedescribesthevaluesof physicalquantities,attributeddirectlytothe space-timepoints,asinfluencingonlythevalues atimmediatelyneighboringpoints.Inthisway theinfluencespropagatethroughspace-time, ratherthanactinstantaneouslyacrossdistances orthroughamedium. Ofcoursethereisametaphysicalprice:on suchadescriptionthespace-timepointsthem- selvestakeontheroleofakindofdematerial- izedether.Indeed,somehavearguedthatthe pervasiveroleoffieldtheoryincontemporary physicsandtheneedforspace-timepointsfora field-theoreticdescriptionconstituteastrong argumentfortheexistenceofthespace-time points.Thisconclusioncontradicts"relational- ism,"whichclaimsthatthereareonlyspa- tiotemporalrelations,butnospace-timepoints orregionsthoughtofasparticulars. Quantumfieldtheoryappearstotakeonapar- ticularlyabstractformoffieldtheory,sinceit associatesaquantummechanicaloperatorwith eachspace-timepoint.However,sinceoperators correspondtophysicalmagnitudesratherthan tovaluesofsuchmagnitudes,itisbettertothink ofthefield-theoreticaspectofquantumfieldthe- oryintermsofthequantummechanicalampli- tudesthatitalsoassociateswiththespace-time points. Seealsoeinstein,newton,philosophy OFSCIENCE,QUANTUMMECHANICS,SPACE- TIME.P.Te. figure.Seesyllogism. figure-ground,thediscriminationofanobjector figurefromthecontextorbackgroundagainst whichitisset.Evenwhenaconnectedregionis groupedtogetherproperly,asinthefamousfig- urethatcanbeseeneitherasapairoffacesoras avase,itispossibletointerprettheregionalter- natelyasfigureandasground.Thisfactwasorig- inallyelaboratedin1921byEdgarRubin(1886- 1951).Figure-groundeffectsandtheexistence ofotherambiguousfiguressuchastheNecker cubeandtheduck-rabbitchallengedthepre- vailingassumptioninclassicaltheoriesofper- ception-maintained,e.g.,byJ.S.MillandH. vonHelmholtz-thatcomplexperceptionscould beunderstoodintermsofprimitivesensations constitutingthem. Theunderdeterminationofperceptionbythe visualstimulus,notedbyBerkeleyinhisEssayof 1709,takesaccountofthefactthattheretinal imageisimpoverishedwithrespecttothree- dimensionalinformation.Identicalstimulation attheretinacanresultfromradicallydifferent distalsources.WithinGestaltpsychology,the Gestalt,orpattern,wasrecognizedtobeunder- determinedbyconstituentpartsavailablein proximalstimuli.M.Wertheimer(1880-1943) observedin1912thatapparentmotioncouldbe inducedbyviewingaseriesofstillpicturesin rapidsuccession.Heconcludedthatperception ofthewhole,asinvolvingmovement,wasfun- damentallydifferentfromtheperceptionofthe staticimagesofwhichitiscomposed.W.Köhler AnexampleofvisualreversalfromEdgarRubin: theobjectdepictedcanbeseenalternatelyasa vaseorasapairoffaces.Thereversaloccurs whetherthereisablackgroundandwhitefigure orwhitefigureandblackground. 310 Filmer,Robert Fludd,Robert (1887-1967)observedthattherewasnofigure- groundarticulationintheretinalimage,and concludedthatinherentlyambiguousstimuli requiredsomeautonomousselectiveprinciples ofperceptualorganization.Assubsequently developedbyGestaltpsychologists,formistaken astheprimitiveunitofperception.Inphilo- sophicaltreatments,figure-groundeffectsare usedtoenforcetheconclusionthatinterpreta- tioniscentraltoperception,andthatperceptions arenomorethanhypothesesbasedonsensory data. Seealsoköhler,perception.R.C.R. Filmer,Robert(1588-1653),Englishpolitical writerwhoproduced,mostimportantly,the posthumousPatriarcha(1680).Itisremembered becauseLockeattackeditinthefirstofhisTwo TreatisesofGovernment(1690).Filmerarguedthat Godgavecompleteauthorityövertheworldto Adam,andthatfromhimitdescendedtohis eldestsonwhenhebecametheheadofthefam- ily.Thereafteronlyfathersdirectlydescended fromAdamcouldproperlyberulers.Justas Adam'srulewasnotderivedfromtheconsentof hisfamily,sotheking'sinheritedauthorityisnot dependentonpopulärconsent.Herightlymakes lawsandimposestaxesathisowngoodpleasure, thoughlikeagoodfatherhehasthewelfareof hissubjectsinview.Filmer'spatriarchalism, intendedtobolstertheabsolutepowerofthe king,istheclassicEnglishstatementofthedoc- trine.Seealsopoliticalphilosophy. J.B.S. finalcause.Seearistotle. finitaryproof.Seehilbert'sprogram. finiteautomaton.Seecomputertheory,turing MACHINE. finitism.Seehilbert,philosophyofmathemat- ics. firstactualization.Seearistotle. firstcause.Seeprimemover. firstcauseargument.Seephilosophyofreligion. firstimposition.Seeimposition. firstintention.Seeimposition. firstIawofthermodynamics.Seeentropy. firstlimittheorem.Seeprobability. firstmover.Seeprimemover. firstness.Seepeirce. first-order.Seeorder. first-orderlogic.Seeformållogic,order,sec- OND-ORDERLOGIC. firstphilosophy,inAristotle'sMetaphysics,the studyofbeingquabeing,includingthestudyof theology(asunderstoodbyhim),sincethe divineisbeingparexcellence.Descartes'sMedita- tionsonFirstPhilosophywasconcernedchiefly withtheexistenceofGod,theimmortalityofthe soul,andthenatureofmatterandofthemind. Seealsometaphysics.P.Bu. firstpotentiality.Seearistotle. fitness.Seephilosophyofbiology. fivephases.See WU-HSING. FiveWays.Seeaquinas. Fludd,Robert(1574-1637),Englishphysician andwriter.InfluencedbyParacelsus,hermetism, andthecabala,FludddefendedaNeoplatonic worldviewontheeveofitssupersessionbythe newmechanisticphilosophy.Heproduced improvementsinthemanufactureofsteeland inventedathermometer,thoughhealsoused magnetstocurediseaseanddevisedasalvetobe appliedtoaweapontocurethewoundithad inflicted.Heheldthatsciencegotitsideasfrom Scriptureallegoricallyinterpreted,whenthey wereofanyvalue.Hisworkscombinetheology withanoccult,NeoplatonicreadingoftheBible, andcontainnumerousfinediagramsillustrating themutualsympathyofhumanbeings,thenat- uralworld,andthesupernaturalworld,each reflectingtheothersinparallelharmonicstruc- tures.IncontroversywithKepler,Fluddclaimed touncoveressentialnaturalprocessesrootedin naturalsympathiesandtheoperationofGod's light,ratherthanmerelydescribingtheexternal movementsoftheheavens.Creationisthe extensionofdivinelightintomatter.Evilarises fromadarknessinGod,hisfailuretowill.Mat- terisuncreated,butthisposesnoproblemfor orthodoxy,sincematterisnothing,amerepos- sibilitywithouttheleastactuality,notsomething 311 fluxion folkpsychology coeternalwiththeCreator.Seealsoneopla- tonism.J.Lo. fluxion.Seecalculus. flyingarrowparadox.Seezeno'sparadoxes. focalmeaning.Seearistotle. Födor,JerryA.(b.1935),influentialcontempo- raryAmericanphilosopherofpsychology, knownforhisenergetic(andoftenwitty) defenseofintensionalrealism,acomputational- representationalmodelofthought,andanatom- istic,externalisttheoryofcontentdetermination formentalstates.Fodor'sphilosophicalwritings fallunderthreeheadings.First,hehasdefended thetheoryofmindimplicitincontemporarycog- nitivepsychology,thatthecognitivemind-brain isbotharepresentational/computationaldevice and,ultimately,physical.Hehastakenonbehav- iorists(Ryle),psychologistsinthetraditionof J.J.Gibson,andeliminativematerialists(P.A. Churchland).Second,hehasengagedinvarious theoreticaldisputeswithincognitivepsychology, arguingforthemodularityoftheperceptualand languagesystems(roughly,theviewthatthey aredomain-specific,mandatory,limited-access, innatelyspecified,hardwired,andinformation- allyencapsulated){TheModularityofMind,1983); forastrongformofnativism(thatvirtuallyallof ourconceptsareinnate);andfortheexistenceof a"languageofthought"(TheLanguageofThought, 1975).Thelatterhasledhimtoargueagainst connectionismasapsychologicaltheory(as opposedtoanimplementationtheory). Finally,hehasdefendedtheviewsofordinary propositionalattitudepsychologythatourmen- talstates(1)aresemanticallyevaluable(inten- tional),(2)havecausalpowers,and(3)aresuch thattheimplicitgeneralizationsoffolkpsychol- ogyarelargelytrueofthem.Hisdefenseis twofold.Folkpsychologyisunsurpassedin explanatorypower;furthermore,itisvindicated bycontemporarycognitivepsychologyinsofaras ordinarypropositionalattitudestatescanbe identifiedwithinformation-processingstates, thosethatconsistinacomputationalrelationto arepresentation.Therepresentationalcompo- nentofsuchstatesallowsustoexplainthe semanticevaluabilityoftheattitudes;thecom- putationalcomponent,theircausalefficacy.Both sortsofaccountsraisedifficulties.Thefirstissat- isfactoryonlyifsupplementedbyanaturalistic accountofrepresentationalcontent.HereFödor hasarguedforanatomistic,externalistcausal theory(Psychosemantics,1987)andagainstholism (theviewthatnomentalrepresentationhascon- tentunlessmanyothernon-synonymousmen- talrepresentationsalsohavecontent)(Holism:A Shopper'sGuide,1992),againstconceptualrole theories(theviewthatthecontentofarepre- sentationisdeterminedbyitsconceptualrole) (NedBlock,BrianLoar),andagainstteleofunc- tionaltheories(teleofunctionalismistheview thatthecontentofarepresentationisdeter- mined,atleastinpart,bythebiologicalfunctions oftherepresentationsthemselvesorsystemsthat produceorusethoserepresentations)(RuthMil- likan,DavidPapineau).Thesecondsortissatis- factoryonlyifitdoesnotimplyepipheno- menalismwithrespecttocontentproperties.To avoidsuchepiphenomenalism,Födorhas arguedthatnotonlystrictlawsbutalsoceteris paribuslawscanbecausal.Inaddition,hehas soughttoreconcilehisexternalismvis-å-viscon- tentwiththeviewthatcausalefficacyrequiresan individualisticindividuationofstates.TwoSolu- tionshavebeenexplored:thesupplementation ofbroad(externallydetermined)contentwith narrowcontent,wherethelattersuperveneson whatis''inthehead"(Psychosemantics,1987),and itssupplementationwithmodesofpresentation identicaltosentencesofthelanguageofthought (TheElmandtheExpert,1995). Seealsocognitivescience,connection- ism,FOLKPSYCHOLOGY,HOLISM,LANGUAGE OFTHOUGHT, MIND. MEANING, PHILOSOPHYOF B.V.E. folkpsychology,inonesense,aputativenetwork ofprinciplesconstitutingacommonsensetheory thatallegedlyunderlieseverydayexplanationsof humanbehavior;thetheoryassignsacentral roletomentalstateslikebelief,desire,andinten- tion.Consideranexampleofaneverydaycom- monsensepsychologicalexplanation:Janewent totherefrigeratorbecauseshewantedabeerand shebelievedtherewasbeerintherefrigerator. Likemanysuchexplanations,thisadvertstoa so-calledpropositionalattitude-amentalstate, expressedbyaverb('believe')plusathat-clause, whoseintentionalcontentispropositional.It alsoadvertstoamentalstate,expressedbyaverb ('want')plusadirect-objectphrase,whose intentionalcontentappearsnottobeproposi- tional. Inanother,relatedsense,folkpsychologyisa networkofsocialpracticesthatincludesascrib- ingsuchmentalstatestoourselvesandothers, andprofferingexplanationsofhumanbehavior thatadverttothesestates.Thetwosensesneed 312 folkpsychology folkpsychology distinguishingbecausesomephilosopherswho acknowledgetheexistenceoffolkpsychologyin thesecondsenseholdthatcommonsensepsy- chologicalexplanationsdonotemployempirical generalizations,andhencethatthereisnosuch theoryasfolkpsychology.(Henceforth,'FP'will abbreviate'folkpsychology'inthefirstsense;the unabbreviatedphrasewillbeusedinthesecond sense.) Eliminativisminphilosophyofmindasserts thatFPisanempiricaltheory;thatFPisthere- foresubjecttopotentialscientificfalsification; andthatmaturescienceveryprobablywillestab- lishthatFPissoradicallyfalsethathumanssim- plydonotundergomentalstateslikebeliefs, desires,andintentions.Onekindofeliminativist argumentfirstsetsforthcertainmethodological stricturesabouthowFPwouldhavetointegrate withmaturescienceinordertobetrue(e.g., beingsmoothlyreducibletoneuroscience,or beingabsorbedintomaturecognitivescience), andthencontendsthatthesestricturesare unlikelytobemet.Anotherkindofargument firstclaimsthatFPembodiescertainstrong empiricalcommitments(e.g.,tomentalrepre- sentationswithlanguagelikesyntacticstruc- ture),andthencontendsthatsuchempirical presuppositionsarelikelytotumoutfalse. Oneinfluentialversionoffolkpsychological realismlargelyagreeswitheliminativismabout whatisrequiredtovindicatefolkpsychology,but alsoholdsthatmaturescienceislikelytoprovide suchvindication.Realistsofthispersuasiontyp- icallyargue,forinstance,thatmaturecognitive sciencewillverylikelyincorporateFP,andalso willverylikelytreatbeliefs,desires,andother propositionalattitudesasstateswithlanguage- likesyntacticstructure.Otherversionsoffolk- psychologicalrealismtakeissue,inonewayor another,witheither(i)theeliminativists'claims aboutFP'sempiricalcommitments,or(ii)the eliminativists'stricturesabouthowFPmust meshwithmaturescienceinordertobetrue,or both.Concerning(i),forinstance,somephiloso- phersmaintainthatFPperseisnotcommitted totheexistenceoflanguagelikementalrepre- sentations.Ifmaturecognitivescienceturnsout nottoposita"languageofthought,"theycon- tend,thiswouldnotnecessarilyshowthatFPis radicallyfalse;insteaditmightonlyshowthat propositionalattitudesaresubservedinsome otherwaythanvialanguagelikerepresenta- tionalstructures. Concerning(ii),somephilosophersholdthat FPcanbetruewithoutbeingastightlyconnected tomaturescientifictheoriesastheeliminativists require.Forinstance,thedemandthatthespe- cialsciencesbesmoothlyreducibletothefunda- mentalnaturalsciencesiswidelyconsideredan excessivelystringentcriterionofintertheoretic compatibility;soperhapsFPcouldbetruewith- outbeingsmoothlyreducibletoneuroscience. Similarly,thedemandthatFPbedirectly absorbableintoempiricalcognitivescienceis sometimesconsideredtoostringentasacriterion eitherofFP'struth,orofthesoundnessofits ontologyofbeliefs,desires,andotherproposi- tionalattitudes,orofthelegitimacyofFP-based explanationsofbehavior.PerhapsFPisatrue theory,andexplanatorilylegitimate,evenifitis notdestinedtobecomeapartofscience.Evenif FP'sontologicalcategoriesarenotscientificnat- uralkinds,perhapsitsgeneralizationsarelike generalizationsaboutclothing:true,explanato- rilyusable,andontologicallysound.(Noone doubtstheexistenceofhats,coats,orscarves.No onedoubtsthetruthorexplanatoryutilityof generalizationslike'Coatsmadeofheavymate- rialtendtokeepthebodywarmincoldweather', eventhoughthesegeneralizationsarenotlaws ofanyscience.) Yetanotherapproachtofolkpsychology,often weddedtorealismaboutbeliefsanddesires (althoughsometimesweddedtoinstrumental- ism),maintainsthatfolkpsychologydoesnot employempiricalgeneralizations,andhenceis notatheoryatall.Onevariantdeniesthatfolk psychologyemploysanygeneralizations,empir- icalorotherwise.Anothervariantconcedesthat therearefolk-psychologicalgeneralizations,but deniesthattheyareempirical;insteadtheyare heldtobeanalytictruths,ornormsofrational- ity,orbothatonce.Advocatesofnon-theory viewstypicallyregardfolkpsychologyasa hermeneutic,orinterpretive,enterprise.They oftenclaimtoothattheattributionofproposi- tionalattitudes,andalsotheprofferingand graspingoffolk-psychologicalexplanations,isa matterofimaginativelyprojectingoneselfinto anotherperson'ssituation,andthenexperienc- ingakindofempathicunderstanding,orVer- stehen,oftheperson'sactionsandthemotives behindthem.Amorerecent,hi-tech,formula- tionofthisideaisthattheinterpreter"runsa cognitivesimulation"ofthepersonwhose actionsaretobeexplained. Philosopherswhodefendfolk-psychological realism,inoneoranotherofthewaysjustcan- vassed,alsosometimesemployargumentsbased ontheallegedlyself-stultifyingnatureofelimi- nativism.Onesuchargumentbeginsfromthe premisethatthenotionofactionisfolk-psycho- 313 Fonseca,Pedroda Foot,Philippa logical-thatabehavioraleventcountsasan actiononlyifitiscausedbypropositionalatti- tudesthatrationalizeit(undersomesuitableact- description).Ifso,andifhumansneverreally undergopropositionalattitudes,thentheynever reallyacteither.Inparticular,theyneverreally assertanything,orargueforanything(since assertingandarguingarespeciesofaction).Soif eliminativismistrue,theargumentconcludes, theneliminativistscanneitherassertitnorargue forit-anallegedlyintolerablepragmaticpara- dox.Eliminativistsgenerallyreacttosuchargu- mentswithbreathtakingequanimity.Atypical replyisthatalthoughourpresentconceptof actionmightwellbefolk-psychological,thisdoes notprecludethepossibilityofafuturesuccessor concept,purgedofanycommitmenttobeliefs anddesires,thatcouldinheritmuchoftherole ofourcurrent,folk-psychologicallytainted,con- ceptofaction. Seealsocognitivescience,philosophy OFMIND,REDUCTION,SIMULATIONTHEORY. T.E.H. Fonseca,Pedroda(1528-99),Portuguese philosopherandlogician.HeenteredtheJesuit orderin1548.Apartfromaperiod(1572-82)in Rome,helivedinPortugal,teachingphilosophy andtheologyattheuniversitiesofEvoraand Coimbraandperformingvariousadministrative dutiesforhisorder.Hewasresponsibleforthe ideaofapublishedcourseonAristotelianphi- losophy,andtheresultingseriesofCoimbra commentaries,theCursusConimbricensis,was widelyusedintheseventeenthcentury.Hisown logictext,theInstitutesofDialectic(1564),went intomanyeditions.Itisagoodexampleof RenaissanceAristotelianism,withitsemphasis onAristotle'ssyllogistic,butitretainssome materialonmedievaldevelopments,notably consequences,exponibles,andsuppositionthe- ory.FonsecaalsowroteacommentaryonAris- totle'sMetaphysics(publishedinpartsfrom1577 on),whichcontainstheGreektext,acorrected Latintranslation,commentsontextualmatters, andanextensiveexplorationofselectedphilo- sophicalproblems.Hecitesawiderangeof medievalphilosophers,bothChristianandArab, aswellasthenewlypublishedGreekcommen- tatorsonAristotle.Hisownpositionissympa- thetictoAquinas,butgenerallyindependent. Fonsecaisimportantnotsomuchforanypartic- ulardoctrines,thoughhedidholdoriginalviews onsuchmattersasanalogy,butforhisprovision offullydocumented,carefullywrittenandcare- fullyarguedbooksthat,alongwithothersinthe sametradition,werereadatuniversities,both CatholicandProtestant,wellintotheseven- teenthcentury.Herepresentswhatisoften calledtheSecondScholasticism.EJ.A. Fontenelle,BernardLeBovierde(1657-1757), Frenchwriterwhoheraldedtheageofthe philosophes.AproductofJesuiteducation,hewas aversatilefreethinkerwithskepticalinclina- tions.DialoguesoftheDead(1683)showedoffhis analyticalmindandelegantstyle.In1699,he wasappointedsecretaryoftheAcademyofSci- ences.Hecomposedfamouseulogiesofscien- tists;defendedthesuperiorityofmodernscience övertraditioninDigressiononAncientsandMod- erns(1688);popularizedCopemicanastronomy inConversationsonthePluralityofWorlds (1686)-famousforpostulatingtheinhabitation ofplanets;stigmatizedsuperstitionandcredulity inHistoryofOracles(1687)andTheOriginofFables (1724);promotedCartesianphysicsinTheTheory ofCartesianVortices(1752);andwroteElementsof InfinitesimalCalculus(1727)inthewakeofNew- tonandLeibniz.J.-L.S. Foot,Philippa(b.1920),Britishphilosopherwho exertedalastinginfluenceonthedevelopment ofmoralphilosophyinthesecondhalfofthe twentiethcentury.Herpersisting,intertwined themesareoppositiontoallformsofsubjec- tivisminethics,thesignificanceofthevirtues andvices,andtheconnectionbetweenmorality andrationality.Inherearlierpapers,particularly "MoralBeliefs"(1958)and"Goodnessand Choice"(1961),reprintedinVirtuesandVices (1978),sheunderminesthesubjectivistaccounts ofmoral"judgment"derivedfromC.L.Steven- sonandHarebyarguingformanylogicalorcon- ceptualconnectionsbetweenevaluationsand thefactualstatementsonwhichtheymustbe based.Latelyshehasdevelopedthiskindof thoughtintothenaturalisticclaimthatmoral evaluationsaredeterminedbyfactsaboutour lifeandournature,asevaluationsoffeaturesof plantsandanimals(asgoodordefectivespeci- mensoftheirkind)aredeterminedbyfactsabout theirnatureandtheirlife. Foofsoppositiontosubjectivismhasremained constant,butherviewsonthevirtuesinrelation torationalityhaveundergoneseveralchanges. In"MoralBeliefs"sherelätesthemtoself-inter- est,maintainingthatavirtuemustbenefitits possessor;inthe(subsequentlyrepudiated) "MoralityasaSystemofHypotheticalImpera- tives"(1972)shewentasfarastodenythatthere wasnecessarilyanythingcontrarytoreasonin 314 force,illocutionary form,aesthetic beinguncharitableorunjust.In"DoesMoral SubjectivismRestonaMistake?"(OxfordJournal ofLegalStudies,1995)thevirtuesthemselves appearasformsofpracticalrationality.Hermost recentwork,soontobepublishedasTheGram- marofGoodness,preservesanddevelopsthelatter claimandreinstatesancientconnectionsbe- tweenvirtue,rationality,andhappiness. Seealsoethics,hare,virtueethics. R.Hu. force,illocutionary.Seephilosophyoflanguage, SPEECHACTTHEORY. forcing,amethodintroducedbyPaulJ. Cohen-seehisSetTheoryandtheContinuum Hypothesis(1966)-toproveindependence resultsinZermelo-Fraenkelsettheory(ZF). Cohenprovedtheindependenceoftheaxiomof choice(AC)fromZF,andofthecontinuum hypothesis(CH)fromZF+AC.Theconsistency ofACwithZFandofCHwithZF+AChadpre- viouslybeenprovedbyGödelbythemethodof constructiblesets.AmodelofZFconsistsoflay- ers,withtheelementsofasetatonelayeralways belongingtolowerlayers.Startingwithamodel M,Cohen'smethodproducesan"outermodel" Nwithnomorelevelsbutwithmoresetsateach level(whereasGödel'smethodproducesan 'innermodel'L):muchofwhatwillbecometrue inNcanbe"forced"fromwithinM.Themethod isapplicableonlytohypothesesinthemore "abstract"branchesofmathematics(infinitary combinatorics,generaltopology,measurethe- ory,universalalgebra,modeltheory,etc);but thereitisubiquitous.Applicationsincludethe proofbyRobertM.Solovayoftheconsistencyof themeasurabilityofallsets(ofallprojectivesets) withZF(withZF+AC);alsotheproofbySolo- vayandDonaldA.Martinoftheconsistencyof Martin'saxiom(MA)plusthenegationofthe continuumhypothesis(~CH)withZF+AC. (CHimpliesMA;andofknownconsequencesof CHabouthalfareimpliedbyMA,abouthalf refutablebyMAH—-CH.)Numeroussimplifica- tions,extensions,andvariants(e.g.Boolean-val- uedmodels)ofCohen'smethodhavebeen introduced.Seealsoindependenceresults, SETTHEORY.J.Bur. Fordyce,David(1711-51),Scottishphilosopher andeducationaltheoristwhosewritingswere influentialintheeighteenthcentury.Hislectures formedthebasisofhisElementsofMoralPhiloso- phy,writtenoriginallyforThePreceptor(1748), låtertranslatedintoGermanandFrench,and abridgedfortheartidesonmoralphilosophyin thefirstEncylopaediaBritannica(1771).Fordyce combinesthepreacher'sappealtotheheartin theadvocacyofvirtuewithamoral"scientisfs" appraisalofhumanpsychology.Heclaimsto deriveourdutiesexperimentallyfromastudyof theprerequisitesofhumanhappiness. MA.St. foreknowledge,divine.Seedivineforeknowl- EDGE. form,inmetaphysics,especiallyPlato'sandAris- totle's,thestructureoressenceofathingascon- trastedwithitsmatter. (1)Plato'stheoryofFormsisarealisticontology ofuniversals.Inhiselenchus,Socratessought whatiscommonto,e.g.,allchairs.Platobelieved theremustbeanessence-orForm-commonto everythingfallingunderoneconcept,which makesanythingwhatitis.Achairisachair becauseit"participatesin"theFormofChair. TheFormsareideal"patterns,"unchanging, timeless,andperfect.Theyexistinaworldof theirown(ef.theKantiannoumenalrealm). Platospeaksofthemasself-predicating:the FormofBeautyisperfectlybeautiful.Thisled,as herealized,totheThirdManargumentthatthere mustbeaninfinitenumberofForms.Theonly trueunderstandingisoftheForms.Thiswe attainthroughanamnesis,"recollection." (2)Aristotleagreedthatformsarecloselytied tointelligibility,butdeniedtheirseparateexis- tence.Aristotleexplainschangeandgeneration throughadistinctionbetweentheformandmat- terofsubstances.Alumpofbronze(matter) becomesastatuethroughitsbeingmoldedinto acertainshape(form).Inhisearliermeta- physics,Aristotleidentifiedprimarysubstance withthecompositeofmatterandform,e.g. Socrates.Låter,hesuggeststhatprimarysub- stanceisform-whatmakesSocrateswhatheis (theformhereishissoul).Thisnotionofforms asessenceshasobvioussimilaritieswiththePla- tonicview.Theybecamethe"substantialforms" ofScholasticism,accepteduntiltheseventeenth century. (3)Kantsawformastheaprioriaspectof experience.Wearepresentedwithphenomeno- logical"matter,"whichhasnomeaninguntilthe mindimposessomeformuponit. Seealsoaristotle,kant,metaphysics, PLATO.R.C. form,aesthetic.Seeaestheticformalism,aes- THETICS. 315 form,grammatical formålfallacy form,grammatical.Seelogicalform. form,logical.Seelogicalform. form,Platonic.Seeform,plato. form,schematic.Seelogicalform. form,substantial.Seeform,hylomorphism. formålcause.Seearistotle. formåldistinction.See fundamentumdivisionis. formålfallacy,aninvalidinferencepatternthatis describedintermsofaformållogic.Thereare threemaincases:(1)aninvalid(orotherwise unacceptable)argumentidentifiedsolelybyits formorstructure,withnoreferencetothecon- tentofthepremisesandconclusion(suchas equivocation)ortootherfeatures,generallyofa pragmaticcharacter,oftheargumentativedis- course(suchasunsuitabilityoftheargumentfor thepurposesforwhichitisgiven,failuretosat- isfyinductivestandardsforacceptableargument, etc;thelatterconditionsofargumentevaluation fallintothepurviewofinformalfallacy);(2)a formålruleofinference,oranargumentform, thatisnotvalid(inthelogicalsystemonwhich theevaluationismade),instancesofwhichare sufficientlyfrequent,familiar,ordeceptiveto meritgivinganametotheruleorform;and(3) anargumentthatisaninstanceofafallacious ruleofinferenceorofafallaciousargumentform andthatisnotitselfvalid. Thecriterionofsatisfactoryargumenttypically takenasrelevantindiscussingformålfålladesis validity.Inthisregard,itisimportanttoobserve thatrulesofinferenceandargumentformsthat arenotvalidmayhaveinstances(whichmaybe anotherruleorargumentform,ormaybeaspe- cificargument)thatarevalid.Thus,whereasthe argumentform (i)P,Q;thereforeR (aformthateveryargument,includingevery validargument,consistingoftwopremises shares)isnotvalid,theargumentform(ii), obtainedfrom(i)bysubstitutingP&QforR,isa validinstanceof(i): (ii)P,Q;thereforeP&Q. Since(ii)isnotinvalid,(ii)isnotaformålfallacy thoughitisaninstanceof(i).Thus,some instancesofformallyfallaciousrulesofinference orargument-formsmaybevalidandtherefore notbeformålfållades.Examplesofformålfål- ladesfollowbelow,presentedaccordingtothe systemoflogicappropriatetothelevelof descriptionofthefallacy.Therearenostandard namesforsomeofthefålladeslistedbelow. Fålladesofsentential(propositional)logic. Affirmingtheconsequent:Ifpthenq; I 'IfRichardhadhisnephewsmurdered,then Richardwasanevilman;Richardwasanevil man.Therefore,Richardhadhisnephews murdered.' Denyingtheantecedent:Ifpthenq;not-p/.'. not-q. 'IfNorthwasfoundguiltybythecourts,then Northcommittedthecrimeschargedofhim; Northwasnotfoundguiltybythecourts. Therefore,Northdidnotcommitthecrimes chargedofhim.' Commutationofconditionals:IfpthenqI:.If qthenp. 'IfReaganwasagreatleader,thensowas Thatcher.Therefore,ifThatcherwasagreat leader,thensowasReagan." Impropertransposition:IfpthenqI:.Ifnot-p thennot-q. 'IfthenationsoftheMiddleEastdisarm,there willbepeaceintheregion.Therefore,ifthe nationsoftheMiddleEastdonotdisarm, therewillnotbepeaceintheregion.' Improperdisjunctivesyllogism(affirmingone disjunct):porq;pI:.,not-q. 'EitherJohnisanåldermanorawardcom- mitteeman;Johnisanålderman.Therefore, Johnisnotawardcommitteeman.'(Thisrule ofinferencewouldbevalidif'or'wereinter- pretedexclusively,where'porq'istrueif exactlyoneconstituentistrueandisfalseoth- erwise.Instandardsystemsoflogic,however, 'or'isinterpretedinclusively.) Fålladesofsyllogisticlogic. Fålladesofdistribution(whereMisthemid- dleterm,Pisthemajorterm,andSistheminor term). Undistributedmiddleterm:themiddletermis notdistributedineitherpremise(roughly,nötn- ingissaidofallmembersoftheclassitdesig- nates),asin 316 formalism formalism SomePareM'Somepoliticiansare crooks. SomeMareSSomecrooksarethieves. .'.SomeSareP..'.Somepoliticiansare thieves.' ////c/fmajor(undistributedmajorterm):the majortermisdistributedintheconclusionbut notinthemajorpremise,asin AllMareP'Allradicalsare communists. NoSareMNosocialistsareradicals. .'.SomeSare.'.Somesocialistsarenot notP.communists.' ////c/fminor(undistributedminorterm):the minortermisdistributedintheconclusionbut notintheminorpremise,asin AllPareM'Allneo-Nazisareradicals. AllMareSAllradicalsareterrorists. .'.AUSareP..'.Allterroristsareneo- Nazis.' Fålladesofnegation. Twonegativepremises(exclusivepremises): thesyllogismhastwonegativepremises,asin NoMareP'Noracistisjust. SomeMarenotSSomeracistsarenot police. .'.SomeSarenotP..'.Somepolicearenot just. ////c/fnegative/affirmative:thesyllogismhasa negativepremise(conclusion)butnonegative conclusion(premise),asin AllMareP'Allliarsaredeceivers. SomeMarenotSSomeliarsarenot aldermen. .'.SomeSareP..'.Somealdermenare deceivers.' and AllPareM'Allvampiresare monsters. AllMareSAllmonstersare creatures. .'.SomeSarenotP...Somecreaturesare notvampires.' Fallacyofexistentialimport:thesyllogismhas twouniversalpremisesandaparticularconclu- sion,asin AllPareM'Allhorsesareanimals. NoSareMNounicornsare animals. .'.SomeSarenotP...Someunicornsarenot horses.' Asyllogismcancommitmorethanonefallacy. Forexample,thesyllogism SomePareM SomeMareS .'.NoSareP commitsthefålladesofundistributedmiddle, illicitminor,illicitmajor,andillicitnegative/affir- mative. Fålladesofpredicatelogic. Illicitquantifiershift:inferringfromauniver- sallyquantifiedexistentialpropositiontoan existentiallyquantifieduniversalproposition, asin (Vx)(By)Fxy/:.(By)(Vx)Fxy 'Everyoneisirrationalatsometime(orother) /.'.Atsometime,everyoneisirrational.' Someare/somearenot(unwarrantedcontrast): inferringfrom'SomeSarePthat'SomeSarenot Porinferringfrom'Some5arenotP'that'Some SareF",asin (3x)(Sx&Px)I:.(3x)(Sx&~Px) 'Somepeopleareleft-handed/.'.Somepeo- plearenotleft-handed.' Illicitsubstitutionofidenticals:wheretyisan opaque(oblique)contextandaandparesingu- larterms,toinferfromtya;a=ji/.'.ty$,asin 'TheInspectorbelievesHydeisHyde;Hydeis Jekyll/.'.TheInspectorbelievesHydeis Jekyll.' Seealsoexistentialimport,logical FORM,MODALLOGIC,SYLLOGISM.W.K.W. formalism,theviewthatmathematicsconcerns manipulationsofsymbolsaccordingtopre- scribedstructuralrules.Itiscousintonominal- ism,theolderandmoregeneralmetaphysical viewthatdeniestheexistenceofallabstract objectsandisoftencontrastedwithPlatonism, whichtakesmathematicstobethestudyofa specialclassofnon-linguistic,non-mental objects,andintuitionism,whichtakesittobethe studyofcertainmentalconstructions.Insophis- ticatedversions,mathematicalactivitycancom- prisethestudyofpossibleformålmanipulations withinasystemaswellasthemanipulations themselves,andthe"symbols"neednotbe regardedaseitherlinguisticorconcrete.Formal- ismisoftenassociatedwiththemathematician 317 formalism,aesthetic formållanguage DavidHilbert.ButHilbertheldthatthe"finitary" partofmathematics,including,forexample, simpletruthsofarithmetic,describesindubitable factsaboutrealobjectsandthatthe"ideal" objectsthatfeatureelsewhereinmathematics areintroducedtofacilitateresearchaboutthe realobjects.Hilberfsformalismistheviewthat thefoundationsofmathematicscanbesecuredby provingtheconsistencyofformålsystemsto whichmathematicaltheoriesarereduced. Gödel'stwoincompletenesstheoremsestablish importantlimitationsonthesuccessofsucha project.Seealsoabstractentity,aes- theticFORMALISM,HILBERT'SPROGRAM, MATHEMATICALINTUITIONISM,PHILOSOPHY OFMATHEMATICS.S.T.K. formalism,aesthetic.Seeaestheticformalism. formalism,ethical.SeeETHics. formalism,jurisprudential.Seejurisprudence. formalism,legal.Seejurisprudence. formalization,anabstractrepresentationofa theorythatmustsatisfyrequirementssharper thanthoseimposedonthestructureoftheories bytheaxiomatic-deductivemethod.That methodcanbetracedbacktoEuclid'sElements. Thecrucialadditionalrequirementistheregi- mentationofinferentialstepsinproofs:notonly doaxiomshavetobegiveninadvance,butthe rulesrepresentingargumentativestepsmustalso betakenfromapredeterminedlist.Toavoida regressinthedefinitionofproofandtoachieve intersubjectivityonaminimalbasis,therulesare tobe"formål"or"mechanical"andmusttake intoaccountonlytheformofstatements.Thus, toexcludeanyambiguity,apreciseandeffec- tivelydescribedlanguageisneededtoformalize particulartheories.Thegeneralkindofrequire- mentswascleartoAristotleandexplicitinLeib- niz;butitwasonlyFregewho,inhis Begriffsschrift(1879),presented,inadditiontoan expressivelyrichlanguagewithrelationsand quantifiers,anadequatelogicalcalculus.Indeed, Frege'scalculus,whenrestrictedtothelanguage ofpredicatelogic,turnedouttobesemantically complete.Heprovidedforthefirsttimethe meanstoformalizemathematicalproofs. Fregepursuedaclearphilosophicalaim, namely,torecognizethe"epistemological nature"oftheorems.Intheintroductiontohis GrundgesetzederArithmetik(1893),Fregewrote: "Byinsistingthatthechainsofinferencedonot haveanygapswesucceedinbringingtolight everyaxiom,assumption,hypothesisorwhat- everelseyouwanttocallitonwhichaproof rests;inthiswayweobtainabasisforjudgingthe epistemologicalnatureofthetheorem."The Fregeanframewasusedinthelåterdevelop- mentofmathematicallogic,inparticular,in prooftheory.Gödelestablishedthroughhis incompletenesstheoremsfundamentallimitsof formalizationsofparticulartheories,likethesys- temofPrincipiaMathematicaoraxiomaticsetthe- ories.Thegeneralnotionofformåltheory emergedfromthesubsequentinvestigationsof ChurchandTuringclarifyingtheconceptof 'mechanicalprocedure'or'algorithm.'Only thenwasitpossibletostateandprovetheincom- pletenesstheoremsforallformåltheoriessatis- fyingcertainverybasicrepresentabilityand derivabilityconditions.Gödelemphasized repeatedlythattheseresultsdonotestablish "anyboundsforthepowersofhumanreason, butratherforthepotentialitiesofpureformal- isminmathematics." Seealsochurch'sthesis,frege,gödel's INCOMPLETENESSTHEOREMS,PROOFTHEORY. w.s. formalize,narrowlyconstrued,toformulatea subjectasatheoryinfirst-orderpredicatelogic; broadlyconstrued,todescribetheessentialsof thesubjectinsomeformållanguageforwhicha notionofconsequenceisdefined.ForHilbert, formalizingmathematicsrequiresatleastthat therebefinitemeansofcheckingpurported proofs.Seealsoformalization,proofthe- ory.S.T.K. formåljustice.Seejustice. formållanguage,alanguageinwhichanexpres- sion'sgrammaticalityandinterpretation(ifany) aredeterminedbypreciselydefinedrulesthat appealonlytotheformorshapeofthesymbols thatconstituteit(ratherthan,forexample,tothe intentionofthespeaker).Itisusuallyunder- stoodthattherulesarefiniteandeffective(so thatthereisanalgorithmfordetermining whetheranexpressionisaformula)andthatthe grammaticalexpressionsareuniquelyreadable, i.e.,theyaregeneratedbytherulesinonlyone way.Aparadigmexampleisthelanguageoffirst- orderpredicatelogic,derivingprincipallyfrom theBegriffsschriftofFrege.Thegrammaticalfor- mulasofthislanguagecanbedelineatedbyan inductivedefinition:(1)acapitalletter'F','G',or 'H',withorwithoutanumericalsubscript,fol- 318 formållearnabilitytheory formållogic lowedbyastringoflowercaseletters'a!,'b',or Y,withorwithoutnumericalsubscripts,isafor- mula;(2)ifAisaformula,sois~A;(3)ifAand Bareformulas,soare(A&B),(A—>B),and(A vB);(4)ifAisaformulaandvisalowercaselet- ter'x','y',or'z',withorwithoutnumericalsub- scripts,then3M'andVM'areformulaswhere A'isobtainedbyreplacingoneormoreoccur- rencesofsomelowercaseletterinA(together withitssubscriptsifany)byv;(5)nothingisa formulaunlessitcanbeshowntobeoneby finitelymanyapplicationsoftheclauses1-4.The definitionusesthedeviceofmetalinguisticvari- ables:clauseswith'A'and'B'aretoberegarded asabbreviationsofalltheclausesthatwould resultbyreplacingtheselettersuniformlyby namesofexpressions.Italsousesseveralnånt- ingconventions:astringofsymbolsisnamedby enclosingitwithinsinglequotesandalsoby replacingeachsymbolinthestringbyitsname; thesymbols'v','(',')','&','—¥','~'areconsid- erednamesofthemselves.Theinterpretationof predicatelogicisspelledoutbyasimilarinduc- tivedefinitionoftruthinamodel.Withappro- priateconventionsandstipulations,alternative definitionsofformulascanbegiventhatmake expressionslike'(PvQ)'thenamesofformulas ratherthanformulasthemselves.Onthis approach,formulasneednotbewrittensymbols atallandformcannotbeidentifiedwithshapein anynarrowsense.ForTarski,Carnap,andoth- ersaformållanguagealsoincludedrulesof "transformation"specifyingwhenoneexpres- sioncanberegardedasaconsequenceofothers. Todayitismorecommontoviewthelanguage anditsconsequencerelationasdistinct.Formål languagesareoftencontrastedwithnaturallan- guages,likeEnglishorSwahili.RichardMon- tague,however,hastriedtoshowthatEnglishis itselfaformållanguage,whoserulesofgrammar andinterpretationaresimilarto-thoughmuch morecomplexthan-predicatelogic.Seealso FORMÅLLOGIC.S.T.K. formållearnabilitytheory,thestudyofhuman languagelearningthroughexplicitformålmod- elstypicallyemployingartificallanguagesand simplifiedleamingstrategies.Thefundamental problemishowalearnerisabletoarriveata grammarofalanguageonthebasisofafinite sampleofpresentedsentences(andperhaps otherkindsofinformationaswell).Theseminal workisbyE.Gold(1967),whoshowed,roughly, thatlearnabilityofcertaintypesofgrammars fromtheChomskyhierarchybyanunbiased learnerrequiredthepresentationofungram- maticalstrings,identifiedassuch,alongwith grammaticalstrings.Recentstudieshavecon- centratedonothertypesofgrammar(e.g.,gen- erativetransformationalgrammars),modesof presentation,andassumptionsaboutlearning strategiesinanattempttoapproximatethe actualsituationmoreclosely.Seealsogram- mar.R.E.W. formållogic,thescienceofcorrectreasoning, goingbacktoAristotle'sPriorAnalytics,based uponthepremisethatthevalidityofanargu- mentisafunctionofitsstructureorlogicalform. Themodernembodimentofformållogicissym- bolic(mathematkal)logic.Thisisthestudyofvalid inferenceinartificial,preciselyformulatedlan- guages,thegrammaticalstructureofwhosesen- tencesorwell-formedformulasisintendedto mirror,orbearegimentationof,thelogicalforms oftheirnaturallanguagecounterparts.Thesefor- mallanguagescanthusbeviewedas(mathemat- ical)modelsoffragmentsofnaturallanguage. Likemodelsgenerally,thesemodelsareidealiza- tions,typicallyleavingoutofaccountsuchphe- nomenaasvagueness,ambiguity,andtense.But theideaunderlyingsymboliclogicisthattothe extentthattheyreflectcertainstructuralfeatures ofnaturallanguagearguments,thestudyofvalid inferenceinformållanguagescanyieldinsight intotheworkingsofthosearguments. Thestandardcourseofstudyforanyoneinter- estedinsymboliclogicbeginswiththe(classical) propositionalcalculus(sententialcalculus),orPC. Hereoneconstructsatheoryofvalidinference foraformållanguagebuiltupfromastockof propositionalvariables(sentenceletters)andan expressivelycompletesetofconnectives.Inthe propositionalcalculus,oneisthereforecon- cernedwithargumentswhosevaliditytums uponthepresenceof(two-valued)truth-func- tionalsentence-formingoperatorsonsentences suchas(classical)negation,conjunction,dis- junction,andthelike.Thenextstepisthepredi- catecalculus(lowerfunctionalcalculus,first-order logic,elementaryquantificationtheory),thestudyof validinferenceinfirst-orderlanguages.Theseare languagesbuiltupfromanexpressivelycom- pletesetofconnectives,first-orderuniversalor existentialquantifiers,individualvariables, names,predicates(relationalsymbols),andper- hapsfunctionsymbols. Further,andmorespecialized,workinsym- boliclogicmightinvolvelookingatfragmentsof thelanguageofthepropositionalorpredicate calculus,changingthesemanticsthatthelan- guageisstandardlygiven(e.g.,byallowing 319 formålmode Foucault,Michel truth-valuegapsormorethantwotruth-values), furtherembellishingthelanguage(e.g.,by addingmodalorothernon-truth-functional connectives,orhigher-orderquantifiers),orlib- eralizingthegrammarorsyntaxofthelanguage (e.g.,bypermittinginfmitelylongwell-formed formulas).Insomeofthesecases,ofcourse,sym- boliclogicremainsonlymarginallyconnected withnaturallanguageargumentsastheinterest shadesoffintooneinformållanguagesfortheir ownsake,amarkofthemostadvancedwork beingdoneinformållogictoday. Seealsodeonticlogic,epistemiclogic, FREELOGIC,INFINITARYLOGIC,MANY-VAL- UEDLOGIC,MATHEMATICALINTUITIONISM, MODALLOGIC,RELEVANCELOGIC,SECOND- ORDERLOGIC.G.F.S. formålmode.Seemetalanguage. formålreality.Seereality. formålsemantics,thestudyoftheinterpretations offormållanguages.Aformållanguagecanbe definedapartfromanyinterpretationofit.This isdonebyspecifyingasetofitssymbolsandaset offormationrulesthatdeterminewhichstrings ofsymbolsaregrammaticalorwellformed. Whenrulesofinference(transformationrules) areaddedand/orcertainsentencesaredesig- natedasaxiomsalogicalsystem(alsoknownas alogisticsystem)isformed.Aninterpretationof aformållanguageis(roughly)anassignmentof meaningstoitssymbolsandtruthconditionsto itssentences. Typicallyadistinctionismadebetweenastan- dardinterpretationofaformållanguageanda non-standardinterpretation.Consideraformål languageinwhicharithmeticisformulable.In additiontothesymbolsoflogic(variables,quan- tifiers,brackets,andconnectives),thislanguage willcontain'0','+','•',andV.Astandardinter- pretationofitassignsthesetofnaturalnumbers asthedomainofdiscourse,zeroto'0',addition to'+',multiplicationto'•',andthesuccessor functiontoV.Otherstandardinterpretations areisomorphictotheonejustgiven.Inparticu- lar,standardinterpretationsarenumeral-com- pleteinthattheycorrelatethenumerals one-to-onewiththedomainelements.Aresult duetoGödelandRosseristhatthereareuniver- salquantifications(x)A(x)thatarenotdeducible fromthePeanoaxioms(ifthoseaxiomsarecon- sistent)eventhougheachA(ri)isprovable.The Peanoaxioms(ifconsistent)aretrueoneach standardinterpretation.ThuseachA(n)istrue onsuchaninterpretation.Thus(x)A(x)istrueon suchaninterpretationsinceastandardinterpre- tationisnumeral-complete.However,thereare non-standardinterpretationsthatdonotcorre- latethenumeralsone-to-onewithdomainele- ments.Onsomeoftheseinterpretationseach A(n)istruebut(x)A(x)isfalse. Inconstructingandinterpretingaformållan- guageweusealanguagealreadyknowntous, say,English.Englishthenbecomesourmetalan- guage,whichweusetotalkabouttheformål language,whichisourobjectlanguage.Theo- remsprovenwithintheobjectlanguagemustbe distinguishedfromthoseproveninthemetalan- guage.Thelatteraremetatheorems. Onegoalofasemanticaltheoryofaformål languageistocharacterizetheconsequencerela- tionasexpressedinthatlanguageandprove semanticalmetatheoremsaboutthatrelation.A sentenceSissaidtobeaconsequenceofasetof sentencesKprovidedSistrueoneveryinterpre- tationonwhicheachsentenceinKistrue.This notionhastobekeptdistinctfromthenotionof deduction.Thelatterconceptcanbedefinedonly byreferencetoalogicalsystemassociatedwitha formållanguage.Consequence,however,canbe characterizedindependentlyofalogicalsystem, aswasjustdone. Seealsodeduction,logicalsyntax, METALANGUAGE,PROOFTHEORY,TRANSFOR- MATIONRULE.C.S. formålsign.Seesemiosis. formationrule.Seewell-formedformula. formoflife.Seewittgenstein. Forms,theoryof.Seeplato. formula.Seewell-formedformula. formula,closed.Seeopenformula,well-formed formula. formula,open.Seeopenformula,well-formed formula. Foucault,Michel(1926-84),Frenchphilosopher andhistorianofthought.Foucaulfsearliestwrit- ings(e.g.,Maladiementaleetpersonnalité["Mental IllnessandPersonality"],1954)focusedonpsy- chologyanddevelopedwithintheframeworksof Marxismandexistentialphenomenology.He soonmovedbeyondtheseframeworks,indirec- tionssuggestedbytwofundamentalinfluences: 320 foundationalism foundationalism historyandphilosophyofscience,aspracticedby Bachelardand(especially)Canguilhem,andthe modernistliteratureof,e.g.,RaymondRoussel, Bataille,andMauriceBlanchot.Instudiesofpsy- chiatry(Histoiredelafolie["HistoryofMadnessin theClassicalAge"],1961),clinicalmedicine(The BirthoftheClinic,1963),andthesocialsciences (TheOrderofThings,1966),Foucaultdeveloped anapproachtointellectualhistory,"thearchae- ologyofknowledge,"thattreatedsystemsof thoughtas"discursiveformations"independent ofthebeliefsandintentionsofindividual thinkers.LikeCanguilhem'shistoryofscience andlikemodernistliterature,Foucaulfsarchae- ologydisplacedthehumansubjectfromthecen- tralroleitplayedinthehumanismdominantin ourculturesinceKant.Hereflectedonthehis- toricalandphilosophicalsignificanceofhis archaeologicalmethodinTheArchaeologyof Knowledge(1969). Foucaultrecognizedthatarchaeologypro- vidednoaccountoftransitionsfromonesystem toanother.Accordingly,heintroduceda "genealogical"approach,whichdoesnotreplace archaeologybutgoesbeyondittoexplain changesinsystemsofdiscoursebyconnecting themtochangesinthenon-discursivepractices ofsocialpowerstructures.Foucaulfsgenealogy admittedthestandardeconomic,social,and politicalcausesbut,inanon-standard,Nie- tzscheanvein,refusedanyunifiedteleological explanatoryscheme(e.g.,WhigorMarxisthis- tories).Newsystemsofthoughtareseenascon- tingentproductsofmanysmall,unrelated causes,notfulfillmentsofgrandhistorical designs.Foucaulfsgeneaologicalstudiesempha- sizetheessentialconnectionofknowledgeand power.Bodiesofknowledgearenotautonomous intellectualstructuresthathappentobeem- ployedasBaconianinstrumentsofpower. Rather,preciselyasbodiesofknowledge,they aretied(butnotreducible)tosystemsofsocial control.Thisessentialconnectionofpowerand knowledgereflectsFoucaulfslåterviewthat powerisnotmerelyrepressivebutacreative,if alwaysdangerous,sourceofpositivevalues. DisciplineandPunish(1975)showedhowpris- onsconstitutecriminalsasobjectsofdisciplinary knowledge.ThefirstvolumeoftheHistoryofSex- uality(1976)sketchedaprojectforseeinghow, throughmodernbiologicalandpsychologicalsci- encesofsexuality,individualsarecontrolledby theirownknowledgeasself-scrutinizingand self-formingsubjects.Thesecondvolumewas projectedasastudyoftheoriginsofthemodern notionofasubjectinpracticesofChristiancon- fession.Foucaultwrotesuchastudy(TheConfes- sionsoftheFlesh)butdidnotpublishitbecausehe decidedthataproperunderstandingofthe Christiandevelopmentrequiredacomparison withancientconceptionsoftheethicalself.This ledtotwovolumes(1984)onGreekandRoman sexuality:TheUseofPleasureandTheCareofthe Self.Thesefinalwritingsmakeexplicittheethi- calprojectthatinfactinformsallofFoucaulfs work:theliberationofhumanbeingsfromcon- tingentconceptualconstraintsmaskedasunsur- passableapriorilimitsandtheadumbrationof alternativeformsofexistence. Seealsobachelard,canguilhem,nie- tzsche.G.G. foundationalism,theviewthatknowledgeand epistemic(knowledge-relevant)justification haveatwo-tierstructure:someinstancesof knowledgeandjustificationarenon-inferential, orfoundational;andallotherinstancesthereof areinferential,ornon-foundational,inthatthey deriveultimatelyfromfoundationalknowledge orjustification.Thisstructuralvieworiginatesin Aristotle'sPosteriorAnalytics(atleastregarding knowledge),receivesanextremeformulationin Descartes'sMeditations,andflourishes,withvary- ingdetails,intheworksofsuchtwentieth-cen- turyphilosophersasRussell,C.I.Lewis,and Chisholm.Versionsoffoundationalismdifferon twomainprojects:(a)thepreciseexplanationof thenatureofnon-inferential,orfoundational, knowledgeandjustification,and(b)thespecific explanationofhowfoundationalknowledgeand justificationcanbetransmittedtonon-founda- tionalbeliefs.Foundationalismallowsfordiffer- encesontheseprojects,sinceitisessentiallya viewaboutthestructureofknowledgeandepis- temicjustification. Thequestionwhetherknowledgehasfounda- tionsisessentiallythequestionwhetherthesort ofjustificationpertinenttoknowledgehasatwo- tierstructure.Somephilosophershavecon- struedtheformerquestionasaskingwhether knowledgedependsonbeliefsthatarecertainin somesense(e.g.,indubitableorinfallible).This construalbears,however,ononlyonespeciesof foundationalism:radicalfoundationalism.Such foundationalism,representedprimarilyby Descartes,requiresthatfoundationalbeliefsbe certainandabletoguaranteethecertaintyofthe non-foundationalbeliefstheysupport.Radical foundationalismiscurrentlyunpopularfortwo mainreasons.First,veryfew,ifany,ofourper- ceptualbeliefsarecertain(i.e.,indubitable);and, second,thoseofourbeliefsthatmightbecandi- 321 foundationalism foundationalism datesforcertainty(e.g.,thebeliefthatIam thinking)lacksufficientsubstancetoguarantee thecertaintyofourrich,highlyinferential knowledgeoftheexternalworld(e.g.,our knowledgeofphysics,chemistry,andbiology). Contemporaryfoundationaliststypically endorsemodestfoundationalism,theviewthat non-inferentiallyjustified,foundationalbeliefs neednotpossessorprovidecertaintyandneed notdeductivelysupportjustifiednon-founda- tionalbeliefs.Foundationalbeliefs(orstate- ments)areoftencalledbasicbeliefs(or statements),butthepreciseunderstandingof 'basic'hereiscontroversialamongfoundational- ists.Foundationalistsagree,however,intheir generalunderstandingofnon-inferentiallyjusti- fied,foundationalbeliefsasbeliefswhosejustifi- cationdoesnotderivefromotherbeliefs, althoughtheyleaveopenwhetherthecausal basisoffoundationalbeliefsincludesother beliefs.(Epistemicjustificationcomesindegrees, butforsimplicitywecanrestrictdiscussionto justificationsufficientforsatisfactionofthejusti- ficationconditionforknowledge;wecanalso restrictdiscussiontowhatittakesforabeliefto havejustification,omittingissuesofwhatittakes toshowthatabeliefhasit.) Threeprominentaccountsofnon-inferential justificationareavailabletomodestfoundation- alists:(a)self-justification,(b)justificationby non-belief,non-propositionalexperiences,and (c)justificationbyanon-beliefreliableoriginofa belief.Proponentsofself-justification(including, atonetime,DucasseandChisholm)contendthat foundationalbeliefscanjustifythemselves,with noevidentialsupportelsewhere.Proponentsof foundationaljustificationbynon-beliefexperi- encesshunliteralself-justification;theyhold,fol- lowingC.I.Lewis,thatfoundationalperceptual beliefscanbejustifiedbynon-beliefsensoryor perceptualexperiences(e.g.,seemingtoseea dictionary)thatmaketrue,arebestexplainedby, orotherwisesupport,thosebeliefs(e.g.,the beliefthatthereis,oratleastappearstobe,adic- tionaryhere).Proponentsoffoundationaljustifi- cationbyreliableoriginsfindthebasisof non-inferentialjustificationinbelief-forming processes(e.g.,perception,memory,introspec- tion)thataretruth-conducive,i.e.,thattendto producetrueratherthanfalsebeliefs.Thisview thusappealstothereliabilityofabeliefsnon- belieforigin,whereasthepreviousviewappeals totheparticularsensoryorperceptualexperi- encesthatcorrespondto(e.g.,maketrueorare bestexplainedby)afoundationalbelief. Despitedisagreementsöverthebasisoffoun- dationaljustification,modestfoundationalists typicallyagreethatfoundationaljustificationis characterizedbydefeasibility,i.e.,canbedefeated, undermined,oroverriddenbyacertainsortof expansionofone'sevidenceorjustifiedbeliefs. Forinstance,yourbeliefthatthereisabluedic- tionarybeforeyoucouldloseitsjustification (e.g.,thejustificationfromyourcurrentpercep- tualexperiences)ifyouacquirednewevidence thatthereisabluelightshiningonthedictionary beforeyou.Foundationaljustification,therefore, canvaryövertimeifaccompaniedbyrelevant changesinone'sperceptualevidence.Itdoesnot follow,however,thatfoundationaljustification positivelydepends,i.e.,isbased,ongroundsfor denyingthattherearedefeaters.Therelevant dependencecanberegardedasnegativeinthat thereneedonlybeanabsenceofgenuine defeaters.Criticsoffoundationalismsometimes neglectthatlatterdistinctionregardingepistemic dependence. Thesecondbigtaskforfoundationalistsisto explainhowjustificationtransmitsfromfounda- tionalbeliefstoinferentiallyjustified,non-foun- dationalbeliefs.Radicalfoundationalistsinsist, forsuchtransmission,onentailmentrelations thatguaranteethetruthorthecertaintyofnon- foundationalbeliefs.Modestfoundationalistsare moreflexible,allowingformerelyprobabilistic inferentialconnectionsthattransmitjustifica- tion.Forinstance,amodestfoundationalistcan appealtoexplanatoryinferentialconnections,as whenafoundationalbelief(e.g.,Iseemtofeel wet)isbestexplainedforapersonbyaparticu- larphysical-objectbelief(e.g.,thebeliefthatthe airconditioneroverheadisleakingonme).Var- iousotherformsofprobabilisticinferenceare availabletomodestfoundationalists;andnötn- inginprinciplerequiresthattheyrestrictfoun- dationalbeliefstowhatone"seems"tosenseor toperceive. Thetraditionalmotivationforfoundationalism comeslargelyfromaneliminativeregressargu- ment,outlinedoriginally(regardingknowledge) inAristotle'sPosteriorAnalytics.Theargument,in shortestform,isthatfoundationalismisacorrect accountofthestructureofjustificationsincethe alternativeaccountsallfail.Inferentialjustifica- tionisjustificationwhereinonebelief,BI,isjus- tifiedonthebasisofanotherbelief,B2.How,ifat all,isB2,thesupportingbelief,itselfjustified? Obviously,Aristotlesuggests,wecannothavea circlehere,whereB2isjustifiedbyBI;norcanwe allowthechainofsupporttoextendendlessly, withnoultimatebasisforjustification.Wecan- not,moreover,allowB2toremainunjustified, 322 foundationaxiom Frankena,WilliamK. lestitlackwhatittakestosupportBl.Ifthisis right,thestructureofjustificationdoesnot involvecircles,endlessregresses,orunjustified starter-beliefs.Thatis,thisstructureisevidently foundationalist.Thisis,inskeletalform,the regressargumentforfoundationalism.Given appropriateflesh,anddueattentiontoskepticism aboutjustification,thisargumentposesaserious challengetonon-foundationalistaccountsofthe structureofepistemicjustification,suchasepis- temiccoherentism.Moresignificantly,founda- tionalismwillthenshowforthasoneofthemost compellingaccountsofthestructureofknowl- edgeandjustification.Thisexplains,atleastin part,whyfoundationalismhasbeenverypromi- nenthistoricallyandisstillwidelyheldincon- temporaryepistemology. Seealsocoherentism,epistemology, JUSTIFICATION.P.K.M. foundationaxiom.Seesettheory. FourBooks,agroupofConfuciantextsincluding theTa-hsiieh(GreatLearning),Chung-Yung(Doc- trineoftheMean),LunYil(Analects),andMengTzu (BookofMencius),thelattertwocontaining respectivelytheteachingsofConfucius(sixth- fifthcenturyb.c.)andMencius(fourthcentury b.c),andtheformertwobeingchaptersfrom theLi-Chi(BookofRites).ChuHsi(1130-1200) selectedthetextsasbasiconesforConfucian education,andwroteinfluentialcommentaries onthem.Thetextsservedasthebasisofcivilser- viceexaminationsfrom1313to1905;asaresult, theyexertedgreatinfluencebothonthedevel- opmentofConfucianthoughtandonChinese lifeingeneral.K.-l.S. fourcauses.Seearistotle. fourelements.Seeempedocles. fourhumors.Seegalen. Fourier,Francois-Marie-Charles(1772-1837), Frenchsocialtheoristandradicalcritic,often calledautopiansocialist.Hismainworkswere TheTheoryofUniversalUnity(1822)andTheNew IndustrialandSocietalWorld(1829). Hearguedthatsinceeachpersonhas,notan integralsoulbutonlyapartialone,personal integrityispossibleonlyinunitywithothers. Fourierthoughtthatallexistingsocietieswere antagonistic.(FollowingEdenism,hebelieved societiesdevelopedthroughstagesofsavagery, patriarchalism,barbarianism,andcivilization.) Hebelievedthisantagonismcouldbetran- scendedonlyinHarmony.Itwouldbebasedon twelvekindsofpassions.(Fiveweresensual, fouraffective,andthreedistributive;andthesein turnencouragedthepassionforunity.)Thebasic socialunitwouldbeaphalanxcontaining300- 400families(about1,600-1,800people)ofsci- entificallyblendedcharacters.Asaplaceofpro- ductionbutalsoofmaximalsatisfactionofthe passionsofeverymember,Harmonyshould makelaborattractiveandpleasurable.Themain occupationsofitsmembersshouldbegastron- omy,opera,andhorticulture.Itshouldalso establishanewworldoflove(aformof polygamy)wheremenandwomenwouldbe equalinrights.Fourierbelievedthatphalanxes wouldattractmembersofallothersocialsys- tems,eventhelesscivilized,andbringaboutthis newworldsystem. Fourier'svisionofcooperation(bothintheory andexperimentalpractice)influencedsome anarchists,syndicalists,andthecooperation- istmovement.Hisradicalsocialcritiquewas importantforthedevelopmentofpoliticaland socialthoughtinFrance,Europé,andNorth America. Seealsopoliticalphilosophy.G.Fl. fourthcondition.Seeepistemology. fourthconditionproblem.Seeepistemology. frame.Seecognitivescience. Frankena,WilliamK.(1908-94),American moralphilosopherwhowroteaseriesofinflu- entialartidesandatext,Ethics(1963),which wastranslatedintoeightlanguagesandremains inusetoday.FrankenataughtattheUniversity ofMichigan(1937-78),whereheandhiscol- leaguesCharlesStevenson(1908-79),aleading noncognitivist,andRichardBrandt,animpor- tantethicalnaturalist,formedformanyyears oneofthemostformidablefacultiesinmoral philosophyintheworld. Frankenawasknownforanalyticalrigorand sharpinsight,qualitiesalreadyevidentinhisfirst essay,"TheNaturalisticFallacy"(1939),which refutedMoore'sinfluentialclaimthatethicalnat- uralism(oranyotherreductionistethicalthe- ory)couldbeconvictedoflogicalerror.Atbest, Frankenashowed,reductionistscouldbesaidto conflateormisidentifyethicalpropertieswith propertiesofsomeotherkind.Evenputthisway, suchassertionswerequestion-begging,Fran- kenaargued.WhereMooreclaimedtoseeprop- 323 FrankfurtSchool FrankfurtSchool ertiesoftwodifferentkinds,naturalistsandother reductionistsclaimedtobeabletoseeonlyone. ManyofFrankena'smostimportantpapers concernedsimilarlyfundamentalissuesabout valueandnormativejudgment."Obligationand MotivationinRecentMoralPhilosophy"(1958), forexample,isaclassictreatmentofthedebate betweeninternalism,whichholdsthatmotiva- tionisessentialtoobligationortothebeliefor perceptionthatoneisobligated,andexternal- ism,whichholdsthatmotivationisonlycontin- gentlyrelatedtothese.Inadditiontometaethics, Frankena'spublishedworksrangedbroadlyöver normativeethicaltheory,virtueethics,moral psychology,religiousethics,moraleducation, andthephilosophyofeducation.Althoughrela- tivelyfewofhisworksweredevotedexclusively tothearea,Frankenawasalsoknownasthepre- eminenthistorianofethicsofhisday.Moreusu- ally,Frankenausedthehistoryofethicsasa frameworkwithinwhichtodiscussissuesof perennialinterest. Itwas,however,forEthics,oneofthemost widelyusedandfrequentlycitedphilosophical ethicstextbooksofthetwentiethcentury,that Frankenawasperhapsbestknown.Ethicscon- tinuestoprovideanunparalleledintroductionto thesubject,asusefulinafirstundergraduate courseasitistograduatestudentsandprofes- sionalphilosopherslookingforperspicuousways toframeissuesandcategorizealtemativeSolu- tions.Forexample,wheninthe1970sphiloso- pherscametosystematicallyinvestigatenorma- tiveethicaltheories,itwasFrankena'sdistinc- tioninEthicsbetweendeontologicalandteleo- logicaltheoriestowhichtheyreferred. Seealsoethics,moralpsychology, MOTIVATIONALINTERNALISM,NATURALISM. S.L.D. FrankfurtSchool,agroupofphilosophers,cul- turalcritics,andsocialscientistsassociatedwith theInstituteforSocialResearch,whichwas foundedinFrankfurtin1929.Itsprominent membersincluded,amongothers,thephiloso- phersHorkheimer,Adorno,andMarcuse,aswell asthepsychoanalystErichFromm(1900-80) andtheliterarycriticWalterBenjamin(1892- 1940).Habermasistheleadingrepresentativeof itssecondgeneration.TheFrankfurtSchoolis lessknownforparticulartheoriesordoctrines thanforitsprogramofa"criticaltheoryofsoci- ety."Criticaltheoryrepresentsasophisticated efforttocontinueMarx'stransformationof moralphilosophyintosocialandpoliticalcri- tique,whilerejectingorthodoxMarxismasa dogma.Criticaltheoryisprimarilyawayofdoing philosophy,integratingthenormativeaspectsof philosophicalreflectionwiththeexplanatory achievementsofthesocialsciences.Theultimate goalofitsprogramistolinktheoryandpractice, toprovideinsight,andtoempowersubjectsto changetheiroppressivecircumstancesand achievehumanemancipation,arationalsociety thatsatisfieshumanneedsandpowers. ThefirstgenerationoftheFrankfurtSchool wentthroughthreephasesofdevelopment.The first,lastingfromthebeginningoftheInstitute untiltheendofthe1930s,canbecalled"inter- disciplinaryhistoricalmaterialism"andisbest representedinHorkheimer'sprogrammaticwrit- ings.Horkheimerarguedthatarevisedversion ofhistoricalmaterialismcouldorganizethe resultsofsocialresearchandgiveitacriticalper- spective.Thesecond,''criticaltheory"phasesaw theabandonmentofMarxismforamoregener- alizednotionofcritique.However,withthe near-victoryoftheNazisintheearly1940s, HorkheimerandAdornoenteredthethirdphase oftheSchool,"thecritiqueofinstrumentalrea- son."IntheirDialecticofEnlightenment(1941)as wellasinMarcuse'sOneDimensionalMan(1964), theprocessofinstrumentallydominatingnature leadstodehumanizationandthedominationof humanbeings.IntheirwritingsafterWorldWar II,AdornoandHorkheimerbecameincreasingly pessimistic,seeingaroundthema"totally administeredsociety"andamanipulated,com- modityculture. Horkheimer'smostimportantessaysarefrom thefirstphaseandfocusontherelationofphi- losophyandsocialscience.Besidesprovidinga cleardefinitionandprogramforcriticalsocialsci- ence,heproposesthatthenormativeorientation ofphilosophyshouldbecombinedwiththe empiricalresearchinthesocialsciences.This metaphilosophicalorientationdistinguishesa "critical,"asopposedto"traditional,"theory.For example,suchaprogramdemandsrethinking therelationofepistemologytothesociologyof science.Acriticaltheoryseekstoshowhowthe normoftruthishistoricalandpractical,without fallingintotheskepticismorrelativismoftradi- tionalsociologiesofknowledgesuchas Mannheim's. Adorno'smajorwritingsbelongprimarilyto thesecondandthirdphasesofthedevelopment oftheFrankfurtSchool.Asthepossibilitiesfor criticismappearedtohimincreasinglynarrow, Adornosoughttodiscovertheminaesthetic experienceandthemimeticrelationtonature. Adorno'sapproachwasmotivatedbyhisview 324 Frankfurt-stylecase freeIogic thatmodernsocietyisa"falsetotality."Hisdiag- nosisofthecausestracedthistrendbacktothe spreadofaone-sided,instrumentalreason, basedonthedominationofnatureandother humanbeings.Forthisreason,hesoughtanon- instrumentalandnon-dominatingrelationto natureandtoothers,andfounditindiverseand fragmentaryexperiences.Primarily,itisartthat preservesthispossibilityincontemporarysoci- ety,sinceinartthereisapossibilityofmimesis, orthe"non-identical"relationtotheobject. Adorno'sinfluentialattempttoavoid"thelogic ofidentity"giveshisposthumousAestheticTheory (1970)andotherlåterworksaparadoxicalchar- acter. Itwasinreactiontothethirdphasethatthe secondgenerationoftheFrankfurtSchoolrecast theideaofacriticaltheory.Habermasarguedfor anewemphasisonnormativefoundationsas wellasareturntoaninterdisciplinaryresearch programinthesocialsciences.Afterfirstdevel- opingsuchafoundationinatheoryofcognitive interests(technical,practical,andemancipa- tory),Habermasturnedtoatheoryofthe unavoidablepresuppositionsofcommunicative actionandanethicsofdiscourse.Thepotential foremancipatorychangeliesincommunicative, ordiscursive,rationalityandpracticesthat embodyit,suchasthedemocraticpublicsphere. Habermas'sanalysisofcommunicationseeksto providenormsfornon-dominatingrelationsto othersandabroadernotionofreason. Seealsoadorno,Continentalphiloso- PHY,CRITICALTHEORY,MARXISM,PHILOSO- PHYOFTHESOCIALSCIENCES,PRAXIS,WEBER. J.Bo. Frankfurt-stylecase.Seefreewillproblem. freebeauty.Seebeauty. freedom,negative.Seepositiveandnegative FREEDOM. freedom,positive.Seepositiveandnegative FREEDOM. freedom,practical.Seefreewillproblem. freelogic,asystemofquantificationtheory,with orwithoutidentity,thatallowsfornon-denoting singularterms.Inclassicalquantificationtheory, allsingularterms(freevariablesandindividual constants)areassignedadenotationinallmod- els.Butthisconditionappearscounterintuitive whensuchsystemsareappliedtonaturallan- guage,wheremanysingulartermsseemtobe non-denoting(Tegasus','SherlockHolmes',and thelike).Varioussolutionsofthisproblemhave beenproposed,rangingfromFrege'schosenobject theory(assignanarbitrarydenotationtoeach non-denotingsingularterm)toRussell'sdescrip- tiontheory(denysingulartermstatustomost expressionsusedassuchinnaturallanguage, andeliminatethemfromthe"logicalform"of thatlanguage)toaweakeningofthequantifiers' "existentialimport,"whichallowsfordenota- tionstobepossible,butnotnecessarilyactual, objects.Allthesesolutionspreservethestructure ofclassicalquantificationtheoryandmake adjustmentsatthelevelofapplication. Freelogicisamoreradicalsolution:itallows forlegitimatesingulartermstobedenotation- less,maintainsthequantifiers'existential import,butmodifiesboththeprooftheoryand thesemanticsoffirst-orderlogic.Withinproof theory,themainmodificationconsistsofelimi- natingtheruleofexistentialgeneralization, whichallowsonetoinfer'Thereexistsaflying horse'from'Pegasusisaflyinghorse'.Within semantics,themainproblemisgivingtruthcon- ditionsforsentencescontainingnon-denoting singularterms,andtherearevariouswaysof accomplishingthis.Conventionalsemantics assignstruth-valuestoatomicsentencescon- tainingnon-denotingsingulartermsbyconven- tion,andthendeterminesthetruth-valuesof complexsentencesasusual.Outerdomainseman- ticsdividesthedomainofinterpretationintoan innerandanouterpart,usingtheinnerpartas therangeofquantifiersandtheouterparttopro- videfor"denotations"fornon-denotingsingular terms(whicharethennotliterallydenotation- less,butratherleftwithoutanexistingdenota- tion).Supervaluationalsemantics,whencon- sideringasentenceA,assignsallpossiblecombi- nationsoftruth-valuestotheatomiccompo- nentsofAcontainingnon-denotingsingular terms,evaluatesAonthebasisofeachofthose combinations,andthenassignstoAthelogical productofallsuchevaluations.(Thusboth 'Pegasusfries'and'Pegasusdoesnotfly'turnout truth-valueless,but'PegasusfriesorPegasusdoes notfly'turnsouttruesincewhatevertruth-value isassignedtoitsatomiccomponent'Pegasusfries' thetruth-valueforthewholesentenceistrue.) Afreelogicisinclusiveifitallowsforthepossi- bilitythattherangeofquantifiersbeempty(that thereexistsnothingatall);itisexclusiveother- wise. Seealsoformålsemantics,proofthe- ory,quantification.E.Ben. 325 freerider freewillproblem freerider,apersonwhobenefitsfromasocial arrangementwithoutbearinganappropriate shareoftheburdensofmaintainingthat arrangement,e.g.onewhobenefitsfromgov- ernmentserviceswithoutpayingone'staxesthat supportthem.Thearrangementsfromwhicha freeriderbenefitsmaybeeitherformålorinfor- mal.Cooperativearrangementsthatpermitfree ridersarelikelytobeunstable;partiestothe arrangementareunlikelytocontinuetobearthe burdensofmaintainingitifothersareableto benefitwithoutdoingtheirpart.Asaresult,itis commonforcooperativearrangementsto includemechanismstodiscouragefreeriders, e.g.legalpunishment,orincasesofinformal conventionsthemeredisapprovalofone'speers. Itisamatterofsomecontroversyastowhether itisalwaysmorallywrongtobenefitfroman arrangementwithoutcontributingtoitsmainte- nance.Seealsojustice,socialchoicethe- ORY,UTILITARIANISM.W.T. freevariable.Seevariable. freewilldefense.Seephilosophyofreligion. freewillproblem,theproblemofthenatureof freeagencyanditsrelationtotheoriginsand conditionsofresponsiblebehavior.Forthose whocontrast'free'with'determined',acentral questioniswhetherhumansarefreeinwhat theydoordeterminedbyextemalevents beyondtheircontrol.Arelatedconcernis whetheranagenfsresponsibilityforanaction requiresthattheagent,theact,ortherelevant decisionbefree.This,inturn,directsattentionto action,motivation,deliberation,choice,and intention,andtotheexactsense,ifany,inwhich ouractionsareunderourcontrol.Useof'free will'isamatteroftraditionalnomenclature;itis debatedwhetherfreedomisproperlyascribedto thewillortheagent,ortoactions,choices,delib- erations,etc. Controversyöverconditionsofresponsible behaviorformsthepredominanthistoricaland conceptualbackgroundofthefreewillproblem. Mostwhoascribemoralresponsibilityacknowl- edgesomesenseinwhichagentsmustbefreein actingastheydo;wearenotresponsibleforwhat wewereforcedtodoorwereunabletoavoidno matterhowhärdwetried.Buttherearediffer- ingaccountsofmoralresponsibilityanddis- agreementsaboutthenatureandextentofsuch practicalfreedom(anotionalsoimportantin Kant).Accordingly,thefreewillproblemcenters onthesequestions:Doesmoralresponsibility requireanysortofpracticalfreedom?Ifso,what sort?Arepeoplepracticallyfree?Ispracticalfree- domconsistentwiththeantecedentdetermina- tionofactions,thoughts,andcharacter?Thereis vividdebateaboutthislastquestion.Considera womandeliberatingaboutwhomtovotefor. Fromherfirst-personperspective,shefeelsfree tovoteforanycandidateandisconvincedthat theselectionisuptoherregardlessofpriorinflu- ences.Butviewinghereventualbehaviorasa segmentoflargernaturalandhistorical processes,manywouldarguethatthereare underlyingcausesdeterminingherchoice.With thiscontrastofintuitions,anyattempttodecide whetherthevoterisfreedependsontheprecise meaningsassociatedwithtermslike'free', 'determine',and'uptoher'. Onething(event,situation)determinesanother ifthelatterisaconsequenceofit,ornecessitated byit,e.g.,thevoter'shandmovementsbyher intention.Asusuallyunderstood,determinism holdsthatwhateverhappensisdeterminedby antecedentconditions,wheredeterminationis standardlyconceivedascausationbyantecedent eventsandcircumstances.Soconstrued,deter- minismimpliesthatatanytimethefutureis alreadyfixedandunique,withnopossibilityof alternativedevelopment.Logicalversionsof determinismdeclareeachfutureeventtobe determinedbywhatisalreadytrue,specifically, bythetruththatitwilloccurthen.Typicaltheo- logicalvariantsacceptthepredestinationofallcir- cumstancesandeventsinasmuchasadivine beingknowsinadvance(orevenfrometernity) thattheywillobtain. Twoelementsarecommontomostinterpreta- tionsof'free'.First,freedomrequiresanabsence ofdeterminationorcertainsortsofdetermina- tion,andsecond,oneactsandchoosesfreely onlyiftheseendeavorsare,properlyspeaking, one'sown.Fromhere,accountsdiverge.Some takefreedom(liberty)ofindifferenceorthecon- tingencyofalternativecoursesofactiontobe critical.Thus,forthewomandeliberatingabout whichcandidatetoselect,eachchoiceisanopen alternativeinasmuchasitispossiblebutnotyet necessitated.Indifferenceisalsoconstruedas motivationalequilibrium,aconditionsomefind essentialtotheideathatafreechoicemustbe rational.Othersfocusonfreedom(liberty)of spontaneity,wherethevoterisfreeifshevotes asshechoosesordesires,areadingthatreflects thepopulärequationoffreedomwith"doing whatyouwant."Associatedwithbothanalyses isathirdbywhichthewomanactsfreelyifshe exerciseshercontrol,implyingresponsivenessto 326 freewillproblem freewillproblem intentaswellasbothabilitiestoperformanact andtorefrain.Afourthviewidentifiesfreedom withautonomy,thevoterbeingautonomousto theextentthatherselectionisself-determined, e.g.,byhercharacter,deeperself,highervalues, orinformedreason.Thoughdistinct,thesecon- ceptionsarenotincompatible,andmanyac- countsofpracticalfreedomincludeelementsof each. Determinismposesproblemsifpracticalfree- domrequirescontingency(alternatepossibilities ofaction).Incompatibilismmaintainsthatdeter- minismprecludesfreedom,thoughincompati- bilistsdifferwhethereverythingisdetermined. Thosewhoacceptdeterminismtherebyendorse härddeterminism(associatedwitheighteenth- centurythinkersliked'Holbachand,recently, certainbehaviorists),accordingtowhichfree- domisanillusionsincebehaviorisbrought aboutbyenvironmentalandgeneticfactors. Somehärddeterministsalsodenytheexistence ofmoralresponsibility.Attheoppositeextreme, metaphysicallibertarianismassertsthatpeopleare freeandresponsibleand,afortiori,thatthepast doesnotdetermineauniquefuture-aposition somefindenhancedbydevelopmentsinquan- tumphysics.Amongadherentsofthissortof incompatibilismarethosewhoadvocateafree- domofindifferencebydescribingresponsible choicesasthosethatareundeterminedby antecedentcircumstances(Epicureans).Torebut thechargethatchoices,soconstrued,areran- domandnotreallyone's"own,"ithasbeensug- gestedthatseveralelements,includingan agenfsreasons,delimittherangeofpossibilities andinfluencechoiceswithoutnecessitating them(aviewheldbyLeibnizand,recently,by RobertKane).Libertarianswhoespouseagency causation,ontheotherhand,blendcontingency withautonomyincharacterizingafreechoiceas onethatisdeterminedbytheagentwho,inturn, isnotcausedtomakeit(aviewfoundin CarneadesandReid). Unwillingtoabandonpracticalfreedomyet unabletounderstandhowalackofdetermina- tioncouldbeeithernecessaryordesirablefor responsibility,manyphilosopherstakepractical freedomandresponsibilitytobeconsistentwith determinism,therebyendorsingcompatibilism. Thosewhoalsoacceptdeterminismadvocate whatJamescalledsoftdeterminism.Itssupporters includesomewhoidentifyfreedomwithauton- omy(theStoics,Spinoza)andotherswhocham- pionfreedomofspontaneity(Hobbes,Locke, Hume).Thelatterspeakoflibertyasthepowerof doingorrefrainingfromanactionaccordingto whatonewills,sothatbychoosingotherwise onewouldhavedoneotherwise.Anagentfails tohavelibertywhenconstrained,thatis,when eitherpreventedfromactingasonechoosesor compelledtoactinamannercontrarytowhat onewills.Extendingthismodel,libertyisalso diminishedwhenoneiscausedtoactinaway onewouldnototherwiseprefer,eithertoavoid agreaterdanger(coercion)orbecausethereis deliberateinterferencewiththeenvisioningof alternatives(manipulation). Compatibilistshaveshownconsiderableinge- nuityinrespondingtocriticismsthattheyhave ignoredfreedomofchoiceortheneedforopen alternatives.Someapplythespontaneity,con- trol,orautonomymodelstodecisions,sothat thevoterchoosesfreelyifherdecisionaccords withherdesires,isunderhercontrol,orcon- formstoherhighervalues,deepercharacter,or informedreason.Otherschallengetheideathat responsibilityrequiresaltemativepossibilitiesof action.Theso-calledFrankfurt-stylecases(devel- opedbyHarryG.Frankfurt)aresituationswhere anagentactsinaccordwithhisdesiresand choices,butbecauseofthepresenceofacoun- terfactualintervener-amechanismthatwould havepreventedtheagentfromdoinganyalter- nativeactionhadheshownsignsofactingdif- ferently-theagentcouldnothavedone otherwise.Frankfurfsintuitionisthattheagent isasresponsibleashewouldhavebeenifthere werenointervener,andthusthatresponsible actiondoesnotrequirealternativepossibilities. CriticshavechallengedthedetailsoftheFrank- furt-stylecasesinattemptingtounderminethe appealoftheintuition. Adifferentcompatibilisttacticrecognizesthe needforopenalternativesandemploysversions oftheindifferencemodelindescribingpractical freedom.Choicesarefreeiftheyarecontingent relativetocertainsubsetsofcircumstances,e.g. thosetheagentisorclaimstobecognizantof, withtheopennessofalternativesgroundedin whatonecanchoose"foralloneknows." Opponentsofcompatibilismchargethatsince theserefinementsleaveagentssubjecttoexter- naldetermination,evenbyhiddencontrollers, compatibilismcontinuestofaceaninsurmount- ablechallenge.Theirobjectionsaresometimes summarizedbytheconsequenceargument(so calledbyPetervanInwagen,whohaspromi- nentlydefendedit):ifeverythingweredeter- minedbyfactorsbeyondone'scontrol,then one'sacts,choices,andcharacterwouldalsobe beyondone'scontrol,andconsequently,agents wouldneverbefreeandtherewouldbenothing 327 Frege,Gottlob Frege,Gottlob forwhichtheyareresponsible.Suchreasoning usuallyemploysprinciplesassertingtheclosure ofthepracticalmodalities(ability,control,avoid- ability,inevitability,etc.)underconsequence relations.However,thereisareasontosuppose thatthesortofabilityandcontrolrequiredby responsibilityinvolvetheagenfssenseofwhat canbeaccomplished.Sincecognitivestatesare typicallynotclosedunderconsequence,theclo- sureprinciplesunderlyingtheconsequence argumentaredisputable. Seealsoactiontheory,closure,deter- minism,DIMINISHEDCAPACITY,MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE,RESPONSIBILITY.T.K. Frege,Gottlob(1848-1925),Germanmathe- maticianandphilosopher.Afounderofmodern mathematicallogic,anadvocateoflogicism,and amajorsourceoftwentieth-centuryanalytic philosophy,hedirectlyinfluencedRussell, Wittgenstein,andCarnap.Frege'sdistinction betweenthesenseandthereferenceoflinguis- ticexpressionscontinuestobedebated. Hisfirstpublicationinlogicwashisstrikingly original1879Begriffsschrift(Concept-notation). Herehedevisedaformållanguagewhosecentral innovationisthequantifier-variablenotationto expressgenerality;hesetforthinthislanguagea versionofsecond-orderquantificationallogic thatheusedtodevelopalogicaldefinitionofthe ancestralofarelation.FregeinventedhisBegriffs- schriftinordertocircumventdrawbacksofthe useofcolloquiallanguagetostateproofs.Collo- quiallanguageisirregular,unperspicuous,and ambiguousinitsexpressionoflogicalrelation- ships.Moreover,logicallycrucialfeaturesofthe contentofstatementsmayremaintacitand unspoken.Itisthusimpossibletodetermine exhaustivelythepremisesonwhichtheconclu- sionofanyproofconductedwithinordinarylan- guagedepends.Frege'sBegriffsschriftistoforce theexplicitstatementofthelogicallyrelevant featuresofanyassertion.Proofsinthesystemare limitedtowhatcanbeobtainedfromabodyof evidentlytruelogicalaxiomsbymeansofasmall numberoftruth-preservingnotationalmanipu- lations(inferencerules).Hereisthefirsthall- markofFrege'sviewoflogic:hisformulationof logicasaformålsystemandtheidealofexplicit- nessandrigorthatthispresentationsubserves. Althoughtheformålexactitudewithwhichhe formulateslogicmakespossiblethemetamathe- maticalinvestigationofformalizedtheories,he showedalmostnointerestinmetamathematical questions.HeintendedtheBegriffsschrifttobe used. HowthoughdoesFregeconceiveofthesub- jectmatteroflogic?Hisorientationinlogicis shapedbyhisanti-psychologism,hisconviction thatpsychologyhasnothingtodowithlogic.He tookhisnotationtobeafull-fledgedlanguagein itsownright.Thelogicalaxiomsdonotmention objectsorpropertieswhoseinvestigationper- tainstosomespecialscience;andFrege'squan- tifiersareunrestricted.Lawsoflogicare,ashe says,thelawsoftruth,andthesearethemost generaltruths.Heenvisionedthesupplementa- tionofthelogicalvocabularyoftheBegriffsschrift withthebasicvocabularyofthespecialsciences. InthiswaytheBegriffsschriftaffordsaframework forthecompletelyrigorousdeductivedevelop- mentofanysciencewhatsoever.Thisresolutely nonpsychologicaluniversalistviewoflogicasthe mostgeneralscienceisthesecondhallmarkof Frege'sviewoflogic.Thisuniversalistviewdis- tinguisheshisapproachsharplyfromthecoeval algebraoflogicapproachofGeorgeBooleand ErnstSchröder.Wittgenstein,bothintheTracta- tusLogico-Philosophicus(1921)andinlåterwrit- ings,isverycriticalofFrege'suniversalistview. Logicalpositivism-mostnotablyCarnapinThe LogicalSyntaxofLanguage(1934)-rejecteditas well.Frege'suniversalistviewisalsodistinct frommorecontemporaryviews.Withhisviewof quantifiersasintrinsicallyunrestricted,hesaw littlepointintalkingofvaryinginterpretationsof alanguage,believingthatsuchtalkisaconfused wayofgettingatwhatisproperlysaidbymeans ofsecond-ordergeneralizations.Inparticular, thesemanticalconceptionoflogicalconse- quencesthatbecomesprominentinlogicafter KurtGödel'sandTarski'sworkisforeignto Frege. Frege'sworkinlogicwaspromptedbyan inquiryaftertheultimatefoundationforarith- metictruths.HecriticizedJ.S.Mill'sempiricist attempttogroundknowledgeofthearithmeticof thepositiveintegersinductivelyinourmanipula- tionsofsmallcollectionsofthings.Healsorejected crudelyformalistviewsthattakepuremathemat- icstobeasortofnotationalgame.Incontrastto theseviewsandKanfs,hehopedtousehis Begriffsschrifttodefineexplicitlythebasicnotions ofarithmeticinlogicaltermsandtodeducethe basicprinciplesofarithmeticfromlogicalaxioms andthesedefinitions.Theexplicitnessandrigorof hisformulationoflogicwillguaranteethatthere arenoimplicitextralogicalpremisesonwhichthe arithmeticalconclusionsdepend.Suchproofs,he believed,wouldshowarithmetictobeanalytic, notsyntheticasKanthadclaimed.However, Fregeredefmed'analytic'tomean'provablefrom 328 Frege,Gottlob Frege,Gottlob logicallaws'(inhisratherun-Kantiansenseof 'logic')anddefinitions. Frege'sstrategyfortheseproofsrestsonan analysisoftheconceptofcardinalnumberthat hepresentedinhisnontechnical1884book,The FoundationsofArithmetic.Frege,attendingtothe useofnumeralsinstatementslike'Marshastwo moons',arguedthatitcontainsanassertion aboutaconcept,thatitassertsthatthereare exactlytwothingsfallingundertheconcept 'Martianmoon'.Healsonotedthatbothnumer- alsinthesestatementsandthoseofpurearith- meticplaythelogicalroleofsingularterms,his propernames.Heconcludedthatnumbersare objectssothatadefinitionoftheconceptofnum- bermustthenspecifywhatobjectsnumbersare. Heobservedthat (1)thenumberofF=thenumberofGjustin casethereisaone-to-onecorrespondence betweentheobjectsthatareFandthose thatareG. Theright-handsideof(1)isstatableinpurely logicalterms.AsFregerecognized,thankstothe definitionoftheancestralofarelation,(1)suf- ficesinthesecond-ordersettingoftheBegriffs- schriftforthederivationofelementaryarith- metic.Thevindicationofhislogicismrequires, however,thelogicaldefinitionoftheexpression 'thenumberof.Hesharplycriticizedtheusein mathematicsofanynotionofsetorcollection thatviewsasetasbuiltupfromitselements. However,heassumedthat,correspondingto eachconcept,thereisanobject,theextensionof theconcept.Hetookthenotionofanextension tobealogicalone,althoughonetowhichthe notionofaconceptisprior.Headoptedasafun- damentallogicalprincipletheill-fatedbicondi- tional:theextensionofF=theextensionofG justincaseeveryFisG,andviceversa.Ifthis principlewerevalid,hecouldexploittheequiva- lencerelationöverconceptsthatfiguresinthe right-handsideof(1)toidentifythenumberofF withacertainextensionandthusobtain(1)asa theorem.InTheBasicLawsofArithmetic(vol.1, 1893;vol.2,1903)heformalizedputativeproofs ofbasicarithmeticallawswithinamodifiedver- sionoftheBegriffsschriftthatincludedageneral- izationofthelawofextensions.However,Frege's lawofextensions,inthecontextofhislogic,is inconsistent,leadingtoRussell'sparadox,as RussellcommunicatedtoFregein1902.Frege's attempttoestablishlogicismwasthus,onitsown terms,unsuccessful. InBegriffsschriftFregerejectedthethesisthat everyuncompoundsentenceislogicallyseg- mentedintoasubjectandapredicate.Sub- sequently,hesaidthathisapproachinlogicwas distinctiveinstartingnotfromthesynthesisof conceptsintojudgments,butwiththenotionof truthandthattowhichthisnotionisapplicable, thejudgeablecontentsorthoughtsthatare expressedbystatements.Althoughhesaidthat truthisthegoaloflogic,hedidnotthinkthatwe haveagraspofthenotionoftruththatisinde- pendentoflogic.Heeschewedacorrespondence theoryoftruth,embracinginsteadaredundancy viewofthetruth-predicate.ForFrege,tocall truththegoaloflogicpointstowardlogic'scon- cernwithinference,withtherecognition-of-the- truth(judging)ofonethoughtonthebasisofthe recognition-of-the-truthofanother.Thisrecog- nition-of-the-truth-ofisnotverballyexpressed byapredicate,butratherintheassertiveforce withwhichasentenceisuttered.Thestarting pointforlogicisthenreflectiononelementary inferencepattemsthatanalyzethoughtsand revealalogicalsegmentationinlanguage. Thisstartingpoint,andthefusionoflogical andontologicalcategoriesitengenders,is arguablywhatFregeispointingtowardbyhis enigmaticcontextprincipleinFoundations:onlyin thecontextofasentencedoesawordhavea meaning.Heviewssentencesashavingafunc- tion-argumentsegmentationlikethatmanifest inthetermsofarithmetic,e.g.,(3X4)+2. Truth-functionalinferencepatterns,likemodus ponens,isolatesentencesaslogicalunitsincom- poundsentences.Leibniz'slaw-thesubstitution ofonenameforanotherinasentenceonthe basisofanequation-isolatespropernames. Propernamesdesignateobjects.Predicates, obtainablebyremovingpropernamesfromsen- tences,designateconcepts.Theremovalofa predicatefromasentenceleavesahigherlevel predicatethatsignifiesasecond-levelconcept underwhichfirst-levelconceptsfall.Anexam- pleistheuniversalquantifieröverobjects:itdes- ignatesasecond-levelconceptunderwhicha first-levelconceptfalls,ifeveryobjectfallsunder it.Fregetakeseachfirst-levelconcepttobedeter- minatelytrueorfalseofeachobject.Vaguepred- icates,like'isbald',thusfailtosignifyconcepts. Thisrequirementofconceptdeterminacyisa productofFrege'sconstrualofquantification överobjectsasintrinsicallyunrestricted.Thus, conceptdeterminacyissimplyaformofthelaw oftheexcludedmiddle:foranyconceptFand anyobjectx,eitherxisForxisnotF. Fregeelaboratesandmodifieshisbasiclogical ideasinthreeseminalpapersfrom1891-92, "FunctionandConcept,""OnConceptand 329 Frege,Gottlob Frege,Gottlob Object,"and"OnSenseandMeaning."In"Func- tionandConcept,"Fregesharpenshisconcep- tionofthefunction-argumentstructureof language.Heintroducesthetwotruth-values, theTrueandtheFalse,andmaintainsthatsen- tencesarepropernamesoftheseobjects.Con- ceptsbecomefunctionsthatmapobjectstoeither theTrueortheFalse.Thecourse-of-valuesofa functionisintroducedasageneralizationofthe notionofanextension.Generallythen,anobject isanythingthatmightbedesignatedbyaproper name.Thereisnothingmorebasictobesaidby wayofelucidatingwhatanobjectis.Similarly, first-levelfunctionsarewhataredesignatedby theexpressionsthatresultfromremovingnames fromcompoundpropernames.Fregecallsfunc- tionsunsaturatedorincomplete,incontrastto objects,whicharesaturated.Propernamesand functionnamesarenotintersubstitutablesothat thedistinctionbetweenobjectsandfunctionsis atype-theoretic,categorialdistinction.Nofunc- tionisanobject;nofunctionnamedesignatesan object;therearenoquantifiersthatsimultane- ouslygeneralizeöverbothfunctionsandcon- cepts. JusthereFrege'sexpositionofhisviews,ifnot theviewsthemselves,encounteradifficulty.In explaininghisviews,heusespropernamesof theform'theconceptF'totalkaboutconcepts; andincontrastingunsaturatedfunctionswith saturatedobjects,apeparstogeneralizeöverboth withasinglequantifier.BennoKerry,acontem- poraryofFrege,chargedFrege'sviewswith inconsistency.Sincethephrase'theconcept horse'isapropername,itmustdesignatean object.OnFrege'sview,itfollowsthatthecon- cept'horse'isnotaconcept,butanobject,an apparentinconsistency.Fregerespondedto Kerry'scriticismin"OnConceptandObject."He embracedKerry'sparadox,denyingthatitrepre- sentsagenuineinconsistency,whileadmitting thathisremarksaboutthefunction-objectdis- tinctionare,astheresultofanunavoidableawk- wardnessoflanguage,misleading.Frege maintainedthatthedistinctionbetweenfunc- tionandobjectislogicallysimpleandsocannot beproperlydefined.Hisremarksonthedistinc- tionareinformalhandwavingdesignedtoeluci- datewhatiscapturedwithintheBegriffsschriftby thedifferencebetweenpropernamesandfunc- tionnamestogetherwiththeirassociateddistinct quantifiers.Frege'shandlingofthefunction- objectdistinctionisalikelysourceforWittgen- stein'ssay-showdistinctionintheTractatus. Atthebeginningof"OnSenseandMeaning," Fregedistinguishesbetweenthereferenceor meaning(Bedeutung)ofapropernameandits sense(Sinn).Heobservesthatthesentence'The MorningStårisidenticalwiththeMorningStår' isatrivialinstanceoftheprincipleofidentity.In contrast,thesentence'TheMorningStårisiden- ticalwiththeEveningStår'expressesasubstan- tiveastronomicaldiscovery.Thetwosentences thusdifferinwhatFregecalledtheircognitive value:someonewhounderstoodbothmight believethefirstanddoubtthesecond.Thisdif- ferencecannotbeexplainedintermsofanydif- ferenceinreferencebetweennamesinthese sentences.Fregeexplaineditintermsofadiffer- encebetweenthesensesexpressedby'the MorningStår'and'theEveningStår'.Inposthu- mouslypublishedwritings,heindicatedthatthe sense-referencedistinctionextendstofunction namesaswell.Inthisdistinction,Fregeextends tonamesthenotionofthejudgeablecontent expressedbyasentence:thesenseofanameis thecontributionthatthenamemakestothe thoughtexpressedbysentencesinwhichit occurs.Simultaneously,inclassifyingsentences aspropernamesoftruth-values,heappliesto sentencesthenotionofaname'sreferringto something.Frege'sfunction-argumentviewof logicalsegmentationconstrainshisviewofboth themeaningandthesenseofcompoundnames: thesubstitutionforanynameoccurringina compoundexpressionofanamewiththesame reference(sense)yieldsanewcompoundex- pressionwiththesamereference(sense)asthe original. Fregeadvancesseveralthesesaboutsensethat individuallyandcollectivelyhavebeenasource ofdebateinphilosophyoflanguage.First,the senseofanexpressioniswhatisgraspedbyany- onewhounderstandsit.Despitetheconnection betweenunderstandingandsense,Fregepro- videsnoaccountofsynonymy,noidentitycri- teriaforsenses.Second,thesenseofan expressionisnotsomethingpsychological. Sensesareobjective.Theyexistindependently ofanyone'sgraspingthem;theiravailabilityto differentthinkersisapresuppositionforcom- municationinscience.Third,thesense expressedbyanameisamodeofpresentation ofthename'sreference.HereFrege'sviewscon- trastwithRussell's.CorrespondingtoFrege's thoughtsareRussell'spropositions.InThe PrinciplesofMathematics(1903),Russellmain- tainedthatthemeaningfulwordsinasentence designatethings,properties,andrelationsthat arethemselvesconstituentsoftheproposition expressedbythesentence.ForFrege,ouraccess throughjudgmenttoobjectsandfunctionsisvia 330 Frege-Geachpoint Freud,Sigmund thesensesthatareexpressedbynamesthat meantheseitems.Thesesenses,nottheitems theypresent,occurinthoughts.Namesexpress- ingdifferentsensesmayrefertothesameitem; andsomenames,whileexpressingasense,refer tonothing.Anycompoundnamecontaininga namethathasasense,butlacksareference, itselflacksameaning.Apersonmayfullyunder- standanexpressionwithoutknowingwhether itmeansanythingandwithoutknowing whetheritdesignateswhatanotherunderstood namedoes.Fourth,thesenseordinarily expressedbyanameisthereferenceofthe name,whenthenameoccursinindirectdis- course.AlthoughtheMorningStårisidentical withtheEveningStår,theinferencefromthe sentence'SmithbelievesthattheMorningStår isaplanet'to'SmithbelievesthattheEvening Stårisaplanet'isnotsound.Frege,however, acceptsLeibniz'slawwithoutrestriction.He accordinglytakessuchseemingfailuresof Leibniz'slawtoexposéapervasiveambiguityin colloquiallanguage:namesinindirectdiscourse donotdesignatewhattheydesignateoutsideof indirectdiscourse.Thefourththesisisofferedas anexplanationofthisambiguity. Seealsologicism,meaning,russell, SET-THEORETICPARADOXES,SETTHEORY. T.R. Frege-Geachpoint.Seegeach. frequencytheoryofprobability.Seeprobability. Frenchpersonalism,aChristiansocialismstress- ingsocialactivismandpersonalresponsibility, thetheoreticalbasisfortheChristianworkers' Espritmovementbeguninthe1930sby EmmanuelMounier(1905-50),aChristian philosopherandactivist.Influencedbyboththe religiousexistentialismofKierkegaardandthe radicalsocialactioncalledforbyMarxandin parttakingdirectionfromtheearlierworkof CharlesPéguy,themovementstronglyopposed fascismandcalledforworkersolidarityduring the1930sand1940s.Italsourgedamore humanetreatmentofFrance'scolonies.Person- alismallowedforaChristiansocialismindepen- dentofbothmoreconservativeChristiangroups andtheCommunistlaborunionsandparty.Its mostimportantsinglebookisMounier'sPerson- alism.ThequarterlyjournalEsprithasregularly publishedcontributionsofleadingFrenchand internationalthinkers.Suchwell-knownChris- tianphilosophersasHenryDuméry,Marcel, Maritain,andRicoeurwereattractedtothe movement.Seealsomarcel,maritain,per- sonalism,ricoeur.J.Bi. Freud,Sigmund(1856-1939),Austrianneurolo- gistandpsychologist,thefounderofpsycho- analysis.Startingwiththestudyofhysteriain latenineteenth-centuryVienna,Freuddevel- opedatheoryofthemindthathascometodom- inatemodernthought.Hisnotionsofthe unconscious,ofaminddividedagainstitself,of themeaningfulnessofapparentlymeaningless activity,ofthedisplacementandtransferenceof feelings,ofstagesofpsychosexualdevelopment, ofthepervasivenessandimportanceofsexual motivation,aswellasofmuchelse,havehelped shapemodemconsciousness.Hislanguage(and thatofhistranslators),whetherspecifyingdivi- sionsofthemind(e.g.id,ego,andsuperego), typesofdisorder(e.g.obsessionalneurosis),or thestructureofexperience(e.g.Oedipuscom- plex,narcissism),hasbecomethelanguagein whichwedescribeandunderstandourselvesand others.AsthepoetW.H.Audenwroteonthe occasionofFreud'sdeath,"ifoftenhewaswrong and,attimes,absurd,/tousheisnomoreaper- son/nowbutawholeclimateofopinion/under whomweconductourdifferentlives...." Hysteriaisadisorderinvolvingorganicsymp- tomswithnoapparentorganiccause.Following earlyworkinneurophysiology,Freud(incollab- orationwithJosefBreuer)cametotheviewthat "hystericssuffermainlyfromreminiscences,"in particularburiedmemoriesoftraumaticexperi- ences,thestrangulatedaffectofwhichemerged (inconversionhysteria)inthedistortedformof physicalsymptoms.Treatmentinvolvedthe recoveryoftherepressedmemoriestoallowthe catharticdischargeorabreactionoftheprevi- ouslydisplacedandstrangulatedaffect.Thispro- videdthebackgroundforFreud'sseductiontheory, whichtracedhystericalsymptomstotraumatic prepubertalsexualassaults(typicallybyfathers). ButFreudlåterabandonedtheseductiontheory becausetheenergyassumptionswereproblem- atic(e.g.,iftheonlyenergyinvolvedwasstran- gulatedaffectfromlong-pastexternaltrauma, whydidn'tthesymptomsuccessfullyuseupthat energyandsoclearitselfup?)andbecausehe cametoseethatfantasycouldhavethesame effectsasmemoryofactualevents:"psychical realitywasofmoreimportancethanmaterial reality."Whatwasrepressedwasnotmemories, butdesires.Hecametoseetherepetitionof symptomsasfueledbyinternal,inparticularsex- ual,energy. WhileitiscertainlytruethatFreudsawthe 331 Freud,Sigmund Freud,Sigmund workingofsexualityalmosteverywhere,itisnot truethatheexplainedeverythingintermsof sexualityalone.Psychoanalysisisatheoryof internalpsychicconflict,andconflictrequiresat leasttwoparties.Despitedevelopmentsand changes,Freud'sinstincttheorywasdeterminedly dualisticfrombeginningtoend-atthebegin- ning,libidoversusegoorself-preservative instincts,andattheendErosversusThanatos,life againstdeath.Freud'sinstincttheory(nottobe confusedwithstandardbiologicalnotionsof hereditarybehaviorpatternsinanimals)places instinctsontheborderlandbetweenthemental andphysicalandinsiststhattheyareinternally complex.Inparticular,thesexualinstinctmust beunderstoodasmadeupofcomponentsthat varyalonganumberofdimensions(source,aim, andobject).Otherwise,asFreudarguesinhis ThreeEssaysontheTheoryofSexuality(1905),it wouldbedifficulttounderstandhowthevarious perversionsarerecognizedas"sexual"despite theirdistancefromthe"normal"conceptionof sexuality(heterosexualgenitalintercourse betweenadults).Hisbroadenedconceptofsex- ualitymakesintelligiblesexualpreferences emphasizingdifferentsources(erotogeniczones orbodilycentersofarousal),aims(acts,suchas intercourseandlooking,designedtoachieve pleasureandsatisfaction),andobjects(whether ofthesameordifferentgender,orevenother thanwholelivingpersons).Italsoallowsforthe recognitionofinfantilesexuality.Phenomena thatmightnotonthesurfaceappearsexual(e.g. childhoodthumbsucking)shareessentialchar- acteristicswithobviouslysexualactivity(infan- tilesensualsuckinginvolvespleasurablestim- ulationofthesameerotogeniczone,themouth, stimulatedinadultsexualactivitiessuchaskiss- ing),andcanbeunderstoodasearlierstagesin thedevelopmentofthesameunderlyinginstinct thatexpressesitselfinsuchvariousformsin adultsexuality.Thestandarddevelopmental stagesareoral,anal,phallic,andgenital. Neuroses,whichFreudsawas"thenegativeof perversions"(i.e.,thesamedesiresthatmightin someleadtoperverseactivity,whenrepressed, resultinneurosis),couldoftenbetracedtostrug- gleswiththeOedipuscomplex:the"nucleusof theneuroses."TheOedipuscomplex,whichin itspositiveformpostulatessexualfeelings towardtheparentoftheoppositesexand ambivalentlyhostilefeelingstowardtheparent ofthesamesex,suggeststhattheuniversalshape ofthehumanconditionisatriangle.Theconflict reachesitspeakbetweentheagesofthreeand five,duringthephallicstageofpsychosexual development.Thefundamentalstructuringof emotionshasitsrootsintheprolongeddepen- dencyofthehumaninfant,leadingtoattach- ment-aprimaryformoflove-totheprimary caregiver,who(partlyforbiologicalreasonssuch aslactation)ismostoftenthemother,andthe experienceofothersasrivalsforthetime,atten- tion,andconcernoftheprimarycaregiver. Freud'sviewsoftheOedipuscomplexshouldnot beoversimplified.Thesexualdesiresinvolved, e.g.,aretypicallyunconsciousandnecessarily infantile,andinfantilesexualityanditsassoci- ateddesiresarenotexpressedinthesameform asmaturegenitalsexuality.Hiseffortstoexplain thedistinctivefeaturesoffemalepsychosexual developmentinparticularledtosomeofhismost controversialviews,includingthepostulationof penisenvytoexplainwhygirlsbutnotboys standardlyexperienceashiftingenderoftheir primaryloveobject(bothstartingwiththe motherastheobject).Låterloveobjects,includ- ingpsychoanalystsastheobjectsoftransference feelings(intheanalyticsetting,theanalystfunc- tionsasablankscreenontowhichthepatient projectsfeelings),aretheresultsofdisplacement ortransferencefromearlierobjects:"Thefinding ofanobjectisinfaetarefindingofit." Freudusedthesamestruetureofexplanation forsymptomsandformorenormalphenomena, suchasdreams,jokes,andslipsofthetongue.All canbeseenascompromiseformationsbetween forcespressingforexpression(localizedby Freud'sstrueturaltheoryintheid,understoodas areservoirofunconsciousinstinct)andforcesof repression(somealsounconscious,seekingto meettheconstraintsofmoralityandreality).On Freud'sunderlyingmodel,thefundamental processofpsychicfunctioning,theprimary process,leadstotheuninhibiteddischargeofpsy- chicenergy.Suchdischargeisexperiencedas pleasurable,hencethegovemingprincipleofthe fundamentalprocessiscalledthepleasureprinci- ple.Increaseoftensionisexperiencedasunplea- sure,andthepsychicapparatusaimsatastateof equilibriumorconstancy(sometimesFreud writesasifthestateaimedatisoneofzeroten- sion,hencetheNirvanaprincipleassociatedwith thedeathinstinctinFreud'sBeyondthePleasure Principle[1920]).Butsincepleasurecaninfact onlybeachievedunderspecificconditions, whichsometimesrequirearrangement,plan- ning,anddelay,individualsmustlearntoinhibit discharge,andthissecondaryprocessthinkingis governedbywhatFreudcametocallthereality principle.Theaimisstillsatisfaction,butthe"exi- genciesoflife"requireattention,reasoning,and 332 Fries,JakobFriedrich fullsubsetalgebra judgmenttoavoidfallingintothefantasywish- fulfillmentoftheprimaryprocess.Sometimes defensemechanismsdesignedtoavoidincreased tensionorunpleasurecanfail,leadingtoneuro- sis(ingeneral,underthetheory,aneurosisisa psychologicaldisorderrootedinunconscious conflict-particularneurosesbeingcorrelated withparticularphasesofdevelopmentandpar- ticularmechanismsofdefense).Repression, involvingtheconfiningofpsychicrepresenta- tionstotheunconscious,isthemostimportant ofthedefensemechanisms.Itshouldbeunder- stoodthatunlikepreconsciousideas,whichare merelydescriptivelyunconscious(thoughone maynotbeawareofthematthemoment,they arereadilyaccessibletoconsciousness),uncon- sciousideasinthestrictsensearekeptfrom awarenessbyforcesofrepression,theyare dynamicallyunconscious-asevidencedbythe resistancetomakingtheunconsciousconscious intherapy.Freud'sdeepdivisionofthemind betweenunconsciousandconsciousgoes beyondneuroticsymptomstohelpmakesense offamiliarformsofirrationality(suchasself- deception,ambivalence,andweaknessofthe will)thatarehighlyproblematicalonCartesian modelsofanindivisibleunitaryconsciousness. Perhapsthebestexampleoftheprimaryprocess thinkingthatcharacterizestheunconscious (unconstrainedbytherealitiesoftime,contra- diction,causation,etc.)canbefoundindream- ing. Freudregardeddreamsas"theroyalroadtoa knowledgeoftheunconscious."Dreamsarethe disguisedfulfillmentofunconsciouswishes.In extractingthemeaningofdreamsthrougha processofinterpretation,Freudreliedonacen- traldistinctionbetweenthemanifestcontent(the dreamasdreamtorasrememberedonwaking) andthelatentcontent(theunconsciousdream- thoughts).Freudheldthatinterpretationvia associationtoparticularelementsofthemanifest contentreversedtheprocessofdreamconstruc- tion,thedream-workinwhichvariousmecha- nismsofdistortionoperatedontheday'sresidues (perceptionsandthoughtsstemmingfromthe daybeforethedreamwasdreamt)andthelatent dream-thoughtstoproducethemanifestdream. Prominentamongthemechanismsarethecon- densation(inwhichmanymeaningsarerepre- sentedbyasingleidea)anddisplacement(in whichthereisashiftofaffectfromasignificant andintenseideatoanassociatedbutotherwise insignificantone)alsotypicalofneuroticsymp- toms,aswellasconsiderationsofrepresentabil- ityandsecondaryrevisionmorespecifictodream formation.Symbolismislessprominentin Freud'stheoryofdreamsthanisoftenthought; indeed,thesectiononsymbolsappearedonlyas alåteradditiontoTheInterpretationofDreams (1900).Freudexplicitlyrejectedtheancient "dreambook"modeofinterpretationintermsof fixedsymbols,andbelievedonehadtorecover thehiddenmeaningofadreamthroughthe dreamer's(nottheinterpretens)associationsto particularelements.Suchassociationsareapart oftheprocessoffreeassociation,inwhicha patientisobligedtoreporttotheanalystall thoughtswithoutcensorshipofanykind.The processiscrucialtopsychoanalysis,whichisboth atechniqueofpsychotherapyandamethodof investigationoftheworkingsofthemind. Freudusedtheresultsofhisinvestigationsto speculateabouttheoriginsofmorality,religion, andpoliticalauthority.Hetendedtofindtheir historicalandpsychologicalrootsinearlystages ofthedevelopmentoftheindividual.Moralityin particularhetracedtotheinternalization(asone partoftheresolutionoftheOedpiuscomplex)of parentalprohibitionsanddemands,producinga conscienceorsuperego(whichisalsothelocusof self-observationandtheego-ideal).Suchidenti- ficationbyinCorporation-introjection-plays animportantroleincharacterformationingen- eral.Theinstinctualrenunciationdemandedby moralityandoftenachievedbyrepressionFreud regardedasessentialtotheordersocietyneeds toconductitsbusiness.Civilizationgetsthe energyfortheachievementsofartandscienceby sublimationofthesameinstinctualdrives.But thecostsofsocietyandcivilizationtotheindi- vidualinfrustration,unhappiness,andneurosis canbetoohigh.Freud'sindividualtherapywas meanttoleadtotheliberationofrepressedener- gies(whichwouldnotbyitselfguaranteehappi- ness);hehopeditmightalsoprovideenergyto transformtheworldandmoderateitsexcess demandsforrestraint.Butjustashisindividual psychologywasfoundedontheinevitabilityof internalconflict,inhissocialthoughthesaw somelimits(especiallyonaggression-thedeath instinctturnedoutward)asnecessaryandhe remainedpessimisticabouttheapparentlyend- lessstrugglereasonmustwage(CivilizationandIts Discontents,1930). Seealsojung,philosophyofmind,phi- LOSOPHYOFPSYCHOLOGY,SELF-DECEPTION. J.Ne. Fries,JakobFriedrich.Seeneo-kantianism. fullsubsetalgebra.Seebooleanalgebra. 333 function,mathematical functionalism function,mathematical.Seealgorithm,mathe- maticalFUNCTION. function,probability.Seebayesianrationality. function,state.Seequantummechanics. function,teleological.Seeteleology. functional.Seerelation. functionalabstraction.See COMBINATORYLOGIC. functionalcalculus,lower.Seeformållogic. functionalcompleteness.Seecompleteness. functionaldependence,arelationshipbetween variablemagnitudes(especiallyphysicalmagni- tudes)andcertainpropertiesorprocesses.In modernphysicalsciencetherearetwotypesof lawsstatingsuchrelationships. (1)Therearenumericallawsstatingconcomi- tantvariationofcertainquantities,whereavari- ationinanyoneisaccompaniedbyvariationsin theothers.Anexampleisthelawforidealgases: pV=aT,wherepisthepressureofthegas,Vits volume,Titsabsolutetemperature,andaacon- stantderivedfromthemässandthenatureofthe gas.Suchlawssaynothingaboutthetemporal orderofthevariations,andtestsofthelawscan involvevariationofanyoftherelevantmag- nitudes.Concomitantvariation,notcausalse- quence,iswhatistestedfor. (2)Othernumericallawsstatevariationsof physicalmagnitudescorrelatedwithtimes. Galileo'slawoffreefallassertsthatthechangein theunittimeofafreelyfallingbody(inavac- uum)inthedirectionoftheearthisequaltogt, wheregisaconstantandtisthetimeofthefall, andwheretheråteoftimechangesofgiscor- relativewiththetemporalintervalt.Thelawis trueofanybodyinastateoffreefallandforany duration.Suchlawsarealsocalled"dynamical" becausetheyrefertotemporalprocessesusually explainedbythepostulationofforcesactingon theobjectsinquestion.R.E.B. functionalexplanation.Seephilosophyofthe SOCIALSCIENCES. functionalism,theviewthatmentalstatesare definedbytheircausesandeffects.Asameta- physicalthesisaboutthenatureofmentalstates, functionalismholdsthatwhatmakesaninner statementalisnotanintrinsicpropertyofthe state,butratheritsrelationstosensorystimula- tion(input),tootherinnerstates,andtobehav- ior(output).Forexample,whatmakesaninner stateapainisitsbeingatypeofstate(typically) causedbypinpricks,sunbums,andsoon,atype thatcausesothermentalstates(e.g.,worry),and atypethatcausesbehavior(e.g.,saying"ouch"). Propositionalattitudesalsoareidentifiedwith functionalstates:aninnerstateisadesirefor waterpartlyinvirtueofitscausingapersonto pickupaglassanddrinkitscontentswhenthe personbelievesthattheglasscontainswater. Thebasicdistinctionneededforfunctionalism isthatbetweenrole(intermsofwhichatypeof mentalstateisdefined)andoccupant(thepartic- ularthingthatoccupiesarole).Functionalstates exhibitmultiplerealizability:indifferentkindsof beings(humans,computers,Martians),apartic- ularkindofcausalrolemayhavedifferentoccu- pants-e.g.,thecausalroledefinitiveofabelief thatp,say,maybeoccupiedbyaneuralstatein ahuman,butoccupied(perhaps)byahydraulic stateinaMartian.Functionalism,likebehavior- ism,thusentailsthatmentalstatesmaybe sharedbyphysicallydissimilarsystems.Al- thoughfunctionalismdoesnotautomatically ruleouttheexistenceofimmaterialsouls,its motivationhasbeentoprovideamaterialistic accountofmentality. Theadventofthecomputergaveimpetusto functionalism.First,thedistinctionbetween Softwareandhardwaresuggestedthedistinction betweenrole(function)andoccupant(struc- ture).Second,sincecomputersareautomated, theydemonstratehowinnerstatescanbecauses ofoutputintheabsenceofahomunculus(i.e.,a "littleperson"intelligentlydirectingoutput). Third,theTuringmachineprovidedamodelfor oneoftheearliestversionsoffunctionalism.A Turingmachineisdefinedbyatablethatspeci- fiestransitionsfromcurrentstateandinputto nextstate(ortooutput).AccordingtoTuring machinefunctionalism,anybeingwithpscycho- logicalstateshasauniquebestdescription,and eachpsychologicalstateisidenticaltoamachine tablestaterelativetothatdescription.Tobein mentalstatetypeMistoinstantiateorrealize TuringmachineTinstateS. Turingmachinefunctionalism,developed largelybyPutnam,hasbeencriticizedby Putnam,NedBlock,andFödor.Tocitejustone seriousproblem:twomachinetablestates-and hence,accordingtoTuringmachinefunctional- ism,twopsychologicalstates-aredistinctifthey arefollowedbydifferentstatesorbydifferent outputs.So,ifapinprickcausesAtosay"Ouch" 334 functionalism,analytical fundamentumdivisionis andcausesBtosay"Oh,"then,ifTuringmachine functionalismweretrue,A'sandB'sstatesofpain wouldbedifferentpsychologicalstates.Butwe donotindividuatepsychologicalstatessofinely, norshouldwe:suchfine-grainedindividuation wouldbeunsuitableforpsychology.Moreover,if weassumethatthereisapathfromanystateto anyotherstate,Turingmachinefunctionalism hastheunacceptableconsequencethatnotwo systemshaveanyoftheirstatesincommon unlesstheyhavealltheirstatesincommon. Perhapsthemostprominentversionoffunc- tionalismisthecausaltheoryofmind.Whereas Turingmachinefunctionalismisbasedonatech- nicalcomputationalorpsychologicaltheory,the causaltheoryofmindreliesoncommonsense understanding:accordingtothecausaltheoryof mind,theconceptofamentalstateisthecon- ceptofastateaptforbringingaboutcertainkinds ofbehavior(Armstrong).Mentalstatetermsare definedbythecommonsenseplatitudesinwhich theyappear(DavidLewis).Philosopherscan determineaprioriwhatmentalstatesare(by conceptualanalysisorbydefinition).Thensci- entistsdeterminewhatphysicalstatesoccupy thecausalrolesdefmitiveofmentalstates.Ifit turnedoutthattherewasnophysicalstatethat occupiedthecausalroleof,say,pain(i.e.,was causedbypinpricks,etc,andcausedworry,etc), itwouldfollow,onthecausaltheory,thatpain doesnotexist.TobeinmentalstatetypeMis tobeinaphysicalstateNthatoccupiescausal roleR. Athirdversionisteleologicalor"homuncular" functionalism,associatedwithWilliamG.Lycan andearlyDennett.Accordingtohomuncular functionalism,ahumanbeingisanalogoustoa largeCorporation,madeupofcooperating departments,eachwithitsownjobtoperform; thesedepartmentsinterpretstimuliandproduce behavioralresponses.Eachdepartment(atthe highestsubpersonallevel)isinturnconstituted byfurtherunits(atasub-subpersonallevel)and soondownuntiltheneurologicallevelis reached.Therole-occupantdistinctionisthus relativizedtolevel:anoccupantatonelevelisa roleatthenextleveldown.Onthisview,tobe inamentalstatetypeMistohaveasub-...sub- personali))-erthatisinitscharacteristicstateS(§). Allversionsoffunctionalismfaceproblems aboutthequalitativenatureofmentalstates.The difficultyisthatfunctionalismindividuatesstates inpurelyrelationalterms,buttheacridodörof, say,apapermillseemstohaveanon-relational, qualitativecharacterthatfunctionalismmisses altogether.Iftwopeople,onseeingaripe banana,areinstateswiththesamecausesand effects,then,byfunctionalistdefinition,theyare inthesamementalstate-say,havingasensa- tionofyellow.Butitseemspossiblethatonehas an"invertedspectrum"relativetotheother,and hencethattheirstatesarequalitativelydifferent. Imaginethat,onseeingthebanana,oneofthe twoisinastatequalitativelyindistinguishable fromthestatethattheotherwouldbeinonsee- ingaripetomato.Despitewidespreadintuitions thatsuchinvertedspectraarepossible,according tofunctionalism,theyarenot.Arelatedproblem isthatof"absentqualia."Thepopulationof China,oreventheeconomyofBolivia,couldbe functionallyequivalenttoahumanbrain-i.e., therecouldbeafunctionthatmappedtherela- tionsbetweeninputs,outputs,andinternal statesofthepopulationofChinaontothoseofa humanbrain;yetthepopulationofChina,no matterhowitsmembersinteractwithone anotherandwithothernations,intuitivelydoes nothavementalstates.Thestatusoftheseargu- mentsremainscontroversial. Seealsobehaviorism,intentionality, PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,TURINGMACHINE. L.R.B. functionalism,analytical.Seephilosophyofmind. functionalism,machinestate.Seephilosophyof MIND. functionalism,Turingmachine.Seefunctional- ism. functionaljurisprudence.Seejurisprudence. functor.Seeformållogic. fundamentumdivisionis(Latin,'foundationofa division'),terminScholasticlogicandontology meaning'groundsforadistinction'.Somedis- tinctionscategorizeseparatelyexistingthings, suchasmenandbeasts.Thisisarealdistinction, andthefundamentumdivisionisexistsinreality. Somedistinctionscategorizethingsthatcannot existseparatelybutcanbedistinguishedmen- tally,suchasthedifferencebetweenbeinga humanbeingandhavingasenseofhumor,or thedifferencebetweenasoulandoneofitspow- ers,say,thepowerofthinking.Amentaldistinc- tionisalsocalledaformåldistinction.Duns Scotusiswellknownfortheideaofformalisdis- tinctiocumfundamentoexparterei(aformåldis- tinctionwithafoundationinthething),pri- marilyinordertohandlelogicalproblemswith 335 FungYu-lan futurecontingents theChristianconceptofGod.Godissupposedto beabsolutelysimple;i.e.,therecanbenomulti- plicityofcompositioninhim.Yet,accordingto traditionaltheology,manypropertiescanbe trulyattributedtohim.Heiswise,good,and powerful.Inordertopreservethesimplicityof God,DunsScotusclaimedthatthedifference betweenwisdom,goodness,andpowerwasonly formålbutstillhadsomefoundationinGod's ownbeing.A.RM. FungYu-lan(1895-1990),Chinesephilosopher. HewaseducatedatPekingUniversityand earnedhisPh.D.fromColumbiaUniversity.His HistoryofChinesePhilosophywasthefirstsuch completehistoryofhighqualitybyacontempo- raryscholar.DuringWorldWarIIheattempted toreconstructChuHsi'sphilosophyintermsof theNewRealismthathehadlearnedfromthe West,anddevelopedhisownsystemofthought, anewphilosophyof/;'(principle).Afterthe Communisttakeoverin1949,hegaveuphisear- lierthought,denouncingConfucianphilosophy duringtheCulturalRevolution.AftertheCul- turalRevolutionhechangedhispositionagain andrewrotehisHistoryofChinesePhilosophyin sevenvolumes.Seealsochinesephilosophy, chuhsi.S.-h.L. futurecontingents,singulareventsorstatesof affairsthatmaycometopass,andalsomaynot cometopass,inthefuture.Therearethreetra- ditionalproblemsinvolvingfuturecontingents: thequestionofuniversalvalidityoftheprinciple ofbivalence,thequestionoffreewillanddeter- minism,andthequestionofforeknowledge. Thedebateaboutfuturecontingentsinmod- ernphilosophicallogicwasrevivedbyLuka- siewicz'sworkonthree-valuedlogic.Hethought thatinordertoavoidfatalisticconsequences,we mustadmitthattheprincipleofbivalence(for anyproposition,p,eitherpistrueornot-pis true)doesnotholdgoodforpropositionsabout futurecontingents.Manyauthorshaveconsid- eredthisviewconfused.Accordingtovon Wright,e.g.,whenpropositionsaresaidtobe trueorfalseand'is'in'itistruethat'istenseless oratemporal,theillusionofdeterminismdoes notarise.Ithasitsrootsinatacitoscillation betweenatemporalandanatemporalreadingof thephrase'itistrue'.Inatemporalizedreading, orinitstensedvariantssuchas'itwas/willbe/is alreadytrue',onecansubstitute,for'true',other wordslike'certain','fixed',or'necessary'. Applyingthisdiachronicnecessitytoatemporal predicationsoftruthyieldstheideaoflogical determinism. Incontemporarydiscussionsoftenseand modality,futurecontingentsareoftentreated withthehelpofamodeloftimeasalinethat breaksupintobranchesasitmovesfromleftto right(i.e.,frompasttofuture).Althoughthecon- ceptionoftruthatamomenthasbeenfound philosophicallyproblematic,themodelofhistori- calmodalitiesandbranchingtimeassuchismuch usedinworksonfreedomanddetermination. Aristotle'sOnInterpretationIXcontainsaclas- sicdiscussionoffuturecontingentswiththe famousexampleoftomorrow'sseabattle. Becauseofvariousambiguitiesinthetextandin Aristotle'smodalconceptionsingeneral,the meaningofthepassageisindispute.IntheMeta- physicsVI.3andintheNiocmacheanEthicsIII.5, Aristotletriestoshowthatnotallthingsarepre- determined.TheStoicsrepresentedacausally deterministicworldview;anancientexampleof logicaldeterminismisDiodorusCronus'sfamous masterargumentagainstcontingency. BoethiusthoughtthatAristotle'sviewcanbe formulatedasfollows:theprincipleofbivalence isuniversallyvalid,butpropositionsaboutfuture contingents,unlikethoseaboutpastandpresent things,donotobeythestrongerprincipleaccord- ingtowhicheachpropositioniseitherdetermi- natelytrueordeterminatelyfalse.Aproposition isindeterminatelytrueaslongastheconditions thatmakeittruearenotyetfixed.Thiswasthe standardLatindoctrinefromAbelardto Aquinas.SimilardiscussionsoccurredinArabic commentariesonOnInterpretation. Inthefourteenthcentury,manythinkersheld thatAristotleabandonedbivalenceforfuture contingentpropositions.Thisrestrictionwas usuallyrefuted,butitfoundsomeadherentslike PeterAureoli.DunsScotusandOckhamheavily criticizedtheBoethian-ThomisticviewthatGod canknowfuturecontingentsonlybecausethe fluxoftimeispresenttodivineeternity.Accord- ingtothem,Godcontingentlyforeknowsfree acts.Explainingthisprovedtobeaverycum- bersometask.LuisdeMolina(1535-1600)sug- gestedthatGodknowswhatpossiblecreatures woulddoinanypossiblesituation.This"middle knowledge"theoryaboutcounterfactualsof freedomhasremainedalivingthemeinphilos- ophyofreligion;analogousquestionsaretreated intheoriesofsubjunctivereasoning. Seealsoaristotle,boethius,freewill PROBLEM,MANY-VALUEDLOGIC,TENSE LOGIC,VAGUENESS.S.K. 336 fuzzylogic fuzzyset fuzzylogic.Seefuzzyset,vagueness. fuzzyset,asetinwhichmembershipisamatter ofdegree.Inclassicalsettheory,foreverysetS andthingx,eitherxisamemberofSorxisnot. Infuzzysettheory,thingsxcanbemembersof setsStoanydegreebetweenand1,inclusive. Degree1correspondsto'isamemberofand correspondsto'isnot';theintermediatedegrees aredegreesofvaguenessoruncertainty.(Exam- ple:LetSbethesetofmenwhoarebaldatage förty.)L.A.Zadehdevelopedalogicoffuzzysets asthebasisforalogicofvaguepredicates.A fuzzysetcanberepresentedmathematicallyasa functionfromagivenuniverseintotheinterval [0,1].Seealsosettheory,vagueness. D.H. 337 G Gadamer,Hans-Georg(b.1900),Germanphi- losopher,theleadingproponentofhermeneutics inthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.He studiedatMarburginthe1920swithNatorpand Heidegger.Hisfirstbook,Plato'sDialecticalEthics (1931),bearstheirimprintandreflectshisabid- inginterestinGreekphilosophy.Truthand Method(1960)establishedGadamerasanorigi- nalthinkerandhadanimpactonavarietyofdis- ciplinesoutsidephilosophy,includingtheology, legaltheory,andliterarycriticism. ThethreepartsofTruthandMethodcombineto displacethescientificconceptionsoftruthand methodasthemodelforunderstandinginthe humansciences.Inthefirstpart,whichpresents itselfasacritiqueoftheabstractioninherentin aestheticconsciousness,Gadamerarguesthat artworksmakeaclaimtotruth.LåterGadamer drawsontheplayofartintheexperienceofthe beautifultoofferananalogytohowatextdraws itsreadersintotheeventoftruthbymakinga claimonthem.Inthecentralportionofthebook Gadamerpresentstraditionasaconditionof understanding.Traditionisnotforhimanobject ofhistoricalknowledge,butpartofone'svery being.ThefinalsectionofTruthandMethodis concernedwithlanguageasthesiteoftradition. Gadamersoughttoshiftthefocusofhermeneu- ticsfromtheproblemsofobscurityandmisun- derstandingtothecommunityofunderstanding thattheparticipantsinadialoguesharethrough language. Gadamerwasinvolvedinthreedebatesthat definehisphilosophicalcontribution.Thefirst wasanongoingdebatewithHeideggerreflected throughoutGadamer'scorpus.Gadamerdidnot acceptalloftheinnovationsthatHeidegger introducedintohisthinkinginthe1930s,partic- ularlyhisreconstructionofthehistoryofphilos- ophyasthehistoryofbeing.Gadameralso rejectedHeidegger'selevationofHölderlintothe statusofanauthority.Gadamer'sgreateraccessi- bilityledHabermastocharacterizeGadamer's contributionasthatofhaving"urbanizedthe Heideggerianprovince."Theseconddebatewas withHabermashimself.Habermascriticized Gadamer'srejectionoftheEnlightenmenfs "prejudiceagainstprejudice."WhereasHaber- masobjectedtotheconservatisminherentin Gadamer'srehabilitationofprejudice,Gadamer explainedthathewasonlysettingoutthecon- ditionsforunderstanding,conditionsthatdid notexcludethepossibilityofradicalchange.The thirddebate,whichformedthebasisofDialogue andDeconstruction(1989),waswithDerrida.Der- rideandeconstructionisindebtedtoHeidegger's låterphilosophyandsothisdebatewasinpart aboutthedirectionphilosophyshouldtakeafter Heidegger.However,manyobserversconcluded thattherewasnorealengagementbetween GadamerandDerrida.Tosomeitseemedthat Derrida,byrefusingtoacceptthetermsonwhich Gadamerinsisteddialogueshouldtakeplace, hadexposedthelimitsimposedbyhermeneu- tics.Toothersitwasconfirmationthatany attempttocircumventtheconditionsofdialogue specifiedbyGadamerianhermeneuticsisself- defeating. Seealsoderrida,heidegger,hermeneu- tics.R.L.B. Gaius.Seecommentariesonplato,middlepla- TONISM. Galen(a.d.129-C.215),physicianandphiloso- pherfromGreekAsiaMinor.Hetraveledexten- sivelyintheGreco-Romanworldbeforesettling inRomeandbecomingcourtphysicianto MarcusAurelius.Hisphilosophicalinterestslay mainlyinthephilosophyofscience(Onthe TherapeuticMethod)andnature(OntheFunctionof Parts),andinlogic(IntroductiontoLogic,inwhich hedevelopsacrudebutpioneeringtreatmentof thelogicofrelations).Galenespousedan extremeformofdirectedteleologyinnatural explanation,andsoughttodevelopasyncretist pictureofcauseandexplanationdrawingon Plato,Aristotle,theStoics,andprecedingmed- icalwriters,notablyHippocrates,whoseviews heattemptedtoharmonizewiththoseofPlato (OntheDoctrinesofHippocratesandPlato).He wroteonphilosophicalpsychology(Onthe PassionsandErrorsoftheSoul);hismaterialist accountofmind(MentalCharacteristicsAreCaused byBodilyConditions)isnotableforitscautionin approachingissues(suchastheactualnatureof thesubstanceofthesoulandtheageandstruc- tureoftheuniverse)thatheregardedasunde- 338 GalileoGalilei gametheory cidable.Inphysiology,headoptedaversionof thefour-humortheorythathealthconsistsinan appropriatebalanceoffourbasicbodilycon- stituents(blood,blackbile,yellowbile,and phlegm),anddiseaseinacorrespondingimbal- ance(aviewowedultimatelytoHippocrates). Hesidedwiththerationalistphysiciansagainst theempiricists,holdingthatitwaspossibleto elaborateandtosupporttheoriesconcerningthe fundamentalsofthehumanbody;buthe stressedtheimportanceofobservationand experiment,inparticularinanatomy(hedis- coveredthefunctionoftherecurrentlaryngeal nervebydissectionandligation).ViatheArabic tradition,Galenbecamethemostinfluential doctoroftheancientworld;hisinfluenceper- sisted,inspiteofthediscoveriesoftheseven- teenthcentury,untiltheendofthenineteenth century.Healsowroteextensivelyonsemantics, butthesetextsarelöst.R.J.H. GalileoGalilei(1564-1642),Italianastronomer, naturalphilosopher,andphysicist.HisDialogue concerningtheTwoChiefWorldSystems(1632) defendedCopemicusbyarguingagainstthe majortenetsoftheAristoteliancosmology.On hisview,onekindofmotionreplacesthemulti- pledistinctcelestialandterrestrialmotionsof Aristotle;mathematicsisapplicabletothereal world;andexplanationofnaturaleventsappeals toefficientcausesalone,nottohypothesizednat- uralends.GalileowascalledbeforetheInquisi- tion,wasmadetorecanthisCopernicanviews, andspentthelastyearsofhislifeunderhouse arrest.DiscourseconcerningTwoNewSciences (1638)createdthemodernscienceofmechanics: itprovedthelawsoffreefall,thusmakingitpos- sibletostudyacceleratedmotions;assertedthe principleoftheindependenceofforces;andpro- posedatheoryofparabolicballistics.Hiswork wasdevelopedbyHuygensandNewton. Galileo'sscientificandtechnologicalachieve- mentswereprodigious.Heinventedanairther- moscope,adeviceforraisingwater,anda computerforcalculatingquantitiesingeometry andballistics.Hisdiscoveriesinpurescience includedtheisochronismofthependulumand thehydrostaticbalance.Histelescopicobserva- tionsledtothediscoveryoffourofJupiter's satellites(theMediceanStars),themoon's mountains,sunspots,themoon'slibration,and thenatureoftheMilkyWay.Inmethodology GalileoacceptedtheancientGreekidealof demonstrativescience,andemployedthe methodofretroductiveinference,wherebythe phenomenaunderinvestigationareattributedto remotecauses.Muchofhisworkutilizesthe hypothetico-deductivemethod.R.E.B. gambler'sfallacy,alsocalledMonteCarlofallacy, thefallacyofsupposing,ofasequenceofinde- pendentevents,thattheprobabilitiesoflåter outcomesmustincreaseordecreaseto"com- pensate"forearlieroutcomes.Forexample, since(byBemoulli'stheorem)inalongrunof tossesofafaircoinitisveryprobablethatthe coinwillcomeupheadsroughlyhalfthetime, onemightthinkthatacointhathasnotcomeup headsrecentlymustbe"due"tocomeup heads-musthaveaprobabilitygreaterthan one-halfofdoingso.Butthisisamisunder- standingofthelawoflargenumbers,which requiresnosuchcompensatingtendenciesofthe coin.Theprobabilityofheadsremainsone-half foreachtossdespitethepreponderance,sofar,of tails.Inthesufficientlylongrunwhat"compen- sates"forthepresenceofimprobablylongsub- sequencesinwhich,say,tailsstronglypre- dominate,issimplythatsuchsubsequences occurrarelyandthereforehaveonlyaslight effectonthestatisticalcharacterofthewhole. Seealsobernoulli'stheorem,probabil- ity.R.Ke. gametheory,thetheoryofthestructureof,and therationalstrategiesforperformingin,games orgamelikehumaninteractions.Althoughthere wereforerunners,gametheorywasvirtually inventedbythemathematicianJohnvonNeu- mannandtheeconomistOskarMorgensternin theearly1940s.Itsmoststrikingfeatureisits compactrepresentationofinteractionsoftwoor morechoosers,orplayers.Forexample,two playersmayfacetwochoiceseach,andincom- binationthesechoicesproducefourpossibleout- comes.Actualchoicesareofstrategies,notof outcomes,althoughitisassessmentsofout- comesthatrecommendstrategies.Todowellin agame,evenforallchooserstodowell,asis oftenpossible,generallyrequirestakingallother players'positionsandinterestsintoaccount. Hence,toevaluatestrategiesdirectly,without referencetotheoutcomestheymightproducein interactionwithothers,isconspicuouslyper- verse.Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatin ethics,gametheoryhasbeenpreeminently appliedtoutilitarianmoraltheory. Asthenumbersofplayersandstrategiesrise, thecomplexityofgamesincreasesgeometrically. Iftwoplayershavetwostrategieseachandeach ranksthefourpossibleoutcomeswithoutties, therearealreadyseventy-eightstrategicallydis- 339 gametheory gametheory tinctgames.Evenminorreal-lifeinteractions mayhaveastronomicallygreatercomplexity. Onemightcomplainthatthismakesgamethe- oryuseless.Alternatively,onecannotethatthis makesitrealisticandhelpsusunderstandwhy real-lifechoicesareatleastascomplexasthey sometimesseem.Tocomplicatemattersfurther, playerscanchooseöverprobabilisticcombina- tionsoftheir"pure"strategies.Hence,theorigi- nalfouroutcomesinasimple2X2gamedefine acontinuumofpotentialoutcomes. Afternotingthestructureofgames,onemight thenbestruckbyanimmediateimplicationof thismeredescription.Arationalindividualmay besupposedtoattempttomaximizeherpoten- tialorexpectedoutcomeinagame.Butifthere aretwoormorechoosersinagame,ingeneral theycannotallmaximizesimultaneouslyöver theirexpectedoutcomeswhileassumingthatall othersaredoinglikewise.Thisisamathematical principle:ingeneral,wecannotmaximizeöver twofunctionssimultaneously.Forexample,the generalnotionofthegreatestgoodofthegreat- estnumberisincoherent.Hence,ininteractive choicecontexts,thesimplenotionofeconomic rationalityisincoherent.Virtuallyallofearly gametheorywasdedicatedtofindinganalter- nativeprincipleforresolvinggameinteractions. Therearenowmanyso-calledsolutiontheories, mostofwhichareaboutoutcomesratherthan strategies(theystipulatewhichoutcomesor rangeofoutcomesisgame-theoreticallyratio- nal).Thereislittleconsensusonhowtogeneral- izefromtheordinaryrationalityofmerely choosingmoreratherthanless(andofdisplay- ingconsistentpreferences)tothegeneralchoice ofstrategiesingames. Payoffsinearlygametheorywerealmost alwaysrepresentedincardinal,transferableUtil- ities.Transferableutilityisanoddnotionthatwas evidentlyintroducedtoavoidthedisdainwith whicheconomiststhentreatedinterpersonal comparisonsofutility.Itseemstobeanalogousto money.Inthelanguageofcontemporarylawand economics,onecouldsaythetheoryisoneof wealthmaximization.Intheearlytheory,the rationalityconditionswereasfollows.(1)Ingen- eral,ifthesumsofthepayoffstoallplayersinvar- iousoutcomesdiffer,itisassumedthatrational playerswillmanagetodividethelargestpossible payoffamongthemselves.(2)Noindividualwill acceptapayoffbelowthe"securitylevel"obtain- ableevenifalltheotherplayersformacoalition againsttheindividual.(3)Finally,sometimesitis alsoassumedthatnogroupofplayerswillratio- nallyacceptlessthanitcouldgetasitsgroup securitylevel-butinsomegames,nooutcome canmeetthiscondition.Thisisanoddcombina- tionofindividualandcollectiveelements.The collectiveelementsareplausiblythoughtofas merelypredictive:ifweindividuallywishtodo well,weshouldcombineeffortstohelpusdobest asagroup.Butwhatwewantisatheorythat convertsindividualpreferencesintocollective results.Unfortunately,toputamovedoingjust thisinthefoundationsofthetheoryisquestion- begging.Ourfundamentalburdenistodeter- minewhetheratheoryofindividualrationality canproducecollectivelygoodresults,nottostip- ulatethatitmust. Inthetheorywithcardinal,additivepayoffs, wecandividegamesintoconstantsumgames,in whichthesumofallplayers'payoffsineachout- comeisaconstant,andvariablesumgames.Zero- sumgamesareaspecialcaseofconstantsum games.Two-personconstantsumgamesare gamesofpureconflict,becauseeachplayer'sgain istheother'sloss.Inconstantsumgameswith morethantwoplayersandinallvariablesum games,thereisgenerallyreasonforcoalitionfor- mationtoimprovepayoffstomembersofthe coalition(hence,theappealofassumptions1 and3above).Gameswithouttransferableutility, suchasgamesinwhichplayershaveonlyordi- nalpreferences,maybecharacterizedasgames ofpureconflictorofpurecoordinationwhen players'preferenceorderingsöveroutcomesare oppositeoridentical,respectively,orasgamesof mixedmotivewhentheirorderingsarepartly thesameandpartlyreversed.Mathematical analysisofsuchgamesisevidentlylesstractable thanthatofgameswithcardinal,additiveutility, andtheirtheoryisonlybeginningtobeexten- sivelydeveloped. Despitetheapparentcircularityoftheratio- nalityassumptionsofearlygametheory,itisthe gametheorists'prisoner'sdilemmathatmakes clearthatcompellingindividualprinciplesof choicecanproducecollectivelydeficientout- comes.Thisgamewasdiscoveredabout1950 andlåtergivenitscatchybutinaptname.Ifthey playitinisolationfromanyotherinteraction betweenthem,twoplayersinthisgamecaneach dowhatseemsindividuallybestandreachan outcomethatbothconsiderinferiortotheout- comethatresultsfrommakingoppositestrategy choices.Evenwiththeknowledgethatthisisthe problemtheyface,theplayersstillhaveincen- tivetochoosethestrategiesthatjointlyproduce theinferioroutcome.Prisoner'sdilemma involvesbothcoordinationandconflict.Ithas playedacentralroleincontemporarydiscus- 340 Gandhi,MohandasKaramchand Gay,John sionsofmoralandpoliticalphilosophy.Games thatpredominantlyinvolvecoordination,such aswhenwecoordinateinalldrivingontheright orallontheleft,haveasimilarlycentralrole.The understandingofbothclassesofgameshasbeen readintothepoliticalphilosophiesofHobbesand Humeandintomutualadvantagetheoriesofjus- tice. Seealsodecisiontheory,prisoner's DILEMMA,UTILITARIANISM.R.Har. Gandhi,MohandasKaramchand,calledMa- hatma(1869-1948),Indiannationalistleader, anadvocateofnonviolentmässpoliticalaction whoopposedracialdiscriminationinSouth Africa(1893-1914)andBritishcolonialrulein India.HecalledhisapproachSatyagraha(San- skritsatya,'truth',andagraha,'force'),consider- ingitasciencewhoseendistruth(whichhe identifiedwithGod)andmethodnonviolence (ahirhsä).Heemphasizedconstructiveresolu- tion,ratherthanelimination,ofconflict,the interrelatednessofmeansandends(precluding evilmeanstogoodends),andtheimportanceof enduringsufferingoneselfratherthaninflicting ituponadversaries. Gandhibelievedlimitedknowledgeoftruth deprivesusofawarranttouseviolence.Hetook nonviolencetobemorethanmereabstention fromviolenceandtocallforcourage,discipline, andloveofanopponent.Ordinarypersonscan practiceitwithoutfullunderstandingofSatya- graha,whichhehimselfdisclaimed.Hecameto distinguishSatyagrahafrompassiveresistance,a weaponoftheweakthatcantumtoviolence whenfacedwithfailure.Satyagraharequires strengthandconsistencyandcannotbeusedin anunjustcause.Notanabsolutist,Gandhisaid thatthoughnonviolenceisalwayspreferable, whenforcedtochoosebetweenviolenceand cowardiceonemightbetterchooseviolence.He wasamanofpracticemorethanatheoretician andclaimedthesuperiorityofSatyagrahatovio- lencecouldbeprovenonlybedemonstration, notargument.Hesawhisworkasanexperiment withtruth.Hewasinfluencedparticularlybythe BhagavadGitafromHinduthought,theSermon ontheMountfromChristianity,andthewritings ofTolstoy,Ruskin,Emerson,andThoreau. Seealsobhagavadgita,nonviolence, PACIFISM.R.L.H. Gassendi,Pierre(1592-1655),Frenchphiloso- pherandscientistwhoadvocatedaviamediato scientificknowledgeabouttheempirically observablematerialworldthatavoidsboththe dogmatismofCartesians,whoclaimedtohave certainknowledge,andtheskepticismofMon- taigneandCharron,whodoubtedthatwehave knowledgeaboutanything.Gassendipresented Epicureanatomismasamodelforexplaining howbodiesarestructuredandinteract.He advancedahypothetico-deductivemethodby proposingthatexperimentsshouldbeusedto testmechanistichypotheses.Liketheancient PyrrhonianSkeptics,hedidnotchallengethe immediatereportsofoursenses;butunlikethem hearguedthatwhilewecannothaveknowledge oftheinneressencesofthings,wecandevelopa reliablescienceoftheworldofappearances.In thisheexemplifiedthemitigatedskepticismof modernsciencethatisalwaysopentorevision onthebasisofempiricalevidence. Gassendi'sfirstbook,ExerätationesParadoxicae AdversisAristoteleos(1624),isanattackonAris- totle.Heisbestknownastheauthorofthefifth setofobjectionstoDescartes'sMeditations(1641), inwhichGassendiproposedthatevenclearand distinctideasmayrepresentnoobjectsoutside ourminds,apossibilitythatDescartescalledthe objectionofobjections,butdismissedasdestruc- tiveofallreason.Gassendi'sSyntagmaPhiloso- phiaeEpicuri(1649)containshisdevelopmentof Epicureanphilosophyandscience.Hiselabora- tionofthemechanisticatomicmodelandhis advocacyofexperimentaltestingofhypotheses werecruciallyimportantintheriseofmodern science. Gassendi'scareerasaCatholicpriest,Epi- cureanatomist,mitigatedskeptic,andmecha- nisticscientistpresentsapuzzle-asdothe careersofseveralotherphilosopher-priestsin theseventeenthcentury-concerninghistrue beliefs.Ontheonehand,heprofessedfaithand setasideChristiandoctrineasnotopentochal- lenge.Ontheotherhand,heutilizedanarsenal ofskepticalargumentsthatwasbeginningto undermineandwouldeventuallydestroythe rationalfoundationsofthechurch.Gassendi thusappearstobeofatypealmostunknown today,athinkerindifferenttotheapparentdis- crepancybetweenhisbeliefinChristiandoctrine andhisadvocacyofmaterialistscience. Seealsodescartes,epicureanism,skep- tics.R.A.W. Gauss,CarlFriedrich.Seenon-euclideangeome- TRY. Gay,John(1699-1745),Britishmoralistwho triedtoreconciledivinecommandtheoryand utilitarianism.Thesonofaminister,Gaywas 341 GCH generaljurisprudence electedafellowofSidneySussexCollege, Cambridge,wherehetaughtchurchhistory, Hebrew,andGreek.Hisonephilosophicalessay, "DissertationConcerningtheFundamental PrincipleofVirtueorMorality"(1731),argues thatobligationisfoundedonthewillofGod, which,becausepeoplearedestinedtobehappy, directsustoacttopromotethegeneralhappiness. Gayoffersanassociationistpsychologyaccording towhichwepursueobjectsthathavecometobe associatedwithhappiness(e.g.money),regard- lessofwhethertheynowmakeushappy,and argues,contraHutcheson,thatourmoralsenseis conditionedratherthannatural.Gay'sblendof utilitarianismwithassociationistpsychologygave DavidHartleythebasisforhismoralpsychology, whichlåterinfluencedBenthaminhisformula- tionofclassicalutilitarianism.Seealsohartley, HUTCHESON,MORALSENSETHEORY.E.S.R. cch.SeeAppendixofSpecialSymbols. Geach,Peter(b.1916),Englishphilosopherand logicianwhosemainworkhasbeeninlogicand philosophyoflanguage.Agreatadmirerof McTaggart,hehaspublishedasympatheticexpo- sitionofthelatter'swork(Truth,Loveand Immortality,1979),andhasalwaysaimedtoemu- latewhatheseesastheclarityandrigorofthe Scottishidealisfsthought.Greatlyinfluencedby FregeandWittgenstein,Geachisparticularly notedforhispowerfuluseofwhathecalls"the Fregepoint,"bettercalled"theFrege-Geach point,"thatthesamethoughtmayoccuras assertedorunassertedandyetretainthesame truth-value.ThepointhasbeenusedbyGeachto refuteascriptivisttheoriesofresponsibility,and canbeemployedagainstnoncognitivisttheories ofethics,whicharesaidtofacetheFrege-Geach problemofaccountingforthesenseofmoral ascriptionsincontextslikeTfhedidwrong,he willbepunished'.Heisalsonotedforhelpingto bringFregetotheEnglish-speakingworld, throughco-translationswithMaxBlack(1909- 88).Inlogicheisknownforproving,indepen- dentlyofQuine,acontradictioninFrege'sway outofRussell'sparadox(Mind,1956),andforhis defenseofmodernFregean-Russellianlogic againsttraditionalAristotelian-Scholasticlogic. HealsohasadeepadmirationforthePolishlogi- cians. Inmetaphysics,Geachisknownforhisdefense ofrelativeidentity,thethesisthatanobjectacanbe thesameF(wherei7isakind-term)asanobject£> whilenotbeingthesameG,eventhoughaandb arebothG's.Hisspiriteddefenseofthethesishas beenmetbyequallyvigorousattacks,andithas notreceivedwideacceptance.Anobviousappli- cationofthethesisistothedefenseofthedoc- trineoftheTrinity(e.g.,theFatheristhesame godastheSonbutnotthesameperson),which hascaughttheattentionofsomephilosophersof religion. Geach'smainworksincludeMentalActs (1958),whichattacksdispositionaltheoriesof mind,ReferenceandGenerality(1962),whichcon- tainsmuchimportantworkonlogic,andthecol- lectionLogicMatters(1972).Anotabledefender ofCatholicism(despitehisanimadversions againstScholasticlogic),hisreligiousviewsfind theirgreatestexposureinGodandtheSoul (1969),ProvidenceandEvil(1977),andTheVirtues (1977).HeismarriedtothephilosopherEliza- bethAnscombe. Seealsoascriptivism,frege,identity, MCTAGGART,RUSSELL,WITTGENSTEIN. D.S.O. Gegenstandstheorie.Seeact-objectpsychology. Geist.Seehegel. Geisteswissenschaften.Seeweber. Gemeinschaft.Seesocialphilosophy. gendertheory.Seepostmodern. genealogy.SeeFoucault,nietzsche. generality.Seevagueness. generalizability.Seeuniversalizability. generalization,existential.Seeexistentialgener- alization. generalization,universal.Seeuniversalizability. generalizationargument.Seeuniversalizability. generalizationprinciple.Seeuniversalizability. generalizedcontinuumhypothesis.SeeAppendix ofSpecialSymbols. generalizedquantifier.Seeformållogic. generaljurisprudence.Seejurisprudence,philos- ophyOFLAW. 342 generalrelativity Gerson,Jeande generalrelativity.Seerelativity. generalsystemstheory.Seesystemstheory. generalterm.Seesingularterm. generalwill.Seerousseau. generativegrammar.Seegrammar. genericconsistency,principleof.Seeuniversaliz- ability. genericsentence.Seephilosophyoflanguage. geneticepistemology.Seepiaget. geneticfallacy.Seeinformalfallacy. genotext.Seekristeva. Gentile,Giovanni(1875-1944),Italianidealist philosopherandeducationalreformer.Hetaught attheuniversitiesofPalermo,Pisa,andRome, andbecameministerofeducationinthefirst yearsofMussolini'sgovernment(1922-24).He wasthemostinfluentialintellectualoftheFas- cistregimeandpromotedaradicaltransforma- tionoftheItalianschoolsystem,mostofwhich didnotsurvivethatera. GentilerejectedHegel'sdialecticsasthe processofanobjectifiedthought.Hisactualkm (oractualidealism)claimsthatonlythepureact ofthinkingortheTranscendentalSubjectcan undergoadialecticalprocess.Allreality,suchas nature,God,good,andevil,isimmanentinthe dialecticsoftheTranscendentalSubject,whichis distinctfromEmpiricalSubjects.Amonghis majorworksareLateoriageneraledellospiritocome attopuro(1916;translatedasTheTheoryofMind asPureAct,1922)andSistemadilogicacometeoria delconoscere("SystemofLogicasaTheoryof Knowledge,"1917). Gentile'spedagogicalviewswerealsoinflu- encedbyactualism.Educationisanactthat overcomesthedifficultiesofintersubjectivecom- municationandrealizestheunityofthepupil andtheteacherwithintheTranscendentalSub- ject(Sommariodipedagogiacomescienzafilosofica, "SummaryofPedagogyasaPhilosophicalSci- ence,"1913-14).Actualismwasinfluentialin ItalyduringGentile'slife.WithCroce'shistori- cism,itinfluencedBritishidealistslikeBosan- quetandCollingwood. Seealsoidealism.P.Gar. genus.Seedefinition. genus,summutn.Seegenusgeneralissimum. genusgeneralissimum(Latin,'mostgeneral genus'),agenusthatisnotaspeciesofsome highergenus;abroadestnaturalkind.Oneofthe tenAristoteliancategories,itisalsocalledsum- mutngenus(highestgenus).ForAristotleand manyofhisfollowers,thetencategoriesarenot speciesofsomehigherall-inclusivegenus-say, being.Otherwise,thatall-inclusivegenuswould whollyincludeitsdifferences,andwouldbeuni- versallypredicableofthem.Butnogenusis predicableofitsdifferencesinthismanner.Few authorsexplainedthisreasoningclearly,but somepointedoutthatifthedifference'rational' justmeant'rationalanimal',thentodefine'man' as'rationalanimal'wouldbetodefinehimas 'rationalanimalanimal',whichisillformed.So toogenerally:nogenuscanincludeitsdiffer- encesinthisway.Thusthereisnoall-inclusive genus;thetencategoriesarethemostgeneral genera.Seealsodefinition,praedica- MENTA,PREDICABLES.P.V.S. geometricconventionalism.Seepoincaré. geometry,Euclidean.Seeeuclideangeometry. geometry,non-Euclidean.Seenon-euclidean geometry. Gerson,Jeande,originalname,JeanCharlier (1363-1429),Frenchtheologian,philosopher, andecclesiastic.HestudiedinParis,andsuc- ceededthenominalistPierred'Aillyaschancel- loroftheuniversityin1395.Bothd'Aillyand Gersonplayedaprominentpartintheworkof theCouncilofConstance(1414-18).Muchof Gerson'sinfluenceonlåterthinkersarosefrom hisconciliarism,theviewthatthechurchisa politicalsocietyandthatageneralcouncil,act- ingonbehalfofthechurch,hasthepowerto deposeapopewhofailstopromotethechurch's welfare,foritseemedthatsimilararguments couldapplytootherformsofpoliticalsociety. Gerson'sconciliarismwasnotconstitutionalism inthemodernsense,forheappealedtocorpo- rateandhierarchicalideasofchurchgovern- ment,anddidnotresthiscaseonanyprinciple ofindividualrights.Hismainwritingsdealtwith mysticaltheology,which,hethought,bringsthe believerclosertothebeatificvisionofGodthan dootherformsoftheology.Hewasinfluencedby 343 Gersonides Geulincx,Arnold St.BonaventureandAlbertusMagnus,butespe- ciallybyPseudo-Dionysius,whomhesawasa discipleofSt.PaulandnotasaPlatonist.Hewas thusabletoadoptananti-Platonicpositioninhis attacksonthemysticRuysbroeckandoncon- temporaryfollowersofDunsScotus,suchas JeandeRipa.IndismissingScotistrealism,he madeuseofnominalistpositions,particularly thosethatemphasizeddivinefreedom.He warnedtheologiansagainstbeingmisledby prideintosupposingthatnaturalreasonalone couldsolvemetaphysicalproblems;andhe emphasizedtheimportanceofapriesfspastoral duties.Despitehisearlyprominence,hespent thelastyearsofhislifeinrelativeobscurity. E.J.A. Gersonides,alsocalledLevibenGershom (1288-1344),FrenchJewishphilosopherand mathematician,theleadingJewishAristotelian afterMaimonides.Gersonideswasalsoadistin- guishedTalmudist,Biblecommentator,and astronomer.Hisphilosophicalwritingsinclude supercommentariesonmostofAverroes'com- mentariesonAristotle(1319-24);OntheCorrect Syllogism(1319),atreatiseonthemodalsyllo- gism;andamajorScholastictreatise,TheWarsof theLord(1317-29).Inaddition,hisbiblicalcom- mentariesrankamongthebestexamplesof philosophicalscripturalexegesis;especiallynote- worthyishisinterpretationoftheSongofSongs asanallegorydescribingtheascentofthehuman intellecttotheagentintellect. Gersonides'mentorsintheAristoteliantradi- tionwereMaimonidesandAverroes.However, morethaneitherofthem,Gersonidesheldphilo- sophicaltruthandrevealedtruthtobecoexten- sive:heacknowledgedneithertheconflictthat Averroessawbetweenreasonandrevelationnor Maimonides'criticalviewofthelimitationsof thehumanintellect.Furthermore,whilere- mainingwithintheAristotelianframework,Ger- sonideswasnotuncriticalofit;hisindependence canbeillustratedbytwoofhismostdistinctive positions.First,againstMaimonides,Gersonides claimedthatitispossibletodemonstrateboththe falsityoftheAristoteliantheoryoftheeternityof theworld(Averroes'position)andtheabsurdity ofcreationexnihilo,thetraditionalrabbinicview thatMaimonidesadopted,thoughfornon- demonstrativereasons.InsteadGersonides advocatedthePlatonictheoryoftemporalcre- ationfromprimordialmatter.Second,unlike MaimonidesandAverroes,whobothheldthat theallegedcontradictionbetweendivinefore- knowledgeoffuturecontingentparticularsand humanfreedomisspurious,Gersonidestookthe dilemmatobereal.Indefenseofhumanfree- dom,hethenarguedthatitislogicallyimpossi- bleevenforGodtohaveknowledgeof particularsasparticulars,sincehisknowledgeis onlyofgenerallaws.Atthesametime,by redefining'omniscience'asknowingeverything thatisknowable,heshowedthatthisimpossi- bilityisnodeficiencyinGod'sknowledge. AlthoughGersonides'biblicalcommentaries receivedwideimmediateacceptance,subse- quentmedievalJewishphilosophers,e.g.,Hasdai Crescas,byandlargereactednegativelytohis rigorouslyrationalisticpositions.Especiallywith thedeclineofAristotelianismwithinthephilo- sophicalworld,bothJewishandChristian,he waseithercriticizedsharplyorsimplyignored. Seealsoaristotle,averroes,jewish PHILOSOPHY,MAIMONIDES,PHILOSOPHYOF RELIGION.J.Ste. Gesellschaft.Seesocialphilosophy. Gestalt.Seefigure- ■GROUND,KOHLER. Gestaltpsychology.Seeköhler. Gettierproblem.Seeepistemology. Gettier-styleexample.Seeepistemology. Geulincx,Arnold(1624-69),Dutchphilosopher. BorninAntwerp,hewaseducatedatLouvain andtherebecameprofessorofphilosophy(1646) anddean(1654).In1657hewasforcedoutof Louvain,perhapsforhisJansenistorCartesian tendencies,andin1658hemovedtoLeydenand becameaProtestant.Thoughhetaughtthere untilhisdeath,heneverattainedaregularpro- fessorshipattheuniversity.Hismainphilosoph- icalworkishisEthica(1675),onlyPartIofwhich appearedduringhislifetimeasDevirtuteetprimis ejusproprietatibus(1665).Alsopublishedduring hislifetimeweretheQuestionesquodlibeticae (1652;låtereditionspublishedasSaturnalia),a Logica(1661),andaMethodusinveniendiargu- mentet(1665).Hismostimportantworks, though,werepublishedposthumously;inaddi- tiontotheEthica,thereisthePhysicavera(1688), thePhysicaperipatetica(1690),theMetaphysica vera(1691),andtheMetaphysicaadmentemperi- pateticam(1691).Therearealsotwoposthumous commentariesonDescartes'sPrincipiaPhiloso- phiae(1690and1691). GeulincxwasdeeplyinfluencedbyDescartes, andhadmanyideasthatcloselyresemblethose 344 Ghazali,al- given ofthelåterCartesiansaswellasthoseofmore independentthinkerslikeSpinozaandLeibniz. Thoughhisgroundswereoriginal,likemany låterCartesians,Geulincxupheldaversionof occasionalism;hearguedthatsomeoneorsome- thingcanonlydowhatitknowshowtodo, inferringfromthatthatwecannotbethegen- uinecausesofourownbodilymovements.In discussingthemind-bodyrelation,Geulincx usedaclockanalogysimilartooneLeibnizused inconnectionwithhispreestablishedharmony. Geulincxalsoheldaviewofmentalandmater- ialsubstancereminiscentofthatofSpinoza. Finally,heproposedasystemofethicsgrounded intheideaofavirtuouswill.Despitetheevident similaritiesbetweenGeulincx'sviewsandthe viewsofhismorerenownedcontemporaries,it isverydifficulttodetermineexactlywhatinflu- enceGeulincxmayhavehadonthem,andthey mayhavehadonhim. Seealsodescartes,leibniz,occasion- alism.D.Garb. Ghazäll,al-.Seeal-ghazäli. ghostinthemachine.Seeryle. GilesofRome,originalname,EgidioColonna (c.1243-1316),Italiantheologianandecclesias- tic.AmemberoftheorderoftheHermitsofSt. Augustine,hestudiedartsatAugustinianhouse andtheologyattheUniversityinParis(1260- 72)butwascensuredbythetheologyfaculty (1277)anddeniedalicensetoteachasmaster. OwingtotheinterventionofPopeHonoriusIV, helåterreturnedfromItalytoParistoteachthe- ology(1285-91),wasappointedgeneralofhis order(1292),andbecamearchbishopofBourges (1295). Gilesbothdefendedandcriticizedviewsof Aquinas.Heheldthatessenceandexistenceare reallydistinctincreatures,butdescribedthemas "things";thatprimemattercannotexistwithout somesubstantialform;and,earlyinhiscareer, thataneternallycreatedworldispossible.He defendedonlyonesubstantialformincompos- ites,includingman.HesupportedPopeBoniface VIIIinhisquarrelwithPhilipIVofFrance. J.F.W. Gilson,Étienne(1884-1978),FrenchCatholic philosopher,historian,cofounderofthe PontificalInstituteofMedievalStudiesin Toronto,andamajorfigureinNeo-Thomism. Gilsondiscoveredmedievalphilosophythrough hispioneeringworkonDescartes'sScholastic background.Asahistorian,hearguedthatearly modernphilosophywasincomprehensiblewith- outmedievalthought,andthatmedievalphilos- ophyitselfdidnotrepresenttheunifiedtheoryof realitythatsomeThomistshadsupposed.His studiesofDunsScotus,Augustine,Bernard, Aquinas,Bonaventure,Dante,andAbelardand Héloiseexplorethisdiversity.ButinhisGifford lectures(1931-32),TheSpiritofMedieval Philosophy,Gilsonattemptedabroadsynthesisof medievalteachingonphilosophy,metaphysics, ethics,andepistemology,andemployeditinhis critiqueofmodernphilosophy,TheUnityof PhilosophicalExperience(1937).Mostofall,Gilson attemptedtoreestablishAquinas'sdistinction betweenessenceandexistenceincreatedbeing, asinBeingandSomePhilosophers(1949).Seealso NEO-THOMISM,THOMISM.D.W.H. Gioberti,Vincenzo(1801-52),Italianphiloso- pherandstatesman.Hewasanordainedpriest, wasimprisonedandexiledforadvocatingItalian unification,andbecameacentralpoliticalfigure duringtheRisorgimento. Hismajorpoliticalwork,Delprimatomoralee civiledegliItaliani("OntheMoralandCivilPri- macyofItalians,"1843),arguesforafederation oftheItalianstateswiththepopeasitsleader. Gioberti'sphilosophicaltheory,ontologism,in contrasttoHegel'sidealism,identifiesthedialec- ticsofBeingwithGod'screation.Hecondensed histheoryintheformula:"Beingcreatesthe existent."ThedialecticsofBeing,whichisthe onlynecessarysubstance,isapalingenesis,ora returntoitsorigin,inwhichtheexistentfirst departsfromandimitatesitscreator(mimesis), andthenreturnstoitscreator(methexis).By intuition,thehumanmindcomesincontact withGodanddiscoverstruthbyretracingthe dialecticsofBeing.However,knowledgeof supernaturaltruthsisgivenonlybyGod'sreve- lation(Teoricadelsoprannaturale["Theoryofthe Supernatural,"1838]andIntroduzioneallostudio dellafilosofia["IntroductiontotheStudyofPhi- losophy,"1841]).Gioberticriticizedmodern philosopherssuchasDescartesfortheirpsychol- ogism-seekingtruthfromthehumansubject insteadoffromBeingitselfanditsrevelation.His thoughtisstillinfluentialinItaly,especiallyin Christianspiritualism.P.Gar. given,inepistemology,the"brutefact"element tobefoundorpostulatedasacomponentofper- ceptualexperience.Sometheoristswhoendorse theexistenceofagivenelementinexperience thinkthatwecanfindthiselementbycareful 345 given,mythofthe Goclenius,Rudolphus introspectionofwhatweexperience(Moore,H. H.Price).Suchtheoristsgenerallydistinguish betweenthosecomponentsofordinarypercep- tualawarenessthatconstitutewhatwebelieve orknowabouttheobjectsweperceiveandthose componentsthatwestrictlyperceive.Forexam- ple,ifweanalyzeintrospectivelywhatweare awareofwhenweseeanäpplewefindthatwhat webelieveoftheäppleisthatitisathree-dimen- sionalobjectwithasoft,whiteinteriör;whatwe seeofit,strictlyspeaking,isjustared-shaped expanseofoneofitsfacingsides.Thislatteris whatis"given"intheintendedsense. Othertheoriststreatthegivenaspostulated ratherthanintrospectivelyfound.Forexample, sometheoriststreatcognitionasanactivity imposingformonsomematerialgivenincon- sciousexperience.Onthisview,oftenattributed toKant,thegivenandtheconceptualareinter- definedandlogicallyinseparable.Sometimesthis interdependenceisseenasrenderingadescrip- tionofthegivenasimpossible;inthiscasethe givenissaidtobeineffable(CLLewis,Mindand theWorldOrder,1929). Onsometheoriesofknowledge(foundation- alism)thefirstvariantofthegiven-thatwhich is"found"ratherthan"postulated"-provides theempiricalfoundationsofwhatwemight knoworjustifiablybelieve.Thus,ifIbelieveon goodevidencethatthereisaredäppleinfront ofme,theevidenceisthenon-cognitivepartof myperceptualawarenessoftheredapple- shapedexpanse.Epistemologiespostulatingthe firstkindofgivennessthusrequireasingle entity-typetoexplainthesensorialnatureof perceptionandtoprovideimmediateepistemic foundationsforempiricalknowledge.This requirementisnowwidelyregardedasimpossi- bletosatisfy;henceWilfredSellarsdescribesthe discreditedviewasthemythofthegiven. Seealsoperception;phenomenalism; SELLARS,WILFRID.T.V. given,mythofthe.Seesellars,wilfrid. Glanvill,Joseph(1636-80),Englishphilosopher andAnglicanministerwhodefendedtheRoyal SocietyagainstScholasticism.Glanvillbelieved thatcertaintywaspossibleinmathematicsand theology,butnotinempiricalknowledge.Inhis mostimportantphilosophicalwork,TheVanityof Dogmatizing(1661),heclaimedthatthehuman corruptionthatresultedfromAdam'sfallpre- cludesdogmaticknowledgeofnature.Usingtra- ditionalskepticalargumentsaswellasan analysisofcausalitythatpartiallyanticipated Hume,Glanvillarguedthatallempiricalknowl- edgeistheprobabilisticvarietyacquiredby piecemealinvestigation.Despitehisskepticism hearguedfortheexistenceofwitchesinWitches andWitchcraft(1668).J.W.A. Gleason'stheorem.Seequantumlogic. globalsupervenience.Seesupervenience. gnosticism,adualisticreligiousandphilosophi- calmovementintheearlycenturiesoftheChris- tianchurch,especiallyimportantinthesecond centuryundertheleadershipofValentinusand Basilides.Theytaughtthatmatterwasevil,the resultofacosmicdisruptioninwhichanevil archon(oftenassociatedwiththegodoftheOld Testament,Yahweh)rebelledagainsttheheav- enlypleroma(thecompletespiritualworld).In theprocessdivinesparkswereunleashedfrom thepleromaandlodgedinmaterialhumanbod- ies.Jesuswasahigh-rankingarchon(Logos)sent torestorethosesoulswithdivinesparkstothe pleromabyimpartingesotericknowledge(gno- sis)tothem. Gnosticisminfluencedandthreatenedthe orthodoxchurchfromwithinandwithout.Non- ChristiangnosticsectsrivaledChristianity,and Christiangnosticsthreatenedorthodoxyby emphasizingsalvationbyknowledgeratherthan byfaith.TheologianslikeelementofAlexandria andhispupilOrigenheldthatthereweretwo roadstosalvation,thewayoffaithforthemasses andthewayofesotericormysticalknowledge forthephilosophers. Gnosticismprofoundlyinfluencedtheearly church,causingittodefineitsscripturalcanon andtodevelopasetofcreedsandanepiscopal organization. Seealsoclementofalexandria,ori- gen.L.P.P. goal-directedsystem.Seecomputertheory, CYBERNETICS. Göckel,Rudolph.Seegoclenius. Goclenius,Rudolphus,inGermany,Rudolf Göckel(1547-1628),Germanphilosopher.After holdingsomeminorpostselsewhere,Goclenius becameprofessorattheUniversityofMarburgin 1581,whereheremaineduntilhisdeath,teach- ingphysics,logic,mathematics,andethics. Thoughhewaswellreadandknowledgeableof låtertrendsinthesedisciplines,hisbasicsympa- thieswereAristotelian.Gocleniuswasverywell 346 God Gödel'sincompletenesstheorems regardedbyhiscontemporaries,whocalledhim thePlatoofMarburg,theChristianAristotle,and theLightofEuropé,amongotherthings.Hepub- lishedanunusuallylargenumberofbooks, includingthePsychologia,hocestdehominisperfec- tione...(i590),theConciliatorphilosophicus (i609),theControversiaelogicaeetphilosophicae (i609),andnumerousotherworksonlogic, rhetoric,physics,metaphysics,andtheLatinlan- guage.ButhismostlastingworkwashisLexicon Philosophicum(1613),togetherwithitscompan- ion,theLexiconPhilosophicumGraecum(1615). Theselexiconsprovidecleardefinitionsofthe philosophicalterminologyoflateScholasticphi- losophy,andarestillusefulasreferenceworks forsixteenth-andearlyseventeenth-century thought.D.Garb. God.Seedivineattributes,philosophyofreli- gion. God,argumentsfortheexistenceof.Seedivine ATTRIBUTES,ENSASE,PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION. Gödel,Kurt.Seegödel'sincompletenesstheo- rems. Gödelnumbering.Seegödel'sincompleteness theorems. Gödel'sincompletenesstheorems,twotheorems formulatedandprovedbytheAustrianlogician KurtGödel(1906-78)inhisfamous1931paper "UberformålunentscheidbareSätzederPrincipia MathematicaundvervandterSystemeI,"proba- blythemostcelebratedresultsinthewholeof logic.Theyareaptlyreferredtoas"incomplete- ness"theoremssinceeachshows,foranymem- berofacertainclassofformålsystems,thatthere isasentenceformulableinitslanguagethatit cannotprove,butthatitwouldbedesirablefor ittoprove.Inthecaseofthefirsttheorem(Gl), whatcannotbeprovedisatruesentenceofthe languageofthegiventheory.Glisthusadisap- pointmenttoanytheoryconstructorwhowants histheorytotellthewholetruthaboutitssub- ject.Inthecaseofthesecondtheorem(G2), whatcannotbeprovedisasentenceofthethe- orythat"expresses"itsconsistency.G2isthusa disappointmenttothosewhodesireastraight- forwardexecutionofHilberfsProgram. Theproofsoftheincompletenesstheorems canbeseenasbasedonthreemainideas.The firstisthatofaGödelnumbering,i.e.,anassign- mentofnaturalnumberstoeachofthevarious objects(i.e.,theterms,formulas,axioms,proofs, etc.)belongingtothevarioussyntacticalcate- goriesofthegivenformålsystemT(referredto hereasthe"representedtheory")whosemeta- mathematicsisunderconsideration.Thesecond isthatofarepresentationalscheme.Thisincludes(i) theuseoftheGödelnumberingtodevelopnum- ber-theoreticcodificationsofvariousofthe metamathematicalpropertiespertainingtothe representedtheory,and(ii)theselectionofa theoryS(hereafter,the"representingtheory") andafamilyofformulasfromthattheory(the "representingformulas")intermsofwhichto registerastheoremsvariousofthefactscon- cerningthemetamathematicalpropertiesofthe representedtheorythusencoded.Thebasic resultofthisrepresentationalschemeistheweak representationofthesetof(Gödelnumbersof) theoremsofT,whereasetAofnumbersissaid tobeweaklyrepresentedinSbyaformula'Lix)' ofSjustincaseforeverynumberv,v£Aifand onlyif'L([v])'isatheoremofS,where'[v]'isthe standardtermofSthat,undertheintended interpretationofS,designatesthenumbern. Sincethesetof(Gödelnumbersof)theoremsof therepresentedtheoryTwilltypicallyberecur- sivelyenumerable,andtherepresentingtheory Smustbecapableofweaklyrepresentingthisset, thebasicstrengthrequirementonSisthatitbe capableofweaklyrepresentingtherecursively enumerablesetsofnaturalnumbers.Because basicsystemsofarithmetic(e.g.Robinson's arithmeticandPeanoarithmetic)allhavethis capacity,Gödel'stheoremsareoftenstatedusing containmentofafragmentofarithmeticasthe basicstrengthrequirementgoverningthecapac- itiesoftherepresentingtheory(which,ofcourse, isalsooftentherepresentedtheory).Moreon thispointbelow. Thethirdmainideabehindtheincomplete- nesstheoremsisthatofadiagonalorfixedpoint constructionwithinSforthenotionofunprov- ability-in-7;i.e.,theformulationofasentence GödelofSwhich,underthegivenGödelnum- beringofT,thegivenrepresentationofT'smeta- mathematicalnotionsinS,andtheintended interpretationofthelanguageofS,saysofitself thatitisnotprovable-in-TGödelisthusfalseif provableandunprovableiftrue.Morespecifi- cally,if'Provr(x)'isaformulaofSthatweakly representsthesetof(Gödelnumbersof)theo- remsofTinS,thenGödelcanbeanyformulaof SthatisprovablyequivalentinStotheformula '-?rovT([Gödel])'. Giventhisbackground,Glcanbestatedasfol- lows:If(a)therepresentingtheorySisanysub- theoryoftherepresentedtheoryT(uptoand 347 Gödel'sincompletenesstheorems Gödel'sincompletenesstheorems includingtherepresentedtheoryitself),(b)the representingtheorySisconsistent,(c)thefor- mula'Provr(x)'weaklyrepresentsthesetof (Gödelnumbersof)theoremsoftherepresented theoryTintherepresentingtheoryS,and(d) Gödelisanysentenceprovablyequivalentinthe representingtheorySto'Provr([Gödel])',then neitherGödelnor~Gödelisatheoremoftherep- resentingtheoryS. Theproofproceedsintwoparts.Inthefirst partitisshownthat,foranyrepresentingtheory S(uptoandincludingthecasewhereS=T),if 5isconsistent,then~Gödelisnotatheoremof S.Toobtainthisinitsstrongestform,wepickthe strongestsubtheorySofTpossible,namelyS= T,andconstructareductio.Thus,supposethat(1) ~GödelisatheoremofT.From(1)and(d)itfol- lowsthat(2)'ProvT([Gödel])'isatheoremofT. Andfrom(2)and(c)(inthe"if"direction)itfol- lowsthat(3)GödelisatheoremofT.But(1)and (3)togetherimplythattherepresentingtheory Tisinconsistent.Hence,ifTisconsistent,~Gödel cannotbeatheoremofT. Inthesecondpartoftheproofitisarguedthat iftherepresentingtheorySisconsistent,then Gödelisnotatheoremofit.Again,toobtainthe strongestresult,weletSbethestrongestsub- theoryofTpossible(namelyTitself)and,as before,arguebyreductio.Thuswesupposethat (A)GödelisatheoremofS(=T).Fromthis assumptionandcondition(d)itfollowsthat(B) '~Provr({Gödel])'isatheoremofS(=T).By(A) and(c)(inthe"onlyif"direction)itfollowsthat (C)'Provr([Gode/])'isatheoremofS(=T).But from(B)and(C)itfollowsthatS(=T)isincon- sistent.Hence,Gödelisnotprovableinanycon- sistentrepresentingtheorySuptoandincluding Titself. TheabovestatementofGlis,ofcourse,not theusualone.Theusualstatementsuppresses thedistinctionstressedabovebetweentherep- resentingandrepresentedtheoriesandcollater- allyreplacesourcondition(c)withaclauseto theeffectthatTisarecursivelyaxiomatizable extensionofsomesuitablyweaksystemofarith- metic(e.g.Robinson'sarithmetic,primitive recursivearithmetic,orPeanoarithmetic).This putsintoasingleclausewhat,metamathemati- callyspeaking,aretwoseparateconditions-one pertainingtotherepresentingtheory,theother totherepresentedtheory.Therequirementthat Tbeanextensionoftheselectedweakarithmetic addressesthequestionofT'sadequacyasarep- resentingtheory,sincethecrucialfactabout extensionsoftheweakarithmeticchosenisthat theyarecapableofweaklyrepresentingall recursivelyenumerablesets.Thisconstrainton T'scapabilitiesasarepresentingtheoryisinpart- nershipwiththeusualrequirementthat,inits capacityasarepresentedtheory,Tberecursively axiomatizable.ForT'srecursiveaxiomatizability ensures(underordinarychoicesoflogicforT) thatitssetoftheoremswillberecursivelyenu- merable-andhenceweaklyrepresentablein thekindofrepresentingtheorythatititself(by virtueofitsbeinganextensionoftheweakarith- meticspecified)is. Glcan,however,beextendedtocertainthe- orieswhosesetsof(Gödelnumbersof)theorems arenotrecursivelyenumerable.Whenthisis done,thebasiccapacityrequiredoftherepre- sentingtheoryisnolongermerelythattherecur- sivelyenumerablesetsofnaturalnumbersbe representableinit,butthatitalsobecapableof representingvariousnon-recursivelyenumer- ablesets,andhencethatitgobeyondtheweak arithmeticsmentionedearlier. G2isamoredemandingresultthatGlinthat itputssignificantlystrongerdemandsonthefor- mula'Provr(x)'usedtoexpressthenotionof provabilityfortherepresentedtheoryT.Inprov- ingGlallthatisrequiredof'Provr(x)'isthatit weaklyrepresent9(=thesetofGödelnumbers oftheoremsofT);i.e.,thatityieldanexten- sionallyaccurateregistryofthetheoremsofthe representedtheoryintherepresentingtheory. G2placesadditionalconditionson'Provr(x)'; conditionswhichresultfromthefactthat,to proveG2,wemustcodifythesecondpartofthe proofofGlinTitself.Todothis,'Provr(x)'must beaprovabilitypredicateforT.Thatis,itmustsat- isfythefollowingconstraints,commonly referredtoastheDerivabilityConditions(for Trovr(x)')'- (I)IfAisatheoremoftherepresentedthe- ory,then'Provr([A])'mustbeatheorem oftherepresentingtheory. (II)Everyinstanceoftheformula'Provr([A ->B])->(Provr([A])H>Provr([B]))' mustbeatheoremofT. (III)Everyinstanceoftheformula'Provr ([A])-^Provr([Provr([A])])'mustbea theoremofT. (I),ofcourse,isjustpartoftherequirement thatTroVj.([^4])'weaklyrepresentT'stheorem- setinT.Soitdoesnotgobeyondwhatisrequired fortheproofofGl.(II)and(III),however,do. Theymakeitpossibleto"formalize"thesecond partoftheproofofGlinTitself.(II)captures,in termsof'Provr(X)',themodusponensinference bywhich(B)isderivedfrom(A),and(III)codi- 348 GodfreyofFontaines Goethe,JohannWolfgangvon fiesinTtheappealto(c)usedinderiving(C) from(A). Theresultofthis"formalization"processisa proofwithinToftheformula'Con7 Gödd' (whereConrisaformulaoftheform'~ProvT ([#])',withTrovr(x)'aprovabilitypredicatefor Tand'[#]'thestandardnumeraldenotingthe Gödelnumber#ofsomeformularefutableinT). Fromthis,andtheproofofthesecondpartofGl itself(inwhichthefirstDerivabilityCondition, whichisjustthe"onlyif"directionof(c),figures prominently),wearriveatthefollowingresult, whichisageneralizedformofG2:IfSisanycon- sistentrepresentingtheoryuptoandincluding therepresentedtheoryTitself,'Provr(x)'any provabilitypredicateforT,andConranyformula ofToftheform'~Provr([#])',thenConrisnot atheoremofS.Totheextentthat,inbeinga provabilitypredicateforT,'ProvT(x)'"expresses" thenotionofprovabilityoftherepresentedthe- oryT,itseemsfairtosaythatConrexpressesits consistency.Andtotheextentthatthisistrue,it issensibletoreadG2assayingthatforanyrep- resentingtheorySandanyrepresentedtheoryT extendingS,ifSisconsistent,thentheconsis- tencyofTisnotprovableinS. Seealsocomputertheory,consistency, HILBERT'SPROGRAM,PROOFTHEORY.M.D. GodfreyofFontaines(probablybefore1250- 1306or1309),Frenchphilosopher.Hetaught theologyatParis(1285-C.1299;1303-04). AmonghismajorwritingsarefifteenQuodlibetal Questionsandotherdisputations.Hewas stronglyAristotelianinphilosophy,withNeopla- tonicinfluencesinmetaphysics.Hedefended identityofessenceandexistenceincreatures againsttheoriesoftheirrealorintentionaldis- tinction,andarguedforthepossibilityofdemon- stratingGod'sexistenceandofsomequidditative knowledgeofGod.Headmitteddivineideasfor speciesbutnotforindividualswithinspecies.He madewideapplicationsofAristotelianact- potencytheory-e.g.,tothedistinctionbetween thesoulanditspowers,totheexplanationof intellectionandvolition,tothegeneraltheoryof substanceandaccident,andinunusualfashion toessence-existence"composition"ofcreatures. J.F.W. Godwin,William(1756-1836),Englishphiloso- pher,novelist,andpoliticalwriter.Godwin's mainphilosophicaltreatise,Enquiryconcerning PoliticalJustice(1793),arousedheateddebate.He arguedforradicalformsofdeterminism,anar- chism,andutilitarianism.Governmentcorrupts everyonebyencouragingstereotypedthinking thatpreventsusfromseeingeachotheras uniqueindividuals.Godwin'snovelCaleb Williams(1794)portraysagoodmancorrupted byprejudice.Onceweremoveprejudiceand artificialinequalitywewillseethatouractsare whollydetermined.Thismakespunishment pointless.Onlyinsmall,anarchicsocietiescan peopleseeothersastheyreallyareandthus cometofeelsympatheticconcernfortheirwell- being.Onlysocanwebevirtuous,becausevirtue isactingfromsympatheticfeelingstobringthe greatesthappinesstoallaffected. Godwintookthisprinciplequiteliterally,and acceptedallitsconsequences.Truthfulnesshas noclaimonusotherthanthehappinessitbrings. Ifkeepingapromisecauseslessgoodthanbreak- ingit,thereisnoreasonatalltokeepit.Ifone mustchoosebetweensavingthelifeeitherofa majorhumanbenefactororofone'smother,one mustchoosethebenefactor.Ideallywewould neednorulesinmoralsatall.Theypreventus fromseeingothersproperly,therebyimpairing thesympatheticfeelingsthatconstitutevirtue. Rightsarepointlesssincesympatheticpeople willacttohelpothers.LåterutilitarianslikeBen- thamhaddifficultyinseparatingtheirpositions fromGodwin'snotoriousviews. Seealsobentham.J.B.S. Goethe,JohannWolfgangvon(1749-1832), Germanwriteroftenconsideredtheleadingcul- turalfigureofhisage.Hewrotelyricpoetry,dra- mas,andfictional,essayistic,andaphoristicprose aswellasworksinvariousnaturalsciences, includinganatomy,botany,andoptics.Alawyer bytraining,formostofhislifeGoethewasagov- ernmentofficialattheprovincialcourtofSax- ony-Weimar.Inhisnumerouscontributionsto worldliterature,suchasthenovelsTheSorrows ofYoungWerther(1774),WilhelmMeister'sYears ofApprenticeship(1795/96),ElectiveAffinities (1809),andWilhelmMeister'sYearsofPilgrimage (1821/29),andthetwo-parttragedyFaust (1808/32),Goetherepresentedthetensions betweenindividualandsocietyaswellas betweencultureandnature,withincreased recognitionoftheirtragicoppositionandthe needtocultivatearesignedself-disciplinein artisticandsocialmatters.Inhispoeticandsci- entifictreatmentofnaturehewasinfluencedby Spinoza'spantheistidentificationofnatureand Godandmaintainedthateverythinginnatureis animateandexpressiveofdivinepresence.Inhis theoryandpracticeofscienceheopposedthe quantitativeandexperimentalmethodand 349 Goldbach'sconjecture Goodman,Nelson insistedonadescriptionofthephenomenathat wastoincludetheintuitivegraspofthearche- typafformsorshapesunderlyingalldevelop- mentinnature.Seealsopantheism,spinoza. G.Z. Goldbach'sconjecture.Seechoicesequence. goldenmean.Seearistotle. Goldman,Alvinl(ra)(b.1938),Americanphi- losopherwhohasmadenotablecontributionsto actiontheory,naturalisticandsocialepistemol- ogy,philosophyofmind,andcognitivescience. Hehaspersistentlyurgedtherelevanceofcog- nitiveandsocialsciencetoproblemsinepiste- mology,metaphysics,thephilosophyofmind, andethics.ATheoryofHumanAction(1970)pro- posesacausaltheoryofaction,describesthe generativestructureofbasicandnon-basic action,andarguesforthecompatibilityoffree willanddeterminism.In"Epistemics:The RegulativeTheoryofCognition"(1978),he arguedthattraditionalepistemologyshouldbe replacedby'epistemics',whichdiffersfromtra- ditionalepistemologyincharacterizingknowl- edge,justifiedbelief,andrationalbeliefinlight ofempiricalcognitivescience.Traditionalepiste- mologyhasusedacoarse-grainednotionof belief,takentoorestrictiveaviewofcognitive methods,offeredadviceforidealcognizers ratherthanforhumanbeingswithlimitedcog- nitiveresources,andignoredflawsinourcogni- tivesystemthatmustberecognizedifcognition istobeimproved.Epistemologistsmustattend totheresultsofcognitivescienceiftheyareto remedythesedeficienciesintraditionalepiste- mology.Goldmanlåterdevelopedepistemicsin EpistemologyandCognition(1986),inwhichhe developedahistorical,reliabilisttheoryof knowledgeandepistemicjustificationand employedempiricalcognitivesciencetocharac- terizeknowledge,evaluateskepticism,and assesshumancognitiveresources.InLiaisons: PhilosophyMeetstheCognitiveandSocialSciences (1992)andinKnowledgeinaSocialWorld(1999), hedefendedandelaboratedaveritistic(i.e., truth-oriented)evaluationofcommunalbelief- profiles,socialinstitutions,andsocialpractices (e.g.,thepracticeofrestrictingevidenceadmis- sibleinajurytrial).Hehasopposedthewidely acceptedviewthatmentalstatesarefunctional states("ThePsychologyofFolkPsychology," BehavioralandBrainSciences,1993)anddefended asimulationtheoryofmentalstateattribution, onwhichoneattributesmentalstatestoanother byimaginingwhatmentalstateonewouldbein ifonewereintheother'ssituation("InDefense oftheSimulationTheory,"1992).Hehasalso arguedthatcognitivesciencebearsonethicsby providinginformationrelevanttothenatureof moralevaluation,moralchoice,andhedonic statesassociatedwiththegood(e.g.,happiness) ("EthicsandCognitiveScience,"1993).Seealso ACTIONTHEORY,COGNITIVESCIENCE,EPISTE- MOLOGY,RELIABILISM,SIMULATIONTHEORY, SOCIALEPISTEMOLOGY.F.F.S. good.Seeethics. good,common.Seecommongood. good-makingcharacteristic,acharacteristicthat makeswhateverismtrinsicallyorinherently good,good.Hedonistsholdthatpleasureand conducingtopleasurearethesolegood-making characteristics.Pluralistsholdthatthosecharac- teristicsareonlysomeamongmanyothergood- makingcharacteristics,whichinclude,forin- stance,knowledge,friendship,beauty,andact- ingfromasenseofduty.Seealsoethics, hedonism.B.R. Goodman,Nelson(1906-98),Americanphi- losopherwhomadeseminalcontributionsto metaphysics,epistemology,andaesthetics.Like Quine,Goodmanrepudiatesanalyticityandkin- drednotions.Goodman'sworkcanbereadasa seriesofinvestigationsintohowtodophilosophy withoutthem.Acentralconcernishowsymbols structurefactsandourunderstandingofthem. TheStructureofAppearance(1952)presents Goodman'sconstructionalism.Pretheoretical beliefsarevagueandmutuallyinconsistent.By devisinganinterpretedformålsystemthat derivesthemfromorexplicatesthemintermsof suitableprimitives,webringthemintological contact,eliminateinconsistencies,anddisclose unanticipatedlogicalandtheoreticalconnec- tions.Multiple,divergentsystemsdojusticeto thesamepretheoreticalbeliefs.Allsystemssatis- fyingourcriteriaofadequacyareequallyaccept- able.Nothingfavörsanyoneofthemöverthe others.WaysofWorldmaking(1978)providesa lessformåltreatmentofthesamethemes. Categoryschemesdictatecriteriaofidentityfor theirobjects.Somutuallyirreduciblecategory schemesdonottreatofthesamethings.Sincea worldconsistsofthethingsitcomprises,irre- ducibleschemesmarkoutdifferentworlds.There are,Goodmanconcludes,manyworldsifany. Inasmuchasthecategoriesthatdefineidentity 350 Gorgias GraciånyMorales,Baltasar conditionsonobjectsarehumanconstructs,we makeworlds. LanguagesofArt(1968)arguesthatart,likesci- ence,makesandrevealsworlds.Aestheticsisthe branchofepistemologythatinvestigatesart's cognitivefunctions.Goodmananalyzesthesyn- tacticandsemanticstructuresofsymbolsystems, bothliteralandfigurative,andshowshowthey advanceunderstandinginartandelsewhere. Fact,Fiction,andForecast(f954)posesthenewrid- dleofinduction.Anitemisgrueifandonlyifitis examinedbeforefuturetimetandfoundtobe greenorisnotsoexaminedandisblue.Allhith- ertoexaminedemeraldsarebothgreenandgrue. Whatjustifiesourexpectingfutureemeraldsto begreen,notgrue?Inductivevaliditytheriddle demonstrates,dependsonthecharacterizationas wellastheclassificationoftheevidenceclass. 'Green'ispreferable,Goodmanmaintains,be- causeitisentrenchedininductivepractice.This doesnotguaranteethatinferencesusing'green' willyieldtruths.Nothingguaranteesthat.But entrenchedpredicatesarepragmaticallyadvan- tageous,becausetheymeshwithourhabitsof thoughtandothercognitiveresources.Good- man^otherworksincludeProblemsandProjects (1972),OfMindandOtherMatters(1984),andRe- conceptions(1988),writtenwithCatherineZ. Elgin. Seealsoaesthetics,analytic-syn- THETICDISTINCTION,GRUEPARADOX.C.Z.E. Gorgias(c.483-c.376b.c),GreekSophist.A teacherofrhetoricfromLeontiniinSyracuse, GorgiascametoAthensin427b.c.asanambas- sadörfromhiscityandcausedasensationwith hisartfuloratory.Heisknownthroughrefer- encesandshortquotationsinlåterwriters,and throughafewsurvivingtexts-twospeeches andaphilosophicaltreatise.Hetaughtarhetor- icalstylemuchimitatedinantiquity,bydeliver- ingmodelspeechestopayingaudiences.Unlike otherSophistshedidnotgiveformålinstruction inothertopics,norprepareaformålrhetorical manual. Hewasknowntohavehadviewsonlanguage, onthenatureofreality,andonvirtue.Gorgias's stylewasremarkableforitsuseofpoeticdevices suchasrhyme,meter,andelegantwords,aswell asforitsdependenceonartificialparallelismand balancedantithesis.Hissurvivingspeeches, defensesofHelenandPalamedes,displayarange ofargumentsthatrelyheavilyonwhatthe ancientscalledeikos('likelihood'or'probabil- ity').Gorgiasmaintainedinhis"Helen"thata speechcancompelitsaudiencetoaction;else- whereheremarkedthatinthetheateritiswiser tobedeceivedthannot. Gorgias'sshortbookOnNature(orOnWhatIs Not)survivesintwoparaphrases,onebySextus Empiricusandtheother(nowconsideredmore reliable)inanAristotelianwork,OnMelissus, Xenophanes,andGorgias.Gorgiasarguedforthree theses:thatnothingexists;thatevenifitdid,it couldnotbeknown;andthatevenifitcouldbe known,itcouldnotbecommunicated.Although thismaybeinpartaparody,mostscholarsnow takeittobeaseriousphilosophicalargumentin itsownright.Inethics,PlatoreportsthatGorgias thoughtthereweredifferentvirtuesformenand forwomen,athesisAristotledefendsinthePol- itics. Seealsosophists.P.Wo. GöttingenSchool.Seeneo-kantianism. grace,efficacious.SeeARNAULD. GraciänyMorales,Baltasar(1601-58),Spanish writer,moralist,andaleadingliterarytheoristof theSpanishbaroque.BorninBelmonte,he enteredtheJesuitorderin1619andbecamerec- toroftheJesuitCollegeatTarragonaanda favoriteofKingPhilipIII.Graciån'smostimpor- tantworksareAgudezayartedeingenio("TheArt ofWorldlyWisdom,"1642-48)andElcriticån ("TheCritic,"1651-57).Thefirstprovidesphilo- sophicalsupportforconceptismo,aSpanishliter- arymovementthatsoughttocreatenew conceptsthroughthedevelopmentofanelabo- ratestyle,characterizedbysubtlety(agudeza) andingeniousliteraryartifices.Elcriticån,written intheconceptiststyle,isaphilosophicalnovel thatpessimisticallycriticizestheevilsofciviliza- tion.GraciånanticipatesRousseau'snoblesav- ageinclaimingthat,althoughhumanbeingsare fundamentallygoodinthestateofnature,they arecorruptedbycivilization.Echoingacommon themeofSpanishthoughtatthetime,heattrib- utesthenefariousinfluenceofcivilizationtothe confusionitcreatesbetweenappearanceand reality.ButGraciån'spessimismistemperedby faith:manhashopeintheafterlife,whenreality isfinallyrevealed. Graciånwroteseveralotherinfluentialbooks. InElhéroe("TheHero,"1637)andElpolitico ("ThePolitician,"1640),hefollowsMachiavelli indiscussingtheattributesoftheidealprince;El discreto("TheManofDiscretion,"1646)explores theidealgentleman,asjudgedbySpanishsoci- ety.MostofGraciån'sbookswerepublished underpseudonymstoavoidcensurebyhisorder. 351 grammar grammar AmongauthorsoutsideSpainwhousedhisideas areNietzsche,Schopenhauer,Voltaire,and Rousseau.J.J.E.G. grammar,asystemofrulesspecifyingalanguage. Thetermhasoftenbeenusedsynonymously with'syntax',theprinciplesgoverningthecon- structionofsentencesfromwords(perhapsalso includingthesystemsofwordderivationand inflection-casemarkings,verbaltensemarkers, andthelike).Inmodernlinguisticusagethe termmoreoftenencompassesothercomponents ofthelanguagesystemsuchasphonologyand semanticsaswellassyntax.Traditionalgram- marsthatwemayhaveencounteredinour schooldays,e.g.,thegrammarsofLatinorEng- lish,weretypicallyfragmentaryandoftenpre- scriptive-basicallyaselectivecatalogofforms andsentencepattems,togetherwithconstruc- tionstobeavoided.Contemporarylinguistic grammars,ontheotherhand,aimtobedescrip- tive,andevenexplanatory,i.e.,embeddedwithin ageneraltheorythatoffersprincipledreasonsfor whynaturallanguagesarethewaytheyare.This isinaccordwiththegenerallyacceptedviewof linguisticsasasciencethatregardshumanlan- guageasanaturalphenomenontobeunder- stood,justasphysicistsattempttomakesenseof theworldofphysicalobjects. SincethepublicationofSyntacticStructures (1957)andAspectsoftheTheoryofSyntax(1965)by NoamChomsky,grammarshavebeenalmost universallyconceivedofasgenerativedevices,i.e., preciselyformulateddeductivesystems-com- monlycalledgenerativegrammars-specifying allandonlythewell-formedsentencesofalan- guagetogetherwithaspecificationoftheirrele- vantstructuralproperties.Onthisview,a grammarofEnglishhasthecharacterofatheory oftheEnglishlanguage,withthegrammatical sentences(andtheirstructures)asitstheorems andthegrammarrulesplayingtheroleofthe rulesofinference.Likeanyempiricaltheory,itis subjecttodisconfirmationifitspredictionsdonot agreewiththefacts-if,e.g.,thegrammar impliesthat'whiteorsnowtheis'isawell- formedsentenceorthat'Thesnowiswhite'is not. Theobjectofthistheoryconstructionisto modelthesystemofknowledgepossessedby thosewhoareabletospeakandunderstandan unlimitednumberofnovelsentencesofthelan- guagespecified.Thus,agrammarinthissenseisa psychologicalentity-acomponentofthehu- manmind-andthetaskoflinguistics(avowedly amentalisticdiscipline)istodetermineexactlyof whatthisknowledgeconsists.Likeothermental phenomena,itisnotobservabledirectlybutonly throughitseffects.Thus,underlyinglinguistic competenceistobedistinguishedfromactuallin- guisticperformance,whichformspartoftheevi- dencefortheformerbutisnotnecessarilyan accuratereflectionofit,containing,asitdoes, errors,falsestarts,etc.Acentralproblemishow thiscompetencearisesintheindividual,i.e.,how agrammarisinferredbyachildonthebasisofa finite,variable,andimperfectsampleofutter- ancesencounteredinthecourseofnormaldevel- opment.Manysortsofobservationsstrongly suggestthatgrammarsarenotconstructedde novoentirelyonthebasisofexperience,andthe viewiswidelyheldthatthechildbringstothe taskasignificant,geneticallydeterminedpredis- positiontoconstructgrammarsaccordingtoa well-definedpattern.Ifthisisso,andsinceappar- entlynoonelanguagehasanadvantageöverany otherinthelearningprocess,thisinborncompo- nentoflinguisticcompetencecanbecorrectly termedauniversalgrammar.Itrepresentswhat- everthegrammarsofallnaturallanguages, actualorpotential,necessarilyhaveincommon becauseoftheinnatelinguisticcompetenceof humanbeings.Theapparentdiversityofnatural languageshasoftenledtoaseriousunderestima- tionofthescopeofuniversalgrammar. Oneofthemostinfluentialproposalsconcern- ingthenatureofuniversalgrammarwas Chomsky'stheoryoftransformationalgrammar.In thisframeworkthesyntacticstructureofasen- tenceisgivennotbyasingleobject(e.g.,aparse tree,asinphrasestructuregrammar),butratherby asequenceoftreesconnectedbyoperations calledtransformations.Theinitialtreeinsucha sequenceisspecified(generated)byaphrase structuregrammar,togetherwithalexicon,and isknownasthedeepstructure.Thefinaltreeinthe sequence,thesurfacestructure,containsthemor- phemes(meaningfulunits)ofthesentenceinthe orderinwhichtheyarewrittenorpronounced. Forexample,theEnglishsentences'Johnhitthe ball'anditspassivecounterpart'Theballwashit byJohn'mightbederivedfromthesamedeep structure(inthiscaseatreelookingverymuch likethesurfacestructurefortheactivesentence) exceptthattheoptionaltransformationalruleof passivizationhasbeenappliedinthederivation ofthelattersentence.Thisrulerearrangesthe constituentsofthetreeinsuchawaythat,among otherchanges,thedirectobject('theball')in deepstructurebecomesthesurface-structure subjectofthepassivesentence.Itisthusan importantfeatureofthistheorythatgrammatical 352 grammar,categorial Gramsci,Antonio relationssuchassubject,object,etc,ofasen- tencearenotabsolutebutarerelativetothelevel ofstructure.Thisaccountsforthefactthatmany sentencesthatappearsuperficiallysimilarin structure(e.g.,'Johniseasytoplease','Johnis eagertoplease')arenonethelessperceivedas havingdifferentunderlying(deep-structure) grammaticalrelations.Indeed,itwasarguedthat anytheoryofgrammarthatfailedtomake adeep-structure/surface-structuredistinction couldnotbeadequate. Contemporarylinguistictheorieshave, nonetheless,tendedtowardminimizingthe importanceofthetransformationalruleswith correspondingelaborationoftheroleofthelex- iconandtheprinciplesthatgoverntheoperation ofgrammarsgenerally.Theoriessuchasgeneral- izedphrase-structuregrammarandlexicalfunc- tiongrammarpostulatenotransformational rulesatallandcapturetherelatednessofpairs suchasactiveandpassivesentencesinother ways.Chomsky'sprinciplesandparameters approach(1981)reducesthetransformational componenttoasinglegeneralmovementoper- ationthatiscontrolledbythesimultaneous interactionofanumberofprinciplesorsubthe- ories:binding,govemment,control,etc.The universalcomponentofthegrammaristhus enlargedandthecontributionoflanguage- specificrulesiscorrespondinglydiminished.Pro- ponentspointtotheadvantagesthiswouldallow inlanguageacquisition.Presumablyaconsider- ableportionofthetaskofgrammarconstruction wouldconsistmerelyinsettingthevaluesofa smallnumberofparametersthatcouldberead- ilydeterminedonthebasisofasmallnumberof instancesofgrammaticalsentences. Aratherdifferentapproachthathasbeen influentialhasarisenfromtheworkofRichard Montague,whoappliedtonaturallanguagesthe sametechniquesofmodeltheorydevelopedfor logicallanguagessuchasthepredicatecalculus. Thisso-calledMontaguegrammarusesacategorial grammarasitssyntacticcomponent.Inthisform ofgrammar,complexlexicalandphrasalcate- goriescanbeoftheformA/B.Typicallysuchcat- egoriescombinebyakindof"cancellation"rule: A/B+B—>A(somethingofcategoryA/Bcom- bineswithsomethingofcategoryBtoyield somethingofcategoryA).Inaddition,thereisa closecorrespondencebetweenthesyntacticcat- egoryofanexpressionanditssemantictype;e.g., commonnounssuchas'book'and'girl'areof typee/t,andtheirsemanticvaluesarefunctions fromindividuals(entities,ore-typethings)to truth-values(T-typethings),orequivalently,sets ofindividuals.Theresultisanexplicit,inter- lockingsyntaxandsemanticsspecifyingnotonly thesyntacticstructureofgrammaticalsentences butalsotheirtruthconditions.Montague'swork wasembeddedinhisownviewofuniversal grammar,whichhasnot,byandlarge,proven persuasivetolinguists.Agreatdealofattention hasbeengiveninrecentyearstomergingthe undoubtedvirtuesofMontaguegrammarwitha linguisticallymorepalatableviewofuniversal grammar. Seealsochomsky,logicalform,pars- ING,PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE.R.E.W. grammar,categorial.Seegrammar. grammar,Montague.Seegrammar. grammar,transformational.Seegrammar. grammar,universal.Seegrammar. grammaticalform.Seelogicalform. grammaticalityintuitions.Seeintuition. grammaticalpredicate.Seelogicalsubject. grammaticalsubject.Seelogicalsubject. Gramsci,Antonio(1891-1937),Italianpolitical leaderwhoseimprisonmentbytheFascistsfor hisinvolvementwiththeItalianCommunist Partyhadtheironicalresultofsparinghimfrom Stalinismandenablinghimtobetterarticulate hisdistinctivepoliticalphilosophy.In1917he welcomedtheBolshevikRevolutionasa"revo- lutionagainstCapital"ratherthanagainstcapi- talism:asarevolutionrefutingthedeterministic Marxismaccordingtowhichsocialismcould ariseonlybythegradualevolutionofcapitalism, andconfirmingthepossibilityoftheradical transformationofsocialinstitutions.In1921he supportedcreationoftheItalianCommunist Party;asitsgeneralsecretaryfrom1924,hetried toreorganizeitalongmoredemocraticlines.In 1926theFascistsoutlawedalloppositionparties. Gramscispenttherestofhislifeinvariouspris- ons,wherehewrotemorethanathousandpages ofnotesrangingfromafewlinestochapter- lengthessays.ThesePrisonNotebooksposea majorinterpretivechallenge,buttheyreveala keen,insightful,andopenmindgrapplingwith importantsocialandpoliticalproblems. Themostcommoninterpretationstemsfrom PalmiroTogliatti,Gramsci'ssuccessorasleaderof 353 greatchainofbeing GregoryofNyssa theItalianCommunists.AfterthefallofFascism andtheendofWorldWarII,Togliattireadinto Gramscitheso-calledItalianroadtosocialism:a strategyforattainingthetraditionalMarxist goalsoftheclasslesssocietyandthenationaliza- tionofthemeansofproductionbycultural means,suchaseducationandpersuasion.In contrasttoBolshevism,onehadtofirstconquer socialinstitutions,andthentheircontrolwould yieldthedesiredeconomicandpoliticalchanges. ThisdemocratictheoryofMarxistrevolution waslongregardedbymanyasespeciallyrelevant toWesternindustrialsocieties,andsoforthis andotherreasonsGramsciisakeyfigureof WesternMarxism.Thesametheoryisoften calledGramsci'stheoryofhegemony,referring toarelationshipbetweentwopoliticalunits whereonedominatestheotherwiththeconsent ofthatother. Thisinterpretationwasapoliticalreconstruc- tion,basedprimarilyonGramsci'sCommunist involvementandonhighlyselectivepassages fromtheNotebooks.Itwasalsobasedonexag- geratingtheinfluenceonGramsciofMarx, Engels,Lenin,andGentile,andminimizing influenceslikeCroce,Mosca,Machiavelli,and Hegel.Nonewconsensushasemergedyet;it wouldhavetobebasedonanalyticalandhis- toricalspadeworkbarelybegun.Onemaininter- pretiveissueiswhetherGramsci,besides questioningthemeans,wasalsoledtoquestion theendsoftraditionalMarxism.Inoneview,his commitmenttorationalpersuasion,political realism,methodologicalfallibilism,democracy, andpluralismismuchdeeperthanhisinclina- tionstowardtheclasslesssociety,theabolitionof privateproperty,thebureaucraticallycentral- izedparty,andthelike;inparticular,hisplural- ismisanaspectofhiscommitmenttothe dialecticasawayofthinking,aconcepthe adaptedfromHegelthroughCroce. Seealsomarxism.M.A.F. greatchainofbeing.Seeprincipleofplenitude. greatesthappinessprinciple.Seeutilitarianism. GreatLearning.Seeta-hsueh. GreekSkepticism.Seeskeptics. Green,T(homas)H(ill)(1836-82),British absoluteidealistandsocialphilosopher.Theson ofaclergyman,Greenstudiedandtaughtat Oxford.Hiscentralconcernwastoresolvewhat hesawasthespiritualcrisisofhisagebyanalyz- ingknowledgeandmoralityinwaysinspiredby KantandHegel.Inhislengthyintroductionto Hume'sTreatise,hearguedthatHumehadshown knowledgeandmoralitytobeimpossibleon empiricistprinciples.Inhismajorwork,Prole- gomenatoEthics(1883),Greencontendedthat thoughtimposedrelationsonsensoryfeelings andimpulses(whosesourcewasaneternalcon- sciousness)toconstituteobjectsofknowledge andofdesire.Furthermore,inactingondesires, rationalagentsseekthesatisfactionofaselfthat isrealizedthroughtheirownactions.This requiresrationalagentstoliveinharmony amongthemselvesandhencetoactmorally.In LecturesonthePrinciplesofPoliticalObligation (1885)Greentransformedclassicalliberalismby arguingthateventhoughthestatehasnointrin- sicvalue,itsinterventioninsocietyisnecessary toprovidetheconditionsthatenablerational beingstoachieveself-satisfaction.Seealso HUME,IDEALISM,POLITICALPHILOSOPHY. J.W.A. GregoryI,Saint,calledGregorytheGreat (c.540-604),apopeandRomanpoliticalleader. Bornapatrician,hewaseducatedforpublic officeandbecameprefectofRomein570.In579, hewasappointedpapalrepresentativeinCon- stantinople,returningtoRomeascounselorto PopePelagiusIIin586.HewaselectedPope GregoryIin590.WhentheLombardsattacked Romein594,Gregoryboughtthemoff.Con- stantinoplewouldneithercedenordefendItaly, andGregorysteppedinassecularrulerofwhat becamethePapalStates.Heassertedtheuniver- saljurisdictionofthebishopofRome,and claimedpatriarchyoftheWest.Hiswritings includeimportantletters;theMoralia,anexposi- tionoftheBookofJobsummarizingChristian theology;PastoralCare,whichdefinedtheduties oftheclergyfortheMiddleAges;andDialogues, whichdealschieflywiththeimmortalityofthe soul,holdingitcouldenterheavenimmediately withoutawaitingtheLastJudgment.His thought,largelyAugustinian,isunoriginal,but wasmuchquotedintheMiddleAges.Seealso AUGUSTINE.J.LO. GregoryofNyssa,Saint(335-98),Greektheolo- gianandmysticwhotriedtoreconcilePlatonism withChristianity.AsbishopofCappadociain easternAsiaMinor,hechampionedorthodoxy andwasprominentattheFirstCouncilofCon- stantinople.HerelatedthedoctrineoftheTrin- itytoPlato'sideasoftheOneandtheMany.He followedOrigeninbelievingthatman'smaterial 354 GregoryofRimini Grosseteste,Robert naturewasduetothefallandinbelievinginthe Apocatastasis,theuniversalrestorationofall souls,includingSatan's,inthekingdomofGod. Seealsoapocatastasis,origen.L.P.P. GregoryofRimini(c.f300-58),Italianphiloso- pherandmonk.HestudiedinItaly,England,and France,andtaughtattheuniversitiesofBologna, Padua,Perugia,andParisbeforebecomingprior generaloftheHermitsofSt.Augustineinhis nativecityofRimini,abouteighteenmonths beforehedied. Gregoryearnedthehonorifictitle"the AuthenticDoctor"becausehewasconsideredby manyofhiscontemporariestobeafaithfulinter- preterofAugustine,andthusadefenderoftra- dition,inthemidstoftheskepticismofOckham andhisdisciplesregardingwhatcouldbeknown innaturalphilosophyandtheology.Thus,inhis commentaryonBooksIandIIofPeterLom- bard'sSentences,Gregoryrejectedtheviewthat becauseofGod'somnipotencehecandoany- thingandisthereforeunknowableinhisnature andhisways.Gregoryalsomaintainedthatafter Adam'sfallfromrighteousness,menneed,in conjunctionwiththeirfreewill,God'shelp (grace)toperformmorallygoodactions. Innon-religiousmattersGregoryisusually associatedwiththetheoryofthecomplexesignifi- cabile,accordingtowhichtheobjectofknowl- edgeacquiredbyscientificproofisneitheran objectexistingoutsidethemind,noraword(sim- plex)oraproposition(complexum),butratherthe complexesignificabile,thatwhichistotallyandade- quatelysignifiedbythepropositionexpressedin theconclusionoftheproofinquestion. Seealsocomplexesignificabile.G.S. Grelling'sparadox.Seeset-theoreticparadoxes. Grice,H.P(aul)(1913-88),Englishphilosopher whoseearlyworkconcernedperceptionandphi- losophyoflanguage,andwhosemostinfluential contributionwastheconceptofaconversa- tionalimplicatureandtheassociatedtheoretical machineryofconversationalpostulates.Thecon- ceptofaconversationalimplicaturewasfirstused inhis1961paperonthecausaltheoryofrefer- ence.Gricedistinguishedbetweenthemeaning ofthewordsusedinasentenceandwhatis impliedbythespeaker'schoiceofwords.Ifsome- onesays"Itlooksasifthereisamailboxinfront ofme,"thechoiceofwordsimpliesthatthereis somedoubtaboutthemailbox.But,Grice argued,thatisamatterofwordchoiceandthe sentenceitselfdoesnotimplythatthereisdoubt. Theterm'conversationalimplicature'was introducedinGrice'sWilliamJameslecturesin 1968(publishedin1988)andusedtodefendthe useofthematerialconditionalasalogicaltrans- lationof'if-then'. WithStrawson("InDefenceofDogma"),Grice gaveaspiriteddefenseoftheanalytic-synthetic distinctionagainstQuine'scriticisms.Insubse- quentsystematicpapersGriceattempted,among otherthings,togiveatheoreticalgroundingof thedistinction. ThoughGrice'searlierworkwaspartofthe Oxfordordinarylanguagetradition,in1968he movedtoBerkeley,andhislåterworkwasmore formålandtheoretical.Inhislastdecade,hecon- centratedmoreonmetaphysics,especiallythe conceptofabsolutevalue. Seealsoanalytic-syntheticdistinc- tion,IMPLICATURE,ORDINARYLANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY.R.E.G. Groot,Huighde.Seegrotius. Grosseteste,Robert(cl168-1253),Englishthe- ologianwhobeganlifeonthebottomrungof feudalsocietyinSuffolkandbecameoneofthe mostinfluentialphilosophersinpre-Reforma- tionEngland.HestudiedatOxford,becominga masterofartsbetween1186and1189.Some- timeafterthisperiodhejoinedthehouseholdof WilliamdeVere,bishopofHereford.Grosseteste mayhavebeenassociatedwiththelocalcathe- dralschoolinHereford,severalofwhosemem- berswerepartofarelativelyadvancedscientific tradition.Itwasacenterforthestudyofnatural scienceandastrologyaswellasliberalartsand theology.Ifso,thiswouldexplain,atleastin part,hislifelonginterestinworkinnaturalphi- losophy.Between1209and1214Grosseteste becameamasteroftheology,probablyinParis. In1221hebecamethefirstchancellorofOxford. From1229to1235hewassecularlecturerin theologytotherecentlyestablishedFranciscan orderatOxford.Itwasduringhistenurewiththe FranciscansthathestudiedGreek-anunusual endeavorforamedievalschoolman.Hespent thelasteighteenyearsofhislifeasbishopofLin- coln. Asauniversityscholar,Grossetestewasan originalthinkerwhousedAristotelianand Augustinianthesesaspointsofdeparture.He believed,withAristotle,thatsenseknowledgeis thebasisofallknowledge,andthatthebasisfor senseknowledgeisourdiscoveryofthecauseof whatisexperiencedorrevealedbyexperiment. Healsobelieved,withAugustine,thatlightplays 355 Grotius,Hugo grueparadox animportantroleincreation.Thushemain- tainedthatGodproducedtheworldbyfirstcre- atingprimematterfromwhichissuedapointof light(lux),thefirstcorporealformorpower,one ofwhosemanifestationsisvisiblelight.Thedif- fusionofthislightresultedinextensionortridi- mensionalityintheformofthenineconcentric celestialspheresandthefourterrestrialspheres offire,air,water,andearth.AccordingtoGrosse- teste,thediffusionoflighttakesplaceinaccor- dancewithlawsofmathematicalproportionality (geometry).Everything,therefore,isamanifes- tationoflight,andmathematicsisconsequently indispensabletoscienceandknowledgegener- ally.TheprinciplesGrossetesteemploystosup- porthisviewsarepresentedin,e.g.,his commentaryonAristotle'sPosteriorAnalytics,the Deluce("OfLight"),andtheDelineis,angulisetfig- uris("OfLines,Angles,andFigures").Heworked inareasasseeminglydisparateasopticsand angelology. Grossetestewasoneofthefirsttotakean interestinandintroduceintotheOxfordcur- riculumnewlyrecoveredAristoteliantexts- someofwhichhetranslated,alongwithGreek commentariesonthem.Hisworkandinterestin naturalphilosophy,mathematics,theBible,and languagesprofoundlyinfluencedhisyounger contemporary,RogerBacon,andtheeducational goalsoftheFranciscanorder.Italsohelpedto stimulateworkintheseareasduringthefour- teenthcentury. Seealsocommentariesonaristotle. G.S. Grotius,Hugo,inDutch,HuighdeGroot(1583- 1645),Dutchhumanist,afounderofmodern viewsofinternationallawandamajortheorist ofnaturallaw.AlawyerandLatinist,Grotius developedanewviewofthelawofnaturein ordertocombatmoralskepticismandtoshow howtherecouldberationalsettlementofmoral disputesdespitereligiousdisagreements.He arguedinTheLawofWarandPeace(1625)that humansarenaturallybothcompetitiveand sociable.Thelawsofnatureshowushowwecan livetogetherdespiteourpropensitytoconflict. Theycanbederivedfromobservationofour natureandsituation.Theselawsreflectthefact thateachindividualpossessesrights,which delimitthesocialspacewithinwhichwearefree topursueourowngoals.Legitimategovernment ariseswhenwegiveupsomerightsinorderto saveorimproveourlives.Theobligationsthat thelawsofnatureimposewouldbindus,Grotius notoriouslysaid,evenifGoddidnotexist;buthe heldthatGoddoesenforcethelaws.Theysetthe limitsonthelawsthatgovernmentsmaylegiti- matelyimpose.Thelawsofnaturereflectour possessionofbothpreciseperfectrightsofjus- tice,whichcanbeprotectedbyforce,andimper- fectrights,whicharenotenforceable,noreven statableveryprecisely.Grotius'sviewsonour combativebutsociablenature,onthefunctionof thelawofnature,andonperfectandimperfect rightswereofcentralimportanceinlåterdiscus- sionsofmoralityandlaw.Seealsonatural LAW,RIGHTS.J.B.S. groundrule.Seethema. grueparadox,aparadoxinthetheoryofinduc- tion,accordingtowhicheveryintuitivelyaccept- ableinductiveargument,A,maybemimickedby indefinitelymanyotherinductivearguments- eachseeminglyquiteanalogoustoAandthere- foreseeminglyasacceptable,yeteachnonethe- lessintuitivelyunacceptable,andeachyieldinga conclusioncontradictorytothatofA,giventhe assumptionthatsufficientlymanyandvariedof thesortofthingsinduceduponexistasyetunex- amined(whichistheonlycircumstanceinwhich Aisofinterest).Supposethefollowingisanintu- itivelyacceptableinductiveargument:(AAAll hithertoobservedemeraldsaregreen;therefore, allemeraldsaregreen.Nowintroducethecolor- predicate'grue',where(forsomegiven,asyet whollyfuture,temporalintervalT)anobjectis grueprovidedithasthepropertyofbeingeither greenandfirstexaminedbeforeT,orblueand notfirstexaminedbeforeT.Thenconsiderthe followinginductiveargument:(A7)Allhitherto observedemeraldsaregrue;therefore,allemer- aldsaregrue.Thepremiseistrue,andA2isfor- mallyanalogoustoA1.ButA2isintuitively unacceptable;ifthereareemeraldsunexamined beforeT,thentheconclusionofA2saysthat theseemeraldsareblue,whereastheconclusion ofAsaysthattheyaregreen. Othercounterintuitivecompetingarguments couldbegiven,e.g.:(A3)Allhithertoobserved emeraldsaregrellow;therefore,allemeraldsare grellow(whereanobjectisgrellowprovideditis greenandlocatedontheearth,oryellowother- wise). Itwouldseem,therefore,thatsomerestriction oninductionisrequired.Thenewriddleof inductionofferstwochallenges.First,statethe restriction-i.e.,demarcatetheintuitivelyaccept- ableinductionsfromtheunacceptableones,in somegeneralway,withoutconstantappealto intuition.Second,justifyourpreferenceforthe 356 Grundnorm guisetheory onegroupofinductionsövertheother.(These twopartsofthenewriddleareoftenconflated. Butitisatleastconceivablethatonemightsolve theanalytical,demarcativepartwithoutsolving thejustificatorypart,and,perhaps,viceversa.) Itwillnotdotoruleout,apriori,"gruelike" (nowcommonlycalled"gruesome")variancesin nature.Water(pureH20)variesinitsphysical statealongtheparameteroftemperature.Ifso, whymightnotemeraldsvaryincoloralongthe parameteroftimeoffirstexamination? Oneapproachtotheproblemofrestrictionis tofocusontheconclusionsofinductivearguments (e.g.,Allemeraldsaregreen,Allemeraldsare grue)andtodistinguishthosewhichmaylegiti- matelysoserve(called"projectiblehypotheses") fromthosewhichmaynot.Thequestionthen ariseswhetheronlynon-gruesomehypotheses (thosewhichdonotcontaingruesomepredi- cates)areprojectible.Asidefromthetaskof defining'gruesomepredicate'(whichcouldbe donestructurallyrelativetoapreferredlan- guage),theanswerisno.TheEnglishpredicate 'solidandlessthan0°C,orliquidandmorethan 0°Cbutlessthan100°C,orgaseousandmore than100°Cisgruesomeonanyplausiblestruc- turalaccountofgruesomeness(notethesimilar- itytotheEnglish'grue'equivalent:greenand firstexaminedbeforeT,orblueandnotfirst examinedbeforeT).Nevertheless,wherenon- transitionalwaterispureH2atoneatmosphere ofpressure(savethatwhichisinatransitional state,i.e.,melting/freezingorboiling/condens- ing,i.e.,at0°Cor100°C),wehappilyprojectthe hypothesisthatallnon-transitionalwaterfalls undertheabovegruesomepredicate. Perhapsthisisbecause,ifwerewritethepro- jectionaboutnon-transitionalwaterasacon- junctionofnon-gruesomehypotheses-(i)All wateratlessthan0°Cissolid,(ii)Allwaterat morethan0°Cbutlessthan100°Cisliquid,and (iii)AllwateratmorethanI00°Cisgaseous-we notethat(i)-(iii)areallsupported(thereare knownpositiveinstances);whereasifwerewrite thegruesomeprojectionaboutemeraldsasa conjunctionofnon-gruesomehypotheses-(i*) AllemeraldsfirstexaminedbeforeTaregreen, and(ii*)Allemeraldsnotfirstexaminedbefore Tareblue-wenotethat(ii*)isasyetunsup- ported. Itwouldseemthat,whereasanon-gruesome hypothesisisprojectibleprovideditisunviolated andsupported,agruesomehypothesisispro- jectibleprovideditisunviolatedandequivalent toaconjunctionofnon-gruesomehypotheses, eachofwhichissupported. ThegrueparadoxwasdiscoveredbyNelson Goodman.ItismostfullystatedinhisFact,Fic- tionandForecast(1955). Seealsoproblemofinduction,quali- TATIVEPREDICATE.D.A.J. Grundnorm.Seebasicnorm. guisetheory,asystemdevelopedbyCastanedato resolveanumberofissuesconcerningthecon- tentofthoughtandexperience,includingrefer- ence,identitystatements,intensionalcontexts, predication,existentialclaims,perception, andfictionaldiscourse.Forexample,since(i) Oedipusbelievedthathekilledthemanat thecrossroads,and(ii)themanatthecrossroads washis(Oedipus's)father,itmightseemthat (iii)Oedipusbelievedthathekilledhisfather. Guisetheoryblocksthisderivationbytaking 'was'in(ii)toexpress,notgenuineidentity, butacontingentsamenessrelationbetweeen thedistinctreferentsofthedescriptions.Definite descriptionsaretypicallytreatedasreferential, contrarytoRussell'stheoryofdescriptions, andtheirreferentsareidenticalinbothdirect andindirectdiscourse,contrarytoFrege's semantics. Tosupportthissolution,guisetheoryoffers uniqueaccountsofpredicationandsingularref- erents.Thelatterareindividualguises,which,like FregeansensesandMeinong'sincomplete objects,arethinlyindividuatedaspectsor"slices" ofordinaryobjectsatbest.Everyguiseisastruc- turec{Fl...,FK}wherecisanoperator expressedby'the'inEnglish-transformingaset ofproperties[F...,Fn}intoadistinctconcrete individual,eachpropertybeinganinternalprop- ertyoftheguise.Guiseshaveexternalproperties bystandinginvarioussamenessrelationsto otherguisesthathavethesepropertiesinter- nally.Therearefoursuchrelations,besidesgen- uineidentity,eachanequivalencerelationinits field.Iftheoldestphilosopherhappenstobe wise,e.g.,wisdomisfactuallypredicatedofthe guise'theoldestphilosopher'becauseitiscon- substantiatedwith'theoldestwisephilosopher'. Othersamenessrelationsaccountforfictional predication(consociation)andnecessaryexternal predication(conflation).Existenceisself-consub- stantiation.Anordinaryphysicalobjectis,atany moment,adusterofconsubstantiated(hence, existing)guises,whilecontinuantsareformed throughthetransubstantiationofguiseswithin temporallydistinctdusters.Therearenosub- strates,andwhileeveryguise"subsists,"notall exist,e.g.,theNorseGodofThunder.Theposi- 357 guisetheory guisetheory tionthuspermitsaunifiedaccountofsingular reference. Onetaskforguisetheoryistoexplainhowa "concretized"setofpropertiesdiffersinternally fromamereset.Perhapsguisesarefaconsde penserwhosecoresetsareconcretizediftheir componentpropertiesareconceivedascoinstan- tiated,withnon-existentsanalyzableintermsof thefailureoftheconceivedpropertiestoactually becoinstantiated.However,itisquestionable whetherthisapproachcanachieveallthatCas- tafiedademandsofguisetheory. Seealsocastaneda.practition.T.K. 358 Habermas,Jiirgen(b.1929),Germanphilosopher andsocialtheorist,aleadingrepresentativeof thesecondgenerationoftheFrankfurtSchoolof criticaltheory.Hisworkhasconsistentlyre- turnedtotheproblemofthenormativefounda- tionsofsocialcriticismandcriticalsocialinquiry notsuppliedintraditionalMarxismandother formsofcriticaltheory,suchaspostmodernism. Hishabilitation,TheStructuralTransformationof thePublicSphere(1961),isaninfluentialhistori- calanalysisoftheemergenceoftheidealofa publicsphereintheeighteenthcenturyandits subsequentdecline.Habermastumedthento theproblemsofthefoundationsandmethodol- ogyofthesocialsciences,developingacriticism ofpositivismandhisowninterpretiveexplana- toryapproachinTheLogicoftheSocialSciences (1963)andhisfirstmajorsystematicwork, KnowledgeandHumanInterests(1967). Rejectingtheunityofmethodtypicalofposi- tivism,Habermasarguesthatsocialinquiryis guidedbythreedistinctinterests:incontrol,in understanding,andinemancipation.Heisespe- ciallyconcernedtouseemancipatoryinterestto overcomethelimitationsofthemodelofinquiry basedonunderstandingandarguesagainst"uni- versalityofhermeneutics"(defendedbyher- meneuticistssuchasGadamer)andfortheneed tosupplementinterpretationswithexplanations inthesocialsciences.Ashecametorejectthe psychoanalyticvocabularyinwhichheformu- latedtheinterestinemancipation,heturnedto findingthebasisforunderstandingandsocial inquiryinatheoryofrationalitymoregenerally. Inthenextphaseofhiscareerhedevelopeda comprehensivesocialtheory,culminatinginhis two-volumeTheTheoryofCommunicativeAction (1982).Thegoalofthistheoryistodevelopa ''criticaltheoryofmodernity,"onthebasisofa comprehensivetheoryofcommunicative(as opposedtoinstrumental)rationality.Thefirst volumedevelopsatheoryofcommunicative rationalitybasedon"discourse,"orsecond-order communicationthattakesplacebothinevery- dayinteractionandininstitutionalizedpractices ofargumentationinscience,law,andcriticism. Thistheoryofrationalityemergesfromauni- versalor"formål"pragmatics,aspeechactthe- orybasedonmakingexplicittherulesandnorms ofthecompetencetocommunicateinlinguistic interaction.Thesecondvolumedevelopsadiag- nosisofmodernsocietyassufferingfrom"one- sidedrationalization,"leadingtodisruptionsof thecommunicativelifeworldby"systems"such asmärketsandbureaucracies. Finally,Habermasapplieshisconceptionof rationalitytoissuesofnormativetheory,includ- ingethics,politics,andthelaw."Discourse Ethics:NotesonaProgramofMoralJustifica- tion"(1982)arguesforanintersubjectivenotion ofpracticalreasonanddiscursiveprocedurefor thejustificationofuniversalnorms.This"dis- courseprinciple"providesadialogicalversionof Kanfsideaofuniversalization;anormisjustified ifandonlyifitcanmeetwiththereasoned agreementofallthoseaffected.BetweenFactsand Norms(1992)combineshissocialandnormative theoriestogiveasystematicaccountoflawand democracy.Hiscontributionhereisanaccount ofdeliberativedemocracyappropriatetothe complexityofmodemsociety.Hisworkinallof thesephasesprovidesasystematicdefenseand critiqueofmoderninstitutionsandavindication oftheuniversalclaimsofpublicpracticalreason. Seealsocriticaltheory,Frankfurt SCHOOL,HERMENEUTICS.J.B. haecceity(fromLatinhaec,'this'),(1)loosely, thisness;morespecifically,anirreduciblecate- goryofbeing,thefundamentalactualityofan existententity;or(2)anindividualessence,a propertyanobjecthasnecessarily,without whichitwouldnotbeorwouldceasetoexistas theindividualitis,andwhich,necessarily,no otherobjecthas.Thereareinthehistoryofphi- losophytwodistinctconceptsofhaecceity.The ideaoriginatedwiththeworkofthethirteenth- centuryphilosopherDunsScotus,andwasdis- cussedinthesameperiodbyAquinas,asa positiveperfectionthatservesasaprimitive existenceandindividuationprincipleforcon- creteexistents.Intheseventeenthcentury Leibniztransformedtheconceptofhaecceity, whichDunsScotushadexplicitlydeniedtobea formoruniversal,intothenotionofanindivid- ualessence,adistinctivenatureorsetofneces- sarycharacteristicsuniquelyidentifyingitunder theprincipleoftheidentityofindiscernibles. 359 Haeckel,Ernst Hamilton,William DunsScotus'shaecceitasappliesonlytothebeing ofcontingentlyexistententitiesintheactual world,butLeibnizextendstheprincipletoindi- viduateparticularthingsnotonlythroughthe changestheymayundergointheactualworld, butinanyalternativelogicallypossibleworld. Leibnizadmittedasaconsequencethecontro- versialthesisthateveryobjectbyvirtueofits haecceityhaseachofitspropertiesessentiallyor necessarily,sothatonlythecounterpartsofindi- vidualscaninhabitdistinctlogicallypossible worlds.Afurthercorollary-sincetheposses- sionofparticularpartsinaparticulararrange- mentisalsoapropertyandhenceinvolvedin theindividualessenceofanycomplexobject-is thedoctrineofmereologicalessentialism:every compositeisnecessarilyconstitutedbyapartic- ularconfigurationofparticularproperparts,and lösesitsself-identityifanypartsareremovedor replaced.Seealsodunsscotus,essential- ism,IDENTITYOFINDISCERNIBLES,META- PHYSICS.D.J. Haeckel,Ernst(1834-1919),Germanzoologist, animpassionedadherentofDarwin'stheoryof evolution.HispopulärworkDieWelträtsel(The RiddleoftheUniverse,1899)becameabest-seller andwasveryinfluentialinitstime.Leninissaid tohaveadmiredit.Haeckel'sphilosophy,which hecalledmonism,ischaracterizednegatively byhisrejectionoffreewill,immortality,and theism,aswellashiscriticismsofthetraditional formsofmaterialismandidealism.Positively itisdistinguishedbypassionatearguments forthefundamentalunityoforganicand inorganicnatureandaformofpantheism. M.K. Ha-Levi,Judah(c.1075-1141),SpanishJewish philosopherandpoet.BorninToledo,hestudied biblicalandrabbinicalliteratureaswellasphi- losophy.HispoetryintroducesArabicformsin Hebrewreligiousexpression.Hewastravelingto Jerusalemonapilgrimagewhenhedied.His mostimportantphilosophicalworkisKuzari:The BookofProofandArgumentoftheDespisedFaith, whichpurportstobeadiscussionofaChristian, aMuslim,andaJew,eachofferingthekingof theKhazars(insouthernRussia)reasonsfor adoptinghisfaith.Around740thehistoricalking andmostofhispeopleconvertedtoJudaism.Ha- LevipresentstheChristianandtheMuslimas Aristotelianthinkers,whofailtoconvincethe king.TheJewishspokesmanbeginsbyasserting hisbeliefintheGodofAbraham,Isaac,and Jacob,theGodofhistorywhoiscontinuously activeinhistory,ratherthantheGodofthe philosophers.Jewishhistoryistheinnercoreof worldhistory.FromtherevelationatSinai,the mostwitnesseddivineeventclaimedbyanyreli- gion,theProvidentialhistoryoftheJewsisthe wayGodhaschosentomakehismessageclear toallhumankind.Ha-Levi'sviewistheclassical expressionofJewishparticularismandnational- ism.HisideashavebeeninfluentialinJudaism andwereearlyprintedinLatinandSpanish.See alsoJEWISHPHILOSOPHY.R.H.P. Halldén-complete.Seecompleteness. hallucination.Seepseudohallucination. hallucination,argumentfrom.Seeperception. haltingproblem.Seecomputability. Hamann,lohannGeorg(1730-88),German philosopher.BornandeducatedinKönigsberg, Hamann,knownastheMagusoftheNorth,was oneofthemostimportantChristianthinkersin Germanyduringthesecondhalfoftheeigh- teenthcentury.Advocatinganirrationalisticthe- oryoffaith(inspiredbyHume),heopposedthe prevailingEnlightenmentphilosophy.Hewasa mentoroftheSturmundDrängliterarymove- mentandhadasignificantinfluenceonJacobi, Hegel,andKierkegaard.Asacloseacquaintance ofKant,healsohadagreatimpactonthedevel- opmentofKanfscriticalphilosophythroughhis Humetranslations.HamamVsmostimportant works,criticizedandadmiredfortheirdifficult andobscurestyle,weretheSocraticMemorabilia (1759),Aestheticainnuce("AestheticsinaNut- shell,"1762),andseveralworksonlanguage.He suppressedhis"metacritical"writingsoutof respectforKant.However,theywerepublished afterhisdeathandnowconstitutethebest- knownpartofhiswork.M.K. Hamilton,William(1788-1856),Scottishphi- losopherandlogician.BorninGlasgowandedu- catedatGlasgow,Edinburgh,andOxford,he wasformostofhislifeprofessorattheUni- versityofEdinburgh(1821-56).Thoughhardly anorthodoxoruncriticalfollowerofReidand Stewart,hebecameoneofthemostimportant membersoftheschoolofScottishcommon sensephilosophy.His''philosophyofthecondi- tioned"hasasomewhatKantianflavor.Like Kant,heheldthatwecanhaveknowledgeonly of"therelativemanifestationsofanexistence, whichinitselfitisourhighestwisdomtorecog- 360 HanFeiTzu Hare,R(ichard)M(ervyn) nizeasbeyondthereachofphilosophy."Unlike Kant,however,hearguedforthepositionofa "naturalrealism"intheReidiantradition.The doctrineoftherelativityofknowledgehas seemedtomany-includingJ.S.Mill-contra- dictorytohisrealism.ForHamilton,thetwoare heldtogetherbyakindofintuitionismthat emphasizescertainfactsofconsciousnessthat arebothprimitiveandincomprehensible.They are,thoughconstitutiveofknowledge,"less formsofcognitionsthanofbeliefs."Inlogiche arguedforadoctrineinvolvingquantificationof predicatesandtheviewthatpropositionscanbe reducedtoequations.Seealsoscottishcom- MONSENSEPHILOSOPHY.M.K. HanFeiTzu,alsocalledMasterHanFei(third centuryb.c),ChineseLegalistpoliticaltheorist. HewasaprinceofthestateofHanandastudent ofHsunTzu.Histhought,recordedinthetext HanFeiTzu,mainlyconcernedthemethodof governmentandwasaddressedprimarilyto rulers.HanFeiTzubelievedthathumanbeings areself-seekingbynature,andthattheycan rarelybetransformedbyeducationandmoral examples.Accordingly,therulershouldinstitute apreciselyformulatedandclearlypropagated systemoflaws(fa)toregulatetheirbehavior,and enforceitwithpunishment.Officials,inaddition tobeinggovernedbylaws,aretoberewarded andpunishedaccordingtowhethertheirperfor- mancecoincideswiththeirofficialdutiesand proposedplans.Therulershouldenforcethis systemstrictlywithoutfavoritism,shouldshun contactwithsubordinatestoavoidbreeding familiarity,andshouldconcealhispersonallikes anddislikestoavoidtheirbeingexploited.Hav- ingproperlysetupthemachinaryofgovern- ment,thegovernmentwillrunsmoothlywith minimalinterventionbytheruler.Seealsochi- neseLEGALISM.K.-l.S. HanYii(768-824),Chinesepoetandessayist who,thoughhisthoughtslackedphilosophical depth,wasthefirsttoemphasize"correcttrans- mission"oftheWayfromthesage-emperorsto ConfuciusandMencius.Hisviewslåterpro- foundlyinfluencedNeo-Confucianphilosophers intheSungdynasty.Hevigorouslydefended ConfucianismagainstBuddhismandTaoismon culturalgrounds:themonksandnunswerepar- asitesonsociety.Healsoformulatedathreefold theoryonwhichhumannaturehassuperior, medium,andinferiorgrades.Seealsoconfu- cianism,CONFUCIUS,MENCIUS,NEO-CONFU- CIANISM,TAO-T'UNG.S.-h.L. happiness.Seearistotle,hedonism,utilitarian- ism. härddeterminism.Seefreewillproblem. Hardenberg,Friedrichvon.Seenovalis. hardware.Seecomputertheory. Hare,R(ichard)M(ervyn)(b.1919),English philosopherwhoisoneofthemostinfluential moralphilosophersofthetwentiethcenturyand thedeveloperofprescriptivisminmetaethics. HarewaseducatedatRugbyandOxford,then servedintheBritisharmyduringWorldWarII andspentyearsasaprisonerofwarinBurma.In 1947hetookapositionatBalliolCollegeand wasappointedWhite'sProfessorofMoralPhi- losophyattheUniversityofOxfordin1966.On retirementfromOxford,hebecameGraduate ResearchProfessorattheUniversityofFlorida (1983-93).HismajorbooksareLanguageof Morals(1953),FreedomandReason(1963),Moral Thinking(1981),andSortingOutEthics(1997). Manycollectionsofhisessayshavealso appeared,andacollectionofotherleading philosophers'artidesonhisworkwaspublished in1988(HareandCritics,eds.SeanorandFotion). AccordingtoHare,acarefulexplorationofthe natureofourmoralconceptsrevealsthat(non- ironic)judgmentsaboutwhatonemorallyought todoareexpressionsofthewill,orcommitments toact,thataresubjecttocertainlogicalcon- straints.Becausemoraljudgmentsareprescrip- tive,wecannotsincerelysubscribetothemwhile refusingtocomplywiththemintherelevantcir- cumstances.Becausemoraljudgmentsareuni- versalprescriptions,wecannotsincerelysub- scribetothemunlesswearewillingforthemto befollowedwereweinotherpeople'spositions withtheirpreferences.Harelåtercontendedthat vividlytoimagineourselvescompletelyinother people'spositionsinvolvesouracquiringprefer- encesaboutwhatshouldhappentousinthose positionsthatmirrorexactlywhatthosepeople nowwantforthemselves.So,ideally,wedecide onauniversalprescriptiononthebasisofnot onlyourexistingpreferencesabouttheactual situationbutalsothenewpreferenceswewould haveifwewerewhollyinotherpeople'sposi- tions.Whatwecanprescribeuniversallyiswhat maximizesnetsatisfactionofthisamalgamated setofpreferences.Hence,Hareconcludedthat histheoryofmoraljudgmentleadstoprefer- ence-satisfactionactutilitarianism.However, likemostotherutilitarians,hearguedthatthe 361 harmony,preestablished Hartley,David bestwaytomaximizeutilityistohave,andgen- erallytoacton,certainnotdirectlyutilitarian dispositions-suchasdispositionsnottohurt othersorsteal,tokeeppromisesandtellthe truth,totakespecialresponsibilityforone'sown family,andsoon. Seealsoemotivism,ethics,prescrip- TIVISM,UTILITARIANISM.B.W.H. harmony,preestablished.Seeleibniz. harmonyofthespheres.Seepythagoras. Hart,H(erbert)L(ionel)A(dolphus)(1907-92), Englishphilosopherprincipallyresponsiblefor therevivaloflegalandpoliticalphilosophyafter WorldWarII.Afterwartimeworkwithmilitary intelligence,Hartgaveupaflourishinglawprac- ticetojointheOxfordfaculty,wherehewasa brilliantlecturer,asympatheticandinsightful critic,andagenerousmentortomanyscholars. Liketheearlier"legalpositivists"Benthamand JohnAustin,Hartacceptedthe"separationof lawandmorals":moralstandardscandeliber- atelybeincorporatedinlaw,butthereisnoauto- maticornecessaryconnectionbetweenlawand soundmoralprinciples.InTheConceptofLaw (1961)hecritiquedtheBentham-Austinnotion thatlawsareordersbackedbythreatsfroma politicalcommunity's"sovereign"-someperson orpersonswhoenjoyhabitualobedienceandare habituallyobedienttonootherhuman-and developedthemorecomplexideathatlawisa "unionofprimaryandsecondaryrules."Hart agreedthatalegalsystemmustcontainsome "obligation-imposing""primary"rules,restrict- ingfreedom.Butheshowedthatlawalso includesindependent"power-conferring"rules thatfacilitatechoice,andhedemonstratedthat alegalsystemrequires"secondary"rulesthat createpublicofficesandauthorizeofficialaction, suchaslegislationandadjudication,aswellas "rulesofrecognition"thatdeterminewhich otherrulesarevalidinthesystem. Hartheldthatrulesoflaware"open-tex- tured,"withacoreofdeterminatemeaningand afringeofindeterminatemeaning,andthus capableofansweringsomebutnotalllegalques- tionsthatcanarise.Hedoubtedcourts'claimsto discoverlaw'smeaningwhenreasonablecom- petinginterpretationsareavailable,andheld thatcourtsdecidesuch"härdcases"byfirstper- formingtheimportant"legislative"functionof fillinggapsinthelaw. Harfsfirstbookwasaninfluentialstudy(with A.M.Honoré)ofCausationintheLaw(1959).His inaugurallectureasProfessorofJurisprudence, "DefinitionandTheoryinJurisprudence" (1953),initiatedacareer-longstudyofrights, reflectedalsoinEssaysonBentham:Studiesin JurisprudenceandPoliticalTheory(1982)andin EssaysinJurisprudenceandPhilosophy(1983). Hedefendedliberalpublicpolicies.InLaw,Lib- ertyandMorality(1963)herefutedLordDevlin's contentionthatasocietyjustifiablyenforcesthe codeofitsmoralmajority,whateveritmightbe. InTheMoralityoftheCriminalLaw(1965)andin PunishmentandResponsibility(1968),Hartcon- tributedsubstantiallytobothanalyticandnor- mativetheoriesofcrimeandpunishment. Seealsoliberalism,philosophyoflaw, POLITICALPHILOSOPHY,RIGHTS.D.Ly. Hartley,David(1705-57),Britishphysicianand philosopher.Althoughthenotionofassociation ofideasisancient,heisgenerallyregardedasthe founderofassociationismasaself-sufficientpsy- chology.Despitesimilaritiesbetweenhisassoci- ationpsychologyandHume's,Hartleydeveloped hissystemindependently,acknowledgingonly thewritingsofclergymanJohnGay(1699- 1745).HartleywasoneofmanyEnlightenment thinkersaspiringtobe"Newtonsofthemind,"in PeterGay'sphrase.InHartley,thistooktheform ofunitingassociationphilosophywithphysiol- ogy,aprojectlåterbroughttofruitionbyBain. Hismajorwork,ObservationsonMan(1749),pic- turedmentaleventsandneuraleventsasoper- atingonparalleltracksinwhichneuralevents causementalevents.Onthementalside,Hart- leydistinguished(likeHume)betweensensation andidea.Onthephysiologicalside,Hartley adoptedNewton'sconceptionofnervoustrans- missionbyvibrationsofafinegranularsubstance withinnerve-tubes.Vibrationswithinsensory nervesperipheraltothebraincorrespondedto thesensationstheycaused,whilesmallvibra- tionsinthebrain,vibratiuncles,correspondedto ideas.Hartleyproposedasinglelawofassocia- tion,contiguitymodifiedbyfrequency,which tooktwoforms,oneforthementalsideandone fortheneural:ideas,orvibratiuncles,occurring togetherregularlybecomeassociated.Hartley distinguishedbetweensimultaneousassociation, thelinkbetweenideasthatoccuratthesame Impression Sensation- -Idea Vibration- -Vibratiuncle 362 Hartmann,Eduardvon Hartshorne,Charles moment,andsuccessiveassociation,betweenideas thatcloselysucceedoneanother.Successive associationsoccuronlyinaforwarddirection; therearenobackwardassociations,athesisgen- eratingmuchcontroversyinthelåterexperi- mentalstudyofmemory.Seealsoasso- ciationism.T.H.L. Hartmann,Eduardvon(1842-1906),German philosopherwhosoughttosynthesizethe thoughtofSchelling,Hegel,andSchopenhauer. Themostimportantofhisfifteenbookswas PhilosophiedesUnbewussten(Philosophyofthe Unconscious,1869).ForHartmannbothwilland ideaareinterrelatedandareexpressionsofan absolute"thing-in-itself,"theunconscious.The unconsciousistheactiveessenceinnaturaland psychicprocessesandistheteleologicaldynamic inorganiclife.Paradoxically,heclaimedthatthe teleologyimmanentintheworldorderandthe lifeprocessleadstoinsightintotheirrationality ofthe"will-to-live."Thematurationofrational consciousnesswould,heheld,leadtothenega- tionofthetotalvolitionalprocessandtheentire worldprocesswouldcease.Ideasindicatethe "what"ofexistenceandconstitute,alongwith willandtheunconscious,thethreemodesof being.Despiteitspessimism,thisworkenjoyed considerablepopularity. Hartmannwasanunusualcombinationof speculativeidealistandphilosopherofscience (defendingvitalismandattackingmechanistic materialism);hispessimisticethicswaspartofa cosmicdramaofredemption.Someofhislåter worksdealtwithacriticalformofDarwinism thatledhimtoadoptapositiveevolutionary stancethatunderminedhisearlierpessimism. Hisgeneralphilosophicalpositionwasself- describedas"transcendentalrealism."HisPhilos- ophyoftheUnconsciouswastranslatedintoEnglish byW.C.Couplandinthreevolumesin1884. Thereislittledoubtthathismetaphysicsofthe unconsciouspreparedthewayforFreud'slåter theoryoftheunconsciousmind. Seealsofreud,hegel,schelling,scho- penhauer.G.J.S. Hartmann,Nicolai(1882-1950),Latvian-born Germanphilosopher.Hetaughtattheuniversi- tiesofMarburg,Cologne,Berlin,andGöttingen, andwrotemorethanadozenmajorworkson thehistoryofphilosophy,ontology,epistemol- ogy,ethics,andaesthetics.Arealistinepiste- mologyandontology,Hartmannheldthat cognitionistheapprehensionofsomethinginde- pendentoftheactofapprehensionoranyother mentalevents.Anaccuratephenomenology, suchasHusserl's,wouldacknowledge,according tohim,thatweapprehendnotonlyparticular, spatiotemporalobjects,butalso"idealobjects," "essences,"whichHartmannexplicitlyidentified withPlatonicForms.Amongtheseareethical valuesandtheobjectsofmathematicsandlogic. Ourapprehensionofvaluesisemotionalinchar- acter,asSchelerhadheld.Thispointiscompati- blewiththeirobjectivityandtheirmind- independence,sincetheemotionsarejust anothermodeofapprehension.Thepoint applies,however,onlytoethicalvalues.Aes- theticvaluesareessentiallysubjective;theyexist onlyforthesubjectexperiencingthem.The numberofethicalvaluesisfargreaterthanusu- allysupposed,noraretheyderivablefromasin- glefundamentalvalue.Atbestweonlyglimpse someofthem,andeventhesemaynotbesimul- taneouslyrealizable.Thisexplainsandtosome extentjustifiestheexistenceofmoraldisagree- ment,betweenpersonsaswellasbetweenwhole cultures. Hartmannwasmostobviouslyinfluencedby Plato,Husserl,andScheler.Buthewasamajor, originalphilosopherinhisownright.Hehas receivedlessrecognitionthanhedeservesprob- ablybecausehisviewswerequitedifferentfrom thosedominantinrecentAnglo-Americanphi- losophyorinrecentContinentalphilosophy. Whatisperhapshismostimportantwork,Ethics, waspublishedinGermanin1926,oneyear beforeHeidegger'sBeingandTime,andappeared inEnglishin1932. Seealsoapriori,husserl,moralreal- ism,PLATO,SCHELER.P.B.U Hartshorne,Charles(b.1897),chiefAmerican exponentofprocessphilosophyandtheologyin thelatetwentiethcentury.Afterreceivingthe Ph.D.atHarvardin1923hecameunderthe influenceofWhitehead,andlåter,withPaul Weiss,editedTheCollectedPapersofC.S.Peirce (1931-35).InThePhilosophyandPsychologyof Sensation(1934)Hartshornearguedthatallsen- sationsarefeelingsonanaffectivecontinuum. Theseideaswerelåterincorporatedintoaneo- classicalmetaphysicthatispanpsychist,indeter- ministic,andtheistic.Natureisatheaterof interactionsamongephemeralcentersofcre- ativeactivity,eachofwhichbecomesobjectively immortalinthememoryofGod. InMan'sVisionofGod(1941)Hartshornechas- tisedphilosophersforbeinginsufficientlyatten- tivetothevarietiesoftheism.Hisalternative, calleddipolartheism,alsodefendedinTheDivine 363 hasty,generalization,fallacyof hedonism Relativity(1948),picturesGodassupremely relatedtoandperfectlyrespondingtoeveryactu- ality.TheuniverseisGod'sbody.Thedivineis,in differentrespects,infiniteandfinite,eternaland temporal,necessaryandcontingent.Establishing God'sexistenceisametaphysicalproject,which HartshornecharacterizesinCreativeSynthesis (1970)asthesearchfornecessarytruthsabout existence.Thecentralelementinhiscumulative caseforGod'sexistence,calledtheglobalargu- ment,isamodalversionoftheontologicalargu- ment,whichHartshornewasinstrumentalin rehabilitatinginTheLogicofPerfection(1962)and Anselm'sDiscovery(1965). CreativeSynthesisalsoarticulatedthetheory thataestheticvaluesarethemostuniversaland thatbeautyisameanbetweenthetwinextremes oforder/disorderandsimplicity/complexity.The ZeroFallacy(1997),Hartshorne'stwentiethbook, summarizedhisassessmentofthehistoryofphi- losophy-alsofoundinInsightsandOversightsof GreatThinkers(1983)andCreativityinAmerican Philosophy(1984)-andintroducedimportant refinementsofhismetaphysics. Seealsopanpsychism,philosophyof RELIGION,PROCESSPHILOSOPHY,WHITE- HEAD.D.W.V. hastygeneralization,fallacyof.Seeinformalfal- lacy. heapparadox.Seesoritesparadox. heart.Seehsin1. Heaven.Seet'ien. hedoniccalculus.Seebentham. hedonism,theviewthatpleasure(includingthe absenceofpain)isthesoleintrinsicgoodinlife. Thehedonistmayholdthat,questionsofmoral- ityaside,personsinevitablydoseekpleasure (psychologicalhedonism);that,questionsofpsy- chologyaside,morallyweshouldseekpleasure (ethicalhedonism);orthatweinevitablydo,and oughtto,seekpleasure(ethicalandpsychologi- calhedonismcombined). Psychologicalhedonismitselfadmitsofavari- etyofpossibleforms.Onemayhold,e.g.,thatall motivationisbasedontheprospectofpresentor futurepleasure.Moreplausibly,somephiloso- phershaveheldthatallchoicesoffutureactions arebasedonone'spresentlytakinggreaterplea- sureinthethoughtofdoingoneactratherthan another.Stillathirdtypeofhedonism-with rootsinempiricalpsychology-isthattheattain- mentofpleasureistheprimarydriveofawide rangeoforganisms(includinghumanbeings) andisresponsible,throughsomeformofcondi- tioning,forallacquiredmotivations. Ethicalhedonistsmay,butneednot,appealto someformofpsychologicalhedonismtobuttress theircase.For,atworst,thetruthofsomeformof psychologicalhedonismmakesethicalhedonism emptyorinescapable-butnotfalse.Asavalue theory(atheoryofwhatisultimatelygood),eth- icalhedonismhastypicallyledtooneortheother oftwoconceptionsofmorallycorrectaction. Bothoftheseareexpressionsofmoralconse- quentialisminthattheyjudgeactionsstrictlyby theirconsequences.Onstandardformulationsof utilitarianism,actionsarejudgedbytheamount ofpleasuretheyproduceforall(sentientbeings); onsomeformulationsofegoistviews,actionsare judgedbytheirconsequencesforone'sownplea- sure.Neitheregoismnorutilitarianism,how- ever,mustbeweddedtoahedonisticvalue theory. Ahedonisticvaluetheoryadmitsofavariety ofclaimsaboutthecharacteristicsourcesand typesofpleasure.Onecontentiousissuehas beenwhatactivitiesyieldthegreatestquantityof pleasure-withprominentcandidatesincluding philosophicalandotherformsofintellectualdis- course,thecontemplationofbeauty,andactivi- tiesproductiveof"thepleasuresofthesenses." (Mostphilosophicalhedonists,despitethepopu- lärassociationsoftheword,havenotespoused sensualpleasure.)Anotherissue,famously raisedbyJ.S.Mill,iswhethersuchdifferentvari- etiesofpleasureadmitofdifferencesofquality(as wellasquantity).Evensupposingthemtobe equalinquantity,canwesay,e.g.,thattheplea- suresofintellectualactivityaresuperiorinqual- itytothoseofwatchingsportsontelevision?And ifwedosaysuchthings,arewedepartingfrom stricthedonismbyintroducingavaluedistinc- tionnotreallybasedonpleasureatall? Mostphilosophershavefoundhedonism- bothpsychologicalandethical-exaggeratedin itsclaims.Onedifficultyforbothsortsofhedo- nismisthehedonisticparadox,whichmaybeput asfollows.Manyofthedeepestandbestplea- suresoflife(oflove,ofchildrearing,ofwork) seemtocomemostoftentothosewhoareengag- inginanactivityforreasonsotherthanpleasure seeking.Hence,notonlyisitdubiousthatwe alwaysinfactseek(orvalueonly)pleasure,but alsodubiousthatthebestwaytoachieveplea- sureistoseekit. Anotherareaofdifficultyconcernshappi- 364 hedonisticparadox Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich ness-anditsrelationtopleasure.Inthetradi- tionofAristotle,happinessisbroadlyunderstood assomethinglikewell-beingandhasbeen viewed,notimplausibly,asakindofnaturalend ofallhumanactivities.But'happiness'inthis senseisbroaderthan'pleasure',insofarasthe latterdesignatesaparticularkindoffeeling, whereas'well-being'doesnot.Attributionsof happiness,moreover,appeartobenormativein awayinwhichattributionsofpleasurearenot. Itisthoughtthatatrulyhappypersonhas achieved,isachieving,orståndstoachieve,cer- tainthingsrespectingthe"trulyimportant"con- cemsofhumanlife.Ofcourse,suchachieve- mentswillcharacteristicallyproducepleasant feelings;but,justascharacteristically,theywill involvestatesofactiveenjoymentofactivities- where,asAristotlefirstpointedout,thereareno distinctivefeelingsofpleasureapartfromthe doingoftheactivityitself.Inshort,theAris- totelianthesisthathappinessisthenaturalend ofallhumanactivities,evenifitistrue,doesnot seemtolendmuchsupporttohedonism-psy- chologicalorethical. Seealsoaristotle,ethics,eudai- MONISM,UTILITARIANISM,VALUE.J.A.M. hedonisticparadox.Seehedonism. Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich(1770-1831), oneofthemostinfluentialandsystematicofthe Germanidealists,alsowellknownforhisphilos- ophyofhistoryandphilosophyofreligion. Lifeandworks.Hegel,theeldestofthreechil- dren,wasborninStuttgart,thesonofaminor financialofficialinthecourtoftheDuchyof Wurttemberg.Hismotherdiedwhenhewas eleven.Ateighteen,hebeganattendingthethe- ologyseminaryorStiftattachedtotheUniversity atTubingen;hestudiedtheologyandclassical languagesandliteratureandbecamefriendly withhisfuturecolleagueandadversary, Schelling,aswellasthegreatgeniusofGerman Romanticpoetry,Hölderlin.In1793,upongrad- uation,heacceptedajobasatutorforafamily inBern,andmovedtoFrankfurtin1797fora similarpost.In1799hisfatherbequeathedhim amodestincomeandthefreedomtoresignhis tutoringjob,pursuehisownwork,andattempt toestablishhimselfinauniversityposition.In 1801,withthehelpofSchelling,hemovedtothe universitytownofJena,alreadywidelyknown asthehomeofSchiller,Fichte,andtheSchlegel brothers.Afterlecturingforafewyears,he becameaprofessorin1805. PriortothemovetoJena,Hegel'sessayshad beenchieflyconcernedwithproblemsinmoral- ity,thetheoryofculture,andthephilosophy ofreligion.HegelsharedwithRousseauand theGermanRomanticsmanydoubtsabout thepoliticalandmoralimplicationsofthe EuropeanEnlightenmentandmodernphiloso- phyingeneral,evenwhilehestillenthusiasti- callychampionedwhathetermedtheprinciple ofmodernity,"absolutefreedom."Likemany, hefearedthatthemodernattackonfeudal politicalandreligiousauthoritywouldmerely issueinthereformulationofnewinternalized andstillrepressiveformsofauthority.Andhe wasamongthatlegionofGermanintellectuals infatuatedwithancientGreeceandthesuperi- orityoftheirsupposedlyharmonioussociallife, comparedwiththeauthoritarianandlegalistic characteroftheJewishandlåterChristianreli- gions. AtJena,however,hecoeditedajournalwith Schelling,TheCriticalJournalofPhilosophy,and cametoworkmuchmoreonthephilosophic issuescreatedbythecriticalphilosophyor"tran- scendentalidealism"ofKant,anditslegacyin theworkofRheinhold,Fichte,andSchelling.His writtenworkbecamemuchmoreinfluencedby thesetheoreticalprojectsandtheirattemptto extendKanfssearchforthebasiccategoriesnec- essaryforexperiencetobediscriminatedand evaluated,andforatheoryofthesubjectthat,in somenon-empiricalway,wasresponsiblefor suchcategories.Problemsconcerningthecom- pleteness,interrelation,andontologicalstatusof suchacategorialstructurewerequitepromi- nent,alongwithacontinuinginterestintherela- tionbetweenafree,self-determiningagentand thesupposedconstraintsofmoralprinciplesand otheragents. InhisearlyyearsatJena(especiallybefore Schellingleftin1803),hewasparticularlypre- occupiedwiththisproblemofasystematicphi- losophy,awayofaccountingforthebasic categoriesofthenaturalworldandforhuman practicalactivitythatwouldgroundallsuchcat- egoriesoncommonlypresupposedandlogically interrelated,eveninterdeducible,principles.(In Hegel'sterms,thiswastheproblemoftherela- tionbetweena"Logic"anda"Philosophyof Nature"and"PhilosophyofSpirit.")After1803, however,whilehewaspreparinghisownsys- tematicphilosophyforpublication,whathad beenplannedasashortintroductiontothissys- temtookonalifeofitsownandgrewintoone ofHegel'smostprovocativeandinfluential books.Workingatafuriouspace,hefinished 365 Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich whatwouldbeeventuallycalledThePhenom- enologyofSpiritinaperiodofgreatpersonaland politicalturmoil.Duringthefinalwritingofthe book,hehadlearnedthatChristinaBurkhard wouldgivebirthtohisillegitimateson.(Ludwig wasborninFebruary1807.)Andheissupposed tohavecompletedthetextonOctober13,1807, thedayNapoleon'sarmiescapturedJena. Itwascertainlyanunprecedentedwork.In conception,itisaboutthehumanraceitselfasa developing,progressivelymoreself-conscious subject,butitscontentseemstotakeinaväst, heterogeneousrangeoftopics,fromtechnical issuesinempiricistepistemologytothesignifi- canceofburialrituals.Itsrangeissoheteroge- neousthatthereiscontroversytothisdayabout whetherithasanyoverallunity,orwhetherit waspiecedtogetheratthelastminute.Addingto theinterpretiveproblem,Hegelofteninvented hisownstrikinglanguageof"invertedworlds," "strugglestothedeathforrecognition,""un- happyconsciousness,""spiritualanimalking- doms,"and"beautifulsouls." ContinuinghisuniversitycareeratJenain thosetimeslookedoutofthequestion,soHegel acceptedajobatBambergeditinganewspaper, andinthefollowingyearbegananeight-year stint(1808-16)asheadmasterandphilosophy teacherataGymnasium(orsecondaryschool)at Niirnberg.Duringthisperiod,atforty-one,he marriedthetwenty-year-oldMarievonTucher. Healsowrotewhatiseasilyhismostdifficult work,andtheoneheoftenreferredtoashis mostimportant,amagisterialtwo-volumeSci- enceofLogic,whichattemptstobeaphilosophi- calaccountoftheconceptsnecessaryinall possiblekindsofaccount-givings. Finally,in1816,Hegelwasofferedachairin philosophyattheUniversityofHeidelberg, wherehepublishedthefirstofseveralversions ofhisEncyclopediaofthePhilosophicalSciences,his ownsystematicaccountoftherelationbetween the"logic"ofhumanthoughtandthe"real" expressionofsuchinterrelatedcategoriesinour understandingofthenaturalworldandinour understandingandevaluationofourownactiv- ities.In1818,heacceptedthemuchmorepres- tigiouspostinphilosophyatBerlin,wherehe remaineduntilhisdeathin1831.Soonafterhis arrivalinBerlin,hebegantoexertapowerful influenceöverGermanlettersandintellectual life.In1821,inthemidstofagrowingpolitical andnationalistcrisisinPrussia,hepublishedhis controversialbookonpoliticalphilosophy,The PhilosophyofRight.Hislecturesattheuniversity werelåterpublishedashisphilosophyofhistory, ofaesthetics,andofreligion,andashishistoryof philosophy. Philosophy.Hegel'smostimportantideas wereformedgradually,inresponsetoanumber ofissuesinphilosophyandofteninresponseto historicalevents.Moreover,hislanguageand approachweresoheterodoxthathehasinspired asmuchcontroversyaboutthemeaningofhis positionasaboutitsadequacy.Henceanysum- marywillbeasmuchasummaryofthecontro- versiesasofthebasicposition. Hisdissatisfactionswiththeabsenceofapub- lierealm,oranyformsofgenuinesocialsolidar- ityintheGermanstatesandinmodernity generally,andhisdistastewithwhathecalled the"positivity"oftheorthodoxreligionsofthe day(theirrelianceonlaw,scripture,andabstract claimstoauthority),ledhimtovariousattempts tomakeuseoftheGreekpolisandclassicalart, aswellastheearlyChristianunderstandingof loveandarenewed''folkreligion,"ascriticalfoils tosuchtendencies.Forsometime,healso regardedmuchtraditionalandmodernphiloso- phyasitselfakindoflifelessclassifyingthatonly contributedtocontemporaryfragmentation, myopia,andconfusion. Theseconcernsremainedwithhimthrough- outhislife,andheisthusrightlyknownasone ofthefirstmodemthinkerstoarguethatwhat hadcometobeacceptedasthecentralproblem ofmodernsocialandpoliticallife,thelegitimacy ofstatepower,hadbeentoonarrowlyconceived. Therearenowallsortsofcircumstances,he argued,inwhichpeoplemightsatisfythemod- erncriterionoflegitimacyand"consent"tothe useofsomepower,butnotfullyunderstandthe termswithinwhichsuchissuesareposed,or assentinanattenuated,resentful,manipulated, orconfusedway.Insuchcasestheywouldexpe- riencenoconnectionbetweentheirindividual willandtheactualcontentoftheinstitutions theyaresupposedtohavesanctioned.Themod- ernproblemisasmuchalienation(Entfremdung) assovereignty,anexerciseofwillinwhichthe produetofone'swillappears"stränge"or"alien," "other,"andwhichresultsinmuchofmodern life,howeverchosenorwilled,beingfundamen- tallyunsatisfying. However,duringtheJenayears,hisviewson thisissuechanged.Mostimportantly,philosoph- icalissuesmovedclosertocenterstageinthe Hegeliandrama.Henolongerregardedphiloso- phyassomesortofself-underminingactivity thatmerelypreparedoneforsomeleapintogen- uine"speculation"(roughlySchelling'sposition) 366 Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich andbegantochampionauniquekindofcom- prehensive,verydeterminatereflectiononthe interrelationsamongallthevariousclassical alternativesinphilosophy.Muchmorecontro- versially,healsoattemptedtounderstandthe wayinwhichsuchrelationsandtransitionswere alsoreflectedinthehistoryoftheart,politics, andreligionsofvarioushistoricalcommunities. Hethuscametothinkthatphilosophyshouldbe somesortofrecollectionofitspasthistory,areal- izationofthemerepartiality,ratherthanfalsity, ofitspastattemptsatacomprehensiveteaching, andanaccountofthecentralityofthesecontin- uouslydevelopingattemptsinthedevelopment ofotherhumanpractices.Throughunderstand- ingthe"logic"ofsuchadevelopment,arecon- ciliationofsortswiththeimplicationsofsucha rationalprocessincontemporarylife,oratleast withthepotentialitiesinherentincontemporary life,wouldbepossible. Inallsuchinfluencesanddevelopments,one revolutionaryaspectofHegel'spositionbecame clearer.ForwhileHegelstillfrequentlyargued thatthesubjectmatterofphilosophywas"rea- son,"or"theAbsolute,"theunconditionedpre- suppositionofallhumanaccount-givingand evaluation,andtherebyanunderstandingofthe "whole"withinwhichthenaturalworldand humandeedswere"parts,"healsoalwayscon- struedthisclaimtomeanthatthesubjectmatterof philosophywasthehistoryofhumanexperience itself.Philosophywasabouttherealworldof humanchangeanddevelopment,understoodby Hegeltobethecollectiveself-educationofthe humanspeciesaboutitself.Itcouldbethis,and satisfythemoretraditionalidealsbecause,inone ofhismostfamousphrases,"whatisactualis rational,"orbecausesomefullaccountcouldbe givenofthelogicorteleologicalorder,eventhe necessity,forthegreatconceptualandpolitical changesinhumanhistory.Wecouldthereby finallyreassureourselvesthatthewayourspecies hadcometoconceptualizeandevaluateisnot finiteorcontingent,butis"identical"with"what thereis,intruth."ThisidentitytheoryorAbsolute /C»oiWe1,andip£I.LetZ,=thesetof allformulasofthatformforQ,,....Qall'3', andtp£TI. Herearetwosuchhierarchiesforlanguagesof arithmetic.Takethelogicalconstantstobetruth- functions,'Vand'3'. (i)Let1°=thefirst-orderlanguageofarith- metic,basedon'=',atwo-placepredicate-con- stant'<. constantsforsuccessor tion allfirst-order allowfreesecond-ordervariables propertiesorsetsofindividuals ofboundedformulas atomicformulasusingconnectivesandbounded quantification:ifcpisboundedsoarevu cp arithmetic second-ordervariables mulasinwhichnosecond-ordervariableis bound ond-ordervariables. metichierarchy.forasetofnaturalnumbers andonlyifaisdefined ofarithmetic assignedto0 ablesranging mulaofl n rijicc2c- ng="2gC^i*A\^KA%..." infact archyclassifiestherealssimpleenoughtobe definedbyarithmeticformulas.example: y higherorder hilbert bers definedbyaformulainti evenga enumerablereals reals.theclassificationofrealsunderthearith- metichierarchyreflectscomplexityofdefining formulas anotionofdegreeofunsolvability notionofcomparativecomputationalcomplex- ity classifications. thearithmetichierarchyextendstosetsof reals ingsentences gzjanddefinesthesetofthoserealswithan evennumber agft standardmodelofarithmeticwithsecond-order variablesranging asdescribedin asetofreals.theinclusionspicturedabovecarry sifiesallrealsandsetsofrealssimpleenoughto haveanalytical definitions. thesubscripted naturalnumbers.butthearithmetichierarchy isextended ramified-analyticalhierarchy.letr="theclass" ofallarithmeticalreals.foranordinalaletr. a mulasofl1inwhichsecond-ordervariables rangeonly imposesramification.foralimit-ordinalx>isfurther"hierar- chized"usingtheclassificationofdefiningfor- mulasgivenabovein(2.i).Thisprocessstops yieldingnewrealsatacountableordinalcalled P.Allrealsclassifiedbythishierarchytumout tobeinXI.Theinitialsegmentofthishierarchy forwhichtheordinalsarerecursive(i.e.,con- structive)isthehyperarithmetichierarchy;reals itclassifiestumouttobeexactlytheAJreals. Theabovehierarchiesariseinarithmetic.Sim- ilarhierarchiesariseinpuresettheory;e.g.by transferringthe"process"thatproducedthe ramifiedanalyticalhierarchytopuresettheory weobtaintheconstructiblehierarchy,definedby Gödelinhis1939monographonthecontinuum hypothesis. Seealsodegreeofunsolvability,math- EMATICALANALYSIS,SETTHEORY.H.T.H. higherorder.Seeorder. higher-orderlogic.Seeformållogic,philosophy OFLOGIC,SECOND-ORDERLOGIC. Hilbert,David(1862-1943),Germanmathe- maticianandphilosopherofmathematics.Bom inKönigsberg,healsostudiedandservedonthe facultythere,acceptingWeber'schairinmathe- maticsatGöttingenin1895.Hemadeimportant contributionstomanydifferentareasofmathe- maticsandwasrenownedforhisgraspofthe entirediscipline.Hismorephilosophicalwork wasdividedintotwoparts.Thefocusofthefirst, whichoccupiedapproximatelytenyearsbegin- ningintheearly1890s,wasthefoundationsof geometryandculminatedinhiscelebrated GrundlagenderGeometrie(1899).Thisisarichand complexworkthatpursuesavarietyofdifferent projectssimultaneously.Prominentamongthese isonewhoseaimistodeterminetheroleplayed ingeometricalreasoningbyprinciplesofconti- nuity.Hilberfsinterestinthisprojectwasrooted inKantianconcerns,asisconfirmedbythe inscription,intheGrundlagen,ofKanfssynopsis ofhiscriticalphilosophy:"Thusallhuman knowledgebeginswithintuition,goesfrom theretoconceptsandendswithideas." Kantbelievedthatthecontinuouscouldnot berepresentedinintuitionandmusttherefore beregardedasanideaofpurereason-i.e.,asa deviceplayingapurelyregulativeroleinthe developmentofourgeometricalknowledge(i.e., ourknowledgeofthespatialmanifoldofsensory experience).Hilbertwasdeeplyinfluencedby thisviewofKanfsandhisworkinthefounda- tionsofgeometrycanbeseen,inlargepart,asan attempttotestitbydeterminingwhether(orto whatextent)puregeometrycanbedeveloped withoutappealtoprinciplesconcemingthe natureofthecontinuous.Toaconsiderable extent,HilberfsworkconfirmedKanfsview- showing,inamannermoreprecisethanany Kanthadmanaged,thatappealstothecontinu- ouscanindeedbeeliminatedfrommuchofour geometricalreasoning. ThesamebasicKantianorientationalsogov- ernedthesecondphaseofHilberfsfoundational work,wherethefocuswaschangedfromgeom- etrytoarithmeticandanalysis.Thisisthephase duringwhichHilberfsProgramwasdeveloped. Thisprojectbegantotakeshapeinthe1917 essay"AxiomatischesDenken."(The1904paper "UberdieGrundlagenderLogikundArith- mefik,"whichturnedawayfromgeometryand towardarithmetic,doesnotyetcontainmore thanaglimmeroftheideasthatwouldlåter becomecentraltoHilberfsprooftheory.)It 381 HilberfsProgram HilberfsProgram reacheditsphilosophicallymostmatureformin the1925essay"UberdasUnendliche,"the1926 address"DieGrundlagenderMathematik,"and thesomewhatmorepopulär1930paper"Natur- erkennenundLogik."(Fromatechnicalas opposedtoaphilosophicalvantage,theclassical statementisprobablythe1922essay"Neube- griindungderMathematik.ErsteMitteilung.") Thekeyelementsoftheprogramare(i)adis- tinctionbetweenrealandidealpropositionsand methodsofprooforderivation;(ii)theideathat theso-calledidealmethods,though,again,play- ingtheroleofKantianregulativedevices(as Hilbertexplicitlyandemphaticallydeclaredin the1925paper),arenonethelessindispensable forareasonablyefficientdevelopmentofour mathematicalknowledge;and(iii)thedemand thatthereliabilityoftheidealmethodsbeestab- lishedbyreal(orfinitary)means. Asiswellknown,HilberfsProgramsooncame underheavyattackfromGödel'sincompleteness theorems(especiallythesecond),whichhave commonlybeenregardedasshowingthatthe thirdelementofHilberfsProgram(i.e.,theone callingforafinitaryproofofthereliabilityofthe idealsystemsofclassicalmathematics)cannotbe carriedout. Seealsogödel'sincompletenesstheo- REMS,HILBERT'SPROGRAM,PROOFTHEORY. M.D. HilberfsProgram,aproposalinthefoundations ofmathematics,namedforitsdeveloper,the Germanmathematician-philosopherDavid Hilbert,whofirstformulateditfullyinthe1920s. Itsaimwastojustifyclassicalmathematics(in particular,classicalanalysisandsettheory), thoughonlyasaKantianregulativedeviceand notasdescriptivescience.Thejustificationthus presupposedadivisionofclassicalmathematics intotwoparts:thepart(termedrealmathemat- icsbyHilbert)toberegulated,andthepart (termedidealmathematicsbyHilbert)servingas regulator. Realmathematicswastakentoconsistofthe meaningful,truepropositionsofmathematics andtheirjustifyingproofs.Theseproofs-com- monlyknownasfinitaryproofs-weretakento beofanespeciallyelementaryepistemiccharac- ter,reducing,ultimately,toquasi-perceptual intuitionsconcerningfiniteassemblagesofper- ceptuallyintuitablesignsregardedfromthepoint ofviewoftheirshapesandsequentialarrange- ment.Idealmathematics,ontheotherhand,was takentoconsistofsentencesthatdonotexpress genuinepropositionsandderivationsthatdonot constitutegenuineproofsorjustifications.The epistemicutilityofidealsentences(typically referredtoasidealpropositions,though,asnoted above,theydonotexpressgenuinepropositions atall)andproofswastakentoderivenotfrom theirmeaningand/orevidentness,butrather fromtheroletheyplayinsomeformålalgebraic orcalcularyschemeintendedtoidentifyorlocate therealtruths.Itisthusametatheoreticfunction oftheformåloralgebraicpropertiesinducedon thosepropositionsandproofsbytheirpositions inalargerderivationalscheme.Hilberfsideal mathematicswasthusintendedtobearthesame relationtohisrealmathematicsasKant'sfaculty ofpurereasonwasintendedtobeartohisfaculty ofunderstanding.Itwastobearegulativedevice whoseproperfunctionistoguideandfacilitate thedevelopmentofoursystemofrealjudg- ments.Indeed,inhis1925essay"Uberdas Unendliche,"Hilbertmadejustthispoint,noting thatidealelementsdonotcorrespondtoany- thinginrealitybutserveonlyasideas"if,follow- ingKanfsterminology,oneunderstandsasan ideaaconceptofreasonwhichtranscendsall experienceandbymeansofwhichtheconcreteis tobecompletedintoatotality." ThestructureofHilberfsscheme,however, involvesmorethanjustthedivisionofclassical mathematicsintorealandidealpropositionsand proofs.Ituses,inaddition,asubdivisionofthe realpropositionsintotheproblematicandthe unproblematic.Indeed,itisthissubdivisionof therealsthatisatbottomresponsibleforthe introductionoftheideals.Unproblematicreal propositions,describedbyHilbertasthebasic equalitiesandinequalitiesofarithmetic(e.g.,'3 >2','2<3','2+3=3+2')togetherwiththeir sentential(andcertainoftheirboundedquan- tificational)compounds,aretheevidentially mostbasicjudgmentsofmathematics.Theyare immediatelyintelligibleanddecidablebyfinitary intuition.Moreimportantly,theycanbelogi- callymanipulatedinallthewaysthatclassical logicallowswithoutleadingoutsidetheclassof realpropositions.Thecharacteristicfeatureof theproblematicreals,ontheotherhand,isthat theycannotbesomanipulated. Hilbertgavetwokindsofexamplesofprob- lematicrealpropositions.Oneconsistedofuni- versalgeneralizationslike'foranynon-negative integera,a+1=1+a',whichHilberttermed hypotheticaljudgments.Suchpropositionsare problematicbecausetheirdenialsdonotbound thesearchforcounterexamples.Hence,the instanceofthe(classical)lawofexcludedmid- dlethatisobtainedbydisjoiningitwithitsdenial 382 HinayanaBuddhism Hinduism isnotitselfarealproposition.Consequently,it cannotbemanipulatedinallthewayspermitted byclassicallogicwithoutgoingoutsidetheclass ofrealpropositions.Similarlyfortheotherkind ofproblematicrealdiscussedbyHilbert,which wasaboundedexistentialquantification.Every suchsentencehasasoneofitsclassicalconse- quentsanunboundedexistentialquantification ofthesamematrix.Hence,sincethelatterisnot arealproposition,theformerisnotarealpropo- sitionthatcanbefullymanipulatedbyclassical logicalmeanswithoutgoingoutsidetheclass ofrealpropositions.Itistherefore"proble- matic." Thequestionwhyfullclassicallogicalmanip- ulabilityshouldbegivensuchweightpointsup animportantelementinHilberfsthinking: namely,thatclassicallogicisregardedasthepre- ferredlogicofhumanthinking-thelogicofthe optimallyfunctioninghumanepistemicengine, thelogicaccordingtowhichthehumanmind mostnaturallyandefficientlyconductsitsinfer- entialaffairs.Itthereforehasaspecialpsycho- logicalstatusanditisbecauseofthisthatthe righttoitscontinuedusemustbepreserved.As justindicated,however,preservationofthisright requiresadditionofidealpropositionsandproofs totheirrealcounterparts,sinceapplyingclassi- callogictothetruthsofrealmathematicsleads toasystemthatcontainsidealaswellasrealele- ments. Hilbertbelievedthattojustifysuchanaddi- tion,allthatwasnecessarywastoshowittobe consistentwithrealmathematics(i.e.,toshow thatitprovesnorealpropositionthatisitself refutablebyrealmeans).Moreover,Hilbert believedthatthismustbedonebyfinitary means.TheproofofGödel'ssecondincomplete- nesstheoremin1931broughtconsiderablepres- suretobearonthispartofHilberfsProgram eventhoughitmaynothavedemonstratedits unattainability. Seealsobrouwer,gödel'sincomplete- NESSTHEOREMS,HILBERT,PHILOSOPHYOF MATHEMATICS.M.D. HinayanaBuddhism.Seebuddhism. Hinduism,thegroupofreligiousandphilosoph- icaltraditionsofIndiathatacceptthedoctrinal authorityoftheVedasandUpanishads,compris- ingtheschoolsMimämsä,Sankhya-Yoga, Nyäya-Vaishesika,andVedanta(sixinnumber, withtheconnectionwithinpairsofschools,indi- catedbyhyphenation,basedonhistoricaland conceptuallinkages).Mostofthestandardissues inGreco-Europeanphilosophyreceiveindepen- dentdiscussioninclassicalIndianthought.Per- hapstheclosestIndiantermto'philosophy'is darsana(seeing);thegoalofphilosophyistypi- callytakentobenotsimplyunderstanding,but enlightenment(moksha),whichinvolvesescape fromthereincarnationcycleandfromkarma.All oftheorthodoxschoolsformallyacceptthedoc- trinesthattheindividualAtmanbeginninglessly transmigratesfrombodytobodyunlessitattains enlightenmentandthatineachlifetimethe Atmanactsandhenceaccumulatesconsequences ofitsactionsthatwillaccruetoitinfuturelife- times(karma),thoughsomeschools(notably AdvaitaVedanta)holdmetaphysicalviewsthat radicallyalteranymeaningthatthedoctrinesof transmigrationandkarmacanhave. The"seeing"typicallyinvolvesembracingthe contentofthesacredtextsandbeingtrans- formedbyit.Inthesamegeneralculturaland intellectualcontextasHinduism,Cärväkarejects anysuchnotionofphilosophy,andJainism, Buddhism,andsomevarietiesofHinduismreject monotheismthoughallbutCärväkaacceptsome sortofreligiousperspectiveandcenteronsome notionofenlightenment. Metaphysics,epistemology,logic,andethics arerichlyrepresentedinHinduism.Asistypical inGreco-Europeanphilosophy,apartfrom(e.g.) someofthemedievalScholasticsandcontempo- rarysymboliclogicians,studyofdeductiveinfer- enceandprobabilityisnotsharplydistinguished fromepistemology,thoughinHinduismitistyp- icallymarkedofffrompsychologicalconsidera- tions. Therearedebatesaboutthesuccessofnatural theology,withversions(e.g.)ofteleologicaland contingencyargumentsanddiscussionsofthe problemofevil,thelattertypicallybeingrelated toaconsiderationofjusticeandkarma. Monotheisticviewstypicallyregardtheworldas everlastinglydependentonBrahmanrather thanashavingbeencreatedafteraperiodin whichnothingdependentexistedorasacondi- tionoftherebeingtimeatall.Typically,theuni- verseisseenasoscillatingbetweenstatesin whichatomshavecometogetherintobodiesthat provideembodimentfortransmigratingsouls andstatesinwhichatomscomeapartandsouls remaininactive. Disputesoccurconcerningthenatureofper- sonsandpersonalidentity,pluralismversus monism,andapersonalDeityversusan Absolute.AdvaitaVedantaapparentlyholdsthat itislogicallyimpossibleforBtodependuponA andforBalsotobeanindividualdistinctfromA, 383 Hinduism Hinduism whereastheothervarietiesofVedantahold(in differentways)thatdependencedoesnotrule outdistinctindividuality.Theformerassumption iscompatiblewith(thoughitdoesnotentail) monismandthelatterallowsfor(butdoesnot require)monotheism.Therearepluralistic(thus non-monistic)schoolsthatarenotmonotheistic. Schoolsdifferaboutwhetherthevarietyofcon- sciousandself-consciousstatesbelongsintrinsi- callytosoulsoronlytosoul-bodycomposites; thoseholdingtheformerviewthinkofpersons ormindsastransmigratingfromlifetolife, whereasthoseholdingthelatterviewhavea thinnernotionofthetraveler.Therearedebates amongschoolsofHinduism,Buddhism,and Jainismöverwhetherasubstantivaloranevent orstateaccountofpersonsandobjectsismore defensible.Forsomeschools,immaterialsouls andmaterialatomsexistbothbeginninglessly andindependently.Forotherstheyexistbegin- ninglesslyanddependently.Forstillothers,no suchthingsexistatall. Epistemology,logic,andphilosophyoflan- guageflourish.Questionsconcerningevidence arediscussedalongthelinesofwhatcountsasa validsourceofknowledge(e.g.,perception,infer- ence,testimony).Indiangrammariansdeveloped techniquesofreducingcomplexexpressionsto simpleonesanddevelopedause-mentiondis- tinction.MImämsaphilosopherswereconcerned withthelogicalanalysisofprescriptions.Vaishe- sikathinkerswereconcernedtoclassifythe meaningsofwords,offeringthecategoriesofsub- stance,quality,action,universal,ultimatediffer- ence,inherence,andabsence,andfoundthe resultofbothlogicalandontologicalsignificance. Ethicsisalsorichlyrepresented,typically withinaperspectiveinwhichthehighestgood (moksha,enlightenment)isviewedasescape fromthebeginninglesscycleofrebirthandthe clutchesofkarma,withthecontentofthehigh- estgoodbeingverydiverselyconceived.Some- timesenlightenmentisconceivedasinvolving retentionofpersonalidentity,sometimesas involvinglossthereof;sometimesaviewisheld thatdeniesthatthereisanythingtopreserve. Thusmoralphilosophyistypicallydoneinthe lightofexplicitlyreligious,oratleastmetaphys- ical,doctrines.TheCärväkaperspectives,atleast asinterpretedbytheiropponents,eitheraccept hedonismoreschewethicsentirely.Forsome metaphysicalandreligiousviews,moralityhasto doonlywiththoseactivitiesthatonemust engageinorrefusetoengageintoachievean enlightenmentthatcontainsnomoralcompo- nentandperhapsinvolvesnothingalongthe linesofone'sidentityasaperson;insuchcon- texts,moralvaluesservereligiousvaluesthat themselvescontainnomoralelement.Inother perspectives,thestatusofpersonsissuchthat theircontinuedexistenceasdistinctpersonsis requiredinorderforenlightenmenttooccurand moralelementsenterintrinsicallyintothe natureofthehighestgood. TheclassicalHinduphilosophertypicallyin effectacceptssomesuchpropositionasthefol- lowing:TheHinduscripturescontainthetruth aboutthenatureofwhatisultimatelyreal,about thenatureofthehumanself,andabouthowto obtainthehighestgood.Somecritics-including Indianunorthodoxmaterialists-arguethat therecannotbeanygenuinephilosophyinHin- duism.(Similarquestionsareraisedconcerning Jewish,Christian,andMuslimmedievalphiloso- phers.)Theacceptanceoftheindicatedproposi- tiondoesnottellonewhatthetruthabout ultimatereality,theself,orthehighestgoodis; variousquitedifferentaccountsofthesematters arepresentedwithintheHinduscriptures.This createsaproblem:sincethetextsareauthorita- tivetheirteachingsmustbetrue.Inconsistent propositionscannotbetrue;showingthatyour opponenfsviewsareself-contradictoryisarefu- tationwithinphilosophicalHinduismasmuchas inAnglo-Americananalyticcircles.Hencethe teachingsofthetextsmustbeconsistent,andso noteverythinginthemcanbereadliterally.In sum,itisnotobviouswhatintheauthoritative textsistobereadliterallyandwhatnon-literally, butsincepatentlycontradictorydoctrinesare offeredifonereadseverythingliterally,some- thingmustbereadnon-literally(orasprovi- sional,thebestthatsomepeoplecanunderstand untiltheybecomemorecapable).Thusifone acceptstheindicatedpropositiononemust decidewhichofthetextualaccountsistheright one-theoneexhypothesiintendedbythetexts tobetakenastheirliteraldoctrine.Decidingthis typicallyisnotamatterofsimpleexegesis.Thus onemustdecidewhatgroundsarerequiredin ordertoestablishthatitisoneratherthan anotheroftheseviewsthatisintendedliterally. Oftenthedefactoansweristhattheintended viewisthetrueview,withtheissueastowhich viewistruebeingdecidedinsubstantialpartby referencetoreasonandexperienceandby"how theargumentgoes."Further,theviewspre- sentedintheauthoritativetext,onceonehas decidedwhattheyliterallyare,willlikelyhave variousphilosophicalimplications.(Forexam- ple,perhapssurprisingly,Rämänuja'stheoryof perceptualerrorrelätesintimatelytohisviews 384 Hintikka,Jaakko Hippocrates onthedivineattributes.)Someoftheseimplica- tionsmayseemfalse,andifthishappensthereis amodustollensconsiderationthatleadstoasking againwhatthetextreallymeans.Butevenifno suchconsiderationarises,thephilosophical implicationsofapositionarelikelythemselvesto needexplicationiftheyaretobeclearlyunder- stood. InHinduismphilosophytypicallyisdoneina commentarialsetting,though(asinEuropean medievalcontexts)oncethecommentatoris doingphilosophyheoftengoesontotopicsvery farindeedfromtheviewsdiscussedinthetexts. Ofcourse,themorewide-rangingacommentary is,thelessunnaturalitisthatacommentaryon thatcommentarybeevenmorewide-ranging; thusarelativelyindependentphilosophicaltra- ditionarises.Theresultisaveryconsiderable bodyofphilosophicalliteratureandtraditionin Indiathatcanbeapproachedwithoutassuming anythingabouttheindicatedproposition,one wayoranother. Seealsoätman,brahman,karma,upan- ISHADS,VEDAS.K.E.Y. Hintikka,Jaakko(b.1929),Finnishphilosopher withcontributionstologic,philosophyofmath- ematics,epistemology,linguisticsandphiloso- phyoflanguage,philosophyofscience,and historyofphilosophy.Hisworkondistributive normalformsandmodelsettechniquesyielded animprovedinductivelogic.Modelsetsdiffer fromCamap'sstate-descriptionsinbeingpartial andnotcompletedescriptionsof"possible worlds."Thetechniquessimplifiedmetatheoret- icalproofsandledtonewresultsine.g.proba- bilitytheoryandthesemantictheoryof information.Theirmainphilosophicalimport neverthelessisinbridgingthegapbetweenproof theoryandmodeltheory. Modelsetsthatdescribeseveralpossible"alter- native"worldsleadtothepossibleworlds semanticsformodalandintensionallogics.Hin- tikkahasusedthemasafoundationforthelogic ofpropositionalattitudes(epistemiclogicand thelogicofperception),andinstudiesonindi- viduation,identification,andintentionality. EpistemiclogicalsoprovidesabasisforHin- tikka^logicofquestions,inwhichconclusive- nessconditionsforanswerscanbedefined.This hasresultedinaninterrogativemodelofinquiry inwhichknowledge-seekingisviewedasapur- suitofconclusiveanswerstoinitial"big"ques- tionsbystrategicallyorganizedseriesof"small" questions(puttonatureortoanothersourceof information).Theapplicationsincludescientific discoveryandexplanation.Hintikka'sindepen- dence-friendlylogicgivesthevariousapplica- tionsaunifiedbasis. Hintikka'sbackgroundphilosophyandap- proachtoformålsemanticsanditsapplicationsis broadlyKantianwithemphasisonseeking-and- findingmethodsandtheconstitutiveactivityof theinquirer.Apartfromaseriesofstudies inspiredbyKant,hehaswrittenextensivelyon Aristotle,Plato,Descartes,Leibniz,Frege,and Wittgenstein.Hintikka'sacademiccareerhas beennotonlyinFinland,chieflyattheUniversity ofHelsinki,but(especially)intheUnitedStates, wherehehasheldprofessorshipsatStanford, FloridaState,and(currently)BostonUniversity. Hisstudentsandco-workersintheFinnish schoolofinductivelogicandinotherareas includeLeilaHaaparanta(b.1954),Risto Hilpinen(b.1943),SimoKnuuttila(b.1946), MartinKusch(b.1959),IlkkaNiiniluoto (b.1946),JuhaniPietarinen(b.1938),Veikko Rantala(b.1933),GabrielSandu(b.1954),Matti Sintonen(b.1951),andRaimoTuomela (b.1940). Seealsoeroteticlogic,hintikkaset, INDUCTIVELOGIC,MODELTHEORY,POSSIBLE WORLDS,PROOFTHEORY.M.T.S. Hintikkaset,alsocalledmodelset,downwardsatu- ratedset,aset(ofacertainsort)ofwell-formed formulasthatarealltrueunderasingleinter- pretationoftheirnon-logicalsymbols(named afterJaakkoHintikka).Suchasetcanbethought ofasa(partial)descriptionofalogicallypossible stateofaffairs,orpossibleworld,fullenoughto makeevidentthattheworlddescribedisindeed possible.ThusitisrequiredofaHintikkasetT thatitcontainnoatomicformulaanditsnega- tion,thati,BGrifAAB£r,thatAGTorB GTifAVBET,andsoforth,foreachlogical constant.Seealsopossibleworlds,setthe- ory.G.F.S. HippiasofElis.Seesophists. Hippocrates(fifthcenturyb.c),semilegendary GreekphysicianfromCos.Somesixtytreatises surviveunderhisname,butitisdoubtful whetherhewastheauthorofanyofthem.The Hippocraticcorpuscontainsmaterialfromawide varietyofstandpoints,rangingfromanextreme empiricismthatrejectedallgrandtheory(On AncientMedicine)tohighlyspeculativetheoretical physiology(OntheNatureofMan,OnRegimen). Manytreatiseswereconcernedwiththeaccurate observationandclassificationofdiseases(Epi- 385 historicaldeterminism Hobbes,Thomas demics)ratherthantreatment.Sometexts(Onthe Art)defendedtheclaimsofmedicinetoscientific statusagainstthosewhopointedtoitsinaccura- ciesandconjecturalstatus;others(Oath,OnDeco- rum)sketchacodeofprofessionalethics.Almost allhistreatiseswerenotablefortheirmaterial- ismandrejectionofsupernatural"explana- tions";theiremphasisonobservation;andtheir concernwiththeisolationofcausalfactors.A largenumberoftextsaredevotedtogynecology. TheHippocraticcorpusbecamethestandard againstwhichlåterdoctorsmeasuredthem- selves;and,viaGalen'srehabilitationandexten- sionofHippocraticmethod,itbecamethebasis forWesternmedicinefortwomillennia. R.J.H. historicaldeterminism.Seemarxism. historicality.Seephilosophyofhistory. historicaljurisprudence.Seejurisprudence. historicalmaterialism.Seeengels. historicaltheoryofreference.Seephilosophyof LANGUAGE. historicism,thedoctrinethatknowledgeofhu- manaffairshasanirreduciblyhistoricalcharac- terandthattherecanbenoahistorical perspectiveforanunderstandingofhuman natureandsociety.Whatisneededinsteadisa philosophicalexplicationofhistoricalknowledge thatwillyieldtherationaleforallsoundknowl- edgeofhumanactivities. Soconstrued,historicismisaphilosophical doctrineoriginatinginthemethodologicaland epistemologicalpresuppositionsofcriticalhisto- riography.Inthemid-nineteenthcenturycertain Germanthinkers(Diltheymostcentrally),react- ingagainstpositivistidealsofscienceandknowl- edge,rejectedscientisticmodelsofknowledge, replacingthemwithhistoricalones.They appliedthisnotonlytothedisciplineofhistory buttoeconomics,law,politicaltheory,andlarge areasofphilosophy.Initiallyconcemedwith methodologicalissuesinparticulardisciplines, historicism,asitdeveloped,soughttoworkout acommonphilosophicaldoctrinethatwould informallthesedisciplines.Whatisessentialto achieveknowledgeinthehumansciencesisto employthewaysofunderstandingusedinhis- toricalstudies.Thereshouldinthehumansci- encesbenosearchfornaturallaws;knowledge therewillbeinterpretiveandrootedinconcrete historicaloccurrences.Assuchitwillbein- escapablyperspectivalandcontextual(contex- tualism).Thisraisestheissueofwhether historicismisaformofhistoricalrelativism.His- toricismappearstobecommittedtothethesis thatwhatforagivenpeopleiswarrantedly assertibleisdeterminedbythedistinctivehistor- icalperspectiveinwhichtheyviewlifeandsoci- ety.Thestressonuniquenessandconcrete specificityandtherejectionofanyappealtouni- versallawsofhumandevelopmentreinforce that.Buttheemphasisoncumulativedevelop- mentintolargercontextsofourhistorical knowledgeputsindoubtanidentificationofhis- toricismandhistoricalrelativism. Theaboveaccountofhistoricismisthatofits mainproponents:Meinecke,Croce,Colling- wood,OrtegayGasset,andMannheim.Butin thetwentiethcentury,withPopperandHayek,a verydifferentconceptionofhistoricismgained somecurrency.Forthem,tobeahistoricististo believethatthereare"historicallaws,"indeed evena"lawofhistoricaldevelopment,"suchthat historyhasapattemandevenanend,thatitis thecentraltaskofsocialsciencetodiscoverit, andthattheselawsshoulddeterminethedirec- tionofpoliticalactionandsocialpolicy.They attributed(incorrectly)thisdoctrinetoMarxbut rightlydenounceditaspseudo-science.How- ever,somelåterMarxists(Lukåcs,Korsch,and Gramsci)werehistoricistsintheoriginalnon- Popperiansenseaswasthecriticaltheorist AdornoandhermeneuticistssuchasGadamer. Seealsocollingwood,croce,dilthey, ENGELS,PHILOSOPHYOFHISTORY.K.N. historicity.Seephilosophyofhistory. history,philosophyof.Seephilosophyofhistory. Hobbes,Thomas(1588-1679),Englishphiloso- pherwhosewritings,especiallytheEnglishver- sionofLeviathan(1651),stronglyinfluencedall ofsubsequentEnglishmoralandpoliticalphilos- ophy.HealsowroteatrilogycomprisingDeCive (1642;Englishversion,PhilosophicalRudiments ConcerningGovernmentandSociety,1651),DeCor- pore(OntheBody,1655),andDeHomine(OnMan, 1658).TogetherwithLeviathan(therevisedLatin versionofwhichwaspublishedin1668),these arehismajorphilosophicalworks.However,an earlydraftofhisthoughts,TheElementsofLaw, NaturalandPolitical(alsoknownasHumanNature andDeCorporePolitico),waspublishedwithout permissionin1650.Manyofthemisinterpreta- tionsofHobbes'sviewsonhumannaturecome 386 Hobbes,Thomas Hobbes,Thomas frommistakingthisearlyworkasrepresenting hismatureviews. HobbeswasinfluentialnotonlyinEngland, butalsoontheContinent.Heistheauthorofthe thirdsetofobjectionstoDescartes'sMeditations. Spinoza'sTractatusTheologico-politicuswasdeeply influencedbyHobbes,notonlyinitspolitical viewsbutalsointhewayitdealtwithScripture. Hobbeswasnotmerelyaphilosopher;hewas mathematicaltutortoCharlesIIandalsoaclas- sicalscholar.Hisfirstpublishedworkwasatrans- lationofThucydides(1628),andamonghis latest,aboutahalf-centurylåter,weretransla- tionsofHomer'sIliadandOdyssey. Hobbes'sphilosophicalviewshavearemark- ablycontemporarysound.Inmetaphysics,he holdsastrongmaterialistview,sometimesview- ingmentalphenomenaasepiphenomenal,but låtermovingtowardareductiveoreliminative view.Inepistemologyheheldasophisticated empiricism,whichemphasizedtheimportance oflanguageforknowledge.Ifnottheoriginator ofthecontemporarycompatibilistviewofthe relationshipbetweenfreewillanddeterminism (seeTheQuestionsConcerningLiberty,Necessityand Chance,1656),hewasoneoftheprimaryinflu- ences.Healsowasoneofthemostimportant philosophersoflanguage,explicitlynotingthat languageisusednotonlytodescribetheworld buttoexpressattitudesand,performatively,to makepromisesandcontracts. OneofHobbes'soutstandingcharacteristicsis hisintellectualhonesty.Thoughhemayhave beentimid(hehimselfclaimsthathewas, explainingthathismothergavebirthtohim becauseoffrightöverthecomingoftheSpanish Armada),hiswritingshowsnotraceofit.During morethanhalfhislonglifetimeheengagedin manyphilosophicalcontroversies,whichre- quiredconsiderablymorecourageinHobbes's daythanatpresent.BoththeRomanCatholic churchandOxfordUniversitybannedtheread- ingofhisbooksandtherewastalknotonlyof burninghisbooksbutofburningHobbeshimself. AnadequateinterpretationofHobbesrequires carefulattentiontohisaccountsofhuman nature,reason,morality,andlaw.Althoughhe wasnotcompletelyconsistent,hismoraland politicalphilosophyisremarkablycoherent.His politicaltheoryisoftenthoughttorequirean egoisticpsychology,whereasitactuallyrequires onlythatmostpersonsbeconcernedwiththeir ownself-interest,especiallytheirownpreserva- tion.Itdoesnotrequirethatmostnotbecon- cernedwithotherpersonsaswell.Allthat Hobbesdeniesisanundifferentiatednatural benevolence:"Forifbynatureonemanshould loveanother(thatis)asman,therecouldnorea- sonbereturnedwhyeverymanshouldnot equallyloveeveryman,asbeingequallyman." Hisargumentisthatlimitedbenevolenceisnot anadequatefoundationuponwhichtobuilda state. Hobbes'spoliticaltheorydoesnotrequirethe denialoflimitedbenevolence,heindeed includesbenevolenceinhislistofthepassionsin Leviathan:"Desireofgoodtoanother,BENEVO- LENCE,GOODWILL,CHARITY.Iftomangen- erally,GOODNATURE."Psychologicalegoism notonlydeniesbenevolentaction,italsodenies actiondonefromamoralsense,i.e.,actiondone becauseonebelievesitisthemorallyrightthing todo.ButHobbesdeniesneitherkindofaction. Butwhenthewords['just'and'unjust']are appliedtopersons,tobejustsignifiesasmuch astobedelightedinjustdealing,tostudyhow todorighteousness,ortoendeavorinall thingstodothatwhichisjust;andtobe unjustistoneglectrighteousdealing,orto thinkitistobemeasurednotaccordingtomy contract,butsomepresentbenefit. Hobbes'spessimismaboutthenumberofjust peopleisprimarilyduetohisawarenessofthe strengthofthepassionsandhisconvictionthat mostpeoplehavenotbeenproperlyeducated anddisciplined. Hobbesisoneofthefewphilosopherstoreal- izethattotalkofthatpartofhumannature whichinvolvesthepassionsistotalkabout humanpopulations.Hesays,"thoughthe wickedwerefewerthantherighteous,yet becausewecannotdistinguishthem,thereisa necessityofsuspecting,heeding,anticipating, subjugating,self-defending,everincidenttothe mosthonestandfairestconditioned."Though wemaybeawareofsmallcommunitiesinwhich mutualtrustandrespectmakelawenforcement unnecessary,thisisneverthecasewhenweare dealingwithalargegroupofpeople.Hobbes's pointisthatifalargegroupofpeoplearetolive together,theremustbeacommonpowersetup toenforcetherulesofthesociety.Thatthereis notnow,norhasthereeverbeen,anylarge groupofpeoplelivingtogetherwithoutsucha commonpowerissufficienttoestablishhispoint. OftenoverlookedisHobbes'sdistinction betweenpeopleconsideredasiftheyweresim- plyanimals,notmodifiedinanywaybyeduca- tionordiscipline,andcivilizedpeople.Though obviouslyanabstraction,peopleasanimalsare fairlywellexemplifiedbychildren."Unlessyou 387 Hobbes,Thomas Hobbes,Thomas givechildrenalltheyaskfor,theyarepeevish, andcry,ayeandstriketheirparentssometimes; andallthistheyhavefromnature."Inthestate ofnature,peoplehavenoeducationortraining, sothereis"continualfear,anddangerofviolent death,andthelifeofman,[is]solitary,poor, nasty,brutish,andshort."Butrealpeoplehave beenbroughtupinfamilies;theyare,atleastto somedegree,civilizedpersons,andhowthey willbehavedependsonhowtheyarebrought up.Hobbesdoesnotsaythatsocietyisacollec- tionofmisfitsandthatthisiswhywehaveallthe troublethatwedo-apositioncongenialtothe psychologicalegoist.Buthedoesacknowledge that"manyalso(perhapsmostmen)either throughdefectofmind,orwantofeducation, remainunfitduringthewholecourseoftheir lives;yethavethey,infantsaswellasthoseof riperyears,ahumannature;whereforemanis madefitforsocietynotbynature,butbyeduca- tion."Educationandtrainingmaychangepeo- plesothattheyactoutofgenuinemoralmotives. Thatiswhyitisoneofthemostimportantfunc- tionsofthesovereigntoprovidefortheproper trainingandeducationofthecitizens.Inthecur- rentdebatebetweennatureandnurture,onthe questionofbehaviorHobbeswouldcomedown stronglyonthesideofnurture. Hobbes'sconceptofreasonhasmoreincom- monwiththeclassicalphilosophicaltradition stemmingfromPlatoandAristotle,whererea- sonsetstheendsofbehavior,thanwiththemod- erntraditionstemmingfromHumewherethe onlyfunctionofreasonistodiscoverthebest meanstoendssetbythepassions.ForHobbes, reasonisverycomplex;ithasagoal,lastingself- preservation,anditseeksthewaytothisgoal.It alsodiscoversthemeanstoendssetbythepas- sions,butitgovemsthepassions,ortriesto,so thatitsowngoalisnotthreatened.Sinceitsgoal isthesameinallpeople,itisthesourceofrules applyingtoallpeople.Allofthisissurprisingly closetothegenerallyacceptedaccountofratio- nality.Wegenerallyagreethatthosewhofollow theirpassionswhentheythreatentheirlifeare actingirrationally.Wealsobelievethateveryone alwaysoughttoactrationally,thoughweknow thatfewalwaysdoso.Perhapsitwasjustthe closenessofHobbes'saccountofreasontothe ordinaryviewofthematterthathasledtoits beingsocompletelyoverlooked. Thefailuretorecognizethattheavoidanceof violentdeathistheprimarygoalofreasonhas distortedalmostallaccountsofHobbes'smoral andpoliticalphilosophy,yetitisapointon whichHobbesiscompletelyclearandconsistent. Heexplicitlysaysthatreason"teacheseveryman toflyacontra-naturaldissolution[mortemviolen- tam]asthegreatestmischiefthatcanarriveto nature."Hecontinuallypointsoutthatitisadic- tateofrightreasontoseekpeacewhenpossible becausepeoplecannot"expectanylasting preservationcontinuingthusinthestateof nature,thatis,ofwar."Andhecallstemperance andfortitudepreceptsofreasonbecausethey tendtoone'spreservation. Ithasnotgenerallybeenrecognizedthat Hobbesregardeditasanendofreasontoavoid violentdeathbecauseheoftentalksoftheavoid- anceofdeathinawaythatmakesitseemmerely anobjectofapassion.Butitisreasonthatdic- tatesthatonetakeallthosemeasuresnecessary forone'spreservation;peaceifpossible,ifnot, defense.Reason'sdictatesarecategorical;it wouldbeatravestyofHobbes'sviewtoregard thedictatesofreasonashypotheticaljudgments addressedtothosewhosedesirefortheirown preservationhappenstobegreaterthananycon- flictingdesire.Heexplicitlydeploresthepowerof theirrationalappetitesandexpresslydeclares thatitisadictateofreasonthatonenotscorn othersbecause"mostmenwouldratherlose theirlives(thatIsaynot,theirpeace)thansuf- ferslander."Hedoesnotsayifyouwouldrather diethansufferslander,itisrationaltodoso. Hobbes,followingAristotle,regardsmorality asconcemedwithcharactertraitsorhabits. Sincemoralityisobjective,itisonlythosehabits thatarecalledgoodbyreasonthataremoral virtues."Reasondeclaringpeacetobegood,it followsbythesamereason,thatallthenecessary meanstopeacebegoodalso;andthereforethat modesty,equity,trust,humanity,mercy(which wehavedemonstratedtobenecessarytopeace), aregoodmannersorhabits,thatis,virtues." Moralvirtuesarethosehabitsofactingthatthe reasonofallpeoplemustpraise.Itisinteresting tonotethatitisonlyinDeHominethatHobbes explicitlyacknowledgesthatonthisaccount, prudence,temperance,andcouragearenot moralvirtues.InDeCivehedistinguishestem- peranceandfortitudefromtheothervirtuesand doesnotcallthemmoral,buthedoesnotexplic- itlydenythattheyaremoralvirtues.ButinDe Homine,heexplicitlypointsoutthatoneshould not"demandthatthecourageandprudenceof theprivateman,ifusefulonlytohimself,be praisedorheldasavirtuebystatesorbyany othermenwhatsoevertowhomthesesameare notuseful." Thatmoralityisdeterminedbyreasonandthat reasonhasasitsgoalself-preservationseemsto 388 Hobbes,Thomas Hobbes,Thomas leadtotheconclusionthatmoralityalsohasas itsgoalself-preservation.Butitisnottheself- preservationofanindividualpersonthatisthe goalofmorality,butofpeopleascitizensofa state.Thatis,moralvirtuesarethosehabitsof personsthatmakeitrationalforallotherpeople topraisethem.Thesehabitsarenotthosethat merelyleadtoanindividual'sownpreservation, buttothepreservationofall;i.e.,topeaceanda stablesociety.Thus,"Gooddispositionsarethose thataresuitableforenteringintocivilsociety; andgoodmanners(thatis,moralvirtues)are thosewherebywhatwasentereduponcanbe bestpreserved."AndinDeCive,whentalkingof morality,hesays,"Thegoodnessofactionscon- sist[s]inthis,thatit[is]inordertopeace,and theevilinthis,thatit[is]relatedtodiscord." Thenatureofmoralityisacomplexandvex- ingquestion.If,likeHobbes,weregardmorality asapplyingprimarilytothosemannersorhabits thatleadtopeace,thenhisviewseemssatisfac- tory.Ityields,ashenotes,allofthemoralvirtues thatareordinarilyconsideredsuch,andfurther, itallowsonetodistinguishcourage,prudence, andtemperancefromthemoralvirtues.Perhaps mostimportant,itprovides,inalmostself-evi- dentfashion,thejustificationofmorality.For whatisittojustifymoralitybuttoshowthatrea- sonfavörsit?Reason,seekingself-preservation, mustfavörmorality,whichseekspeaceandasta- blesociety.Forreasonknowsthatpeaceanda stablesocietyareessentialforlastingpreserva- tion.Thissimpleandelegantjustificationof moralitydoesnotreducemoralitytoprudence; ratheritisanattempt,inagreatphilosophical traditionstemmingfromPlato,toreconcilerea- sonorrationalself-interestandmorality. Inthestateofnatureeverypersonisandought tobegovernedonlybytheirownreason.Reason dictatesthattheyseekpeace,whichyieldsthe lawsofnature,butitalsoallowsthemtouseany meanstheybelievewillbestpreservethem- selves,whichiswhatHobbescallsTheRightof Nature.Hobbes'sinsightistoseethat,except whenoneisinclearandpresentdanger,in whichcaseonehasaninalienablerighttodefend oneself,thebestwaytoguaranteeone'slong- termpreservationistogiveupone'srighttoact onone'sowndecisionsaboutwhatisthebest waytoguaranteeone'slong-termpreservation andagreetoactonthedecisionsofthatsingle personorgroupwhoisthesovereign.Ifallindi- vidualsandgroupsareallowedtoactonthedeci- sionstheyregardasbest,notacceptingthe commandsofthesovereign,i.e.,thelaws,asthe overridingguidefortheiractions,theresultis anarchyandcivilwar.Exceptinrareand unusualcases,uniformityofactionfollowingthe decisionofthesovereignismorelikelytoleadto long-termpreservationthandiverseactionsfol- lowingdiversedecisions.Andthisistrueevenif eachoneofthediversedecisions,ifacceptedby thesovereignasitsdecision,wouldhavebeen morelikelytoleadtolong-termpreservation thantheactualdecisionthatthesovereignmade. ThisargumentexplainswhyHobbesholdsthat sovereignscannotcommitinjustice.Onlyinjus- ticecanproperlybepunished.Hobbesdoesnot denythatsovereignscanbeimmoral,buthedoes denythattheimmoralityofsovereignscanprop- erlybepunished.Thisisimportant,forotherwise anyimmoralactbythesovereignwouldserveas apretextforpunishingthesovereign,i.e.,for civilwar.Whatisjustandunjustisdetermined bythelawsofthestate,whatismoraland immoralisnot.Moralityisawiderconceptthan thatofjusticeandisdeterminedbywhatleadsto peaceandstability.However,toletjusticebe determinedbywhatthereasonofthepeople takestoleadtopeaceandstability,ratherthan bywhatthereasonofthesovereigndecides, wouldbetoinvitediscordandcivilwar,whichis contrarytothegoalofmorality:astablesociety andpeace.Onecancreateanairofparadoxby sayingthatforHobbesitisimmoraltoattemptto punishsomeimmoralacts,namely,thoseofthe sovereign.Hobbesiswillingtoacceptthisseem- ingparadoxforheneverlösessightofthegoalof morality,whichispeace. TosummarizeHobbes'ssystem:people,insofar astheyarerational,wanttoliveouttheirnatural livesinpeaceandsecurity.Todothis,theymust cometogetherintocitiesorstatesofsufficientsize todeterattackbyanygroup.Butwhenpeople cometogetherinsuchalargegrouptherewill alwaysbesomethatcannotbetrusted,andthus itisnecessarytosetupagovernmentwiththe powertomakeandenforcelaws.Thisgovern- ment,whichgetsbothitsrighttogovemandits powertodosofromtheconsentofthegoverned, hasasitsprimarydutythepeople'ssafety.Aslong asthegovernmentprovidesthissafetytheciti- zensareobligedtoobeythelawsofthestateinall things.Thus,therationalityofseekinglasting preservationrequiresseekingpeace;thisinturn requiressettingupastatewithsufficientpowerto keepthepeace.Anythingthatthreatensthesta- bilityofthestateistobeavoided. Asapracticalmatter,HobbestookGodand religionveryseriously,forhethoughttheypro- videdsomeofthestrongestmotivesforaction. HalfofLeviathanisdevotedtotryingtoshowthat 389 Hohenheim,TheophrastusBombastusvon holism hismoralandpoliticalviewsaresupportedby Scripture,andtodiscreditthosereligiousviews thatmayleadtocivilstrife.Butacceptingthesin- cerityofHobbes'sreligiousviewsdoesnot requireholdingthatHobbesregardedGodasthe foundationofmorality.Heexplicitlydeniesthat atheistsanddeistsaresubjecttothecommands ofGod,butheneverdeniesthattheyaresubject tothelawsofnatureorofthecivilstate.Once onerecognizesthat,forHobbes,reasonitselfpro- videsaguidetoconducttobefollowedbyall people,thereisabsolutelynoneedtobringin God.Forinhismoralandpoliticaltheorythere isnothingthatGodcandothatisnotalready donebyreason. Seealsocontractarianism,natural LAW,POLITICALPHILOSOPHY.B.Ge. Hohenheim,TheophrastusBombastusvon.See PARACELSUS. Hohfeld,WesleyNewcomb(1879-1918),Amer- icanjuristwhotaughtatStanfordandYale.His maincontributiontolegalandmoraltheorywas hisidentificationofeightfundamentallegalcon- ceptions: OnepersonXhasalegaldutytoasecondper- sonYtodosomeactAwhenthelaw requiresXtodoAforY. Xhasalegalprivilege(orliberty)infaceofY todoAwhenXhasnolegaldutytoYnot todoA. Xhasalegalright(orclaim)againstYthatY doAwhenYhasalegaldutytoXtodoA. Xhasalegalno-rightagainstYthatYnotdoA whenYhasalegallibertyinfaceofXtodo A. XhasalegalpoweröverYtoeffectsomelegal consequenceCforYwhenthereissome voluntaryactionofXthatwillbringabout CforY. XhasalegaldisabilityinfaceofYtoeffectC whenthereisnoactionXcanperformthat willbringaboutCforY. XhasalegalliabilityinfaceofYtoeffectC whenYhasalegalpowertoeffectCforX. XhasalegalimmunityagainstYfromCwhen YhasnolegalpoweröverXtoeffectC. MoralphilosophershaveadaptedHohfeld'ster- minologytoexpressanalogousmoralconcep- tions. Injurisprudenceorethics,thesefundamental conceptionsprovidesomethinglikeatomsinto whichallmorecomplexlegalormoralrelation- shipscanbeanalyzed.Inlogic,theseconceptions revealpairsofcorrelatives,suchasaclaimofX againstYandadutyofYtoX,eachofwhich impliestheother,andpairsofopposites,suchas adutyofXtoYandalibertyofYinfaceofX, whicharecontradictories.Inthetheoryofrights, hisdistinctionsbetweenliberties,claims,pow- ers,andimmunitiesareoftenusedtoreveal ambiguitiesinthelanguageofrightsortoclas- sifyspeciesofrights. Seealsoduty,ethics,rights.C.We. Holbach,Paul-Henri-Dietrichd'.Seedholbach. Hölderlin,lohannChristianFriedrich(1770- 1843),Germanpoet,novelist,anddramatist.He studiedatTubingen,wherehebefriended SchellingandHegel,andatJena,wherehemet SchillerandFichte.SinceHölderlinneverheldan academicpositionorpublishedanyofhisphilo- sophicalwritings,hisinfluenceonphilosophy wasprimarilythroughhispersonality,conversa- tions,andletters.Heiswidelyviewedasthe authoroftheso-called"OldestSystem-Program ofGermanIdealism,"afragmentthatculminates inanexaltationofpoetryandacallforanew "mythologyofreason."Thisthemeisillustrated inthenovelHyperion(1797/99),whichcriticizes thesubjectiveheroismofethicalidealism, emphasizesthesacredcharacterofnature,and attemptstoconflatereligionandartas"overseers ofreason." Inhisvenerationofnatureandobjectionsto Fichte'streatmentofthe"Not-I,"Hölderlin echoedSchelling'sNaturphilosophie.Inhis Hellenismandhiscritiqueofthe"philosophyof reflection"(seeUeberSeinundUrteil["OnBeing andJudgment"])heanticipatedandinfluenced Hegel.InHölderlin'sexaltationofartasalone capableofrevealingthenatureofreality,he betrayedadebttoSchillerandanticipated Romanticism.However,hisviewofthepoetpos- sessesatragicdimensionquiteforeigntoSchell- ingandtheyoungerRomantics.Theartist,asthe interpreterofdivinenature,mediatesbetween thegodsandmen,butforthisveryreasonis estrangedfromhisfellows.Thisaspectof Hölderlin'sthoughtinfluencedHeidegger. D.Br. holism,anyofawidevarietyofthesesthatinone wayoranotheraffirmtheequalorgreaterreality ortheexplanatorynecessityofthewholeofsome systeminrelationtoitsparts.Inphilosophy,the issuesofholism(thewordismorereasonably, butlessoften,spelled'wholism')haveappeared 390 holism,confirmational homoeomerous traditionallyinthephilosophyofbiology,ofpsy- chology,andespeciallyofthehumansciences.In thecontextofdescription,holismwithrespectto somesystemmaintainsthatthewholehassome propertiesthatitspartslack.Thisdoctrinewill ordinarilybetriviallytrueunlessitisfurther held,inthethesisofdescriptiveemergentism,that thesepropertiesofthewholecannotbedefined bypropertiesoftheparts.Theviewthatallprop- ertiesofthewholesinquestioncanbesodefined isdescriptiveindividualism.Inthecontextofexpla- nation,holismwithrespecttosomeobjectorsys- temmaintainseither(1)thatthelawsofthe morecomplexcasesinitarenotdeduciblebyway ofanycompositionlawsorlawsofcoexistence fromthelawsofthelesscomplexcases(e.g.,that thelawsofthebehaviorofpeopleingroupsare notdeduciblebycompositionlawsorlawsof coexistencefromthelawsofsolitarybehavior), or(2)thatallthevariablesthatconstitutethe systeminteractwitheachother.Thisdenialofde- ducibilityisknownalsoasmetaphysicalormeth- odologicalholism,whereasaffirmingthededucibil- ityismethodologicalindividualism.Inaspecialcase ofexplanatoryholismthatpresupposesdescrip- tiveemergentism,holismissometimesunder- stoodasthethesisthatwithrespecttosome systemthewholehaspropertiesthatinteract "back"withthepropertiesofitsparts.Inthephi- losophyofbiology,anyoftheseformsofholism maybeknownasvitalism,whileinthephiloso- phyofpsychologytheyhavebeencalledGestalt doctrine. Inthephilosophyofthesocialsciences,where 'holism'hashaditsmostcommonuseinphiloso- phy,themanyissueshaveoftenbeenreducedto thatofmetaphysicalholismversusmethodologi- calindividualism.Thisterminologyreflectedthe positivists'beliefthatholismwasnon-empirical inpostulatingsocial"wholes"ortherealityof societybeyondindividualpersonsandtheir propertiesandrelations(asinDurkheimand other,mostlyContinental,thinkers),whileindi- vidualismwasnon-metaphysical(i.e.,empirical) inrelyingultimatelyonlyonobservableproper- tiesindescribingandexplainingsocialphenom- ena. Morerecently,'holism'hasacquiredaddi- tionalusesinphilosophy,especiallyinepiste- mologyandphilosophyoflanguage.Doxasticor epistemicholismarethesesaboutthe"webof belief,"usuallysomethingtotheeffectthataper- son^beliefsaresoconnectedthattheirchange onanytopicmayaffecttheircontentonany othertopicor,perhaps,thatthebeliefsofaratio- nalpersonaresoconnected.Semanticormeaning holismhavebothbeenusedtodenoteeitherthe thesisthatthemeaningsofallterms(orsen- tences)inalanguagearesoconnectedthatany changeofmeaninginoneofthemmaychange anyothermeaning,orthethesisthatchangesof beliefentailchangesofmeaning. Seealsoköhlbr,methodological HOLISM,PHILOSOPHYOFBIOLOGY,PHILOSO- PHYOFTHESOCIALSCIENCES,SEMANTIC HOLISM.L.A. holism,confirmational.Seephilosophyofsci- ENCE. holism,doxastic.Seeholism. holism,epistemic.Seeholism. holism,methodological.Seemethodological holism. holism,semantic.Seesemanticholism. holisticsystem.Seecomputertheory. hologram,theimageofanobjectinthreedimen- sionscreatedandreproducedbytheuseoflasers. Holographyisamethodforrecordingandrepro- ducingsuchimages.Hologramsareremarkable inthat,unlikenormalphotographs,everypartof themcontainsthecompleteimagebutin reduceddetail.Thusasmallsquarecutfroma hologramcanstillbelaser-illuminatedtoreveal thewholesceneoriginallyholographed,albeit withlossofresolution.Thisfeaturemadethe hologramattractivetoproponentsofthethesis ofdistributionoffunctioninthebrain,who arguedthatmemoriesarelikeholograms,not beinglocatedinasinglepreciseengram-as claimedbyadvocatesoflocalizationoffunc- tion-butdistributedacrossperhapsallofthe cortex.Althoughintriguing,theholographic modelofmemorystoragefailedtogainaccep- tance.CurrentviewsfavörD.O.Hebb's"cell assembly"concept,inwhichmemoriesare storedintheconnectionsbetweenagroupof neurons.Seealsoconnectionism,percep- tion.T.H.L. homoeomerity.Seehomoeomerous. homoeomerous(fromGreekhomoiomeres,'oflike parts'),havingparts,nomatterhowsmall,that sharetheconstitutivepropertiesofthewhole. Thederivativeabstractnounis'homoeomery'. TheGreekformsoftheadjectiveandofitscor- 391 homoromery homunculus respondingprivative'anhomoeomerous'are usedbyAristotletodistinguishbetween(a)non- uniformpartsoflivingthings,e.g.,limbsand organs,and(b)biologicalstuffs,e.g.,blood, bone,sap.Inspiteofbeingcomposedofthefour elements,eachofthebiologicalstuffs,when takenindividuallyandwithoutadmixtures,is through-and-throughF,whereFrepresentsthe dusteroftheconstitutivepropertiesofthatstuff. Thus,ifacertainphysicalvolumequalifiesas blood,allitsmathematicallypossiblesubvol- umes,regardlessofsize,alsoqualifyasblood. Bloodisthushomoeomerous.Bycontrast,aface orastomachoraleafareanhomoeomerous:the partsofafacearenotaface,etc.InAristotle'ssys- tem,thehomoeomeryofthebiologicalstuffsis tiedtohisdoctrineoftheinfinitedivisibilityof matter.ThedistinctionisprefiguredinPiato(Pro- tagoras329d). Theterm'homoeomerous'isstricterinits applicationthantheordinaryterms'homoge- neous'and'uniform'.Forwemayspeakofa homogeneousentityevenifthepropertiesat issueareidenticallypresentonlyinsamplesthat fallaboveacertainsize:thecoloroftheseacan behomogeneouslyoruniformlyblue;butitis nothomoeomerouslyblue. Theadjectivehomoiomeres,-es,andthenoun homoiomereiaalsooccur-probablytenden- tiously,undertheinfluenceofAristotle's usage-inourancientsourcesforapre-Aris- totelianphilosopher,AnaxagorasofClazome- nae,withreferencetotheconstituent"things" (chremata)involvedinthelatter'sschemeofuni- versalmixture.Moreover,theconceptof homoeomeryhasplayedasignificantroleout- sideancientGreekphilosophy,notablyintwen- tieth-centuryaccountsofthecontrastbetween mässtermsandcounttermsorsortals. Seealsoanaxagoras,aristotle,count NOUN,SORTALPREDICATE.A.P.D.M. homoeomery.Seehomoeomerous. homoiousian.Seehomoousios. homological.Seeset-theoreticparadoxes. homomorphism,inmodeltheory,astructure- preservingmappingfromonestructureto another.Astructureconsistsofadomainof objectstogetherwithafunctionspecifyinginter- pretations,withrespecttothatdomain,ofthe relationsymbols,functionsymbols,andindivid- ualsymbolsofagivenlanguage.Relations,func- tions,andindividualsindifferentstructuresfora languageLcorrespondtooneanotheriftheyare interpretationsofthesamesymbolofL.Tocalla mapping"structure-preserving"istosay(1)that ifobjectsinthefirststructurebearacertainrela- tiontooneanother,thentheirimagesinthesec- ondstructure(underthemapping)bearthe correspondingrelationtooneanother,(2)that thevalueofafunctionforagivenobject(orn- tupleofobjects)inthefirststructurehasasits imageunderthemappingthevalueofthecor- respondingfunctionfortheimageoftheobject (orM-tupleofimages)inthesecondstructure, and(3)thattheimageinthesecondstructureof anobjectinthefirstisthecorrespondingobject. Anisomorphismisahomomorphismthatisone- to-oneandwhoseinverseisalsoahomomor- phism.Seealsomodeltheory.R.Ke. homonymy.Seeambiguity. homoousian.Seehomoousios. homoousios(Greek,'ofthesamesubstance'),a conceptcentraltotheChristiandoctrineofthe Trinity,enshrinedintheNiceneCreedofa.d. 381.ItatteststhatGodtheSon(andbyextension theSpirit)isofoneandthesamebeingorsub- stance(ousia)astheFather.Reflectingtheinsis- tenceofAthanasiusagainstArianismthatChrist isGod'seternal,coequalSonandnotacreature, theNicenehomoousiosisalsotobedifferentiated fromarivalformula,homoiousios(Greek,'ofsim- ilarsubstance'),whichaffirmsmerelytheSon's likenessinbeingtoGod.Thoughnotoriouslyand superficiallyanargumentöveroneGreekiota, theissuewasphilosophicallyprofoundandtheo- logicallycrucialwhetherornotJesusofNazareth incarnatedGod'sownbeing,revealedGod'sown truth,andmediatedGod'sownsalvation.See alsoTRINITARIANISM.A.E.L. homuncularfunctionalism.Seefunctionalism. homunculus(fromLatin,Tittleman'),aminia- tureadultheldtoinhabitthebrain(orsome otherorgan)whoperceivesalltheinputstothe senseorgansandinitiatesallthecommandsto themuscles.Anytheorythatpositssuchan internalagentrisksaninfiniteregress(some- timescalledthehomunculusfallacy),sincewecan askwhetherthereisalittlemaninthelittle man'shead,responsibleforhisperceptionand action,andsoon.Manyfamiliarviewsofthe mindanditsactivitiesseemtorequirea homunculus.Forinstance,modelsofvisualper- ceptionthatpositaninnerpictureasitsproduct 392 Horkheimer,Max hsien apparentlyrequireahomunculustolookatthe picture,andmodelsofactionthattreatinten- tionsascommandstothemusclesapparently requireahomunculustoissuethecommands.It isneveraneasymattertodeterminewhethera theoryiscommittedtotheexistenceofa homunculusthatvitiatesthetheory,andinsome circumstances,homunculicanbelegitimately positedatintermediatelevelsoftheory: "Homunculiarebogeymenonlyiftheyduplicate entirethetalentstheyarerungintoexplain.If onecangetateamorcommitteeofrelatively ignorant,narrow-minded,blindhomunculito producetheintelligentbehaviorofthewhole, thisisprogress"(Dennett,Brainstorms,1978). Theories(inphilosophyofmindorartificialintel- ligenceorcognitivescience)thatpositsuch teamsofhomunculihavebeencalledhomuncu- larfunctionalismbyWilliamLycan.D.C.D. Horkheimer,Max(1895-1973),German philosopher,theleadingtheoristofthefirstgen- erationoftheFrankfurtSchoolofcriticaltheory. BothasdirectoroftheInstituteforSocial Researchandinhisearlyphilosophicalessays publishedintheZeitschriftfiirSozialforschung, Horkheimersettheagendaforthecollaborative workoftheFrankfurtSchoolinthesocialsci- ences,includinganalysesofthedevelopmentsof statecapitalism,thefamily,modernculture,and fascism.Hisprogrammaticessaysontherelation ofphilosophyandthesocialscienceslongpro- videdthephilosophicalbasisforFrankfurt Schoolsocialcriticismandresearchandhave profoundlyinfluencedHabermas'sreformula- tionofFrankfurtSchoolcriticaltheory.Inthese essays,suchas"ThePresentSituationofSocial PhilosophyandtheTasksofanInstitutefor SocialResearch"(1931),Horkheimerelaborated acooperativerelationbetweenphilosophyand thesocialsciencesthroughaninterdisciplinary historicalmaterialism.His"TraditionalandCrit- icalTheory"(1937)developsthedistinction between"critical"and"traditional"theoriesin termsofbasicgoals:criticaltheoriesaimat emancipatinghumanbeingsratherthandescrib- ingrealityasitisnow. InthedarkestdaysofWorldWarIIHork- heimerbegancollaboratingwithAdornoonThe DialecticofEnlightenment(1941),inwhichthey seetheoriginsofmodernreasonandautonomy inthedominationofnatureandtheinnerself. Thisgenealogyofmodemreasonarguesthat mythandenlightenmentareinseparably "entwined,"aviewproposedprimarilyto explainthecatastropheinwhichEuropéfound itself.WhileHorkheimerthoughtthatarevised notionofHegeliandialecticsmightleadbeyond thisimpasse,henevercompletedthispositive project.Instead,hefurtherdevelopedthecri- tiqueofinstrumentalreasoninsuchworksas EclipseofReason(1947),wherehearguesthat moderninstitutions,includingdemocracy,are undertheswayofformålandinstrumentalratio- nalityandtheimperativesofself-preservation. Whilehedidlittlenewworkafterthisperiod,he tumedattheendofhislifetoaphilosophical reinterpretationofreligionandthecontentof religiousexperienceandconcepts,developinga negativetheologyofthe"completelyOther."His mostenduringinfluenceishisclearformulation oftheepistemologyofpracticalandcriticalsocial inquiryorientedtohumanemancipation. Seealsocriticaltheory,Frankfurt SCHOOL.J.BO. hormicpsychology.Seemcdougall. HoYen(d.A.D.249),Chinesephilosopher,an earlyleaderoftheNeo-Taoistmovement.HoYen broughtintocurrencytheideaof"non-being" (wu)inexplainingthetaoandtheoriginofbeing. Withoutlimitandinexhaustible,thetaoconsti- tutesthetotalityofallthereis.Formlessand nameless,itisacreativevitalenergy(ch'i)that throughaprocessofdifferentiationproduces heavenandearthandthemyriadcreatures.Ho Yenisalsofamousforhisviewthatthesagedoes nothaveemotions(ch'ing).Thisisbecausethe sageisexceptionallyendowedwithpurech'i- energy,whichprecludesemotionaldisturbance. Ethically,thisfurthertranslatesintoacritiqueof hypocrisyandtheabuseofpowerthatHoYen consideredthebaneofChinesesociety.Seealso CH'ING,NEO-TAOISM.A.K.L.C. hsiao,Chineseteammeaning'filialpiety'.Hsiao refersbothtoavirtueandtoactsmanifesting thatvirtue.Originally,hsiaohadtodowiththe properperformanceofone'sparents'funeralrit- ualsandsacrificestoone'sancestors.Låter,hsiao cametoencompassthepropertreatmentofone's parentswhiletheyarealive.Hsiaoisfundamen- taltoConfucianisminthatshowingproper respectforone'sparentsisthoughttoberelated torespectforlegitimatepoliticalauthority.See alsoCONFUCIANISM,li2.B.W.V.N. hsien,inChinesephilosophy,divine"immortals" or"transcendents"-spiritualbeingswhohave attainedthetaoandarecharacterizedbytran- scendenceandimmortality;acentralidealin 393 HsiK'ang hsing religiousTaoism.Theideahasitsrootsinancient Chinesereligion;initsmatureform,itsignifiesa beingconstitutedbythepurestandmostpotent formofvitalenergy(ch'i),whichrendershim/ herbeyondthelimitationsofmundanelife. Thus,hsienareoftencharacterizedbythepower offlight.Inpoetryandphilosophicdiscourse, hsienevokesfulfillmentandfreedom,especially fromdesireandthevagariesofhumanstriving. InreligiousTaoism,thereisanimportantdebate whetherimmortalitycanbeachievedthrough effort.Variousmethodsthatfallunderthegen- eralrubricsof"internalalchemy"(nei-tari)and "externalalchemy"(wai-tan)havebeendevised tobringabouttheperfectedstate.Seealsoch'i, taoism.A.K.L.C. HsiK'ang(a.d.223-62),Chinesephilosopher,a keyrepresentativeofNeo-Taoism.HsiK'ang's philosophycentersontheconceptoftzu-jan- naturalnessor,literally,whatisofitselfso- whichdepictstheinherentorderoftheTaoist universe.Natureconformsto"necessaryprinci- ples"(pi-janchihIi);individualsreceivean energyendowment(ch'i)atbirthofvaryingrich- nessthatdefinestheirnatureandcapacity.While endowmentisinborn,self-cultivationdirectedat dispellingself-interestcansubstantiallyenhance one'sphysicalandspiritualwell-being.Inethics andpolitics,HsiK'angthusadvocatesgoing beyondtheorthodoxteachingsofConfucianism (ming-chiao),whichemphasizelearning,confor- mity,andtradition.Hsiisalsofamousforhis musicaltheorythat"soundsdonothavesorrow orjoy"(shengwuai-lo):whilesoundsarenatu- rallyproduced,emotionsinvolvesubjectiveand cognitivereactions.Seealsoch'i,neo-tao- ism.A.K.L.C. hsin1,Chinesetermmeaning'heart','mind', 'feeling'.Generally,thehsinisboththephysical organwecalltheheart,andthefacultyofappe- tition,cognition,andemotion,buttheprecise natureandproperroleofhsinisoneofthefun- damentalissuesdividingChinesephilosophers. Menciusspeaksof"fourhearts,"associatinga particularvirtueandsetofemotionalandcogni- tivecapacitieswitheach.ChuangTzusuggests thatwe"fast"(chai),ratherthancultivate,the hsin,lettingourselvesbeguidedinsteadbythe ch'i.HstinTzuholdsthatthehsinshouldcontrol andsublimatethedesires.InNeo-Confucianism, thehsinisconceivedasafullydevelopedmoral sense,presentineveryhuman,whoseproper functioningisobscuredbyselfishdesires.Neo- Confuciansdifferöverwhetherhsinisidentical withprinciple(Ii)andnature(hsing).Seealso CONFUCIANISM,LI1,MENCIUS,NEO-CONFU- CIANISM.B.W.V.N. hsin2,Chinesetermmeaning'trust','faith', 'trustworthiness','honest'.Inearlytexts,hsinis themutualtrustofsinceritybetweenworshiper andspirit.TheChinesecharacterforthisword consistsoftwoelementsrepresenting'person' and'speech',andthisprovidesareliableguideto itsrootsense:beingtruetoone'sword.Hsin becameoneofthecardinalConfucianvirtues: trustworthinessorhonesty(butonlyinservice towhatisright).InBuddhistcontexts,hsincan mean'faith'inthereligioussense,e.g.,thePure LandSchool'spracticeoffaithinAmitäbhaBud- dha.ThisinfluencedNeo-Confucianismandis manifestedintheirfaithinaperfect,innate moralfaculty.Seealsochinesephilosophy, NEO-CONFUCIANISM.P.J.I. hsing,Chinesephilosophicaltermgenerally agreedtobederivedfrom'sheng'(life,growth), andusuallytranslatedas'nature'.Initsearliest useasatermdistinctfrom'sheng',itprobably referredtothetendencyordirectionofdevelop- mentthatathingwillrealizeifunobstructed (e.g.itisthehsingofasprouttogrowintoafull- grownplantandthehsingofwatertoflowdown- ward),andthehsingofhumanbeingsisalso supposedtobetheirpropercourseofdevelop- ment.Theconcepthsingprobablyenteredphilo- sophicaldiscoursewiththedevelopmentofthe schoolofthoughtassociatedwithYangChu (fifth-fourthcenturyb.c),whichregardedthe hsingofhumanbeingsasthetendencytolivea lifeofacertainspäningoodhealthandwithsen- sorydesiresappropriatelysatisfied.Itsubse- quentlybecameacentralconceptinConfucian thought,thoughunderstooddifferentlybydif- ferentConfucianthinkers.Mencius(fourthcen- turyb.c.)regardedthemoralwayoflifeasafull realizationofthehsingofhumanbeings,which isconstitutedbythedirectionofdevelopment indicatedbycertainincipientmoralinclinations oftheheart/mind(hsin);hsingisgoodinthatit hasamoraldirection.HsiinTzu(thirdcentury b.c.)regardedthemoralwayoflifeasatrans- formationofthehsingofhumanbeings,which comprisesprimarilyself-regardingdesires humanbeingshavebybirth;hsingisevilinthat unregulatedpursuitofsatisfactionofsuch desiresleadstostrifeanddisorder.Different viewsofhsingcontinuedtoevolve;buteversince theviewthatMenciuswasthetruetransmitter ofConfucius'steachingsbecameestablished, 394 hsing-erh-shang HsiinTzu largelythroughtheeffortsofChuHsi(1130- 1200),theideathatthehsingofhumanbeingsis goodhasbeenacentraltenetofConfucian thought.Seealsoconfucianism.K.-l.S. hsing-erh-shang,inChinesephilosophy,formless ormetaphysical.InpartoneoftheI-Ching(the BookofChanges)thereisastatementthatwhatis hsing-erh-shangiscalledtao(theWay),andwhat ishsing-er-hsia(withform)iscalledch'i,acon- cretething.IntheChinesewayofthinking,tao andch'iareunderstoodtobeinseparablefrom eachother;astaoisbothtranscendentand immanent,itpermeatesthings,andthingsmust notbecutoffandalienatedfromtheirmeta- physicalorigin.Seealsochinesephilosophy. S.-h.L. hsing-ming,inChinesephilosophy,"formsand names,"animportantphilosophicalconcept associatedwithLegalismandtheHuang-Lao School(theschooloftheYellowEmperorand LaoTzu),whichflourishedduringtheWarring StatesperiodandtheearlyHandynasty(third- secondcenturyb.c).Thenarrowermeaningof thetermhastodowithasystemoflawandpun- ishment,designedespeciallytokeepstateoffi- cialsincheck.Morebroadly,hsing-mingpointsto avisionoforder,inwhichall"names"(ming) shouldcorrespondtotheirunderlying"form" (hsing)orreality.Appliedtopolitics,thissuggests thattherulermustdiscemtheworkingsofthe cosmos,ensurethatofficialsperformtheir assignedduties,andallowthepeopletoprosper intheperceivednaturalorderofthings.Seealso CHINESELEGALISM.A.K.L.C. HsiungShih-li(1885-1968),Chinesecontempo- raryNewConfucianphilosopher.Hewasarev- olutionarywhenyoungandlåterstudied Wei-shih(Vijnanavada,'Consciousness-Only') philosophyattheChinaBuddhistInstitute underOu-yangChing-wu(1871-1943).But, dissatisfied,hedevelopedhisNewWei-shihphi- losophyofcreativitybasedontheinsightshe derivedfromtheI-Ching.Hebecameinfluential andhadMouTsung-san,T'angChiin-i,andHsii Fu-kuanamonghisdisciples.AftertheCommu- nisttakeoverin1949,hestillrejectedmaterial- ism,butembracedaradicalsocialphilosophy thatwasnotsharedbymostofhisformerdisci- ples.Seealsochinesephilosophy,hsufu- kuan,I-CHING,T'ANGCHUN-I.S.-h.L. hsu,Chinesetermmeaning'void','vacuity','the tenuous'.Hsuisnottheabsenceofallthingsbut astateinwhichthingslackdistinctions.For ChuangTzu,hsuistheidealstateofmind,in whichthemindisreceptivetoallthings,per- ceivesclearly,andrespondseffortlessly,asaclean mirrorreflectstheimagesbeforeit.HsiinTzu developsthisideal,characterizingamindthatis hsii(tenuous),unifiedandstill.Extendinglåter Taoistviews,Neo-Confuciansregardhsiiasthe original,inchoatestateofthecosmos,outof whichallthingscontinuallyemergeandinto whichtheyeventuallydissolve.Neo-Confucians distinguishhsiifromtheBuddhistconceptk'ung (emptiness),whichtheyseeasdenyingtheulti- materealityoftheworld.Seealsoneo-confu- cianism.P.J.I. HsuFu-kuan(1903-82),Chineseintellectual andhistorianwhoserveddirectlyunderChiang Kai-shekatonetime,butbecameacriticofthe NationalistgovernmentafteritmovedtoTaiwan in1949.HefoundedDemocraticReview,theinflu- entialmagazinethatspreadtheideasofcontem- poraryNewConfucians.Healsostartedthe DepartmentofChineseatTunghaiUniversityin 1955andinvitedMouTsung-santojointhestaff toformanothercenterofNewConfucianism otherthanNewAsiaCollegeinHongKong.He characterizedhisownpositionasbetweenacad- emicstudiesandpolitics,andbetweenhistorical scholarshipandphilosophicalunderstanding. Hismagnumopuswasthethree-volumeHistory ofHanThought;hisworksonChineseliterature andartwerealsowidelyquoted.Seealso CH'IENMU,HSIUNGSHIH-LI,T'ANGCHUN-I. S.-h.L. HsuHsing(c.315b.c),Chinesephilosopher,a memberoftheTillersorAgricultureSchool (NungChia).TheTillersbelievedthatinantiquity ShenNung,theDivineFarmer,hadruledwith- outreward,punishment,oradministrationöver adecentralizedutopiaofsmallcommunities whereall,includingtheruler,livedbytheirown labor.Accordingly,HsiiHsingattackedcontem- poraryrulerswhodidnotplowthefieldsbut ratherlivedoffthelaborofothers.Healsosought tostabilizegrainpricesbycontrollingsupply: grainwouldbestoredingoodyearsanddistrib- utedinbadones.R.P.P.&R.T.A. HsiinTzu(thirdcenturyb.c),atough-minded Confucianphilosopherbestknownforhisoppo- sitiontoMencius'sconceptionoftheinherent goodnessofhumannature.ForHsiinTzu,the essentialnatureofhumanbeingsisbadinthe senseofpossessingaproblematicalmotivational 395 HuaiNanTzu humanism structure:everyhumanseekstosatisfyhis/her desires;unlessguidedbyIi(propriety)andi (rightness),thesedesiresinevitablyleadtocon- flictespeciallyinviewofthescarcityofgoodsand thenativehumantendencytowardpartialityfor one'sownbenefitsandforthoseofone'sclose relations.Significantly,theIiorrulesofproper behaviorperformthreebasicfunctions:delimit- ing,supportive,andennobling.Thefirstdraws theboundariesofproperconduct;thesecond provideschannelsforsatisfactionofdesires withintheseboundaries;andthethirdprovides sourcesforennoblingpersonalcharacterin accordancewithjen(benevolence)andi(right- ness).HsiinTzuisalsonotedforemphasizinglaw asasupplementtoIi(rulesofproperconduct); theneedofargumentationtoresolveethicaldis- agreement;theimportanceofclarityofmind,as opposedtopi(obscuration)inthepursuitofeth- icalknowledge;andtheimportanceofConfu- cianclassicsincharactereducation.Seealso mencius.A.S.C. HuaiNanTzu,anancientChinesesyncreticcom- pendiumofknowledge.Itwascompiledbyan academyofscholarsresidingunderthepatron- ageofoneofthemostprominentliteraryfigures oftheage,LiuAn,PrinceofHuaiNan,andpre- sentedtotheimperialcourtofEmperorWuin about140b.c.Thetwentytreatisesthatmakeup thetextincludetechnicalträetsonastronomy, topography,andcalendrics,aswellasoriginal reconfigurationsoftheideasandbeliefsthat flourishedintheformativeperiodofclassical Chinesephilosophy.Inmanyways,itisaHan dynasty(206b.c.-a.d.220)summaryofexist- ingknowledge,andlikemostChinesedocu- mentsitispracticalandprescriptive.Asa politicaldocument,itissyncretic,blendingCon- fucian,Legalist,andTaoistpreceptstorecom- mendakindofpracticableTaoistaltemativeto politicalcentralism.R.P.P.8-R.T.A. Huang-Lao(Chinese,'SchooloftheYellow EmperorandLaoTzu'),aneclecticschool(c. thirdcenturyb.c.)purportedlybasedonthe teachingsofthemythicYellowEmperorandLao Tzu,advocatingakindofRealpolitikTaoism stressingrelianceonmethodsofruling(e.g., rewardsandpunishments)andthepowerof politicalandsocialstruetures.Huang-Lao soughttoestablishaperfectlyorganizedstate, whichtzujan(naturally)runssmoothly,in whichtherulerreigns(notrules)throughwuwei (non-action).Huang-Lao'smysticalsidecon- cernsitsclaimthatonlytherulercanattainthe unifyingvisionneededforsuchorganizationand thatthisvisionisachievedthroughthepractice ofstillnessandhsii(tenuousness).P.J.I. HuangTsung-hsi(1610-95),Chinesephiloso- pherandhistorian.AstudentofLiuTsung-chou (1578-1645),thelastgreatNeo-Confucian philosopherintheMingdynasty,hecompiled Ming-ju-hsiieh-anandSung-Yiian-hsueh-an,im- portantanthologiesandcriticalaccountsofthe Neo-ConfucianistsoftheMingdynastyandSung andYiiandynasties.HealsowroteMing-i-tai- fang-lu("WaitingfortheDawn:APlanforthe Prince"),inwhichhedenouncedthesystemof governmentworkingonlyfortheselfishinterest oftheruler.Thisworkexertedgreatinfluencein thelastdaysoftheChineseempire.Seealso CHINESEPHILOSOPHY,CHUHSI,WANGYANG- MING.S.-h.L. HuHung,alsocalledWu-feng(1100-55),Chi- neseNeo-Confucianphilosopherandanimpor- tantfigureintheHunanSchool.Accordingto him,hsin(mind/heart)istheoutwardmanifes- tationofhsing(humannature);onemustfirst understandthenatureofjen(humanity)before onecanpracticemoraleultivation.Professor MouTsung-sanbelievedthatHuHungsuc- ceededChouTun-yi,ChangTsai,andCh'eng Hao,representingathirdlineofthoughtother thanthoseofCh'eng-ChuandLu-Wang.See alsoCHANGTSAI,CH'ENGHAO,CHOUTUN-YI, CHUHSI,NEO-CONFUCIANISM.S.-h.L. HuiShih(c.380-305b.c),Chinesephilosopher, primeministerofthestateofWei,andaleading memberoftheSchoolofNames(mingchia,also referredtoaspienche,theDialecticiansor Sophists).Asafriendanddebatingpartnerofthe TaoistphilosopherChuangTzu,HuiShihparried ChuangTzu'spoetic,rhapsodic,andmeditation- basedintuitionswithsophisticatedlogicand analyticrigor.AnadvocateoftheMohistideaof impartialconcernforothers(chienai)andan opponentofwar,heismostfamousforhisTen Paradoxes,collectedintheChuangTzu.Though HuiShih'sexplanationsarenolongerextant, paradoxessuchas"IgotoYiiehtodaybutarrived yesterday"and"Thesouthhasnolimityethasa limit"raiseissuesofrelativityandperspectivism withrespecttolanguage,values,andconcepts suchasspaceandtime.Seealsochuangtzu. R.P.P.&R.T.A. humanism,asetofpresuppositionsthatassigns tohumanbeingsaspecialpositioninthescheme 396 humanism,civic humanism,civic ofthings.Notjustaschoolofthoughtoracol- lectionofspecificbeliefsordoctrines,humanism isratherageneralperspectivefromwhichthe worldisviewed.Thatperspectivereceiveda gradualyetpersistentarticulationduringdiffer- enthistoricalperiodsandcontinuestofurnisha centralleitmotifofWesterncivilization.Itcomes intofocuswhenitiscomparedwithtwocom- petingpositions.Ontheonehand,itcanbecon- trastedwiththeemphasisonthesupematural, transcendentdomain,whichconsidershuman- itytoberadicallydependentondivineorder.On theotherhand,itresiststhetendencytotreat humanityscientificallyaspartofthenatural order,onaparwithotherlivingorganisms. Occupyingthemiddleposition,humanismdis- cernsinhumanbeingsuniquecapacitiesand abilities,tobecultivatedandcelebratedfortheir ownsake. Theword'humanism'cameintogeneraluse onlyinthenineteenthcenturybutwasapplied tointellectualandculturaldevelopmentsinpre- viouseras.Ateacherofclassicallanguagesand literaturesinRenaissanceItalywasdescribedas umanista(contrastedwithlegista,teacheroflaw), andwhatwetodaycall"thehumanities,"inthe fifteenthcenturywascalledstudiahum.anita.tis, whichstoodforgrammar,rhetoric,history,liter- ature,andmoralphilosophy.Theinspirationfor thesestudiescamefromtherediscoveryof ancientGreekandLatintexts;Plato'scomplete worksweretranslatedforthefirsttime,andAris- totle'sphilosophywasstudiedinmoreaccurate versionsthanthoseavailableduringtheMiddle Ages. Theunashamedlyhumanisticflavorofclassi- calwritingshadatremendousimpactonRenais- sancescholars.Here,onefeltnoweightofthe supernaturalpressingonthehumanmind,de- mandinghomageandallegiance.Humanity- withallitsdistinctcapacities,talents,worries, problems,possibilities-wasthecenterofinter- est.Ithasbeensaidthatmedievalthinkersphi- losophizedontheirknees,but,bolsteredbythe newstudies,theydaredtoståndupandtorise tofullstature.InsteadofdevotionalChurch Latin,themediumofexpressionwasthepeople's ownlanguage-Italian,French,German,Eng- lish.Poetical,lyricalself-expressiongained momentum,affectingallareasoflife.Newpaint- ingsshowedgreatinterestinhumanform.Even whiledepictingreligiousscenes,Michelangelo celebratedthehumanbody,investingitwith instrinsicvalueanddignity.Thedetailsofdaily life-food,clothing,musicalinstruments-as wellasnatureandlandscape-domesticand exotic-werelovinglyexaminedinpaintings andpoetry.Imaginationwasstirredbystories broughthomebythediscoverersofnewlands andcontinents,enlargingthescopeofhuman possibilitiesasexhibitedinthecustomsandthe naturalenvironmentsofstränge,remotepeo- ples. Thehumanistmodeofthinkingdeepenedand wideneditstraditionwiththeadventofeigh- teenth-centurythinkers.TheyincludedFrench philosopheslikeVoltaire,Diderot,andRousseau, andotherEuropeanandAmericanfigures- Bentham,Hume,Lessing,Kant,Franklin,and Jefferson.Notalwaysagreeingwithoneanother, thesethinkersneverthelessformedafamily unitedinsupportofsuchvaluesasfreedom, equality,tolerance,secularism,andcosmopoli- tanism.Althoughtheychampioneduntram- meleduseofthemind,theyalsowantedittobe appliedinsocialandpoliticalreform,encourag- ingindividualcreativityandexaltingtheactive överthecontemplativelife.Theybelievedin theperfectibilityofhumannature,themoral senseandresponsibility,andthepossibilityof progress. Theoptimisticmotifofperfectibilityendured inthethinkingofnineteenth-andtwentieth- centuryhumanists,eventhoughtheaccelerating paceofindustrialization,thegrowthofurban populations,andtheriseincrime,nationalistic squabbles,andideologicalstrifeleadingtolarge- scaleinhumanewarfareoftenputinquestion theefficacyofhumanisticideals.Buteventhe depressingrunofhumanexperiencehighlighted theappealofthoseideals,reinforcingthe humanisticfaithinthevaluesofendurance, nobility,intelligence,moderation,flexibility, sympathy,andlove. Humanistsattributecrucialimportanceto education,conceivingofitasanall-around developmentofpersonalityandindividualtal- ents,marryingsciencetopoetryandcultureto democracy.Theychampionfreedomofthought andopinion,theuseofintelligenceandprag- maticresearchinscienceandtechnology,and socialandpoliticalsystemsgovemedbyrepre- sentativeinstitutions.Believingthatitispossible toliveconfidentlywithoutmetaphysicalorreli- giouscertaintyandthatallopinionsareopento revisionandcorrection,theyseehumanflour- ishingasdependentonopencommunication, discussion,criticism,andunforcedconsensus. Seealsoencyclopedia,politicalphi- losophy,SOCIALPHILOSOPHY.K.K. humanism,civic.Seeclassicalrepublicanism. 397 humannature Hume,David humannature,aqualityorgroupofqualities, belongingtoallandonlyhumans,thatexplains thekindofbeingweare.Wearealltwo-footed andfeatherless,but'featherlessbiped'doesnot explainoursociallysignificantcharacteristics. Wearealsoallbothanimalsandrationalbeings (atleastpotentially),and'rationalanimal'might explainthespecialfeatureswehavethatother kindsofbeings,suchasängels,donot. Thebeliefthatthereisahumannatureispart ofthewiderthesisthatallnaturalkindshave essences.Acceptanceofthispositioniscompati- blewithmanyviewsaboutthespecificqualities thatconstitutehumannature.Inadditionto rationalityandembodiment,philosophershave saidthatitispartofournaturetobewhollyself- interested,benevolent,envious,sociable,fearful ofothers,abletospeakandtolaugh,andde- sirousofimmortality. Philosophersdisagreeabouthowwearetodis- coverournature.Somethinkmetaphysical insightintoeternalformsortruthsisrequired, othersthatwecanlearnitfromobservationof biologyorofbehavior.Mosthaveassumedthat onlymalesdisplayhumannaturefully,andthat females,evenattheirbest,areimperfector incompleteexemplars. Philosophersalsodisagreeonwhetherhuman naturedeterminesmorality.Somethinkthatby notingourdistinctivefeatureswecaninferwhat Godwillsustodo.Othersthinkthatournature showsatmostthelimitsofwhatmoralitycan require,sinceitwouldplainlybepointlessto directustowaysoflivingthatournaturemakes impossible. Somephilosophershavearguedthathuman natureisplasticandcanbeshapedindifferent ways.Othersholdthatitisnothelpfultothink intermsofhumannature.Theythinkthat althoughwesharefeaturesasmembersofabio- logicalspecies,ourotherqualitiesaresocially constructed.Ifthedifferencesbetweenmaleand femalereflectculturalpatternsofchildrearing, work,andthedistributionofpower,ourbiolog- icallycommonfeaturesdonotexplainour importantcharacteristicsandsodonotconsti- tuteanature. Seealsoembodiment,essentialism,phi- LOSOPHYOFMIND.J.B.S. humanrights.SeeRiGHTs. humansciences.Seeweber. Humboldt,Wilhelmvon(1767-1835),German statesman,scholar,andeducator,oftenregarded asthefatherofcomparativelinguistics.Bomin Potsdam,Wilhelm,withhisyoungerbrother Alexander,waseducatedbyprivatetutorsinthe "enlightened"stylethoughtsuitableforfuture Prussiandiplomats.Thisincludedclassicallan- guages,history,philosophy,andpoliticalecon- omy.Afterhisuniversitystudiesinlawat FrankfurtanderÖderandGöttingen,hiscareer wasdividedamongassorteddiplomaticposts, writingonabroadrangeoftopics,and(hisfirst love)thestudyoflanguages.Hisbroad-ranging worksrevealtheimportantinfluencesofHerder inhisconceptionofhistoryandculture,Kant andFichteinphilosophy,andtheFrench"Ideo- logues"inlinguistics.Hismostenduringwork hasprovedtobetheIntroduction(publishedin 1836)tohismassivestudyoftheKawilanguage spökenonJava. Humboldtmaintainedthatlanguage,asavital anddynamic"organism,"isthekeytounder- standingboththeoperationsofthehumanmind andthedistinctivedifferencescharacteristicof variousnationalcultures.Everylanguagepos- sessesadistinctiveinnerformthatshapes,ina wayreminiscentofKanfsmoregeneralcate- gories,thesubjectiveexperiences,theworld- view,andultimatelytheinstitutionsofagiven nationanditsculture.Whilealllåtercompara- tivelinguistsareindebtedtobothhisempirical studiesandhistheoreticalinsights,suchphiloso- phersofcultureasDiltheyandCassireracknowl- edgehimasestablishinglanguageasacentral concernforthehumansciences.J.P.Su. Hume,David(1711-76),Scottishphilosopher andhistorianwhomaybeaptlyconsideredthe leadingneo-skepticoftheearlymodernperiod. ManyofHume'simmediatepredecessors (Descartes,Bayle,andBerkeley)hadgrappled withimportantelementsofskepticism.Hume consciouslyincorporatedmanyofthesesame elementsintoaphilosophicalsystemthatman- agestobebothskepticalandconstructive. BornandeducatedinEdinburgh,Humespent threeyears(1734-37)inFrancewritingthe penultimatedraftofATreatiseofHumanNature. Inmiddlelife,inadditiontowritingawide-rang- ingsetofessaysandshorttreatisesandalong HistoryofEngland,heservedbrieflyascompanion toamadnobleman,thenasamilitaryattaché, beforebecominglibrarianoftheAdvocates LibraryinEdinburgh.In1763heservedaspri- vatesecretarytoLordHertford,theBritish ambassadörinParis;in1765hebecamesecre- tarytotheembassythereandthenservedas chargéd'affaires.In1767-68heservedinLon- 398 Hume,David Hume,David donasunder-secretaryofstatefortheNorthern Department.HeretiredtoEdinburghin1769 anddiedthere. Hume'searlycarewaschieflyinthehandsof hiswidowedmother,whoreportedthatyoung Davidwas"uncommonwake-minded"(i.e., uncommonlyacute,inthelocaldialectofthe period).Hisearliestsurvivingletter,writtenin 1727,indicatesthatevenatsixteenhewas engagedinthestudythatresultedinthepubli- cation(1739)ofthefirsttwovolumesofATrea- tiseofHumanNature.Bythetimeheleftcollege (c.1726)hehadathoroughgroundinginclassi- calauthors,especiallyCiceroandthemajorLatin poets;innaturalphilosophy(particularlythatof Boyle)andmathematics;inlogicortheoryof knowledge,metaphysics,andmoralphilosophy; andinhistory.Hisearlyreadingincludedmany ofthemajorEnglishandFrenchpoetsandessay- istsoftheperiod.Hereportsthatinthethree yearsendingaboutMarch1734,heread"most ofthecelebratedBooksinLatin,French&Eng- lish,"andalsolearnedItalian.Thus,although Hume'sviewsareoftensupposedtoresultfrom hisengagementwithonlyoneortwophiloso- phers(witheitherLockeandBerkeley,orHutch- esonorNewton),thebreadthofhisreading suggeststhatnosinglewriterorphilosophical traditionprovidesthecomprehensivekeytohis thought. Hume'smostoftencitedworksincludeATrea- tiseofHumanNature(threevolumes,1739-40); anAbstract(1740)ofvolumes1and2oftheTrea- tise;acollectionofapproximatelyförtyessays (EssaysMoral,Political,andLiterary,firstpub- lished,forthemostpart,between1741and 1752);AnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstand- ing(1748);AnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesof Morals(1751);TheNaturalHistoryofReligion (1757);asix-volumeHistoryofEnglandfrom Romantimesto1688(1754-62);abriefautobi- ography,MyOwnLife(1777);andDialoguescon- cerningNaturalReligion(1778). Hume'sneo-skepticalstancemanifestsitselfin eachoftheseworks.Heinsiststhatphilosophy "cannotgobeyondexperience;andanyhypoth- esis,thatpretendstodiscovertheultimateorig- inalqualitiesofhumannature,oughtatfirstto berejectedaspresumptuousandchimerical."He saysoftheTreatisethatit"isverysceptical,and tendstogiveusanotionoftheimperfectionsand narrowlimitsofthehumanunderstanding."But hegoeswellbeyondtheconventionalrecogni- tionofhumanlimitations;fromhisskeptical startingplaceheprojectsanobservationally basedscienceofhumannature,andproducesa comprehensiveandconstructiveaccountof humannatureandexperience. HumebeginstheTreatisewithadiscussionof the"elements"ofhisphilosophy.Arguingthatit isnaturalphilosophers(scientists)whoshould explainhowsensationworks,hefocuseson thoseentitiesthataretheimmediateandonly objectspresenttothemind.Thesehecalls"per- ceptions"anddistinguishesintotwokinds, "impressions"and"ideas."Humeinitiallysug- geststhatimpressions(ofwhichtherearetwo kinds:ofsensationandofreflection)aremore forcefulorvivaciousthanideas,butsomeideas (thoseofmemory,e.g.)dosometimestakeon enoughforceandvivacitytobecalledimpres- sions,andbeliefalsoaddssufficientforceand vivacitytoideastomakethempracticallyindis- tinguishablefromimpressions.Intheendwe findthatimpressionsareclearlydistinguished fromideasonlyinsofarasideasarealways causallydependentonimpressions. ThomasReidchargedthattheallegedlyrepre- sentativetheoryofperceptionfoundin DescartesandLockehadservedasaphilosoph- icalTröjanhorseleadingdirectlytoskeptical despair.Humewasfullyawareoftheskeptical implicationsofthistheory.Heknewwellthose sectionsofBayleandLockethatrevealtheinad- equacyofDescartes'sattemptstoprovethat thereisanexternalworld,andalsoappreciated theforceoftheobjectionsbroughtbyBayleand Berkeleyagainsttheprimary-secondaryquality distinctionchampionedbyLocke.Hume adoptedtheviewthattheimmediateobjectsof themindarealways"perceptions"becausehe thoughtitcorrect,andinspiteofthefactthatit leadstoskepticismabouttheexternalworld. Satisfiedthatthebattletoestablishabsolutely reliablelinksbetweenthoughtandrealityhad beenfoughtandlöst,Humemadenoattemptto explainhowourimpressionsofsensationare linkedtotheirentirely"unknowncauses."He insteadfocusedexclusivelyonperceptionsqua objectsofmind: Astothoseimpressions,whicharisefromthe senses,theirultimatecauseis,inmyopinion, perfectlyinexplicablebyhumanreason,and 'twillalwaysbeimpossibletodecidewithcer- tainty,whethertheyariseimmediatelyfrom theobject,orareproduc'dbythecreative powerofthemind,orarederiv'dfromthe authorofourbeing.Norissuchaquestion anywaymaterialtoourpresentpurpose.We maydrawinferencesfromthecoherenceof ourperceptions,whethertheybetrueor 399 Hume,David Hume,David false;whethertheyrepresentnaturejustly,or bemereillusionsofthesenses. BookIoftheTreatiseisanefforttoshowhowour perceptionscoheretoformcertainfundamental notions(thoseofspaceandtime,causalconnec- tion,externalandindependentexistence,and mind)inwhich,skepticaldoubtsnotwithstand- ing,wereposebeliefandonwhich"lifeand actionentirelydepend." AccordingtoHume,wehavenodirectimpres- sionsofspaceandtime,andyettheideasofspace andtimeareessentialtoourexistence.Thishe explainsbytracingourideaofspacetoa'man- nerofappearance":bymeansoftwosenses,sight andtouch,wehaveimpressionsthatarraythem- selvesassomanypointsonacontrastingback- ground;theimaginationtransformsthese particularsofexperienceintoa"compound impression,whichrepresentsextension"orthe abstractideaofspaceitself.Ourideaoftimeis, mutatismutandis,accountedforinthesameway: "As'tisfromthedispositionofvisibleandtangi- bleobjectswereceivetheideaofspace,sofrom thesuccessionofideasandimpressionsweform theideaoftime."Theabstractideaoftime,like allotherabstractideas,isrepresentedinthe imaginationbya"particularindividualideaofa determinatequantityandquality"joinedtoa term,'time',thathasgeneralreference. Humeisoftencreditedwithdenyingthereis physicalnecessityandthatwehaveanyideaof necessaryconnection.Thisinterpretationsignif- icantlydistortshisintent.Humewasconvinced bytheCartesians,andespeciallybyMale- branche,thatneitherthesensesnorreasoncan establishthatoneobject(acause)isconnected togetherwithanotherobject(aneffect)insuch awaythatthepresenceoftheoneentailsthe existenceoftheother.Experiencerevealsonly thatobjectsthoughttobecausallyrelatedare contiguousintimeandspace,thatthecauseis priortotheeffect,andthatsimilarobjectshave beenconstantlyassociatedinthisway.Theseare thedefining,perceptiblefeaturesofthecausal relation.Andyetthereseemstobemoretothe matter."Thereis,"hesays,a"necessarycon- nectiontobetakenintoconsideration,"andour beliefinthatrelationmustbeexplained.Despite ourdemonstratedinabilitytoseeorprovethat therearenecessarycausalconnections,wecon- tinuetothinkandactasifwehadknowledgeof them.Weact,forexample,asthoughthefuture willnecessarilyresemblethepast,and"wou'd appearridiculous"ifweweretosay"that'tis onlyprobablethesunwillriseto-morrow,or thatallmenmustdye."Toexplainthisphenom- enonHumeasksustoimaginewhatlifewould havebeenlikeforAdam,suddenlybroughtto lifeinthemidstoftheworld.Adamwouldhave beenunabletomakeeventhesimplestpredic- tionsaboutthefuturebehaviorofobjects.He wouldnothavebeenabletopredictthatone movingbilliardball,strikingasecond,would causethesecondtomove.Andyetwe,endowed withthesamefaculties,cannotonlymake,but areunabletoresistmaking,thisandcountless othersuchpredictions. Whatisthedifferencebetweenourselvesand thisputativeAdam?Experience.Wehaveexpe- riencedtheconstantconjunction(theinvariant successionofpairedobjectsorevents)ofpartic- ularcausesandeffectsand,althoughourexperi- enceneverincludesevenaglimpseofacausal connection,itdoesarouseinusanexpectation thataparticularevent(a"cause")willbefol- lowedbyanotherevent(an"effect")previously andconstantlyassociatedwithit.Regularitiesof experiencegiverisetothesefeelings,andthus determinethemindtotransferitsattentionfrom apresentimpressiontotheideaofanabsentbut associatedobject.Theideaofnecessaryconnec- tioniscopiedfromthesefeelings.Theideahasits foundationinthemindandisprojectedontothe world,butthereisnonethelesssuchanidea. Thatthereisanobjectivephysicalnecessityto whichthisideacorrespondsisanuntestable hypothesis,norwoulddemonstratingthatsuch necessaryconnectionshadheldinthepastguar- anteethattheywillholdinthefuture.Thus, whilenotdenyingthattheremaybephysical necessityorthatthereisanideaofnecessary connection,Humeremainsaskepticabout causalnecessity. Hume'saccountofourbelief\nfutureeffectsor absentcauses-oftheprocessofmindthat enablesustoplaneffectively-isapartofthis sameexplanation.Suchbeliefinvolvesanideaor conceptionoftheentitybelievedin,butisclearly differentfrommereconceptionwithoutbelief. Thisdifferencecannotbeexplainedbysupposing thatsomefurtheridea,anideaofbeliefitself,is presentwhenwebelieve,butabsentwhenwe merelyconceive.Thereisnosuchidea.More- over,giventhemind'sabilitytofreelyjointo- getheranytwoconsistentideas,ifsuchanidea wereavailablewebyanactofwillcould,con- trarytoexperience,combinetheideaofbelief withanyotheridea,andbysodoingcauseour- selvestobelieveanything.Consequently,Hume concludesthatbeliefcanonlybea"different mannerofconceivinganobject";itisalivelier, 400 Hume,David Hume,David firmer,morevividandintenseconception.Belief incertain"mattersoffact"-thebeliefthatbe- causesomeeventorobjectisnowbeingexperi- enced,someothereventorobjectnotyet availabletoexperiencewillinthefutnrebeexperi- enced-isbroughtaboutbypreviousexperience oftheconstantconjunctionoftwoimpressions. Thesetwoimpressionshavebeenassociated togetherinsuchawaythattheexperienceofone ofthemautomaticallygivesrisetoanideaofthe other,andhastheeffectoftransferringtheforce orlivelinessoftheimpressiontotheassociated idea,therebycausingthisideatobebelievedorto takeonthelivelycharacterofanimpression. Ourbeliefsincontinuingandindependently existingobjectsandinourowncontinuingselves are,onHume'saccount,beliefsin"fictions,"or inentitiesentirelybeyondallexperience.We haveimpressionsthatwenaturallybutmistak- enlysupposetobecontinuing,externalobjects, butanalysisquicklyrevealsthattheseimpres- sionsarebytheirverynaturefleetingand observer-dependent.Moreover,noneofour impressionsprovidesuswithadistinctivemark orevidenceofanexternalorigin.Similarly, whenwefocusonourownminds,weexperi- enceonlyasequenceofimpressionsandideas, andneverencounterthemindorselfinwhich theseperceptionsaresupposedtoinhere.Toour- selvesweappeartobemerely"abundleorcol- lectionofdifferentperceptions,whichsucceed eachotherwithaninconceivablerapidity,and areinaperpetualfluxandmovement."Howdo we,then,cometobelieveinexternalobjectsor ourownselvesandself-identity?Neitherreason northesenses,workingwithimpressionsand ideas,provideanythinglikecompellingproofof theexistenceofcontinuing,externalobjects,or ofacontinuing,unifiedself.Indeed,thesetwo facultiescannotsomuchasaccountforourbelief inobjectsorselves.Ifwehadonlyreasonandthe senses,thefacultieschampionedby,respectively, therationalistsandempiricists,wewouldbe miredinadebilitatinganddestructiveuncer- tainty.Sounfortunateanoutcomeisavoided onlybytheoperationofanapparentlyunreliable thirdfaculty,theimagination.It,bymeansof whatappeartobeaseriesofoutrightmistakes andtrivialsuggestions,leadsustobelieveinour ownselvesandinindependentlyexisting objects.Theskepticismofthephilosophersisin thiswaybothconfirmed(wecanprovideno arguments,e.g.,provingtheexistenceofthe externalworld)andshowntobeoflittlepracti- calimport.Anirrationalfaculty,theimagination, savesusfromtheexcessesofphilosophy:"Phi- losophywou'drenderusentirelyPyrrhonian," saysHume,werenotnature,intheformofthe imagination,toostrongforit. BooksIIandIIIoftheTreatiseandtheEnquiry concerningthePrinciplesofMoralsrevealHume's concerntoexplainourmoralbehaviorandjudg- mentsinamannerthatisconsistentwithhissci- enceofhumannature,butwhichnonetheless recognizestheirreduciblemoralcontentofthese judgments.Thusheattemptedtorescuethepas- sionsfromtheadhocexplanationsandnegative assessmentsofhispredecessors.Fromthetimeof PlatoandtheStoicsthepassionshadoftenbeen characterizedasirrationalandunnaturalanimal elementsthat,giventheirhead,wouldunder- minehumankind'strue,rationalnature.Hume's mostfamousremarkonthesubjectofthepas- sions,"Reasonis,andoughtonlytobe,theslave ofthepassions,"willbebetterunderstoodifread inthiscontext(andifitisrememberedthathe alsoclaimsthatreasoncananddoesextinguish somepassions).Incontrasttothelong-standing orthodoxy,Humeassumesthatthepassionscon- stituteanintegralandlegitimatepartofhuman nature,apartthatcanbeexplainedwithout recoursetophysicalormetaphysicalspeculation. Thepassionscanbetreatedasofapiecewith otherperceptions:theyaresecondaryimpres- sions("impressionsofreflection")thatderive frompriorimpressionsandideas.Somepassions (prideandhumility,loveandhatred)maybe characterizedasindirect;i.e.,theyariseasthe resultofadoublerelationofimpressionsand ideasthatgivesthemoneformofintentional character.Thesepassionshavebothassignable causes(typically,thequalitiesofsomepersonor someobjectbelongingtoaperson)andakind ofindirectobject(thepersonwiththequalitiesor objectsjustmentioned);theobjectofprideor humilityisalwaysoneself,whiletheobject ofloveorhatredisalwaysanother.Thedirectpas- sions(desire,aversion,hope,fear,etc.)arefeel- ingscausedimmediatelybypleasureorpain,or theprospectthereof,andtakeentitiesorevents astheirintentionalobjects. InhisaccountofthewillHumeclaimsthat whileallhumanactionsarecaused,theyare nonethelessfree.Hearguesthatourascriptions ofcausalconnectionhaveallthesamefounda- tion,namely,theobservationofa"uniformand regularconjunction"ofoneobjectwithanother. Giventhatinthecourseofhumanaffairswe observe"thesameuniformityandregularoper- ationofnaturalprinciples"foundinthephysical world,andthatthisuniformityresultsinan expectationofexactlythesortproducedbyphys- 401 Hume,David Hume,David icalregularities,itfollowsthatthereisno"nega- tionofnecessityandcauses,"ornolibertyofindif- ference.Thewill,that"internalimpressionwefeel andareconsciousofwhenweknowinglygiveriseto" anyactionorthought,isaneffectalwayslinked (byconstantconjunctionandtheresultingfeel- ingofexpectation)tosomepriorcause.But, insofarasouractionsarenotforciblyconstrained orhindered,wedoremainfreeinanothersense: weretainalibertyofspontaneity.Moreover,only freedominthislattersenseisconsistentwith morality.Alibertyofindifference,thepossibility ofuncausedactions,wouldundercutmoral assessment,forsuchassessmentspresuppose thatactionsarecausallylinkedtomotives. MoralityisforHumeanentirelyhumanaffair foundedonhumannatureandthecircum- stancesofhumanlife(oneformofnaturalism). Weasaspeciespossessseveralnotabledisposi- tionsthat,övertime,havegivenrisetomorality. Theseincludeadispositiontoformbondedfam- ilygroups,adisposition(sympathy)tocommu- nicateandthussharefeelings,adisposition-the moralsense-tofeelapprobationanddisappro- bationinresponsetotheactionsofothers,anda dispositiontoformgeneralrules.Ourdisposition toformfamilygroupsresultsinsmallsocialunits inwhichanaturalgenerosityoperates.Thefact thatsuchgenerosityispossibleshowsthatthe egoistsaremistaken,andprovidesafoundation forthedistinctionbetweenvirtueandvice.The factthatthemoralsenserespondsdifferentlyto distinctivemotivations-wefeelapprobationin responsetowell-intendedactions,disapproba- tioninresponsetoill-intendedones-means thatourmoralassessmentshaveanaffectivebut nonethelesscognitivefoundation.Toclaimthat Nerowasviciousistomakeajudgmentabout Nero'smotivesorcharacterinconsequenceofan observationofhimthathascausedanimpartial observertofeelauniquesentimentofdisappro- bation.Thatourmoraljudgmentshavethis affectivefoundationaccountsforthepractical andmotivationalcharacterofmorality.Reasonis "perfectlyinert,"andhenceourpractical,action- guidingmoraldistinctionsmustderivefromthe sentimentsorfeelingsprovidedbyourmoral sense. Humedistinguishes,however,betweenthe "naturalvirtues"(generosity,benevolence,e.g.) andthe"artificialvirtues"(justice,allegiance, e.g.).Thesedifferinthattheformernotonlypro- ducegoodoneachoccasionoftheirpractice,but arealsooneveryoccasionapproved.Incontrast, anyparticularinstantiationofjusticemaybe "contrarytothepublicgood"andbeapproved onlyinsofarasitisentailedby"ageneralscheme orsystemofaction,whichisadvantageous."The artificialvirtuesdifferalsoinbeingtheresultof contrivancearisingfrom"thecircumstancesand necessitiesoflife."Inouroriginalconditionwe didnotneedtheartificialvirtuesbecauseour naturaldispositionsandresponseswereade- quatetomaintaintheorderofsmall,kinship- basedunits.Butashumannumbersincreased,so toodidthescarcityofsomematerialgoodslead toanincreaseinthepossibilityofconflict,par- ticularlyöverproperty,betweentheseunits.As aconsequence,andoutofself-interest,our ancestorsweregraduallyledtoestablishcon- ventionsgoverningpropertyanditsexchange.In theearlystagesofthisnecessarydevelopment ourdispositiontoformgeneralruleswasan indispensablecomponent;atlåterstages,sympa- thyenablesmanyindividualstopursuethearti- ficialvirtuesfromacombinationofself-interest andaconcernforothers,thusgivingthefully developedartificialvirtuesafoundationintwo kindsofmotivation. Hume'sEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstand- ingandhisEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesof Moralsrepresenthiseffortto"recast"important aspectsoftheTreatiseintomoreaccessibleform. HisEssaysextendhishuman-centeredphilo- sophicalanalysistopoliticalinstitutions,eco- nomics,andliterarycriticism.Hisbest-selling HistoryofEnglandprovides,amongmuchelse,an extendedhistoricalanalysisofcompetingWhig andToryclaimsabouttheoriginandnatureof theBritishconstitution. Hume'strenchantcritiqueofreligionisfound principallyinhisEnquiryconcerningHuman Understanding,NaturalHistoryofReligion,andDia- logues.Inanefforttocurbtheexcessesofreli- giousdogmatism,Humefocuseshisattentionon miracles,ontheargumentfromdesign,andon theoriginoftheideaofmonotheism.Miracles areputativefactsusedtojustifyacommitment tocertaincreeds.Suchcommitmentsareoften maintainedwithamind-numbingtenacityanda disruptiveintolerancetowardcontraryviews. Humearguesthatthewidelyheldviewofmira- clesasviolationsofalawofnatureisincoherent, thattheevidenceforeventhemostlikelymira- clewillalwaysbecounterbalancedbytheevi- denceestablishingthelawofnaturethatthe miracleallegedlyviolates,andthattheevidence supportinganygivenmiracleisnecessarilysus- pect.Hisargumentleavesopenthepossibility thatviolationsofthelawsofnaturemayhave occurred,butshowsthatbeliefsaboutsuch eventslacktheforceofevidenceneededtojus- 402 humors Husserl,Edmund tifythearroganceandintolerancethatcharac- terizessomanyofthereligious. Hume'scritiqueoftheargumentfromdesign hasasimilareffect.Thisargumentpurportsto showthatourwell-ordereduniversemustbethe effectofasupremelyintelligentcause,thateach aspectofthisdivinecreationiswelldesignedto fulfillsomebeneficialend,andthattheseeffects showusthattheDeityiscaringandbenevolent. Humeshowsthattheseconclusionsgowell beyondtheavailableevidence.Thepleasantand well-designedfeaturesoftheworldarebalanced byagoodmeasureoftheunpleasantandthe plainlybotched.Ourknowledgeofcausalcon- nectionsdependsontheexperienceofconstant conjunctions.Suchconnectionscausethevivac- ityofapresentimpressiontobetransferredto theideaassociatedwithit,andleaveusbeliev- inginthatidea.Butinthiscasetheeffecttobe explained,theuniverse,isunique,anditscause unknown.Consequently,wecannotpossibly haveexperientialgroundsforanykindofinfer- enceaboutthiscause.Onexperientialgrounds themostwecansayisthatthereisamassive, mixedeffect,and,aswehavethroughexperi- encecometobelievethateffectshavecauses commensuratetothem,thiseffectprobablydoes haveacommensuratelylargeandmixedcause. Furthermore,astheeffectisremotelylikethe productsofhumanmanufacture,wecansay "thatthecauseorcausesoforderintheuniverseprob- ablybearsomeremoteanalogytohumanintelligence." Thereisindeedaninferencetobedrawnfrom theuniqueeffectinquestion(theuniverse)to thecauseofthateffect,butitisnotthe"argu- ment"ofthetheologiansnordoesitinanyway supportsectarianpretensionorintolerance. TheNaturalHistoryofReligionfocusesonthe questionoftheoriginofreligioninhuman nature,anddeliversathoroughlynaturalistic answer:thewidespreadbutnotuniversalbelief ininvisibleandintelligentpowercanbetraced toderivativeandeasilypervertedprinciplesof ournature.Primitivepeoplesfoundphysical naturenotanorderlywholeproducedbya beneficentdesigner,butarbitraryandfearsome, andtheycametounderstandtheactivitiesof natureastheeffectofpettypowersthatcould, throughpropitiatingworship,beinfluencedto amelioratetheirlives.Subsequently,thesame fearsandperceptionstransformedpolytheism intomonotheism,theviewthatasingle, omnipotentbeingcreatedandstillcontrolsthe worldandallthattranspiresinit.Fromthiscon- clusionHumegoesontoarguethatmonothe- ism,apparentlythemoresophisticatedposition, ismorallyretrograde.Monotheismtendsnatu- rallytowardzealandintolerance,encourages debasing,"monkishvirtues,"andprovesitselfa dangertosociety:itisasourceofviolenceanda causeofimmorality.Incontrast,polytheism, whichHumehereregardsasaformofatheism, istolerantofdiversityandencouragesgenuine virtuesthatimprovehumankind.Fromamoral pointofview,atleastthisoneformofatheismis superiortotheism. Seealsobundletheory,causation, EMPIRICISM,ETHICS,PHILOSOPHYOFRELI- GION,PROBLEMOFINDUCTION,SKEPTICISM. D.F.N. humors.Seegalen. HuShih(1891-1962),Chinesephilosopherand historianandafamousliberalintellectualincon- temporaryChina.HestudiedatColumbiaUni- versityunderDewey,andbroughtpragmatismto China.HewastheChineseambassadörtothe UnitedStatesduringWorldWarIIandlåter headedtheAcademiaSinicainTaipei.Aversa- tilewriter,hehelpedtoinitiatethevemacular movementinChineseliterature;publishedhis AncientHistoryofChinesePhilosophyin1919,the firsthistoryofChinesephilosophywrittenfrom amodernpointofview;andadvocatedwhole- saleWesternizationormodernizationofChina. Areformistcommittedtothedemocraticideal, heremainedananti-Communistthroughouthis life.Seealsochinesephilosophy,liang sou-ming.S.-h.L. Husserl,Edmund(1859-1938),Germanphiloso- pherandfounderofphenomenology.Bornin Prossnits(nowProstéjovintheCzechRepublic), hestudiedscienceandphilosophyatLeipzig, mathematicsandphilosophyatBerlin,andphi- losophyandpsychologyatViennaandHalle.He taughtatHalle(1887-1901),Göttingen(1901- 16),andFreiburg(1916-28).HusserlandFrege werethefoundersofthetwomajortwentieth- centurytrends.Throughhisworkandhisinflu- enceonRussell,Wittgenstein,andothers,Frege inspiredthemovementknownasanalyticphi- losophy,whileHusserl,throughhisworkandhis influenceonHeidegger,Sartre,Merleau-Ponty, andothers,establishedthemovementknownas phenomenology. Husserlbeganhisacademiclifeasamathe- matician.HestudiedatBerlinwithKronecker andWeierstrassandwroteadissertationin mathematicsatVienna.There,influencedby Brentano,hisintereststumedtowardphiloso- 403 Husserl,Edmund Husserl,Edmund phyandpsychologybutremainedrelatedto mathematics.Hishabilitation,writtenatHalle, wasapsychological-philosophicalstudyofthe conceptofnumberandledtohisfirstbook,The PhilosophyofArithmetic(189i).Husserldistin- guishesbetweennumbersgivenintuitivelyand thosesymbolicallyintended.Theformerare givenastheobjectivecorrelatesofactsofcount- ing;whenwecountthingssetoutbeforeus,we constitutegroups,andthesegroupscanbecom- paredwitheachotherasmoreandless.Inthis waythefirstfewnumbersinthenumberseries canbeintuitivelypresented.Althoughmost numbersareonlysymbolicallyintended,their senseasnumbersisderivedfromthosethatare intuitivelygiven. During1890-1900Husserlexpandedhis philosophicalconcernsfrommathematicsto logicandthegeneraltheoryofknowledge,and hisreflectionsculminatedinhisLogicalInvestiga- tions(1900-01).Theworkismadeupofsix investigationsprecededbyavolumeofprole- gomena.Theprolegomenaareasustainedand effectivecritiqueofpsychologism,thedoctrinethat reduceslogicalentities,suchaspropositions, universals,andnumbers,tomentalstatesor mentalactivities.Husserlinsistsontheobjectiv- ityofsuchtargetsofconsciousnessandshows theincoherenceofreducingthemtotheactivi- tiesofmind.Therestoftheworkexaminessigns andwords,abstraction,partsandwholes,logical grammar,thenotionofpresentation,andtruth andevidence.Hisearlierdistinctionbetween intuitivepresentationandsymbolicintentionis nowexpandedfromourawarenessofnumbers totheawarenessofallsortsofobjectsofcon- sciousness.Thecontrastbetweenemptyinten- tionandfulfillmentorintuitionisappliedto perceptualobjects,anditisalsoappliedtowhat hecallscategorialobjects:statesofaffairs,relation- ships,causalconnections,andthelike.Husserl claimsthatwecanhaveanintellectualintuition ofsuchthingsandhedescribesthisintuition;it occurswhenwearticulateanobjectashaving certainfeaturesorrelationships.Theformål structureofcategorialobjectsiselegantlyrelated tothegrammaticalpartsoflanguage.Asregards simplematerialobjects,Husserlobservesthatwe canintendthemeitheremptilyorintuitively,but evenwhentheyareintuitivelygiven,theyretain sidesthatareabsentandonlycointendedbyus, soperceptionitselfisamixtureofemptyand filledintentions. Theterm'intentionality'referstobothempty andfilled,orsignitiveandintuitive,intentions.It namestherelationshipconsciousnesshas towardthings,whetherthosethingsaredirectly givenormeantonlyintheirabsence.Husserl alsoshowsthattheidentityofthingsisgivento uswhenweseethattheobjectweonceintended emptilyisthesameaswhatisactuallygivento usnow.Suchidentitiesaregiveneveninper- ceptualexperience,asthevarioussidesand aspectsofthingscontinuetopresentoneandthe sameobject,butidentitiesaregivenevenmore explicitlyincategorialintuition,whenwerecog- nizethepartialidentitybetweenathingandits features,orwhenwedirectlyfocusontheiden- tityathinghaswithitself.Thesephenomenaare describedunderthegeneralrubricofidentity- synthesis. AweaknessinthefirsteditionofLogicalInves- tigationswasthefactthatHusserlremained somewhatKantianinitanddistinguished sharplybetweenthethingasitisgiventousand thething-in-itself;heclaimedthatinhisphe- nomenologyhedescribedonlythethingasitis giventous.Inthedecade1900-10,through deeperreflectiononourexperienceoftime,on memory,andonthenatureofphilosophical thinking,heovercamethisKantiandistinction andclaimedthatthething-in-itselfcanbeintu- itivelygiventousastheidentitypresentedina manifoldofappearances.Hisnewpositionwas expressedinIdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenome- nologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophy(1913). Thebookwasmisinterpretedbymanyasadopt- ingatraditionalidealism,andmanythinkers whoadmiredHusserl'searlierworkdistanced themselvesfromwhathenowtaught. Husserlpublishedthreemorebooks.Formål andTranscendentalLogic(1929)waswrittenright afterhisretirement;CartesianMeditations(1931), whichappearedinFrenchtranslation,wasan elaborationofsomelectureshegaveinParis.In addition,someearliermanuscriptsontheexpe- rienceoftimewereassembledbyEdithSteinand editedbyHeideggerin1928asLecturesonthePhe- nomenologyofinnerTime-Consciousness.Thus,Hus- serlpublishedonlysixbooks,butheamasseda hugeamountofmanuscripts,lecturenotes,and workingpapers.Healwaysretainedthespiritof ascientistanddidhisphilosophicalworkinthe manneroftentativeexperiments.Manyofhis bookscanbeseenascompilationsofsuchexper- imentsratherthanassystematictreatises. Becauseofitsexploratoryanddevelopmental character,histhinkingdoesnotlenditselftodoc- trinalsummary.HusserlwasofJewishancestry, andafterhisdeathhispaperswereindanger fromtheNaziregime;theywerecovertlytaken outofGermanybyaBelgianscholar,Herman 404 Husserl,Edmund Husserl,Edmund LeoVanBreda,who,afterWorldWarII,estab- lishedtheHusserlArchivesatLouvain.This institution,withcentersatCologne,Freiburg, Paris,andNewYork,hassincesupervisedthe criticaleditionofmanyvolumesofHusserl's writingsintheseriesHusserliana. Husserlbelievesthatthingsarepresentedtous invariousways,andthatphilosophyshouldbe engagedinprecisedescriptionoftheseappear- ances.Itshouldavoidconstructinglarge-scale theoriesanddefendingideologies.Itshouldana- lyze,e.g.,howvisualobjectsareperceivedand howtheydependonourcognitiveactivityof seeing,focusing,movingabout,onthecorrela- tionofseeingwithtouchingandgrasping,andso on.Philosophyshoulddescribethedifferent waysinwhichsuch"regionsofbeing"asmate- rialobjects,livingthings,otherpersons,andcul- turalobjectsaregiven,howthepastandthe presentareintended,howspeech,numbers, timeandspace,andourownbodiesaregivento us,andsoon.Husserlcarriesoutmanysuch analyseshimselfandinallofthemdistinguishes betweentheobjectgivenandthesubjectivecon- sciousactivitywemustperformtoletitbegiven. Thephenomenologicaldescriptionoftheobject iscallednoematicanalysisandthatofthesubjec- tiveintentionsiscallednoeticanalysis.Thenoema istheobjectasdescribedphenomenologically, thenoesisisthecorrespondingmentalactivity, alsoasdescribedbyphenomenology.Theobjec- tiveandthesubjectivearecorrelativebutnever reducibletooneanother. Inworkingoutsuchdescriptionswemustget totheessentialstructuresofthings.Wedosonot byjustgeneralizingöverinstanceswehave experienced,butbyaprocesshecalls"freevari- ation"or"imaginativevariation."Weattemptin ourimaginationtoremovevariousfeaturesfrom thetargetofouranalysis;theremovalofsome featureswouldleavetheobjectintact,butthe removalofotherfeatureswoulddestroythe object;hence,whenwecomeuponthelatterwe knowwehavehitonsomethingessentialtothe thing.Themethodofimaginativevariationthus leadstoeideticintuition,theinsightthatthisor thatfeaturebelongstotheeidos,theessence,of thethinginquestion.Eideticintuitionisdirected notonlytowardobjectsbutalsotowardthevar- iousformsofintentionality,aswetrytodeter- minetheessenceofperception,memory, judging,andthelike. Husserlthinksthattheeideticanalysisof intentionalityanditsobjectsyieldsapodictic truths,truthsthatcanbeseentobenecessary. Examplesmightbethathumanbeingscouldnot bewithoutapastandfuture,andthateachmate- rialperceptualobjecthassidesandaspectsother thanthosepresentedatanymoment.Husserl admitsthattheobjectsofperceptualexperience, materialthings,arenotgivenapodicticallyto perceptionbecausetheycontainpartsthatare onlyemptilyintended,butheinsiststhatthe phenomenologicalreflectiononperceptual experience,thereflectionthatyieldsthestate- mentthatperceptioninvolvesamixtureof emptyandfilledintentions,canbeapodictic:we knowapodicticallythatperceptionmusthavea mixtureofemptyandfilledintentions.Husserl didadmitinthe1920sthatalthoughphenome- nologicalexperienceandstatementscouldbe apodictic,theywouldneverbeadequatetowhat theydescribe,i.e.,furtherclarificationsofwhat theysignifycouldalwaysbecarriedout.This wouldmean,e.g.,thatwecanbeapodictically surethathumanbeingscouldnotbewhatthey areiftheydidnothaveasenseofpastandfuture, butwhatitistohaveapastandfuturealways needsdeeperclarification. Husserlhasmuchtosayaboutphilosophical thinking.Hedistinguishesbetweenthe"natural attitude,"ourstraightforwardinvolvementwith thingsandtheworld,andthe"phenomenologi- calattitude,"thereflectivepointofviewfrom whichwecarryoutphilosophicalanalysisofthe intentionsexercisedinthenaturalattitudeand theobjectivecorrelatesoftheseintentions. Whenweenterthephenomenologicalattitude, weputoutofactionorsuspendalltheintentions andconvictionsofthenaturalattitude;thisdoes notmeanthatwedoubtornegatethem,only thatwetakeadistancefromthemandcontem- platetheirstructure.Husserlcallsthissuspension thephenomenologicalepoché.Inourhumanlife webegin,ofcourse,inthenaturalattitude,and thenamefortheprocesssbywhichwemoveto thephenomenologicalattitudeiscalledthephe- nomenologicalreduction,a"leadingback"from naturalbeliefstothereflectiveconsiderationof intentionsandtheirobjects.Inthephenomeno- logicalattitudewelookattheintentionsthatwe normallylookthrough,thosethatfunction anonymouslyinourstraightforwardinvolve- mentwiththeworld.Throughouthiscareer, Husserlessayedvarious"waystoreduction"or argumentstoestablishphilosophy.Attimeshe triedtomodeltheargumentonDescartes's methodicaldoubt;attimeshetriedtoshowthat theworld-directedsciencesneedthefurther supplementofphenomenologicalreflectionif theyaretobetrulyscientific. Oneofthespecialfeaturesofthenaturalatti- 405 Husserl,Edmund Husserl,Edmund tudeisthatitsimplyacceptstheworldasaback- groundorhorizonforallourmoreparticular experiencesandbeliefs.Theworldisnotalarge thingnorisitthesumtotalofthings;itisthe horizonormatrixforallparticularthingsand statesofaffairs.Theworldasnoemaiscorrelated toourworld-belieforworld-doxaasnoesis.In thephenomenologicalattitudewetakeadis- tanceeventowardournaturalbeingintheworld andwedescribewhatitistohaveaworld. Husserlthinksthatthissortofradicalreflection andradicalquestioningisnecessaryforbegin- ningphilosophyandenteringintowhathecalls pureortranscendentalphenomenology;solong aswefailtoquestionourworld-beliefandthe worldassuch,wefailtoreachphilosophical purityandouranalyseswillinfactbecomeparts ofworldlysciences(suchaspsychology)andwill notbephilosophical. Husserldistinguishesbetweentheapophantic andtheontologicaldomains.Theapophanticis thedomainofsensesandpropositions,whilethe ontologicalisthedomainofthings,statesof affairs,relations,andthelike.Husserlcalls"apo- phanticanalytics"thesciencethatexaminesthe formål,logicalstructuresoftheapophantic domainand"formålontology"thesciencethat examinestheformålstructuresoftheontologi- caldomain.Themovementbetweenfocusingon theontologicaldomainandfocusingontheapo- phanticdomainoccurswithinthenaturalatti- tude,butitisdescribedfromthephenomeno- logicalattitude.Thismovementestablishesthe differencebetweenpropositionsandstatesof affairs,anditpermitsscientificverification;sci- enceisestablishedinthezigzagmotionbetween focusingonthingsandfocusingonpropositions, whicharethenverifiedorfalsifiedwhentheyare confirmedordisconfirmedbythewaythings appear.Evidenceistheactivityofeitherhaving athinginitsdirectpresenceorexperiencingthe conformityordisconformitybetweenanempty intentionandtheintuitionthatistofulfillit. Therearedegreesofevidence;thingscanbe givenmoreorlessfullyandmoreorlessdis- tinctly.Adequationoccurswhenanintuitionfully satisfiesanemptyintention. Husserlalsomakesahelpfuldistinctionbe- tweenthepassive,thoughtlessrepetitionof wordsandtheactivityofexplicitjudging,in whichwedistinctlymakejudgmentsonour own.Explicitthinkingcanitselffallbackinto passivityorbecome"sedimented"aspeopletake itforgrantedandgoontobuildfurtherthinking uponit.Suchsedimentedthoughtmustbereac- tivatedanditsmeaningsrevived.Passivethink- ingmayharborcontradictionsandincoherences; theapplicationofformållogicpresumesjudg- mentsthataredistinctlyexecuted. Inourreflectivephenomenologicalanalyses wedescribevariousintentionalacts,butwealso discovertheegoastheowneroragentbehind theseacts.Husserldistinguishesbetweenthepsy- chologicalego,theegotakenasapartoftheworld, andthetranscendentalego,theegotakenasthat whichhasaworldandisengagedintruth,and hencetosomeextenttranscendstheworld.He oftencommentsontheremarkableambiguityof theego,whichisbothapartoftheworld(asa humanbeing)andyettranscendstheworld(asa cognitivecenterthatpossessesorintendsthe world).Thetranscendentalegoisnotseparable fromindividuals;itisadimensionofevery humanbeing.Weeachhaveatranscendental ego,sinceweareallintentionalandrational beings.Husserlalsodevotedmuchefforttoana- lyzingintersubjectivityandtriedtoshowhow otheregosandotherminds,othercentersofcon- sciousandrationalawareness,canbepresented andintended.Theroleofthebody,theroleof speechandothermodesofcommunication,and thefactthatweallsharethingsandaworld incommonareimportantelementsinthese analyses. Thetranscendentalego,thesourceofallinten- tionalacts,isconstitutedthroughtime:ithasits ownidentity,whichisdifferentfromthatofthe identityofthingsorstatesofaffairs.Theidentity oftheegoisbuiltupthroughtheflowofexperi- encesandthroughmemoryandanticipation. OneofHusserl'smajorcontributionsishisanaly- sisoftime-consciousnessanditsrelationtothe identityoftheself,atopictowhichheoften returns.Hedistinguishesamongtheobjective timeoftheworld,theinnertimeoftheflowof ourexperiences(suchasactsofperception,judg- ments,andmemories),andathird,stilldeeper levelthathecalls"theconsciousnessofinner time."Itisthisthird,deepestlevel,thecon- sciousnessofinnertime,thatpermitsevenour mentalactstobeexperiencedastemporal.This deepestlevelalsoprovidestheultimatecontext inwhichtheidentityoftheegoisconstituted.In oneway,weachieveourconsciousidentity throughthememoriesthatwestoreandrecall, butthesememoriesthemselveshavetobe stitchedtogetherbythedeepestleveloftempo- ralityinordertoberecoverableasbelongingto oneandthesameself.Husserlobservesthaton thisdeepestleveloftheconsciousnessofinner time,weneverhaveasimpleatomicpresent: whatwecometoasultimateisamovingform 406 Hutcheson,Francis Hutcheson,Francis thathasaretentionoftheimmediatepast,apre- tentionofthatwhichiscoming,andacentral core.Thisformofinnertime-consciousness,the formofwhatHusserlcalls"thelivingpresent,"is prioreventotheegoandisakindofapex reachedbyhisphilosophicalanalysis. OneoftheimportantthemesthatHusserl developedinthelastdecadeofhisworkisthat ofthelife-worldorLebenswelt.Heclaimsthatsci- entificandmathematicalabstractionhasrootsin theprescientificworld,theworldinwhichwe live.Thisworldhasitsownstructuresofappear- ance,identification,evidence,andtruth,andthe scientificworldisestablishedonitsbasis.Oneof thetasksofphenomenologyistoshowhowthe idealizedentitiesofsciencedrawtheirsense fromthelife-world.Husserlclaims,e.g.,that geometricalformshavetheirrootsintheactivity ofmeasuringandintheidealizationofthevol- umes,surfaces,edges,andintersectionswe experienceinthelife-world.Thesenseofthesci- entificworldanditsentitiesshouldnotbeplaced inoppositiontothelife-world,butshouldbe shown,byphenomenologicalanalysis,tobea developmentofappearancesfoundinit.Inaddi- tion,thestructuresandevidencesofthelife- worlditselfmustbephilosophicallydescribed. Husserl'sinfluenceinphilosophyhasbeen verygreatduringtheentiretwentiethcentury, especiallyinContinentalEuropé.Hisconceptof intentionalityisunderstoodasawayofover- comingtheCartesiandualismbetweenmindand world,andhisstudyofsigns,formålsystems,and partsandwholeshasbeenvaluableinstruc- turalismandliterarytheory.Hisconceptofthe life-worldhasbeenusedasawayofintegrating sciencewithwiderformsofhumanactivity,and hisconceptsoftimeandpersonalidentityhave beenusefulinpsychoanalytictheoryandexis- tentialism.Hehasinspiredworkinthesocialsci- encesandrecentlyhisideashaveprovedhelpful toscholarsincognitivescienceandartificial intelligence. Seealsobrentano,intentionality, KANT,PHENOMENOLOGY.R.So. Hutcheson,Francis(1694-1746),Scottishphi- losopherwhowasthechiefexponentoftheearly modernmoralsensetheoryandofasimilarthe- orypostulatingasenseofbeauty.Hewasbornin Drumalig,Ireland,andcompletedhistheological trainingin1717attheUniversityofGlasgow, wherehelåtertaughtmoralphilosophy.Hewas aPresbyterianministerandfoundedanacademy forPresbyterianyouthinDublin. SparkedbyHobbes'sthesis,inLeviathan (1651),thathumanbeingsalwaysactoutofself- interest,moraldebateintheeighteenthcentury waspreoccupiedwiththepossibilityofagenuine benevolence.Hutchesoncharacterizedhisfirst work,AnInquiryintotheOriginalofourIdeasof BeautyandVirtue(1725),asadefenseofthenon- egoisticmoralsensetheoryofhismoreimmedi- atepredecessor,Shaftesbury,againsttheegoism ofBernardMandeville(1670-1733).Hissecond work,AnEssayontheNatureandConductofthePas- sionsandAffectionswithIllustrationsontheMoral Sense(1728),exploresthepsychologyofhuman action,apparentlyinfluencedbyButler'sclassifi- cationofthepassions(inhisSermons,1726). Hutchesonassertstheexistenceofseveral "internal"senses-i.e.,capacitiesforperceptual responsestoconcepts(suchasone'sideaof Nero'scharacter),asopposedtoperceptionsof physicalobjects.Amongtheseinternalsensesare thoseofhonor,sympathy,morality,andbeauty. Onlythelattertwo,however,arediscussedin detailbyHutcheson,whodevelopshisaccount ofeachwithintheframeworkofLocke'sempiri- cistepistemology.ForHutcheson,theideaof beautyisproducedinuswhenweexperience pleasureuponthinkingofcertainnaturalobjects orartifacts,justasourideaofmoralgoodnessis occasionedbytheapprovalwefeeltowardan agentwhenwethinkofheractions,evenifthey innowaybenefitus.Beautyandgoodness(and theiropposites)areanalogoustoLockeansec- ondaryqualities,suchascolors,tastes,smells, andsounds,inthattheirexistencedepends somehowonthemindsofperceivers.Thequal- itythesenseofbeautyconsistentlylindsplea- surableisapatternof"uniformityamidst variety,"whilethequalitythemoralsense invariablyapprovesisbenevolence. Aprincipalreasonforthinkingwepossessa moralsense,accordingtoHutcheson,isthatwe approveofmanyactionsunrelatedorevencon- trarytoourinterests-afactthatsuggestsnotall approvalisreason-based.Further,hearguesthat attemptstoexplainourfeelingsofapprovalor disapprovalwithoutreferringtoamoralsense arefutile:ourreasonsareultimatelygroundedin thefactthatwesimplyareconstitutedtocare aboutothersandtakepleasureinbenevolence (thequalityofbeingconcemedaboutothersfor theirownsakes).Forinstance,weapproveof temperancebecauseoverindulgencesignifies selfishness,andselfishnessiscontrarytobenev- olence.Hutchesonalsofindsthattheendspro- motedbythebenevolentpersonhavea tendencytoproducethegreatesthappinessfor thegreatestnumber.Thus,sinceheregards 407 Huygens,Christiaan Hypatia beingmotivatedbybenevolenceaswhatmakes actionsmorallygood,HutchesorTstheoryisa versionofmotiveutilitarianism. OnHutcheson'smoralpsychology,weare motivated,ultimatelynotbyreasonalone,but bydesiresthatariseinusattheprospectofour ownorothers'pleasure.Hutchesonformulates severalquantitativemaximsthatpurportto relätethestrengthofmotivatingdesirestothe degreesofgood,orbenefit,projectedfordiffer- entactions-ananalysisthatanticipatesBen- tham'shedoniccalculus.Hutchesonwasalsoone ofthefirstphilosopherstorecognizeandmake useofthedistinctionbetweenexciting,ormoti- vating,reasonsandjustifyingreasons.Exciting reasonsareaffections,ordesires,ascribedtoan agentasmotivesthatexplainparticularactions. Justifyingreasonsderivefromtheapprovalofthe moralsenseandservetoindicatewhyacertain actionismorallygood.Theconnectionbetween thesetwokindsofreasonshasbeenasourceof considerabledebate. ContemporarycriticsincludedJohnBalguy (1686-1748),whochargedthatHutcheson's moraltheoryrendersvirtuearbitrary,sinceit dependsonwhateverhumannatureGodhap- penedtogiveus,whichcouldjustaswellhave beensuchastomakeusdelightinmalice.Hutch- esondiscussedhisviewsincorrespondencewith Hume,wholåtersentHutchesontheunpub- lishedmanuscriptofhisownaccountofmoral sentiment(BookIIIofATreatiseofHuman Nature).AsateacherofAdamSmith,Hutcheson helpedshapeSmith'swidelyinfluentialeco- nomicandmoraltheories.Hutcheson'smajor worksalsoincludeAShortIntroductiontoMoral Philosophy(originallypublishedinLatinin1742) andASystemofMoralPhilosophy(1755). Seealsobentham,hume,moralsense THEORY,SMITH.E.S.R. Huygens,Christiaan(1629-95),Dutchphysicist andastronomerwhorankedamongtheleading experimentalscientistsofhistimeandinflu- encedmanyotherthinkers,includingLeibniz. HewroteonphysicsandastronomyinLatin (HorologiumOscillatorium,1673;DeViCentrifuga, 1703)andinFrenchfortheJournaldesScavans. HebecameafoundingmemberoftheFrench AcademyofSciences.Huygensgroundlenses, builttelescopes,discoveredtheringsofSaturn, andinventedthependulumclock.Hismostpop- ulärcomposition,Cosmotheoros(1699),inspired byFontenelle,praisesadivinearchitectandcon- jecturesthepossibleexistenceofrationalbeings onotherplanets.J.-L.S. Hwajaeng-non.Seekoreanphilosophy. hyle,ancientGreektermformatter.Aristotle broughtthewordintouseinphilosophybycon- trastwiththetermforform,andasdesignating oneofthefourcauses.ByhyleAristotleusually means'thatoutofwhichsomethinghasbeen made',buthecanalsomeanbyit'thatwhichhas form'.InAristotelianphilosophyhyleissome- timesalsoidentifiedwithpotentialityandwith substrate.Neoplatonistsidentifiedhylewiththe receptacleofPlato.Seealsoaristotle,form, HYLOMORPHISM,METAPHYSICS,SUBSTANCE. P.Wo. hylomorphism,thedoctrine,firsttaughtbyAris- totle,thatconcretesubstanceconsistsofformin matter(hyle).Thedetailsofthistheoryare exploredinthecentralbooksofAristotle'sMeta- physics(Zeta,Eta,andTheta).Seealsoaris- totle,FORM,HYLE,SUBSTANCE.P.Wo. hylozoism(fromGreekhyle,'matter',andzöe, 'life'),thedoctrinethatmatterisintrinsically alive,orthatallbodies,fromtheworldasa wholedowntothesmallestcorpuscle,have somedegreeorsomekindoflife.Itdiffersfrom panpsychismthoughthedistinctionissome- timesblurred-inupholdingtheuniversalpres- enceoflifeperse,ratherthanofsoulorof psychicattributes.Inasmuchasitmayalsohold thattherearenolivingentitiesnotconstitutedof matter,hylozoismisoftencriticizedbytheistic philosophersasaformofatheism.Thetermwas introducedpolemicallybyRalphCudworth,the seventeenth-centuryCambridgePlatonist,to helpdefineapositionthatissignificantlyincon- trasttosoul-bodydualism(Pythagoras,Plato, Descartes),reductivematerialism(Democritus, Hobbes),andAristotelianhylomorphism.So understood,hylozoismhadmanyadvocatesin theeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,among bothscientistsandnaturalisticallyminded philosophers.Inthetwentiethcentury,theterm hascometobeused,ratherunhelpfully,tochar- acterizetheanimisticandnaive-vitalistviewsof theearlyGreekphilosophers,especiallyThales, Anaximenes,Heraclitus,andEmpedocles-who couldhardlycountashylozoistsinCudworth's sophisticatedsense.Seealsoartificiallife, CAMBRIDGEPLATONISTS,HYLOMORPHISM, PANPSYCHISM.A.P.D.M. Hypatia(c.370-415),GreekNeoplatonistphi- losopherwholivedandtaughtinAlexandria. ShewasbrutallymurderedbyaChristianmob 408 hypostasis hypothetico-deductivemethod becauseofherassociationswiththecity'spre- fect,whowasinconflictwithitsaggressivearch- bishop,Cyril.Sheissaidtohavewrittencom- mentariesoncertainmathematicalworks,but theonlycertaintraceofherliteraryactivityisin herfatherTheon'scommentaryonbook3of Ptolemy'sAlmagest,whichTheonsaysisHypa- tia'sredaction.Hypatiaappearstohavebeena verypopulärphilosophyteacher.Shepresum- ablyprofessedastandardNeoplatonistcurricu- lum,usingmathematicsasaladdertothe intelligibleworld.Agoodsenseofherviewscan begainedfromtheessays,hymns,andlettersof herpupilSynesius,bishopofPtolemaisandan eclecticmanofletters.Hypatia'smodemfame canbetracedbacktotheanticlericalismofthe Enlightenment;see,e.g.,chapter47ofEdward Gibbon'sHistoryoftheDeclineandFalloftheRoman Empire(1778).Themostinfluentialrepresenta- tionofherappearedinCharlesKingsley'sdidac- tichistoricalnovelHypatiaorNewFoeswithanOld Face(1853).Thefactsthat-accordingtoancient report-Hypatiawasnotonlyabrilliantperson, butabeautifulonewhoarousedtheeroticpas- sionof(atleast)onestudent,andthatshewas strippednakedbeforebeingslaughtered,seemto havecontributedtotherevivalofinterestinher. Seealsoneoplatonism.LM. hypostasis(fromLatin,'substance'),theprocess ofregardingaconceptorabstractionasaninde- pendentorrealentity.Theverbforms'hyposta- tize'and'reify'designatetheactsofpositing objectsofacertainsortforthepurposesofone's theory.Itissometimesimpliedthatafallacyis involvedinsodescribingtheseprocessesoracts, asin'Platowasguiltyofthereificationofuniver- sals'.Theissueturnslargelyoncriteriaofonto- logicalcommitment.Seealsometaphysics, ONTOLOGICALCOMMITMENT.C.F.D. hypostatize.Seehypostasis. hypotheticalconsent.Seecontractarianism. hypotheticalconstruct.Seeoperationalism. hypotheticalimperative.Seekant. hypotheticalsyllogism.Seesyllogism. hypothetico-deductivemethod,amethodoftest- inghypotheses.Thoughttobepreferabletothe methodofenumerativeinduction,whoselimita- tionshadbeendecisivelydemonstratedby Hume,thehypothetico-deductive(H-D)method hasbeenviewedbymanyastheidealscientific method.Itisappliedbyintroducinganexplana- toryhypothesisresultingfromearlierinductions, aguess,oranactofcreativeimagination.The hypothesisislogicallyconjoinedwithastate- mentofinitialconditions.Thepurelydeductive consequencesofthisconjunctionarederivedas predictions,andthestatementsassertingthem aresubjectedtoexperimentalorobservational test.Moreformally,given(H•A)—>O,Histhe hypothesis,Aastatementofinitialconditions, andOoneofthetestableconsequencesof(H-A). Ifthehypothesisis'allleadismalleable',and 'thispieceofleadisnowbeinghammered'states theinitialconditions,itfollowsdeductivelythat 'thispieceofleadwillchangeshape'.Indeduc- tivelogictheschema (H-A)- O (H-A) isformallyinvalid,committingthelogicalfallacy ofaffirmingtheconsequent.Butrepeatedoccur- rencesofOcanbesaidtoconfirmtheconjunc- tionofHandA,ortorenderitmoreprobable. Ontheotherhand,theschema (H-A) not-O not-(H-A) isdeductivelyvalid(theargumentformmodin tollens).Forthisreason,KarlPopperandhisfol- lowersthinkthattheH-Dmethodisbest employedinseekingfalsificationsoftheoretical hypotheses.Criticismsofthemethodpointout thatinfinitelymanyhypothesescanexplain,in theH-Dmode,agivenbodyofdata,sothatsuc- cessfulpredictionsarenotprobative,andthat (followingDuhem)itisimpossibletotestiso- latedsingularhypothesesbecausetheyare alwayscontainedincomplextheoriesanyoneof whosepartsiseliminableinthefaceofnegative evidence.Seealsocurve-fittingproblem, DUHEM,TESTABILITY.R.E.B. 409 lamblichus.Seecommentariesonplato,neopla- TONISM. IbnBäjja,AbuBakr,inLatin,Avempace (d.1139),SpanishIslamicphilosopherwhowas exceptionallywellregardedbylåterArabic authorities.Duringacareerasagovernmentoffi- cialandvizierhewroteimportanttreatiseson philosophybutappearstohaveleftmostofthem unfinished.Oneofthemprovidesanimportant theoryoftheconjunctionoftheintellectwith thehuman,basedinpartonnotionsofprogres- siveabstractionofspecificformsandtheuniver- salityoftheActiveIntellect.Anotheroffersa politicalphilosophygroundedinassumptions aboutarepresentativeofthevirtuouscitywho existswithinahostile,erringcityasasolitaryor aberrant"weed."P.E.W. IbnDaud,Abraham,alsocalledRabad(c.1110- 80),SpanishJewishhistorianandastronomer,a philosophicprecursorofMaimonides.Bomin Cordovaandschooledbyabeloveduncle, BaruchAlbalia,inJewishandGreco-Arabic learning,heHedtheAlmohadinvasionof1146, settlinginChristianToledo,wherehewasmar- tyred.HisSeferha-Qabbalah(1161;translatedby GersonCohenasTheBookofTradition,1967)finds providentialcontinuityinJewishintellectual history.HisEmunahRamah(1161;translatedby NorbertSamuelsonasTheExaltedFaith,1986) waswritteninArabicbutpreservedinHebrew. ItanchorsJewishnaturaltheologyandethicsin Avicennanmetaphysics,mitigatedbyavolun- taristicaccountofemanationandbytheasser- tionthatGodcreatedmatter.IbnDaudsaves humanfreedombyholdingthatGodknows undeterminedeventsaspossible.Hedefends prophecyasanoutpouringoftheActiveIntel- lect-orofGod-onthosewhosenaturesand circumstancespermittheirinspiration.Prophetic miraclesareperfectlynaturalalterationsofthe familiarcharactersofthings.Seealsoavi- CENNA.L.E.G. IbnGabirol,Solomon,inLatin,Avicebron (c.1020-c.1057),SpanishJewishphilosopher andpoet,theauthor(inArabic)ofTheSourceof Life,aclassicofNeoplatonicthought.Thiswork waswrittenwithoutanyexplicitJewishassocia- tions,andwaspreservedonlyinatwelfth-cen- turyLatintranslation,theFonsvitae. Consequently,itsauthorwasassumeduntilthe lastcenturytobeMuslimorChristian.Jewish NeoplatonistsandmysticsuntiltheRenaissance werefamiliarwiththeworkanditsauthor,and itsinfluencewasfeltinChristianScholasticcir- clesaswell.IbnGabirol'sphilosophyisalso reflectedinhisepicHebrewpoem"TheRoyal Crown,"whichmergesthepersonalandreli- giousfeelingsofthepoetwithaversesummary ofhismetaphysicalandastronomicalbeliefs. TheFonsvitaeisaprolixandofteninconsistent treatise,butexhibitsradicalcreativity.Theinflu- enceofProclusandofthefirstJewishNeopla- tonist,thetenth-centuryIsaacIsraeli,isalso evident.IbnGabirolsuperimposesonthetradi- tionalNeoplatonictriadofuniversalsubstances, theIntellect,Soul,andNature,anothersetof creativeandmorefundamentalhypostases,the One,DivineWill,andFormandMatter.Inone ofhismostradicalformulations,thisprimordial FormandMatterarethoughttosuffusenotonly theentireworldthatproceedsfromthem,butto befoundwithintheOneitself,Matterbeing identifiedwiththedivineessence,Formwith DivineWill.Matterhereemergesaspriorand moreessentialtothedivinebeingthanForm; Godbyimplicationisidentifiedprimarilywith potentialityandbecoming,apointnotlöstupon themystics. Seealsojewishphilosophy.A.L.I. IbnKhaldun,'Abdurrahmän(1332-1406),Arab historian,scholar,andpolitician,thefirstthinker toarticulateacomprehensivetheoryofhistori- ographyandphilosophyofhistoryinhisMnqad- dima(finalrevision1402),theintroductory volumetohisUniversalHistory(Kitäbal-'ibar, 1377-82).BornandraisedinTunis,hespentthe politicallyactivefirstpartofhislifeinnorth- westernAfricaandMuslimSpain.Hemovedto Cairoin1382topursueacareerasprofessorof Mälikllawandjudge. IbnKhalduncreatedintheMnqaddima(Eng- lishtranslationbyF.Rosenthal,1967)whathe calledan"entirelyoriginalscience."Heestab- lishedascientificmethodologyforhistoriogra- 410 IbnRushd idea phybyprovidingatheoryofthebasiclawsoper- atinginhistorysothatnotonlycouldtheoccur- rencesofthepastberegisteredbutalso"thehow andwhyofevents"couldbeunderstood.Histo- riographyisbasedonthecriticismofsources;the criteriatobeusedareinherentprobabilityofthe historicalreports(khabar;plural:akhbär)-tobe judgedonthebasisofanunderstandingof significantpolitical,economic,andculturalfac- tors-andtheirconformitywithrealityandthe natureofthehistoricalprocess.Thelatterhe analyzedasthecyclical(everythreegenerations, c.120years)riseanddeclineofhumansocieties (nmrän)insofarastheyexhibitapoliticalcohe- siveness('asabiya)inacceptingtheauthorityofa dynasticheadofstate.IbnKhaldun'ssources weretheactualcourseofIslamichistoryandthe injunctionsaboutpoliticalandsocialbehavior foundintheGreek/Persian/Arabmirrorsfor princesandwisdomliterature,weldedtogether byanAristotelianteleologicalrealism/empiri- cism;bycontrast,hewascriticalofthemeta- physicalPlatonicutopiasofthinkerslike al-Färäbl.HisinfluenceistobefeltinlåterArab authorsandinparticularinOttomanhistoriog- raphy.IntheWest,wherehehasbeenintensely studiedsincetheeighteenthcentury,hehas beenvariouslyseenasthefounderofsociology, economichistory,andothermodemtheoriesof state.(SeeA.Al-Azmeh,IbnKhaldun,1989.) Seealsoarabicphilosophy.D.Gu. IbnRushd.Seeaverroes. IbnSina.Seeavicenna. IbnTufayl,AbuBakr(d.1186),SpanishIslamic philosopherwhoplayedanimportantrolein promotingthephilosophicalcareerofAverroes. Hisowncontribution,however,isafamous philosophicalfantasy,HayyibnYaqzan-an accountofasolitaryautodidactwhogrowsupon adesertedislandyetdiscoversbyhisown unaidedeffortsaphilosophical(Aristotelian) explanationoftheworldandofdivinetruths. Låter,havingfinallycomeincontactwithhuman civilization,thischaracteralsorecognizesthe necessityofreligiouslawandregulationforthat other,essentiallyimperfect,society,althoughhe holdshimselfpersonallyabovethisrequirement. Theworkattractedconsiderableattentioninlate seventeenth-centuryEuropéfollowingitspubli- cationin1671.Seealsoarabicphilosophy. P.E.W. I-Ching("BookofChanges"),aChinesedivina- tionmanualthatmayhaveexistedinsomeform asearlyastheseventhcenturyb.c.Itwasnot philosophicallysignificantuntilaugmentedbya groupofappendices,the"TenWings,"around 200b.c.Thebookhastremendouslyinfluenced ChinesethoughtsincetheHandynasty,forat leasttworeasons.First,itprovidedacosmology thatsystematicallygroundedcertainideas, particularlyConfucianethicalclaims,inthe natureofthecosmos.Second,itpresentedthis cosmologythroughasystemoflooselydescribed symbolsthatprovidedvirtuallylimitlessinter- pretivepossibilities.Inorderto"read"thetext properly,oneneededtobeacertainkindofper- son.Inthisway,theI-Chhigaccommodatedboth intuitionismandself-cultivationism,twopromi- nentcharacteristicsofearlyChinesethought. Atthesametime,thetexfsendlessinterpre- tivepossibilitiesallowedittobeusedinwidely differentwaysbyavarietyofthinkers.See alsoCHINESEPHILOSOPHY,CONFUCIANISM. P.J.I. icon.Seepeirce. id.Seefreud. idea,intheseventeenthandeighteenthcen- turies,whateverisimmediatelybeforethemind whenonethinks.Thenotionofthinkingwas takeninaverybroadsense;itincludedpercep- tion,memory,andimagination,inadditionto thinkingnarrowlyconstrued. Inconnectionwithperception,ideaswere often(thoughnotalways-Berkeleyisthe exception)heldtoberepresentationalimages, i.e.,imageso/something.Inothercontexts,ideas weretakentobeconcepts,suchastheconceptof ahorseorofaninfinitequantity,thoughcon- ceptsofthesesortscertainlydonotappeartobe images. Aninnateideawaseitheraconceptoragen- eraltruth,suchas'Equalsaddedtoequalsyield equals',thatwasallegedlynotleamedbutwasin somesensealwaysinthemind.Sometimes,asin Descartes,innateideasweretakentobecogni- tivecapacitiesratherthanconceptsorgeneral truths,butthesecapacities,too,wereheldtobe inbom. Anadventitiousidea,eitheranimageoracon- cept,wasanideaaccompaniedbyajudgment concerningthenon-mentalcauseofthatidea. So,avisualimagewasanadventitiousideapro- videdonejudgedofthatideathatitwascaused bysomethingoutsideone'smind,presumablyby theobjectbeingseen. 411 idea,clearanddistinct idealism Seealsoberkeley,descartes,hume, LOCKE,PERCEPTION.G.S.P. idea,clearanddistinct.Seedescartes. idea,innate.Seeidea. idealism,thephilosophicaldoctrinethatrealityis somehowmind-correlativeormind-coordi- nated-thattherealobjectsconstitutingthe "externalworld"arenotindependentofcogniz- ingminds,butexistonlyasinsomewaycorrel- ativetomentaloperations.Thedoctrinecenters ontheconceptionthatrealityasweunderstand itreflectstheworkingsofmind.Perhapsitsmost radicalversionistheancientOrientalspiritualis- ticorpanpsychisticidea,renewedinChristian Science,thatmindsandtheirthoughtsareall thereis-thatrealityissimplythesumtotalof thevisions(ordreams?)ofoneormoreminds. Adisputehaslongragedwithintheidealist campöverwhether"themind"atissueinsuch idealisticformulaswasamindemplacedoutside oforbehindnature(absoluteidealism),ora nature-pervasivepowerofrationalityofsome sort(cosmicidealism),orthecollectiveimper- sonalsocialmindofpeopleingeneral(socialide- alism),orsimplythedistributivecollectionof individualminds(personalidealism).Överthe years,thelessgrandioseversionsofthetheory cameincreasinglytotheföre,andinrecenttimes virtuallyallidealistshaveconstrued"theminds" atissueintheirtheoryasseparateindividual mindsequippedwithsociallyengendered resources. Therearecertainlyversionsofidealismshort ofthespiritualisticpositionofanontologicalide- alismthat(asKantputsitatProlegomena,section 13,n.2)holdsthat"therearenonebutthinking beings."Idealismneedcertainlynotgosofaras toaffirmthatmindmakesorconstitutesmatter;it isquiteenoughtomaintain(e.g.)thatallofthe characterizingpropertiesofphysicalexistents resemblephenomenalsensorypropertiesinrep- resentingdispositionstoaffectmind-endowed creaturesinacertainsortofway,sothatthese propertieshavenostandingwithoutreferenceto minds.Weakerstillisanexplanatoryidealism whichmerelyholdsthatanadequateexplanation oftherealalwaysrequiressomerecoursetothe operationsofmind. Historically,positionsofthegenerallyidealis- tictypehavebeenespousedbynumerous thinkers.Forexample,Berkeleymaintainedthat "tobe[real]istobeperceived"(esseestpercipi). Andwhilethisdoesnotseemparticularlyplau- siblebecauseofitsinherentcommitmentto omniscience,itseemsmoresensibletoadopt"to beistobeperceivable"(esseestpercipileesse).For Berkeley,ofcourse,thiswasadistinctionwith- outadifference:ifsomethingisperceivableatall, thenGodperceivesit.Butifweforgophilosoph- icalrelianceonGod,thematterlooksdifferent, andpivotsonthequestionofwhatisperceivable forperceiverswhoarephysicallyrealizablein"the realworld,"sothatphysicalexistencecouldbe seen-notsoimplausibly-astantamountto observability-in-principle. Thethreepositionstotheeffectthatrealthings justexactlyarethingsasphilosophyorasscience oras"commonsense"takesthemtobe-posi- tionsgenerallydesignatedasScholastic,scientific, andnaiverealism,respectively-areinfactver- sionsofepistemicidealismexactlybecausethey seerealsasinherentlyknowableanddonotcon- templatemind-transcendenceforthereal.Thus, thethesisofnaive("commonsense")realism that'Extemalthingsexistexactlyasweknow them'soundsrealisticoridealisticaccordingas onestressesthefirstthreewordsofthedictumor thelastfour. Anytheoryofnaturalteleologythatregards therealasexplicableintermsofvaluecouldto thisextentbecountedasidealistic,inthatvalu- ingisbynatureamentalprocess.Tobesure,the goodofacreatureorspeciesofcreatures(e.g., theirwell-beingorsurvival)neednotbesome- thingmind-represented.Butnevertheless,goods countassuchpreciselybecauseifthecreatures atissuecouldthinkaboutit,theywouldadopt themaspurposes.Itisthiscircumstancethat rendersanysortofteleologicalexplanationat leastconceptuallyidealisticinnature.Doctrines ofthissorthavebeenthestock-in-tradeofphi- losophyfromthedaysofPlato(thinkofthe SocratesofthePhaedo)tothoseofLeibniz,with hisinsistencethattherealworldmustbethebest possible.Andthislineofthoughthasrecently surfacedoncemoreinthecontroversial "anthropicprinciple"espousedbysometheoret- icalphysicists. Thentooitispossibletocontemplateaposi- tionalongthelinesenvisionedinFichte'sWis- senschaftslehre(TheScienceofKnowledge),which seestheidealasprovidingthedeterminingfac- torforthereal.Onsuchaview,therealisnot characterizedbythescienceweactuallyhavebut bytheidealsciencethatisthetelosofourscien- tificefforts.Onthisapproach,whichWilhelm Wundtcharacterizedas"ideal-realism"(Idealre- alismus;seehisLogik,vol.1,2ded.,1895),the knowledgethatachievesadequationtothereal 412 idealism,Critical ideallanguage (adaequatioadrem)byadequatelycharacterizing thetruefactsinscientificmattersisnotthe knowledgeactuallyaffordedbypresent-daysci- ence,butonlythatofanidealorperfectedsci- ence. Övertheyears,manyobjectionstoidealism havebeenadvanced.SamuelJohnsonthought torefuteBerkeley'sphenomenalismbykickinga stone.HeconvenientlyforgotthatBerkeleygoes togreatlengthstoprovideforstones-evento thepointofinvokingtheaidofGodontheir behalf.Moorepointedtothehumanhandasan undeniablymind-externalmaterialobject.He overlookedthat,gesticulateashewould,he woulddonomorethaninducepeopletoaccept thepresenceofahandonthebasisofthehand- orientationoftheirexperience.Peirce's"Harvard Experiment"oflettinggoofastoneheldaloft wassupposedtoestablishScholasticrealism becausehisaudiencecouldnotcontroltheir expectationofthestone'sfallingtoearth.Butan uncontrollableexpectationisstillanexpecta- tion,andtherealismatissueisnomorethana realisticthought-exposure. Kanfsfamous"RefutationofIdealism"argues thatourconceptionofourselvesasmind- endowedbeingspresupposesmaterialobjects becauseweviewourmind-endowedselvesas existinginanobjectivetemporalorder,andsuch anorderrequirestheexistenceofperiodicphys- icalprocesses(clocks,pendula,planetaryregu- larities)foritsestablishment.Atmost,however, thisargumentsucceedsinshowingthatsuch physicalprocesseshavetobeassumedbyminds, theissueoftheiractualmind-independentexis- tenceremainingunaddressed.(Kantianrealism isanintraexperiential"empirical"realism.) Itissometimessaidthatidealismconfuses objectswithourknowledgeofthemandcon- flatestherealwithourthoughtaboutit.Butthis chargemissesthepoint.Theonlyrealitywith whichweinquirerscanhaveanycognitivecom- merceisrealityasweconceiveittobe.Ouronly informationaboutrealityisviatheoperationof mind-ouronlycognitiveaccesstorealityis throughthemediationofmind-devisedmodels ofit. Perhapsthemostcommonobjectiontoideal- ismturnsonthesupposedmind-independence ofthereal:"Surelythingsinnaturewould remainsubstantiallyunchangediftherewereno minds."Thisisperfectlyplausibleinonesense, namelythecausalone-whichiswhycausalide- alismhasitsproblems.Butitiscertainlynottrue conceptually.Theobjectorhastospecifyjust exactlywhatwouldremainthesame."Surely roseswouldsmelljustassweetinamind- denudedworld!"Well...yesandno.Tobesure, theabsenceofmindswouldnotchangeroses.But rosesandrosefragranceandsweetness-and eventhesizeofroses-areallfactorswhose determinationhingesonsuchmentaloperations assmelling,scanning,measuring,andthelike. Mind-requiringprocessesareneededforsome- thingintheworldtobediscriminatedasarose anddeterminedtobearcertainfeatures.Identi- fication,classification,propertyattributionareall requiredandbytheirverynatureareallmental operations.Tobesure,theroleofmindishere hypothetical.(''Ifcertaininteractionswithduly constitutedobserverstookplace,thencertain outcomeswouldbenoted.")Butthefactremains thatnothingcouldbediscriminatedorcharac- terizedasaroseinacontextwheretheprospect ofperformingsuitablementaloperations(mea- suring,smelling,etc.)isnotpresupposed. Perhapsthestrongestargumentfavoringide- alismisthatanycharacterizationoftherealthat wecandeviseisboundtobeamind-constructed one:ouronlyaccesstoinformationaboutwhat therealisisthroughthemediationofmind. Whatseemsrightaboutidealismisinherentin thefactthatininvestigatingtherealweare clearlyconstrainedtouseourownconceptsto addressourownissues-thatwecanlearnabout therealonlyinourowntermsofreference.But whatseemsrightaboutrealismisthatthe answerstothequestionsweputtotherealare providedbyrealityitself-whatevertheanswers maybe,theyaresubstantiallywhattheyare becauseitisrealityitselfthatdeterminesthemto bethatway. Seealsoberkeley,fichte,hegel,kant, METAPHYSICS.N.R. idealism,Critical.Seekant. idealism,transcendental.Seekant. ideallanguage,asystemofnotationthatwould correctperceiveddeficienciesofordinarylan- guagebyrequiringthestructureofexpressions tomirrorthestructureofthatwhichtheyrepre- sent.Thenotionthatconceptualerrorscanbe correctedandphilosophicalproblemssolved(or dissolved)byproperlyrepresentingthemin somesuchsystemfiguredprominentlyinthe writingsofLeibniz,Carnap,Russell,Wittgen- stein,andFrege,amongothers.ForRussell,the ideal,or"logicallyperfect,"languageisonein whichgrammaticalformcoincideswithlogical form,therearenovagueorambiguousexpres- 413 idealmärket ideationaltheoryofmeaning sions,andnopropernamesthatfailtodenote. Frege'sBegriffsschriftisperhapsthemostthor- oughandsuccessfulexecutionoftheideallan- guageproject.Deductionsrepresentedwithin thissystem(oritsmoderndescendants)canbe effectivelycheckedforcorrectness.Seealso CARNAP,FORMÅLLANGUAGE,LOGICALFORM, RUSSELL.S.T.K. idealmärket,ahypotheticalmärket,usedasa toolofeconomicanalysis,inwhichallrelevant agentsareperfectlyinformedofthepriceofthe goodinquestionandthecostofitsproduction, andalleconomictransactionscanbeundertaken withnocost.Aspecificcaseisamärketexempli- fyingperfectcompetition.Thetermissometimes extendedtoapplytoanentireeconomyconsist- ingofidealmärketsforeverygood.Seealso PERFECTCOMPETITION,PHILOSOPHYOFECO- NOMICS.A.N. idealmathematics.Seehilbertsprogram. idealobserver,ahypotheticalbeing,possessedof variousqualitiesandtraits,whosemoralreac- tions(judgmentsorattitudes)toactions,persons, andstatesofaffairsfigurecentrallyincertainthe- oriesofethics.Therearetwomainversionsof idealobservertheory:(a)thosethattakethe reactionsofidealobserversasastandardofthe correctnessofmoraljudgments,and(b)thosethat analyzethemeaningsofmoraljudgmentsin termsofthereactionsofidealobservers. Theoriesofthefirstsort-idealobservertheo- riesofcorrectness-hold,e.g.,thatjudgments like'John'slyingtoBrendaaboutherfather's deathwaswrong(bad)'arecorrectprovidedany idealobserverwouldhaveanegativeattitude towardJohn'saction.Similarly,'Alison'srefusal todivulgeconfidentialinformationabouther patientwasright(good)'iscorrectprovidedany idealobserverwouldhaveapositiveattitude towardthataction.Thisversionofthetheorycan betracedtoAdamSmith,whoisusuallycredited withintroducingtheconceptofanidealobserver intophilosophy,thoughheusedtheexpression 'impartialspectator'torefertotheconcept. Regardingthecorrectnessofmoraljudgments, Smithwrote:"Thatpreciseanddistinctmeasure canbefoundnowherebutinthesympathetic feelingsoftheimpartialandwell-informedspec- tator"(ATheoryofMoralSentiments,1759). Theoriesofasecondsort-idealobserverthe- oriesofmeaning-taketheconceptofanideal observeraspartoftheverymeaningofordinary moraljudgments.Thus,accordingtoRoderick Firth("EthicalAbsolutismandtheIdealOb- server,"PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch, 1952),moraljudgmentsoftheform'xisgood (bad)',onthisview,mean'Allidealobservers wouldfeelmoralapproval(disapproval)toward x',andsimilarlyforothermoraljudgments (wheresuchapprovalsanddisapprovalsare characterizedasfeltdesireshavinga"demand quality"). Differentconceptionsofanidealobserver resultfromvariouslyspecifyingthosequalities andtraitsthatcharacterizesuchbeings.Smith's characterizationincludesbeingwellinformed andimpartial.However,accordingtoFirth,an idealobservermustbeomniscient;omnipercipi- ent,i.e.,havingtheabilitytoimaginevividlyany possibleeventsorstatesofaffairs,includingthe experiencesandsubjectivestatesofothers;dis- interested,i.e.,havingnointerestsordesiresthat involveessentialreferencetoanyparticularindi- vidualsorthings;dispassionate;consistent;and otherwisea"normal"humanbeing.Bothver- sionsofthetheoryfaceadilemma:ontheone hand,ifidealobserversarerichlycharacterized asimpartial,disinterested,andnormal,then sincethesetermsappeartobemoral-evaluative terms,appealtothereactionsofidealobservers (eitherasastandardofcorrectnessorasan analysisofmeaning)iscircular.Ontheother hand,ifidealobserversreceiveanimpoverished characterizationinpurelynon-evaluativeterms, thensincethereisnoreasontosupposethatsuch idealobserverswilloftenallagreeintheirreac- tionstoactions,people,andstatesofaffairs,most moraljudgmentswilltumouttobeincorrect. Seealsoethicalobjectivism,ethics, RELATIVISM.M.C.T idealproposition.Seehilbert'sprogram. idealtype.Seemosca,weber. idealutilitarianism.Seerashdall,utilitarianism. ideasofpracticalreason.Seekant. ideasofpurereason.Seekant. ideasofreflection.Seelocke. ideasofsensation.Seelocke. ideatheoryofmeaning.Seemeaning. ideationaltheoryofmeaning.Seephilosophyof LANGUAGE. 414 identity identity identity,therelationeachthingbearsjustto itself.Formally,a=bVF(Fa—>Vb);informally, theidentityofaandbimpliesandisimpliedby theirsharingofalltheirproperties.Readfrom lefttoright,thisbiconditionalassertstheindis- cernibilityofidenticals;fromrighttoleft,the identityofindiscernibles.Theindiscernibilityof identicalsisnottobeconfusedwithametalin- guisticprincipletotheeffectthatifaandbare namesofthesameobject,theneachmaybesub- stitutedfortheotherinasentencewithout changeoftruth-value:thatmaybefalse, dependingonthesemanticsofthelanguage underdiscussion.Similarlytheidentityofindis- cerniblesisnottheclaimthatifaandbcanbe exchangedinallsententialcontextswithout affectingtruth-value,thentheynamethesame object.Forsuchintersubstitutabilitymayarise whenthelanguageinquestionsimplylacks predicatesthatcoulddiscriminatebetweenthe referentsofaandb.Inshort,theidentityof thingsisnotarelationamongnames. Identityproperisnumericalidentity,tobedis- tinguishedfromexactsimilarity(qualitativeiden- tity).Intuitively,twoexactlysimilarobjectsare "copies"ofeachother;stilltheyaretwo,hence notidentical.Onewaytoexpressthisisviathe notionsofextrinsicandintrinsicproperties:exactly similarobjectsdifferinrespectoftheformer only.Butwecanbestexplain'instrinsicprop- erty'bysayingthatathing'sintrinsicproperties arethoseitshareswithitscopies.Thesenotions appearvirtuallyinterdefmable.(Notethatthe conceptofanextrinsicpropertymustberela- tivizedtoaclassorkindofthings.Notbeingin SanFranciscoisanextrinsicpropertyofpersons butarguablyanintrinsicpropertyofcities.) Whilequalitativeidentityisafamiliarnotion,its theoreticalutilityisunclear.Theabsolutenotion ofqualitativeidentityshould,however,bedis- tinguishedfromanunproblematicrelative notion:ifsomelistofsalientpropertiesisfixedin agivencontext(say,inmechanicsornormative ethics),thentheexactlysimilarthings,relative tothatcontext,arethosethatagreeontheprop- ertieslisted. Boththeidentityofindiscerniblesand(less frequently)theindiscernibilityofidenticalsare sometimescalledLeibniz'slaw.Neitherattribu- tionisapt.AlthoughLeibnizwouldhave acceptedtheformerprinciple,hisdistinctive claimwastheimpossibilityofexactlysimilar objects:numericallydistinctindividualscannot evenshareallintrinsicproperties.Moreover,this wasnot,forhim,simplyalawofidentitybut ratheranapplicationofhisprincipleofsufficient reason.Andtheindiscernibilityofidenticalsis partofauniversalunderstandingofidentity. WhatdistinguishesLeibnizistheprominenceof identitystatementsinhismetaphysicsandlogi- caltheory. Althoughidentityremainsaclearandbasic logicalnotion,identityquestionsaboutproblem- atickindsofobjectsraisedifficulties.Oneexam- pleistheidentificationofproperties,particularly incontextsinvolvingreduction.Althoughwe knowwhatidentityis,thenotionofaproperty isunclearenoughtoposesystematicobstaclesto theevaluationoftheoreticallysignificantiden- titystatementsinvolvingproperties.Otherdiffi- cultiesinvolvepersonalidentityorthepossible identificationofnumbersandsetsinthefounda- tionsofmathematics.Inthesecases,theidentity questionssimplyinherit-andprovidevivid waysofformulating-thedifficultiespertaining tosuchconceptsasperson,property,ornumber; norethinkingoftheidentityconceptitselfis indicated.Butpuzzlesabouttherelationofan ordinarymaterialbodytoitsconstituentmatter maysuggestthatthelogician'sanalysisofiden- titydoesnotcleanlycaptureoureveryday notion(s). Considerabronzestatue.Althoughthestatue mayseemtobenothingbesidesitsmatter,reflec- tiononchangeövertimesuggestsadistinction. Thestatuemaybemelteddown,hence destroyed,whilethebronzepersists,perhaps simplyasamässorperhapsasanewstatue formedfromthesamebronze.Alternatively,the statuemaypersistevenassomeofitsbronzeis dissolvedinacid.Sothestatueseemstobeone thingandthebronzeanother.Yetwhatisthe bronzebesidesastatue?Surelywedonothave twostatues(orstatuelikeobjects)inoneplace? Someauthorsfeelthatvariantsoftheidentity relationmaypermitaperspicuousdescriptionof therelationofstatueandbronze: (1)tensedidentity:Assumeaclassoftime- boundproperties-roughly,propertiesan objectcanhaveatatimeregardlessofwhat propertiesithasatothertimes.(E.g.,a statue'sshape,location,orelegance.)Then a=bprovidedaandbsharealltime- boundpropertiesattimet.Thus,thestatue andthebronzemaybeidenticalattimetl butnotatt2. (2)relativeidentity:aandbmaybeidenticalrel- ativetooneconcept(orpredicate)butnot toanother.Thus,thestatuemaybeheldto bethesamelumpofmatterasthebronzebut notthesameobjectofart. 415 identity,'is'of ideo-motoraction Ineachcase,onlydetailedstudywillshow whetherthevariantnotioncanatonceoffera naturaldescriptionofchangeandqualifyasa viabieidentityconcept.(Strongdoubtsarise about(2).)Butitseemslikelythatoureveryday talkofidentityhasarichnessandambiguitythat escapesformålcharacterization. Seealsoessentialism,identityofindis- CERNIBLES,PERSONALIDENTITY,PROPERTY, TIME.S.J.W. identity,'is'of.Seeis. identity,psychophysical.Seephysicalism. identity,theoretical.Seephilosophyofmind. identityofindiscernibles,anyofafamilyofprin- ciples,importantmembersofwhichincludethe following: (1)Ifobjectsaandbhaveallpropertiesin common,thenaandbareidentical. (2)Ifobjectsaandbhavealltheirqualitatlve propertiesincommon,thenaandbare identical. (3)Ifobjectsaandbhavealltheirnon-rela- tionalqualitatlvepropertiesincommon, thenaandbareidentical. Twoquestionsregardingtheseprinciplesare raised:Which,ifany,aretrue?Ifanyaretrue, aretheynecessarilytrue? Discussionsoftheidentityofindiscernibles typicallyrestrictthescopeoftheprincipletocon- creteobjects.Althoughthenotionsofqualitative andnon-relationalpropertiesplayaprominent roleinthesediscussions,theyarenotoriously difficulttodefine.Intuitively,aqualitativeprop- ertyisonethatcanbeinstantiatedbymorethan oneobjectanddoesnotinvolvebeingrelatedto anotherparticularobject.Itdoesnotfollowthat allqualitativepropertiesarenon-relational, sincesomerelationalproperties,suchasbeingon topofabrowndesk,donotinvolvebeingrelated tosomeparticularobject. (1)isgenerallyregardedasnecessarilytruebut trivial,sinceifaandbhaveallpropertiesincom- monthenahasthepropertyofbeingidentical withbandbhasthepropertyofbeingidentical witha.Hence,mostdiscussionsfocuson(2)and (3).(3)isgenerallyregardedas,atbest,acon- tingenttruthsinceitappearspossibletoconceive oftwodistinctredballsofthesamesize,shadeof color,andcomposition.Somehavearguedthat elementaryscientificparticles,suchaselectrons, arecounterexamplestoeventhecontingent truthof(3).(2)appearsdefensibleasacontin- genttruthsince,intheactualworld,objectssuch astheredballsandtheelectronsdifferintheir relationalqualitativeproperties.Ithasbeen argued,however,that(2)isnotanecessarytruth sinceitispossibletoconceiveofaworldconsist- ingofonlythetworedballs.Insuchaworld,any qualitativerelationalpropertypossessedbyone ballisalsopossessedbytheother.Defendersof thenecessarytruthof(2)havearguedthata carefulexaminationofsuchcounterexamples revealshiddenqualitativepropertiesthatdiffer- entiatetheobjects. Seealsoidentity,individuation,leib- NIZ,PROPERTY,substance.A.C. identityofpersons.Seepersonalidentity. identitytheory.Seephilosophyofmind. identitythesis.Seephilosophyofmind. ideographic.See windelband. ideology,generallyadisparagingtermusedto describesomeoneelse'spoliticalviewswhich oneregardsasunsound.Thisusederivesfrom Marx'semploymentofthetermtosignifyafalse consciousnesssharedbythemembersofapar- ticularsocialclass.Forexample,accordingto Marx,membersofthecapitalistclasssharethe ideologythatthelawsofthecompetitivemärket arenaturalandimpersonal,thatworkersina competitivemärketarepaidallthattheycanbe paid,andthattheinstitutionsofprivateproperty inthemeansofproductionarenaturalandjus- tified.Seealsomarxism,politicalphilos- ophy.J.P.St. ideo-motoraction,atheoryofthewillaccording towhich"everyrepresentationofamovement awakensinsomedegreetheactualmovement whichisitsobject"(WilliamJames).Proposedby physiologistW.B.Carpenter,andtaughtby LotzeandRenouvier,ideo-motoractionwas developedbyJames.Herejectedtheregnant analysisofvoluntarybehavior,whichheldthat willoperatesbyreinstating"feelingsofinnerva- tion"(Wundt)intheefferentnerves.Deploying introspectionandphysiology,Jamesshowed thatfeelingsofinnervationdonotexist.James advancedideo-motoractionasthepsychological basisofvolition:actionstendtooccurautomati- callywhenthought,unlessinhibitedbyacon- traryidea.Willconsistsinfixingattentionona 416 idolsofthecave imagination desiredideauntilitdominatesconsciousness,the executionofmovementfollowingautomatically. JamesalsorejectedBain'sassociationistthesis thatpleasureorpainisthenecessaryspringof action,sinceaccordingtoideo-motortheory thoughtofanactionbyitselfproducesit.James's analysisbecamedogma,butwaseffectively attackedbypsychologistE.L.Thorndike(1874- 1949),whoproposedinitsplacethebehavioris- ticdoctrinethatideashavenopowertocause behavior,andarguedthatbeliefinideo-motor actionamountedtobeliefinsympatheticmagic. Thusdidwillleavethevocabularyofpsychology. Seealsojames,volition.T.H.L. idolsofthecave.Seebacon,francis. idolsofthemarketplace.Seebacon,francis. idolsofthemind.Seebacon,francis. idolsofthetheater.Seebacon,francis. idolsofthetribe.Seebacon,francis. iff,anabbreviationfor'ifandonlyifthatisused asifitwereasinglepropositionaloperator(con- nective).Anothersynonymfor'iff'is'justin case'.Thejustificationfortreating'iff'asifitwere asinglepropositionalconnectiveisthat'Pifand onlyifQ'isellipticalfor'PifQ,andPonlyifQ', andthisassertionislogicallyequivalentto'P biconditionalQ'.Seealsobiconditional. R.W.B. ignoratioelenchi.Seeinformalfallacy. Il'in,IvanAleksandrovich(1883-1954),Russian philosopherandconservativelegalandpolitical theorist.Heauthoredanimportanttwo-volume commentaryonHegel(1918),plusextensive writingsinethics,politicaltheory,aesthetics,and spirituality.Exiledin1922,hewasknownforhis passionateoppositiontoBolshevism,hisexten- siveproposalsforrebuildingaradicallyreformed Russianstate,church,andsocietyinapost-Com- munistfuture,andhisdevoutRussianOrthodox spirituality.Heiswidelyregardedasamasterof Russianlanguageandapenetratinginterpreter ofthehistoryofRussianculture.Hiscollected worksarecurrentlybeingpublishedinMoscow. Seealsorussianphilosophy.RT.G. illation.Seeinduction. illative.Seeinduction. illativesense.Seenewman. illicitprocessofthemajor.Seesyllogism. illicitprocessoftheminor.Seesyllogism. illocutionaryact.Seespeechacttheory. illocutionaryforce.Seephilosophyoflanguage, SPEECHACTTHEORY. illocutionaryforcepotential.Seespeechactthe- ory. illusion,argumentfrom.Seeperception. imagetheoryofmeaning.Seemeaning. imagetheoryofmemory.Seememory. imagination,thementalfacultysometimes thoughttoencompassallactsofthinkingabout somethingnovel,contrarytofact,ornotcur- rentlyperceived;thus:"ImaginethatLincoln hadnotbeenassassinated,"or"Useyourimagi- nationtocreateanewdesignforrollerskates." 'Imagination'alsodenotesanimportantpercep- tion-likeaspectofsomesuchthoughts,sothatto imaginesomethingistobringtomindwhatit wouldbeliketoperceiveit. Philosophicaltheoriesofimaginationmust explainitsapparentintentionality:whenwe imagine,wealwaysimaginesomething.Imagina- tionisalwaysdirectedtowardanobject,even thoughtheobjectmaynotexist.Moreover, imagination,likeperception,isoftenseenas involvingqualia,orspecialsubjectiveproperties thataresometimesthoughttodiscreditmateri- alist,especiallyfunctionalist,theoriesofmind. Theintentionalityofimaginationanditsper- ceptualcharacterleadsometheoriestoequate imaginationwith"imaging":beingconsciousof orperceivingamentalimage.However,because theontologicalstatusofsuchimagesandthe natureoftheirpropertiesareobscure,many philosophershaverejectedmentalimagesin favörofanadverbialtheoryonwhichtoimag- inesomethingredisbestanalyzedasimagining "redly."Suchtheoriesavoidthedifficultiesasso- ciatedwithmentalimages,butmustoffersome otherwaytoaccountfortheapparentintention- alityofimaginationaswellasitsperceptualchar- acter. Imagination,inthehandsofHusserland Sartre,becomesaparticularlyaptsubjectfor phenomenology.Itisalsocitedasafacultythat 417 imaging immediacy separateshumanthoughtfromanyformofarti- ficialintelligence.Finally,imaginationoftenfig- uresprominentlyindebatesaboutpossibility,in thatwhatisimaginableisoftentakentobecoex- tensivewithwhatispossible. Seealsoconceivability,idea,inten- TIONALITY,PERCEPTION,PHILOSOPHYOF MIND.L.-M.R. imaging.Seeimagination. immanence,atermmostoftenusedincontrast to'transcendence'toexpressthewayinwhich Godisthoughttobepresentintheworld.The mostextremeformofimmanenceisexpressed inpantheism,whichidentifiesGod'ssubstance eitherpartlyorwhollywiththeworld.Incon- trasttopantheism,JudaismandChristianity holdGodtobeatotallyseparatesubstancefrom theworld.InChristianity,theseparatenessof God'ssubstancefromthatoftheworldisguar- anteedbythedoctrineofcreationexnihilo. AquinasheldthatGodisintheworldasaneffi- cientcauseispresenttothatonwhichitacts. Thus,Godispresentintheworldbycontinu- ouslyactingonittopreserveitinexistence. Perhapstheweakestnotionofimmanenceis expressedineighteenth-andnineteenth- centurydeism,inwhichGodinitiallycreates theworldandinstitutesitsuniversallaws,but isbasicallyanabsenteelandlord,exercising noprovidentialactivityöveritscontinuinghis- tory.Seealsodeism,naturalreligion,phi- LOSOPHYOFRELIGION,TRANSCENDENCE. W.L.R. immanentcausation.Seeagentcausation. immaterial.Seedisembodiment. immaterialism,theviewthatobjectsarebest characterizedasmerecollectionsofqualities:"a certaincolour,taste,smell,figureandconsis- tencehavingbeenobservedtogotogether,are accountedonedistinctthing,signifiedbythe nameäpple"(Berkeley,Principles,1).Socon- strued,immaterialismanticipatesbysometwo hundredyearsadoctrinedefendedintheearly twentiethcenturybyRussell.Thenegativeside ofthedoctrinecomesinthedenialofmaterial substanceormatter.Somephilosophershadheld thatordinaryobjectsareindividualmaterialsub- stancesinwhichqualitiesinhere.Theaccountis mistakenbecause,accordingtoimmaterialism, thereisnosuchthingasmaterialsubstance,and soqualitiesdonotinhereinit. Immaterialismshouldnotbeconfusedwith Berkeley'sidealism.Thelatter,butnotthefor- mer,impliesthatobjectsandtheirqualitiesexist ifandonlyiftheyareperceived. Seealsoberkeley,idealism,phenome- NALISM.G.S.R immediacy,presencetothemindwithoutinter- mediaries.Theterm'immediate'anditscognates havebeenusedextensivelythroughoutthehis- toryofphilosophy,generallywithoutmuch explanation.Descartes,e.g.,explainshisnotion ofthoughtthus:"Iusethistermtoincludeevery- thingthatiswithinusinawaythatweare immediatelyawareofit"(SecondReplies).He offersnoexplanationofimmediateawareness. However,whenusedasaprimitiveinthisway, thetermmaysimplymeanthatthoughtsarethe immediateobjectsofperceptionbecause thoughtsaretheonlythingsperceivedinthe strictandpropersensethatnoperceptionofan intermediaryisrequiredfortheperson'saware- nessofthem. Sometimes'immediate'means'notmediated'. (1)Aninferencefromapremisetoaconclusion canexhibitlogicalimmediacybecauseitdoesnot dependonotherpremises.Thisisatechnical usageofprooftheorytodescribetheformofa certainclassofinferencerules.(2)Aconceptcan exhibitconceptualimmediacybecauseitisdefi- nitionallyprimitive,asintheBerkeleiandoc- trinethatperceptionofqualitiesisimmediate, andperceptionofobjectsisdefinedbytheper- ceptionoftheirqualities,whichisdirectly understood.(3)Ourperceptionofsomething canexhibitcausalimmediacybecauseitisnot causedbyinterveningactsofperceptionorcog- nition,aswithseeingsomeoneimmediatelyin thefleshratherthanthroughimagesonamovie screen.(4)Abelief-formationprocesscanpos- sesspsychologicalimmediacybecauseitcontains nosubprocessofreasoningandinthatsensehas nopsychologicalmediator.(5)Ourknowledgeof somethingcanexhibitepistemicimmediacy becauseitisjustifiedwithoutinferencefrom anotherproposition,asinintuitiveknowledgeof theexistenceoftheself,whichhasnoepistemic mediator. Anoteworthyspecialapplicationofimmedi- acyistobefoundinRussell'snotionofknowl- edgebyacquaintance.Thisnotionisadevelop- mentofthevenerabledoctrineoriginatingwith Plato,andalsofoundinAugustine,thatunder- standingthenatureofsomeobjectrequiresthat wecangainimmediatecognitiveaccesstothat object.Thus,forPlato,tounderstandthenature 418 immediateinference implication ofbeautyrequiresacquaintancewithbeauty itself.Thisviewcontrastswithoneinwhich understandingthenatureofbeautyrequireslin- gnisticcompetenceintheuseoftheword'beauty' or,alternatively,withonethatrequireshavinga mentalrepresentationofbeauty.Russelioffers sense-dataanduniversalsasexamplesofthings knownbyacquaintance. Tothesesensesofimmediacywemayadd anothercategorywhosemembershaveacquired specialmeaningswithincertainphilosophical traditions.Forexample,inHegel'sphilosophyif (perimpossibile)anobjectwereencountered"as existinginsimpleimmediacy"itwouldbe encounteredasitisinitself,unchangedbycon- ceptualization.Inphenomenology"immediate" experienceis,roughly,bracketedexperience. Seealsoberkeley,epistemology,idea, INFERENTIALKNOWLEDGE,PERCEPTION,PHI- LOSOPHYOFMIND.T.V. immediateinference.Seeinference. immortality.Seedisembodiment,soul. impartiality,astateordispositionachievedtothe degreethatone'sactionsorattitudesarenot infTuencedinarelevantrespectbywhichmem- bersofarelevantgrouparebenefitedorhärmed byone'sactionsorbytheobjectofone'satti- tudes.Forexample,abasketballrefereeandthat referee'scallsareimpartialwhenthereferee's applicationsoftherulesarenotaffectedby whetherthecallshelponeteamortheother.A fan'sapprovalofacalllacksimpartialityifthat attituderesultsfromthefan'spreferenceforone teamövertheother. Impartialityinthisgeneralsensedoesnot excludearbitrarinessorguaranteefairness;nor doesitrequireneutralityamongvalues,fora judgecanbeimpartialbetweenpartieswhile favoringlibertyandequalityforall.Differentsit- uationsmightcallforimpartialityindifferent respectstowarddifferentgroups,sodisagree- mentsarise,forexample,aboutwhenmorality requiresorallowspartialitytowardfriendsor familyorcountry.Moralphilosophershavepro- posedvarioustestsofthekindofimpartiality requiredbymorality,includingrolereversibility (KurtBaier),universalizability(Hare),aveilof ignorance(Rawls),andarestrictiontobeliefs sharedbyallrationalpeople(BernardGert). Seealsoethics,hare,rawls,universal- izability.W.S.-A. imperative,categorical.Seekant. imperative,hypothetical.Seekant. imperfectduty.Seeduty,kant. imperfectrights.Seegrotius. implication,arelationthatholdsbetweentwo statementswhenthetruthofthefirstensuresthe truthofthesecond.Anumberofstatements togetherimplyQiftheirjointtruthensuresthe truthofQ.Anargumentisdeductivelyvalid exactlywhenitspremisesimplyitsconclusion. Expressionsofthefollowingformsareoften interchangedonefortheother:'PimpliesQ','Q followsfromP',and'PentailsQ'.('Entailment' alsohasamorerestrictedmeaning.) Inordinarydiscourse,'implication'haswider meaningsthatareimportantforunderstanding reasoningandcommunicationofallkinds.The sentence'LastTuesday,theeditorremained soberthroughoutlunch'doesnotimplythatthe editorisnotalwayssober.Butonewhoasserted thesentencetypicallywouldimplythis.Thethe- oryofconversationalimplicatnreexplainshow speakersoftenimplymorethantheirsentences imply. Theterm'implication'alsoappliestocondi- tionalstatements.Amaterialimplicationofthe form'ifP,thenQ'(oftensymbolized'P—>Q'or 'POQ')istruesolongaseithertheif-clausePis falseorthemainclauseQistrue;itisfalseonly ifPistrueandQisfalse.Astridimplicationofthe form'ifP,thenQ'(oftensymbolized'P—iQ')is trueexactlywhenthecorrespondingmaterial implicationisnecessarilytrue;i.e.,whenitis impossibleforPtobetruewhenQisfalse.The followingvalidformsofargumentarecalled paradoxesofmaterialimplication: Q.Therefore,PDQ. Not-P.Therefore,PDQ. Theappearanceofparadoxhereisduetousing 'implication'asanamebothforarelation betweenstatementsandforstatementsofcondi- tionalform.Aconditionalstatementcanbetrue eventhoughthereisnorelationbetweenits components.Considerthefollowingvalidinfer- Butterfloatsinmilk.Therefore,fishsleepat nightZ>butterfloatsinmilk. Sincethesimplepremiseistrue,theconditional conclusionisalsotruedespitethefactthatthe nocturnalactivitiesoffishandthecomparative densitiesofmilkandbutterarecompletelyunre- 419 implication,paradoxesof imposition lated.Thestatement'Fishsleepatnight'doesnot implythatbutterfloatsinmilk.Itisbettertocall aconditionalstatementthatistruejustsolong asitdoesnothaveatrueif-clauseandafalse mainclauseamaterialconditionalratherthana materialimplication. Stridconditionalissimilarlypreferableto'strict implication'.Respectingthisdistinction,how- ever,doesnotdissolveallthepuzzlementofthe so-calledparadoxesofstridimplication: NecessarilyQ.Therefore,P—!Q. ImpossiblethatP.Therefore,P—iQ. Hereisanexampleofthefirstpattem: Necessarily,allrectanglesarerectangles. Therefore,fishsleepatnight—iallrectangles arerectangles. 'Allrectanglesarerectangles'isanexampleofa vacuoustruth,socalledbecauseitisdevoidof content.'Allsquaresarerectangles'and'5is greaterthan3'arenotsoobviouslyvacuous truths,althoughtheyarenecessarytruths.Vacu- ityisnotasharplydefinednotion. Hereisanexampleofthesecondpattern: Itisimpossiblethatbutteralwaysfloatsin milkyetsometimesdoesnotfloatinmilk. Therefore,butteralwaysfloatsinmilkyet sometimesdoesnotfloatinmilk—ifishsleep atnight. Doestheif-clauseoftheconclusionimply(or entail)themainclause?Ononehand,whatbut- terdoesinmilkis,asbefore,irrelevantto whetherfishsleepatnight.Onthisground,rel- evancelogicdeniesthereisarelationofimplica- tionorentailment.Ontheotherhand,itis impossiblefortheif-clausetobetruewhenthe mainclauseisfalse,becauseitisimpossiblefor theif-clausetobetrueinanycircumstances whatever. Seealsocounterfactuals,formål LOGIC,IMPLICATURE,PRESUPPOSITION,RELE- VANCELOGIC.D.H.S. implication,paradoxesof.Seeimplication. implication,strict.Seeimplication. implicature,apragmaticrelationdifferentfrom, buteasilyconfusedwith,thesemanticrelationof entailment.Thisconceptwasfirstidentified, explained,andusedbyH.P.Grice(Studiesinthe WayofWords,1989).Griceidentifiedtwomain typesofimplicature,conventionalandconversa- tional.Aspeakerissaidtoconversationallyimpli- cateapropositionPinutteringagivensentence, providedthat,althoughPisnotlogicallyimplied bywhatthespeakersays,theassumptionthat thespeakerisattemptingcooperativecommuni- cationwarrantsinferringthatthespeaker believesp.IfBsays,"Thereisagaragearoundthe corner"inresponsetoA'ssaying,"Iamoutof gas,"Bconversationallyimplicatesthatthe garageisopenandhasgastosell. Griceidentifiesseveralconversationalmaxims towhichcooperativespeakersmaybeexpected toconform,andwhichjustifyinferencesabout speakers'implicatures.Intheaboveexample, theimplicaturesareduetotheMaximofRele- vance.Anotherimportantmaximisthatof Quantity("Makeyourcontributionasinforma- tiveasisrequired").Amongimplicaturesdueto theMaximofQuantityarescalarimplicatures, whereinthesentenceutteredcontainsanele- mentthatispartofaquantitativescale.Utter- anceofsuchasentenceconversationally implicatesthatthespeakerdoesnotbelieve relatedpropositionshigheronthescaleofinfor- mativeness.Forinstance,speakerswhosay, "Someofthezooanimalsescaped,"implicatethat theydonotbelievethatmostofthezooanimals escaped,orthatallofthezooanimalsescaped. Unlikeconversationalimplicatures,conven- tionalimplicaturesareduesolelytothemeaning ofthesentenceuttered.Asentenceutteranceis saidbyGricetoconventionallyimplicatea proposition,p,ifthemeaningofthesentence commitsthespeakertop,eventhoughwhatthe sentencesaysdoesnotentailp.Thus,uttering "Shewaspoorbutshewashonest"implicates, butdoesnotsay,thatthereisacontrastbetween povertyandhonesty. Seealsopresupposition.M.M. implicitdefinition.Seebeth'sdefinabilitytheo- REM,DEFINITION. imposition,apropertyoftermsresultingfroma linguisticconventiontodesignatesomething. Termsarenotmerenoisesbutsignificantsounds. Thosedesignatingextralinguisticentities,suchas 'tree','stone','blue',andthelike,wereclassified bythetraditionsinceBoethiusastermsoffirst imposition;thosedesignatingothertermsor otherlinguisticitems,suchas'noun','declen- sion',andthelike,wereclassifiedastermsofsec- ondimposition.Thedistinctionbetweentermsof firstandsecondimpositionbelongstotherealm ofwrittenandspökenlanguage,whiletheparal- leldistinctionbetweentermsoffirstandsecond 420 impredicativedefinition incompatibilism intentionbelongstotherealmofmentallan- guage:firstintentionsare,broadly,thoughts abouttrees,stones,colors,etc;secondinten- tionsarethoughtsaboutfirstintentions.See alsoINTENTIONALITY,METALANGUAGE. I.Bo. impredicativedefinition,thedefinitionofacon- ceptintermsofthetotalitytowhichitbelongs. Russell,inthesecond(1925)editionofPrincipia Mathematica,introducedtheterm'impredica- tive',prohibitingthiskindofdefinitionfromthe conceptualfoundationsofmathematics,onthe groundsthattheyimplyformållogicalpara- doxes.TheimpredicativedefinitionofthesetR ofallsetsthatarenotmembersofthemselvesin Russell'sparadoxleadstotheself-contradictory conclusionthati?isamemberofitselfifandonly ifitisnotamemberofitself.Toavoidantinomies ofthiskindintheformalizationoflogic,Russell firstimplementedinhisramifiedtypetheorythe viciouscircleprinciple,thatnowholemaycon- tainpartsthataredefmableonlyintermsofthat whole.Thelimitationoframifiedtypetheoryis thatwithoutuseofimpredicativedefinitionsitis impossibletoquantifyöverallmathematical objects,butonlyöverallmathematicalobjectsof acertainorderortype.Withoutbeingableto quantifyöverallrealnumbersgenerally,many ofthemostimportantdefinitionsandtheorems ofclassicalrealnumbertheorycannotbeformu- lated.Russellforthisreasonlåterabandoned ramifiedinfavörofsimpletypetheory,which avoidsthelogicalparadoxeswithoutoutlawing impredicativedefinitionbyforbiddingthepredi- cationoftermsofanytype(object,propertyand relation,higher-orderpropertiesandrelationsof propertiesandrelations,etc.)totermsofthe sametype.Seealsodefinition,philosophy OFMATHEMATICS,QUANTIFICATION,SET-THEO- RETICPARADOXES,TYPETHEORY.D.J. impredicativeproperty.Seetypetheory. impression.Seehume. impropersymbol.Seesyncategoremata. inclusivedisjunction.Seedisjunctiveproposi- tion. incoherence,self-referential.Seeself-referential INCOHERENCE. incommensurability,inthephilosophyofscience, thepropertyexhibitedbytwoscientifictheories providedthat,eventhoughtheymaynotlogi- callycontradictoneanother,theyhavereference tonocommonbodyofdata.Positivistandlogical empiricistphilosophersofsciencelikeCarnap hadlongsoughtanadequateaccountofatheory- neutrallanguagetoserveasthebasisfortesting competingtheories.Thepredicatesofthislan- guagewerethoughttorefertoobservables;the observationlanguagedescribedtheobservable worldor(inthecaseoftheoreticalterms)could dosoinprinciple.Thisviewisallegedtosuffer fromtwomajordefects.First,observationis infectedwiththeory-whatelsecouldspecifythe meaningsofobservationtermsexcepttherele- vanttheory?Eventoperceiveistointerpret,to conceptualize,whatisperceived.Andwhat aboutobservationsmadebyinstruments?Are thesenotcompletelyconstrainedbytheory? Second,studiesbyKuhn,PaulFeyerabend,and othersarguedthatinperiodsofrevolutionary changeinsciencetheadoptionofanewtheory includesacceptanceofacompletelynewconcep- tualschemethatisincommensurablewiththe older,nowrejected,theory.Thetwotheoriesare incommensurablebecausetheirconstituent termscannothavereferencetoatheory-neutral setofobservations;thereisnooverlapofobser- vationalmeaningbetweenthecompetitortheo- ries;eventhedatatobeexplainedaredifferent. Thus,whenGalileooverthrewthephysicsof Aristotlehereplacedhisconceptualscheme-his "paradigm"-withonethatisnotlogically incompatiblewithAristotle's,butisincommen- surablewithitbecauseinasenseitisaboutadif- ferentworld(ortheworldconceivedentirely differently).Aristotle'saccountofthemotionof bodiesrelieduponoccultqualitieslikenatural tendencies;Galileo'sreliedheavilyuponcon- trivedexperimentalsituationsinwhichvariable factorscouldbemathematicallycalculated. Feyerabend'sevenmoreradicalviewisthat unlessscientistsintroducenewtheoriesincom- mensurablewitholderones,sciencecannotpos- siblyprogress,becausefalsehoodswillneverbe uncovered.Itisanimportantimplicationofthese viewsaboutincommensurabilitythatacceptance oftheorieshastodonotonlywithobservable evidence,butalsowithsubjectivefactors,social pressures,andexpectationsofthescientificcom- munity.Suchacceptanceappearstothreatenthe verypossibilityofdevelopingacoherent methodologyforscience.Seealsoparadigm, PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE,THEORETICALTERM. R.E.B. incompatibilism.Seefreewillproblem. 421 incompleteness indeterminacyoftranslation incompleteness.Seecompleteness. incompletenesstheorem.Seegödel'sincom- pletenessTHEOREMS. incompletesymbol.Seelogicalconstruction, RUSSELL,SYNCATEGOREMATA,THEORYOFDESCRIP- TIONS. incompossible.Seecompossible. inconsistenttriad,(1)mostgenerally,anythree propositionssuchthatitcannotbethecasethat allthreeofthemaretrue;(2)morenarrowly,any threecategoricalpropositionssuchthatitcannot bethecasethatallthreeofthemaretrue.Acate- goricalsyllogismisvalidprovidedthethree propositionsthatareitstwopremisesandthe negation(contradiction)ofitsconclusionarean inconsistenttriad;thisfactunderliesvarioustests forthevalidityofcategoricalsyllogisms,which testsareoftencalled"methodsof"inconsistent triads.Seealsoantilogism,syllogism. R.W.B. incontinence.Seeakrasia. incorrigibility.Seeprivilegedaccess. indenumerable.Seeinfinity. independence.Seedependence. independence,logical.Seeindependenceresults. independence,probabilistic.Seeprobability. independence,statistical.Seeprobability. independenceresults,proofsofnon-deducibility. Anyofthefollowingequivalentconditionsmay becalledindependence:(1)Aisnotdeducible fromB;(2)itsnegation~AisconsistentwithB; (3)thereisamodelofBthatisnotamodelofA; e.g.,thequestionofthenon-deducibilityofthe parallelaxiomfromtheotherEuclideanaxioms isequivalenttothatoftheconsistencyofits negationwiththem,i.e.ofnon-Euclideangeom- etry.Independenceresultsmaybenotabsolute butrelative,oftheform:ifBisconsistent(orhas amodel),thenBtogetherwith~Ais(ordoes); e.g.modelsofnon-Euclideangeometryarebuilt withinEuclideangeometry.Inanothersense,a setBissaidtobeindependentifitisirredundant, i.e.,eachhypothesisinBisindependentofthe others;inyetanothersense,Aissaidtobeinde- pendentofBifitisundecidablebyB,i.e.,both independentofandconsistentwithB. TheincompletenesstheoremsofGödelare independenceresults,prototypesformanyfur- therproofsofundecidabilitybysubsystemsof classicalmathematics,orbyclassicalmathemat- icsasawhole,asformalizedinZermelo- Fraenkelsettheorywiththeaxiomofchoice(ZF +ACorZFC).Mostfamousistheundecidabil- ityofthecontinuumhypothesis,provedconsis- tentrelativetoZFCbyGödel,usinghismethod ofconstructiblesets,andindependentrelative toZFCbyPaulJ.Cohen,usinghismethodof forcing.Ratherthanbuildmodelsfromscratch bysuchmethods,independence(consistency) forAcanalsobeestablishedbyshowingA implies(isimpliedby)someA*alreadyknown independent(consistent).ManysuitableA* (Jensen'sDiamond,Martin'sAxiom,etc.)are nowavailable.Philosophically,formalismtakes A'sundecidabilitybyZFCtoshowthequestion of^4'struthmeaningless;Platonismtakesitto establishtheneedfornewaxioms,suchasthose oflargecardinals.(Considerationsrelatedtothe incompletenesstheoremsshowthatthereisno hopeevenofarelativeconsistencyprooffor theseaxioms,yettheyimply,bywayofdeter- minacyaxioms,manyimportantconsequences aboutrealnumbersthatareindependentof ZFC.) Withnon-classicallogics,e.g.second-order logic,(l)-(3)abovemaynotbeequivalent,so severalsensesofindependencebecomedistin- guishable.Thequestionofindependenceofone axiomfromothersmayberaisedalsoforfor- malizationsoflogicitself,wheremany-valued logicsprovidemodels. Seealsoforcing,gödel'sincomplete- nessTHEOREMS,SETTHEORY.J.Bur. indeterminacyargument.Seeskepticism. indeterminacyoftranslation,apairoftheses derived,originally,fromathoughtexperiment regardingradicaltranslationfirstpropoundedby QuineinWordandObject(1960)anddeveloped inhisOntologicalRelativity(1969),Theoriesand Things(1981),andPursuitofTruth(1990).Radi- caltranslationisanimaginarycontextinwhicha fieldlinguistisfacedwiththechallengeoftrans- latingahithertounknownlanguage.Further- more,itisstipulatedthatthelinguisthasno accesstobilingualsandthatthelanguagetobe translatedishistoricallyunrelatedtothatofthe linguist.Presumably,theonlydatathelinguist hastogoonaretheobservablebehaviorsof 422 indeterminacyprinciple indifference,principleof nativespeakersamidthepubliclyobservable objectsoftheirenvironment. (1)Thestrongthesisofindeterminacy,indetermi- nacyoftranslationoftheoreticalsentencesas wholes,istheclaimthatinthecontextofradical translationalinguist(orlinguists)couldcon- structanumberofmanualsfortranslatingthe (natives')sourcelanguageintothe(linguists') targetlanguagesuchthateachmanualcouldbe consistentwithallpossiblebehaviordataandyet themanualscoulddivergewithoneanotherin countlessplacesinassigningdifferenttarget-lan- guagesentences(holophrasticallyconstrued)as translationsofthesamesource-languagesen- tences(holophrasticallyconstrued),diverge eventothepointwherethesentencesassigned haveconflictingtruth-values;andnofurther data,physicalormental,couldsingleoutone suchtranslationmanualasbeingtheuniquely correctone.Allsuchmanuals,whichareconsis- tentwithallthepossiblebehavioraldata,arecor- rect. (2)Theweakthesisofindeterminacy,indetermi- nacyofreference(orinscrutabilityofreference), istheclaimthatgivenallpossiblebehaviordata, divergenttarget-languageinterpretationsof wordswithinasource-languagesentencecould offsetoneanothersoastosustaindifferenttarget- languagetranslationsofthesamesource-lan- guagesentence;andnofurtherdata,physicalor mental,couldsingleoutonesuchinterpretation astheuniquelycorrectone.Allsuchinterpreta- tions,whichareconsistentwithallthepossible behavioraldata,arecorrect.Thisweakersortof indeterminacytakestwoforms:anonticformand asyntacticform.Quine'sfamousexamplewhere thesource-languageterm'gavagai'couldbecon- struedeitheras'rabbit','undetachedrabbitpart', 'rabbithood',etc.(seeWordandObject),andhis proxyfunctionargumentwheredifferentontolo- giescouldbemappedontooneanother(see OntologicalRelativity,TheoriesandThings,and PursuitofTruth),bothexemplifytheonticformof indeterminacyofreference.Ontheotherhand, hisexampleoftheJapaneseclassifier,whereapar- ticularthree-wordconstructionofJapanesecan betranslatedintoEnglishsuchthatthethirdword oftheconstructioncanbeconstruedwithequal justificationeitherasatermofdividedreference orasamässterm(seeOntologicalRelativityand PursuitofTruth),exemplifiesthesyntacticformof indeterminacyofreference. Seealsomeaning,philosophyoflan- guage,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND.R.F.G. indeterminacyprinciple.SeeQUANTUMmechanics. indeterminate.Seevagueness. index.Seepeirce. indexical,atypeofexpressionwhosesemantic valueisinpartdeterminedbyfeaturesofthe contextofutterance,andhencemayvarywith thatcontext.Amongindexicalsarethepersonal pronouns,suchasT','you','he','she',and'it'; demonstratives,suchas'this'and'that';tempo- ralexpressions,suchas'now','today','yester- day';andlocativeexpressions,suchas'here', 'there',etc.Althoughclassicallogicignored indexicality,manyrecentpractitioners,follow- ingRichardMontague,haveprovidedrigorous theoriesofindexicalsinthecontextofformål semantics.Perhapsthemostplausibleandthor- oughtreatmentofindexicalsisbyDavidKaplan (b.1933;aprominentAmericanphilosopherof languageandlogicwhoselong-unpublished "Demonstratives"wasespeciallyinfluential;it eventuallyappearedinJ.Almog,J.Perry,and H.Wettstein,eds.,ThemesfromKaplan,1988). Kaplanarguespersuasivelythatindexicalsingu- lartermsaredirectlyreferentialandaspeciesof rigiddesignator.Healsoforcefullybringsouta cruciallessontobeleamedfromindexicals, namely,thattherearetwotypesofmeaning, whichKaplancalls"content"and"character."A sentencecontaininganindexical,suchas'Iam hungry',canbeusedtosaydifferentthingsindif- ferentcontexts,inpartbecauseofthedifferent semanticcontributionsmadebyTinthesecon- texts.Kaplancallsaterm'scontributiontowhat issaidinacontexttheterm'scontent.Thoughthe contentofanindexicallikeTvarieswithitscon- text,itwillneverthelesshaveasinglemeaning inthelanguage,whichKaplancallstheindexi- calscharacter.Thischaractermaybeconceivedas aruleoffunctionthatassignsdifferentcontents totheindexicalindifferentcontexts.Seealso PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE,TOKEN-REFLEX- ive.M.M. Indianphilosophy.Seebuddhism,hinduism,jain- ism. indicator,logical.Seelogicalindicator. indicatorword.Seelogicalindicator. indifference,Iibertyof.Seefreewillproblem, HUME. indifference,principleof.Seeprincipleofindif- ference. 423 indirectconsequentialism individuation indirectconsequentialism.Seebutler. indirectdiscourse,alsocalledoratioobliqua,the useofwordstoreportwhatotherssay,butwith- outdirectquotation.Whenonesays"Johnsaid, 'Noteverydoctorishonest,'"oneusesthewords inone'squotationdirectly-oneusesdirectdis- coursetomakeanassertionaboutwhatJohnsaid. Accuratedirectdiscoursemustgettheexact words.Butinindirectdiscourseonecanuseother wordsthanJohndoestoreportwhathesaid, e.g.,"Johnsaidthatsomephysiciansarenot honest."Thewordsquotedherecapturethe senseofJohn'sassertion(thepropositionhe asserted). Byextension,'indirectdiscourse'designates theuseofwordsinreportingbeliefs.Oneuses wordstocharacterizethepropositionbelieved ratherthantomakeadirectassertion.When Alicesays,"Johnbelievesthatsomedoctorsare nothonest,"sheusesthewords'somedoctors arenothonest'topresentthepropositionthat Johnbelieves.Shedoesnotasserttheproposi- tion.Bycontrast,directdiscourse,alsocalledora- tioreda,istheordinaryuseofwordstomake assertions. Seealsointensionality,quantifyingin, REFERENTIALLYTRANSPARENT.T.M. indirectintention.Seeintention. indirectknowledge.Seebasingrelation. indirectpassions.Seehume. indirectproof.Seereductioadabsurdum. indirectsense.Seeobliquecontext. indirectspeechact.Seespeechacttheory. indiscernibilityofidenticals,theprinciplethatif AandBareidentical,thereisnodifference betweenAandB:everythingtrueofAistrueof B,andeverythingtrueofBistrueofA;AandB havejustthesameproperties;thereisnoprop- ertysuchthatAhasitwhileBlacksit,orBhasit whileAlacksit.Atemptingformulationofthis principle,'Anytwothingsthatareidenticalhave alltheirpropertiesincommon',vergesonnon- sense;fortwothingsareneveridentical.'Ais numericallyidenticalwithB'meansthatAand Bareoneandthesame.AandBhavejustthe samepropertiesbecauseA,thatis,B,hasjustthe propertiesthatithas.Thisprincipleissometimes calledLeibniz'slaw.Itshouldbedistinguished fromitsconverse,Leibniz'smorecontroversial principleoftheidentityofindiscemibles. Acontraposedformoftheindiscernibilityof identicals-callitthedistinctnessofdiscern- ibles-revealsitspointinphilosophicdialectic.If somethingistrueofAthatisnottrueofB,or(to saythesamethingdifferently)ifsomethingis trueofBthatisnottrueofA,thenAandBarenot identical;theyaredistinct.Oneusesthisprinci- pletoattackidentityclaims.Classicalarguments fordualismattempttofindsomethingtrueofthe mindthatisnottrueofanythingphysical.For example,themind,unlikeeverythingphysical,is indivisible.Also,theexistenceofthemind, unliketheexistenceofeverythingphysical,can- notbedoubted.Thislastargumentshowsthat thedistinctnessofdiscemiblesrequiresgreatcare ofapplicationinintentionalcontexts. Seealsoidentity,intensionality. D.H.S. individual.Seemetaphysics. individualism.Seepoliticalphilosophy. individualism,descriptive.Seeholism. individualism,methodological.Seemethodologi- CALHOLISM. individuation,(1)inmetaphysics,aprocess wherebyauniversal,e.g.,cat,becomesinstanti- atedinanindividual-alsocalledaparticular e.g.,Minina;(2)inepistemology,aprocess wherebyaknowerdiscernsanindividual,e.g., someonediscemsMinina.Thedoubleunder- standingofindividuationraisestwodistinct problems:identifyingthecausesofmetaphysical individuation,andofepistemologicalindividua- tion.Inbothcasesthecausesarereferredtoas theprincipleofindividuation.Attemptstosettlethe metaphysicalandepistemologicalproblemsof individuationpresupposeanunderstandingof thenatureofindividuality.Individualityhasbeen variouslyinterpretedasinvolvingoneormoreof thefollowing:indivisibility,difference,division withinaspecies,identitythroughtime,impred- icability,andnon-instantiability.Ingeneral,the- oriesofindividuationtrytoaccountvariouslyfor oneormoreofthese. Individuationmayapplytobothsubstances (e.g.,Minina)andtheirfeatures(e.g.,Minina'sfur color),generatingtwodifferentsortsoftheories. Thetheoriesofthemetaphysicalindividuationof substancesmostoftenproposedidentifysixtypes ofprinciples:abundleoffeatures(Russell);space 424 indubitability induction and/ortime(Boethius);matter(Aristotle);form (Averroes);adecharacterized,suigeneriscompo- nentcalledbareparticular(Bergmann)orhaecce- ity(DunsScotus);andexistence(Avicenna). Sometimesseveralprinciplesarecombined.For example,forAquinastheprincipleofindividua- tionismatterunderdimensions(materiasignata). Twosortsofobjectionsareoftenbroughtagainst theseviewsofthemetaphysicalindividuationof substances.Onepointsoutthatsomeofthesethe- or\esv\o\atet\\tprincipleofacquaintance,s\ncethey identifyasindividuatorsentitiesforwhichthereis noempiricalevidence.Thesecondarguesthat someofthesetheoriesexplaintheindividuation ofsubstancesintermsofaccidents,thuscontra- dictingtheontologicalprecedenceofsubstance overaccident. Thetwomostcommontheoriesoftheepiste- mologicalindividuationofsubstancesidentify spatiotemporallocationand/orthefeaturesof substancesastheirindividuators;weknowa thingasanindividualbyitslocationinspaceand timeorbyitsfeatures.Theobjectionsthatare broughttobearagainstthesetheoriesaregener- allybasedontheineffectivenessofthoseprinci- plesinallsituationstoaccountforthedis- cernmentofalltypesofindividuals. Thetheoriesofthemetaphysicalindividuation ofthefeaturesofsubstancesfallintotwogroups. Someidentifythesubstanceitselfastheprinci- pleofindividuation;othersidentifysomefea- ture(s)ofthesubstanceasindividuator(s).Most accountsoftheepistemologicalindividuationof thefeaturesofsubstancesaresimilartothese views. Themostcommonobjectionstothemeta- physicaltheoriesoftheindividuationoffeatures attempttoshowthatthesetheoriesareeither incompleteorcircular.Itisargued,e.g.,thatan accountoftheindividuationoffeaturesinterms ofsubstanceisincompletebecausetheindividu- ationofthesubstancemustalsobeaccounted for:Howwouldoneknowwhattreeonesees, apartfromitsfeatures?However,ifthesub- stanceisindividuatedbyitsfeatures,onefalls intoaviciouscircle.Similarpointsaremadewith respecttotheepistemologicaltheoriesofthe individuationoffeatures. Apartfromtheviewsmentioned,some philosophersholdthatindividualsareindividual essentially(perse),andthereforethattheydo notundergoindividuation.Underthosecondi- tionseitherthereisnoneedforametaphysical principleofindividuation(Ockham),orelsethe principleofindividuationisidentifiedastheindi- vidualentityitself(Suårez). Seealsobundletheory,identity,meta- PHYSICS,PRINCIPIUMINDIVIDUATIONIS. J.J.E.G. indubitability.Seeprivilegedaccess. induction,(1)inthenarrowsense,inferenceto ageneralizationfromitsinstances;(2)inthe broadsense,anyampliativeinference-i.e.,any inferencewheretheclaimmadebytheconclu- siongoesbeyondtheclaimjointlymadebythe premises.Inductioninthebroadsenseincludes, ascasesofparticularinterest:argumentbyanal- ogy,predictiveinference,inferencetocauses fromsignsandsymptoms,andconfirmationof scientificlawsandtheories.Thenarrowsense coversoneextremecasethatisnotampliative. Thatisthecaseofmathematicalinduction,where thepremisesoftheargumentnecessarilyimply thegeneralizationthatisitsconclusion. Inductivelogiccanbeconceivedmostgenerally asthetheoryoftheevaluationofampliative inference.Inthissense,muchofprobabilitythe- ory,theoreticalstatistics,andthetheoryofcom- putabilityarepartsofinductivelogic.Inaddition, studiesofscientificmethodcanbeseenas addressinginalessformålwaythequestionof thelogicofinductiveinference.Thename 'inductivelogic'hasalso,however,becomeasso- ciatedwithaspecificapproachtotheseissues derivingfromtheworkofBayes,Laplace,De Morgan,andCarnap.Onthisapproach,one's priorprobabilitiesinastateofignoranceare determinedorconstrainedbysomeprinciplefor thequantificationofignoranceandonelearnsby conditioningontheevidence.Arecurrentdiffi- cultywiththislineofattackisthatthewayin whichignoranceisquantifieddependsonhow theproblemisdescribed,withdifferentlogically equivalentdescriptionsleadingtodifferentprior probabilities. Carnaplaiddownasapostulatefortheappli- cationofhisinductivelogicthatoneshould alwaysconditiononone'stotalevidence.This ruleoftotalevidenceisusuallytakenforgranted, butwhatjustificationisthereforit?Good pointedoutthatthestandardBayesiananalysis oftheexpectedvalueofnewinformationpro- videssuchajustification.Purecost-freeinforma- tionalwayshasnon-negativeexpectedvalue, andifthereispositiveprobabilitythatitwill affectadecision,itsexpectedvalueispositive. Ramseymadethesamepointinanunpublished manuscript.Theproofgeneralizestovarious modelsoflearninguncertainevidence. Adeductiveaccountissometimespresented 425 induction,eliminative inference whereinductionproceedsbyeliminationofpossi- bilitiesthatwouldmaketheconclusionfalse. ThusMill'smethodsofexperimentalinquiryare sometimesanalyzedasproceedingbyelimina- tionofalternativepossibilities.Inamoregeneral setting,thehypothetico-deductiveaccountof scienceholdsthattheoriesareconfirmedbytheir observationalconsequences-i.e.,byelimina- tionofthepossibilitiesthatthisexperimentor thatobservationfalsifiesthetheory.Inductionby eliminationissometimesputforthasanalterna- tivetoprobabilisticaccountsofinduction,butat leastoneversionofitisconsistentwith-and indeedaconsequenceof-probabilisticaccounts. ItisanelementaryfactofprobabilitythatifF,the potentialfalsifier,isinconsistentwithTandboth haveprobabilitystrictlybetweenand1,then theprobabilityofTconditionalonnot-i7ishigher thantheunconditionalprobabilityofT. Inacertainsense,inductivesupportofauni- versalgeneralizationbyitsinstancesmaybea specialcaseoftheforegoing,butthispointmust betreatedwithsomecare.Inthefirstplace,the universalgeneralizationmusthavepositiveprior probability.(ItisworthnotingthatCarnap'ssys- temsofinductivelogicdonotsatisfythiscondi- tion,althoughsystemsofHintikkaandNiini- luotodo.)Inthesecondplace,thenotionof instancemustbeconstruedsothe"instances"of auniversalgeneralizationareinfactlogicalcon- sequencesofit.ThusTfAisaswanthenAis white'isaninstanceof'Allswansarewhite'in theappropriatesense,but'Aisawhiteswan'is not.Thelatterstatementislogicallystronger than'IfAisaswanthenAiswhite'andacom- pletereportonspecies,weight,color,sex,etc,of individualAwouldbestrongerstill.Suchstate- mentsarenotlogicalconsequencesoftheuni- versalgeneralization,andthetheoremdoesnot holdforthem.Forexample,thereportofaman 7feet11%inchestallmightactuallyreducethe probabilityofthegeneralizationthatallmenare under8feettall. Residualqueasinessabouttheforegoingmay bedispelledbyapointmadebyCarnapapropos ofHempel'sdiscussionofparadoxesofconfirma- tion.'Confirmation'isambiguous.'EconfirmsH' maymeanthattheprobabilityofHconditional onEisgreaterthantheunconditionalprobabil- ityofH,inwhichcasedeductiveconsequences ofHconfirmHundertheconditionssetforth above.Or'EconfirmsH'maymeanthatthe probabilityofHconditionalonEishigh(e.g., greaterthan.95),inwhichcaseifEconfirmsH, thenEconfirmseverylogicalconsequenceofH. Conflationofthetwosensescanleadonetothe paradoxicalconclusionthatEconfirmsE&Pand thusPforanystatement,P. Seealsoconfirmation,mathematical INDUCTION,MILI/SMETHODS,PROBLEMOF INDUCTION.B.Sk. induction,eliminative.Seeinduction. induction,intuitive.Seeross. induction,mathematical.Seemathematical INDUCTION. induction,newriddleof.Seegrueparadox. induction,problemof.Seeproblemofinduction. inductiveclause.Seemathematicalinduction. inductivedefinition.Seedefinition. inductiveexplanation.Seecoveringlawmodel. inductivejustification.Seejustification. inductiveprobability.Seeprobability. inductivism,aphilosophyofscienceinventedby PopperandP.K.Feyerabendasafoilfortheir ownviews.Accordingtoinductivism,aunique aprioriinductivelogicenablesonetoconstruct analgorithmthatwillcomputefromanyinput ofdatathebestscientifictheoryaccountingfor thatdata.Seealsoalgorithm,duhem,phi- losophyofscience.B.Sk. infallibility.Seeprivilegedaccess. inference,theprocessofdrawingaconclusion frompremisesorassumptions,or,loosely,the conclusionsodrawn.Anargumentcanbemerely anumberofstatementsofwhichoneisdesig- natedtheconclusionandtherestaredesignated premises.Whetherthepremisesimplythecon- clusionisthusindependentofanyone'sactual beliefsineitherofthem.Belief,however,is essentialtoinference.Inferenceoccursonlyif someone,owingtobelievingthepremises, beginstobelievetheconclusionorcontinuesto believetheconclusionwithgreaterconfidence thanbefore.Becauseinferencerequiresasubject whohasbeliefs,somerequirementsof(anide- ally)acceptableinferencedonotapplyto abstractarguments:onemustbelievethe premises;onemustbelievethatthepremises supporttheconclusion;neitherofthesebeliefs 426 inferencerule inferencetothebestexplanation maybebasedonone'spriorbeliefintheconclu- sion.W.E.Johnsoncalledthesetheepistemic conditionsofinference.Inareductioadabsurdum argumentthatdeducesaself-contradictionfrom certainpremises,notallstepsoftheargument willcorrespondtostepsofinference.Noone deliberatelyinfersacontradiction.Whatone infers,insuchanargument,isthatcertain premisesareinconsistent. Acceptableinferencescanfallshortofbeing ideallyacceptableaccordingtotheaboverequire- ments.Relevantbeliefsaresometimesindefinite. Infantsandchildreninferdespitehavingno graspofthesophisticatednotionofsupport.One functionofidealizationistosetstandardsforthat whichfallsshort.Itispossibletojudgehow nearlyinexplicit,automatic,unreflective,less- than-idealinferencesmeetidealrequirements. Inordinaryspeech,'infer'oftenfunctionsasa synonymof'imply',asin'Thenewtaxlawinfers thatwehavetocalculatethevalueofourshrub- bery'.Carefulphilosophicalwritingavoidsthis usage.Implicationis,andinferenceisnot,arela- tionbetweenstatements. Validdeductiveinferencecorrespondstoa validdeductiveargument:itislogicallyimpossi- bleforallthepremisestobetruewhenthecon- clusionisfalse.Thatis,theconjunctionofallthe premisesandthenegationoftheconclusionis inconsistent.Wheneveraconjunctionisincon- sistent,thereisavalidargumentforthenegation ofanyconjunctfromtheotherconjuncts.(Rel- evancelogicimposesrestrictionsonvalidityto avoidthis.)Wheneveroneargumentisdeduc- tivelyvalid,soisanotherargumentthatgoesin adifferentdirection.(1)'Stacyleftherslippersin thekitchen'implies(2)'Stacyhadsomeslip- pers'.ShouldoneacquaintedwithStacyandthe kitcheninfer(2)from(1),orinfernot-(l)from not-(2),ormakeneitherinference?Formållogic tellsusaboutimplicationanddeductivevalidity, butitcannottelluswhenorwhattoinfer.Rea- sonableinferencedependsoncomparativede- greesofreasonablebelief. Aninferenceinwhicheverypremiseand everystepisbeyondquestionisademonstrative inference.(Similarly,reasoningforwhichthis conditionholdsisdemonstrativereasoning.) Justaswhatisbeyondquestioncanvaryfrom onesituationtoanother,socanwhatcountsas demonstrative.Thetermpresumablyderives fromAristotle'sPosteriorAnalytics.Understanding Aristotle'sviewsondemonstrationrequires understandinghisgeneralschemeforclassifying inferences. Notallinferencesaredeductive.Inaninduc- tiveinference,oneinfersfromanobservedcom- binationofcharacteristicstosomesimilarunob- servedcombination. 'Reasoning'like'painting',and'frosting',and manyotherwords,hasaprocess-productambi- guity.Reasoningcanbeaprocessthatoccursin timeoritcanbearesultorproduct.Aletterto theeditorcanbothcontainreasoningandbethe resultofreasoning.Itisoftenunclearwhethera wordsuchas'statistical'thatmodifiesthewords 'inference'or'reasoning'appliesprimarilyto stagesintheprocessortothecontentofthe product. Oneview,attractiveforitssimplicity,isthat thestagesoftheprocessofreasoningcorrespond closelytothepartsoftheproduct.Examplesthat confirmthisviewarescarce.Testingalternatives, discardingandreviving,revisingandtranspos- ing,andsoon,areascommontotheprocessof reasoningastoothercreativeactivities.Aprod- uctseldomreflectstheexacthistoryofitspro- duction. InAnExaminationofSirWilliamHamilton'sPhi- losophy,J.S.Millsaysthatreasoningisasource fromwhichwederivenewtruths(Chapter14). Thisisausefulsayingsolongasweremember thatnotallreasoningisinference. Seealsodeduction,implication,induc- tion.D.H.S. inferencerule.Seelogisticsystem. inferencetothebestexplanation,aninferenceby whichoneconcludesthatsomethingisthecase onthegroundsthatthisbestexplainssomething elseonebelievestobethecase.Paradigmexam- plesofthiskindofinferencearefoundinthenat- uralsciences,whereahypothesisisacceptedon thegroundsthatitbestexplainsrelevantobser- vations.Forexample,thehypothesisthatmate- rialsubstanceshaveatomicstructuresbest explainsarangeofobservationsconcerninghow suchsubstancesinteract.Inferencestothebest explanationoccurineverydaylifeaswell.Upon walkingintoyourhouseyouobservethatalamp islyingbrokenonthefloor,andonthebasisof thisyouinferthatthecathasknockeditöver. Thisisplausiblyanalyzedasaninferencetothe bestexplanation;youbelievethatthecathas knockedöverthelampbecausethisisthebest explanationforthelamp'slyingbrokenonthe floor. Thenatureofinferencetothebestexplanation andtheextentofitsusearebothcontroversial. Positionsthathavebeentakeninclude:(a)that itisadistinctivekindofinductivereasoning;(b) 427 inferentialjustification infinitarylogic thatallgoodinductiveinferencesinvolveinfer- encetothebestexplanation;and(c)thatitisnot adistinctivekindofinferenceatall,butisrather aspecialcaseofenumerativeinduction.Another controversyconcernsthecriteriaforwhatmakes anexplanationbest.Simplicity,cognitivefit,and explanatorypowerhaveallbeensuggestedas relevantmerits,butnoneofthesenotionsiswell understood.Finally,askepticalproblemarises: inferencetothebestexplanationisplausibly involvedinbothscientificandcommonsense knowledge,butitisnotclearwhythebestexpla- nationthatoccurstoapersonislikelytobetrue. Seealsoabduction,explanation,in- duction,INFERENCE,PHILOSOPHYOFSCI- ENCE.J.G. inferentialjustification.Seefoundationalism. inferentialknowledge,akindof"indirect" knowledge,namely,knowledgebasedonor resultingfrominference.Assumingthatknowl- edgeisatleasttrue,justifiedbelief,inferential knowledgeisconstitutedbyabeliefthatisjusti- fiedbecauseitisinferredfromcertainother beliefs.Theknowledgethat7equals7seems non-inferential.Wedonotinferfromanything that7equals7-itisobviousandself-evident. Theknowledgethat7isthecuberootof343,in contrast,seemsinferential.Wecannotknowthis withoutinferringitfromsomethingelse,suchas theresultobtainedwhenmultiplying7times7 times7. Twosortsofinferentialrelationsmaybedis- tinguished.Tinferredthatsomeonedied becausetheflagisathalf-mast'maybetrue becauseyesterdayIacquiredthebeliefaboutthe flag,whichcausedmetoacquirethefurther beliefthatsomeonedied.'Iinferentiallybelieve thatsomeonediedbecausetheflagisathalf- mast'maybetruenowbecauseIretainthebelief thatsomeonediedanditremainsbasedonmy beliefabouttheflag.Mybeliefthatsomeonedied isthuseitherepisodicallyorstructurallyinferential. Theepisodicprocessisanoccurrent,causalrela- tionamongbeliefacquisitions.Thestructural basingrelationmayinvolvetheretentionof beliefs,andneednotbeoccurrent.(Some reserve'inference'fortheepisodicrelation.)An inferentialbeliefacquiredononebasismaylåter beheldonadifferentbasis,aswhenIforgetIsaw aflagathalf-mastbutcontinuetobelievesome- onediedbecauseofnewsreports. That"Howdoyouknow?"and"Proveit!" alwaysseempertinentsuggeststhatallknowl- edgeisinferential,aversionofthecoherence theory.Thewell-knownregressargumentseems toshow,however,thatnotallknowledgecanbe inferential,whichisaversionoffoundational- ism.ForifSknowssomethinginferentially,S mustinferitcorrectlyfrompremisesSknowsto betrue.Thequestionwhetherthosepremises arealsoknowninferentiallybeginseitheraninfi- niteregressofinferences(whichishumanly impossible)oracircleofjustification(which couldnotconstitutegoodreasoning). Whichsourcesofknowledgearenon-inferen- tialremainsanissueevenassumingfoundation- alism.Whenweseethatanäppleisred,e.g.,our knowledgeisbasedinsomemannerontheway theäpplelooks."Howdoyouknowitisred?" canbeanswered:"Bythewayitlooks."This answerseemscorrect,moreover,onlyifaninfer- encefromthewaytheäpplelookstoitsbeingred wouldbewarranted.Nevertheless,perceptual beliefsareformedsoautomaticallythattalkof inferenceseemsinappropriate.Inaddition, inferenceasaprocesswherebybeliefsare acquiredasaresultofholdingotherbeliefsmay bedistinguishedfrominferenceasastatein whichonebeliefissustainedonthebasisofoth- ers.Knowledgethatisinferentialinoneway neednotbeinferentialintheother. Seealsofoundationalism,inference, PRACTICALREASONING.W.A.D. intimaspecies(Latin,'lowestspecies'),aspecies thatisnotagenusofanyotherspecies.Accord- ingtothetheoryofclassification,division,and definitionthatispartoftraditionalorAris- totelianlogic,everyindividualisaspecimenof someinfimaspecies.Aninfimaspeciesisamember ofagenusthatmayinturnbeaspeciesofamore inclusivegenus,andsoon,untilonereachesa summumgenus,agenusthatisnotaspeciesofa moreinclusivegenus.SocratesandPlatoare specimensoftheinfimaspecishumanbeing(mor- talrationalanimal),whichisaspeciesofthe genusrationalanimal,whichisaspeciesofthe genusanimal,andsoon,uptothesummumgenus substance.Whereastwospecimensofani- mal-e.g.,anindividualhumanandanindivid- ualhorse-candifferpartlyintheiressential characteristics,notwospecimensoftheinfima specieshumanbeingcandifferinessence.See alsoARISTOTLE,ESSENTIALISM,GENUSGEN- ERALISSIMUM,TREEOFPORPHYRY.W.E.M. infinitarylogic,thelogicofexpressionsofinfinite length.Quinehasadvancedtheclaimthatfirst- orderlogic(FOL)isthelanguageofscience,a positionacceptedbymanyofhisfollowers.How- 428 infinite,actual infiniteregressargument ever,manyimportantnotionsofmathematics andsciencearenotexpressibleinFOL.The notionoffiniteness,e.g.,iscentralinmathemat- icsbutcannotbeexpressedwithinFOL.Thereis nowaytoexpresssuchasimple,preciseclaimas 'Thereareonlyfinitelymanystars'inFOL.This andrelatedexpressivelimitationsinFOLseri- ouslyhamperitsapplicabilitytothestudyof mathematicsandhaveledtothestudyof strongerlogics. Therehavebeenvariousapproachestogetting aroundthelimitationsbythestudyofso-called stronglogics,includingsecond-orderlogic (whereonequantifiesöversetsorproperties,not justindividuals),generalizedquantifiers(where oneaddsquantifiersinadditiontotheusual'for all'and'thereexists'),andbranchingquantifiers (wherenotionsofindependenceofvariablesis introduced).Oneofthemostfruitfulmethods hasbeentheintroductionofidealized"infinitely long"statements.Forexample,theabovestate- mentaboutthestarswouldbeformalizedasan infinitedisjunction:thereisatmostonestår,or thereareatmosttwostars,orthereareatmost threestars,etc.Eachofthesedisjunctsisexpres- sibleinFOL. TheexpressivelimitationsinFOLareclosely linkedwithGödel'sfamouscompletenessand incompletenesstheorems.Theseresultsshow, amongotherthings,thatanyattempttosystem- atizethelawsoflogicisgoingtobeinadequate, onewayoranother.Eitheritwillbeconfmedto alanguagewithexpressivelimitations,sothat thesenotionscannotevenbeexpressed,orelse, iftheycanbeexpressed,thenanattemptatgiv- inganeffectivelistingofaxiomsandrulesof inferenceforthelanguagewillfallshort.In infinitarylogic,therulesofinferencecanhave infinitelymanypremises,andsoarenoteffec- tivelypresentable. Earlyworkininfmitarylogicusedcardinality asaguide:whetherornotadisjunction,con- junction,orquantifierstringwaspermittedhad todoonlywiththecardinalityofthesetinques- tion.Ittumedoutthatthemostfruitfulofthese logicswasthelanguagewithcountableconjunc- tionsandfinitestringsoffirst-orderquantifiers. Thislanguagehadfurtherrefinementstoso- calledadmissiblelanguages,wheremorerefined set-theoreticconsiderationsplayaroleindeter- miningwhatcountsasaformula. Infmitarylanguagesarealsoconnectedwith strongaxiomsofinfinity,statementsthatdonot followfromtheusualaxiomsofsettheorybut forwhichonehasotherevidencethattheymight wellbetrue,oratleastconsistent.Inparticular, compactcardinalsareinfinitecardinalnumbers wheretheanalogueofthecompactnesstheorem ofFOLgeneralizestotheassociatedinfinitary language.Thesecardinalshaveproventobevery importantinmodernsettheory. Duringthe1990s,someinfinitarylogicsplayed asurprisingroleincomputerscience.Byallow- ingarbitrarilylongconjunctionsanddisjunc- tions,butonlyfinitelymanyvariables(freeor bound)inanyformula,languageswithattractive closurepropertieswerefoundthatallowedthe kindsofinductiveproceduresofcomputersci- ence,proceduresnotexpressibleinFOL. Seealsocompactnesstheorem,com- pleteness,GÖDEI/SINCOMPLETENESSTHEO- REMS,INFINITY,SECOND-ORDERLOGIC. J.Ba. infinite,actual.Seearistotle. infiniteanalysis,doctrineof.Seeleibniz. infiniteregressargument,adistinctivelyphilo- sophicalkindofargumentpurportingtoshow thatathesisisdefectivebecauseitgeneratesan infiniteserieswheneither(formA)nosuch seriesexistsor(formB)wereittoexist,thethe- siswouldlacktherole(e.g.,ofjustification)that itissupposedtoplay. Themeregenerationofaninfiniteseriesisnot objectionable.Itismisleadingthereforetouse 'infiniteregress'(or'regress')and'infiniteseries' equivalently.Forinstance,bothofthefollowing claimsgenerateaninfiniteseries:(1)everynat- uralnumberhasasuccessorthatitselfisanat- uralnumber,and(2)everyeventhasacausal predecessorthatitselfisanevent.Yet(1)istrue (arguably,necessarilytrue),and(2)maybetrue forallthatlogiccansayaboutthematter.Like- wise,thereisnothingcontrarytologicaboutany oftheinfiniteseriesgeneratedbythesupposi- tionsthat(3)everyfreeactistheconsequenceof afreeactofchoice;(4)everyintelligentopera- tionistheresultofanintelligentmentalopera- tion;(5)wheneverindividualsxandysharea propertyFthereexistsathirdindividualzwhich paradigmaticallyhasFandtowhichxandyare somehowrelated(ascopies,byparticipation,or whatnot);or(6)everygeneralizationfromexpe- rienceisinductivelyinferablefromexperience byappealtosomeothergeneralizationfrom experience. WhatLocke(intheEssayconcerningHuman Understanding)objectstoaboutthetheoryoffree willembodiedin(3)andRyle(inTheConceptof Mind)objectstoaboutthe"intellectualistleg- 429 infinity infinity end"embodiedin(4)canthereforebeonlythat itisjustplainfalseasamatteroffactthatweper- formaninfinitenumberofactsofchoiceoroper- ationsoftherequisitekinds.Ineffecttheir infiniteregressargumentsareofformA:they arguethatthetheoriesconcemedmustbe rejectedbecausetheyfalselyimplythatsuchinfi- niteseriesexist. Arguablytheinfiniteregressargumentsem- ployedbyPlato(intheParmenides)regardinghis owntheoryofFormsandbyPopper(intheLogic ofScientificDiscovery)regardingtheprincipieof inductionproposedbyMill,arebestconstruedas havingformB,theirobjectionsbeinglessto(5) or(6)thantotheirepistemicversions:(5*)that wecanunderstandhowxandycanshareaprop- ertyFonlyifweunderstandthatthereexistsa thirdindividual(the"Form"z)whichparadig- maticallyhasFandtowhichxandyarerelated; and(6*)thatsincetheprincipieofinduction mustitselfbeageneralizationfromexperience, wearejustifiedinacceptingitonlyifitcanbe inferredfromexperiencebyappealtoahigher- order,andjustified,inductiveprincipie.Theyare arguingthatbecausetheseriesgeneratedby(5) and(6)areinfinite,theepistemicenlightenment promisedby(5*)and(6*)willforevereludeus. Whensuccessful,infiniteregressarguments canshowusthatcertainsortsofexplanation, understanding,orjustificationarewill-o'-the- wisps.AsPassmorehasobserved(inPhilosophi- calReasoning)thereisanimportantsenseof 'explain'inwhichitisimpossibletoexplain predication.Wecannotexplainx'sandy'spos- sessionofthecommonpropertyFbysayingthat theyarecalledbythesamename(nominalism)or fallunderthesameconcept(conceptualism)any morethanwecanbysayingthattheyarerelated tothesameform(Platonicrealism),sinceeachof theseisitselfapropertythatxandyaresupposed tohaveincommon.Likewise,itmakesnosense totrytoexplainwhyanythingatallexistsby invokingtheexistenceofsomethingelse(suchas thetheisfsGod).Thegeneraltruthsthatthings exist,andthatthingsmayhavepropertiesin common,are"brutefacts"aboutthewaythe worldis. Someinfiniteregressobjectionsfailbecause theyaredirectedat"strawmen."Bradley's regressargumentagainstthepluralisfs"arrange- mentofgivenfactsintorelationsandqualities," fromwhichheconcludesthatmonismistrue,is acaseinpoint.Hecorrectlyarguesthatifone positstheexistenceoftwoormorethings,then theremustberelationsofsomesortbetween them,andthen(givenhiscovertassumption thattheserelationsarethings)concludesthat theremustbefurtherrelationsbetweenthese relationsadinfmiturn.Bradley'sregressmisfires becauseapluralistwouldrejecthisassumption. Again,someregressargumentsfailbecausethey presumethatanyinfiniteseriesisvicious. Aquinas'sregressobjectiontoaninfiniteseriesof movers,fromwhichheconcludesthatthere mustbeaprimemover,involvesthissortofcon- fusion. Seealsoepistemicregressargument, INFINITY,VICIOUSREGRESS.R.D.B. infinity,insettheory,thepropertyofaset wherebyithasapropersubsetwhosemembers canbeplacedinone-to-onecorrespondence withallthemembersoftheset,astheeveninte- gerscanbesoarrangedinrespecttothenatural numbersbythefunctionf(x)=x/2,namely: 2468 *V*■* 1234 DevisedbyRichardDedekindindefianceofthe age-oldintuitionthatnopartofathingcanbeas largeasthething,thisset-theoreticaldefinition of'infinity',havingbeenmuchacclaimedby philosopherslikeRussellasamodelofconcep- tualanalysisthatphilosopherswereurgedto emulate,canelucidatetheputativeinfinityof space,time,andevenGod,hispower,wisdom, etc. Ifasefsbeingdenumerable-i.e.,capableof havingitsmembersplacedinone-to-onecorre- spondencewiththenaturalnumbers-canwell appeartodefinemuchmoresimplywhatthe infinityofaninfinitesetis,Cantorexhibitedthe realnumbers(asexpressedbyunendingdecimal expansions)asacounterexample,showingthem tobeindenumerablebymeansofhisfamous diagonalargument.Supposealltherealnumbers betweenand1areplacedinone-to-onecorre- spondencewiththenaturalnumbers,thus: 1^ 2poweroftheirmeandistances,servedtocon- firmhislong-standingconvictionthattheuni- verseisfashionedaccordingtoidealharmonic relationships. IntheEpitomeastronomiaeCopernicanae(1612), hecontinuedhissearchforcauses"eithernat- uralorarchetypal,"notonlyfortheplanetary motions,butforsuchdetailsasthesizeofthesun andthedensitiesoftheplanets.Hewasmore convincedthaneverthataphysicsoftheheav- enshadtorestuponitsabilitytoexplain(andnot justtopredict)thepeculiaritiesoftheplanetary andlunarmotions.Whatpreventedhimfrom movingevenfurtherthanhedidtowardanew physicswasthathehadnotgraspedwhatlåter cametobecalledtheprincipleofinertia.Thushe wascompelledtopostulatenotonlyanattractive forcebetweenplanetandsunbutalsoasecond forcetourgetheplanetonward.ItwasNewton whoshowedthatthesecondforceisunneces- sary,andwhofinallyconstructedthe"physicsof thesky"thathadbeenKepler'sambition.Buthe couldnothavedoneitwithoutKepler'snotion ofaquantifiableforceoperatingbetweenplanet andsun,anunorthodoxnotionshapedinthe firstplacebyanimaginationsteepedinNeopla- tonicmetaphysicsandthetheologyoftheHoly Spirit. Seealsonewton.E.M. Kerry'sparadox.Seefrege. Keynes,JohnMaynard(1883-1946),English economistandpublicservantwhorevolution- izedeconomictheoryandtheapplicationofeco- nomictheoryingovernmentpolicy.Hismost philosophicallyimportantworkswereTheGen- eralTheoryofEmployment,InterestandMoney (1936)andATreatiseonProbability(1921). KeyneswasalsoactiveinEnglishphilosophical life,beingwellacquaintedwithsuchthinkersas MooreandRamsey. Inthephilosophyofprobability,Keynespio- neeredthetreatmentofpropositionsasthebear- ersofprobabilityassignments.Unlikeclassical subjectivists,hetreatedprobabilitiesasobjective evidentialrelationsamongpropositions.These relationsweretobedirectlyepistemicallyacces- sibletoanintuitivefaculty.Anidiosyncraticfea- tureofKeynes'ssystemisthatdifferent probabilityassignmentscannotalwaysbecom- pared(orderedasequal,lessthan,orgreater thanoneanother). Keynesianeconomicsisstillpresentedin introductorytextbooksandithaspermanently affectedboththeoryandpractice.Keynes'seco- nomicthoughthadanumberofphilosophically 467 Kierkegaard,SörenAabye Kierkegaard,SörenAabye importantdimensions.Whilehistheorizingwas inthecapitalistictradition,herejectedSmith's notionofaninvisiblehandthatwouldoptimize theperformanceofaneconomywithoutany intentionaldirectionbyindividualsorbythe government.Thisinvolvedrejectionoftheeco- nomicpolicyoflaissez-faire,accordingtowhich governmentinterventionintheeconomy'soper- ationisuseless,orworse.Keynesarguedthat naturalforcescoulddeflectaneconomyfroma courseofoptimalgrowthandkeepitperma- nentlyoutofequilibria.IntheGeneralTheoryhe proposedanumberofmechanismsforadjusting itsperformance.Headvocatedprogramsofgov- ernmenttaxationandspending,notprimarilyas ameansofprovidingpublicgoods,butasa meansofincreasingprosperityandavoiding unemployment.Politicalphilosophersare therebyprovidedwithanothermeansforjusti- fyingtheexistenceofstronggovernments. OneoftheimportantwaysthatKeynes'sthe- orystilldirectsmucheconomictheorizingisits deepdivisionbetweenmicroeconomicsand macroeconomics.Keynesargued,ineffect,that microeconomicanalysiswithitsemphasison idealindividualrationalityandperfectcompeti- tionwasinadequateasatoolforunderstanding suchimportantmacrophenomenaasemploy- ment,interest,andmoney.Hetriedtoshowhow humanpsychologicalfoiblesandmärketfric- tionsrequiredaqualitativelydifferentkindof analysisatthemacrolevel.Muchcurrenteco- nomictheorizingisconcernedwithunderstand- ingtheconnectionsbetweenmicro-andmacro- phenomenaandmicro-andmacroeconomicsin anattempttodissolveorblurthedivision.This issueisaphilosophicallyimportantinstanceofa potentialtheoreticalreduction. Seealsophilosophyofeconomics, PROBABILITY.A.N. Kierkegaard,SårenAabye(1813-55),Danish writerwhose''literature,"ashecalledit,includes philosophy,psychology,theologyanddevotional literature,fiction,andliterarycriticism.Bornto awell-to-domiddleclassfamily,heconsumed hisinheritancewhilewritingalargecorpusof booksinaremarkablyshorttime.Hislifewas markedbyanintenserelationshipwithadevout butmelancholyfather,fromwhomheinherited hisownbenttomelancholy,withwhichhecon- stantlystruggled.Adecisiveeventwashisbro- kenengagementfromRegineOisen,which precipitatedthebeginningofhisauthorship;his firstbooksarepartlyanattempttoexplain,ina covertandsymbolicway,thereasonswhyhefelt hecouldnotmarry.LåterKierkegaardwas involvedinacontroversyinwhichhewasmer- cilesslyattackedbyapopulärsatiricalperiodical; thisexperiencedeepenedhisunderstandingof thesignificanceofsufferingandthenecessityfor anauthenticindividualtoståndaloneifneces- saryagainst"thecrowd."Thiscausedhimto abandonhisplanstotakeapastorate,apostfor whichhistheologicaleducationhadprepared him.Attheendofhislife,hewagedalonely, publiccampaigninthepopulärpressandina magazinehefoundedhimself,againsttheDan- ishstatechurch.Hecollapsedonthestreetwith thefinalissueofthismagazine,TheInstant,ready fortheprinter,andwascarriedtoahospital.He diedafewweekslåter,affirmingastrongChris- tianfaith,butrefusingtotakecommunionfrom thehandsofapriestoftheofficialchurch. Thoughsomewritershavequestionedwheth- erKierkegaard'swritingsadmitofaunifiedinter- pretation,hehimselfsawhisliteratureasserving Christianity;hesawhimselfasa"missionary" whosetaskwasto"reintroduceChristianityinto Christendom."However,muchofthisliterature doesnotaddressChristianitydirectly,butrather concernsitselfwithananalysisofhumanexis- tence.Kierkegaardsawthisasnecessary,because Christianityisfirstandforemostawayofexist- ing.HesawmuchoftheconfusionaboutChris- tianfaithasrootedinconfusionaboutthenature ofexistence;hencetoclearuptheformer,the lattermustbecarefullyanalyzed.Thegreatmis- fortuneof"Christendom"and"thepresentage" isthatpeople"haveforgottenwhatitmeansto exist,"andKierkegaardseeshimselfasamodern Socratessentto"remind"othersofwhatthey knowbuthaveforgotten.Itisnotsurprisingthat theanalysesofhumanexistenceheprovides havebeenofgreatinteresttonon-Christianwrit- ersaswell. Kierkegaardfrequentlyusestheverb'toexist' (atexistere)inaspecialsense,torefertohuman existence.InthissenseGodissaidnottoexist, eventhoughGodhasetemalreality.Kierkegaard describeshumanexistenceasanunfinished process,inwhich"theindividual"(akeyconcept inhisthought)musttakeresponsibilityfor achievinganidentityasaselfthroughfree choices.Suchachoiceisdescribedasaleap,to highlightKierkegaard'sviewthatintellectual reflectionalonecannevermotivateaction.A decisiontoendtheprocessofreflectionisneces- saryandsuchadecisionmustbegeneratedby passion.Thepassionsthatshapeaperson'sself arereferredtobyKierkegaardastheindividual's "inwardness"or"subjectivity."Themostsignifi- 468 Kierkegaard,SörenAabye Kierkegaard,SörenAabye cantpassions,suchasloveandfaith,donot merelyhappen;theymustbecultivatedand formed. Theprocessbywhichtheindividualbecomes aselfisdescribedbyKierkegaardasideallymov- ingthroughthreestages,termedthe"stageson life'sway."Sincehumandevelopmentoccursby freedomandnotautomatically,however,the individualcanbecomefixatedinanyofthese stages.Thusthestagesalsoconfronteachother asrivalviewsoflife,or"spheresofexistence." Thethreestagesorspheresaretheaesthetic,the ethical,andthereligious.Adistinctivefeatureof Kierkegaard'sliteratureisthatthesethreelife- viewsarerepresentedbypseudonymous"char- acters"whoactually"author"someofthebooks; thisleadstointerpretivedifficulties,sinceitisnot alwaysclearwhattoattributetoKierkegaard himselfandwhattothepseudonymouscharac- ter.Fortunatelyhealsowrotemanydevotional andreligiousworksunderhisownname,where thisproblemdoesnotarise. TheaestheticlifeisdescribedbyKierkegaard aslivedforandin"themoment."Itisalifegov- ernedby"immediacy,"orthesatisfactionof one'simmediatedesires,thoughitiscapableofa kindofdevelopmentinwhichonelearnsto enjoylifereflectively,asinthearts.Whattheaes- theticpersonlacksiscommitment,whichisthe keytotheethicallife,alifethatattemptsto achieveaunifiedselfthroughcommitmentto idealswithenduringvalidity,ratherthansimply momentaryappeal.Thereligiouslifeemerges fromtheethicallifewhentheindividualrealizes boththetranscendentcharacterofthetrueideals andalsohowfarshortofrealizingthoseideals thepersonis. InConcludingUnscientificPostscripttwoformsof thereligiouslifearedistinguished:a"natural" religiosity(religiousness"A")inwhichtheper- sonattemptstorelätetothedivineandresolve theproblemofguilt,relyingsolelyonone'snat- ural"immanent"ideaofthedivine;andChris- tianity(religiousness"B"),inwhichGodbe- comesincarnateasahumanbeinginorderto establisharelationwithhumans.Christianity canbeacceptedonlythroughthe"leapoffaith." Itisareligionnotof"immanence"butof"tran- scendence,"sinceitisbasedonarevelation.This revelationcannotberationallydemonstrated, sincetheincarnationisaparadoxthattran- scendshumanreason.Reasoncan,however, whenthepassionoffaithispresent,cometo understandtheappropriatenessofrecognizing itsownlimitsandacceptingtheparadoxical incarnationofGodintheformofJesusChrist. ThetrueChristianisnotmerelyanadmirerof Jesus,butonewhobelievesbybecomingafol- lower. Theirreducibilityofthereligiouslifetothe ethicallifeisillustratedforKierkegaardinthe biblicalstoryofAbraham'swillingnesstosacri- ficehissonIsaactoobeythecommandofGod. InFearandTremblingKierkegaard(throughhis pseudonymJohannesdeSilentio)analyzesthis actofAbraham'sasinvolvinga"teleologicalsus- pensionoftheethical."Abraham'sactcannotbe understoodmerelyinethicaltermsasaconflict ofdutiesinwhichonerationallycomprehensi- bledutyissupersededbyahigherone.Rather, Abrahamseemstobewillingto"suspend"the ethicalasawholeinfavörofahigherreligious duty.Thus,ifoneadmiresAbrahamas"the fatheroffaith,"oneadmiresaqualitythatcan- notbereducedtosimplymoralvirtue.Some havereadthisasaclaimthatreligiousfaithmay requireimmoralbehavior;othersarguethat whatisrelativizedbytheteleologicalsuspension oftheethicalisnotaneternallyvalidsetofmoral requirements,butratherethicalobligationsas theseareembeddedinhumansocialinstitutions. Thus,inarguingthat"theethical"isnotthe highestelementinexistence,Kierkegaardleaves openthepossibilitythatoursocialinstitutions, andtheethicalidealsthattheyembody,donot deserveourabsoluteandunqualifiedallegiance, anideawithimportantpoliticalimplications. Inaccordwithhisclaimthatexistencecannot bereducedtointellectualthought,Kierkegaard devotesmuchattentiontoemotionsandpas- sions.Anxietyisparticularlyimportant,sinceit reflectshumanfreedom.Anxietyinvolvesa "sympatheticantipathyandanantipatheticsym- pathy";itisthepsychologicalstatethatprecedes thebasichumanfallintosin,butitdoesnot explainthis"leap,"sincenofinalexplanationof afreechoicecanbegiven.Suchnegativeemo- tionsasdespairandguiltarealsoimportantfor Kierkegaard;theyrevealtheemptinessofthe aestheticandtheultimatelyunsatisfactorychar- acteroftheethical,drivingindividualsontoward thereligiouslife.Ironyandhumorarealsoseen asimportant"boundaryzones"forthestagesof existence.Thepersonwhohasdiscoveredhisor herown"etemalvalidity"canlookironicallyat therelativevaluesthatcapturemostpeople, wholivetheirlivesaesthetically.Similarly,the "existentialhumorist"whohasseentheincon- gruitiesthatnecessarilypervadeourethical humanprojectsisonthebörderofthereligious life. Kierkegaardalsoanalyzesthepassionsoffaith 469 Kilvington,Richard Kilwardby,Robert andlove.Faithisultimatelyunderstoodasa "willingtobeoneself"thatismadepossiblebya transparent,trustingrelationshiptothe"power thatcreatedtheself."Kierkegaarddistinguishes variousformsoflove,stressingthatChristian lovemustbeunderstoodasneighborlove,alove thatiscombinedandisnotrootedinanynatural relationshiptotheself,suchasfriendshiporkin- ship,butultimatelyisgroundedinthefactthat allhumanssharearelationshiptotheircreator. Kierkegaardiswellknownforhiscritiqueof Hegel'sabsoluteidealism.Hegel'sclaimtohave written"thesystem"isridiculedforitspreten- sionsoffinality.FromtheDane'sperspective, thoughrealitymaybeasystemforGod,itcan- notbesoforanyexistingthinker,sincebothreal- ityandthethinkerareincompleteandsystem impliescompleteness.Hegeliansarealsocriti- cizedforpretendingtohavefoundapresupposi- tionlessorabsolutestartingpoint;for Kierkegaard,philosophybeginsnotwithdoubt butwithwonder.Reflectionispotentiallyinfi- nite;thedoubtthatleadstoskepticismcannotbe endedbythoughtalonebutonlybyaresolution ofthewill.Kierkegaardalsodefendstraditional Aristotelianlogicandtheprincipleofnon-con- tradictionagainsttheHegelianintroductionof "movement"intologic.Kierkegaardisparticu- larlydisturbedbytheHegeliantendencytosee Godasimmanentinsociety;hethoughtitimpor- tanttounderstandGodas"whollyother,"the "absolutelydifferent"whocanneverbeexhaus- tivelyembodiedinhumanachievementorinsti- tutions.ToståndbeforeGodonemustståndas anindividual,in"fearandtrembling,"conscious thatthismayrequireabreakwiththegiven socialorder. Kierkegaardisoftencharacterizedasthe fatherofexistentialism.Therearereasonsfor this;hedoesindeedphilosophizeexistentially, andheundoubtedlyexercisedadeepinfluence onmanytwentieth-centuryexistentialistssuch asSartreandCamus.Butthecharacterizationis anachronistic,sinceexistentialismasamove- mentisatwentieth-centuryphenomenon,and thedifferencesbetweenKierkegaardandthose existentialistsarealsoprofound.Ifexistentialism isdefinedasthedenialthatthereissuchathing asahumanessenceornature,itisunlikelythat Kierkegaardisanexistentialist.Morerecently, theDanehasalsobeenseenasaprecursorof postmodernism.Hisrejectionofclassicalfoun- dationalistepistemologiesandemploymentof elusiveliterarytechniquessuchashispseudo- nymsagainmakesuchassociationssomewhat plausible.However,despitehisrejectionofthe systemandcriticismofhumanclaimstofinality andcertitude,Kierkegaarddoesnotappearto espouseanyformofrelativismorhavemuch sympathyfor"anti-realism."Hehasthekindof passionforclarityanddelightinmakingsharp distinctionsthatareusuallyassociatedwithcon- temporary"analytic"philosophy.Intheendhe mustbeseenashisownperson,auniqueChris- tianpresencewithsensibilitiesthatareinmany waysGreekandpremodemratherthanpost- modern.Hehasbeenjoyfullyembracedandfer- ventlycriticizedbythinkersofallstripes.He remains"theindividual"hewroteabout,andto whomhededicatedmanyofhisworks. Seealsocamus,existentialism,hegel, POSTMODERN,SARTRE.C.S.E. Kilvington,Richard,surnamealsospelledKil- mington,Chillington(1302/05-61),English philosopher,theologian,andecclesiastic.Hewas ascholarassociatedwiththehouseholdof RicharddeBuryandanearlymemberofthe OxfordCalculators,importantintheearlydevel- opmentofphysics.Kilvington'sSophismata(early 1320s)istheonlyworkofhisstudiedextensively todate.Itisaninvestigationofpuzzlesregarding change,velocityandacceleration,motivepower, beginningandceasing,thecontinuum,infmity, knowinganddoubting,andtheliarandrelated paradoxes.Hisapproachispeculiarinsofarasall thesearetreatedinapurelylogicalorconceptual way,incontrasttothemathematical"calcula- tions"usedbyBradwardine,Heytesbury,and otherlåterOxfordCalculatorstohandleprob- lemsinphysics.Kilvingtonalsowroteacom- mentaryonPeterLombard'sSentencesand questionsonAristotle'sOnGenerationandCor- ruption,Physics,andNicomacheanEthics.Seealso OXFORDCALCULATORS.P.V.S. Kilwardby,Robert(d.1279),Englishphilosopher andtheologian.Heapparentlystudiedandper- hapstaughtattheUniversityofParis,låterjoin- ingtheDominicansandperhapslecturingat Oxford.HebecamearchbishopofCanterburyin 1272andin1277condemnedthirtyproposi- tions,amongthemAquinas'spositionthatthere isasinglesubstantialforminahumanbeing.Kil- wardbyresignedhisarchbishopricin1278and wasappointedtothebishopricofSantaRufinain Italy,wherehedied. Kilwardbywroteextensivelyandhadconsid- erablemedievalinfluence,especiallyinphiloso- phyoflanguage;butitisnowunusuallydifficult todeterminewhichworksareauthenticallyhis. DeOrtuScientiarumadvancedasophisticated 470 Kim,Jaegwon Kleist,Heinrichvon accountofhownamesareimposedanda detailedaccountofthenatureandrofeoffogic. Inmetaphysicsheinsistedthatthingsareindi- vidualandthatuniversalityarisesfromopera- tionsofthesoul.Hewroteextensivelyon happinessandwasconcernedtoshowthatsome happinessispossibleinthislife.Inpsychologyhe arguedthatfreedomofdecisionisadisposition arisingfromthecooperationoftheintellectand thewill.C.G.Norm. Kim,Jaegwon(b.1934),Korean-Americanphi- losopher,writingintheanalytictradition,author ofimportantworksinmetaphysicsandthephi- losophyofmind. Kimhasdefendeda"fine-grained"conception ofeventsaccordingtowhichaneventisthepos- sessingofapropertybyanobjectatatime(see "Causation,NomicSubsumption,andtheCon- ceptofEvent,"1973;thisandotherpapers referredtoherearecollectedinSupervenienceand Mind,1993).Thisviewhasbeenaprominent rivalofthe"coarse-grained"accountofevents associatedwithDavidson. Kim'sworkontheconceptofsupervenience hasbeenwidelyinfluential,especiallyinthe philosophyofmind(see"Supervenienceasa PhilosophicalConcept,"1990).Heregards supervenience(or,ashenowprefers,"property covariation")asarelationholdingbetween propertyfamilies(mentalpropertiesandphysi- calproperties,forinstance).IfA-properties superveneonB-properties,then,necessarily,for any^-property,a,ifanobject,o,hasa,thereis someB-property,b,suchthatohasb,and(nec- essarily)anythingthathasbhasa.Strongeror weakerversionsofsupervenienceresultfrom varyingthemodalstrengthoftheparenthetical 'necessarily',oromittingitentirely. Althoughthenotionofsuperveniencehas beenembracedbyphilosopherswhofavörsome formof"non-reductivephysicalism"(theview thatthementaldependson,butisnotreducible to,thephysical),Kimhimselfhasexpressed doubtsthatphysicalismcanavoidreduction ("TheMythofNonreductiveMaterialism," 1989).Ifmentalpropertiessuperveneon,butare distinctfrom,physicalproperties,thenitishärd toseehowmentalpropertiescouldhaveapartin theproductionofphysicaleffects-ormental effects,giventhedependenceofthementalon thephysical. Morerecently,Kimhasdevelopedanaccount of"functionalreduction"accordingtowhich supervenientpropertiesarecausallyefficaciousif andonlyiftheyarefunctionallyreducibleto propertiesantecedentlyacceptedascausallyeffi- cacious(MindinaPhysicalWorld,1998). Properties,includingpropertiesofconscious experiences,notsoreducibleare"epiphenome- nal." Seealsodavidson,event,philosophyof MIND,REDUCTION,SUPERVENIENCE.J.F.H. KindI,al-.Seeal-kindi. kinesis.Seearistotle. kineticpleasure.Seeepicureanism. kingdomofends.Seekant. KK-thesis,thethesisthatknowingentailsknow- ingthatoneknows,symbolizedinpropositional epistemiclogicasKp—>KKp,where'K'ståndsfor knowing.AccordingtotheKK-thesis,the (propositional)logicofknowledgeresemblesthe modalsystemS4.TheKK-thesiswasintroduced intoepistemologicaldiscussionbyHintikkain KnowledgeandBelief(1962).HecallstheKK- thesisa"virtualimplication,"aconditional whosenegationis"indefensible."Atacitoran explicitacceptanceofthethesishasbeenpartof manyphilosophers'viewsaboutknowledge sincePlatoandAristotle.Ifthethesisisformal- izedasKp—>KKp,where'K'isreadas'a aq'. Materialbiconditional(sometimescalledmaterial equivalence):'p=q','pq'. And,giventhat'x','y','z',etc,areindividual variablesand'F','G','H',etc,arepredicatelet- ters,wefindinthepredicatecalculustwoquan- tifiers,auniversalandanexistentialquantifier: Universalquantification:'[x)Fx','(\/x)Fx','axFx'. Existentialquantification:'(Ex)Fx','(Bx)Fx', 'vxFx''. Theformationprincipleinalltheschemata involvingdyadicorbinaryoperators(connec- tives)isthatthelogicaloperatorisplaced betweenthepropositionalvariables(orproposi- tionalconstants)connectedbyit.Butthereexists anotation,theso-calledPolishnotation,basedon theformationrulestipulatingthatalloperators, andnotonlynegationandquantifiers,beplaced infrontoftheschemataöverwhichtheyare ranging.Thefollowingrepresentationsarethe resultofapplicationofthatrule: Negation:'Np'. Conjunction:'Kpq'. Weakorinclusivedisjunction:'Apq'. Strongorexclusivedisjwiction:'Jpq'. Conditional:'Cpq'. Biconditional:'Epq'. Shefferstroke:'Dpq'. Universalquantification:TlxFx'. Existentialquantifications:'IxFx'. Rememberingthat'K','A','J','C,'E',and'D'are dyadicfunctors,weexpectthemtobefollowed bytwopropositionalsigns,eachofwhichmay itselfbesimpleorcompound,butnoparenthe- sesareneededtopreventambiguity.Moreover, thisnotationmakesitveryperspicuousasto whatkindofpropositionagivencompound propositionis:allweneedtodoistolookatthe leftmostoperator.Toillustrate,'p\i(q&r)isa disjunctionof'p'withtheconjunction'Kqf,i.e., 'ApKqf,while'(pVq)&fisaconjunctionofa disjunction'Apq'with'r',i.e.,'KApqf.'~p—>q' iswrittenas'CNpq',i.e.,'ifNp,thenq',while negationofthewholeconditional,'~(p—>q)', becomes'NCpq'.Alogicalthesissuchas'((p&q) —>r)—>((s—>p)—>(s&q)—»r))'iswrittencon- ciselyas'CCKpqrCCspCKsqr'.Thegeneralpropo- sition'(V*)(Fx—>Gx)'iswrittenas'TIxCFxGx', whileatruth-functionofquantifiedpropositions '(\/x)Fx-»(3y)Gy'iswrittenas'CTbcFxIyGy'.An equivalencesuchas'(Vx)Fx~(3x)~Fx' becomes'EfIxFxN£xNFx',etc. Dotnotationiswayofusingdötstoconstruct well-formedformulasthatismorethriftywith punctuationmarksthantheuseofparentheses withtheirprogressivestrengthsofscope.Butdot notationislessthriftythantheparenthesis-free Polishnotation,whichsecureswell-formed expressionsentirelyonthebasisoftheorderof logicaloperatorsrelativetotruth-functional compounds.Variousdotnotationshavebeen devised.Theconventionmostcommonly adoptedisthatpunctuationdötsalwaysoperate awayfromtheconnectivesymbolthatthey flank.Itisbesttoexplaindotpunctuationby examples: (1)'pV(q~t)'becomes'pv.q—>~f; (2)'{pvq)—>~fbecomes'pvq.—>~f; (3)'(p—>(qr))v(pvr)'becomes'p—>.q r:v.pvr'; (4)'(~ps'. 513 logicalparadoxes logicalpositivism Notethatherethedotisusedasconjunctiondot andisnotflankedbypunctuationdöts,although insomecontextsadditionalpunctuationdöts mayhavetobeadded,e.g.,'p.((q.r)—>s),which isrewrittenas'p:q.r.—>s'.Thescopeofagroup ofndötsextendstothegroupofnormoredöts. (5)'~p(q.(r—>s))'becomes'—p.O:q.r—> s'; (6)'~p((.r)—>s)'becomes'~p.:q.r.^s'; (7)'(~pO(q.r))—>s'becomes'~p.q.r:^> s'. Thenotationformodalpropositionsmade populärbyC.I.Lewisconsistedoftheuseof'O'to expresstheideaofpossibility,intermsofwhich otheralethicmodalnotionsweredefined.Thus, startingwith'0p'for'Itispossiblethatp'weget'~ p'for'Itisnotpossiblethatp'(i.e.,'Itisimpossi- blethatp'),'~~p'for'Itisnotpossiblethatnot p'(i.e.,'Itisnecessarythatp'),and'0~p'for'Itis possiblethatnotp'(i.e.,'Itiscontingentthatp'in thesenseof'Itisnotnecessarythatp',i.e.,Ttis possiblethatnotp').Giventhisprimitiveor undefinednotionofpossibility,Lewisproceeded tointroducethenotionofstrictimplication,rep- resentedby'—i'anddefinedasfollows:'p—iq.= .~(p—q)'.Morerecenttraditionfindsitconve- nienttouse'□',eitherasadefinedorasaprimi- tivesymbolofnecessity.Intheparenthesis-free Polishnotationtheletter'M'isusuallyaddedas thesignofpossibilityandsometimestheletter'L' isusedasthesignofnecessity.Noinconvenience resultsfromadoptingtheseletters,aslongasthey donotcoincidewithanyoftheexistingtruth- functionaloperators'N','K','A','J','C,'£",'D'. Thuswecanexpresssymbolicallythesentences 'lipisnecessary,thenpispossible'as'CNMNpMp' oras'CLpMp';'ItisnecessarythatwhateverisT7is G'as'NMNTTxCFxGx'oras'LITxCFxGx';and 'WhateverisFisnecessarilyG'asTIxCFxNMNGx' orasTIxCFxLGx;etc. Seealsoimplication,modallogic, well-formedformula,AppendixofSpe- cialSymbols.I.Bo. logicalparadoxes.Seeset-theoreticparadoxes. logicalpositivism,alsocalledpositivism,aphilo- sophicalmovementinspiredbyempiricismand verificationism;itbeganinthe1920sandflour- ishedforabouttwentyorthirtyyears.While therearestillphilosopherswhowouldidentify themselveswithsomeofthelogicalpositivists' theses,manyofthecentraldocrinesofthethe- oryhavecomeunderconsiderableattackinthe lasthalfofthiscentury.Insomewayslogicalpos- itivismcanbeseenasanaturaloutgrowthofrad- icalorBritishempiricismandlogicalatomism. Thedrivingforceofpositivismmaywellhave beenadherencetotheverifiabilitycriterionfor themeaningfulnessofcognitivestatements. Acceptanceofthisprincipleledpositiviststo rejectasproblematicmanyassertionsofreligion, morality,andthekindofphilosophythey describedasmetaphysics. Theverifiabilitycriterionofmeaning.Therad- icalempiriciststookgenuineideastobecom- posedofsimpleideastraceabletoelementsin experience.Ifthisistrueandifthoughtsabout theempiricalworldare"madeup"outofideas, itwouldseemtofollowthatallgenuinethoughts abouttheworldmusthaveasconstituents thoughtsthatdenoteitemsofexperience.While notallpositiviststiedmeaningsoclearlytothe sortofexperiencestheempiricistshadinmind, theywereconvincedthatagenuinecontingent assertionabouttheworldmustbeverifiable throughexperienceorobservation. Questionsimmediatelyaroseconcerningthe relevantsenseof'verify'.Extremeversionsofthe theoryinterpretverificationintermsofexperi- encesorobservationsthatentailthetruthofthe propositioninquestion.Thusformyassertion thatthereisatablebeforemetobemeaningful, itmustbeinprinciplepossibleformetoaccu- mulateevidenceorjustificationthatwouldguar- anteetheexistenceofthetable,whichwould makeitimpossibleforthetablenottoexist.Even thisstatementoftheviewisambiguous,how- ever,fortheimpossibilityoferrorcouldbeinter- pretedaslogicalorconceptual,orsomething muchweaker,say,causal.Eitherway,extreme verificationismseemsvulnerabletoobjections. Universalstatements,suchas'Allmetalexpands whenheated',aremeaningful,butitisdoubtful thatanyobservationscouldeverconclusively verifythem.Onemightmodifythecriterionto includeasmeaningfulonlystatementsthatcan beeitherconclusivelyconfirmedorconclusively disconfirmed.Itisdoubtful,however,thateven ordinarystatementsaboutthephysicalworld satisfytheextremepositivistinsistencethatthey admitofconclusiveverificationorfalsification.If theevidencewehaveforbelievingwhatwedo aboutthephysicalworldconsistsofknowledge offleetingandsubjectivesensation,thepossibil- ityofhallucinationordeceptionbyamalevolent, powerfulbeingseemstoprecludethepossibility ofanyfinitesequenceofsensationsconclusively establishingtheexistenceorabsenceofaphysi- calobject. 514 logicalpositivism logicalpositivism Facedwiththesedifficulties,atleastsomepos- itivistsretreatedtoamoremodestformofveri- ficationismwhichinsistedonlythatifa propositionistobemeaningfulitmustbepossi- bletofindevidenceorjustificationthatbearson thelikelihoodoftheproposition'sbeingtrue.Itis, ofcourse,muchmoredifficulttofindcounterex- amplestothisweakerformofverificationism, butbythesametokenitismoredifficulttosee howtheprinciplewilldotheworkthepositivists hopeditwoulddoofweedingoutallegedlyprob- lematicassertions. Necessarytruth.Anothercentraltenetoflog- icalpositivismisthatallmeaningfulstatements fallintotwocategories:necessarytruthsthatare analyticandknowableapriori,andcontingent truthsthataresyntheticandknowableonlya posteriori.Ifameaningfulstatementisnotacon- tingent,empiricalstatementverifiablethrough experience,thenitiseitheraformåltautologyor isanalytic,i.e.,reducibletoaformåltautology throughsubstitutionofsynonymousexpres- sions.Accordingtothepositivist,tautologiesand analytictruthsthatdonotdescribetheworldare madetrue(iftrue)orfalse(iffalse)bysomefact abouttherulesoflanguage.'Pornot-P'ismade truebyruleswehavefortheuseoftheconnec- tives'or'and'not'andfortheassignmentsofthe predicates'true'and'false'. Againtherearenotoriousproblemsforlogical positivism.Itisdifficulttoreducethefollowing apparentlynecessarytruthstoformåltautologies throughthesubstitutionofsynonymousexpres- sions:(1)Everythingthatisblue(allöver)isnot red(allöver).(2)Allequilateraltrianglesare equiangulartriangles.(3)Nopropositionisboth trueandfalse.Ironically,thepositivistshada greatdealoftroublecategorizingtheverytheses thatdefinedtheirview,suchastheclaimsabout meaningfulnessandverifiabilityandtheclaims abouttheanalytic-syntheticdistinction. Reductionism.Mostofthelogicalpositivists werecommittedtoafoundationalistepistemol- ogyaccordingtowhichalljustifiedbeliefrests ultimatelyonbeliefsthatarenon-inferentially justified.Thesenon-inferentiallyjustifiedbeliefs weresometimesdescribedasbasic,andthe truthsknowninsuchmannerwereoften referredtoasself-evident,orasprotocolstate- ments.Partlybecausethepositivistsdisagreedas tohowtounderstandthenotionofabasicbelief oraprotocolstatement,andevendisagreedasto whatwouldbegoodexamples,positivismwasby nomeansamonolithicmovement.Still,thever- ifiabilitycriterionofmeaning,togetherwithcer- tainbeliefsaboutwherethefoundationsofjus- tificationlieandbeliefsaboutwhatconstitutes legitimatereasoning,drovemanypositiviststo embraceextremeformsofreductionism.Briefly, mostofthemimplicitlyrecognizedonlydeduc- tionand(reluctantly)inductionaslegitimate modesofreasoning.Givensuchaview,difficult epistemologicalgapsarisebetweenavailableevi- denceandthecommonsenseconclusionswe wanttoreachabouttheworldaroundus.The problemwasparticularlyacuteforempiricists whorecognizedasgenuineempiricalfounda- tionsonlypropositionsdescribingperceptionsor subjectivesensations.Suchphilosophersfaced anenormousdifficultyexplaininghowwhatwe knowaboutsensationscouldconfirmforus assertionsaboutanobjectivephysicalworld. Clearlywecannotdeduceanytruthsaboutthe physicalworldfromwhatweknowaboutsensa- tions(rememberthepossibilityofhallucina- tion).Nordoesitseemthatwecouldinductively establishsensationasevidencefortheexistence ofthephysicalworldwhenallwehavetorelyon ultimatelyisourawarenessofsensations.Faced withthepossibilitythatallofourcommonplace assertionsaboutthephysicalworldmightfailthe verifiabilitytestformeaningfulness,manyofthe positiviststooktheböldstepofarguingthat statementsaboutthephysicalworldcouldreally beviewedasreducibleto(equivalentinmean- ingto)verycomplicatedstatementsaboutsensa- tions.Phenomenalists,asthesephilosophers werecalled,thoughtthatassertingthatagiven tableexistsisequivalentinmeaningtoacom- plexassertionaboutwhatsensationsor sequencesofsensationsasubjectwouldhave werehetohavecertainothersensations. Thegapbetweensensationandthephysical worldisjustoneoftheepistemicgapsthreaten- ingthemeaningfulnessofcommonplaceasser- tionsabouttheworld.Ifallweknowaboutthe mentalstatesofothersisinferredfromtheir physicalbehavior,wemuststillexplainhow suchinferenceisjustified.Thuslogicalpositivists whotookprotocolstatementstoincludeordi- naryassertionsaboutthephysicalworldwere comfortablereducingtalkaboutthemental statesofotherstotalkabouttheirbehavior;this islogicalbehaviorism.Evensomeofthoseposi- tivistswhothoughtempiricalpropositionshadto bereducedultimatelytotalkaboutsensations werepreparedtotranslatetalkaboutthemental statesofothersintotalkabouttheirbehavior, which,ironically,wouldinturngettranslated rightbackintotalkaboutsensation. 515 logicalpredicate logicalsyntax Manyofthepositivistswereprimarilycon- cemedwiththehypothesesoftheoretical physics,whichseemedtogofarbeyondanything thatcouldbeobserved.Inthecontextofphilos- ophyofscience,somepositivistsseemedtotake asunproblematicordinarystatementsaboutthe macrophysicalworldbutwerestilldetermined eithertoreducetheoreticalstatementsinscience tocomplexstatementsabouttheobservable world,ortoviewtheoreticalentitiesasakindof convenientfiction,descriptionofwhichlacks anyliteraltruth-value.Thelimitsofapositivisfs willingnesstoembracereductionismaretested, however,whenhecomestogripswithknowl- edgeofthepast.Itseemsthatpropositions describingmemoryexperiences(ifsuch"experi- ences"reallyexist)donotentailanytruthsabout thepast,nordoesitseempossibletoestablish memoryinductivelyasareliableindicatorofthe past.(Howcouldoneestablishthepastcorrela- tionswithoutrelyingonmemory?)Thetruly hard-corereductionistsactuallytoyedwiththe possibilityofreducingtalkaboutthepasttotalk aboutthepresentandfuture,butitisperhapsan understatementtosuggestthatatthispointthe plausibilityofthereductionistprogramwas severelystrained. Seealsoanalytic-syntheticdistinc- TION,BEHAVIORISM,EMPIRICISM,FOUNDA- TIONALISM,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE,VERIFI- CATIONISM,VIENNACIRCLE.R.A.F. logicalpredicate.Seelogicalsubject. logicalpriority.Seedependence. logicalprobability.Seeprobability. logicalproduct,aconjunctionofpropositionsor predicates.Theterm'product'derivesfroman analogythatconjunctionbearstoarithmetic multiplication,andthatappearsveryexplicitlyin analgebraiclogicsuchasaBooleanalgebra.In thesameway,'logicalsum'usuallymeansthe disjunctionofpropositionsorpredicates,andthe term'sum'derivesfromananalogythatdisjunc- tionbearswitharithmeticaddition.Inthelogi- calliteratureofthenineteenthcentury,e.g.in theworksofPeirce,'logicalproduct'and'logical sum'oftenrefertotherelativeproductandrel- ativesum,respectively.IntheworkofGeorge Boole,'logicalsum'indicatesanoperationthat correspondsnottodisjunctionbutrathertothe exclusive'or'.Theuseof'logicalsum'initscon- temporarysensewasintroducedbyJohnVenn andthenadoptedandpromulgatedbyPeirce. 'Relativeproduct'wasintroducedbyAugustus DeMorganandalsoadoptedandpromulgated byPeirce.R.W.B. logicalreconstruction.Seerationalreconstruc- TION. logicalsubject,inAristotelianandtraditional logic,thecommonnoun,orsometimesthe intensionortheextensionofthecommonnoun, thatfollowstheinitialquantifierword('every', 'some','no',etc.)ofasentence,asopposedtothe grammaticalsubject,whichistheentirenoun phraseincludingthequantifierandthenoun, andinsomeusages,anymodifiersthatmay apply.Thegrammaticalsubjectof'Everynumber exceedingzeroispositive'is'everynumber',or insomeusages,'everynumberexceedingzero', whereasthelogicalsubjectis'number',orthe intensionortheextensionof'number'.Similar distinctionsaremadebetweenthelogicalpredi- cateandthegrammaticalpredicate:intheabove example,'ispositive'isthegrammaticalpredi- cate,whereasthelogicalpredicateistheadjec- tive'positive',orsometimesthepropertyof beingpositiveoreventheextensionoftheword 'positive'.Instandardfirst-orderlogicthelogical subjectofasentenceunderagiveninterpreta- tionistheentireuniverseofdiscourseofthe interpretation.Seealsogrammar,logical FORM,SUBJECT,UNIVERSEOFDISCOURSE. J.Cor. logicalsum.Seelogicalproduct. logicalsyntax,descriptionoftheformsofthe expressionsofalanguageinvirtueofwhichthe expressionsståndinlogicalrelationstoone another.Implicitintheideaoflogicalsyntaxis theassumptionthatall-oratleastmost-logi- calrelationsholdinvirtueofform:e.g.,that'If snowiswhite,thensnowhascolor'and'Snow iswhite'jointlyentail'Snowhascolor'invirtue oftheirrespectiveforms,'IfP,thenQ','P',and 'Q'.Theformassignedtoanexpressioninlogical syntaxisitslogicalform. Logicalformmaynotbeimmediatelyapparent fromthesurfaceformofanexpression.Both(1) 'Everyindividualisphysical'and(2)'Someindi- vidualisphysical'apparentlysharethesubject- predicateform.Butthissurfaceformisnotthe forminvirtueofwhichthesesentences(orthe propositionstheymightbesaidtoexpress)stånd inlogicalrelationstoothersentences(orproposi- tions),forifitwere,(1)and(2)wouldhavethe samelogicalrelationstoallsentences(orpropo- 516 logicalsystem logicism sitions),buttheydonot;(1)and(3)'Aristotleis anindividual'jointlyentail(4)'Aristotleisphys- ical',whereas(2)and(3)donotjointlyentail(4). So(1)and(2)differinlogicalform.Thecontem- porarylogicalsyntax,devisedlargelybyFrege, assignsverydifferentlogicalformsto(1)and(2), namely:'Foreveryx,ifxisanindividual,thenxis physical'and'Forsomex,xisanindividualandx isphysical',respectively.Anotherexample:(5) 'Thesatelliteofthemoonhaswater'seemsto entail'Thereisatleastonethingthatorbitsthe moon'and'Thereisnomorethanonethingthat orbitsthemoon'.Inviewofthis,Russellassigned to(5)thelogicalform'Forsomex,xorbitsthe moon,andforeveryy,ifyorbitsthemoon,then yisidenticalwithx,andforeveryy,ifyorbitsthe moon,thenyhaswater'. Seealsogrammar,logicalform,the- ORYOFDESCRIPTIONS.T.Y. logicalsystem.Seeformålsemantics,logistic SYSTEM. logicaltableofjudgments.Seekant. logicaltruth,linguistictheoryof.Seeconvention- ALISM. logicism,thethesisthatmathematics,oratleast somesignificantportionthereof,ispartoflogic. ModifymgCarnap'ssuggestion(in"TheLogicist FoundationforMathematics,"firstpublishedin Erkenntnis,1931),thisthesisistheconjunctionof twotheses:expressibilitylogicism:mathematical propositionsare(orarealternativeexpressionsof) purelylogicalpropositions;andderivationallogicism: theaxiomsandtheoremsofmathematicscanbe derivedfrompurelogic. Hereisamotivatingexamplefromthearith- meticofthenaturalnumbers.Letthecardinal- ity-quantifiersbethoseexpressibleintheform 'thereareexactly...manyxssuchthat',which weabbreviater(...x),nwith'...'replacedbyan Arabicnumeral.Thesequantifiersareexpress- iblewiththeresourcesoffirst-orderlogicwith identity;e.g.'(2x)Px'isequivalentto/'3x'3y(x¥=y frVz[Pz=(z=xVz=y)])',thelatterinvolvingno numeralsorotherspecificallymathematical vocabulary.Now2+3=5issurelyamathe- maticaltruth.Wemighttakeittoexpressthefol- lowing:ifwetaketwothingsandthenanother threethingswehavefivethings,whichisavalid- ityofsecond-orderlogicinvolvingnomathe- maticalvocabulary: VXVY([(2x)Xx&(3x)Yx&~iBx(XxfrYx)]D (5x)(XxVYx)). Furthermore,thisisprovableinanyformalized fragmentofsecond-orderlogicthatincludesall offirst-orderlogicwithidentityandsecond- order'V'-introduction. Butwhatcountsaslogic?Asaderivation?As aderivationfrompurelogic?Suchunclarities keepalivetheissueofwhethersomeversionor modificationoflogicismistrue. The"classical"presentationsoflogicismwere Frege'sGnindgesetzederArithmetikandRussell andWhitehead'sPrincipiaMathematica.Frege tooklogictobeaformalizedfragmentofsecond- orderlogicsupplementedbyanoperatorform- ingsingulartermsfrom"incomplete"expres- sions,suchatermstandingforanextensionof the"incomplete"expressionstandingforacon- ceptoflevel1(i.e.type1).Axiom5ofGnindge- setzeservedasacomprehension-axiomimplying theexistenceofextensionsforarbitraryFregean conceptsoflevel1.Inhisfamousletterof1901 Russellshowedthataxiomtobeinconsistent, thusderailingFrege'soriginalprogram. RussellandWhiteheadtooklogictobeafor- malizedfragmentofaramifiedfullfinite-order (i.e.typeco)logic,withhigher-ordervariables rangingöverappropriatepropositionalfunc- tions.ThePrincipiaandtheirotherwritingsleft thelatternotionsomewhatobscure.Asadefense ofexpressibilitylogicism,Principiahadthispecu- liarity:itpostulatedtypicalambiguitywhere naivemathematicsseemedunambiguous;e.g., eachtypehaditsownsystemofnaturalnumbers twotypesup.Asadefenseofderivationallogi- cism,Principiawasflawedbyvirtueofitsreliance onthreeaxioms,aversionoftheAxiomof Choice,andtheaxiomsofReducibilityandInfin- ity,whosetruthwascontroversial.Reducibility couldbeavoidedbyeliminatingtheramification ofthelogic(assuggestedbyRamsey).Buteven then,eventhearithmeticofthenaturalnumbers requireduseofInfinity,whichineffectasserted thatthereareinfinitelymanyindividuals(i.e., entitiesoftype0).ThoughInfinitywas"purely logical,"i.e.,containedonlylogicalexpressions, inhisIntrodnctiontoMathematicalPhilosophy(p. 141)Russelladmitsthatit"cannotbeassertedby logictobetrue."Russellthen(pp.194-95)for- getsthis:"Iftherearestillthosewhodonot admittheidentityoflogicandmathematics,we maychallengethemtoindicateatwhatpointin thesuccessivedefinitionsanddeductionsofPrin- cipiaMathematicatheyconsiderthatlogicends andmathematicsbegins.Itwillthenbeobvious thatanyanswerisarbitrary."Theanswer,"Sec- tion120,inwhichInfinityisfirstassumed!,"is notarbitrary.InPrincipiaRussellandWhitehead 517 logicofdiscovery Iotteryparadox sayofInfmitythatthey"prefertokeepitasa hypothesis"(Vol.2,p.203).Perhapsthenthey didnotreallytakelogicismtoasserttheabove identity,butratheracorrespondence:toeach sentence.Onecan provethat,ifEsatisfiesspecifiedconditions,then thereexistsameasurementfimctionmappingDto asetNumofrealnumbers,insuchawaythat theLand°relationsbetweenobjectsinDcorre- spondtothe,iscalledarepresentationthe- orem. Measurementfunctionsarenotunique,buta uniquenesstheoremcharacterizesallsuchfunc- tionsforaspecifiedkindofempiricalrelational systemandspecifiedtypeofnumericalimage. Forexample,supposethatforanymeasurement functions/,gforEthereexistsrealnumbera> suchthatforanyxinD,f(x)=ag(x).Thenit issaidthatthemeasurementisonaratioscale, 528 Mahabharata Maimonides andthefunctiona(x)=ax,forxintherealnum- bers,isthescaletransformation.Forsomeempir- icalsystems,onecanprovethatanytwo measurementfunctionsarerelatedby/=ag+ P,wherea>and/3arerealnumbers.Thenthe measurementisonanintervalscale,withthe scaletransformationa(x)=ax+P;e.g.,mea- surementoftemperaturewithoutanabsolute zeroisonanintervalscale.Inadditiontoratio andintervalscales,otherscaletypesaredefined intermsofvariousscaletransformations;many relationalsystemshavebeenmathematically analyzedforpossibleapplicationsinthebehav- ioralsciences.Measurementwithweakscale typesmayprovideonlyanorderingofthe objects,soquantitativemeasurementandcom- parativeorderingscanbetreatedbythesame generalmethods. Theolderliteratureonmeasurementoften distinguishesextensivefromintensivemagnitudes. Intheformercase,thereissupposedtobean empiricaloperation(like°above)thatinsome sensedirectlycorrespondstoadditiononnum- bers.Anintensivemagnitudesupposedlyhasno suchempiricaloperation.Itissometimesclaimed thatgenuinequantitiesmustbeextensive, whereasanintensivemagnitudeisaquality.This extensiveversusintensivedistinction(anditsusein distinguishingquantitiesfromqualities)is impreciseandhasbeensupplantedbythetheory ofscaletypessketchedabove. Seealsooperationalism,philosophyof SCIENCE.R.L.C. Mahabharata.Seebhagavadgita. Mahävirä,title('GreatHero')ofVardhamäna Jnätrputra(sixthcenturyb.c),Indianreligious leaderwhofoundedJainism.Heisviewed withinJainismasthetwenty-fourthandmost recentofaseriesofTirthankarasorreligious "ford-makers"andconquerors(överignorance) andastheestablisheroftheJaincommunity.His enlightenmentisdescribedintheJainaSlitrasas involvingreleaseofhisinherentlyimmortalsoul fromreincarnationandkarmaandasincluding hisomniscience.AccordingtoJainatradition, VardhamänaJnätrputrawasbornintoawarrior classandatagethirtybecameawandering asceticseekingenlightenment,whichhe achievedatageforty-two.Seealsojainism. K.E.Y. MahayanaBuddhism.Seebuddhism. maieutic.Seesocrates. Maimon,Salomon(1753-1800),Lithuanian- bornGermanJewishphilosopherwhobecame thefriendandprotegéofMosesMendelssohn andwasanacuteearlycriticandfollowerof Kant.HismostimportantworksweretheVersuch tiberdieTranszendentalphilosophie.Miteinem AnhangilberdiesymbolischeErkenntnis("Essayon TranscendentalPhilosophy.WithanAppendix onSymbolicCognition,"1790),thePhilosophis- chesWörterbiich("PhilosophicalDictionary," 1791)andtheVersucheinerneuenLogiköderThe- oriedesDenkens("AttemptataNewLogicorThe- oryofThought,"1794).Maimonarguedagainst the"thing-in-itself"asitwasconceivedbyKarl LeonhardReinholdandGottliebErnstSchulze. ForMaimon,thething-in-itselfwasmerelya limitingconcept,notarealobject"behind"the phenomena.WhilehethoughtthatKanfssys- temwassufficientasarefutationofrationalism or"dogmatism,"hedidnotthinkthatithad-or could-successfullydisposeofskepticism.In- deed,headvancedwhatcanbecalledaskeptical interpretationofKant.Ontheotherhand,he alsoarguedagainstKanfssharpdistinction betweensensibilityandunderstandingandfor thenecessityofassumingtheideaofan"infinite mind."Inthisway,hepreparedthewayfor FichteandHegel.However,inmanywayshis owntheoryismoresimilartothatoftheneo- KantianHermannCohen.Seealsojewishphi- losophy,NEO-KANTIANISM.M.K. Maimonides,LatinizednameofMosesbenMai- mon(1135-1204),Spanish-bornJewishphilos- opher,physician,andjurist.BorninCordova, Maimonidesandhisfamilyfledtheforcedcon- versionsoftheAlmohadinvasionin1148,living anonymouslyinFezbeforefindingrefugein 1165inCairo.ThereMaimonidesservedas physiciantothevizierofSaladin,whooverthrew theFätimiddynastyin1171.Hewrotetenmed- icaltreatises,butthreeworkssecuredhisposi- tionamongthegreatestrabbinicjurists:hisBook oftheCommandments,cataloguingthe613biblical laws;hisCommentaryontheMishnah,expounding therationalpurposesoftheancientrabbinic code;andthefourteen-volumeMishnehTorah,a codificationofTalmudiclawthatretainsalmost canonicalauthority. HisArabicphilosophicmasterpieceTheGuide tothePerplexedmediatesbetweentheScriptural andphilosophicidioms,derivingasophisticated negativetheologybysubtlydecodingbiblical anthropomorphisms.Itdefendsdivinecreation againstal-FäräbI'sandAvicenna'seternalism, whilerejectingeffortstodemonstratecreation 529 Maistre,Joseph-Mariede Malcolm,Norman apodictically.TheradicaloccasionalismofArabic dialecticaltheology(kaläm)thatresultsfrom suchattempts,Maimonidesargues,renders natureunintelligibleanddivinegovemanceirra- tional:ifGodcreateseachparticularevent,nat- uralcausesareotiose,andmuchofcreationisin vain.ButAristotle,whotaughtustheveryprin- ciplesofdemonstration,wellunderstood,ashis resorttopersuasivelanguagereveals,thathis argumentsforetemitywerenotdemonstrative. Theyproject,metaphysically,ananalysisoftime, matter,andpotentialityastheyarenowand ignorethepossibilitythatatitsoriginathinghad averydifferentnature.Wecouldallegorizebib- licalcreationifitweredemonstratedtobefalse. Butsinceitisnot,wearguethatcreationismore plausibleconceptuallyandpreferabletheologi- callytoitsalternative:moreplausible,becausea freecreativeactallowsdifferentiationofthe world'smultiplicityfromdivinesimplicity,asthe seeminglymechanicalnecessitationofemana- tion,strictlyconstrued,cannotdo;preferable, becauseAvicennanclaimsthatGodisauthorof theworldanddeterminerofitscontingencyare undercutbytheassertionthatatnotimewas natureotherthanitisnow. Maimonidesreadthebiblicalcommandments thematically,asservingtoinformhumanchar- acterandunderstanding.Hefollowedal-Färäbi's PlatonizingreadingofScriptureasasymbolic elaborationofthemesbestknowntothephiloso- pher.Thushearguedthatprophetsleamnötn- ingnewfromrevelation;theignorantremain ignorant,butthegiftofimaginationinthewise, iftheyaredisciplinedbythemoralvirtues,espe- ciallycourageandcontentment,giveswingto ideas,renderingthemaccessibletothemasses andsettingthemintopractice.Inprinciple,any philosopherofcharacterandimaginationmight beaprophet;butinpracticethelegislative,eth- ical,andmythopoeicimaginationthatserves philosophyfindsfullestarticulationinonetradi- tion.Itshighestphase,whereimaginationyields topureintellectualcommunion,wasuniqueto Moses,elaboratedinJudaismanditsdaughter religions.Maimonides'philosophywaspivotal forlåterJewishthinkers,highlyvaluedby AquinasandotherScholastics,studiedbySpi- nozainHebrewtranslation,andannotatedby LeibnizinBuxtorfs1629rendering,DoctorPer- plexorum. Seealsojewishphilosophy.L.E.G. Maistre,Joseph-Mariede.Seedemaistre. majorpremise.Seesyllogism. majorterm.Seesyllogism. Malcolm,Norman(1911-90),Americanphilos- opherwhowasaprominentfigureinpost- WorldWarIIanalyticphilosophyandperhaps theforemostAmericaninterpreterandadvocate ofWittgenstein.HisassociationwithWittgen- stein(vividlydescribedinhisLudwigWittgenstein, AMemoir,1958)beganwhenhewasastudentat Cambridge(1938-40).Otherinfluenceswere Bouwsma,Malcolm'sundergraduateteacherat theUniversityofNebraska,andMoore,whom heknewatCambridge.Malcolmtaughtforöver thirtyyearsatCornell,andafterhisretirement in1978wasassociatedwithKing'sCollege,Lon- don. Malcolm'searliestpapers(e.g.,'TheVerifica- tionArgument,"1950,and"Knowledgeand Belief,"1952)dealtwithissuesofknowledgeand skepticism,andtwodealtwithMoore."Moore andOrdinaryLanguage"(1942)interpreted Moore'sdefenseofcommonsenseasadefense ofordinarylanguage,but"DefendingCommon Sense"(1949)arguedthatMoore's"twohands" proofoftheexternalworldinvolvedamisuseof 'know'.Moore'sproofwasthetopicofextended discussionsbetweenMalcolmandWittgenstein duringthelatter's1949visitinIthaca,NewYork, andtheseprovidedthestimulusforWittgen- stein^OnCertainty. Malcolm's"Wittgenstein'sPhilosophicalIn- vestigations"(1954)wasahighlyinfluentialdis- cussionofWittgenstein'slåterphilosophy,and especiallyofhis"privatelanguageargument." TwootherworksofthatperiodwereMalcolm's Dreaming(1958),whicharguedthatdreamsdo nothavegenuinedurationortemporallocation, anddonotentailhavinggenuineexperiences, and"Anselm'sOntologicalArguments"(1960), whichdefendedaversionoftheontological argument. Malcolmwroteextensivelyonmemory,firstin his"ThreeLecturesonMemory,"publishedin hisKnowledgeandCertainty(1963),andthenin hisMemoryandMind(1976).Inthelatterhecrit- icizedbothphilosophicalandpsychologicalthe- oriesofmemory,andarguedthatthenotionofa memorytrace"isnotascientificdiscovery... [but]aproductofphilosophicalthinking,ofa sortthatisnaturalandenormouslytempting,yet thoroughlymuddled." ArecurrentthemeinMalcolm'sthoughtwas thatphilosophicalunderstandingrequiresget- tingtotherootofthetemptationstoadvance somephilosophicaldoctrine,andthatoncewe dosowewillseethephilosophicaldoctrinesas 530 Malebranche,Nicolas Malebranche,Nicolas confusedornonsensical.Althoughhewascon- vincedthatdualismandotherCartesianviews aboutthemindwerethoroughlyconfused,he thoughtnobetterofcontemporarymaterialist andfunctionalistviews,andofcurrenttheoriz- inginpsychologyandlinguistics(onepaperis entitled'TheMythofCognitiveProcessesand Structures").HesharedwithWittgensteinboth anantipathytoscientismandarespectforreli- gion.HesharedwithMooreanantipathyto obscurantismandarespectforcommonsense. Malcolm'slastpublishedbook,NothingIsHid- den(1986),examinestherelationsbetween Wittgenstein'searlierandlåterphilosophies.His otherbooksincludeProblemsofMind(1971), ThoughtandKnowledge(1977),andConsciousness andCausality(1984),thelattercoauthoredwith Armstrong.Hiswritingsaremarkedbyanexcep- tionallylucid,direct,andvividstyle. Seealsobouwsma,moore,ordinary LANGUAGEPHILOSOPHY,WITTGENSTEIN. S.Sho. Malebranche,Nicolas(1638-1715),French philosopherandtheologian,animportantbut unorthodoxproponentofCartesianphilosophy. MalebranchewasapriestoftheOratory,areli- giousorderfoundedin1611byCardinalBérulle, whowasfavorablyinclinedtowardDescartes. MalebranchehimselfbecameaCartesianafter readingDescartes'sphysiologicalTreatiseonMan in1664,althoughheultimatelyintroducedcru- cialmodificationsintoCartesianontology,epis- temology,andphysics. Malebranche'smostimportantphilosophical workisTheSearchAfterTruth(1674),inwhichhe presentshistwomostfamousdoctrines:the visioninGodandoccasionalism.Heagreeswith Descartesandotherphilosophersthatideas,or immaterialrepresentationspresenttothemind, playanessentialroleinknowledgeandpercep- tion.ButwhereasDescartes'sideasaremental entities,ormodificationsofthesoul,Male- branchearguesthattheideasthatfunctionin humancognitionareinGod-theyjustarethe essencesandidealarchetypesthatexistinthe divineunderstanding.Assuch,theyareeternal andindependentoffiniteminds,andmakepos- sibletheclearanddistinctapprehensionof objective,neccessarytruth.Malebranchepre- sentsthevisioninGodastheproperAugustin- ianview,albeitmodifiedinthelightof Descartes'sepistemologicaldistinctionbetween understandingandsensation.Thetheory explainsbothourapprehensionofuniversals andmathematicalandmoralprinciples,aswell astheconceptualelementthat,heargues,nec- essarilyinformsourperceptualacquaintance withtheworld.LikeDescartes'stheoryofideas, Malebranche'sdoctrineisatleastpartlymoti- vatedbyanantiskepticism,sinceGod'sideas cannotfailtorevealeithereternaltruthsorthe essencesofthingsintheworldcreatedbyGod. ThevisioninGod,however,quicklybecamethe objectofcriticismbyLocke,Amauld,Foucher, andothers,whothoughtitledtoavisionaryand skepticalidealism,withthemindforever enclosedbyaveilofdivineideas. Malebrancheisalsothebest-knownpropo- nentofoccasionalism,thedoctrinethatfinite createdbeingshavenocausalefficacyandthat Godaloneisatruecausalagent.Startingfrom Cartesianpremisesaboutmatter,motion,and causation-accordingtowhichtheessenceof bodyconsistsinextensionalone,motionisa modeofbody,andacausalrelationisalogically necessaryrelationbetweencauseandeffect- Malebranchearguesthatbodiesandmindscan- notbegenuinecausesofeitherphysicalevents ormentalstates.Extendedbodies,heclaims,are essentiallyinertandpassive,andthuscannot possessanymotiveforceorpowertocauseand sustainmotion.Moreover,thereisnonecessary connectionbetweenanymentalstate(e.g.avoli- tion)orphysicaleventandthebodilymotions thatusuallyfollowit.Suchnecessityisfound onlybetweenthewillofanomnipotentbeing anditseffects.Thus,allphenomenaaredirectly andimmediatelybroughtaboutbyGod, althoughhealwaysactsinalawlikewayandon theproperoccasion. Malebranche'stheoryofideasandhisocca- sionalism,aspresentedintheSearchandthelåter DialoguesonMetaphysics(1688),wereinfluential inthedevelopmentofBerkeley'sthought;and hisargumentsforthecausaltheoryforeshadow manyoftheconsiderationsregardingcausation andinductionlåterpresentedbyHume.Inaddi- tiontotheseinnovationsinCartesianmeta- physicsandepistemology,Malebranchealso modifiedelementsofDescartes'sphysics,most notablyinhisaccountofthehardnessofbodies andofthelawsofmotion. Inhisothermajorwork,theTreatiseonNature andGrace(1680),Malebranchepresentsatheod- icy,anexplanationofhowGod'swisdom,good- ness,andpoweraretobereconciledwiththe apparentimperfectionsandevilsintheworld.In hisaccount,elementsofwhichLeibnizborrows, MalebrancheclaimsthatGodcouldhavecreated amoreperfectworld,onewithoutthedefects thatplaguethisworld,butthatthiswouldhave 531 Mani Mannheim,Karl involvedgreatercomplexityinthedivineways. Godalwaysactsinthesimplestwaypossible,and onlybymeansoflawlikegeneralvolitions;God neveractsby"particular"oradhocvolitions.But thismeansthatwhileonanyparticularoccasion Godcouldinterveneandforestallanapparent evilthatisabouttooccurbytheordinarycourses ofthelawsofnature(e.g.adrought),Godwould notdoso,forthiswouldcompromisethesim- plicityofGod'smeans.Theperfectionorgood- nessoftheworldperseisthusrelativizedtothe simplicityofthelawsofthatworld(or,whichis thesamething,tothegeneralityofthedivine volitionsthat,ontheoccasionalistview,govern it).Takentogether,thelawsandthephenomena oftheworldformawholethatismostworthyof God'snature-infact,thebestcombinationpos- sible.Malebranchethenextendsthisanalysisto explaintheapparentinjusticeinthedistribution ofgraceamonghumankind.Itisjustthisexten- sionthatinitiatedArnauld'sattackanddrew Malebrancheintoalongphilosophicalandthe- ologicaldebatethatwouldlastuntiltheendof thecentury. Seealsoarnauld,berkeley,occasion- ALISM.S.N. Mani.Seemanichaeanism. Manichaeanism,alsoManichaeism,asyncretis- ticreligionfoundedbytheBabylonianprophet Mani(a.d.216-77),whoclaimedarevelation fromGodandsawhimselfasamemberofaline thatincludedtheBuddha,Zoroaster,andJesus. Indramaticmyths,Manichaeanismpositedthe goodkingdomofGod,associatedwithlight,and theevilkingdomofSatan,associatedwithdark- ness.Awarenessoflightcausedgreed,hate,and envyinthedarkness;thisprovokedanattackof darknessonlight.InresponsetheFathersent PrimalMan,wholöstthefightsothatlightand darknessweremixed.ThePrimalManappealed forhelp,andtheLivingSpiritcametowinabat- tle,makingheavenandearthoutofthecorpses ofdarknessandfreeingsomecapuredlight.A ThirdMessengerwassent;inresponsethe powerofdarknesscreatedAdamandEve,who containedthelightthatstillremainedunderhis sway.ThenJesuswassenttoastillinnocent Adamwhononethelesssinned,settingin motionthereproductiveseriesthatyields humanity. Thisisthemythologicalbackgroundtothe Manichaeanaccountofthebasicreligiousprob- lem:thehumansoulisabitofcapturedlight,and theproblemistofreethesoulfromdarkness throughasceticismandesotericknowledge. ManichaeanismdeniesthatJesuswascrucified, andAugustine,himselfasometimeManichaean, viewedthereligionasaDoceticheresythat deniestheincamationofthesecondpersonof theTrinityinarealhumanbody.Thereligion exhibitsthepatternofescapefromembodiment asaconditionofsalvation,alsoseeninHinduism andBuddhism. Seealsoaugustine,buddhism,hinduism. K.E.Y. manifestcontent.SeeFREUD. manifold.Seekant. Mannheim,Karl(1893-1947),Hungarian-born Germansocialscientistbestknownforhissoci- ologyofknowledge.BorninBudapest,wherehe tookauniversitydegreeinphilosophy,hesettled inHeidelbergin1919asaprivatescholaruntil hiscalltoFrankfurtasprofessorofsociologyin 1928.SuspendedasaJewandasforeign-bornby theNazisin1933,heacceptedaninvitationfrom theLondonSchoolofEconomics,wherehewas alecturerforadecade.In1943,Mannheim becamethefirstprofessorofsociologyofeduca- tionattheUniversityofLondon,apositionhe helduntilhisdeath. TrainedintheHegeliantradition,Mannheim defieseasycategorization:hismaturepolitics becamethoseofaliberalcommittedtosocial planning;withhismanystudiesinthesociology ofculture,ofpoliticalideologies,ofsocialorga- nization,ofeducation,andofknowledge,among others,hefoundedseveralsubdisciplinesinsoci- ologyandpoliticalscience.WhilehisManand SocietyinanAgeofReconstruction(1940)expressed hisowncommitmenttosocialplanning,hismost famouswork,IdeologyandUtopia(originalGer- manedition,1929;revisedEnglishedition, 1936),establishedsociologyofknowledgeasasci- entificenterpriseandsimultaneouslycastdoubt onthepossibilityoftheveryscientificknowledge onwhichsocialplanningwastoproceed.As developedbyMannheim,sociologyofknowl- edgeattemptstofindthesocialcausesofbeliefsas contrastedwiththereasonspeoplehaveforthem. Mannheimseemedtobelievethatthisinvestiga- tionbothpresupposesanddemonstratesthe impossibilityof"objective"knowledgeofsociety, athemethatrelätessociologyofknowledgetoits rootsinGermanphilosophyandsocialtheory (especiallyMarxism)andearlierinthethought oftheidéologuesoftheimmediatepost-French Revolutiondecades.L.A. 532 Mansel,HenryLongueville many-valuedlogic Mansel,HenryLongueville(1820-71),British philosopherandclergyman,aprominent defenderofScottishcommonsensephilosophy. Manselwasaprofessorofphilosophyandeccle- siasticalhistoryatOxford,andthedeanofSt. Paul'sCathedral.Muchofhisphilosophywas derivedfromKantasinterpretedbyHamilton.In ProlegomenaLogica(1851)hedefinedlogicasthe scienceofthelawsofthought,whileinMeta- physics(1860)hearguedthathumanfacultiesare notsuitedtoknowtheultimatenatureofthings. Hedrewthereligiousimplicationsoftheseviews inhismostinfluentialwork,TheLimitsofReligious Thought(1858),byarguingthatGodisrationally inconceivableandthattheonlyavailablecon- ceptionofGodisananalogicalonederivedfrom revelation.Fromthisheconcludedthatreligious dogmaisimmunefromrationalcriticism.Inthe ensuingcontroversyManselwascriticizedby Spenser,ThomasHenryHuxley(1825-95),and J.S.Mill.J.W.A. manyquestions,fallacyof.Seeinformalfallacy. many-valuedlogic,alogicthatrejectstheprinci- pleofbivalence:everypropositionistrueor false.However,therearetwoformsofrejection: thetruth-functionalmode(many-valuedlogic proper),wherepropositionsmaytakemanyval- uesbeyondsimpletruthandfalsity,valuesfunc- tionallydeterminedbythevaluesoftheir components;andthetruth-valuegapmode, inwhichtheonlyvaluesaretruthandfalsity, butpropositionsmayhaveneither.Whatvalue theydoordonothaveisnotdeterminedby thevaluesorlackofvaluesoftheirconsti- tuents. Many-valuedlogichasitsoriginsinthework ofLukasiewiczand(independently)Postaround 1920,inthefirstdevelopmentoftruthtablesand semanticmethods.Lukasiewicz'sphilosophical motivationforhisthree-valuedcalculuswasto dealwithpropositionswhosetruth-valuewas openor"possible"-e.g.,propositionsaboutthe future.Heproposedtheymighttakeathird value.Let1representtruth,falsity,andthe thirdvaluebe,say,V2.Wetake-1(not)and—> (implication)asprimitive,lettingv(~B)=min(1,1-v(A)+v(B)). Thesevaluationsmaybedisplayed: -» 1 2 1 ~l 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 Lukasiewiczgeneralizedtheideain1922,to allowfirstanyfinitenumberofvalues,and finallyinfinitely,evencontinuum-manyvalues (betweenand1).Onecanthennolongerrep- resentthefunctionalitybyamatrix;however, theformulasgivenabovecanstillbeapplied. WajsbergaxiomatizedLukasiewicz'scalculusin 1931.In1953Lukasiewiczpublishedafour-val- uedextensionalmodallogic. In1921,Postpresentedanm-valuedcalculus, withvalues(truth),...,m—1(falsity),and matricesdefinedoniandv(or):v(~,using1,V2,andasabove: -* 1 2 1 ~l 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 Inordertodevelopalogicofmanyvalues,one needstocharacterizethenotionofathesis,orlog- icaltruth.Thestandardwaytodothisinmany- valuedlogicistoseparatethevaluesinto designatedandundesignated.Effectively,thisis toreintroducebivalence,nowintheform:Every propositioniseitherdesignatedorundesignated. ThusinLukasiewicz'sscheme,1(truth)isthe onlydesignatedvalue;inPosfs,anyinitialseg- ment0,...,n—1,wherenpis,butpV^pisnot,atukasiewicz thesis. However,certainmatricesmaygenerateno logicaltruthsbythismethod,e.g.,theBochvar matricesgiveViforeveryformulaanyofwhose variablesisindeterminate.Ifboth1andViwere designated,allthesesofclassicallogicwouldbe theses;ifonly1,nothesesresult.Sothedistinc- tionfromclassicallogicislöst.Bochvar'ssolu- tionwastoaddanexternalassertionand negation.Butthisinturnrunstheriskofunder- cuttingthewholephilosophicalmotivation,if theexternalnegationisusedinaRussell-type paradox. Onealternativeistoconcentrateonconse- quence:Aisaconsequenceofasetofformulas Xifforeveryassignmentofvalueseitherno memberofXisdesignatedorAis.Bochvar'scon- sequencerelation(withonly1designated)re- sultsfromrestrictingclassicalconsequenceso thateveryvariableinAoccursinsomemember ofX. Thereislittletechnicaldifficultyinextending many-valuedlogictothelogicofpredicatesand quantifiers.Forexample,inLukasiewicz'slogic, v(VxA)=min{v(A(a/x))\aGD],whereDis,say, somesetofconstantswhoseassignmentsex- haustthedomain.Thisinterpretstheuniversal quantifierasan"infinite"conjunction. In1965,Zadehintroducedtheideaoffuzzysets, whosemembershiprelationallowsindetermina- cies:itisafunctionintotheunitinterval[0,1], where1meansdefinitelyin,definitelyout. Onephilosophicalapplicationistothesorites paradox,thatoftheheap.Insteadofinsisting thattherebeasharpcutoffinnumberofgrains betweenaheapandanon-heap,orbetweenred and,say,yellow,onecanintroduceaspectrumof indeterminacy,asdefiniteapplicationsofacon- ceptshadeoffintolessclearones. Nonetheless,manyhavefoundtheideaof assigningfurtherdefinitevalues,beyondtruth andfalsity,unintuitive,andhaveinsteadlooked todevelopaschemethatencompassestruth- valuegaps.Oneapplicationofthisideaisfound inKleene'sstrongandweakmatricesof1938. Kleene'smotivationwastodevelopalogicof partialfunctions.Forcertainarguments,these givenodefinitevalue;butthefunctionmaylåter beextendedsothatinsuchcasesadefinitevalue isgiven.Kleene'sconstraint,therefore,wasthat thematricesberegular:nocombinationisgiven adefinitevaluethatmightlåterbechanged; moreover,onthedefinitevaluesthematrices mustbeclassical.Theweakmatricesareasfor Bochvar.Thestrongmatricesyield(1fortruth, forfalsity,anduforindeterminacy): -» u 1 ~! 1 1 1 1 u u u 1 u 1 u 1 Analternativeapproachtotruth-valuegaps waspresentedbyBasvanFraasseninthe1960s. Supposev(A)isundefinedifv(B)isundefinedfor anysubformulaBofA.Letaclassicalextension ofatruth-valueassignmentvbeanyassignment thatmatchesvonand1andassignseitheror 1whenevervassignsnovalue.Thenwecan defineasupervaluationwöverv:w(A)=1ifthe valueofAonallclassicalextensionsofvis1,if itisandundefinedotherwise.Aisvalidifw(A) =1forallsupervaluationsw(överarbitraryval- uations).Bythismethod,excludedmiddle,e.g., comesoutvalid,sinceittakes1inallclassical extensionsofanypartialvaluation.VanFraassen presentedseveralapplicationsofthesupervalu- ationtechnique.Oneistofreelogic,logicin whichemptytermsareadmitted. Seealsofreelogic,vagueness.S.L.R. MaoTse-tung(1893-1976),ChineseCommunist leader,founderofthePeople'sRepublicofChina in1949.HebelievedthatMarxistideasmustbe adaptedtoChina.ContrarytotheMarxistortho- doxy,whichemphasizedworkers,Maoorga- nizedpeasantsinthecountryside.Hisphi- losophicalwritingsincludeOnPractice(1937) andOnContradiction(1937),synthesizingdialec- ticalmaterialismandtraditionalChinesephilos- ophy.Inhislåteryearshedepartedfromthe gradualstrategyofhisOnNewDemocracy(1940) andadoptedincreasinglyradicalmeansto changeChina.FinallyhestartedtheCultural Revolutionin1967andplungedChinaintodis- aster.Seealsochinesephilosophy,liang SOU-MING,LIUSHAO-CH'l.S.-h.L. MarburgSchool.Seeneo-kantianism. Marcel,Gabriel(1889-1973),Frenchphiloso- pherandplaywright,amajorrepresentativeof Frenchexistentialthought.Hewasamemberof theAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience oftheInstituteofFrance.Musician,dramacritic, andlecturerofinternationalrenown,he authoredthirtyplaysandasmanyphilosophic essays.Heconsideredhisprincipalcontribution tobethatofaphilosopher-dramatist.Together, hisdramaticandphilosophicworkscutapathfor 534 Marcus,RuthBarcan Marcus,RuthBarcan thereasonedexerciseoffreedomtoenhancethe dignityofhumanlife.Theconflictsandchal- lengesofhisownlifehebroughttothelightof thetheater;hisphilosophicworksfollowedas effortstodiscerncriticallythroughrigorous,rea- sonedanalysesthealtemativeoptionslifeoffers. Hisdramaticmasterpiece,TheBrokenWorld, compassionatelyportrayedthedevastatingsense ofemptiness,superficialactivities,andfractured relationshipsthatplaguethemodernera.This playclearedawayforMarceltotranscendnine- teenth-centuryBritishandGermanidealism, articulatehisdistinctionbetweenproblemand mysteryandevolveanexistentialapproachthat reflectivelyclarifiedmysteriesthatcanprovide depthandmeaningfulnesstohumanlife.Inthe essay"OntheOntologicalMystery,"aphilo- sophicsequeltoTheBrokenWorld,Marcelcon- frontedthequestions"WhoamI?-IsBeing emptyorfull?"Heexploredtheregionsofbody orincamatebeing,intersubjectivity,andtran- scendence.Hisresearchfocusedprincipallyon intersubjectivityclarifyingtherequisiteattitudes andessentialcharacteristicsofI-Thouencoun- ters,interpersonalrelations,commitmentand creativefidelity-notionshealsodevelopedin HomoViator(1945)andCreativeFidelity(1940). Marcel'sthoughtbalanceddespairandhope, infidelityandfidelity,self-deceptionandaspirit oftruth.Herecognizedboththeroleoffreedom andtheroleoffundamentalattitudesorpre- philosophicdispositions,astheseinfluenceone's wayofbeingandtheinterpretationoflife's meaning. Concernforthepresenceoflovedoneswho havediedappearsinbothMarcel'sdramaticand philosophicworks,notablyinPresenceand Immortality.Thisconcem,coupledwithhisreflec- tionsonintersubjectivity,ledhimtoexplorehow ahumansubjectcanexperiencethepresenceof Godorthepresenceoflovedonesfrombeyond death.Throughpersonalexperience,dramatic imagination,andphilosophicinvestigation,he discoveredthatsuchpresencecanbeexperi- encedprincipallybywayofinwardnessand depth."Presence"isaspiritualinfluxthatpro- foundlyaffectsone'sbeing,upliftingitand enrichingone'spersonalresources.Whileitdoes dependonaperson'sbeingopenandpermeable, presenceisnotsomethingthatthepersoncan summonforth.Aconferralorpresenceisalways agratuitousgift,coauthoredandmarkedbyits signalbenefit,anincitementtocreate.SoMar- cel'sreflectiononinterpersonalcommunion enabledhimtoconceivephilosophicallyhow Godcanbepresenttoapersonasalife-giving andpersonalizingforcewhosebenefitisalways anincitementtocreate. Seealsobuber,existentialism,philoso- PHYOFLITERATURE.K.R.H. Marcus,RuthBarcan(b.1921),Americanphi- losopherbestknownforherseminalworkin philosophicallogic.In1946shepublishedthe firstsystematictreatmentofquantifiedmodal logic,therebyturningasideQuine'sfamous attackonthecoherenceofcombiningquantifiers withalethicoperators.Shelåterextendedthe first-orderformalizationtosecondorderwith identity(1947)andtomodalizedsettheory (1963).Marcus'swritingsinlogiceitherinaugu- ratedorbroughttotheföremanyissuesthat haveloomedlargeinsubsequentphilosophical theorizing.OfparticularsignificancearetheBar- canformula(1946),thetheoremaboutthe necessityofidentity(1963),aflexiblenotionof extensionality(1960,1961),andtheviewthat ordinarypropernamesarecontentlessdirectly referentialtags(1961).Thislastlaidtheground- workforthetheoryofdirectreferencelåter advancedbyKripke,KeithDonnellan,David Kaplan,andothers. Nolessarevolutionaryinmoraltheory,Mar- cusunderminedtheentirestructureofstandard deonticlogicinherpaperoniterateddeontic modalities(1966).Shelåter(1980)argued againstsometheoriststhatmoraldilemmasare real,andagainstothersthatmoraldilemmas needneitherderivefrominconsistentrulesnor implymoralanti-realism. Inherseriesofpapersonbelief(1981,1983, 1990),Marcusrepudiatestheoriesthatidentify beliefswithattitudestolinguisticorquasi-lin- guisticitems.Shearguesinsteadthatforanagent AtobelievethatpisforAtobedisposedto behaveasifpobtains(wherepisapossiblestate ofaffairs).Heranalysismobilizesaconceptionof rationalagentsasseekingtomaintainglobal coherenceamongtheverbalandnon-verbal indicatorsoftheirbeliefs. DuringmuchofMarcus'scareersheservedas ReubenPostHalleckProfessorofPhilosophyat YaleUniversity.Shehasalsoservedaschairof theBoardofOfficersoftheAmericanPhilosoph- icalAssociationandpresidentofitsCentralDivi- sion,presidentoftheAssociationofSymbolic Logic,andpresidentoftheInstitutInternational dePhilosophie. Seealsobelief,causaltheoryof PROPERNAMES,MODALLOGIC,MORAL DILEMMA,PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE,PHI- LOSOPHYOFLOGIC,QUINE.D.R.&W.S.-A. 535 MarcusAurelius Mariana,Juande MarcusAurelius(a.d.121-80),Romanemperor (from161)andphilosopher.Authoroftwelve booksofMeditations(Greektitle.ToHimself), MarcusAureliusisprincipallyinterestinginthe historyofStoicphilosophy(ofwhichhewasa diligentstudent)forhisethicalself-portrait. Exceptforthefirstbook,detailinghisgratitude tohisfamily,friends,andteachers,theapho- rismsarearrangedinnoorder;manywerewrit- tenincampduringmilitarycampaigns.They reflectboththeOldStoaandthemoreeclectic viewsofPosidonius,withwhomheholdsthat involvementinpublicaffairsisamoralduty. Marcus,inaccordwithStoicism,considers immortalitydoubtful;happinessliesinpatient acceptanceofthewillofthepanentheisticStoic God,thematerialsoulofamaterialuniverse. Anger,likeallemotions,isforbiddentheStoic emperor:heexhortshimselftocompassionfor theweakandevilamonghissubjects."Donotbe turnedinto'Caesar,'ordyedbythepurple:for thatnappens"(6.30)."Itistheprivilegeofa humanbeingtoloveeventhosewhostumble" (7.22).Sayingslikethese,ratherthantechnical arguments,givethebookitsplaceinliteraryhis- tory.Seealsohellenisticphilosophy,sto- icism.D.Ar. Marcuse,Herbert(1898-1979).German-born Americanpoliticalphilosopherwhoreinter- pretedtheideasofMarxandFreud.Marcuse's workisamongthemostsystematicandphilo- sophicaloftheFrankfurtSchooltheorists.After aninitialattempttounifyHegel,Marx,andHei- deggerinanontologyofhistoricityinhishabili- tationonHegel'sOntologyandtheTheoryof Historicity(1932),Marcusewasoccupiedduring the1930swiththeproblemoftruthinacritical historicalsocialtheory,defendingacontext- independentnotionoftruthagainstrelativizing tendenciesofthesociologyofknowledge.Mar- cusethoughtHegel's"dialectics"providedan alternativetorelativism,empiricism,andposi- tivismandevendevelopedarevolutionaryinter- pretationoftheHegelianlegacyinReasonand Revolution(1941)opposedtoPopper'stotalitar- ianone. AfterWorldWarII,Marcuseappropriated Freudinthesamewaythathehadappropriated Hegelbeforethewar,usinghisbasicconceptsfor acriticaltheoryoftherepressivecharacterofciv- ilizationinErosandCivilization(1955).Inmany respects,thisbookcomesclosertopresentinga positiveconceptionofreasonandEnlighten- mentthananyotherworkoftheFrankfurt School.Marcusearguedthatcivilizationhas beenantagonistictohappinessandfreedom throughitsconstantstruggleagainstbasic humaninstincts.AccordingtoMarcuse,human existenceisgroundedinEros,buttheseimpulses dependuponandareshapedbylabor.Bysyn- thesizingMarxandFreud,Marcuseholdsoutthe utopianpossibilityofhappinessandfreedomin theunityofErosandlabor,whichatthevery leastpointstowardthereductionof"surplus repression"asthegoalofarationaleconomyand emancipatorysocialcriticism. Thiswasalsothegoalofhisaesthetictheoryas developedinTheAestheticDimension(1978).In OneDimensionalMan(1964)andotherwritings, Marcuseprovidesananalysisofwhythepoten- tialforafreeandrationalsocietyhasneverbeen realized:intheirrationalityofthecurrentsocial totality,itscreationandmanipulationoffalse needs(or"repressivedesublimation"),andhos- tilitytowardnature.PerhapsnootherFrank- furtSchoolphilosopherhashadasmuchpopu- lärinfluenceasMarcuse,asevidencedbyhis receptioninthestudentandecologymove- ments. Seealsocriticaltheory,Frankfurt school.J.Bo. marginalutility.Seeutilitarianism. Mariana,Juande(1536-1624),SpanishJesuit historianandpoliticalphilosopher.Bomin TalaveradelaReina,hestudiedatAlcalåde HenaresandtaughtatRome,Sicily,andParis. HispoliticalideasarecontainedinDeregeetregis institutione("OnKingship,"1599)andDemonetae mutatione("OnCurrency,"1609).Marianaheld thatpoliticalpowerrestsonthecommunityof citizens,andthepowerofthemonarchderives fromthepeople.Thenaturalstateofhumanity didnotinclude,asVitoriaheld,governmentand otherpoliticalinstitutions.Thestateofnature wasoneofjusticeinwhichallpossessionswere heldincommon,andcooperationcharacterized humanrelations.Privatepropertyistheresultof technologicaladvancesthatproducedjealousy andstrife.AntedatingbothHobbesand Rousseau,Marianaarguedthathumansmadea contractanddelegatedtheirpoliticalpowerto leadersinordertoeliminateinjusticeandstrife. However,onlythepeoplehavetherightto changethelaw.Amonarchwhodoesnotfollow thelawandceasestoactforthecitizens'welfare maybeforciblyremoved.Tyrannicideisthusjus- tifiableundersomecircumstances.Seealso CONTRACTARIANISM,POLITICALPHILOSO- PHY.J.J.E.G. 536 Maritain,Jacques Martineau,James Maritain,Jacques(1882-1973),FrenchCatholic philosopherwhoseinnovativeinterpretationof Aquinas'sphilosophymadehimacentralfigure inNeo-Thomism.Bergson'steachingsavedhim frommetaphysicaldespairandasuicidepact withhisfiancée.AfterhisdiscoveryofAquinas, herejectedBergsonismforarealisticaccountof theconceptandaunifiedtheoryofknowledge, aligningtheempiricalscienceswiththephiloso- phyofnature,metaphysics,theology,andmys- ticisminDistinguishtoUniteorTheDegreesof Knowledge(1932).Maritainopposedtheskepti- cismandidealismthatseveredthemindfrom sensibility,typifiedbythe"angelism"of Descartes'sintuitionism.Maritaintracedthe practicaleffectsofangelisminart,politics,and religion.HisArtandScholasticism(1920)employs ancientandmedievalnotionsofartasavirtue andbeautyasatranscendentalaspectofbeing. Inpolitics,especiallyManandtheState(1961), Maritainstressedthedistinctionbetweenthe personandtheindividual,theontologicalfounda- tionofnaturalrights,thereligiousoriginsofthe democraticideal,andtheimportanceofthecom- mongood.Healsoarguedforthepossibilityof philosophyinformedbythedataofrevelation withoutcompromisingitsintegrity,andanInte- gralHumanism(1936)thataffirmsthepolitical orderwhileupholdingtheeternaldestinyofthe humanperson.Seealsoaquinas,neo- THOMISM.D.W.H. Markovprocess.Seestochasticprocess. MarsiliodeiMainardine.Seemarsiliusofpadua. MarsiliusofInghen(c.1330-96),Dutchphiloso- pherandtheologian.BomnearNijmegen,Mar- siliusstudiedunderBuridan,taughtatParisfor thirtyyears,then,in1383,movedtothenewly foundedUniversityofHeidelberg,whereheand AlbertofSaxonyestablishednominalisminGer- many.Inlogic,heproducedanOckhamistrevi- sionoftheTractatusofPeterofSpain,often publishedasTextusdialecticesinearlysixteenth- centuryGermany,andacommentaryonAris- totle'sPriorAnalytics.HedevelopedBuridan's theoryofimpetusinhisownway,accepted Bradwardine'saccountoftheproportionsof velocities,andadoptedNicholasofOresme'sdoc- trineofintensionandremissionofforms,apply- ingthenewphysicsinhiscommentarieson Aristotle'sphysicalworks.Intheologyhefol- lowedOckham'sskepticalemphasisonfaith, allowingthatonemightprovetheexistenceof GodalongScotisticlines,butinsistingthat,since naturalphilosophycouldnotaccommodatethe creationoftheuniverseexnihilo,God'somnipo- tencewasknownonlythroughfaith.J.Lo. MarsiliusofPadua,inItalian,Marsiliodei Mainardini(1275/80-1342),Italianpolitical theorist.HeservedasrectoroftheUniversityof Parisbetween1312and1313;hisanti-papal viewsforcedhimtofleeParis(1326)forNurem- berg,wherehewaspoliticalandecclesiastic adviserofLouisofBavaria. Hismajorwork,Defensorpacis("Defenderof Peace,"1324),attacksthedoctrineofthe supremacyofthepopeandarguesthatthe authorityofasecularrulerelectedtorepresent thepeopleissuperiortotheauthorityofthe papacyandpriesthoodinbothtemporaland spiritualaffairs.ThreebasicclaimsofMarsilius's theoryarethatreason,notinstinctorGod, allowsustoknowwhatisjustandconducesto theflourishingofhumansociety;thatgovern- mentsneedtoenforceobediencetothelawsby coercivemeasures;andthatpoliticalpowerulti- matelyresidesinthepeople.Hewasinfluenced byAristotle'sidealofthestateasnecessarytofos- terhumanflourishing.Histhoughtisregardedas amajorstepinthehistoryofpoliticalphilosophy andoneofthefirstdefensesofrepublicanism. BGar. Martineau,James(1805-1900),Englishphiloso- pherofreligionandethicalintuitionist.Asa ministerandaprofessor,Martineaudefended Unitarianismandopposedpantheism.InAStudy ofReligion(1888)MartineauagreedwithKant thatrealityasweexperienceitistheworkofthe mind,buthesawnoreasontodoubthisintuitive convictionthatthephenomenalworldcorre- spondstoarealworldofenduring,causally relatedobjects.Hebelievedthattheonlyintelli- giblenotionofcausationisgivenbywillingand concludedthatrealityistheexpressionofa divinewillthatisalsothesourceofmoral authority.InTypesofEthicalTheory(1885)he claimedthatthefundamentalfactofethicsisthe humantendencytoapproveanddisapproveof themotivesleadingtovoluntaryactions,actions inwhichtherearetwomotivespresenttocon- sciousness.Afterfreelychoosingoneofthe motives,theagentcandeterminewhichaction bestexpressesit.SinceMartineauthoughtthat agentsintuitivelyknowthroughconscience whichmotiveishigher,thecoreofhisethical theoryisarankingofthethirteenprincipal motives,thehighestofwhichisreverence.See alsointuitionism.J.W.A. 537 Marx,Karl Marxism Marx,Karl(1818-83),Germansocialphiloso- pher,economictheorist,andrevolutionary.He livedandworkedasajournalistinCologne, Paris,andBrussels.Aitertheunsuccessiul1848 revolutionsinEuropé,hesettledinLondon, doingresearchandwritingandeamingsome moneyascorrespondentlortheNewYorkTrib- une. Inearlywritings,hearticulatedhiscritiqueof thereligiouslyandpoliticallyconservativeimpli- cationsofthethen-reigningphilosophyofHegel, findingthereanacceptanceofexistingprivate propertyrelationshipsandofthealienationgen- eratedbythem.Marxunderstoodalienationasa stateofradicaldisharmony(1)amongindividu- als,(2)betweenthemandtheirownlifeactivity, orlabor,and(3)betweenindividualsandtheir systemofproduction.Låter,inhismasterwork Capital(1867,1885,1894),Marxemployed Hegel'smethodofdialectictogenerateaninter- nalcritiqueofthetheoryandpracticeofcapital- ism,showingthat,underassumptions(notably thathumanlaboristhesourceofeconomic value)foundinsuchearliertheoristsasAdam Smith,thissystemmustundergoincreasingly severecrises,resultingintheeventualseizureof controloftheincreasinglycentralizedmeansof production(factories,largefarms,etc.)fromthe relativelysmallclassofcapitalistproprietorsby thepreviouslyimpoverishednon-owners(the proletariat)intheinterestofathenceforthclass- lesssociety. Marx'searlywritings,somewhatutopianin tone,mostneverpublishedduringhislifetime, emphasizesocialethicsandontology.Inthem, hecharacterizeshispositionasa"humanism" anda"naturalism."IntheThesesonFeuerbach,he chartsamiddlepathbetweenHegel'sidealist accountofthenatureofhistoryastheself- unfoldingofspiritandwhatMarxregardsasthe ahistorical,mechanistic,andpassivematerialist philosophyofFeuerbach;Marxproposesacon- ceptionofhistoryasforgedbyhumanactivity,or praxis,withindeterminatematerialconditions thatvarybytimeandplace.InlåterMarxism, thisgeneralpositionisoftenlabeleddialectical materialism. Marxbeganradicallytoquestionthenatureof philosophy,comingtoviewitasideology,i.e.,a thoughtsystemparadingasautonomousbutin factdependentonthematerialconditionsofthe societyinwhichitisproduced.ThetoneofCap- italisthereforeonthewholelessphilosophical andmoralistic,moresocialscientificandtending towardhistoricaldeterminism,thanthatofthe earlierwritings,butpunctuatedbyburstsof indignationagainstthebanefuleffectsofcapital- ism'sprofitorientationandreferencestothe "societyofassociatedproducers"(socialismor communism)thatwould,orcould,replacecap- italistsociety.Hisenthusiasticpredictionsof immanentworldwiderevolutionarychanges,in variousletters,artides,andthefamousCommu- nistManifesto(1848;jointlyauthoredwithhis closecollaborator,FriedrichEngels),departfrom thegenerallymorehypotheticalcharacterofthe textofCapitalitself. Thelinchpinthatperhapsbestconnects Marx'searlierandlåterthoughtandguarantees hisenduringrelevanceasasocialphilosopheris hisanalysisoftheroleofhumanlaborpoweras apeculiartypeofcommoditywithinasystemof commodityexchange(histheoryofsurplusvalue). Labor'speculiarity,accordingtohim,liesinits capacityactivelytogeneratemoreexchangevalue thanititselfcostsemployersassubsistence wages.Buttotreathumanbeingsasprofit-gen- eratingcommoditiesrisksneglectingtotreat themashumanbeings. Seealsomarxism,politicalphilosophy, PRAXIS.W.L.M. Marxism,thephilosophyofKarlMarx,oranyof severalsystemsofthoughtorapproachesto socialcriticismderivedfromMarx.Thetermis alsoapplied,incorrectly,tocertainsociopolitical structurescreatedbydominantCommunistpar- tiesduringthemid-twentiethcentury. KarlMarxhimself,apprisedoftheideasofcer- tainFrenchcriticswhoinvokedhisname, remarkedthatheknewatleastthathewasnot aMarxist.Thefactthathiscollaborator,Friedrich Engels,apopularizerwithagreaterinterestthan Marxinthenaturalsciences,outlivedhimand wrote,amongotherthings,a"dialecticsof nature"thatpurportedtodiscovercertainuni- versalnaturallaws,addedtotheconfusion. Lenin,theleadingRussianCommunistrevolu- tionary,neartheendofhislifediscoveredprevi- ouslyunacknowledgedconnectionsbetween Marx'sCapital(1867)andHegel'sScienceofLogic (1812-16)andconcluded(inhisPhilosophical Notebooks)thatMarxistsforahalf-centuryhad notunderstoodMarx.Specificpoliticalagendas of,amongothers,theMarxistfactionwithinthe turn-of-the-centuryGermanSocialDemocratic Party,theBolshevikfactionofRussiansocialists ledbyLenin,andlåtergovernmentsandparties claimingallegianceto"Marxist-Leninistprinci- ples"havecontributedtoreinterpretations.For severaldecadesintheSovietUnionandcoun- triesalliedwithit,abroadagreementconcern- 538 Marxism Marxism ingfundamentalMarxistdoctrineswasestab- lishedandpoliticallyenforced,resultinginadoc- trinaireversionlabeled"orthodoxMarxism"and virtuallyensuringthewidespread,wholesale rejectionofMarxismassuchwhendissidents taughttoacceptthisversionasauthenticMarx- ismcametopower. Marxneverwroteasystematicexpositionof histhought,whichinanycasedrastically changedemphasesacrosstimeandincludedele- mentsofhistory,economics,andsociologyas wellasmoretraditionalphilosophicalconcerns. Inoneletterhespecificallywarnsagainstregard- inghishistoricalaccountofWesterncapitalism asatranscendentalanalysisofthesupposedly necessaryhistoricaldevelopmentofanyandall societiesatacertaintime.Itisthussomewhat paradoxicalthatMarxismisoftenidentifiedasa "totalizing"ifnot"totalitarian"systembypost- modernistphilosopherswhorejectglobaltheo- riesor"grandnarratives"asinherentlyinvalid. However,theevolutionofMarxismsinceMarx's timehelpsexplainthisidentification. That"orthodox"Marxismwouldplaceheavy emphasisonhistoricaldeterminism-theinevi- tabilityofacertaingeneralsequenceofevents leadingtothereplacementofcapitalismbya socialisteconomicsystem(inwhich,according toaformulainMarx'sCritiqueoftheGothaPro- gram,eachpersonwouldberemunerated accordingtohis/herwork)andeventuallybya communistone(remunerationinaccordance withindividualneeds)-wasforeshadowedby Plekhanov.InTheRoleoftheIndividualinHistory, heportrayedindividualidiosyncrasiesasacci- dental:e.g.,hadNapoleonnotexistedthegen- eralcourseofhistorywouldnothavetumedout differently.InMaterialismandEmpiriocriticism, Leninofferedepistemologicalreinforcementfor thenotionthatMarxismistheuniquelytrue worldviewbydefendinga"copy"or"reflection" theoryofknowledgeaccordingtowhichtrue conceptssimplymirrorobjectivereality,like photographs.Elsewhere,however,heargued against"economism,"theinferencethatthehis- toricalinevitabilityofcommunism'svictory obviatedpoliticalactivism.Lenininsteadmain- tainedthat,atleastundertherepressivepolitical conditionsofczaristRussia,onlyaclandestine partyofprofessionalrevolutionaries,actingas thevanguardoftheworkingclassandinits interests,couldproducefundamentalchange. Låter,duringthelongpoliticalreignofJosef Stalin,thehegemonicCommunistPartyofthe USSRwasidentifiedasthesupremeinterpreter oftheseinterests,thusjustifyingtotalitarianrule. So-calledWesternMarxismopposedthis "orthodox"version,althoughthewritingsofone ofitsforemostearlyrepresentatives,Georg Lukacs,whobrilliantlyperceivedtheclosecon- nectionbetweenHegel'sphilosophyandthe earlythoughtofMarxbeforetheunpublished manuscriptsprovingthisconnectionhadbeen retrievedfromarchives,actuallytendedtorein- forceboththeviewthatthepartyincarnatedthe idealinterestsoftheproletariat(seehisHistory andClassConsciousness)andanaestheticsfavoring theartof"socialistrealism"övermoreexperi- mentalforms.Hiscontemporary,KarlKorsch,in MarxismasPhilosophy,insteadsawMarxismas aboveallaheuristicmethod,pointingtosalient phenomena(e.g.,socialclass,materialcondi- tioning)generallyneglectedbyotherphiloso- phies.Hiscounselwasineffectfollowedbythe FrankfurtSchoolofcriticaltheory,including WalterBenjaminintheareaofaesthetics, TheodorAdornoinsocialcriticism,andWil- helmReichinpsychology.Aspateof"new Marxisms"-therelativedegreesoftheirfidelity toMarx'soriginalthoughtcannotbeweighed here-developed,especiallyinthewakeofthe gradualrediscoveryofMarx'smoreethicallyori- ented,lessdeterministicearlywritings.Among thenamesmeritingspecialmentioninthiscon- textareErnstBloch,whoexploredMarxism's connectionwithutopianthinking;HerbertMar- cuse,criticofthe"one-dimensionality"ofindus- trialsociety;thePraxisschool(afterthenameof theirjournalandinviewoftheirconcernwith analyzingsocialpractices)ofYugoslavphiloso- phers;andthelåterJean-PaulSartre.Alsowor- thyofnotearethewritings,manyofthem composedinprisonunderMussolini'sItalian Fascistrule,ofAntonioGramsci,whostressed theroleofculturalfactorsindeterminingwhat isdominantpoliticallyandideologicallyatany giventime. Simultaneouswiththedeclineandfallof regimesinwhich"orthodoxMarxism"wasoffi- ciallyprivilegedhasbeentherecentdevelop- mentofnewapproaches,looselyconnectedby virtueoftheirutilizationoftechniquesfavored byBritishandAmericanphilosophers,collec- tivelyknownasanalyticMarxism.Problemsof justice,theoriesofhistory,andthequestionable natureofMarx'stheoryofsurplusvaluehave beenspecialconcernstothesewriters.This developmentsuggeststhatthecurrentunfash- ionablenessofMarxisminmanycircles,due largelytoitsunderstandablebutmisleading identificationwiththeaforementionedregimes, isitselfonlyatemporaryphenomenon,evenif 539 mässnoun mathematicalanalysis futureMarxismsarelikelytorangeevenfurther fromMarx'sownspecificconcernswhilestill sharinghiscommitmenttoidentifying,explain- ing,andcriticizinghierarchiesofdominanceand subordination,particularlythoseofaneconomic order,inhumansociety. Seealsocriticaltheory,Frankfurt SCHOOL,LUKACS,MARX,PRAXIS,PRAXIS SCHOOL.W.L.M. mässnoun.Seecountnoun. masterargument.Seemegarians. materialadequacy,thepropertythatbelongstoa formåldefinitionofaconceptwhenthatdefini- tioncharacterizesor"captures"theextension(or material)oftheconcept.Lntuitively,aformål definitionofaconceptismateriallyadequateif andonlyifitisneithertoobroadnortoonarrow. Tarskiadvancedthestateofphilosophicalse- manticsbydiscoveringthecriterionofmaterial adequacyoftruthdefinitionscontainedinhis conventionT.Materialadequacycontrastswith analyticadequacy,whichbelongstodefinitions thatprovideafaithfulanalysis.Defininganinte- gertobeevenifandonlyifitistheproductof twoconsecutiveintegerswouldbematerially adequatebutnotanalyticallyadequate,whereas defininganintegertobeevenifandonlyifitis amultipleof2wouldbebothmateriallyandana- lyticallyadequate.Seealsoconventiont, DEFINITION,FORMÅLSEMANTICS,TARSKI, TRUTH.J.COr. materialcause.Seearistotle. materialconditional.Seecounterfactuals,impli- cation. materialequivalence.Seeequivalence. materialimplication.Seeimplication. materialimplication,paradoxesof.Seeimplica- tion. materialism.Seemetaphysics,philosophyof mind. materialism,Australian.Seesmart. materialism,centralstate.Seephilosophyof MIND. materialism,dialectic.il.Seemarx,plekhanov. materialism,emergent.Seephilosophyofmind. materialism,historical.Seeengels. materialism,non-reductive.Seephilosophyof MIND. materialmode.Seemetalanguage. materialsupposition.Seesuppositio. mathematicalanalysis,alsocalledstandardanal- ysis,theareaofmathematicspertainingtothe so-calledrealnumbersystem,i.e.theareathat canbebasedonanaxiomsetwhoseintended interpretation(standardmodel)hasthesetof realnumbersasitsdomain(universeofdis- course).Thusanalysisincludes,amongitsmany subbranches,elementaryalgebra,differential andintegralcalculus,differentialequations,the calculusofvariations,andmeasuretheory.Ana- lyticgeometryinvolvestheapplicationofanaly- sistogeometry.Analysiscontainsalargepartof themathematicsusedinmathematicalphysics. Therealnumbers,whicharerepresentableby theendingandunendingdecimals,areusefully construedas(orascorrespondingto)distances measured,relativetoanarbitraryunitlength, positivelytotherightandnegativelytotheleft ofanarbitrarilyfixedzeropointalongageomet- ricalstraightline.Inparticular,theclassofreal numbersincludesasincreasinglycomprehensive propersubclassesthenaturalnumbers,theinte- gers(positive,negative,andzero),therational numbers(orfractions),andthealgebraicnum- bers(suchasthesquarerootoftwo).Especially importantisthepresenceintheclassofreal numbersofnon-algebraic(ortranscendental) irrationalnumberssuchaspi.Thesetofreal numbersincludesarbitrarilysmallandarbitrar- ilylarge,finitequantities,whileexcludinginfin- itesimalandinfinitequantities. Analysis,oftenconceivedasthemathematics ofcontinuousmagnitude,contrastswitharith- metic(naturalnumbertheory),whichis regardedasthemathematicsofdiscretemagni- tude.Analysisisoftenconstruedasinvolvingnot justtherealnumbersbutalsotheimaginary (complex)numbers.Traditionallyanalysisis expressedinasecond-orderorhigher-orderlan- guagewhereinitsaxiomsethascategoricity; eachofitsmodelsisisomorphicto(hasthesame structureas)thestandardmodel.Whenanalysis iscarriedoutinafirst-orderlanguage,ashas beenincreasinglythecasesincethe1950s,cate- goricityisimpossibleandithasnonstandard 540 mathematicalconstructivism mathematicalinduction modelsinadditiontoitsstandardmodel.Anon- standardmodelofanalysisisaninterpretationnot isomorphictothestandardmodelbutneverthe- lesssatisfyingtheaxiomset.Someofthenon- standardmodelsinvolveobjectsreminiscentof themuch-despised"infinitesimals"thatwere essentialtotheLeibnizapproachtocalculusand thatweresubjecttointensecriticismbyBerke- leyandotherphilosophersandphilosophically sensitivemathematicians.Thesenon-standard modelsgiverisetoanewareaofmathematics, non-standardanalysis,withinwhichthefalla- ciousargumentsusedbyLeibnizandotherearly analystsformtheheuristicbasisofnewand entirelyrigorousproofs. Seealsocalculus,categoricity,philos- OPHYOFMATHEMATICS.J.Cor. mathematicalconstructivism.Seephilosophyof MATHEMATICS. mathematicalfunction,anoperationthat,when appliedtoanentity(setofentities)calledits argument(s),yieldsanentityknownasthevalue ofthefunctionforthatargument(s).Thisopera- tioncanbeexpressedbyafunctionalequationof theformy=f(x)suchthatavariableyissaidto beafunctionofavariablexifcorrespondingto eachvalueofxthereisoneandonlyonevalue ofy.Thexiscalledtheindependentvariable(or argumentofthefunction)andtheythedepen- dentvariable(orvalueofthefunction).(Some definitionsconsidertherelationtobethefunc- tion,notthedependentvariable,andsomedefi- nitionspermitmorethanonevalueofyto correspondtoagivenvalueofx,asinx2+y2= 4.)Moreabstractly,afunctioncanbeconsidered tobesimplyaspecialkindofrelation(setof orderedpairs)thattoanyelementinitsdomain relätesexactlyoneelementinitsrange.Sucha functionissaidtobeaone-to-onecorrespondenceif andonlyiftheset[x,y]elementsofSand{z,y}ele- mentsofSjointlyimplyx=z.Consider,e.g.,the function{(1,1),(2,4),(3,9),(4,16),(5,25), (6,36)},eachofwhosemembersisoftheform (x,x2)-thesquaringfunction.Orconsider thefunction{(0,1),(1,0)}-whichwecancall thenegationfunction.Incontrast,considerthe functionforexclusivealternation(asinyoumay haveabeerorglassofwine,butnotboth).Itis notaone-to-onecorrespondence.For,isthe valueof(0,1)andof(1,0),and1isthevalueof (0,0)andof(1,1). Ifwethinkofafunctionasdefinedonthenat- uralnumbers-functionsfromN"toNforvari- ousn(mostcommonlyn=1or2)-apartial functionisafunctionfromN"toNwhosedomain isnotnecessarilythewholeofN"(e.g.,not definedforallofthenaturalnumbers).Atotal functionfromN"toNisafunctionwhosedomain isthewholeofN"(e.g.,allofthenaturalnum- bers). Seealsofunctionalism,teleology. F.A. mathematicalinduction,amethodofdefinition andamethodofproof.Acollectionofobjects canbedefinedinductively.Allmembersofsuch acollectioncanbeshowntohaveapropertyby aninductiveproof.Thenaturalnumbersandthe setofwell-formedformulasofaformållanguage arefamiliarexamplesofsetsgivenbyinductive definition.Thus,thesetofnaturalnumbersis inductivelydefinedasthesmallestset,N,such that:(B)isinJVand(I)foranyxinNthesuc- cessorofxisinN.(B)isthebasicclauseand(I) theinductiveclauseofthisdefinition.Orconsider apropositionallanguagebuiltonnegationand conjunction.Westartwithadenumerableclass ofatomicsentencesymbolsatom={Al,A2, ...}.Thenwecandefinethesetofwell-formed formulas,wff,asthesmallestsetofexpressions suchthat:(B)everymemberofatomisinwff and(I)ifxisinwffthen(~x)isinwffandif xandyareinwffthen(x&y)isinwff.We showthatallmembersofaninductivelydefined sethaveapropertybyshowingthatthemem- bersspecifiedbythebasishavethatpropertyand thatthepropertyispreservedbytheinduction. Forexample,weshowthatallwffshavean evennumberofparenthesesbyshowing(i)that allatomshaveanevennumberofparentheses and(ii)thatifxandyhaveanevennumberof parenthesesthensodo(~x)and(x&y).This showsthatthesetofwffswithanevennumber ofparenthesessatisfies(B)and(I).Thesetof wffswithanevennumberofparenthesesmust thenbeidenticaltowff,since-bydefinition- wffisthesmallestsetthatsatisfies(B)and(I). Ordinaryproofbymathematicalinduction showsthatallthenaturalnumbers,orallmem- bersofsomesetwiththeordertypeofthenat- uralnumbers,shareaproperty.Proofby transfiniteinduction,amoregeneralformofproof bymathematicalinduction,showsthatallmem- bersofsomewell-orderedsethaveacertain property.Asetiswell-orderedifandonlyif everynon-emptysubsetofithasaleastelement. Thenaturalnumbersarewell-ordered.Itisa consequenceoftheaxiomofchoicethatevery setcanbewell-ordered.Supposethataset,X,is well-orderedandthatPisthesubsetofXwhose 541 mathematicalintuitionism mathematicalintuitionism membershavethepropertyofinterest.Suppose thatitcanbeshownforanyelementxofX,ifall membersofXlessthatxareinP,thensoisx. Thenitfollowsbytransfiniteinductionthatall membersofXhavetheproperty,thatX=P.For ifXdidnotcoincidewithP,thenthesetofele- mentsofxnotinPwouldbenon-empty.Since Xiswell-ordered,thissetwouldhavealeastele- ment,x*.Butthenbydefinition,allmembersof Xlessthanx*areinP,andbyhypothesisx*must beinPafterall. Seealsoinduction,philosophyof MATHEMATICS,PROOFTHEORY.B.Sk. mathematicalintuitionism,atwentieth-century movementthatreconstructsmathematicsin accordancewithanepistemologicalidealismand aKantianmetaphysics.Specifically,Brouwer,its founder,heldthattherearenounexperienced truthsandthatmathematicalobjectsstemfrom theaprioriformofthoseconsciousactswhich generateempiricalobjects.UnlikeKant,how- ever,Brouwerrejectedtheapriorityofspaceand basedmathematicssolelyonarefinedconcep- tionoftheintuitionoftime. Intuitionisticmathematics.Accordingto Brouwer,thesimplestmathematicalactistodis- tinguishbetweentwodiverseelementsinthe flowofconsciousness.Byrepeatingandconcate- natingsuchactswegenerateeachofthenatural numbers,thestandardarithmeticaloperations, andthustherationalnumberswiththeiropera- tionsaswell.Unfortunately,thesesimple,termi- natingprocessescannotproducetheconvergent infinitesequencesofrationalnumbersthatare neededtogeneratethecontinuum(thenon- denumerablesetofrealnumbers,orofpointson theline).Some"proto-intuitionists"admitted infinitesequenceswhoseelementsaredeter- minedbyfinitelydescribablerules.However,the setofallsuchalgorithmicsequencesisdenu- merableandthuscanscarcelygeneratethecon- tinuum.Brouwer'sfirstattempttocircumvent this-bypostulatingasingleintuitionofanever growingcontinuum-mirroredAristotle'spic- tureofthecontinuumasadynamicwholecom- posedofinseparableparts.Butthisapproachwas incompatiblewiththeset-theoreticframework thatBrouweraccepted,andby1918hehad replaceditwiththeconceptofaninfinitechoice sequence.Achoicesequenceofrationalnum- bersis,tobesure,generatedbya"rule,"butthe rulemayleaveroomforsomedegreeoffreedom inchoosingthesuccessiveelements.Itmight, e.g.,simplyrequirethatthen+1stchoicebea rationalnumberthatlieswithinlinofthewth choice.Thesetofrealnumbersgeneratedby suchsemideterminatesequencesisdemonstra- blynon-denumerable.Followinghisepistemo- logicalbeliefs,Brouweradmittedonlythose propertiesofachoicesequencewhicharedeter- minedbyitsruleandbyafinitenumberofactual choices.Heincorporatedthisrestrictionintohis versionofsettheoryandobtainedaseriesof resultsthatconflictwithstandard(classical) mathematics.Mostfamously,heprovedthat everyfunctionthatisfullydefinedöveraninter- valofrealnumbersisuniformlycontinuous. (Pictorially,thegraphofthefunctionhasnogaps orjumps.)Interestingly,onecorollaryofthisthe- oremisthatthesetofrealnumberscannotbe dividedintomutuallyexclusivesubsets,aprop- ertythatrigorouslyrecoverstheAristotelianpic- tureofthecontinuum. Theclashwithclassicalmathematics.Unlike hisdiscipleArendHeyting,whoconsideredintu- itionisticandclassicalmathematicsasseparate andthereforecompatiblesubjects,Brouwer viewedthemasincompatibletreatmentsofasin- glesubjectmatter.Heevenoccasionallyaccused classicalmathematicsofinconsistencyatthe placeswhereitdifferedfromintuitionism.This clashconcernsthebasicconceptofwhatcounts asamathematicalobject.Intuitionismallows, andclassicalmathematicsrejects,objectsthat maybeindeterminatewithrespecttosomeof theirproperties. Logicandlanguage.Becausehebelievedthat mathematicalconstructionsoccurinprelinguis- ticconsciousness,Brouwerrefusedtolimit mathematicsbytheexpressivecapacityofany language.Logic,heclaimed,merelycodifies alreadycompletedstagesofmathematicalrea- soning.Forinstance,theprincipleofthe excludedmiddlestemsfroman"observational period"duringwhichmankindcataloguedfinite phenomena(withdecidableproperties);andhe deridedclassicalmathematicsforinappropriately applyingthisprincipletoinfinitaryaspectsof mathematics. Formalization.Brouwer'sviewsnotwith- standing,in1930Heytingproducedformålsys- temsforintuitionisticlogic(IL)andnumber theory.Theseinspiredfurtherformalizations (evenofthetheoryofchoicesequences)anda seriesofproof-theoretic,semantic,andalgebraic studiesthatrelatedintuitionisticandclassicalfor- malsystems.StephenKleene,e.g.,interpretedIL 542 mathematicallogic Maxwell,JamesClerk andotherintuitionisticformålsystemsusingthe classicaltheoryofrecursivefunctions.Gödel, whoshowedthatILcannotcoincidewithany finitemany-valuedlogic,demonstrateditsrela- tiontothemodallogic,S4;andKripkeprovideda formålsemanticsforILsimilartothepossible worldssemanticsforS4.Forawhilethestudyof intuitionisticformålsystemsusedstronglyclassi- calmethods,butsincethe1970sintuitionistic methodshavebeenemployedaswell. Meaning.Heyting'sformalizationreflecteda theoryofmeaningimplicitinBrouwer'sepiste- mologyandmetaphysics,atheorythatreplaces thetraditionalcorrespondencenotionoftruth withthenotionofconstructiveproof.More recentlyMichaelDummetthasextendedthisto awarrantedassertabilitytheoryofmeaningfor areasofdiscourseoutsideofmathematics.Hehas shownhowassertabilismprovidesastrategyfor combatingrealismaboutsuchthingsasphysical objects,mentalobjects,andthepast. Seealsobrouwer,choicesequence,phi- LOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICS,SETTHEORY. C.J.P. mathematicallogic.Seeformållogic. mathematicalspace.Seespace. mathematicalstructuralism,theviewthatthe subjectofanybranchofmathematicsisastruc- tureorstructures.Thesloganisthatmathemat- icsisthescienceofstructure.Definea"natural numbersystem"tobeacountablyinfinitecol- lectionofobjectswithonedesignatedinitial objectandasuccessorrelationthatsatisfiesthe principleofmathematicalinduction.Examples ofnaturalnumbersystemsaretheArabic numeralsandaninfinitesequenceofdistinct momentsoftime.Accordingtostructuralism, arithmeticisabouttheformorstructurecom- montonaturalnumbersystems.Accordingly,a naturalnumberissomethinglikeanofficeinan organizationoraplaceinapattern.Similarly, realanalysisisabouttherealnumberstructure, theformcommontocompleteorderedfields. Thephilosophicalissuesconcerningstructural- ismconcemthenatureofstructuresandtheir places.Sinceastructureisaone-over-manyof sorts,itissomethinglikeauniversal.Structural- istshavedefendedanaloguesofsomeofthetra- ditionalpositionsonuniversals,suchasrealism andnominalism.Seealsomathematical INDUCTION,PEANOPOSTULATES,PHILOSOPHY OFMATHEMATICS.S.Sha. mathematics,philosophyof.Seephilosophyof MATHEMATICS. matrixmechanics.Seequantummechanics. matter.Seemetaphysics. matter,prime.Seehylomorphism. matter,principleoftheconservationof.Seephi- losophyOFSCIENCE. maxim.Seekant. maximalconsistentset,informållogic,anysetof sentencesSthatisconsistent-i.e.,nocontradic- tionisprovablefromS—andmaximallyso-i.e., ifTisconsistentandSCT,thenS=T.Itcanbe shownthatifSismaximallyconsistentandsisa sentenceinthesamelanguage,theneitheraor ~o"(thenegationofo)isinS.Thus,amaximally consistentsetiscomplete:itsettleseveryques- tionthatcanberaisedinthelanguage.Seealso COMPLETENESS,SETTHEORY.P.Mad. maximalproposition.SeeToncs. maximinstrategy,astrategythatmaximizesan agenfsminimumgain,orequivalently,mini- mizeshismaximumloss.Writerswhoworkin termsoflossthuscallsuchastrategyaminimax strategy.Theterm'securitystrategy',which avoidspotentialconfusions,isnowwidelyused. Foreachaction,itssecuritylevelisitspayoff undertheworst-casescenario.Asecuritystrat- egyisonewithmaximalsecuritylevel. Anagenfssecuritystrategymaximizeshis expectedutilityifandonlyif(1)heiscertainthat "nature"hashisworstinterestsatheartand(2) heiscertainthatnaturewillbecertainofhis strategywhenchoosinghers.Thefirstcondition issatisfiedinthecaseofatwo-personzero-sum gamewherethepayoffstructureiscommonly known.Inthissituation,"nature"istheother player,andhergainisequaltothefirstplayer's loss.Obviously,theseconditionsdonotholdfor alldecisionproblems. Seealsodecisiontheory,gametheory. B.Sk. Maxwell,JamesClerk(1831-79),Scottishphysi- cistwhomadepioneeringcontributionstothe theoryofelectromagnetism,thekinetictheoryof gases,andthetheoryofcolorvision.Hisworkon electromagnetismissummarizedinhisTreatiseon ElectricityandMagnetism(1873).In1871he 543 maya Mead,GeorgeHerbert becameCambridgeUniversity'sfirstprofessorof experimentalphysicsandfoundedtheCaven- dishLaboratory,whichhedirecteduntilhis death. Maxwelfsmostimportantachievementswere hisfieldtheoryofelectromagnetismandthedis- coveryoftheequationsthatbearhisname.The fieldtheoryunifiedthelawsofelectricityand magnetism,identifiedlightasatransversevibra- tionoftheelectromagneticether,andpredicted theexistenceofradiowaves.Thefactthat MaxwelfsequationsareLorentz-invariantand containthespeedoflightasaconstantplayeda majorroleinthegenesisofthespecialtheoryof relativity.Hearrivedathistheorybysearching fora"consistentrepresentation"oftheether,i.e., amodelofitsinnerworkingsconsistentwiththe lawsofmechanics.Hissearchforaconsistent representationwasunsuccessful,buthispapers usedmechanicalmodelsandanalogiestoguide histhinking.LikeBoltzmann,Maxwelladvo- catedtheheuristicvalueofmodelbuilding. Maxwellwasalsoapioneerinstatistical physics.Hisderivationofthelawsgoverningthe macroscopicbehaviorofgasesfromassumptions abouttherandomcollisionsofgasmoleculesled directlytoBoltzmann'stransportequationand thestatisticalanalysisofirreversibility.Toshow thatthesecondlawofthermodynamicsisprob- abilistic,Maxwellimagineda"neat-fingered" demonwhocouldcausetheentropyofagasto decreasebyseparatingthefaster-movinggas moleculesfromtheslower-movingones. Seealsophilosophyofscience,relativ- ity.M.C. mäyä,atermwithvarioususesinIndian thought;itexpressestheconceptofBrahman's powertoact.OnetypeofBrahmanicactionisthe assumingofmaterialformswhoseappearance canbechangedatwill.Demonsaswellasgods aresaidtohavemäyä,understoodaspowertodo thingsnotwithinastandardhumanrepertoire. AdeepersensereferstotheideathatBrahman hasandexercisesthepowertosustaineverlast- inglytheentireworldofconsciousandnon-con- sciousthings. Monotheisticallyconceived,mäyäisthepower ofanomnipotentandomniscientdeitytopro- ducetheworldofdependentthings.Thispower typicallyisconceivedasfeminine(Sakti)and variousrepresentationsofthedeityarecon- ceivedasmalewithfemaleconsorts,aswith VishnuandSiva.WithoutSakti,Brahmanwould bemasculineandpassiveandnocreatedworld wouldexist.Byassociation,mäyäistheproduct ofcreatedactivity.Thecreatedworldiscon- ceivedasdependent,bothamanifestationof divinepowerandaveilbetweenBrahmanand thedevotee.Monisticallyconceived,mäyä expressesthenotionthatthereonlyseemstobe aworldcomposedofdistinctconsciousandnon- consciousthings,andratherthanthisseeming multiplicitythereexistsonlyineffableBrahman. Brahmanisconceivedassomehowproducing theillusionoftherebeingapluralityofpersons andobjects,andenlightenment(moksha)iscon- ceivedasseeingthroughtheillusion.Monothe- ists,whoaskwho,onthemonisticview,hasthe qualitiesrequisitetoproduceillusionandhow anillusioncanseethroughitself,regardenlight- enment(moksha)asamatterofdevotiontothe Brahmanwhomthecreateduniversepartially manifests,butalsoveils,whosenatureisalso revealedinreligiousexperience. Seealsobrahman.K.E.Y. Mead,GeorgeHerbert(1863-1931),American philosopher,socialtheorist,andsocialreformer. HewasamemberoftheChicagoschoolofprag- matism,whichincludedfiguressuchasJames HaydenTuftsandJohnDewey.Whitehead agreedwithDewey'sassessmentofMead:"a seminalmindoftheveryfirstorder."Meadwas raisedinahouseholdwithdeeprootsinNew Englandpuritanism,butheeventuallybecamea confirmednaturalist,convincedthatmodernsci- encecouldmaketheprocessesofnatureintelli- gible.Onhispathtonaturalismhestudiedwith theidealistJosiahRoyceatHarvard.TheGerman idealisttraditionofFichte,Schelling,andHegel (whowereportrayedbyMeadasRomantic philosophersinMovementsofThoughtintheNine- teenthCentnry)hadalastinginfluenceonhis thought,eventhoughhebecameaconfirmed empiricist. Meadisconsideredtheprogenitorofthe schoolofsymbolicinteractioninsociology,and isbestknownforhisexplanationofthegenesis ofthemindandtheselfintermsoflanguage developmentandroleplaying.Aclosefriendof JaneAddams(1860-1935),heviewedhistheo- reticalworkinthisareaaslendingweighttohis progressivepoliticalconvictions.Meadisoften referredtoasasocialbehaviorist.Heemployedthe categoriesofstimulusandresponseinorderto explainbehavior,butcontrabehavioristssuchas JohnB.Watson,Meaddidnotdismissconduct thatwasnotobservedbyothers.Heexamined thenatureofself-consciousness,whosedevelop- mentisdepictedinMind,Self,andSociety,fromthe StandpointofaSocialBehaviorist.Healsoaddressed 544 mean,doctrineofthe meaning behaviorintermsofthephasesofanorganism's adjustmenttoitsenvironmentinThePhilosophy oftheAct. Hisreputationasatheoristofthesocialdevel- opmentoftheselfhastendedtoeclipsehisorig- inalworkinotherareasofconcerntophiloso- phers,e.g.,ethics,epistemology,metaphysics, andthephilosophyofscience.Influencedby Darwin,Meadsoughttounderstandnature,as wellassocialrelationships,intermsofthe processofemergence.Heemphasizedthatqual- itativelynewformsoflifearisethroughnatural andintelligibleprocesses.Whennovelevents occurthepastistransformed,forthepasthas nowgivenrisetothequalitativelynew,andit mustbeseenfromadifferentperspective. Betweenthearrivaloftheneworder-which thenoveleventinstigates-andtheoldorder, thereisaphaseofreadjustment,astagethat Meaddescribesasoneofsociality.Mead'sviews ontheseandrelatedmattersarediscussedinThe PhilosophyofthePresent.Meadneverpublisheda book-lengthworkinphilosophy.Hisunpub- lishedmanuscriptsandstudents'noteswere editedandpublishedasthebookscitedabove. Seealsophilosophyofthesocialsci- ENCES,PRAGMATISM.M.Ab. mean,doctrineofthe.Seearistotle,chung-yung. meaning,theconventional,common,orstan- dardsenseofanexpression,construction,orsen- tenceinagivenlanguage,orofanon-linguistic signalorsymbol.Literalmeaningisthenon-figu- rative,strictmeaninganexpressionorsentence hasinalanguagebyvirtueofthedictionary meaningofitswordsandtheimportofitssyn- tacticconstructions.Synonymyissamenessoflit- eralmeaning:'prestidigitator'means'expertat sleightofhand'.Itissaidthatmeaningiswhata goodtranslationpreserves,andthismayormay notbeliteral:inFrench'Oiisontlesneigesd'an- tan?'literallymeans'Wherearethesnowsof yesteryear?'andfigurativelymeans'nothing lasts'.Signal-typesandsymbolshavenon-lin- guisticconventionalmeaning:thewhiteflag meanstruce;thelionmeansSt.Mark. Inanothersense,meaningiswhataperson intendstocommunicatebyaparticularutter- ance-utterer'smeaning,asGricecalledit,or speaker'smeaning,inStephenSchiffer'sterm.A speaker'smeaningmayormaynotcoincidewith theliteralmeaningofwhatisuttered,anditmay benon-linguistic.Non-literal:insaying"wewill soonbeinourtropicalparadise,"Janemeant thattheywouldsoonbeinAntarctica.Literal:in saying"thafsdeciduous,"shemeantthatthe treelösesitsleaveseveryyear.Non-linguistic:by shrugging,shemeantthatsheagreed. Theliteralmeaningofasentencetypically doesnotdetermineexactlywhataspeakersays inmakingaliteralutterance:themeaningof'she ispraisingme'leavesopenwhatJohnsaysin utteringit,e.g.thatJanepraisesJohnat12:00 p.m.,Dec.21,1991.Anotuncommon-butthe- oreticallyloaded-wayofaccommodatingthisis tocountthecontext-specificthingsthatspeakers sayaspropositions,entitiesthatcanbeexpressed indifferentlanguagesandthatare(oncertain theories)thecontentofwhatissaid,believed, desired,andsoon.Onthatassumption,asen- tence^literalmeaningisacontext-independent rule,orfunction,thatdeterminesacertain proposition(thecontentofwhatthespeaker says)giventhecontextofutterance.David Kaplanhascalledsucharuleorfunctionasen- tence^"character." Asentence'sliteralmeaningalsoincludesits potentialforperformingcertainillocutionaryacts, inJ.L.Austin'sterm.Themeaningofanimper- ativesentencedetermineswhatorders,requests, andthelikecanliterallybeexpressed:'sitdown there'canbeutteredliterallybyJanetorequest (ororderorurge)Johntositdownat11:59a.m. onacertainbenchinSantaMonica.Thusasen- tence^literalmeaninginvolvesbothitscharac- terandaconstraintonillocutionaryacts:itmaps contextsontoillocutionaryactsthathave(some- thinglike)determinatepropositionalcontents.A contextincludestheidentityofspeaker,hearer, timeofutterance,andalsoaspectsofthe speaker'sintentions. Inethicsthedistinctionhasflourishedbe- tweentheexpressiveoremotivemeaningofaword orsentenceanditscognitivemeaning.Theemotive meaningofanutteranceoratermistheattitude itexpresses,thepejorativemeaningof'chiseler', say.Anemotivistinethics,e.g.C.L.Stevenson (1908-79),holdsthattheliteralmeaningof'itis good'isidenticalwithitsemotivemeaning,the positiveattitudeitexpresses.OnHare'stheory, theliteralmeaningof'ought'isitsprescriptive meaning,theimperativeforceitgivestocertain sentencesthatcontainit.Such"noncognitivist" theoriescanallowthatatermlike'good'alsohas non-literaldescriptivemeaning,implyingnon- evaluativepropertiesofanobject.Bycontrast, cognitiviststaketheliteralmeaningofanethical termtobeitscognitivemeaning:'good'ståndsfor anobjectiveproperty,andinasserting"itis good"oneliterallyexpresses,notanattitude,but atrueorfalsejudgment. 545 meaning meaning 'Cognitivemeaning'servesaswellasany othertermtocapturewhathasbeencentralin thetheoryofmeaningbeyondethics,the"fac- tual"elementinmeaningthatremainswhenwe abstractfromitsillocutionaryandemotive aspects.Itiswhatissharedby'therewillbean eclipsetomorrow'and'willtherebeaneclipse tomorrow?'.Thiscommonelementisoften identifiedwithaproposition(ora"character"), but,onceagain,thatistheoreticallyloaded. Althoughcognitivemeaninghasbeenthepre- occupationofthetheoryofmeaninginthetwen- tiethcentury,itisdifficulttodefinepreciselyin non-theoreticalterms.Supposewesaythatthe cognitivemeaningofasentenceis'thataspectof itsmeaningwhichiscapableofbeingtrueor false':therearenon-truth-conditionaltheories ofmeaning(seebelow)onwhichthiswouldnot capturetheessentials.Supposewesayitis'what iscapableofbeingasserted':anemotivistmight allowthatonecanassertthatathingisgood.Still manyphilosophershavetakenforgrantedthat theyknowcognitivemeaning(underthatname ornot)wellenoughtotheorizeaboutwhatit consistsin,anditisthefocusofwhatfollows. Theoldesttheoriesofmeaninginmodernphi- losophyaretheseventeenth-to-nineteenth-cen- turyideatheory(alsocalledtheideationaltheory) andimagetheoryofmeaning,accordingtowhich themeaningofwordsinpubliclanguagederives fromtheideasormentalimagesthatwordsare usedtoexpress.Asforwhatconstitutestherep- resentationalpropertiesofideas,Descartesheld ittobeabasicpropertyofthemind,inexplica- ble,andLockeamatterofresemblance(insome sense)betweenideasandthings.Contemporary analyticphilosophyspeaksmoreofpropositional attitudes-thoughts,beliefs,intentions-thanof ideasandimages;anditspeaksofthecontentsof suchattitudes:ifJanebelievesthatthereare lionsinAfrica,thatbeliefhasasitscontentthat therearelionsinAfrica.Virtuallyallphiloso- phersagreethatpropositionalattitudeshave somecrucialconnectionwithmeaning. Afundamentalelementofatheoryofmean- ingiswhereitlocatesthebasisofmeaning,in thought,inindividualspeech,orinsocialprac- tices.(i)Meaningmaybeheldtoderiveentirely fromthecontentofthoughtsorpropositional attitudes,thatmentalcontentitselfbeingconsti- tutedindependentlyofpubliclinguisticmean- ing.('Constitutedindependentlyofdoesnot imply'unshapedby'.)(ii)Itmaybeheldthatthe contentsofbeliefsandcommunicativeinten- tionsthemselvesderiveinpartfromthemean- ingofovertspeech,orevenfromsocialpractices. Thenmeaningwouldbejointlyconstitutedby bothindividualpsychologicalandsociallinguis- ticfacts. Theoriesofthefirstsortincludethoseinthe styleofGrice,accordingtowhichsentences' meaningsaredeterminedbypracticesorimplicit conventionsthatgovernwhatspeakersmean whentheyusetherelevantwordsandconstruc- tions.Aspeaker'smeaningisexplainedinterms ofcertainpropositionalattitudes,namelythe speaker'sintentionstoproducecertaineffectsin hearers.Tomeanthatitisrainingistoutterorto dosomething(notnecessarilylinguistic)with theintention(veryroughly)ofgettingone's hearertobelievethatitisraining.Theoriesof speaker'smeaninghavebeenelaboratedby GriceandbySchiffer.DavidLewishasproposed thatlinguisticmeaningisconstitutedbyimplicit conventionsthatsystematicallyassociatesen- tenceswithspeakers'beliefsratherthanwith communicativeintentions. Thecontentsofthoughtmightbeheldtobe constitutiveoflinguisticmeaningindependently ofcommunication.Russell,andWittgensteinin hisearlywritings,wroteaboutmeaningasifthe keythingisthepropositionalcontentofthe belieforthoughtthatasentence(somehow) expresses;theyapparentlyregardedthisashold- ingonanindividualbasisandnotessentiallyas derivingfromcommunicationintentionsor socialpractices.AndChomskyspeaksofthe pointoflanguageasbeing"thefreeexpressionof thought."Suchviewssuggestthat'linguistic meaning'mayståndfortwoproperties,one involvingcommunicationintentionsandprac- tices,theothermoreintimatelyrelatedtothink- ingandconceiving. Bycontrast,thecontentofpropositionalatti- tudesandthemeaningofovertspeechmightbe regardedascoordinatefactsneitherofwhichcan obtainindependently:tointerpretotherpeople onemustassignbothcontenttotheir beliefs/intentionsandmeaningtotheirutter- ances.ThisisexplicitinDavidson'struth-condi- tionaltheory(seebelow);perhapsitispresent alsointhepost-Wittgensteiniannotionofmean- ingasassertabilityconditions-e.g.,inthewrit- ingsofDummett. Onstillotheraccounts,linguisticmeaningis essentiallysocial.Wittgensteinisinterpretedby Kripkeasholdinginhislåterwritingsthatsocial rulesareessentialtomeaning,onthegrounds thattheyaloneexplainthenormativeaspectof meaning,explainthefactthatanexpression's meaningdeterminesthatsomeusesarecorrect orothersincorrect.Anotherwayinwhich 546 meaning meaning meaningmaybeessentiallysocialisPutnam's "divisionoflinguisticlabor":themeaningsof someterms,sayinbotanyorcabinetmaking,are setfortherestofusbyspecialists.Thepoint mightextendtoquitenon-technicalwords,like 'red':aperson'suseofitmaybesociallydefer- ential,inthattherulewhichdetermineswhat 'red'meansinhismouthisdetermined,notby hisindividualusage,butbytheusageofsome socialgrouptowhichhesemanticallydefers. ThishasbeenarguedbyTylerBurgetoimplythat thecontentsofthoughtsthemselvesareinparta matterofsocialfacts. LetussupposethereisalanguageLthatcon- tainsnoindexicalterms,suchas'now',T,or demonstrativepronouns,butcontainsonly propernames,commonnouns,adjectives,verbs, adverbs,logicalwords.(Nonaturallanguageis likethis;butthesuppositionsimplifieswhatfol- lows.)Theoriesofmeaningdifferconsiderablyin howtheywouldspecifythemeaningofasen- tenceSofL.Herearethemaincontenders.(i) SpecifyS'struthconditions:Sistrueifandonlyif someswansareblack,(ii)Specifytheproposition thatSexpresses:Smeans(theproposition)that someswansareblack,(iii)SpecifyS'sassertabil- ityconditions:Sisassertableifandonlyifblack- swan-sightingsoccurorblack-swan-reports comein,etc.(iv)TranslateSintothatsentence ofourlanguagewhichhasthesameuseasSor thesameconceptualrole. Certaintheories,especiallythosethatspecify meaningsinways(i)and(ii),takethecomposi- tionalityofmeaningasbasic.Hereisanelementary fact:asentence'smeaningisafunctionofthe meaningsofitscomponentwordsandconstruc- tions,andasaresultwecanutterandunder- standnewsentences-oldwordsandconstruc- tions,newsentences.Frege'stheoryofBedeutung orreference,especiallyhisuseofthenotionsof functionandobject,isaboutcompositionality.In theTractatus,Wittgensteinexplainscomposition- alityinhispicturetheoryofmeaningandtheory oftruth-functions.AccordingtoWittgenstein,a sentenceorpropositionisapictureofa(possi- ble)stateofaffairs;termscorrespondtonon-lin- guisticelements,andthoseterms'arrangements insentenceshavethesameformasarrange- mentsofelementsinthestatesofaffairsthesen- tencesståndfor. Theleadingtruth-conditionaltheoryofmeaning istheoneadvocatedbyDavidson,drawingon theworkofTarski.Tarskishowedthat,forcer- tainformalizedlanguages,wecanconstructa finitesetofrulesthatentails,foreachsentenceS oftheinfinitelymanysentencesofsuchalan- guage,somethingoftheform'Sistrueifand onlyif...'.Thosefinitelystatablerules,which takentogetheraresometimescalledatruththe- oryofthelanguage,mightentail'"(x)(Rx^Bx)" istrueifandonlyifeveryrävenisblack'.They woulddothisbyhavingseparatelyassigned interpretationsto'R','B','—>',and'(x)'.Truth conditionsarecompositionallydeterminedin analogouswaysforsentences,howevercom- plex. DavidsonproposesthatTarski'sdeviceis applicabletonaturallanguagesandthatit explains,moreover,whatmeaningis,giventhe followingsetting.Interpretationinvolvesaprin- cipleofcharity:interpretingapersonNmeans makingthebestpossiblesenseofN,andthis meansassigningmeaningssoastomaximizethe overalltruthofN'sutterances.Asystematic interpretationofN'slanguagecanbetakentobe aTarski-styletruththeorythat(roughly)maxi- mizesthetruthofN'sutterances.Ifsuchatruth theoryimpliesthatasentenceSistrueinN'slan- guageifandonlyifsomeswansareblack,then thattellsusthemeaningofSinN'slanguage. Apropositionaltheoryofmeaningwouldaccom- modatecompositionalitythus:afinitesetof rules,whichgovernthetermsandconstructions ofL,assigns(derivatively)aproposition(putting asideambiguity)toeachsentenceSofLbyvirtue ofS'stermsandconstructions.IfLcontains indexicals,thensuchrulesassigntoeachsen- tencenotafullyspecificpropositionbuta'char- acter'intheabovesense.Propositionsmaybe conceivedintwoways:(a)assetsofpossiblecir- cumstancesor"worlds"-then'Hesperusishot' inEnglishisassignedthesetofpossibleworldsin whichHesperusishot;and(b)asstructured combinationsofelements-then'Hesperusis hot'isassignedacertainorderedpairofelements .TherearetwotheoriesaboutMl andM2.Theymaybethesensesof'Hesperus'and '(is)hot',andthentheorderedpairisa "Fregean"proposition.Theymaybethereferences of'Hesperus'and'(is)hot',andthentheordered pairisa"Russellian"proposition.Thisdifference reflectsafundamentaldisputeintwentieth-cen- turyphilosophyoflanguage. Theconnotationorsenseofatermisits"mode ofpresentation,"thewayitpresentsitsdenotation orreference.Termswiththesamereferenceor denotationmaypresenttheirreferencesdiffer- entlyandsodifferinsenseorconnotation.This isunproblematicforcomplextermslike'thecap- italofItaly'and'thecityontheTiber',which refertoRomeviadifferentconnotations.Con- troversyarisesöversimpleterms,suchasproper 547 meaning meaning namesandcommonnouns.Fregedistinguished senseandreferenceforallexpressions;the propernames'Phosphorus'and'Hesperus' expressdescriptivesensesaccordingtohowwe understandthem-[thatbrightstarlikeobject visiblebeforedawnintheeasternsky...],[that brightstarlikeobjectvisibleaftersunsetinthe westernsky...];andtheyrefertoVenusby virtueofthosesenses.Russellheldthatordinary propernames,suchas'Romulus',abbreviate definitedescriptions,andinthisrespecthisview resemblesFrege's.ButRussellalsoheldthat,for thosesimpleterms(not'Romulus')intowhich statementsareanalyzable,senseandreference arenotdistinct,andmeaningsare"Russellian" propositions.(ButRussell'sviewoftheircon- stituentsdiffersfrompresent-dayviews.) Kripkerejectedthe"Frege-Russell"viewof ordinarypropernames,arguingthattherefer- enceofapropernameisdetermined,notbya descriptivecondition,buttypicallybyacausal chainthatlinksnameandreference-inthecase of'Hesperus'apartiallyperceptualrelationper- haps,inthecaseof'Aristotle'acausal-historical relation.Apropernameisratherarigiddesigna- tor:anysentenceoftheform'Aristotleis...' expressesapropositionthatistrueinagiven possibleworld(orsetofcircumstances)ifand onlyifour(actual)Aristotlesatisfies,inthat world,thecondition'...'.The"Frege-Russell" viewbycontrastincorporatesintheproposition, nottheactualreferent,butadescriptivecondi- tionconnotatedby'Aristotle'(theauthorofthe Metaphysics,orthelike),sothatthename'srefer- encediffersindifferentworldsevenwhenthe descriptiveconnotationisconstant.(Someone elsecouldhavewrittentheMetaphysics.) Somerecentphilosophershavetakentherigid designatorviewtomotivatethestarkthesisthat meaningsareRussellianpropositions(orcharac- tersthatmapcontextsontosuchpropositions): intheaboveproposition/meaning, Mlissimplythereferent-theplanetVenus- itself.Thiswouldbeareferentialtheoryofmeaning, onethatequatesmeaningwithreference.But wemustemphasizethattherigiddesignator viewdoesnotdirectlyentailareferentialtheory ofmeaning. Whataboutthemeaningsofpredicates?What sortofentityisM2above?PutnamandKripke alsoargueananti-descriptivepointaboutnatural kindterms,predicateslike'(is)gold','(isa)tiger', '(is)hot'.Thesearenotequivalenttodescrip- tions-'gold'doesnotmean'metalthatisyellow, malleable,etc'-butarerigiddesignatorsof underlyingnaturalkindswhoseidentitiesare discoveredbyscience.Onareferentialtheoryof meaningsasRussellianpropositions,themean- ingof'gold'isthenanaturalkind.(Acomplica- tionarises:thepropertyorkindthat'widow' ståndsforseemsagoodcandidateforbeingthe senseorconnotationof'widow',forwhatone understandsbyit.ThedistinctionbetweenRus- sellianandFregeanpropositionsisnotthenfirm ateverypoint.) Onthestandardsense-theoryofmeaningsas Fregeanpropositions,MlandM2arepure descriptivesenses.Butacertain"neo-Fregean" view,suggestedbutnotheldbyGarethEvans, wouldcountMlandM2asobjed-dependent senses.Forexample,'Hesperus'and'Phosphorus' wouldrigidlydesignatethesameobjectbuthave distinctsensesthatcannotbespecifiedwithout mentionofthatobject.Notethat,ifproper namesornaturalkindtermshavemeaningsof eithersort,theirmeaningsvaryfromspeakerto speaker. Apropositionalaccountofmeaning(orthe correspondingaccountof"character")maybe partofabroadertheoryofmeaning;forexam- ple:(a)aGrice-typetheoryinvolvingimplicit conventions;(b)atheorythatmeaningderives fromanintimateconnectionoflanguageand thought;(c)atheorythatinvokesaprincipleof charityorthelikeininterpretinganindividual's speech;(d)asocialtheoryonwhichmeaning cannotderiveentirelyfromtheindependently constitutedcontentsofindividuals'thoughtsor uses. Acentraltraditionintwentieth-centurythe- oryofmeaningidentifiesmeaningwithfactors otherthanpropositions(intheforegoingsenses) andtruth-conditions.Themeaningofasentence iswhatoneunderstandsbyit;andunderstand- ingasentenceisknowinghowtouseit-know- inghowtoverifyitandwhentoassertit,orbeing abletothinkwithitandtouseitininferences andpracticalreasoning.Therearecompeting theorieshere. Inthe1930s,proponentsoflogicalpositivism heldaverificationtheoryofmeaning,wherebya sentence'sorstatemenfsmeaningconsistsinthe conditionsunderwhichitcanbeverified,certi- fiedasacceptable.Thiswasmotivatedbythepos- itivists'empiricismtogetherwiththeirviewof truthasametaphysicalornon-empiricalnotion. Adescendantofverificationismisthethesis, influencedbythelåterWittgenstein,thatthe meaningofasentenceconsistsinitsassertability conditions,thecircumstancesunderwhichoneis justifiedinassertingthesentence.Ifjustification andtruthcandiverge,astheyappearto,thena 548 meaning meaning sentence'sassertabilityconditionscanbedistinct from(whatnon-verificationistsseeas)itstruth conditions.Dummetthasarguedthatassertabil- ityconditionsarethebasisofmeaningandthat truth-conditionalsemanticsrestsonamistake (andhencealsopropositionalsemanticsinsense [a]above).Aproblemwithassertabilitytheories isthat,asisgenerallyacknowledged,composi- tionaltheoriesoftheassertabilityconditionsof sentencesarenoteasilyconstructed. Aconceptualroletheoryofmeaning(alsocalled conceptualrolesemantics)typicallypresupposes thatwethinkinalanguageofthought(anidea championedbyFödor),asystemofinternal statesstructuredlikealanguagethatmayormay notbecloselyrelatedtoone'snaturallanguage. Theconceptualroleofatermisamatterofhow thoughtsthatcontainthetermaredisposition- allyrelatedtootherthoughts,tosensorystates, andtobehavior.HartryFieldhaspointedout thatourFregeanintuitionsabout'Hesperus'and 'Phosphorus'areexplainedbythoseterms'hav- ingdistinctconceptualroles,withoutappealto Fregeandescriptivesensesorthelike,andthat thisiscompatiblewiththoseterms'rigidlydesig- natingthesameobject.Thiscombinationcanbe articulatedintwoways.GilbertHarmanpro- posesthatmeaningis"wide"conceptualrole,so thatconceptualroleincorporatesnotjustinfer- entialfactors,etc,butalsoKripke-Putnam externalreferencerelations.Buttherearealso two-factortheoriesofmeaning,asproposedby Fieldamongothers,whichrecognizetwostrata ofmeaning,onecorrespondingtohowaperson understandsaterm-itsnarrowconceptualrole, theotherinvolvingreferences,Russellianpropo- sitions,ortruth-conditions. Asthelanguage-of-thoughtviewindicates, someconcernsaboutmeaninghavebeentaken överbytheoriesofthecontentofthoughtsor propositionalattitudes.Adistinctionisoften madebetweenthenarrowcontentofathought anditswidecontent.Ifpsychologicalexplanation invokesonly"whatisinthehead,"andif thoughtcontentsareessentialtopsychological explanation,theremustbenarrowcontent. Theorieshaveappealedtothe"syntax"orcon- ceptualrolesor"characters"ofinternalsen- tences,aswellastoimagesandstereotypes.A thoughfswidecontentmaythenberegarded(as motivatedbytheKripke-Putnamarguments)as aRussellianproposition.Thenaturalisticrefer- ence-relationsthatdeterminetheelementsof suchpropositionsarethefocusofcausal,"infor- mational"and"teleological"theoriesbyFödor, Dretske,andRuthMillikan. Assertabilitytheoriesandconceptualrolethe- orieshavebeencalledusetheoriesofmeaningina broadsensethatmarksacontrastwithtruth- conditionaltheories.Onausetheoryinthis broadsense,understandingmeaningconsistsin knowinghowtouseatermorsentence,orbeing disposedtouseatermorsentenceinresponseto certainexternalorconceptualfactors.But'use theory'alsoreferstothedoctrineofthelåter writingsofWittgenstein,bywhomtheoriesof meaningthatabstractfromtheverylargevari- etyofinterpersonalusesoflanguagearedeclared aphilosopher'smistake.Themeaningsofterms andsentencesareamatterofthelanguagegames inwhichtheyplayroles;thesearetoovariousto haveacommonstructurethatcanbecapturedin aphilosopher'stheoryofmeaning. Conceptualroletheoriestendtowardmeaning holism,thethesisthataterm'smeaningcannot beabstractedfromtheentiretyofitsconceptual connections.Onaholisticviewanybeliefor inferentialconnectioninvolvingatermisas muchacandidatefordeterminingitsmeaningas anyother.Thiscouldbeavoidedbyaffirmingthe analytic-syntheticdistinction,accordingto whichsomeofaterm'sconceptualconnections areconstitutiveofitsmeaningandothersonly incidental.('Bachelorsareunmarried'versus 'Bachelorshaveataxadvantage'.)Butmany philosophersfollowQuineinhisskepticism aboutthatdistinction.Theimplicationsofholism aredrastic,foritstrictlyimpliesthatdifferent people'swordscannotmeanthesame.Inthe philosophyofscience,meaningholismhasbeen heldtoimplytheincommensurabilityoftheo- ries,accordingtowhichascientifictheorythat replacesanearliertheorycannotbeheldtocon- tradictitandhencenottocorrectortoimprove onit-forthetwotheories'apparentlycommon termswouldbeequivocal.Remediesmight include,again,maintainingsomesortofana- lytic-syntheticdistinctionforscientificterms,or holdingthatconceptualroletheoriesandhence holismitself,asFieldproposes,holdonlyintra- personally,whiletakinginterpersonalandinter- theoreticmeaningcomparisonstobereferential andtruth-conditional.Eventhis,however,leads todifficultquestionsabouttheinterpretationof scientifictheories.Aradicalposition,associated withQuine,identifiesthemeaningofatheoryas awholewithitsempiricalmeaning,thatis,theset ofactualandpossiblesensoryorperceptualsitu- ationsthatwouldcountasverifyingthetheory asawhole.Thiscanbeseenasasuccessortothe verificationisttheory,withtheoryreplacing statementorsentence.Articulationsofmeaning 549 meaning,conceptualroletheoryof mechanisticexplanation internaltoatheorywouldthenbespurious,as wouldvirtuallyallordinaryintuitionsabout meaning.ThisfitswellQuine'sskepticismabout meaning,histhesisoftheindeterminacyoftrans- lation,accordingtowhichnoobjectivefactsdis- tinguishafavoredtranslationofanotherlan- guageintooursfromeveryapparentlyincorrect translation.Manyconstructivetheoriesofmean- ingmaybeseenasrepliestothisandotherskep- ticismsabouttheobjectivestatusofsemantic facts. Seealsoformålsemantics,philosophy OFLANGUAGE,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,SEMAN- TICHOLISM,SPEECHACTTHEORY,VERIFICA- TIONISM.B.L. meaning,conceptualroletheoryof.Seemeaning. meaning,descriptive.Seeemotivism,meaning. meaning,dispositionaltheoryof.Seemeaning. meaning,emotive.Seeemotivism,meaning. meaning,focal.Seearistotle. meaning,ideatheoryof.Seemeaning. meaning,ideationaltheoryof.Seephilosophyof LANGUAGE. meaning,imagetheoryof.Seemeaning. meaning,picturetheoryof.Seemeaning,wittgen- stein. meaning,referentialtheoryof.Seemeaning,phi- losophyOFLANGUAGE. meaning,speaker's.Seemeaning. meaning,truth-conditionaltheoryof.Seemeaning. meaning,usetheoryof.Seemeaning,philosophy OFLANGUAGE. meaning,verifiabilitytheoryof.Seemeaning,phi- losophyOFLANGUAGE,VERIFICATIONISM. meaningholism.Seeholism. meaningpostulate,asentencethatspecifiespart orallofthemeaningofapredicate.Meaning postulateswouldthusincludeexplicit,contex- tual,andrecursivedefinitions,reductionsen- tencesfordispositionalpredicates,and,more generally,anysentencesstatinghowtheexten- sionsofpredicatesareinterrelatedbyvirtueof themeaningsofthosepredicates.Forexample, anyreductionsentenceoftheform(x)(xhas§ Z>(xismalleable=xhas\|/))couldbeameaning postulateforthepredicate'ismalleable'.The notionofameaningpostulatewasintroducedby Carnap,whoseoriginalintereststemmedfroma desiretoexplicatesentencesthatareanalytic ("truebyvirtueofmeaning")butnotlogically true.WhereTisasetofsuchpostulates,one couldsaythatAisanalyticwithrespecttoTif andonlyifAisalogicalconsequenceofT.On thisaccount,e.g.,thesentence'Jakeisnotamar- riedbachelor'isanalyticwithrespectto{'All bachelorsareunmarried'}.Seealsoanalytic- SYNTHETICDISTINCTION,MEANING,REDUC- TIONSENTENCE.G.F.S. measurement.Seemagnitude. measurement,theoryof.Seemagnitude. mechanicaljurisprudence.Seejurisprudence. mechanism,logical.Seecomputertheory. mechanisticexplanation,akindofexplanation countenancedbyviewsthatrangefromthe extremepositionthatallnaturalphenomenacan beexplainedentirelyintermsofmassesin motionofthesortpostulatedinNewtonian mechanics,tolittlemorethanacommitmentto naturalisticexplanations.Mechanisminits extremeformisclearlyfalsebecausenumerous physicalphenomenaofthemostordinarysort cannotbeexplainedentirelyintermsofmasses inmotion.Mechanicsisonlyonesmallpartof physics.Historically,explanationsweredesig- natedasmechanistictoindicatethatthey includednoreferencetofinalcausesorvital forces.Inthisweaksense,allpresent-dayscien- tificexplanationsaremechanistic.Theadequacy ofmechanisticexplanationisusuallyraisedin connectionwithlivingcreatures,especially thosecapableofdeliberateaction.Forexample, chromosomesliningupoppositetheirpartners inpreparationformeiosislookslikeanythingbut apurelymechanicalprocess,andyetthemore wediscoverabouttheprocess,themoremecha- nisticitturnsouttobe.Themechanismsrespon- sibleformeiosisarosethroughvariationand selectionandcannotbetotallyunderstoodwith- outreferencetotheevolutionaryprocess,but meiosisasittakesplaceatanyonetimeappears tobeapurelymechanisticphysicochemical 550 mediateinference Meinong,Alexius process.Intentionalbehavioristhephenome- nonthatismostresistanttoexplanationentirely inphysicochemicalterms.Theproblemisnot thatwedonotknowenoughaboutthefunc- tioningofthecentralnervoussystembutthatno matterhowitturnsouttowork,wewillbedis- inclinedtoexplainhumanactionentirelyin termsofphysicochemicalprocesses.Thejustifi- cationforthisdisinclinationtendstoturnon whatwemeanwhenwedescribepeopleas behavingintentionally.Evenso,wemaysimply bemistakentoascribemoretohumanaction thancanbeexplainedintermsofpurely physicochemicalprocesses.Seealsobehavior- ISM,EXPLANATION,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND. D.L.H. mediateinference.Seeinference. medicalethics.Seeethics. Medina,Bartolomeo(1527-80),SpanishDo- minicantheologianwhotaughttheologyat AlcalåandthenatSalamanca.Hismajorworks arecommentariesonAquinas'sSummatheologica. Medinaisoftencalledthefatherofprobabilism butscholarsdisagreeonthelegitimacyofthis attribution.SupportforitiscontainedinMe- dina^commentaryonAquinas'sPrimasecundae (1577).Medinadeniesthatitissufficientforan opiniontobeprobablethatthereareapparent reasonsinitsfavörandthatitissupportedby manypeople.Forthenallerrorswouldbeprob- able.Rather,anopinionisprobableifitcanbe followedwithoutcensureandreproof,aswhen wisepersonsstateandsupportitwithexcellent reasons.Medinasuggeststheuseofthesecrite- riaindecisionsconcerningmoraldilemmas (Surnadecasosmorales["SummaofMoralQues- tions"],1580).P.Gar. Megarians,alsocalledMegarics,aloose-knit groupofGreekphilosophersactiveinthefourth andearlythirdcenturiesb.c,whoseworkin logicprofoundlyinfluencedthecourseofancient philosophy.Thenamederivesfromthatof Megara,thehometownofEuclid(diedc.365 b.c;unrelatedtothelåtermathematician),who wasanavidcompanionofSocratesandauthor of(löst)Socraticdialogues.Littleisrecorded abouthisviews,andhislegacyrestswithhis philosophicalheirs.Mostprominentofthesewas Eubulides,acontemporaryandcriticofAristotle; hedevisedahöstoflogicalparadoxes,including theliarandthesoritesorheapparadoxes.To manythisingenuityseemedsheereristic,alabel someappliedtohim.Oneofhisassociates,Alex- inus,wasaleadingcriticofZeno,thefounderof Stoicism,whoseargumentshetwittedinincisive parodies.Stilpo(c.380-c.300b.c),anativeof Megara,wasalsofamousfordisputationbutbest knownforhisapatheia(impassivity).Rivaling theCynicsasapreacherofself-reliance,heonce insisted,afterhiscityandhomewereplundered, thathelöstnothingofhisownsinceheretained hisknowledgeandvirtue.ZenotheStoicwas oneofmanyfollowersheattracted. MostbrilliantoftheMegarianswasDiodorus, nicknamedCronusor"OldFogey"(fl.300b.c), whohadanenormousimpactonStoicismand theskepticalAcademy.Amongthefirstexplorers ofpropositionallogic,heandhisassociateswere called"thedialecticians,"alabelthatreferrednot toanorganizedschoolorsetofdoctrinesbutsim- plytotheirhighlyoriginalformsofreasoning. Diodorusdefinedthepossiblenarrowlyaswhat eitherisorwillbetrue,andthenecessarybroadly aswhatistrueandwillnotbefalse.Againsthis associatePhilo,thefirstproponentofmaterial implication,hemaintainedthataconditionalistrue ifandonlyifitisneverthecasethatitsantecedent istrueanditsconsequentfalse.Hearguedthat matterisatomicandthattimeandmotionare likewisediscrete.Withanexhibitionisfsflair,he demonstratedthatmeaningisconventionalby naminghisservants"But"and"However."Most celebratedishisMaster(orRuling)Argument, whichturnsonthreepropositions:(1)Every truthaboutthepastisnecessary;(2)nothing impossiblefollowsfromsomethingpossible;and (3)somethingsarepossiblethatneitherarenor willbetrue.Hisaimwasapparentlytoestablish hisdefinitionofpossibilitybyshowingthatits negationin(3)isinconsistentwith(1)and(2), whichheregardedasobvious.VariousStoics, objectingtotheimplicationofdeterminismhere, soughttoupholdawiderformofpossibilityby overturning(1)or(2).Diodorus'sfamemade himatargetofsatirebyeminentpoets,anditis saidthatheexpiredfromshameafterfailingto solveonthespötapuzzleStilpoposedataparty. Seealsoacademy,aristotle,cynics, SOCRATES,SORITESPARADOX,STOICISM. S.A.W. Meinong,Alexius(1853-1920),Austrianphi- losopherandpsychologist,founderofGegen- standstheorie,thetheoryof(existentandnon- existentintended)objects.Hewasthetargetof Russell'scriticismsoftheideaofnon-existent objectsinhislandmarkessay"OnDenoting" (1905). 551 Meinong,Alexius Meinong,Alexius Meinong,aftereightyearsattheViennaGym- nasium,enrolledintheUniversityofViennain 1870,studyingGermanphilologyandhistory andcompletingadissertation(1874)onArnold vonBrescia.Afterthisperiodhebecameinter- estedinphilosophyasaresultofhiscriticalself- directedreadingofKant.Atthesuggestionofhis teacherFranzBrentano,heundertookasystem- aticinvestigationofHume'sempiricism,culmi- natinginhisfirstpublicationsinphilosophy,the Hume-StudienI,II(1878and1882).In1882, MeinongwasappointedProfessorExtraordinar- iusattheUniversityofGraz(receivingpromo- tiontoOrdinariusin1889),whereheremained untilhisdeath.AtGrazheestablishedthefirst laboratoryforexperimentalpsychologyinAus- tria,andwasoccupiedwithpsychologicalaswell asphilosophicalproblemsthroughouthiscareer. TheGrazschoolofphenomenologicalpsychol- ogyandphilosophicalsemantics,whichcentered onMeinongandhisstudents,madeimportant contributionstoobjecttheoryinphilosophical semantics,metaphysics,ontology,valuetheory, epistemology,theoryofevidence,possibilityand probability,andtheanalysisofemotion,imagi- nation,andabstraction. Meinong'sobjecttheoryisbasedonaversion ofBrentano'simmanentintentionalitythesis, thateverypsychologicalstatecontainsan intendedobjecttowardwhichthementalevent (or,inalesscommonterminology,amentalart) issemanticallydirected.Meinong,however, rejectsBrentano'searlyviewoftheimmanence oftheintentional,maintainingthatthoughtis directedtowardtranscendentmind-indepen- dentexistentornon-existentobjects.Meinong distinguishesbetweenjudgmentsaboutthe being(Sein)ofintendedobjectsofthought,and judgmentsabouttheir"so-being,"character,or nature(Sosein).Heclaimsthateverythoughtis intentionallydirectedtowardthetranscendent mind-independentobjectthethoughtpurports tobe"about,"whichentailsthatinatleastsome casescontingentlynon-existentandevenimpos- sibleobjects,forinstanceBerkeley'sgolden mountainandtheroundsquare,mustbe includedasnon-existentintendedobjectsinthe objecttheorysemanticdomain.Meinongfurther maintainsthatanintendedobjecfsSoseinisinde- pendentofitsSeinorontologicalstatus,of whetherornottheobjecthappenstoexist.This means,contrarytowhatmanyphilosophers havesupposed,thatnon-existentobjectscan trulypossesstheconstitutivepropertiespredi- catedoftheminthought. Meinong'sobjecttheoryevolvedöveraperiod ofyears,andunderwentmanyadditionsand revisions.Initsmatureform,thetheoryincludes thefollowingprinciples:(1)Thoughtcanfreely (eveniffalsely)assumetheexistenceofany describableobject(principleofunrestrictedfree assumption,orunbeschränktenAnnahmefreiheit thesis);(2)Everythoughtisintentionally directedtowardatranscendent,mind-indepen- dentintendedobject(modifiedintentionality thesis);(3)Everyintendedobjecthasanature, character,Sosein,"how-it-is,""so-being,"or "beingthus-and-so,"regardlessofitsontological status(independenceofSoseinfromSeinthesis); (4)Beingornon-beingisnotpartoftheSoseinof anyintendedobject,norofanobjectconsidered initself(indifferencethesis,ordoctrineofthe Ausserseinofthehomelesspureobject);(5)There aretwomodesofbeingorSeinforintendedob- jects:(a)spatiotemporalexistenceand(b)Pla- tonicsubsistence(Existenz/Bestandthesis);(6) Therearesomeintendedobjectsthatdonothave Seinatall,butneitherexistnorsubsist(objectsof whichitistruethattherearenosuchobjects). Objecttheory,unlikeextensionalistsemantics, makesitpossible,asinmuchofordinaryandsci- entificthoughtandlanguage,torefertoand trulypredicatepropertiesofnon-existentob- jects.Therearemanymisconceptionsabout Meinong'stheory,suchasthatreflectedinthe objectionthatMeinongisasuper-Platonistwho inflatesontologywithnon-existentobjectsthat neverthelesshavebeinginsomesense,that objecttheorytoleratesoutrightlogicalinconsis- tencyratherthanmereincompatibilityofprop- ertiesintheSoseineofimpossibleintended objects.Russell,inhisreviewsofMeinong'sthe- oryin1904-05,raisestheproblemoftheexis- tentroundsquare,whichseemstobeexistentby virtueoftheindependenceofSoseinfromSein, andtobenon-existentbyvirtueofbeingglob- allyandsimultaneouslybothroundandsquare. Meinong'sresponseinvolvesseveralcomplex distinctions,butithasbeenobservedthatto avoidthedifficultyheneedonlyappealtothe distinctionbetweenkonstitutorischornuclearand ausserkonstitutorischorextranuclearproperties, adoptedfromasuggestionbyhisstudentErnst Mally(1878-1944),accordingtowhichonly ordinarynuclearpropertieslikebeingred, round,ortencentimeterstallarepartofthe Soseinofanyobject,totheexclusionofcategor- icalorextranuclearpropertieslikebeingexis- tent,determinate,possible,orimpossible.This avoidscounterexamplesliketheexistentround square,becauseitlimitstheindependenceof SoseinfromSeinexclusivelytonuclearproperties, 552 MeisterEckhart memory implyingthatneithertheexistentnorthenon- existentroundsquarecanpossiblyhavethe (extranuclear)propertyofbeingexistentornon- existentintheirrespectiveSoseine,andcannotbe saidtrulytohavethepropertiesofbeingexistent ornon-existentmerelybyfreeassumptionand theindependenceofSoseinfromSein. Seealsobrentano,extensionalism, FORMÅLSEMANTICS,INTENTIONALITY,META- PHYSICS.D.J. MeisterEckhart.Seeeckhart. Melanchthon,Philip.Seesynergism. meliorism(fromLatinmelior,'better'),theview thattheworldisneithercompletelygoodnor completelybad,andthatincrementalprogressor regressdependonhumanactions.Bycreative intelligenceandeducationwecanimprovethe environmentandsocialconditions.Theposition isfirstattributedtoGeorgeEliotandWilliam James.Whiteheadsuggestedthatmeliorism appliestoGod,whocanbothimprovetheworld anddrawsustenancefromhumaneffortsto improvetheworld.Seealsojames,white- head.L.P.P. MelissusofSamos(fl.mid-fifthcenturyb.c), Greekphilosopher,traditionallyclassifiedasa memberoftheEleaticSchool.Hewasalso famousasthevictoriouscommanderinapre- emptiveattackbytheSamiansonanAthenian navalforce(441b.c).LikeParmenides-who musthaveinfluencedMelissus,eventhough thereisnoevidencethetwoevermet-Melissus arguesthat"what-is"or"thereal"cannotcome intobeingoutofnothing,cannotperishinto nothing,ishomogeneous,andisunchanging. Indeed,hearguesexplicitly(whereasPar- menidesonlyimplies)thatthereisonlyonesuch entity,thatthereisnovoid,andthatevenspa- tialrearrangement(tnetakosmesis)mustberuled out.ButunlikeParmenides,Melissusdeduces thatwhat-isistemporallyinfinite(insignificant contrasttoParmenides,regardlessastowhether thelatterheldthatwhat-isexistsstrictlyinthe "now"orthatitexistsnon-temporally).More- over,Melissusarguesthatwhat-isisspatially infinite(whereasParmenidesspökeof"bounds" andcomparedwhat-istoawell-madeball).Sig- nificantly,Melissusrepeatedlyspeaksof"the One."Itis,then,inMelissus,morethaninPar- menidesorinZeno,thatwefindtheemphasison monism.Inacorollarytohismainargument, Melissusarguesthat"ifthereweremanythings," eachwouldhavetobe-perimpossibile-exactly like"theOne."Thisremarkhasbeeninterpreted asissuingthechallengethatwastakenupbythe atomists.Butitismorereasonabletoreaditasa philosophicalstrategisfspreemptivestrike: Melissusanticipatesthemovemadeintheplu- ralistsystemsofthesecondhalfofthefifthcen- tury,viz.,positingapluralityofeternaland unchangingelementsthatundergoonlyspatial rearrangement.Seealsoeleaticschool, parmenides,pre-socratics.A.P.D.M. memory,theretentionof,orthecapacityto retain,pastexperienceorpreviouslyacquired information.Therearetwomainphilosophical questionsaboutmemory:(1)Inwhatdoes memoryconsist?and(2)Whatconstitutes knowingafactonthebasisofmemory?Notall memoryisrememberingfacts:thereisremem- beringone'sperceivingorfeelingoractingina certainway-which,whileitentailsremember- ingthefactthatonedidexperienceinthatway, mustbemorethanthat.Andnotallremember- ingoffactsisknowledgeoffacts:anextremely hesitantattempttorememberanaddress,ifone getsitright,countsasrememberingtheaddress evenifoneistoouncertainforthistocountas knowingit. (1)Answerstothefirstquestionagreeonsome obviouspoints:thatmemoryrequires(a)apres- entand(b)apaststateof,oreventin,thesub- ject,and(c)therightsortofinternalandcausal relationsbetweenthetwo.Also,wemustdistin- guishbetweenmemorystates(rememberingfor manyyearsthenameofone'sfirst-grade teacher)andmemoryoccurrences(recallingthe namewhenasked).Amemorystateisusually takentobeadispositiontodisplayanappropri- atememoryoccurrencegivenasuitablestimu- lus.Butphilosophersdisagreeaboutfurther specifics.Ononetheory(heldbymanyempiri- cistsfromHumetoRussell,amongothers,but nowlargelydiscredited),occurrentmemory consistsinimagesofpastexperience(which haveaspecialqualitymarkingthemasmemory images)andthatmemoryoffactsisreadoffsuch imagememory.Thisoverlooksthepointthat peoplecommonlyrememberfactswithout rememberingwhenorhowtheyleamedthem. Amoresophisticatedtheoryoffactualmemory (populärnowadays)holdsthatanoccurrent memoryofafactrequires,besidesapastleam- ingofit,(i)somesortofpresentmentalrepre- sentationofit(perhapsalinguisticone)and(ii) continuousstoragebetweenthenandnowofa representationofit.Butcondition(i)maynotbe 553 memory,imagetheoryof Mencius conceptuallynecessary:adispositiontodialthe rightnumberwhenonewantstocallhomecon- stitutesrememberingthenumber(provideditis appropriatelylinkedcausallytopastlearningof thenumber)andmanifestingthatdispositionis occurrentlyrememberingthefactastowhatthe numberisevenifonedoesnotintheprocess mentallyrepresentthatfact.Condition(ii)may alsobetoostrong:itseemsatleastconceptually possiblethatacausallinksufficientformemory shouldbesecuredbyarelationthatdoesnot involveanythingcontinuousbetweentherele- vantpastandpresentoccurrences(inTheAnaly- sisofMind,Russellcountenancedthispossibility andcalledit"mnemiccausation"). (2)Whatmustbeaddedtorememberingthat ptogetacaseofknowingitbecauseone remembersit?Wesawthatonemustnotbe uncertainthatp.Mustonealsohavegroundsfor trustingone'smemoryimpression(itsseeming toonethatoneremembers)thatp?Howcould onehavesuchgroundsexceptbyknowingthem onthebasisofmemory?Thefactsonecanknow notonthebasisofmemoryarelimitedatmost towhatonepresentlyperceivesandwhatone presentlyfindsself-evident.Ifnomemorybelief qualifiesasknowledgeunlessitissupportedby memoryknowledgeofthereliabilityofone's memorythentheprocessofqualifyingasmem- oryknowledgecannotsucceed:therewouldbe anendlesschain,orloop,offacts-thisbeliefis memoryknowledgeifandonlyifthisother beliefis,whichisifandonlyifthisotheroneis, andsoon-whichneverbecomesasetthat entailsthatanybeliefismemoryknowledge.On thebasisofsuchreasoningaskepticmightdeny thepossibilityofmemoryknowledge.Wemay avoidthisconsequencewithoutgoingtothelax extremeofallowingthatanycorrectmemory impressionisknowledge;wecanimposethe (frequentlysatisfied)requirementthatonenot havereasonsspecifictotheparticularcasefor believingthatone'smemoryimpressionmight beunreliable.Finally,rememberingthatp becomesmemoryknowledgethatponlyifone believesthatpbecauseitseemstoonethatone remembersit.Onemightrememberthatpand confidentlybelievethatp,butifonehasno memoryimpressionofhavingpreviously learnedit,oronehassuchanimpressionbut doesnottrustitandbelievesthatponlyfor otherreasons(ornoreason),thenoneshould notbecountedasknowingthatponthebasisof memory. Seealsoepistemology,perception, SKEPTICISM.CG. memory,imagetheoryof.Seememory. memory,occurrent.Seememory. memory,representationaltheoryof.Seemem- ory. Mencius,alsoknownasMeng-tzu,MengK'o(fl. fourthcenturyb.c),ChineseConfucianphiloso- pher,probablythesinglemostinfluential philosopherintheChinesetradition.Hissayings, discussions,anddebateswerecompiledbydisci- plesinthebookentitledMeng-tzu. Menciusisbestknownforhisassertionthat humannatureisgoodbutitisunclearwhathe meantbythis.Atonepoint,hesaysheonly meansthatahumancanbecomegood.Else- where,though,hesaysthathumannatureis goodjustaswaterflowsdownward,implying thathumanswillbecomegoodifonlytheirnat- uraldevelopmentisunimpeded.Certainly,part ofwhatisimpliedbytheclaimthathuman natureisgoodisMencius'sbeliefthatallhumans havewhathedescribesasfour"hearts"or "sprouts"-benevolence(jen),righteousness(yi), ritualpropriety(Ii),andwisdom(chih).Theterm 'sprout'seemstorefertoanincipientemotional orbehavioralreactionofavirtuousnature. Menciusclaims,e.g.,thatanyhumanwhosawa childabouttofallintoawellwouldhaveaspon- taneousfeelingofconcern,whichisthesproutof benevolence.Althoughallhumansmanifestthe sprouts,"concentration"(ssu)isrequiredinorder tonurturethemintomaturevirtues.Menciusis notspecificaboutwhatconcentrationis,butit probablyinvolvesanongoingawarenessof,and delightin,theoperationofthesprouts.Theresult oftheconcentrationandconsequentdelightin theoperationofthesproutsisthe"extension" (t'ui,ta,chi)or"Ellingout"(k'uo,ch'ung)ofthe incipientreactions,sothatbenevolence,for instance,comestobemanifestedtoallsuffering humans.Nonetheless,Menciusmaintainsthe belief,typicalofConfucianism,thatwehave greatermoralresponsibilityforthosetiedtous becauseofparticularrelationshipssuchaskin- ship.MenciusisalsoConfucianinhisbeliefthat thevirtuesfirstmanifestthemselveswithinthe family. AlthoughMenciusisaself-cultivationist,he alsobelievesthatone'senvironmentcanposi- tivelyornegativelyaffectone'smoraldevelop- ment,andencouragesrulerstoproducesocial conditionsconducivetovirtue.Headmits,how- ever,thattherearemoralprodigieswhohave flourisheddespitedeleteriouscircumstances. 554 Mendel,Gregor Mendelssohn,Moses Mencius'svirtueethicislikeAristotle'sincom- biningantinomianismwithabeliefintheobjec- tivityofspecificmoraljudgments,buthis de-emphasisofintellectualvirtuesandemphasis uponbenevolencearereminiscentofJoseph Butler.MenciusdiffersfromBuller,however,in thatalthoughhethinkstheConfucianwayisthe mostprofitable,hecondemnsprofitorself-love asamotivation.Menciussawhimselfasdefend- ingthedoctrinesofConfuciusagainstthe philosophiesofotherthinkers,especiallyMoTzu andYangChu.Insodoing,heoftengoesbeyond whatConfuciussaid. Seealsochuangtzu,confucianism, FOURBOOKS,HSUNTZU.B.W.V.N. Mendel,Gregor(1822-84),Austrianbotanist anddiscovererofwhatarenowconsideredthe basicprinciplesofheredity.AnAugustinian monkwhoconductedplant-breedingexperi- mentsinamonasterygardeninBrunn(now Brno,CzechRepublic),Mendeldiscoveredthat certaincharactersofacommonvarietyofgarden peaaretransmittedinastrikinglyregularway. Thecharacterswithwhichhedealtoccurintwo distinctstates,e.g.,podsthataresmoothor ridged.Incharacterssuchasthese,onestateis dominanttoitsrecessivepartner,i.e.,whenvari- etiesofeachsortarecrossed,alltheoffspring exhibitthedominantcharacter.However,when theoffspringofthesecrossesarethemselves crossed,theresultisaratioofthreedominants toonerecessive.Inmodernterms,pairsofgenes (alleles)separateatreproduction(segregation) andeachoffspringreceivesonlyonememberof eachpair.Ofequalimportance,therecessive characterreappearsunaffectedbyitstemporary suppression.Allelesremainpure.Mendelalso notedthatthepairsofcharactersthathestudied assortindependentlyofeachother,i.e.,iftwo pairsofcharactersarefollowedthroughsucces- sivecrosses,nostatisticalcorrelationsintheir transmissioncanbefound.Asgeneticsdevel- opedaftertheturnofthecentury,thesimple "laws"thatMendelhadsetoutwereexpanded andaltered.Onlyarelativelyfewcharacters exhibittwodistinctstates,onedominanttothe other.Inmany,theheterozygoteexhibitsan intermediatestate.Inaddition,genesdonot existinisolationfromeachotherbuttogetheron chromosomes.Onlythosegenesthatresideon differentpairsofchromosomesassortintotal independenceofeachother. Duringhisresearch,Mendelcorresponded withKarlvonNägeli(1817-91),amajorauthor- ityinplanthybridization.VonNägeliurged Mendeltocrossvarietiesofthecommonhawk- weed.WhenMendeltookhisadvice,hefailedto discoverthehereditarypatternsthathehad foundingardenpeas.In1871Mendelceasedhis researchtotakechargeofhismonastery.In1900 HugodeVries(1848-1935)stumbleduponsev- eralinstancesofthree-to-oneratioswhiledevel- opinghisowntheoryoftheoriginofspecies.No soonerdidhepublishhisresultsthantwoyoung biologistsannouncedindependentdiscovery ofwhatcametobeknownasMendel'slaws. Thefoundersofmoderngeneticsabandoned attemptstoworkoutthecomplexitiesofembry- ologicaldevelopmentandconcentratedjuston transmission.Asaresultofseveralunfortunate misunderstandings,earlyMendeliangeneticists thoughtthattheirtheoryofgeneticswasincom- patiblewithDarwin'stheoryofevolution.Even- tually,however,thetwotheoriesweremergedto formthesynthetictheoryofevolution.Inthe process,R.A.Fisher(1890-1962)questioned theveracityofMendel'sresearch,arguingthat theonlywaythatMendelcouldhavegottendata asgoodashedidwasbysanitizingit. Present-dayhistoriansviewallofthepreced- ingeventsinaverydifferentlight.Thescienceof hereditythatdevelopedattheturnofthecen- turywassodifferentfromanythingthatMendel hadinmindthatMendelhardlywarrantsbeing considereditsfather.TheneglectofMendel's workismadetoseemsoproblematiconlyby readinglåterdevelopmentsbackintoMendel's originalpaper.LikedeVries,Mendelwasinter- estedprimarilyindevelopingatheoryoftheori- ginofspecies.TheresultsofMendel'sresearch onthehawkweedbroughtintoquestionthe generalizabilityoftheregularitiesthathehad foundinpeas,buttheysupportedhistheoryof speciesformationthroughhybridization.Simi- larly,therediscoveryofMendel'slawscanbe viewedasaninstanceofmultiple,simultaneous discoveryonlybyignoringimportantdifferences intheviewsexpressedbytheseauthors.Finally, Mendelcertainlydidnotmindlesslyorganize andreporthisdata,butthemethodsthatheused canbeconstruedasquestionableonlyincontrast toanoverlyempirical,inductiveviewofscience. PerhapsMendelwasnoMendelian,buthewas notafraudeither. Seealsodarwinism.D.L.H. Mendeliangenetics.Seemendel. Mendelssohn,Moses(1729-86),Germanphi- losopherknownas"theJewishSocrates."He beganasaBibleandTalmudscholar.Aftermov- 555 MengK'o Mentalese ingtoBerlinhelearnedLatinandGerman,and becameaclosefriendofLessing,whomodeled theJewinhisplayNathantheWiseafterhim. Mendelssohnbeganwritingonmajorphilo- sophicaltopicsoftheday,andwonaprizefrom theBerlinAcademyin1764.Hewasactively engagedindiscussionsaboutaesthetics,psychol- ogy,andreligion,andofferedanempirical,sub- jectivistviewthatwasverypopuläratthetime. HismostfamouswritingsareMorgenstunden (MorningHours,orLecturesontheExistenceofGod, 1785),Phaedon(Phaedo,oronthelmmortalityofthe Soul,1767),andJerusalem(1783). Hecontendedthatonecouldprovetheexis- tenceofGodandtheimmortalityofthesoul.He acceptedtheontologicalargumentandtheargu- mentfromdesign.InPhaedohearguedthatsince thesoulisasimplesubstanceitisindestructible. KantcriticizedhisargumentsinthefirstCritique. MendelssohnwaspressedbytheSwissscientist Lavatertoexplainwhyhe,asareasonableman, didnotacceptChristianity.Atfirstheignoredthe challenge,butfinallysetforthhisphilosophical viewsaboutreligionandJudaisminJerusalem, whereheinsistedthatJudaismisnotasetofdoc- trinesbutasetofpractices.Reasonablepersons canacceptthatthereisauniversalreligionof reason,andtherearepracticesthatGodhas ordainedthattheJewsfollow.Mendelssohnwas astrongadvocateofreligioustolerationandsep- arationofchurchandstate.Hisviewsplayedan importantpartintheemancipationoftheJews, andintheJewishEnlightenmentthatflowered inGermanyatthebeginningofthenineteenth century. Seealsojewishphilosophy.R.H.P. MengK'o.Seemencius. Meng-tzu.Seemencius. mensrea,literally,guiltymind,inlawLatin.Itis oneofthetwomainprerequisites(alongwith actusreus)forprimafacieliabilitytocriminal punishmentinAnglo-Americanlegalsystems. Tobepunishableinsuchsystems,onemustnot onlyhaveperformedalegallyprohibitedaction, suchaskillinganotherhumanbeing;onemust havedonesowithaculpablestateofmind,or mensrea.Suchculpablementalstatesareofthree kinds:theyareeithermotivationalstatesofpur- pose,cognitivestatesofbelief,orthenon-men- talstateofnegligence. Toillustrateeachofthesewithrespecttothe actofkilling:akillermaykilleitherhaving another'sdeathasultimatepurpose,orasmedi- atepurposeonthewaytoachievingsomefur- ther,ultimateend.Alternatively,thekillermay actbelievingtoapracticalcertaintythathisact willresultinanother'sdeath,eventhoughsuch deathisanunwantedsideeffect,orhemay believethatthereisasubstantialandunjustified riskthathisactwillcauseanother'sdeath.The actormayalsobeonlynegligent,whichistotake anunreasonableriskofanother'sdeathevenif theactorisnotawareeitherofsuchriskorofthe lackofjustificationfortakingit. Mensreausuallydoesnothavetodowithany awarenessbytheactorthattheactdoneiseither morallywrongorlegallyprohibited.Neither doesmensreahavetodowithanyemotional stateofguiltorremorse,eitherwhileoneisact- ingorafterward.Sometimesinitsolderusages thetermistakentoincludetheabsenceof excusesaswellasthementalstatesnecessaryfor primafacieliability;insuchausage,therequire- mentishelpfullylabeled"generalmensrea,"and therequirementabovediscussedislabeled"spe- cialmensrea." Seealsodiminishedcapacity,ethics, INTENTION.M.S.M. mentalcontent,causaltheoryof.Seeskepticism. mentaldistinction.Seefundamentumdivisionis. Mentalese,thelanguageofthought(thetitleofa bookbyFödor,1975)orof"brainwriting"(a termofDennetfs);specifically,alanguagelike mediumofrepresentationinwhichthecontents ofmentaleventsaresupposedlyexpressedor recorded.(ThetermwasprobablycoinedbyWil- fridSellars,withwhoseviewsitwasfirstassoci- ated.)Ifwhatonebelievesarepropositions,then itistemptingtoproposethatbelievingsome- thingishavingtheMentaleseexpressionofthat propositionsomehowwrittenintherelevant placeinone'smindorbrain.Thinkingathought, atleastonthoseoccasionswhenwethink "wordlessly"(withoutformulatingourthoughts insentencesorphrasescomposedofwordsofa publiclanguage),thusappearstobeamatterof creatingashort-livedMentaleseexpressionina specialarenaorworkspaceinthemind.Inafur- therapplicationoftheconcept,theprocessof comingtounderstandasentenceofnaturallan- guagecanbeviewedasoneoftranslatingthe sentenceintoMentalese.Ithasoftenbeen arguedthatthisviewofunderstandingonly postponesthedifficultquestionsofmeaning,for itleavesunansweredthequestionofhowMen- taleseexpressionscometohavethemeanings 556 mentalism mereology theydo.Therehavebeenfrequentattemptsto developversionsofthehypothesisthatmental activityisconductedinMentalese,andjustas frequentcriticismsoftheseattempts.Somecrit- icsdenythereisanythingproperlycalledrepre- sentationinthemindorbrainatall;othersclaim thatthesystemofrepresentationusedbythe brainisnotenoughlikeanaturallanguagetobe calledalanguage.Evenamongdefendersof Mentalese,ithasseldombeenclaimedthatall brains"speak"thesameMentalese.Seealso PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE;PHILOSOPHYOF mind;sellars,wilfrid.D.C.D. mentalism,anytheorythatpositsexplicitlymen- taleventsandprocesses,where'mental'means exhibitingintentionalitynotnecessarilybeing immaterialornon-physical.Amentalistictheory iscouchedintermsofbelief,desire,thinking, feeling,hoping,etc.Ascrupulouslynon-mental- istictheorywouldbecouchedentirelyinexten- sionalterms:itwouldreferonlytobehavioror toneurophysiologicalstatesandevents.The attackonmentalismbybehavioristswasledby B.F.Skinner,whosecriticismsdidnotalldepend ontheassumptionthatmentalistsweredualists, andthesubsequentriseofcognitivesciencehas restoredasortofmentalism(a"thoroughlymod- ernmentalism,"asFödorhascalledit)thatis explicitlymaterialistic. Seealsobehaviorism,cognitivescience, PHILOSOPHYOFMIND.D.C.D. mentalrepresentation.Seecognitivescience. Mercier,Désiré-Joseph(1851-1926),Belgian Catholicphilosopher,aformativefigureinNeo- ThomismandfounderoftheInstitutSupérieur dePhilosophie(1889)atLouvain.Createdatthe requestofPopeLeoxm,Mercier'sinstitute treatedAquinasasasubjectofhistoricalresearch andasaphilosopherrelevanttomodern thought.HisapproachtoNeo-Thomismwasdis- tinctiveforitsdirectresponsetotheepistemolog- icalchallengesposedbyidealism,rationalism, andpositivism.Mercier'sepistemologywas termedacriteriology;itintendedtodefendthe certitudeoftheintellectagainstskepticismby providinganaccountofthemotivesandrules thatguidejudgment.Truthisaffirmedbyintel- lectualjudgmentbyconformingitselfnottothe thing-in-itselfbuttoitsabstractapprehension. Sincethecertitudeofjudgmentisastateofthe cognitivefacultyinthehumansoul,Merciercon- sideredcriteriologyaspsychology;seeCritér- iologiegénéraleouThéoriegénéraledelacertitude (1906),OriginsofContemporaryPsychology(träns. 1918),andManualofScholasticPhilosophy(träns. 1917-18).Seealsoaquinas,neo-thomism. D.W.H. mereologicalessentialism.Seehaecceity. mereologicalsum.Seemereology. mereology(fromGreekmeros,'part'),themath- ematicaltheoryofparts;specifically,Lesniewski's formåltheoryofparts.Typically,amereological theoryemploysnotionssuchasthefollowing: properpart,improperpart,overlapping(having apartincommon),disjoint(notoverlapping), mereologicalproduct(the"intersection"ofover- lappingobjects),mereologicalsum(acollection ofparts),mereologicaldifference,theuniversal sum,mereologicalcomplement,andatom(that whichhasnoproperparts). Formålmereologiesareaxiomaticsystems. Lesniewski'smereologyandGoodman'sformål mereology(whichhecallstheCalculusofIndi- viduals)arecompatiblewithnominalism,i.e.,no referenceismadetosets,properties,orother abstractentities.Lesniewskihopedthathis mereology,withitsmanyparallelstosettheory, wouldprovideanalternativetosettheoryasa foundationformathematics. Fundamentalandcontroversialimplications ofLesniewski'sandGoodman'stheoriesinclude theirextensionalityandcollectivism.Extensional theoriesimplythatforanyindividuals,xandy,x =yprovidedxandyhavethesameproperparts. Onereasonextensionalityiscontroversialisthat itrulesoutanobjecfsacquiringorlosingapart, andthereforeisinconsistentwithcommonsense beliefssuchasthatacarhasanewtireorthata tablehaslöstasliverofwood.Asecondreason forcontroversyisthatextensionalityisincom- patiblewiththebeliefthatastatueandthepiece ofbronzeofwhichitismadehavethesameparts andyetarediverseobjects. Collectivismimpliesthatanyindividuals,no matterhowscattered,haveamereologicalsum orconstituteanobject.Moreover,accordingto collectivism,assemblingordisassemblingparts doesnotaffecttheexistenceofthings,i.e.,noth- ingiscreatedordestroyedbyassemblyordisas- sembly,respectively.Thus,collectivismis incompatiblewithcommonsensebeliefssuchas thatwhenawatchisdisassembled,itis destroyed,orthatwhencertainpartsareassem- bled,awatchiscreated. Becausetheaforementionedformåltheories shunmodality,theylacktheresourcestoexpress 557 meritarian Merleau-Ponty,Maurice thethesisthatawholehaseachofitspartsneces- sarily.Thisthesisofmereologicalessentialismhas recentlybeendefendedbyRoderickChisholm. Seealsoessentialism,extensionalism, METAPHYSICS,SETTHEORY.J.Ho.&G.Ro. meritarian,onewhoassertstherelevanceof individualmerit,asanindependentjustificatory condition,inattemptstodesignsocialstructures ordistributegoods.'Meritarianism'isarecently coinedterminsocialandpoliticalphilosophy closelyrelatedto'meritocracy',andusedtoiden- tifyarangeofrelatedconcemsthatsupplement oropposeegalitarian,utilitarian,andcontractar- ianprinciplesandprinciplesbasedonentitle- ment,right,interest,andneed,amongothers. Forexample,onecanhaveapressingneedfor anOlympicmedalbutnotmeritit;onecanhave themoneytobuyamasterpiecebutnotbewor- thyofit;onecanhavetherighttoacertainben- efitbutnotdeserveit.Meritariansassertthat considerationsofdesertarealwaysrelevantand sometimesdecisiveinsuchcases. Whatcountsasmerit,andhowimportant shoulditbeinmoral,social,andpoliticaldeci- sions?Answerstothesequestionsservetodis- tinguishonemeritarianfromanother,and sometimestoblurthedistinctionsbetweenthe meritarianpositionandothers.Meritmayrefer toanyofthese:comparativerank,capacities, abilities,effort,intention,orachievement.More- over,thereisarelevanceconditiontobemet:to saythathighesthonorsinaraceshouldgotothe mostdeservingispresumablytosaythatthe honorsshouldgotothosewiththerelevantsort ofmerit-speed,e.g.,ratherthangrace.Further, meritariansmaydifferaboutthestrengthofthe meritprinciple,andhowvariouspoliticalor socialstructuresshouldbeinfluencedbyit. Seealsoethics,justice.L.C.B. meritocracy,inordinaryusage,asystemin whichadvancementisbasedonabilityand achievement,oroneinwhichleadershiproles areheldbytalentedachievers.Thetermmayalso refertoanelitegroupoftalentedachievers.In philosophicalusage,theterm'smeaningissimi- lar:ameritocracyisaschemeofsocialorganiza- tioninwhichessentialoffices,andperhaps careersandjobsofallsortsare(a)openonlyto thosewhohavetherelevantqualificationsfor successfulperformanceinthem,or(b)awarded onlytothecandidateswhoarelikelytoperform thebest,or(c)managedsothatpeopleadvance inandretaintheirofficesandjobssolelyonthe basisofthequalityoftheirperformanceinthem, or(d)alloftheabove.Seealsojustice,meri- tarian.L.C.B. meritoriousduty.Seekant. Merleau-Ponty,Maurice(1908-61),Frenchphi- losopherdescribedbyPaulRicoeuras"thegreat- estoftheFrenchphenomenologists."Merleau- Pontyoccupiedthechairofchildpsychologyand pedagogyattheSorbonneandwaslåterprofes- sorofphilosophyattheCollegedeFrance.His suddendeathprecededcompletionofanimpor- tantmanuscript;thiswaslåtereditedandpub- lishedbyClaudeLefortunderthetitleTheVisible andtheInvisible.Therelationbetweenthelate, unfmishedworkandhisearlyPhenomenologyof Perception(1945)hasreceivedmuchscholarly discussion.Whilesomecommentatorsseeasig- nificantshiftindirectioninhislåterthought, othersinsistoncontinuitythroughouthiswork. Thus,theexactsignificanceofhisphilosophy, whichinhislifewascalledbothaphilosophyof ambiguityandanambiguousphilosophy,retains tothisdayitsessentialambiguity. Withhiscompatriotandfriend,Sartre,Mer- leau-Pontywasresponsibleforintroducingthe phenomenologyofEdmundHusserlintoFrance. ImpressedaboveallbythelåterHusserlandby Husserl'snotionofthelife-world(Lebenswelt), Merleau-PontycombinedHusserl'stranscen- dentalapproachtoepistemologicalissueswith anexistentialorientationderivedfromHeideg- gerandMarcel.GoingevenfurtherthanHei- degger,whohadhimselfsoughttogobeyond Husserlby"existentializing"Husserl'sTranscen- dentalEgo(referringtoitasDasein),Merleau- Pontysoughttoemphasizenotonlythe existential(worldly)natureofthehumansub- jectbut,aboveall,itsbodilynature.Thushisphi- losophycouldbecharacterizedasaphilosophy ofthelivedbodyorthebodysubject(lecorps propre).AlthoughNietzschecalledattentionto theall-importanceofthebody,itwasMerleau- Pontywhofirstmadethebodythecentraltheme ofadetailedphilosophicalanalysis.Thispro- videdanoriginalperspectivefromwhichto rethinksuchperennialphilosophicalissuesas thenatureofknowledge,freedom,time(tempo- rality),language,andintersubjectivity.Espe- ciallyinhisearlywork,Merleau-Pontybattled againstabsolutistthought("lapenséedeVabsolu"), stressingtheinsurmountableambiguityand contingencyofallmeaningandtruth.Anarch- opponentofCartesianrationalism,hewasan earlyandardentspokesmanforthatposition nowcalledantifoundationalism. 558 Merleau-Ponty,Maurice Merleau-Ponty,Maurice Merleau-Ponty'smajorearlywork,thePhe- nomenologyofPerception,isbestknownforitscen- tralthesisconcerning"theprimacyofper- ception."Inthislengthystudyhearguedthatall the"higher"functionsofconsciousness(e.g., intellection,volition)arerootedinanddepend uponthesubjecfsprereflective,bodilyexistence, i.e.,perception("Allconsciousnessisperceptual, eventheconsciousnessofourselves").Merleau- Pontymaintained,however,thatperceptionhad neverbeenadequatelyconceptualizedbytradi- tionalphilosophy.Thusthebookwastoalarge extentadialecticalconfrontationwithwhathe tooktobethetwomainformsofobjectivethink- ing-intellectualismandempiricism-bothof which,heargued,ignoredthephenomenonof perception.Hisprincipalgoalwastogetbeyond theintellectualconstructsoftraditionalphiloso- phy(suchassense-data)andtoeffect"areturn tothephenomena,"totheworldasweactually experienceitasembodiedsubjectspriortoall theorizing.Hismainargument(directedagainst mainlinephilosophy)wasthatthelivedbodyis notanobjectintheworld,distinctfromthe knowingsubject(asinDescartes),butisthesub- jecfsownpointofviewontheworld;thebodyis itselftheoriginalknowingsubject(albeitanon- orprepersonal,"anonymous"subject),from whichallotherformsofknowledgederive,even thatofgeometry.Asaphenomenological(or,as healsosaid,"archaeological")attemptto unearththebasic(corporeal)modalitiesof humanexistence,emphasizingtherootedness (enracinement)ofthepersonalsubjectinthe obscureandambiguouslifeofthebodyand,in thisway,theinsurpassablecontingencyofall meaning,thePhenomenologywasimmediately andwidelyrecognizedasamajorstatementof Frenchexistentialism. Inhissubsequentworkinthelate1940sand the1950s,inmanyshorteressaysandartides, Merleau-Pontyspelledoutingreaterdetailthe philosophicalconsequencesof"theprimacyof perception."Thesewritingssoughttorespondto widespreadobjectionsthatby"grounding"all intellectualandculturalacquisitionsintheprere- flectiveandprepersonallifeofthebody,the PhenomenologyofPerceptionresultsinakindof reductionismandanti-intellectualismand teachesonlya"badambiguity,"i.e.,completely underminesthenotionsofreasonandtruth.By shiftinghisattentionfromthephenomenonof perceptiontothatof(creative)expression,his aimwastoworkouta"goodambiguity"by showinghow"communicationwithothersand thoughttakeupandgobeyondtherealmofper- ceptionwhichinitiatedustothetruth."His announcedgoalafterthePhenomenologywas "workingoutinarigorouswaythephilosophical foundations"ofatheoryoftruthandatheoryof intersubjectivity(includingatheoryofhistory). Nosuchlarge-scalework(asequel,asitwere,to thePhenomenology)eversawthelightofday, althoughinpursuingthisprojecthereflectedon subjectsasdiverseaspainting,literarylanguage, Saussurianlinguistics,structuralistanthropol- ogy,politics,history,thehumansciences,psy- choanalysis,contemporaryscience(including biology),andthephilosophyofnature. Towardtheendofhislife,however,Merleau- Pontydidbeginworkonaprojectedlarge-scale manuscript,theremnantsofwhichwerepub- lishedposthumouslyasTheVisibleandtheInvisi- ble.Aremarkablefeatureofthiswork(asClaude Leforthaspointedout)istheresolutewayin whichMerleau-Pontyappearstobegropingfor anewphilosophicallanguage.Hisexpresscon- cernsinthisabortivemanuscriptareexplicitly ontological(asopposedtothemorelimitedphe- nomenologicalconcemsofhisearlywork),and heconsistentlytriestoavoidthesubject(con- sciousness)-objectlanguageofthephilosophyof consciousness(inheritedfromHusserl'stran- scendentalidealism)thatcharacterizedthePhe- nomenologyofPerception.Althoughmuchof Merleau-Ponty'slåterthoughtwasaresponseto thelåterHeidegger,Merleau-Pontysetshimself apartfromHeideggerinthisunfmishedworkby claimingthattheonlyontologypossibleisan indirectonethatcanhavenodirectaccessto Beingitself.Indeed,hadhecompletedit,Mer- leau-Ponty^newontologywouldprobablyhave beenoneinwhich,asLeforthasremarked,"the wordBeingwouldnothavetobeuttered."He wasalwayskeenlyattunedto"thesensible world";thekeyterminhisontologicalthinking isnotsomuch'Being'asitis'theflesh',aterm withnoequivalentinthehistoryofphilosophy. Whattraditionalphilosophyreferredtoas"sub- ject"and"object"werenottwodistinctsortsof reality,butmerely"differentiationsofonesoleand massiveadhesiontoBeing[Nature]whichisthe flesh."Byviewingtheperceivingsubjectas"a coilingöverofthevisibleuponthevisible,"Mer- leau-Pontywasattemptingtoovercomethesub- ject-objectdichotomyofmodernphilosophy, whichraisedtheintractableproblemsofthe externalworldandotherminds.Withthenotion ofthefleshhebelievedhecouldfinallyovercome thesolipsismofmodemphilosophyandhaddis- coveredthebasisforagenuineintersubjectivity (conceivedofasbasicallyanintercorporeity). 559 Mersenne,Marin metalanguage Does'flesh'signifysomethingsignificantlydif- ferentfrom'body'inMerleau-Ponty'searlier thought?Didhisgrowingconcernwithontology (andthequestionofnature)signalabandon- mentofhisearlierphenomenology(towhich thequestionofnatureisforeign)?Thishas remainedaprincipalsubjectofconflictinginter- pretationsinMerleau-Pontyscholarship. Asillustratedbyhislast,unfinishedwork, Merleau-Ponty'soeuvreasawholeisfragmen- tary.Healwaysinsistedthattruephilosophyis theenemyofthesystem,andhedisavowedclo- sureandcompletion.WhileHeideggerhashad numerousdisciplesandepigones,itisdifficultto imaginewhata"Merleau-Pontyschoolofphi- losophy"wouldbe.ThisisnottodenythatMer- leau-Ponty^workhasexertedconsiderable influence.Althoughhewasrelegatedtoakindof intellectualpurgatoryinFrancealmostimmedi- atelyuponhisdeath,theworkofhispoststruc- turalistsuccessorssuchasFoucaultandJacques Derridabetraysagreatdebttohispreviousstrug- gleswithphilosophicalmodemity.AndinGer- many,GreatBritain,and,aboveall,North America,Merleau-Pontyhascontinuedtobea sourceofphilosophicalinspirationandthesub- jectofextensivescholarship.Althoughhiswork doesnotpresumetoanswerthekeyquestionsof existence,itisasalientmodelofphilosophycon- ceivedofasunremittinginterrogation.Itisthis questioning("zetetic")attitude,combinedwitha non-dogmatichumanism,thatcontinuesto speaknotonlytophilosophersbutalsotoawide audienceamongpractitionersofthehumansci- ences(phenomenologicalpsychologybeinga particularlynoteworthyexample). SeealsoContinentalphilosophy,exis- tentialism,PHENOMENOLOGY,SUBJECT- OBJECTDICHOTOMY.G.B.M. Mersenne,Marin(1588-1648),Frenchpriest whocompiledmassiveworksonphilosophy, mathematics,music,andnaturalscience,and conductedanenormouscorrespondencewith suchfiguresasGalileo,Descartes,andHobbes. HetranslatedGalileo'sMechanicsandHerbertof Cherbury'sDeVeritateandarrangedforpublica- tionofHobbes'sDeCive.Heisbestknownfor gatheringtheobjectionspublishedwithDes- cartes^Meditations.Mersenneservedafunction intheriseofmodernphilosophyandsciencethat istodayservedbyprofessionaljournalsandasso- ciations. Hisworkscontainattacksondeists,atheists, libertines,andskeptics;buthealsopresentsmit- igatedskepticismasapracticalmethodforattain- ingscientificknowledge.Hedidnotbelievethat wecanattainknowledgeofinneressences,but argued-bydisplayingit-thatwehavean immenseamountofknowledgeaboutthemate- rialworldadequatetoourneeds. LikeGassendi,Mersenneadvocatedmecha- nisticexplanationsinscience,andfollowing Galileo,heproposedmathematicalmodelsof materialphenomena.LiketheEpicureans,he believedthatmechanismwasadequatetosave thephenomena.HethusrejectedAristotelian formsandoccultpowers.Mersennewasanother ofthegreatphilosopher-priestsoftheseven- teenthcenturywhobelievedthattoincreasesci- entificknowledgeistoknowandserveGod. Seealsodescartes,epicureanism. R.A.W. MertonSchool.Seeoxfordcalculators. metaethicalrelativism.Seerelativism. metaethics.Seeethics. metalanguage,informålsemantics,alanguage usedtodescribeanotherlanguage(theobjectlan- guage).Theobjectlanguagemaybeeitheranat- urallanguageoraformållanguage.Thegoalofa formålsemantictheoryistoprovideanaxiomatic orotherwisesystematictheoryofmeaningfor theobjectlanguage.Themetalanguageisusedto specifytheobjectlanguage'ssymbolsandforma- tionrules,whichdetermineitsgrammaticalsen- tencesorwell-formedformulas,andtoassign meaningsorinterpretationstothesesentencesor formulas.Forexample,inanextensionalsemantics, themetalanguageisusedtoassigndenotationsto thesingularterms,extensionstothegeneral terms,andtruthconditionstosentences.The standardformatforassigningtruthconditions,as inTarski'sformulationofhis"semanticalconcep- tionoftruth,"isaT-sentence,whichtakesthe form'Sistrueifandonlyifp.'Davidsonadapted thisformattothepurposesofhistruth-theoretic accountofmeaning.ExamplesofT-sentences, withEnglishasthemetalanguage,are'"Laneige estblanche"istrueifandonlyifsnowiswhite', wheretheobjectlangaugeisFrenchandthe homophonic(Davidson)'"Snowiswhite"istrue ifandonlyifsnowiswhite',wheretheobjectlan- guageisEnglishaswell. Althoughforformålpurposesthedistinction betweenmetalanguageandobjectlanguage mustbemaintained,inpracticeonecanusea langaugetotalkaboutexpressionsinthevery samelanguage.Onecan,inCarnap'sterms,shift 560 metalogic metaphilosophy fromthematerialmodetotheformålmode,e.g. from'Everyveterinarianisananimaldoctor'to '"Veterinarian"means"animaldoctor".'This shiftisimportantindiscussionsofsynonymyand oftheanalytic-syntheticdistinction.Carnap's distinctioncorrespondstotheuse-mentiondis- tinction.Wearespeakingintheformål mode-wearementioningalinguisticexpres- sion-whenweascribeapropertytoawordor otherexpressiontype,suchasitsspelling,pro- nunciation,meaning,orgrammaticalcategory orwhenwespeakofanexpressiontokenasmis- spelled,mispronounced,ormisused.Weare speakinginthematerialmodewhenwesay "Reimsishärdtofind"butintheformålmode whenwesay"'Reims'ishärdtopronounce." Seealsophilosophyoflanguace,type- tokenDISTINCTION,USE-MENTIONDISTINC- TION.K.B. metalogic.Seeprooftheory. metamathematics,thestudyandestablishment, byrestricted(and,inparticular,finitary)means, oftheconsistencyorreliabilityofthevarioussys- temsofclassicalmathematics.Thetermwas apparentlyintroduced,withpejorativeover- tonesrelatingitto'metaphysics',inthe1870sin connectionwiththediscussionofnon-Euclidean geometries.Itwasintroducedinthesensegiven here,shornofnegativeconnotations,byHilbert (seehis"NeubegriindungderMathematik.Erste Mitteilung,"1922),whoalsoreferredtoitas Beweistheorieorprooftheory.Afewyearslåter (specifically,inthe1930papers"Ubereinigefun- damentaleBegriffederMetamathematik"and "FundamentaleBegriffederMethodologieder deduktivenWissenschaften.I")Tarskifittedit withasomewhatbroader,lessrestrictedsense: broaderinthatthescopeofitsconcemswas increasedtoincludenotonlyquestionsofcon- sistency,butalsoahöstofotherquestions(e.g. questionsofindependence,completenessand axiomatizability)pertainingtowhatTarski referredtoasthe"methodologyofthedeductive sciences"(whichwashissynonymfor'meta- mathematics');lessrestrictedinthatthestan- dardsofproofwererelaxedsoastopermitother thanfinitary-indeed,otherthanconstructive- means. OnthisbroaderconceptionofTarski's,formal- izeddeductivedisciplinesformthefieldof researchofmetamathematicsroughlyinthe samesenseinwhichspatialentitiesformthefield ofresearchingeometryoranimalsthatofzool- ogy.Disciplines,hesaid,aretoberegardedassets ofsentencestobeinvestigatedfromthepointof viewoftheirconsistencyaxiomatizability(of varioustypes),completeness,andcategoricityor degreeofcategoricity,etc.Eventually(seethe 1935and1936papers"GrundziigedesSyste- menkalkiil,ErsterTeil"and"GrundziigederSys- temenkalkiil,ZweiterTeil")Tarskiwentonto includeallmannerofsemanticalquestions amongtheconcernsofmetamathematics,thus divergingrathersharplyfromHilberfsoriginal syntacticalfocus.Today,theterms'metatheory' and'metalogic'areusedtosignifythatbroadset ofinterests,embracingbothsyntacticaland semanticalstudiesofformållanguagesandsys- tems,whichTarskicametoincludeunderthe generalheadingofmetamathematics.Those havingtodospecificallywithsemanticsbelongto thatmorespecializedbranchofmodemlogic knownasmodeltheory,whilethosedealingwith purelysyntacticalquestionsbelongtowhathas cometobeknownasprooftheory(wherethis latterisnow,however,permittedtoemploy otherthanfinitarymethodsintheproofsofits theorems). Seealsocategoricity,completeness, CONSISTENCY,MODELTHEORY,PROOFTHE- ORY.M.D. metaphilosophy,thetheoryofthenatureofphi- losophy,especiallyitsgoals,methods,andfun- damentalassumptions.First-orderphilosophical inquiryincludessuchdisciplinesasepistemol- ogy,ontology,ethics,andvaluetheory.Itthus constitutesthemainactivityofphilosophers, pastandpresent.Thephilosophicalstudyoffirst- orderphilosophicalinquiryraisesphilosophical inquirytoahigherorder.Suchhigher-order inquiryismetaphilosophy.Thefirst-orderphilo- sophicaldisciplineof(e.g.)epistemologyhasthe natureofknowledgeasitsmainfocus,butthat disciplinecanitselfbethefocusofhigher-order philosophicalinquiry.Thelatterfocusyieldsa speciesofmetaphilosophycalledmetaepistemol- ogy.Twootherprominentspeciesaremetaethics andmetaontology.Eachsuchbranchofmeta- philosophystudiesthegoals,methods,andfun- damentalassumptionsofafirst-orderphi- losophicaldiscipline. Typicalmetaphilosophicaltopicsinclude(a) theconditionsunderwhichaclaimisphilo- sophicalratherthannon-philosophical,and(b) theconditionsunderwhichafirst-orderphilo- sophicalclaimiseithermeaningful,true,orwar- ranted.Metaepistemologye.g.,pursuesnotthe natureofknowledgedirectly,butratherthecon- ditionsunderwhichclaimsaregenuinelyepiste- 561 metaphor metaphysicalrealism mologicalandtheconditionsunderwhichepis- temologicalclaimsareeithermeaningful,or true,orwarranted.Thedistinctionbetweenphi- losophyandmetaphilosophyhasananaloguein thefamiliardistinctionbetweenmathematics andmetamathematics. Questionsabouttheautonomy,objectivity, relativity,andmodalstatusofphilosophical claimsariseinmetaphilosophy.Questionsabout autonomyconcerntherelationshipofphiloso- phytosuchdisciplinesasthoseconstitutingthe naturalandsocialsciences.Forinstance,isphi- losophymethodologicallyindependentofthe naturalsciences?Questionsaboutobjectivity andrelativityconcernthekindoftruthandwar- rantavailabletophilosophicalclaims.For instance,arephilosophicaltruthscharacteristi- cally,orever,madetruebymind-independent phenomenainthewaythattypicalclaimsofthe naturalsciencessupposedlyare?Or,arephilo- sophicaltruthsunavoidablyconventional,being fullydeterminedby(andthusaltogetherrelative to)linguisticconventions?Aretheyanalytic ratherthansynthetictruths,andisknowledgeof themaprioriratherthanaposteriori?Questions aboutmodalstatusconsiderwhetherphilosoph- icalclaimsarenecessaryratherthancontingent. Arephilosophicalclaimsnecessarilytrueorfalse, incontrasttothecontingentclaimsofthenat- uralsciences?Theforegoingquestionsidentify majorareasofcontroversyincontemporary metaphilosophy. Seealsoanalytic-syntheticdistinc- tion,APRIORI,EPISTEMOLOGY,MEANING. P.K.M. metaphor,afigureofspeech(oratrope)inwhich awordorphrasethatliterallydenotesonething isusedtodenoteanother,therebyimplicitly comparingthetwothings.Inthenormaluseof thesentence'TheMississippiisariver','river'is usedliterally-orassomewouldprefertosay, usedinitsliteralsense.Bycontrast,ifone assertivelyuttered"Timeisariver,"onewould beusing'river'metaphorically-orbeusingitin ametaphoricalsense. Metaphorhasbeenatopicofphilosophical discussionsinceAristotle;infact,ithasalmost certainlybeenmorediscussedbyphilosophers thanalltheothertropestogether.Twothemes areprominentinthediscussionsuptothenine- teenthcentury.Oneisthatmetaphors,along withalltheothertropes,aredecorationsof speech;hencethephrase'figuresofspeech'. Metaphorsareadornmentsorfigurations.They donotcontributetothecognitivemeaningofthe discourse;insteadtheylenditcolor,vividness, emotionalimpact,etc.Thusitwascharacteristic oftheEnlightenmentandproto-Enlightenment philosophers-HobbesandLockearegood examples-toinsistthatthoughphilosophers maysometimeshavegoodreasontocommuni- catetheirthoughtwithmetaphors,theythem- selvesshoulddotheirthinkingentirelywithout metaphors.Theotherthemeprominentindis- cussionsofmetaphoruptothenineteenthcen- turyisthatmetaphorsare,sofarastheir cognitiveforceisconcerned,ellipticalsimiles. Thecognitiveforceof'Timeisariver',when 'river'inthatsentenceisusedmetaphorically,is thesameas'Timeislikeariver'. Whatcharacterizesalmostalltheoriesof metaphorfromthetimeoftheRomanticsup throughourowncenturyistherejectionofboth thesetraditionalthemes.Metaphors-soithas beenargued-arenotcognitivelydispensable decorations.Theycontributetothecognitive meaningofourdiscourse;andtheyareindis- pensable,notonlytoreligiousdiscourse,butto ordinary,andevenscientific,discourse,notto mentionpoetic.Nietzsche,indeed,wentsofaras toarguethatallspeechismetaphorical.And thoughnoconsensushasyetemergedonhow andwhatmetaphorscontributetomeaning,nor howwerecognizewhattheycontribute,near- consensushasemergedonthethesisthattheydo notworkasellipticalsimiles. Seealsomeaning,philosophyoflan- GUAGE,TROPE.N.P.W. metaphysicalcertainty.Seecertainty. metaphysicalholism.Seemethodologicalholism. metaphysicallibertarianism.Seefreewillprob- lem. metaphysicalnaturalism.Seemetaphysics,natu- ralism. metaphysicalnecessity.Seenecessity,philosophy OFMIND. metaphysicalrealism,inthewidestsense,the viewthat(a)therearerealobjects(usuallythe viewisconcernedwithspatiotemporalobjects), (b)theyexistindependentlyofourexperienceor ourknowledgeofthem,and(c)theyhaveprop- ertiesandenterintorelationsindependentlyof theconceptswithwhichweunderstandthemor ofthelanguagewithwhichwedescribethem. Anti-realismisanyviewthatrejectsoneormore 562 metaphysicalvoluntarism metaphysics ofthesethreetheses,thoughif(a)isrejectedthe rejectionof(b)and(c)followstrivially.(Ifit merelydeniestheexistenceofmaterialthings, thenitstraditionalnameis'idealism.') Metaphysicalrealism,inallofitsthreeparts, issharedbycommonsense,thesciences,and mostphilosophers.Thechiefobjectiontoitis thatwecanformnoconceptionofrealobjects, asunderstoodbyit,sinceanysuchconception mustrestontheconceptswealreadyhaveand onourlanguageandexperience.Toacceptthe objectionseemstoimplythatwecanhaveno knowledgeofrealobjectsastheyareinthem- selves,andthattruthmustnotbeunderstoodas correspondencetosuchobjects.Butthisitself hasanevenfartherreachingconsequence: either(i)weshouldaccepttheseeminglyabsurd viewthattherearenorealobjects(sincethe objectionequallywellappliestomindsandtheir states,toconceptsandwords,topropertiesand relations,toexperiences,etc),forweshould hardlybelieveintherealityofsomethingof whichwecanformnoconceptionatall;or(ii) wemustfacetheseeminglyhopelesstaskofa drasticchangeinwhatwemeanby'reality', 'concept','experience','knowledge','truth',and muchelse.Ontheotherhand,theobjectionmay beheldtoreducetoameretautology,amount- ingto'We(can)knowrealityonlyaswe(can) knowit',andthenitmaybearguedthatnosub- stantivethesis,whichanti-realismclaimstobe, isderivablefromameretautology.Yetevenifthe objectionisatautology,itservestoforceusto avoidasimplisticviewofourcognitiverelation- shiptotheworld. Indiscussionsofuniversals,metaphysicalreal- ismistheviewthatthereareuniversals,and usuallyiscontrastedwithnominalism.Butthis eitherprecludesastandardthirdalternative, namelyconceptualism,orsimplypresupposes thatconceptsaregeneralwords(adjectives, commonnouns,verbs)orusesofsuchwords.If thispresuppositionisaccepted,thenindeedcon- ceptualismwouldbethesameasnominalism, butthisshouldbeargued,notlegislatedverbally. Traditionalconceptualismholdsthatconcepts areparticularmentalentities,oratleastmental dispositions,thatservetheclassificatoryfunction thatuniversalshavebeensupposedtoserveand alsoexplaintheclassificatoryfunctionthatgen- eralwordsundoubtedlyalsoserve. Seealsoarmstrong,conceptualism, METAPHYSICS,MORALREALISM,PROPERTY, SCIENTIFICREALISM.P.Bu. metaphysicalvoluntarism.Seevoluntarism. metaphysics,mostgenerally,thephilosophical investigationofthenature,constitution,and structureofreality.Itisbroaderinscopethansci- ence,e.g.,physicsandevencosmology(thesci- enceofthenature,structure,andoriginofthe universeasawhole),sinceoneofitstraditional concernsistheexistenceofnon-physicalenti- ties,e.g.,God.Itisalsomorefundamental,since itinvestigatesquestionssciencedoesnotaddress buttheanswerstowhichitpresupposes.Are there,forinstance,physicalobjectsatall,and doeseveryeventhaveacause? Sounderstood,metaphysicswasrejectedby positivismonthegroundthatitsstatementsare "cognitivelymeaningless"sincetheyarenot empiricallyverifiable.Morerecentphilosophers, suchasQuine,rejectmetaphysicsontheground thatsciencealoneprovidesgenuineknowledge. InTheMetaphysicsofLogicalPositivism(1954), Bergmannarguedthatlogicalpositivism,and anyviewsuchasQuine's,presupposesameta- physicaltheory.Andthepositivists'criterionof cognitivemeaningwasneverformulatedina waysatisfactoryeventothem.Asuccessorofthe positivistattitudetowardmetaphysicsisP.F. Strawson'spreference(especiallyinIndividuals, 1959)forwhathecallsdescriptivemetaphysics, whichis"contenttodescribetheactualstructure ofourthoughtabouttheworld,"ascontrasted withrevisionarymetaphysics,whichis"concerned toproduceabetterstructure." Theview,sometimesconsideredscientific(but anassumptionratherthananarguedtheory), thatallthatthereis,isspatiotemporal(apartof "nature")andisknowableonlythroughthe methodsofthesciences,isitselfametaphysics, namelymetaphysicalnaturalism(nottobecon- fusedwithnaturalphilosophy).Itisnotpartof scienceitself. Initsmostgeneralsense,metaphysicsmay seemtocoincidewithphilosophyasawhole, sinceanythingphilosophyinvestigatesispre- sumablyapartofreality,e.g.,knowledge,values, andvalidreasoning.Butitisusefultoreservethe investigationofsuchmorespecifictopicsfordis- tinctbranchesofphilosophy,e.g.,epistemology, ethics,aesthetics,andlogic,sincetheyraise problemspeculiartothemselves. Perhapsthemostfamiliarquestioninmeta- physicsiswhetherthereareonlymaterialenti- ties-materialism-oronlymentalentities,i.e., mindsandtheirstates-idealism-orboth-dual- ism.Here'entity'hasitsbroadestsense:anything real.Morespecificquestionsofmetaphysicscon- cerntheexistenceandnatureofcertainindivid- uals-alsocalledparticulars-(e.g.,God),or 563 metaphysics metaphysics certainproperties(e.g.,aretherepropertiesthat nothingexemplifies?)orrelations(e.g.,isthere arelationofcausationthatisanecessarycon- nectionratherthanamereregularconjunction betweenevents?).Thenatureofspaceandtime isanotherimportantexampleofsuchamore specifictopic.Arespaceandtimepeculiarindi- vidualsthat"contain"ordinaryindividuals,or aretheyjustsystemsofrelationsbetweenindi- vidualthings,suchasbeing(spatially)higheror (temporally)prior.Whatevertheanswer,space andtimearewhatrenderaworldoutofthe totalityofentitiesthatarepartsofit.Sinceon anyaccountofknowledge,ourknowledgeofthe worldisextremelylimited,concerningbothits spatialandtemporaldimensionsanditsinner constitution,wemustallowforanindefinite numberofpossiblewaystheworldmaybe, mighthavebeen,orwillbe.Andthisthought givesrisetotheideaofanindefinitenumberof possibleworlds.Thisideaisusefulinmaking vividourunderstandingofthenatureofneces- sarytruth(anecessarilytruepropositionisone thatistrueinallpossibleworlds)andthusis commonlyemployedinmodallogic.Buttheidea canalsomakepossibleworldsseemreal,ahighly controversialdoctrine. Thenotionofaspatiotemporalworldiscom- monlythatemployedindiscussionsoftheso- calledissueofrealismversusanti-realism, althoughthisissuehasalsobeenraisedwith respecttouniversals,values,andnumbers, whicharenotusuallyconsideredspatiotempo- ral.Whilethereisnoclearsenseinassertingthat nothingisreaLthereseemstobeaclearsensein assertingthatthereisnospatiotemporalworld, especiallyifitisaddedthattherearemindsand theirideas.ThiswasBerkeley'sview.Butcon- temporaryphilosopherswhoraisequestions abouttherealityofthespatiotemporalworldare notcomfortablewithBerkeleyanmindsand ideasandusuallyjustsomewhatvaguelyspeak of"ourselves"andour''representations."The latterarethemselvesoftenunderstoodasmate- rial(statesofourbrains),aclearlyinconsistent positionforanyonedenyingtherealityofthe spatiotemporalworld. Usually,thecontemporaryanti-realistdoes notactuallydenyitbutratheradoptsaview resemblingKanfstranscendentalidealism.Our onlyconceptionoftheworld,theanti-realist wouldargue,restsonourperceptualandcon- ceptualfaculties,includingourlanguage.But thenwhatreasondowehavetothinkthatthis conceptionistrue,thatitcorrespondstothe worldastheworldisinitself?Hadourfaculties andlanguagebeendifferent,surelywewould havehadverydifferentconceptionsofthe world.Andverydifferentconceptionsofitare possibleevenintermsofourpresentfaculties, asseemstobeshownbythefactthatverydif- ferentscientifictheoriescanbesupportedby exactlythesamedata.Sofar,wedonothave anti-realismproper.Butitisonlyashortstepto it:ifourconceptionofanindependentspa- tiotemporalworldisnecessarilysubjective,then wehavenogoodreasonforsupposingthatthere issuchaworld,especiallysinceitseemsself- contradictorytospeakofaconceptionthatis independentofourconceptualfaculties.Itis clearthatthisquestion,likealmostalltheques- tionsofgeneralmetaphysics,isatleastinpart epistemological. Metaphysicscanalsobeunderstoodinamore definitesense,suggestedbyAristotle'snotion(in hisMetaphysics,thetitleofwhichwasgivenbyan earlyeditorofhisworks,notbyAristotlehim- self)of"firstphilosophy,"namely,thestudyof beingquabeing,i.e.,ofthemostgeneralandnec- essarycharacteristicsthatanythingmusthavein ordertocountasabeing,anentity(ens).Some- times'ontology'isusedinthissense,butthisis bynomeanscommonpractice,'ontology'being oftenusedasasynonymof'metaphysics'. Examplesofcriteria(eachofwhichisamajor topicinmetaphysics)thatanythingmustmeetin ordertocountasabeing,anentity,arethefol- lowing. (A)Everyentitymustbeeitheranindividual thing(e.g.,Socratesandthisbook),ora property(e.g.,Socrates'colorandthe shapeofthisbook),orarelation(e.g.,mar- riageandthedistancebetweentwocities), oranevent(e.g.,Socrates'death),ora stateofaffairs(e.g.,Socrates'havingdied), oraset(e.g.,thesetofGreekphiloso- phers).Thesekindsofentitiesareusually calledcategories,andmetaphysicsisvery muchconcernedwiththequestion whetherthesearetheonlycategories,or whetherthereareothers,orwhethersome ofthemarenotultimatebecausetheyare reducibletoothers(e.g.,eventstostatesof affairs,orindividualthingstotemporal seriesofevents). (B)Theexistence,orbeing,ofathingiswhat makesitanentity. (C)Whateverhasidentityandisdistinctfrom everythingelseisanentity. (D)Thenatureofthe"connection"betweenan entityanditspropertiesandrelationsis 564 metaphysics metaphysics whatmakesitanentity.Everyentitymust havepropertiesandperhapsmustenter intorelationswithatleastsomeotherenti- ties. (E)Everyentitymustbelogicallyself-consis- tent.Itisnoteworthythatafterannounc- inghisprojectoffirstphilosophyAristotle immediatelyembarkedonadefenseofthe lawofnon-contradiction. Concerning(A)wemayask(i)whetherat leastsomeindividualthings(particulars)aresub- stances,intheAristoteliansense,i.e.,enduring throughtimeandchangesintheirpropertiesand relations,orwhetherallindividualthingsare momentary.Inthatcase,theindividualsofcom- monsense(e.g.,thisbook)arereallytemporal seriesofmomentaryindividuals,perhapsevents suchasthebook'sbeingonatableataspecific instant.Wemayalsoask(ii)whetheranyentity hasessentialproperties,i.e.,propertieswithout whichitwouldnotexist,orwhetherallproper- tiesareaccidental,inthesensethattheentity couldexistevenifitlöstthepropertyinquestion. Wemayask(iii)whetherpropertiesandrela- tionsareparticularsoruniversals,e.g.,whether thecolorofthispageandthecolorofthenext page,which(letusassume)areexactlyalike,are twodistinctentities,eachwithitsseparatespa- tiallocation,orwhethertheyareidenticaland thusoneentitythatisexemplifiedby,perhaps evenlocatedin,thetwopages. Concerning(B),wemayaskwhetherexis- tenceisitselfaproperty.Ifitis,howisittobe understood,andifitisnot,howarewetounder- stand'xexists'and'xdoesnotexist',whichseem crucialtoeverydayandscientificdiscourse,just asthethoughtstheyexpressseemcrucialto everydayandscientificthinking?Shouldwe countenance,asMeinongdid,objectshavingno existence,e.g.goldenmountains,eventhough wecantalkandthinkaboutthem?Wecantalk andthinkaboutagoldenmountainandeven claimthatitistruethatthemountainisgolden, whileknowingallalongthatwhatwearethink- ingandtalkingaboutdoesnotexist.Ifwedonot construenon-existentobjectsassomething, thenwearecommittedtothesomewhatstar- tlingviewthateverythingexists. Concerning(C)wemayaskhowtoconstrue informativeidentitystatements,suchas,touse Frege'sexample,'TheEveningStårisidentical withtheMorningStår'.Thiscontrastswithtriv- ialandperhapsdegeneratestatements,suchas 'TheEveningStårisidenticalwiththeEvening Står',whicharealmostnevermadeinordinary orscientificdiscourse.Theformerareessentialto anycoherent,systematiccognition(evento everydayrecognitionofpersonsandplaces).Yet theyarepuzzling.Wecannotsaythattheyassert oftwothingsthattheyareone,eventhoughordi- narylanguagesuggestspreciselythis.Neither canwejustsaythattheyassertthatacertain thingisidenticalwithitself,forthisviewwould beobviouslyfalseifthestatementsareinforma- tive.ThefactthatFrege'sexampleincludesdefi- nitedescriptions('theEveningStår','the MorningStår')isirrelevant,contrarytoRussell's view.Informativeidentitystatementscanalso haveastheirsubjecttermspropernamesand evendemonstrativepronouns(e.g.,'Hesperusis identicalwithPhosphorus'and'This[theshape ofthispage]isidenticalwiththat[theshapeof thenextpage]'),thereferenceofwhichisestab- lishednotbydescriptionbutostensively,perhaps byactualpointing. Concerning(D)wecanaskaboutthenature oftherelationship,usuallycalledinstantiationor exemplification,betweenanentityanditsprop- ertiesandrelations.Surely,thereissucharela- tionship.Butitcanhardlybelikeanordinary relationsuchasmarriagethatconnectsthingsof thesamekind.Andwecanaskwhatisthecon- nectionbetweenthatrelationandtheentitiesit relätes,e.g.,theindividualthingononehand anditspropertiesandrelationsontheother. Raisingthisquestionseemstoleadtoaninfinite regress,asBradleyheld;forthesupposedcon- nectionisyetanotherrelationtobeconnected withsomethingelse.Buthowdoweavoidthe regress?Surely,anindividualthinganditsprop- ertiesandrelationsarenotunrelateditems.They haveacertainunity.Butwhatisitscharacter? Moreover,wecanhardlyidentifytheindividual thingexceptbyreferencetoitspropertiesand relations.Yetifwesay,assomehave,thatitis nothingbutabundleofitspropertiesandrela- tions,couldtherenotbeanotherbundleof exactlythesamepropertiesandrelations,yet distinctfromthefirstone?(Thisquestioncon- cernstheso-calledproblemofindividuation,as wellastheprincipleoftheidentityofindis- cernibles.)Ifanindividualissomethingother thanitspropertiesandrelations(e.g.,whathas beencalledabareparticular),itwouldseemtobe unobservableandthusperhapsunknowable. Concerning(E),virtuallynophilosopherhas questionedthelawofnon-contradiction.But thereareimportantquestionsaboutitsstatus.Is itmerelyalinguisticconvention?Somehave heldthis,butitseemsquiteimplausible.Isthe lawofnon-contradictionadeeptruthabout 565 metaphysicsofpresence Metrodorus beingquabeing?Ifitis,(E)connectscloselywith (B)and(C),forwecanthinkoftheconceptsof self-consistency,identity,andexistenceasthe mostfundamentaimetaphysicalconcepts.They arealsofundamentaltologic,butlogic,evenif ultimatelygroundedinmetaphysics,hasarich additionalsubjectmatter(sometimesmerging withthatofmathematics)andthereforeisprop- erlyregardedasaseparatebranchofphilosophy. Theword'metaphysics'hasalsobeenusedin atleasttwoothersenses:first,theinvestigation ofentitiesandstatesofaffairs"transcending" humanexperience,inparticular,theexistenceof God,theimmortalityofthesoul,andthefree- domofthewill(thiswasKanfsconceptionofthe sortofmetaphysicsthat,accordingtohim, required"critique");andsecond,theinvestiga- tionofanyallegedsupernaturaloroccultphe- nomena,suchasghostsandtelekinesis.Thefirst senseisproperlyphilosophical,thoughseldom occurringtoday.Thesecondisstrictlypopulär, sincetherelevantsupernaturalphenomenaare mostquestionableonbothphilosophicalandsci- entificgrounds.Theyshouldnotbeconfused withthesubjectmatterofphilosophicaltheology, whichmaybethoughtofaspartofmetaphysics inthegeneralphilosophicalsense,thoughitwas includedbyAristotleinthesubjectmatterof metaphysicsinhissenseofthestudyofbeingqua being. Seealsobundletheory,causation,nat- uralism,PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION,PROP- ERTY,TIME.P.Bu. metaphysicsofpresence.Seederrida,postmod- ern. metatheorem.Seeformålsemantics. metatheory.Seephilosophyoflogic. metempsychosis.Seepythagoras. method,axiomatic.Seeaxiomaticmethod. methodicdoubt.Seedescartes. methodism.Seeproblemofthecriterion. methodofagreement.Seemill'smethods. methodofdifference.Seemill'smethods. methodofdoubt.Seedescartes. methodofresidues.Seemill'smethods. methodofsupervaluations.Seevagueness. methodologicalconservatism.Seephilosophyof SCIENCE. methodologicalholism,alsocalledmetaphysical holism,thethesisthatwithrespecttosomesys- temthereisexplanatoryemergence,i.e.,thelawsof themorecomplexsituationsinthesystemarenot deduciblebywayofanycompositionlawsor lawsofcoexistencefromthelawsofthesimpler orsimplestsituation(s).Explanatoryemergence mayexistinasystemforanyofthefollow- ingreasons:thatatsomemorecomplexlevel avariableinteractsthatdoesnotdosoatsimpler levels,thatapropertyofthe"whole"interacts withpropertiesofthe"parts,"thattherelevant variablesinteractbydifferentlawsatmore complexlevelsowingtothecomplexityofthe levels,or(thelimitingcase)thatstrictlawful- nessbreaksdownatsomemorecomplexlevel. Thus,explanatoryemergencedoesnotpresup- posedescriptiveemergence,thethesisthatthere arepropertiesof"wholes"(ormorecomplex situations)thatcannotbedefinedthrough thepropertiesofthe"parts"(orsimplersitua- tions). Theoppositeofmethodologicalholismis methodologicalindividualism,alsocalledexplana- toryreductionism,accordingtowhichalllawsof the"whole"(ormorecomplexsituations)canbe deducedfromacombinationofthelawsofthe simplerorsimplestsituation(s)andeithersome compositionlawsorlawsofcoexistence(de- pendingonwhetherornotthereisdescriptive emergence).Methodologicalindividualistsneed notdenythattheremaybesignificantlawful connectionsamongpropertiesofthe"whole," butmustinsistthatallsuchpropertiesareeither definablethrough,orconnectedbylawsofcoex- istencewith,propertiesofthe"parts." Seealsoholism,philosophyofthe SOCIALSCIENCES,REDUCTION.L.A. methodologicalindividualism.Seemethodologi- calHOLISM. methodologicalnaturalism.Seenaturalism. methodologicalskepticism.Seeskepticism. methodologicalsolipsism.Seesolipsism. methodology.Seephilosophyofscience. Metrodorus.Seeepicureanism. 566 microreduction Mill,James microreduction.Seereduction. middleknowledge,knowledgeofaparticular kindofpropositions,nowusuallycalled"coun- terfactuaisoffreedom/'firstattributedtoGodby thesixteenth-centuryJesuitLuisdeMolina. Thesepropositionsstate,concerningeachpossi- blefreecreatureGodcouldcreate,whatthat creaturewoulddoineachsituationof(libertar- ian)freechoiceinwhichitcouldpossiblyfind itself.TheclaimthatGodknowstheseproposi- tionsoffersimportanttheologicaladvantages;it helpsinexplainingbothhowGodcanhavefore- knowledgeoffreeactionsandhowGodcan maintaincloseprovidentialcontrolöveraworld containinglibertarianfreedom.Opponentsof middleknowledgetypicallyarguethatitis impossiblefortheretobetruecounterfactualsof freedom.Seealsofreewillproblem, molina.W.Has. MiddlePlatonism,theperiodofPlatonism betweenAntiochusofAscalon(c.130-68b.c.) andPlotinus(a.d.204-70),characterizedbya rejectionoftheskepticalstanceoftheNewAcad- emyandbyagradualadvance,withmanyindi- vidualvariations,towardacomprehensive dogmaticpositiononmetaphysicalprinciples, whileexhibitingacertainlatitude,asbetween StoicizingandPeripateticizingpositions,inthe sphereofethics. Antiochushimselfwasmuchinfluencedby Stoicmaterialism(thoughdisagreeingwiththe Stoicsinethics),butinthenextgenerationa neo-Pythagoreaninfluencemadeitselffelt,gen- eratingthemixofdoctrinesthatonemaymost properlytermMiddlePlatonic.FromEudorusof Alexandria(fl.c.25b.c.)on,atranscendental, two-worldmetaphysicprevailed,featuringa supremegod,orMonad,asecondarycreator god,andaworldsoul,withwhichcameasignif- icantchangeinethics,substituting,asan'endof goods'(telos),"likenesstoGod"(fromPlato, Theaetetus176b),fortheStoicizing"assimilation tonature"ofAntiochus. Ourviewoftheperiodishamperedbyalackof survivingtexts,butitisplainthat,intheabsence ofacentralvalidatingauthority(theAcademyas aninstitutionseemstohaveperishedinthewake ofthecaptureofAthensbyMithridatesin88 b.c),aconsiderablevarietyofdoctrineprevailed amongindividualPlatonistsandschoolsof Platonists,particularlyinrelationtoapreference forAristotelianorStoicprinciplesofethics. Mostknownactivityoccurredinthelatefirst andsecondcenturiesa.d.Chieffiguresinthis periodarePlutarchofChaeronea(c.45-125), CalvenusTaurus(fl.c.145),andAtticus(fl. c.175),whoseactivitycenteredonAthens (thoughPlutarchremainedloyaltoChaeroneain Boeotia);Gaius(fl.c.100)andAlbinus(fl. c.130)-nottobeidentifiedwith"Alcinous," authoroftheDidaskalikos;therhetoricianApu- leiusofMadaura(fl.cl50),whoalsocomposeda usefultreatiseonthelifeanddoctrinesofPlato; andtheneo-PythagoreansModeratusofGades (fl.c.90),NicomachusofGerasa(fl.c.140),and Numenius(fl.c.150),whodonot,however,con- stitutea"school."Goodevidenceforanearlier stageofMiddlePlatonismisprovidedbythe JewishphilosopherPhiloofAlexandria(c.25 B.C.-A.D.50). Perhapsthesinglemostimportantfigurefor thelåterPlatonismofPlotinusandhissuccessors isNumenius,ofwhoseworkswehaveonlyfrag- ments.Hisspeculationsonthenatureofthefirst principle,however,doseemtohavebeenastim- ulustoPlotinusinhispostulationofa supraessentialOne.Plutarchisimportantasalit- eraryfigure,thoughmostofhisseriousphilo- sophicalworksarelöst;andthehandbooksof AlcinousandApuleiusaresignificantforour understandingofsecond-centuryPlatonism. Seealsocommentariesonplato,neo- PLATONISM,PERIPATETICSCHOOL,PLATO, STOICISM.J.M.D. MiddleStoicism.Seestoicism. middleterm.Seesyllogism. middleway.Seemädhyamika. Milesians,thepre-SocraticphilosophersofMile- tus,aGreekcity-stateontheIoniancoastofAsia Minor.Duringthe6thcenturyb.c.Thales, Anaximander,andAnaximenesproducedthe earliestWesternphilosophies,stressinganarche ormaterialsourcefromwhichthecosmosandall thingsinitweregenerated.Seealsoanaxi- mander,ANAXIMENESOFMILETUS,THALES OFMILETUS.D.W.G. Mill,James(1773-1836),Scottish-bornphiloso- pherandsocialtheorist.Heappliedtheutilitari- anismofhiscontemporaryBenthamtosuch socialmattersassystemsofeducationandgov- ernment,lawandpenalsystems,andcolonial policy.Healsoadvocatedtheassociationismof Hume.Millwasaninfluentialthinkerinearly nineteenth-centuryLondon,buthismostimpor- tantroleinthehistoryofphilosophywasthe 567 MM,JohnStuart Mill,John,Stuart influencehehadonhisson,J.S.Mill.Heraised hismoreiamoussonasalivingexperimentinhis associationisttheoryoieducation.Hisutilitarian viewsweredevelopedandextendedbyJ.S.Mill, whilehisassociationismwasalsoadoptedbyhis sonandbecameaprecursoroithelatter'sphe- nomenalism.Seealsomill,j.s.A.N. Mill,JohnStuart(1806-73),Britishempiricist philosopherandutilitariansocialreformer.He wasthesonofJamesMill,ahistorianofBritish India,aleadingdefenderofBentham'sutilitari- anism,andanadvocateofreformsbasedonthat philosophy.TheyoungerMillwaseducatedby hisfatherinaccordancewiththeprinciplesofthe associationistpsychologyadoptedbytheBen- thamitesandderivingfromHartley,andwas raisedwiththeexpectationthathewould becomeadefenderoftheprinciplesoftheBen- thamiteschool.HebeganthestudyofGreekat threeandLatinateight,andlåterassistedhis fatherineducatinghisyoungerbrothersandsis- ters.AttwentyhewenttoFrancetolearnthe language,andstudiedchemistryandmathemat- icsatMontpellier.From1824to1828hewrote regularlyfortheWestminsterReview,theBen- thamitejournal.In1828heunderwentamen- talcrisisthatlastedsomemonths.Thishelåter attributedtohisrigideducation;inanycasehe emergedfromaperiodofdeepdepressionstill advocatingutilitarianismbutinaverymuch revisedversion.MillvisitedParisduringtherev- olutionof1830,meetingLafayetteandother populärleaders,andwasintroducedtothewrit- ingsofSaint-SimonandComte.Alsoin1830he metMrs.HarrietTaylor,towhomheimmedi- atelybecamedevoted.Theymarriedonlyin 1851,whenherhusbanddied.Hejoinedthe IndiaHouseheadquartersoftheEastIndiaCom- panyin1823,servingasanexamineruntilthe companywasdissolvedin1858intheaftermath oftheIndianMutiny.MillsatinParliamentfrom 1865to1868.HarrietMilldiedin1858,andwas buriedatAvignon,whereMillthereafterregu- larlyresidedforhalfofeachyearuntilhisown death. Mill'smajorworksarehisSystemofLogic,Deduc- tiveandInductive(firstedition,1843),Political Economy(firstedition,1848),OnLiberty(1860), Utilitarianism(firstpublishedinFraser'sMagazine, 1861),TheSubjectionofWomen(1869),AnExam- inationofSirWilliamHamilton'sPhilosophy(1865), andtheposthumousThreeEssaysonReligion (1874).Hiswritingstyleisexcellent,andhishis- toryofhisownmentaldevelopment,theAutobi- ography(1867),isamajorVictorianliterarytext. Hismainopponentsphilosophicallywere WhewellandHamilton,anditissafetosaythat afterMilltheirintuitionisminmetaphysics,phi- losophyofscience,andethicscouldnolongerbe defended.Mill'sownviewswerelåtertobe eclipsedbythoseofT.H.Green,F.H.Bradley, andtheotherBritishidealists.Inthepresentcen- turyhisviewsinmetaphysicsandphilosophyof sciencehavebeenrevivedanddefendedbyRus- sellandthelogicalpositivists,whilehisutilitar- ianethicshasregaineditsstatusasoneofthe majorethicaltheories.Hissocialphilosophy deeplyinfuencedtheFabiansandothergroups ontheBritishleft;itsimpactcontinues. Millwasbroughtuponthebasisof,andto believein,thestrictutilitarianismofhisfather. Hisowndevelopmentlargelyconsistedinhis attemptstobroadenit,toincludealargerand moresympatheticviewofhumannature,andto humanizeitsprogramtoätthisbroaderviewof humanbeings.Inhisownview,nodoubtlargely correct,hedidnotsomuchrejecthisfather's principlesasfillinthegapsandeliminaterigidi- tiesandcrudities.Hecontinuedthroughouthis lifehisfather'sconcemtopropagateprinciples conceivedasessentialtopromotinghumanhap- piness.Theseextendedfrommoralprinciplesto principlesofpoliticaleconomytoprinciplesof logicandmetaphysics. Psychology.Mill'svisionofthehumanbeing wasrootedinthepsychologicaltheorieshe defended.Arguingagainsttheintuitionismof ReidandWhewell,heextendedtheassociation- ismofhisfather.Onthistheory,ideashavetheir geneticantecedentsinsensation,acomplexidea beinggeneratedoutofauniquesetofsimple, elementaryideas,throughassociationsbasedon regularpatternsinthepresentedsensations.Psy- chologicalanalysisrevealstheelementaryparts ofideasandisthusthemeansforinvestigating thecausaloriginsofourideas.TheelderMillfol- lowedLockeinconceivinganalysisonthemodel ofdefinition,sothatthepsychologicalelements arepresentintheideatheycomposeandtheidea isnothingbutitsassociatedelements.The youngerMillemergedfromhismentalcrisis withtherecognitionthatmentalstatesareoften morethanthesumoftheideasthataretheir geneticantecedents.Ontherevisedmodelof analysis,theanalyticalelementsarenotactually presentintheidea,butarepresentonlydisposi- tionally,readytoberecoveredbyassociation undertheanalyticalset.Moreover,itiswords thataredefined,notideas,thoughwordsbecome generalonlybybecomingassociatedwithideas. 568 Mill,JohnStuart Mill,JohnStuart Analysisthusbecameanempiricaltask,rather thansomethingsettledaprioriaccordingtoone's metaphysicalpredispositions,asithadbeenfor Mill'spredecessors.Therevisedpsychology allowedtheyoungerMilltoaccountempirically inamuchmoresubtlewaythancouldtheear- lierassociationistsforthevariationsinourstates offeeling.Thus,forexample,theoriginalmotive toactionissimplesensationsofpleasure,but throughassociationthingsoriginallydesiredas meansbecomeassociatedwithpleasureand therebybecomedesirableasends,aspartsof one'spleasure.Buttheseacquiredmotivesare notmerelythesumofthesimplepleasuresthat makethemup;theyaremorethanthesumof thosegeneticantecedents.Thus,whileMillholds withhisfatherthatpersonsseektomaximize theirpleasures,unlikehisfatherhealsoholds thatnotallendsareselfish,andthatpleasures arenotonlyquantitativelybutalsoqualitatively distinct. Ethics.Inethics,then,Millcanholdwiththe intuitioniststhatourmoralsentimentsarequal- itativelydistinctfromthelowerpleasures,while denyingtheintuitionistconclusionthattheyare innate.Millurges,withhisfatherandBentham, thatthebasicmoralnormistheprincipleofutil- ity,thatanactionisrightprovideditmaximizes humanwelfare.Personsalwaysacttomaximize theirownpleasure,butthegeneralhumanwel- farecanbeamongthepleasurestheyseek.Mill's positionthusdoesnothavetheproblemsthat theapparentlyegoisticpsychologyofhisfather created.Theonlyissueiswhetherapersonought tomaximizehumanwelfare,whetherheoughtto bethesortofpersonwhoissomotivated. Mill'sownethicsisthatthisisindeedwhatone oughttobe,andhetriestobringthisstateof humanbeingaboutinothersbyexample,andby urgingthemtoexpandtherangeoftheirhuman sympathythroughpoetrylikethatofWords- worth,throughreadingthegreatmoralteachers suchasJesusandSocrates,andbyothermeans ofmoralimprovement. Millalsooffersanargumentindefenseofthe principleofutility.Againstthosewho,like Whewell,arguethatthereisnobasicrightto pleasure,hearguesthatasamatterofpsycho- logicalfact,peopleseekonlypleasure,andcon- cludesthatitisthereforepointlesstosuggestthat theyoughttodoanythingotherthanthis.The testofexperiencethusexcludesendsotherthan pleasure.Thisisaplausibleargument.Lessplau- sibleishisfurtherargumentthatsinceeachseeks herownpleasure,thegeneralgoodisthe(ulti- mate)aimofall.Thislatterargumentunfortu- natelypresupposestheinvalidpremisethatthe lawforawholefollowsfromlawsabouttheindi- vidualpartsofthewhole. Othermoralrulescanbejustifiedbytheirutil- ityandthetestofexperience.Forexample,such principlesofjusticeastherulesofpropertyand ofpromisekeepingarejustifiedbytheirrolein servingcertainfundamentalhumanneeds. Exceptionstosuchsecondaryrulescanbejusti- fiedbyappealtotheprincipleofutility.Butthere isalsoutilityinnotrequiringineveryapplication alengthyutilitariancalculation,whichprovides anobjectivejustificationforoverlookingwhat mightbe,objectivelyconsideredintermsofthe principleofutility,anexceptiontoasecondary rule. Logicandphilosophyofscience.Thetestof experienceisalsobroughttobearonnorms otherthanthoseofmorality,e.g.,thoseoflogic andphilosophyofscience.Millargues,against therationalists,thatscienceisnotdemonstrative fromintuitedpremises.Reasoninthesenseof deductivelogicisnotalogicofproofbutalogic ofconsistency.Thebasicaxiomsofanyscience arederivedthroughgeneralizationfromexperi- ence.Theaxiomsaregenericanddelimitarange ofpossiblehypothesesaboutthespecificsubject mattertowhichtheyareapplied.Itisthenthe taskofexperimentand,moregenerally,obser- vationtoeliminatethefalseanddetermine whichhypothesisistrue.Theaxioms,themost genericofwhichisthelawoftheuniformityof nature,arearrivedatnotbythissortofprocess ofeliminationbutbyinductionbysimpleenu- meration:Millarguesplausiblythatonthebasis ofexperiencethismethodbecomesmorereliable themoregenericisthehypothesisthatitisused tojustify.ButlikeHume,Millholdsthatforany generalizationfromexperiencetheevidencecan neverbesufficienttoeliminateallpossibilityof doubt. ExplanationforMill,asforthelogicalposi- tivists,isbysubsumptionundermatter-of-fact generalizations.Causalgeneralizationsthatstate sufficientornecessaryandsufficientconditions aremoredesirableasexplanationsthanmere regularities.Stillmoredesirableisalaworbody oflawsthatgivesnecessaryandsufficientcondi- tionsforanystateofasystem,i.e.,abodyoflaws forwhichtherearenoexplanatorygaps.Asfor explanationoflaws,thiscanproceedeitherby fillingingapsorbysubsumingthelawundera generictheorythatunifiesthelawsofseveral areas. 569 Mill,JohnStuart Mill,JohnStuart Millarguesthatinthesocialsciencesthesub- jectmatteristoocomplextoapplythenormal methodsofexperiment.Buthealsorejectsthe purelydeductivemethodoftheBenthamite politicaleconomistssuchashisfatherandDavid Ricardo.Rather,onemustdeducethelawsfor wholes,i.e.,thelawsofeconomicsandsociology, fromthelawsfortheparts,i.e.,thelawsofpsy- chology,andthentestthesederivedlawsagainst theaccumulateddataofhistory.Millgottheidea forthismethodologyofthesocialsciencesfrom Comte,butunfortunatelyitisvitiatedbythe falseidea,alreadynoted,thatonecandeduce withoutanyfurtherpremisethelawsforwholes fromthelawsfortheparts.Subsequentmethod- ologistsofthesocialscienceshavecometosub- stitutethemorereasonablemethodsofstatistics forthisinvalidmethodMillproposes. Mill'saccountofscientificmethoddoeswork wellforempiricalsciences,suchasthechemistry ofhisday.Hewasabletoshow,too,thatitmade goodsenseofagreatdealofphysics,thoughitis arguablethatitcannotdojusticetotheoriesthat explaintheatomicandsubatomicstructureof matter-somethingMillhimselfwaspreparedto acknowledge.Healsoattemptedtoapplyhis viewstogeometry,andevenmoreimplausibly, toarithmetic.Intheseareas,hewascertainly bestedbyWhewell,andtheworldhadtowaitfor thelogicalworkofRussellandWhiteheadbefore areasonableempiricistaccountoftheseareas becameavailable. Metaphysics.Thestartingpointofallinfer- enceisthesortofobservationwemakethrough oursenses,andsinceweknowbyexperience thatwehavenoideasthatdonotderivefrom senseexperience,itfollowsthatwecannotcon- ceiveaworldbeyondwhatweknowbysense. Tobesure,wecanformgenericconcepts,such asthatofanevent,whichenableustoformcon- ceptsofentitiesthatwecannotexperience,e.g., theconceptofthetinyspeckofsandthatstoppedmy watchortheconceptoftheeventthatisthecauseof mypresentsensation.Millheldthatwhatweknow ofthelawsofsensationissufficienttomakeit reasonabletosupposethattheimmediatecause ofone'spresentsensationisthestateofone's nervoussystem.Ourconceptofanobjective physicalobjectisalsoofthissort;itisthesetof eventsthatjointlyconstituteapermanentpossi- blecauseofsensation.Itisourinductiveknowl- edgeoflawsthatjustifiesourbeliefsthatthere areentitiesthatfallundertheseconcepts.The pointisthattheseentities,whileunsensed,are (wereasonablybelieve)partoftheworldwe knowbymeansofoursenses. Thecontrastistosuchthingsasthesubstances andtranscendentIdeasofrationalists,ortheGod ofreligiousbelievers,entitiesthatcanbeknown onlybymeansthatgobeyondsenseandinduc- tiveinferencestherefrom.Millremainedessen- tiallypre-Darwinian,andwaswillingtoallow theplausibilityofthehypothesisthatthereisan intelligentdesignerfortheperceivedorderinthe universe.Butthishasthestatusofascientific hypothesisratherthanabeliefinasubstanceor apersonalGodtranscendingtheworldofexpe- rienceandtime.Whewell,atoncethedefender ofrationalistideasforscienceandforethicsand thedefenderofestablishedreligion,isaspecial objectforMill'sscorn. Socialandpoliticalthought.WhileMillis respectfuloftheteachingsofreligiousleaders suchasJesus,theinstitutionsofreligion,like thoseofgovernmentandoftheeconomy,areall tobesubjectedtocriticismbasedontheprinci- pleofutility:Dotheycontributetohumanwel- fare?Arethereanyalternativesthatcoulddo better?Thus,Millarguesthatafree-market economyhasmanybenefitsbutthatthedefects, intermsofpovertyformany,thatresultfrom privateownershipofthemeansofproduction mayimplythatweshouldinstitutethealtema- tiveofsocialismorpublicownershipofthe meansofproduction.Hesimilarlyarguesforthe utilityoflibertyasasocialinstitution:undersuch asocialorderindividualitywillbeencouraged, andthisindividualityinturntendstoproduce innovationsinknowledge,technology,and moralitythatcontributesignificantlytoimprov- ingthegeneralwelfare.Conversely,institutions andtraditionsthatstifleindividuality,asreligious institutionsoftendo,shouldgraduallybere- formed.Similarconsiderationsargueontheone handfordemocraticrepresentativegovernment andontheotherforalegalsystemofrightsthat candefendindividualsfromthetyrannyofpub- licopinionandofthemajority. Statusofwomen.Amongthethingsforwhich Millcampaignedwerewomen'srights,women's suffrage,andequalaccessforwomentoeduca- tionandtooccupations.Hecouldnotescapehis ageandcontinuedtoholdthatitwasundesirable forawomantoworktohelpsupportherfamily. WhilehedisagreedwithhisfatherandBentham thatallmotivesareegoisticandself-interested, henonethelessheldthatinmostaffairsofeco- 570 milletparadox Mill'smethods nomicsandgovernmentsuchmotivesaredom- inant.Hewasthereforeledtodisagreewithhis fatherthatvotesforwomenareunnecessary sincethemalecanspeakforthefamily.Women's votesareneededpreciselytocheckthepursuitof maleself-interest.Moregenerally,equalityis essentialiftheinterestsofthefamilyassuchare tobeserved,ratherthanmakingthefamilyserve maleself-interestashadhithertobeenthecase. Changingtherelationbetweenmenandwomen tooneofequalitywillforcebothpartiestocurb theirself-interestandbroadentheirsocialsym- pathiestoincludeothers.Women'ssuffrageisan essentialsteptowardthemoralimprovementof humankind. Seealsobentham,empiricism,mill's METHODS,PHILOSOPHYOFTHESOCIALSCI- ENCES,UTILITARIANISM,WHEWELL.F.W. milletparadox.Seesoritesparadox. Mill'smethods,proceduresfordiscoveringnec- essaryconditions,sufficientconditions,andnec- essaryandsufficientconditions,wherethese termsareusedasfollows:ifwheneverAthenB (e.g.,wheneverthereisafirethenoxygenis present),thenBisanecessary(cansal)conditionfor A;andifwheneverCthenD(e.g.,whenever sugarisinwater,thenitdissolves),thenCisasuf- ficient(cansal)conditionforD. Methodofagreement.Givenapairofhypoth- esesaboutnecessaryconditions,e.g., (1)wheneverylthenBl wheneverAthenB2, thenanobservationofanindividualthatisAbut notB2willeliminatethesecondalternativeas false,enablingonetoconcludethattheunelim- inatedhypothesisistrue.Thismethodfordis- coveringnecessaryconditionsiscalledthe methodofagreement.Toillustratethemethodof agreement,supposeseveralpeoplehaveall becomeilluponeatingpotatosaladatarestau- rant,buthaveinotherrespectshadquitediffer- entmeals,somehavingmeat,somevegetables, somedesserts.Beingillandnoteatingmeat eliminatesthelatterasthecause;beingilland noteatingdesserteliminatesthelatterascause; andsoon.Itistheconditioninwhichtheindi- vidualswhoareillagreethatisnoteliminated. Wethereforeconcludethatthisisthecauseor necessaryconditionfortheillness. Methodofdifference.Similarly,withrespect tothepairofhypothesesconcerningsufficient conditions,e.g., (2)wheneverClthenD wheneverC2thenD, anindividualthatisCYbutnotDwilleliminate thefirsthypothesisandenableonetoconclude thatthesecondistrue.Thisisthemethodofdif- ference.Asimplechangewilloftenyieldanexam- pleofaninferencetoasufficientconditionbythe methodofdifference.Ifsomethingchangesfrom CjtoC2,andalsothereuponchangesfromnot- DtoD,onecanconcludethatC,inrespectof whichtheinstancesdiffer,isthecauseofD.Thus, Becquereldiscoveredthatburnscanbecaused byradium,i.e.,proximitytoradiumisasufficient butnotnecessaryconditionforbeingburned, whenheinferredthattheradiumhecarriedina bottleinhispocketwasthecauseofabumon hislegbynotingthatthepresenceoftheradium wastheonlyrelevantcausaldifferencebetween thetimewhentheburnwaspresentandtheear- liertimewhenitwasnot. Clearly,bothmethodscanbegeneralizedto coveranyfinitenumberofhypothesesintheset ofalternatives.Thetwomethodscanbecom- binedinthejointmethodofagreementanddifference toyieldthediscoveryofconditionsthatareboth necessaryandsufficient. Sometimesitispossibletoeliminateanalter- native,notonthebasisofobservation,butonthe basisofpreviouslyinferredlaws.Ifweknowby previousinductionsthatnoC2isD,thenobser- vationisnotneededtoeliminatethesecond hypothesisof(2),andwecaninferthatwhat remains,ortheresidue,givesusthesufficient conditionforD.Whereanalternativeiselimi- natedbypreviousinductions,wearesaidtouse themethodofresidues. Themethodsmaybegeneralizedtocover quantitativelaws.AcauseofQmaybetakennot tobeanecessaryandsufficientcondition,buta factorPonwhosemagnitudethemagnitudeof Qfunctionallydepends.IfPvarieswhenQ varies,thenonecanusemethodsofelimination toinferthatPcausesQ.Thishasbeencalledthe methodofconcomitantvariation.Morecomplicated methodsareneededtoinferwhatpreciselyisthe functionthatcorrelatesthetwomagnitudes. Clearly,ifwearetoconcludethatoneof(1)is trueonthebasisofthegivendata,weneedan additionalpremisetotheeffectthat thereisatleastonenecessaryconditionforB anditisamongthesetconsistingofAandA2. 571 MTmamsa mimesis Theexistenceclaimhereisknownasaprincipleof determinismandthedelimitedrangeofaltema- tivesisknownasaprincipleoflimitedvariety. Similarprinciplesareneededfortheothermeth- ods.Suchprinciplesareclearlyempirical,and mustbegivenpriorinductivesupportifthe methodsofeliminationaretobeconclusive.In practice,genericscientifictheoriesprovidethese principlestoguidetheexperimenter.Thus,on thebasisoftheobservationsthatjustifiedKep- ler'slaws,Newtonwasabletoeliminateall hypothesesconcerningtheforcethatmovedthe planetsaboutthesunsavetheinversesquare law,providedthathealsoassumedasapplyingto thisspecificsortofsystemthegenerictheoretical frameworkestablishedbyhisthreelawsof motion,whichassertedthatthereexistsaforce accountingforthemotionoftheplanets(deter- minism)andthatthisforcesatisfiescertaincon- ditions,e.g.,theaction-reactionlaw(limited variety). Theeliminativemethodsconstitutethebasic logicoftheexperimentalmethodinscience. TheywerefirstelaboratedbyFrancisBacon(see J.Weinberg,Abstraction,Relation,andInduction, 1965).TheywererestatedbyHume,elaborated byJ.F.W.Herschel,andlocatedcentrallyinsci- entificmethodologybyJ.S.Mill.Theirstructure wasstudiedfromtheperspectiveofmodern developmentsinlogicbyKeynes,W.E.Johnson, andespeciallyBroad. Seealsocausation,confirmation,grue PARADOX,INDUCTION,PHILOSOPHYOFSCI- ENCE.F.W. MImämsä,alsocalledPurvaMImämsä,anortho- doxschoolwithinHinduismthatacceptsthe existenceofeverlastingsoulsormindstowhich consciousnessisnotintrinsic,everlastingmater- ialatoms,andmind-independentphysical objectscausedbythenaturalmutualattraction ofatoms.Atheistic,itaccepts-incommonwith theotherorthodoxschools-thedoctrinesofthe beginninglesstransmigrationofsoulsandthe operationofkarma. MImämsäacceptsperception,inference,and testimony(orauthority)asreliablesourcesof knowledge.Testimonycomesintwokinds,per- sonalandimpersonal.Personaltestimony (someone'sspökenorwrittenword,giving knowledgeifthepersongivingitisreliable)is descriptive.Impersonaltestimony(theVedas)is imperatival,givingcommandsthatritualactions beperformed;properlyunderstandingandfol- lowingthesecommandsisessentialtoachieving enlightenment.Reliablepersonaltestimonypre- supposesreliableperceptionandinference; impersonaltestimonydoesnot. Postulationistakentobeafourthsourceof knowledge.IfthepostulationthateventA occurredadequatelyexplainsthateventB occurred,thoughAisunobservedandthereisno necessaryoruniversalconnectionbetween eventslikeAandeventslikeB,onecanknow thatAoccurred,butthisknowledgeisneither perceptualnorinferential.Ineffect,thisdistin- guishesinferencetobestexplanation(abduc- tion)frominductivereasoning. Seealsohinduism,karma.K.E.Y. mimesis(fromGreekmimesis,'imitation'),the modelingofonethingonanother,orthepre- sentingofonethingbyanother;imitation.The conceptplayedacentralroleintheaccountfor- mulatedbyPlatoandAristotleofwhatwewould nowcallthefinearts.Thepoet,thedramatist,the painter,themusician,thesculptor,allcomposea mimesisofreality.ThoughPlato,inhisaccountof painting,definitelyhadinmindthatthepainter imitatesphysicalreality,thegeneralconceptof mimesisusedbyPlatoandAristotleisusually bettertranslatedby'representation'thanby'imi- tation':itbelongstothenatureoftheworkofart torepresent,tore-present,reality.Thisrepresen- tationalormimetictheoryofartremainedfarand awaythedominanttheoryintheWestuntilthe riseofRomanticism-thoughbynomeansev- eryoneagreedwithPlatothatitisconcreteitems ofphysicalrealitythattheartistrepresents.The holdofthemimetictheorywasbrokenbythe insistenceoftheRomanticsthat,ratherthanthe workofartbeinganimitation,itistheartistwho, inhisorhercreativeactivity,imitatesNatureor Godbycomposinganautonomousobject. Fewcontemporarytheoristsofartwouldsay thattheessenceofartistorepresent;themimetic theoryisallbutdead.Inpartthisisareflectionof thepoweroftheRomanticalternativetothe mimetictheory;inpartitisareflectionoftherise toprominenceöverthelastcenturyofnon- objective,abstractpaintingandsculptureandof "absolute"instrumentalmusic.Nonetheless,the phenomenonofrepresentationhasnotceasedto drawtheattentionoftheorists.Inrecentyears threequitedifferentgeneraltheoriesofrepresen- tationhaveappeared:NelsonGoodman's(The LanguagesofArt),NicholasWolterstorffs(Works andWorldsofArt),andKendallWalton's(Mimesis asMake-Believe). Seealsoaesthetics.N.P.W. 572 mimetictheoryofart M'Naghtenrule mimetictheoryofart.Seemimesis. mind.Seehsin1,philosophyofmind,problemof OTHERMINDS. mind,causaltheoryof.Seefunctionalism. mind,philosophyof.Seephilosophyofmind. mind-bodyproblem.Seephilosophyofmind. ming,Chinesetermmeaning'fäte','mandate'.In general,mingiswhatisoutsideofhumancon- trol.'Ming'isthusnearlysynonymouswithone useof't'ien',asintheobservationbyMencius: "Thatwhichisdonewhennoonedoesitisdue tot'ien;thatwhichcomesaboutwhennoone bringsitaboutisduetoming."Mingcanalsorefer tothemandatetorulegivenbyt'ienorthe "moralendowment"ofeachhuman.Seealso CHUNG-YUNG,T'lEN.B.W.V.N. mingchia.Seeschoolofnames. minimalisttheoryoftruth.Seetruth. minimaxstrategy.Seemaximinstrategy. Minkowskispace-time.Seerelativity,space- TIME. minorpremise.Seesyllogism. minorterm.Seesyllogism. minuteperceptions,doctrineof.Seeleibniz. miracle,anextraordinaryeventbroughtabout byGod.Inthemedievalunderstandingof nature,objectshavecertainnaturalpowersand tendenciestoexercisethosepowersundercer- taincircumstances.Stoneshavethepowertofall totheground,andthetendencytoexercisethat powerwhenliberatedfromaheight.Amiracle isthenanextraordinaryeventinthatitisnot broughtaboutbyanyobjectexercisingitsnat- uralpowers-e.g.,aliberatedstonerisinginthe air-butbroughtaboutdirectlybyGod. Inthemodernunderstandingofnature,there arejustevents(statesofobjects)andlawsof naturethatdeterminewhicheventsfollow whichotherevents.Thereisalawofnaturethat heavybodieswhenliberatedfalltotheground. Amiracleisthena"violation"ofalawofnature byGod.Wemustunderstandbyalawaprinci- plethatdetermineswhathappensunlessthereis interventionfromoutsidethenaturalorder,and bya"violation"suchanintervention.Thereare thenthreeproblemsinidentifyingamiracle.The firstistodeterminewhetheraneventofsome kind,ifitoccurred,wouldbeaviolationofalaw ofnature(beyondthenaturalpowerofobjects tobringabout).Toknowthiswemustknow whatarethelawsofnature.Thesecondproblem istofindoutwhethersuchaneventdidoccuron aparticularoccasion.Ourownmemories,the testimonyofwitnesses,andphysicaltraceswill bethehistoricalevidenceofthis,buttheycan mislead.Andtheevidencefromwhathappened onotheroccasionsthatsomelawLisalawof natureisevidencesupportingtheviewthaton theoccasioninquestionLwasoperative,andso therewasnoviolation.Humeclaimedthatin practicetherehasneverbeenenoughhistorical evidenceforamiracletooutweighthelatterkind ofcounterevidence.Finally,itmustbeshown thatGodwasthecauseoftheviolation.Forthat weneedgroundsfromnaturaltheologyfor believingthatthereisaGodandthatthisisthe sortofoccasiononwhichheislikelytointervene innature. Seealsoevent,lawlikegeneralization, PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION.R.Sw. Miskawayh(936-c.1030),Persiancourtier- statesman,historian,physician,andadvocateof GreekandotherancientleaminginIslam.HisOn theRefinementofCharacter(tr.Constantine Zurayk,1968)hasbeencalled"themostinflu- entialworkonphilosophicalethics"inIslam.It transmutesKoraniccommandethicsintoan Aristotelianvirtueethicswhosegoalisthedisci- plining(ta'dib,ef.theGreekpaideia)ofournat- uralirascibility,allowingourdeeperunitytobe expressedinloveandfellowship.Miskawayh's systemwascopiedwidely-crucially,inal-Gha- zäli'sall-but-canonicaltreatmentofvirtue ethics-butdenaturedbyal-GhazälI'ssubstitu- tionofpietisticthemeswhereMiskawayh seemedtoosecularorhumanistic.Seealsoal- GHAZÄLI.L.E.G. misplacedconcreteness,fallacyof.Seewhitehead. Mitfreude.Seevalue. mixedhypotheticalsyllogism.Seesyllogism. M'Naghtenrule,aruleinAnglo-Americancrim- inallawdefininglegalinsanityforpurposesof 573 mnemiccausation modallogic creatingadefensetocriminalliability:legal insanityisanydefectofreason,duetodiseaseof themind,thatcausesanaccusedcriminaleither nottoknowthenatureandqualityofhisact,or nottoknowthathisactwasmorallyorlegally wrong.AdoptedintheM'NaghtencaseinEng- landin1843,theruleharksbacktotherespon- sibilitytestforchildren,whichwaswhetherthey werematureenoughtoknowthedifference betweenrightandwrong.Theruleisaltema- tivelyviewedtodayasbeingeitheratestofa humanbeing'sgeneralstatusasamoralagentor atestofwhenanadmittedmoralagentis nonethelessexcusedbecauseofeitherfactualor moral/legalmistakes.Onthefirst(orstatus)in- terpretationoftherule,theinsaneareexempted fromcriminalliabilitybecausethey,likeyoung children,lacktherationalagencyessentialto moralpersonhood.Onthesecond(ormistake) interpretationoftherule,theinsaneare exemptedfromcriminalliabilitybecausethey instantiatetheacceptedmoralexcusesofmis- takeorignorance.Seealsodiminished CAPACITY,RESPONSIBILITY.M.S.M. mnemiccausation,atypeofcausationinwhich, inordertoexplaintheproximatecauseofan organism'sbehavior,itisnecessarytospecifynot onlythepresentstateoftheorganismandthe presentstimulioperatinguponit,butalsothe pastexperiencesoftheorganism.Thetermwas introducedbyRussellinTheAnalysisofMind (1921).Seealsomemory.N.G. modalities,alethic.Seealethicmodalities. modality,themannerinwhichaproposition(or statement)describesorappliestoitssubjectmat- ter.Derivatively'modality'referstocharacteris- ticsofentitiesorstatesofaffairsdescribedby modalpropositions. Modalitiesareclassifiedasfollows:Assertoric propositionsareexpressionsofmerefact.Alethic modalitiesincludenecessityandpossibility(the lattertwosometimesarereferredtorespectively astheapodicticandproblematicmodalities).The causalmodalitiesincludecausal(orempirical) necessityandpossibility,whereasthedeontic modalitiesincludeobligationandpermittedness. Thereareepistemicmodalitiessuchasknowing thatanddoxasticonessuchasbelievingthat. Followingmedievallogicians,propositionscan bedistinguishedonthebasisofwhetherthe modalityisintroducedviaadverbialmodification ofthecopulaorverb(sensusdivisus)orviaa modaloperatorthatmodifiestheproposition (sensuscompositus).Todaymanydenythedistinc- tionorconfineattentionjusttomodaloperators. Modaloperatorsinnon-assertoricpropositions aresaidtoproducereferentialopacityoroblique contextsinwhichtruthisnotpreservedunder substitutionofextensionallyequivalentexpres- sions. Modalanddeonticlogicsprovideformål analysesofvariousmodalities.Intensionallogics investigatethelogicofobliquecontexts.Modal logicianshaveproducedpossibleworldsseman- ticsinterpretationswhereinpropositionsMP withmodaloperatorMaretrueprovidedPistrue inallsuitable(e.g.,logicallypossible,causally possible,morallypermissible,rationallyaccept- able)possibleworlds.Modalrealismgrantsonto- logicalstatustopossibleworldsotherthanthe actualworldorotherwisecommitstoobjective modalitiesinnatureorreality. Seealsointensionallogic,modal LOGIC,QUANTIFYINGIN.F.S. modality,iterated.Seealethicmodalities. modality,practical.Seefreewillproblem. modality,problematic.Seemodality. modalitydedicto.Seeessentialism. modalitydere.Seeessentialism. modallogic,thestudyofthelogicoftheopera- tors'itispossiblethat'and'itisnecessarythat'. Theseoperatorsareusuallysymbolizedbyand □respectively,andeachcanbedefinedinterms oftheother.Tosaythatapropositionispossible, orpossiblytrue,istosaythatitisnotnecessar- ilyfalse.Thus$couldberegardedasanabbre- viationof~D~could beregardedasanabbreviationof~0~.How- ever,itaidscomprehensiontotakebothopera- torsasprimitive. Systemsofsententialmodallogicareobtained byaddingand□tosententiallogic;ifthesen- tentiallogicisclassical/intuitionist/minimal,sois thecorrespondingmodallogic.Weconcentrate ontheclassicalcasehere.Aswithanykindof logic,therearethreecomponentstoasystemof modallogic:asyntax,whichdeterminesthefor- mallanguageS£andthenotionofwell-formed formula(wff);asemantics,whichdetermines thesemanticconsequencerelation1=on££-wffs; andasystemofinference,whichdeterminesthe 574 modallogic modallogic deductiveconsequencerelationhoni£-wffs.The syntaxofthemodaloperatorsisthesamein everysystem:briefly,themodaloperatorsare one-placeconnectiveslikenegation.Thereare manydifferentsystemsofmodallogic,someof whichcanbegeneratedbydifferentwaysofset- tingupthesemantics.Eachofthefamiliarways ofdoingthiscanbeassociatedwithasoundand completesystemofinference.Alternatively,a systemofinferencecanbelaiddownfirstandwe cansearchforasemanticsforitrelativetowhich itissoundandcomplete.Herewegiveprimacy tothesemanticviewpoint. Semanticconsequenceisdefinedinmodal logicintheusualclassicalway:asetofsentences £semanticallyentailsasentencea,21=a,ifand onlyifnointerpretationImakesallmembersof Etrueandofalse.Thequestionishowtoextend thenotionofinterpretationfromsententiallogic toaccommodatethemodaloperators.Inclassi- calsententiallogic,aninterpretationisanassign- menttoeachsentenceletterofexactlyoneofthe twotruth-valuesTand±,andthetruth-value ofasentenceinaninterpretationiscalculatedby applyingthetruth-functionsexpressed,accord- ingtothesemantics,bytheconnectives,tothe sentencelettersofthesentence.Butwecannot extendthistomodallogicbyassigningsomefur- thertruth-functionstothemodaloperators, sinceneitheroftheseoperatorsexpressesa truth-function.Forexample,givenjustthattyis true,wecannotdeterminethetruth-valueofOty, forifisacontingenttruth('Humeisafamous philosopher')then\Dtyisfalse,whileiftyisnec- essary('Allfamousphilosophersarephiloso- phers')then\3tyistrue. Thesolutionistoregardand□asquantifiers överentitiescalledpossibleworlds.Apossible worldisacompletewaythingsmightbeormight havebeen;theactualworldisapossibleworld andsoisanyotherwaythingsmighthavegone, e.g.oneinwhichHumewasobscure.\3tyisthen interpretedassayingthatistrueinallpossible worlds,whiletyisinterpretedassayingthatty istrueatatkastonepossibleworld.Astatement istrueifitistrueattheactualworld(usually denoted'w*'),andgivensomesupplyofpossible worlds,thetruth-valueofanystatementtyatthe actualworldcanbecalculatedbyapplyingthese tworulesforthemodaloperators(togetherwith thetruth-functionsforthenon-modalconnec- tives).Forexample,D(B—>0(C&D))istrueatw* ifB—>(C&D)istrueateveryworldw,which requiresinturnthateitherBisfalseatworelse thatatsomeworldu,CandDarebothtrue.Thus wecancalculatethetruth-valueofD(B—>(C& D))providedweknowthetruth-valuesofthe sentencelettersB,C,andDateachworld. Aninterpretationshouldthereforecontaina collectionWofpossibleworlds(includingone designatedasw*)andaspecification,foreach worldw,ofthetruth-valuesofallsentencelet- tersatw;inotherwords,acollectionWofworlds thatassociateseachwinWwithaninterpreta- tionofthenon-modalpartofthelanguage. However,thereisalsoathirdcomponent.A worldvmaybesaidtobepossiblerelativetoa worlduifnopropositionnecessarilytrueatuis falseatv.Theideahereistoaccommodatethe thoughtthatwhatisnecessaryorpossiblemay dependonhowthingsactuallyare;thus,given thewaythingsactuallyare,certainthingsmay bepossiblethatwouldnotbepossibleifthings hadactuallybeendifferent.SupposethatImight haveoriginatedfromadifferentsperm,oradif- ferentegg,butnotboth,andsupposethatatthe actualworldIoriginatefromslandesothat thereisapossibleworlduwhereIoriginatefrom Sjande2andapossibleworldvwhereIoriginate froms2andel.Thenbothuandvarepossiblerel- ativetotheactualworld,butifitistrueatevery worldthatonecouldnothaveoriginatedfroma differentspermandegg,thenuandvareeach impossiblerelativetotheother.Thethirdcom- ponentofaninterpretationisthereforeastipu- lationofwhichworldsarepossiblerelativeto which.Thestipulationtakestheformofthe specificationofatwo-placerelationRonW.A two-placerelationonasetisacollectionofpairs ofobjectsfromtheset;e.g.,therelationimme- diatelyprecedes'onthenaturalnumbersisthe setofpairswheren=m+1.Sotodeter- minerelativepossibilityinamodel,weidentify Rwithacollectionofpairsoftheform whereeachofuandvisinW.Ifapairisin R,vispossiblerelativetou,andifisnotin R,visimpossiblerelativetou.Therelativepos- sibilityrelationthenentersintotherulesfor evaluatingmodaloperators.Forexample,wedo notwanttosaythatattheactualworld,itispos- sibleformetooriginatefromadifferentsperm andegg,sincetheonlyworldswherethistakes placeareimpossiblerelativetotheactualworld. Sowehavetherulethattyistrueataworldu iftyistrueatsomeworldvsuchthatvispossible relativetou.Similarly,Distrueataworlduif tyistrueateveryworldvwhichispossiblerela- tivetou. Rmayhavesimplefirst-orderpropertiessuch asreflexivity,(Vx)Rxx,symmetry,(\/x)(\/y)(Rxy—> Ryx),andtransitivity,(Vx)(Vy)(Vz)((Rxy&Ryz)—> Rxz),anddifferentmodalsystemscanbe 575 modallogic modallogic obtainedbyimposingdifferentcombinationsof theseonR(othersystemscanbeobtainedfrom higher-orderconstraints).Theleastconstrained systemisthesystemK,inwhichnostructural propertiesareputonR.InKwehave(B8-C)1= B,sinceif(B&C)holdsatw*then(B&C) holdsatsomeworldivpossiblerelativetow*,and thusbythetruth-functionfor&,Bholdsatwas well,soBholdsatw*.Henceanyinterpretation thatmakes(B&C)true(=trueatw*)also makesBtrue.Sincetherearenorestrictionson RinK,wecanexpect0(B&C)l=Bineverysys- temofmodallogicgeneratedbyconstrainingR. However,forKwealsohaveCM=OC.Forsuppose Choldsatw*.CholdsatW*onlyifthereissome worldpossiblerelativetow*whereCholds.But thereneedbenosuchworld.Inparticular,since Rneednotbereflexive,w*itselfneednotbepos- siblerelativetow*.Concomitantly,inanysystem forwhichwestipulateareflexiveR,wewillhave C1=C.ThesimplestsuchsystemisknownasT, whichhasthesamesemanticsasKexceptthatR isstipulatedtobereflexiveineveryinterpreta- tion.Inothersystems,furtherordifferentcon- straintsareputonR.Forexample,inthesystem B,eachinterpretationmusthaveanRthatis reflexiveandsymmetric,andinthesystemS4, eachinterpretationmusthaveanRthatisreflex- iveandtransitive.InBwehaveCW1C,as canbeshownbyaninterpretationwithnon- transitiveR,whileinS4wehaveDCM=C,ascan beshownbyaninterpretationwithnon-sym- metricR.Correspondingly,inS4,C1=C,and inB,DC1=C.ThesysteminwhichRisreflexive, transitive,andsymmetriciscalledS5,andinthis system,Rcanbeomitted.ForifRhasallthree properties,Risaneqiävalencerelation,i.e.,itpar- titionsWintomutuallyexclusiveandjointly exhaustiveequivalenceclasses.IfCistheequiv- alenceclasstowhichubelongs,thenthetruth- valueofaformulaatuisindependentofthe truth-valuesofsentencelettersatworldsnotin Cu,soonlytheworldsinCarerelevanttothe truth-valuesofsentencesinanS5interpretation. ButwithinC„Risuniversal:everyworldispos- siblerelativetoeveryother.Consequently,inan S5interpretation,weneednotspecifyarelative possibilityrelation,andtheevaluationrulesfor and□neednotmentionrelativepossibility;e.g., wecansaythatistrueataworlduifthereisat leastoneworldvatwhich(j>istrue.Notethatby thecharacteristicsofR,wheneverX1=oinK,T,B, orS4,thenENoinS5:theothersystemsarecon- tainedinS5.Kiscontainedinallthesystemswe havementioned,whileTiscontainedinBand S4,neitherofwhichiscontainedintheother. Sententialmodallogicsgiverisetoquantified modallogics,ofwhichquantifiedS5isthebest- known.Justas,inthesententialcase,eachworld inaninterpretationisassociatedwithavaluation ofsentencelettersasinnon-modalsentential logic,soinquantifiedmodallogic,eachworldis associatedwithavaluationofthesortfamiliarin non-modalfirst-orderlogic.Morespecifically,in quantifiedS5,eachworldwisassignedadomain D-thethingsthatexistatw—suchthatatleast oneD:isnon-empty,andeachatomicw-place predicateofthelanguageisassignedanexten- sionExt(|,ofK-tuplesofobjectsthatsatisfythe predicateatw.Soevenrestrictingourselvesto justtheonefirst-orderextensionofasentential system,S5,variousdegreesoffreedomare alreadyevident.Wediscussthefollowing:(a) variabilityofdomains,(b)interpretationof quantifiers,and(c)predication. (a)Shouldallworldshavethesamedomainor maythedomainsofdifferentworldsbedifferent? Thelatterappearstobethemorenaturalchoice; e.e.,ifneitherofofD,andDaresubsetsofthe other,thisrepresentstheintuitiveideathatsome thingsthatexistmightnothave,andthatthere couldhavebeenthingsthatdonotactuallyexist (thoughformulatingthislatterclaimrequires addinganoperatorfor'actually'tothelan- guage).Soweshoulddistinguishtwoversionsof S5,onewithconstantdomarns,S5C,andthe otherwithvariabledomains,S5V.(b)Shouldthe truthof(3v)§ataworldwrequirethat(3x) (3x)atomicarevalid.InS5Vwith possibilistquantifiers,allinstancesofboth schemataarevalid,sincetheprefixes(3x)and (3x)correspondto(3x)(3m;)and(3w)(3x), whichareequivalent(withactualistquantifiers, theprefixescorrespondto(3xGD„),and(3tv) (3x£ö)whicharenon-equivalentifDand D.neednotbethesameset). FinallyinS5Vwithactualistquantifiers,the standardquantifierintroductionandelimination rulesmustbeadjusted.Supposecisanamefor anobjectthatdoesnotactuallyexist;then~Ec istruebut(3x)~Exisfalse.Thequantifierrules mustbethoseoffreelogic:werequireEc&c beforeweinfer(3v)tyc,aswellasthe usualVIrestrictions,beforeweinfer(Vv)i))v. Seealsocontingent,essentialism, MATHEMATICALINTUITIONISM,POSSIBLE WORLDS,SECOND-ORDERLOGIC.G.Fo. modallogicofprograms.Seedynamiclogic. modalrealism.Seelewis,david. modalsquareofopposition.Seecontingent. mode(fromLatinmodus,'way','fashion'),aterm usedinmanysensesinphilosophy.InAris- totelianlogic,itreferseithertothearrangement ofuniversal,particular,affirmative,ornegative propositionswithinasyllogism,onlycertainof whicharevalid(thisisoftentranslatedas'mood' inEnglish),ortothepropertyapropositionhas byvirtueofwhichitisnecessaryorcontingent, possibleorimpossible.InScholasticmetaphysics, itwasoftenusedinanotaltogethertechnical sensetomeanthatwhichcharacterizesathing anddistinguishesitfromothers.Micraelius(Lex- iconphilosophicum,1653)writesthat"amode doesnotcomposeathing,butdistinguishesit andmakesitdeterminate."Itwasalsousedin thecontextofthemodaldistinctioninthethe- oryofdistinctionstodesignatethedistinction thatholdsbetweenasubstanceanditsmodesor betweentwomodesofasinglesubstance.The term'mode'alsoappearsinthetechnicalvocab- ularyofmedievalspeculativegrammarincon- nectionwiththenotionsofmodesofsignifying (modisignificandi),modesofunderstanding(modi intelligendi),andmodesofbeing{modiessendi). Theterm'mode'becameespeciallyimportant intheseventeenthcentury,whenDescartes, Spinoza,andLockeeachtookitup,givingit threesomewhatdifferentspecialmeanings withintheirrespectivesystems.Descartesmakes 'mode'acentralnotioninhismetaphysicsinhis Principiaphilosophiae.ForDescartes,eachsub- stanceischaracterizedbyaprincipalattribute, thoughtformindandextensionforbody.Modes, then,areparticularwaysofbeingextendedor thinking,i.e.,particularsizes,shapes,etc,or particularthoughts,properties(inthebroad sense)thatindividualthings(substances)have. Inthisway,'mode'occupiestherolein Descartes'sphilosophythat'accidenfdoesin Aristotelianphilosophy.ButforDescartes,each modemustbeconnectedwiththeprincipal attributeofasubstance,awayofbeingextended orawayofthinking,whereasfortheAris- totelian,accidentsmayormaynotbeconnected withtheessenceofthesubstanceinwhichthey inhere. LikeDescartes,Spinozarecognizesthreebasic metaphysicalterms,'substance,''attribute',and 'mode'.RecallingDescartes,hedefines'mode'as "theaffectionsofasubstance,orthatwhichisin another,andwhichisalsoconceivedthrough another"(EthicsI).ButforSpinoza,thereisonly onesubstance,whichhasallpossibleattributes. Thismakesitsomewhatdifficulttodetermine exactlywhatSpinozameansby'modes', whethertheyaretobeconstruedasbeingin somesense"properties"ofGod,theoneinfinite 577 model modeltheory substance,orwhethertheyaretobeconstrued morebroadlyassimplyindividualthingsthat dependfortheirexistenceonGod,justasCarte- sianmodesdependonCartesiansubstance. Spinozaalsointroducessomewhatobscuredis- tinctionsbetweeninfmiteandfmitemodes,and betweenimmediateandmediateinfmitemodes. Lockeuses'mode'inawaythatevidently derivesfromDescartes'susage,butthatalsodif- fersfromit.ForLocke,modesare"suchcomplex Ideas,whichhowevercompounded,containnot inthemthesuppositionofsubsistingbythem- selves,butareconsideredasDependenceson,or AffectionsofSubstances"(EssayII).Modesare thusideasthatrepresenttousthecomplexprop- ertiesofthings,ideasderivedfromwhatLocke callsthesimpleideasthatcometousfromexpe- rience.Lockedistinguishesbetweensimple modeslikenumber,space,andinfinity,which aresupposedtobeconstructedbycompounding thesameideamanytimes,andmixedmodeslike obligationortheft,whicharesupposedtobe compoundedofmanysimpleideasofdifferent sorts. Seealsodescartes,locke,metaphysics, property,spinoza.D.Garb. model.Seecomputertheory,modeltheory. modeling,computer.Seecomputertheory. modelset.Seehintikkaset. modeltheory,abranchofmathematicallogic thatdealswiththeconnectionbetweenalan- guageanditsinterpretationsorstructures.Basic toitisthecharacterizationoftheconditions underwhichasentenceistrueinstructure.Itis confusingthattheterm'model'itselfisused slightlydifierently:amodelforasentenceisa structureforthelanguageofthesentencein whichitistrue.Modeltheorywasoriginally developedforexplicitlyconstructed,formållan- guages,withthepurposeofstudyingfounda- tionalquestionsofmathematics,butwaslåter appliedtothesemanticalanalysisofempirical theories,adevelopmentinitiatedbytheDutch philosopherEvertBeth,andofnaturallan- guages,asinMontaguegrammar.Morerecently, insituationtheory,wefindatheoryofsemantics inwhichnottheconceptoftruthinastructure, butthatofinformationcarriedbyastatement aboutasituation,iscentral. Theterm'modeltheory'cameintouseinthe 1930s,withtheworkonfirst-ordermodeltheory byTarski,butsomeofthemostcentralresultsof thefielddatefrombeforethattime.Thehistory ofthefieldiscomplicatedbythefactthatinthe 1910sand1920s,whenthefirstmodel-theoretic findingswereobtained,theseparationbetween first-orderlogicanditsextensionswasnotyet completed.Thus,in1915,thereappeared anartidebyLeopoldLöwenheim,containing thefirstversionofwhatisnowcalledthe Löwenheim-Skolemtheorem.Löwenheim provedthateverysatisfiablesentencehasa countablemodel,buthedidnotyetworkinfirst- orderlogicaswenowunderstandit.Oneofthe firstwhodidsowastheNorwegianlogician ThoralfSkolem,whoshowedin1920thataset offirst-ordersentencesthathasamodel,hasa countablemodel,oneformoftheLöwenheim- Skolemtheorem.Skolemarguedthatlogicwas first-orderlogicandthatfirst-orderlogicwasthe properbasisformetamathematicalinvestiga- tions,fullyacceptingtherelativityofset-theo- reticnotionsinfirst-orderlogic.Withinphi- losophythisthesisisstilldominant,butinthe endithasnotprevailedinmathematicallogic.In 1930KurtGödelsolvedanopenproblemof Hilbert-Ackermannandprovedacompleteness theoremforfirst-orderlogic.Thisimmediately ledtoanotherimportantmodel-theoreticresult, thecompactnesstheorem:ifeveryfinitesubsetofa setofsentenceshasamodelthenthesethas amodel.Agoodsourceforinformationabout themodeltheoryoffirst-orderlogic,orclassical modeltheory,isstillModelTheorybyC.C.Chang andH.J.Keisler(1973). Whentheseparationbetweenfirst-orderlogic andstrongerlogicshadbeencompletedandthe modeltheoryoffirst-orderlogichadbecomea maturefield,logiciansundertookinthelate 1950sthestudyofextendedmodeltheory,the modeltheoryofextensionsoffirst-orderlogic: firstofcardinalityquantifiers,låterofinfmitary languagesandoffragmentsofsecond-order logic.Withsomanyexamplesoflogics around-wheresometimesclassicaltheorems didgeneralize,sometimesnot-PerLindström showedin1969whatsetsfirst-orderlogicapart fromitsextensions:itisthestrongestlogicthat isbothcompactandsatisfiestheLöwenheim- Skolemtheorem.Thisworkhasbeenthebegin- ningofastudyoftherelationsbetweenvarious propertieslogicsmaypossess,theso-called abstractmodel. Seealsoformålsemantics,löwenheim- SKOLEMTHEOREM,SATISFACTION. Z.G.S. 578 modernism Mohism modernism.Seepostmodern. modestfoundationalism.Seefoundationalism. modularity,thecommitmenttofunctionally independentandspecializedcognitivesystemsin psychologicalorganization,or,moregenerally, intheorganizationofanycomplexsystem.Mod- ularityentailsthatbehavioristheproductof componentswithsubordinatefunctions,that thesefunctionsarerealizedindiscretephysical systems,andthatthesubsystemsareminimally interactive.Modulärorganizationvariesfrom simpledecomposabilitytowhatHerbertSimoncalls neardecomposability.Intheformer,component systemsareindependent,operatingaccordingto intrinsicallydeterminedprinciples;systembe- haviorisanadditiveoraggregativefunctionof theseindependentcontributions.Inthelatter, theshort-runbehaviorofcomponentsisinde- pendentofthebehaviorofothercomponents; thesystembehaviorisarelativelysimplefunc- tionofcomponentcontributions. Intheearlynineteenthcentury,FranzJoseph Gäll(1758-1828)defendedamodulärorganiza- tionforthemind/brain,holdingthatthecerebral hemispheresconsistofavarietyoforgans,or centers,eachsubservingspecificintellectualand moralfunctions.Thispictureofthebrainasacol- lectionofrelativelyindependentorganscon- trastssharplywiththetraditionalviewthat intellectualactivityinvolvestheexerciseofa generalfacultyinavarietyofdomarns,aview thatwascommontoDescartesandHumeaswell asGall'smajoropponentssuchasPierreFlourens (1794-1867).Bythemiddleofthenineteenth century,theFrenchphysiciansJean-Baptiste Bouillaud(1796-1881)andPierre-PaulBroca (1824-80)defendedtheviewthatlanguageis controlledbylocalizedstructuresintheleft hemisphereandisrelativelyindependentof othercognitiveactivities.Itwaslåterdiscovered byKarlWemicke(1848-1905)thatthereareat leasttwocentersforthecontroloflanguage,one moreposteriorandonemoreanterior.Onthese views,therearediscretephysicalstructures responsibleforlanguage,whicharelargelyinde- pendentofoneanotherandofstructuresrespon- sibleforotherpsychologicalfunctions.Thisis thereforeamodulärorganization.Thisviewof theneurophysiologicalorganizationoflanguage continuestohaveadvocatesintothelatetwen- tiethcentury,thoughtheprecisecharacteriza- tionofthefunctionsthesetwocentersserveis controversial.Manymorerecentviewshave tendedtolimitmodularitytomoreperipheral functionssuchasvision,hearing,andmotor controlandspeech,buthaveexcludedso-called highercognitiveprocesses. Seealsocognitivescience,philosophy OFMIND.R.C.R. modusponendotollens.Seesyllogism. modusponens,infull,modusponendoportens (Latin,'proposingmethod'),(1)theargument form'IiAthenB;A;therefore,B',andarguments ofthisform(comparefallacyofaffirmingthecon- sequent);(2)theruleofinferencethatpermits onetoinfertheconsequentofaconditionalfrom thatconditionalanditsantecedent.Thisisalso knownastheruleofD-eliminationorruleo/D- detachment.Seealsocounterfactuals,for- malfallacy.G.F.S. modustollendoponens.Seesyllogism. modustollens,infull,modustollendotollens(Latin, 'removingmethod'),(1)theargumentform'IfA thenB;not-5;therefore,not-A',andarguments ofthisform(comparefallacyofdenyingthe antecedent);(2)theruleofinferencethatpermits onetoinferthenegationoftheantecedentofa conditionalfromthatconditionalandthenega- tionofitsconsequent.Seealsocounterfac- tuals,FORMÅLFALLACY.G.F.S. Mohism,aschoolofclassicalChinesethought foundedbyMoTzu(fl.479-438b.c.).MoTzu wasthefirstmajorphilosophertochallengeCon- fucius.WhereasConfuciusbelievedamorallife wasanendinitself,MoTzuadvocatedaformof utilitarianismwhereinthetestofmoralrightness (yi)wastheamountofbenefit(Ii)tothegods, state,andpeople.Accordingly,MoTzucon- demnedwarasharmful,criticizedConfucians fortheirelaboratefuneralsandwastefulindul- genceinmusic,andpromotedahierarchical meritocracydominatedbyapowerfulruleras themostefficientwaytounifytheconflicting moralviewsandinterestsofthepeople,and therebyachievesocialorder.MoTzualso attackedfatalism,andunliketheagnosticCon- fucius,firmlybelievedinspiritsandananthro- pomorphicHeaven(t'ien)thatrewardedthose whobenefitedothersandpunishedthosewho didnot.Heismostfamousforhisdoctrineof chienaiorimpartialconcern(oftentranslatedas universallove).WhereasConfuciusespouseda relationalmoralityinwhichone'sobligations 579 MohistSchool monadology varieddependingonthestatusofthepartiesand thedegreeofcloseness,MoTzuinsistedthat eachpersonbetreatedequallyasanobjectof moralconcem. DuringtheWarringStatesperiod(403-221 b.c),theMohistssplitintothreefactions.The LåterMohistCanons,mostofwhichwerewrit- tenaslateasthethirdcenturyb.c,arecharac- terizedbyanalyticalreasoningandlogical sophistication.LåterMohistssoughttoprovidea rationalratherthanareligiousbasisforMoTzu's utilitarianismbaseduponlogical(andcausal) necessity(pi).Treatingawidevarietyofsubjects frompoliticstoopticstoeconomics,theCanons areorganizedaroundfourtopics:discourse,or knowledgeoftherelationbetweennamesand objects;ethics,orknowledgeofhowtoact;sci- ences,orknowledgeofobjects;andargumenta- tion,orknowledgeofnames.AsConfucianism emergedtobecomethestateideology,the MohistsdisappearedsometimeintheearlyHan dynasty(206b.c.-a.d.220),havingbeenin importantmeasureco-optedbytheleading interpreterofConfucianismoftheperiod,Hsun Tzu(c.298-238B.c). Seealsoconfucianism,li3,motzu,yi. R.P.P.8-R.T.A. MohistSchool.Seemohism,motzu. moksha.Seemäyä. Molina,Luisde(1535-1600),SpanishJesuitthe- ologianandphilosopher.Hestudiedandtaught atCoimbraandÉvoraandalsotaughtinLisbon andMadrid.Hismostimportantworksarethe Concordialiberiarbitriicumgratiaedonis("FreeWill andGrace,"1588),Commentariainprimamdivi Thomaepartem("CommentaryontheFirstPartof Thomas'sSumma,"1592),andDejustitiaetjure ("OnJusticeandLaw,"1592-1613). Molinaisbestknownforhisdoctrineofmid- dleknowledge(scientiamedia).Itsaimwastopre- servefreewillwhilemaintainingtheChristian doctrineoftheefficacyofdivinegrace.Itwas opposedbyThomistssuchasBanez,whomain- tainedthatGodexercisesphysicalpredetermina- tionöversecondarycausesofhumanactionand, thus,thatgraceisintrinsicallyefficaciousand independentofhumanwillandmerits.For Molina,althoughGodhasforeknowledgeof whathumanbeingswillchoosetodo,neither thatknowledgenorGod'sgracedetermine humanwill;thecooperation(concursus)ofdivine gracewithhumanwilldoesnotdeterminethe willtoaparticularaction.Thisismadepossible byGod'smiddleknowledge,whichisaknowl- edgeinbetweentheknowledgeGodhasofwhat existed,exists,andwillexist,andtheknowledge Godhasofwhathasnotexisted,doesnotexist, andwillnotexist.MiddleknowledgeisGod's knowledgeofconditionalfuturecontingent events,namely,ofwhatpersonswoulddounder anypossiblesetofcircumstances.Thankstothis knowledge,Godcanarrangeforcertainhuman actstooccurbyprearrangingthecircumstances surroundingthechoicewithoutdeterminingthe humanwill.Thus,God'sgraceisconcurrentwith theactofthewillanddoesnotpredetermineit, renderingtheThomisticdistinctionbetweensuf- ficientandefficaciousgracesuperfluous. Seealsoaquinas,freewillproblem, FUTURECONTINGENTS,MIDDLEKNOWLEDGE. J.J.E.G. Molyneuxquestion,alsocalledMolyneux'sprob- lem,thequestionthat,incorrespondencewith Locke,WilliamMolyneux(orMolineux,1656- 98),aDublinlawyerandmemberoftheIrish Parliament,posedandLockeinsertedinthesec- ondeditionofhisEssayConcerningHumanUnder- standing(1694;book2,chap.9,section8): SupposeaManbornblind,andnowadult, andtaughtbyhistouchtodistinguishaCube, andaSphereofthesamemetal,andnighlyof thesamebigness,soastotell,whenhefelt oneandfother,whichistheCube,whichthe Sphere.SupposethentheCubeandSphere placedonaTable,andtheBlindMantobe madetosee.Quaere,Whetherbyhissight, beforehetouch'dthem,hecouldnowdistin- guish,andtell,whichistheGlobe,whichthe Cube. AlthoughitistemptingtoregardMolyneux's questionasstraightforwardlyempirical,at- temptstogaugetheabilitiesofnewlysighted adultshaveyieldeddisappointingandambigu- ousresults.Moreinteresting,perhaps,istheway inwhichdifferenttheoriesofperceptionanswer thequestion.Thus,accordingtoLocke,sensory modalitiesconstitutediscreteperceptualchan- nels,thecontentsofwhichperceiversmustlearn tocorrelate.Suchatheoryanswersthequestion inthenegative(asdidMolyneuxhimself).Other theoriesencouragedifferentresponses.Seealso PERCEPTION.J.F.H. monad.Seeleibniz. monadology.Seeleibniz. 580 monism Montesquieu monism.Seephilosophyofmind. monism,anomalous.Seephilosophyofmind. monism,neutral.Seephilosophyofmind,rus- SELL. monotonic.Seenon-monotoniclogic. Montaguegrammar.Seegrammar. Montaigne,Michelde(1533-92),Frenchessay- istandphilosopherwhosetforththeRenais- sanceversionofGreekskepticism.Bornand raisedinBordeaux,hebecameitsmayor,and wasanadvisertoleadersoftheReformation andCounter-Reformation.In1568hetranslated theworkoftheSpanishrationalisttheologian RaimundSebondonnaturaltheology.Shortly thereafterhebeganwritingessais,attempts,as theauthorsaid,topainthimself.These,thefirst inthisgenre,arerambling,curiousdiscussionsof varioustopics,suggestingtoleranceandan undogmaticStoicmorality.Thelongestessai,the "ApologyforRaimundSebond,""defends" Sebond'srationalismbyarguingthatsinceno adequatereasonsorevidencecouldbegivento supportanypointofviewintheology,philoso- phy,orscience,oneshouldnotblameSebondfor hisviews.Montaignethenpresentsanddevelops theskepticalargumentsfoundinSextusEmpir- icusandCicero. Montaignerelatedskepticalpointstothen- currentfindingsandproblems.Dataofexplorers, heargues,reinforcetheculturalandethicalrel- ativismoftheancientSkeptics.Disagreements betweenScholastics,Platonists,andRenaissance naturalistsonalmosteverythingcastdoubton whetheranytheoryiscorrect.Scientistslike CopernicusandParacelsuscontradictprevious scientists,andwillprobablybecontradictedby futureones.Montaignethenoffersthemorethe- oreticalobjectionsoftheSkeptics,aboutthe unreliabilityofsenseexperienceandreasoning andourinabilitytofindanunquestionablecrite- rionoftrueknowledge.Tryingtoknowrealityis liketryingtoclutchwater.Whatshouldwethen do?Montaigneadvocatessuspendingjudgment onalltheoriesthatgobeyondexperience, acceptingexperienceundogmatically,livingac- cordingtothedictatesofnature,andfollowing therulesandcustomsofone'ssociety.Therefore oneshouldremaininthereligioninwhichone wasborn,andacceptonlythoseprinciplesthat Godchoosestorevealtous. Montaigne'sskepticismgreatlyinfluenced Europeanthinkersinunderminingconfidencein previoustheoriesandforcingthemtoseeknew waysofgroundingknowledge.Hisacceptanceof religiononcustomandfaithprovidedawayof livingwithtotalskepticism.Hispresentationof skepticisminamodernlanguageshapedthe vocabularyandtheproblemsofphilosophyin moderntimes. Seealsoskepticism,skeptics.R.H.R Montanism,acharismatic,schismaticmovement inearlyChristianity,originatinginPhrygiainthe latesecondcentury.Itrebukedthemainstream churchforlaxityandapathy,andtaughtmoral purity,new,i.e.postbiblical,revelation,andthe imminentendoftheworld.Traditionalaccounts, derivingfromcriticsofthemovement,contain exaggerationsandprobablysomefabrications. Montanushimself,abettedbytheprophetesses MaximillaandPrisca,announcedinecstatic speechanew,finalageofprophecy.Thisfulfilled thebiblicalpromisesthatinthelastdaystheHoly Spiritwouldbepouredoutuniversally(Joel2: 28ff.;Acts2:16ff.)andwouldteach"thewhole truth"(Jon.14:26;16:13).Italsoempoweredthe Montaniststoenjoinmorerigorousdiscipline thanthatrequiredbyJesus.Thesectdeniedthat forgivenessthroughbaptismcoveredserious subsequentsin;forbaderemarriageforwidows andwidowers;practicedfasting;andcondemned believerswhoevadedpersecution.Somelåter followersmayhaveidentifiedMontanuswith theHolySpirititself,thoughheclaimedonlyto betheSpirifsmouthpiece.The"newprophecy" flourishedforageneration,especiallyinNorth Africa,gainingafamousconvertinTertullian. Butthechurch'sbishopsrepudiatedthemove- menfscriticismsandinnovations,andturned moreresolutelyagainstpostapostolicrevelation, apocalypticexpectation,andasceticextremes. A.E.L. Montanus.Seemontanism. MonteCarlofallacy.Seegamblersfallacy. Montesquieu,BarondeLaBrédeetde,titleof Charles-LouisdeSecondat(1689-1755),French politicalphilosopher,thepoliticalphilosopheof theEnlightenment.HewasbornatLaBréde, educatedattheOratorianCollegedeJuilly (1700-05),andreceivedlawdegreesfromthe UniversityofBordeaux(1708).Fromhisuncle heinheritedthebaronyofMontesquieu(1716) andtheofficeofPresidentåMortieratthePar- liamentofGuyenneatBordeaux.Fame,national 581 mood Moore,G(eorge)E(dward) andinternational,camesuddenly(1721)with theLettrespersanes("ThePersianLetters"),pub- lishedinHollandandFrance,alandmarkofthe Enlightenment.HisReflexionssurlamonarchie universelleenEuropé,writtenandprinted(1734) toremindtheauthoritiesofhisqualificationsand availability,deliveredthewrongmessageatthe wrongtime(anti-militarism,pacifism,freetrade, whileFrancesupportedPoland'sKingStanislas, dethronedbyRussiaandAustria).Montesquieu withdrewtheReflexionsbeforepublicationand substitutedtheConsiderationsontheRomans:the samethesisisexpoundedhere,butintheexclu- sivelyclassicalcontextofancienthistory.The stratagemsucceeded:theAmsterdamedition wasfreelyimported;thePariseditionappeared witharoyalprivilége(1734). AfewmonthsaftertheappearanceoftheCon- siderations,heundertookUEspritdeslois,theout- lineofamodernpoliticalscience,conceivedas thefoundationofaneffectivegovernmentalpol- icy.Hisoptimismwasshakenbythedisastersof theWarofAustrianSuccession(1740-48);the Espritdesloisunderwenthurriedchangesthat upsetitsoriginalplan.Duringtheveryprinting process,theauthorwasdiscoveringthetrue essenceofhisphilosophiepratique:itwouldnever culminateinafinal,invariableprogram,butin anorientation,continuously,intelligentlyadapt- ingtotheunpredictablecircumstancesofhistor- icaltimeinthelightofpermanentvalues. AccordingtoUEspritdeslois,governmentsare eitherrepublics,monarchies,ordespotisms.The principles,ormotivationalforces,ofthesetypes ofgovernmentare,respectively,politicalvirtue, honor,andfear.Thetypeofgovernmentapeo- plehasdependsonitscharacter,history,and geographicalsituation.Onlyaconstitutional governmentthatseparatesitsexecutive,legisla- tive,andjudicialpowerspreservespoliticallib- erty,takenasthepowertodowhatoneoughtto will.Aconstitutionalmonarchywithseparation ofpowersisthebestformofgovernment.Mon- tesquieuinfluencedtheauthorsoftheU.S.Con- stitutionandthepoliticalphilosophersBurke andRousseau. Seealsoburke,encyclopedia,political PHILOSOPHY,ROUSSEAU.C.J.B. mood.Seesyllogism. Moore,C(eorge)E(dward)(1873-1958),English philosopherwhospearheadedtheattackonide- alismandwasamajorsupporterofrealisminall itsforms:metaphysical,epistemological,andaxi- ological.HewasborninUpperNorwood,asub- urbofLondon;didhisundergraduateworkat CambridgeUniversity;spent1898-1904asafel- lowofTrinityCollege;returnedtoCambridgein 1911asalecturer;andwasgrantedaprofessor- shiptherein1925.Healsoservedaseditorof Mind. Thebulkofhisworkfallsintofourcategories: metaphysics,epistemology,ethics,andphilo- sophicalmethodology. Metaphysics.Inthisarea,Mooreismainly knownforhisattemptedrefutationofidealism andhisdefensetherebyofrealism.Inhis"The RefutationofIdealism"(1903),hearguedthat thereisacrucialpremisethatisessentialtoall possibleargumentsfortheidealisticconclusion that"Allrealityismental(spiritual)."This premiseis:"Tobeistobeperceived"(inthebroad senseof'perceive').Moorearguedthat,under everypossibleinterpretationofit,thatpremiseis eitheratautologyorfalse;hencenosignificant conclusioncaneverbeinferredfromit.Hispos- itivedefenseofrealismhadseveralprongs.One wastoshowthattherearecertainclaimsheldby non-realistphilosophers,bothidealistonesand skepticalones.Mooreargued,in"ADefenseof CommonSense"(1925),thattheseclaimsare eitherfactuallyfalseorself-contradictory,orthat insomecasesthereisnogoodreasontobelieve them.AmongtheclaimsthatMooreattackedare these:"Propositionsabout(purported)material factsarefalse";"Noonehaseverknownany suchpropositionstobetrue";"Every(purported) physicalfactislogicallydependentonsome mentalfact";and"Everyphysicalfactiscausally dependentonsomementalfact."Anothermajor prongofMoore'sdefenseofrealismwastoargue fortheexistenceofanexternalworldandlåter togivea"ProofofanExternalWorld"(1933). Epistemology.MostofMoore'sworkinthis areadealtwiththevariouskindsofknowledge wehave,whytheymustbedistinguished,and theproblemofperceptionandourknowledgeof anexternalworld.Becausehehadalready arguedfortheexistenceofanexternalworldin hismetaphysics,heherefocusedonhowwe knowit.Inmanypapersandchapters(e.g.,"The NatureandRealityofObjectsofPerception," 1906)heexaminedandattimessupportedthree mainpositions:naiveordirectrealism,repre- sentativeorindirectrealism,andphenomenal- ism.Althoughheseemedtofavördirectrealism atfirst,inthemajorityofhispapershefoundrep- resentativerealismtobethemostsupportable positiondespiteitsproblems.Itshouldalsobe notedthat,inconnectionwithhisleanings 582 Moore'sparadox Moore'sparadox towardrepresentativerealism,Mooremain- tainedtheexistenceofsense-dataandarguedat lengthforanaccountofjusthowtheyarerelated tophysicalobjects.Thattherearesense-data Mooreneverdoubted.Thequestionwas,What istheir(ontological)status? Withregardtothevariouskindsofknowledge (orwaysofknowing),Mooremadeadistinction betweendispositional(ornon-actualized)and actualizedknowledge.WithinthelatterMoore madedistinctionsbetweendirectapprehension (oftenknownasknowledgebyacquaintance), indirectapprehension,andknowledgeproper (orpropositionalknowledge).Hedevotedmuch ofhisworktofindingtheconditionsforknowl- edgeproper. Ethics.Inhismajorworkinethics,Principia Ethica(1903),Mooremaintainedthatthecentral problemofethicsis,Whatisgood?-meaningby this,notwhatthingsaregood,buthow'good'is tobedefined.Hearguedthattherecanbeonly oneanswer,onethatmayseemdisappointing, namely:goodisgood,or,alternatively,'good'is indefinable.Thus'good'denotesa"unique,sim- pleobjectofthought"thatisindefinableand unanalyzable.Hisfirstargumentonbehalfof thatclaimconsistedinshowingthattoidentify goodwithsomeotherobject(i.e.,todefine 'good')istocommitthenaturalisticfallacy.To committhisfallacyistoreduceethicalproposi- tionstoeitherpsychologicalpropositionsor reportivedefinitionsastohowpeopleusewords. Inotherwords,whatwasmeanttobeanethical proposition,thatXisgood,becomesafactual propositionaboutpeople'sdesiresortheirusage ofwords.Moore'ssecondargumentranlikethis: Suppose'good'weredefinable.Thentheresult wouldbeevenworsethanthatofreducingeth- icalpropositionstonon-ethicalpropositions- ethicalpropositionswouldbetautologies!For example,supposeyoudefined'good'as'plea- sure'.Thensupposeyoumaintainedthatplea- sureisgood.Allyouwouldbeassertingisthat pleasureispleasure,atautology.Toavoidthis conclusion'good'mustmeansomethingother than'pleasure'.Whyisthisthenaturalisticfal- lacy?Becausegoodisanon-naturalproperty. Butevenifitwereanaturalone,therewould stillbeafallacy.Hencesomehaveproposedcall- ingitthedefinistfallacy—thefallacyofattempt- ingtodefine'good'byanymeans.Thisargument isoftenknownastheopenquestionargument becausewhateverpurporteddefinitionof'good' anyoneoffers,itwouldalwaysbeanopenques- tionwhetherwhateversatisfiesthedefinition reallyisgood.InthelastpartofPrincipiaEthica Mooreturnedtoadiscussionofwhatsortsof thingsarethegreatestgoodswithwhichweare acquainted.Hearguedfortheviewthattheyare personalaffectionandaestheticenjoyments. Philosophicalmethodology.Moore'smethod- ologyinphilosophyhadmanycomponents,but twoståndout:hisappealtoanddefenseofcom- monsenseandhisutilizationofvariousmethods of(philosophical/conceptual)analysis."ADe- fenseofCommonSense"arguedforhisclaim thatthecommonsenseviewoftheworldis whollytrue,andfortheclaimthatanyview whichopposedthatviewiseitherfactuallyfalse orself-contradictory.Throughouthiswritings Mooredistinguishedseveralkindsofanalysis andmadeuseofthemextensivelyindealing withphilosophicalproblems.Allofthesemaybe foundintheworkscitedaboveandotheressays gatheredintoMoore'sPhilosophicalStudies(1922) andPhilosophicalPapers(1959).Thesehavebeen referredtoasrefutationalanalysis,withtwosub- forms,showingcontradictionsand"translation intotheconcrete";distinctionalanalysis;decom- positionalanalysis(eitherdefinitionalordivi- sional);andreductionalanalysis. Moorewasgreatlyreveredasateacher.Many ofhisstudentsandcolleagueshavepaidhigh tributetohiminverywarmandgratefulterms. Seealsoanalysis,definition,episte- MOLOGY,ETHICS,MALCOLM,NATURALISM. E.D.K. Moore'sparadox,asfirstdiscussedbyG.E. Moore,theperplexityinvolvingassertionof whatisexpressedbyconjunctionssuchas'It's raining,butIbelieveitisn'fand'It'sraining,but Idon'tbelieveitis'.Theoddityofsuchpresent- tensefirst-personusesof'tobelieve'seemspecu- liartothoseconjunctionsjustbecauseitis assumedboththat,whenasserting-roughly, representingastrue-aconjunction,onealso assertsitsconjuncts,andthat,asarule,theasser- torbelievestheassertedproposition.Thus,no perplexityarisesfromassertionsof,forinstance, 'It'srainingtoday,butI(falsely)believeditwasn't untilIcameouttotheporch'and'Ifit'sraining butIbelieveitisn't,Ihavebeenmisledbythe weatherreport'.However,therearereasonsto thinkthat,ifwerelyonlyontheseassumptions andexamples,ourcharacterizationoftheprob- lemisundulynarrow.First,assertionseemsrel- evantonlybecauseweareinterestedinwhatthe assertorbelieves.Secondly,thoseconjunctions aredisturbingonlyinsofarastheyshowthat 583 moralargumentforGod'sexistence moralepistemology someoftheassertor'sbeliefs,thoughcontingent, canonlybeirrationallyheld.Thirdly,autobio- graphicalreportsthatmayjustifiablybeusedto chargethereporterwithirrationalityneedbe neitherabouthisbeliefsystem,norconjunctive, nortrue(e.g.,'Idon'texist','Ihavenobeliefs'), norfalse(e.g.,'It'sraining,butIhavenoevi- dencethatitis').So,Moore'sparadoxisbestseen astheproblemposedbycontingentpropositions thatcannotbejustifiablybelieved.Arguably,in formingabeliefofthosepropositions,thebe- lieveracquiresnon-overridableevidenceagainst believingthem.Asuccessfulanalysisoftheprob- lemalongtheselinesmayhaveimportantepis- temologicalconsequences.Seealsocontin- gent,EPISTEMOLOGY,EVIDENCE,JUSTIFICA- TION,MOORE,PARADOX,PROPOSITION,RA- TIONALITY,REASONSFORBELIEF.Cd.A. moralargumentforGod'sexistence.Seephiloso- PHYOFRELIGION. moralcertainty.Seecertainty. moraldilemma,(f)Anyproblemwheremoral- ityisrelevant.Thisbroaduseincludesnotonly conflictsamongmoralreasonsbutalsoconfficts betweenmoralreasonsandreasonsoflaw,reli- gion,orself-interest.Inthissense,Abrahamisin amoraldilemmawhenGodcommandshimto sacrificehisson,evenifhehasnomoralreason toobey.Similarly,IaminamoraldilemmaifI cannothelpafriendintroublewithoutforgoing alucrativebutmorallyneutralbusinessoppor- tunity. 'Moraldilemma'alsooftenrefersto(2)any topicareawhereitisnotknownwhat,ifany- thing,ismorallygoodorright.Forexample, whenoneaskswhetherabortionisimmoralin anyway,onecouldcallthetopic"themoral dilemmaofabortion."Thisepistemicusedoes notimplythatanythingreallyisimmoralatall. Recently,moralphilosophershavediscusseda muchnarrowersetofsituationsas"moraldilem- mas."Theyusuallydefine'moraldilemma'as(3) asituationwhereanagentmorallyoughttodo eachoftwoactsbutcannotdoboth.Thebest- knownexampleisSartre'sstudentwhomorally oughttocareforhismotherinParisbutatthe sametimemorallyoughttogotoEnglandtojoin theFreeFrenchandfighttheNazis. However,'ought'coversidealactionsthatare notmorallyrequired,suchaswhensomeone oughttogivetoacertaincharitybutisnot requiredtodoso.Sincemostcommonexamples ofmoraldilemmasincludemoralobligationsor duties,orotherrequirements,itismoreaccurate todefine'moraldilemma'morenarrowlyas (4)asituationwhereanagenthasamoralre- quirementtodoeachoftwoactsbutcannotdo both. Somephilosophersalsorefusetocallasitua- tionamoraldilemmawhenoneoftheconflict- ingrequirementsisclearlyoverridden,suchas whenImustbreakatrivialpromiseinorderto savealife.Toexcludesuchresolvableconflicts, 'moraldilemma'canbedefinedas(5)asituation whereanagenthasamoralrequirementto adopteachoftwoalternatives,andneither requirementisoverridden,buttheagentcannot fulfillboth. Anothercommonmoveistodefine'moral dilemma'as(6)asituationwhereeveryalterna- tiveismorallywrong.Thisisequivalentto(4)or (5),respectively,ifanactismorallywrong wheneveritviolatesanymoralrequirementor anynon-overriddenmoralrequirement.How- ever,weusuallydonotcallanactwrongunless itviolatesanoverridingmoralrequirement,and then(6)rulesoutmoraldilemmasbydefinition, sinceoverridingmoralrequirementsclearlycan- notconflict. Although(5)thusseemspreferable,some wouldobjectthat(5)includestrivialrequire- mentsandconflicts,suchasconflictsbetween trivialpromises.Toincludeonlytragicsitua- tions,wecoulddefine'moraldilemma'as(7)a situationwhereanagenthasastrongmoral obligationorrequirementtoadopteachoftwo alternatives,andneitherisoverridden,butthe agentcannotadoptbothalternatives.Thisdefi- nitionisstrongenoughtoraisetheimportant controversiesaboutmoraldilemmaswithout beingsostrongastoruleouttheirpossibilityby definition. Seealsodeonticlogic,duty,ethics. W.S.-A. moralepistemology,thediscipline,attheinter- sectionofethicsandepistemology,thatstudies theepistemicstatusandrelationsofmoraljudg- mentsandprinciples.Ithasdevelopedoutofan interest,commontobothethicsandepistemol- ogy,inquestionsofjustificationandjustifi- ability-inepistemology,ofstatementsorbeliefs, andinethics,ofactionsaswellasjudgmentsof actionsandalsogeneralprinciplesofjudgment. Itsmostprominentquestionsincludethefol- lowing.Cannormativeclaimsbetrueorfalse? Ifso,howcantheybeknowntobetrueorfalse? Ifnot,whatstatusdotheyhave,andarethey capableofjustification?Iftheyarecapableof 584 moralepistemology moralepistemology justification,howcantheybejustified?Doesthe justificationofnormativeclaimsdifferwith respecttoparticularclaimsandwithrespectto generalprinciples? Inepistemologyrecentyearshaveseenaten- dencytoacceptasvalidanaccountofknowledge asentailingjustifiedtruebelief,aconceptionthat requiresanaccountnotjustoftruthbutalsoof justificationandofjustifiedbelief.Thus,under whatconditionsissomeonejustified,epistemi- callyinbelievingsomething?Justification,of actions,ofjudgments,andofprinciples,haslong beenacentralelementinethics.Itisonly recentlythatjustificationinethicscametobe thoughtofasanepistemologicalproblem,hence 'moralepistemology',asanexpression,isafairly recentcoinage,althoughitsproblemshavea longlineage. Onelong-standinglinkageisprovidedbythe challengeofskepticism.Skepticisminethicscan beabouttheexistenceofanygenuinedistinction betweenrightandwrong,oritcanfocusonthe possibilityofattaininganyknowledgeofright andwrong,goodorbad.Istherearightanswer? isaquestioninthemetaphysicsofethics.Canwe knowwhattherightansweris,andifsohow?is oneofmoralepistemology.Problemsofpercep- tionandobservationandonesaboutobservation statementsorsense-dataplayanimportantrole inepistemology.Thereisnotanyobviousparal- lelinmoralepistemology,unlessitistheroleof prereflectivemoraljudgments,orcommonsense moraljudgments-moraljudgmentsunguided byanyovertmoraltheory-whichcanbetaken toprovidethedataofmoraltheory,andwhich needtobeexplained,systematized,coordinated, orrevisedtoattainanappropriaterelation betweentheoryanddata.Thiswouldbeanalo- goustotakingthedataofepistemologytobepro- vided,notbysense-dataorobservationsbutby judgmentsofperceptionorobservationstate- ments.Oncethisstepistakentheparallelisvery close.Onesourceofmoralskepticismisthe apparentlackofanyobservationalcounterpart formoralpredicates,whichgeneratestheques- tionhowmoraljudgmentscanbetrueifthereis nothingforthemtocorrespondto.Another sourceofmoralskepticismisapparentlyconstant disagreementanduncertainty,whichwould appeartobeexplainedbytheskepticalhypoth- esisdenyingtherealityofmoraldistinctions. Noncognitivisminethicsmaintainsthatmoral judgmentsarenotobjectsofknowledge,that theymakenostatementscapableoftruthorfal- sity,butareorareakintoexpressionsofatti- tudes. Someothermajordifferencesamongethical theoriesarelargelyepistemologicalincharacter. Intuitionismmaintainsthatbasicmoralproposi- tionsareknowablebyintuition.Empiricismin ethicsmaintainsthatmoralpropositionscanbe establishedbyempiricalmeansorarecomplex formsofempiricalstatements.Ethicalrational- ismmaintainsthatthefundamentalprinciple(s) ofmoralitycanbeestablishedaprioriasholding ofnecessity.ThisisexemplifiedbyKanfsmoral philosophy,inwhichthecategoricalimperative isregardedassyntheticapriori;morerecentlyby whatAlanGewirth(b.1912)callsthe"principle ofgenericconsistency,"whichheclaimsitisself- contradictorytodeny.Ethicalempiricismis exemplifiedbyclassicalutilitarianism,suchas thatofBentham,whichaspirestodevelopethics asanempiricalscience.Iftheconsequencesof actionscanbescientificallypredictedandtheir Utilitiescalculated,thenethicscanbeascience. Situationismisequivalenttoconcretecaseintu- itionisminmaintainingthatwecanknowimme- diatelywhatoughttobedoneinspecificcases, butmostethicaltheoriesmaintainthatwhat oughttobedoneis,inJ.S.Mill'swords,deter- minedby"theapplicationofalawtoanindivid- ualcase."Differenttheoriesdifferonthe epistemicstatusoftheselawsandontheprocess ofapplication.Deductivists,eitherempiricisticor rationalistic,holdthatthelawisessentially unchangedintheapplication;non-deductivists holdthatthelawismodifiedintheprocessof application.(ThisdistinctionisexplainedinF.L. Will[1909-98],BeyondDeduction,1988.)Thereis similarvariationaboutwhatifanythingisself- evident,Sidgwickmaintainingthatonlycertain highlyabstractprinciplesareself-evident,Ross thatonlygeneralrulesare,andPrichardthat onlyconcretejudgmentsare,"byanactofmoral thinking." Otherproblemsinmoralepistemologyare providedbythefact-valuedistinction-and controversiesaboutwhetherthereisanysuch distinction-andtheis-oughtquestion,the questionhowamoraljudgmentcanbederived fromstatementsoffactalone.Naturalistsaffirm thepossibility,non-naturalistsdenyit.Prescrip- tivistsclaimthatmoraljudgmentsareprescrip- tionsandcannotbededucedfromdescriptive statementsalone.Thisquestionultimatelyleads tothequestionhowanultimateprinciplecanbe justified.Ifitcannotbededucedfromstatements offact,thatrouteisout;ifitmustbededuced fromsomeothermoralprinciple,thentheprin- ciplededucedcannotbeultimateandinanycase thisprocessiseithercircularorleadstoaninfi- 585 moralevil morality niteregress.Iftheultimateprincipleisself-evi- dent,thentheproblemmayhaveananswer.But ifitisnotitwouldappeartobearbitrary.The problemofthejustificationofanultimateprin- ciplecontinuestobealeadingoneinmoralepis- temology. Recentlytherehasbeenmuchinterestinthe statusandexistenceof"moralfacts."Arethere any,whatarethey,andhowaretheyestablished as"facts"?Thisrelätestoquestionsaboutmoral realism.Moralrealismmaintainsthatmoral predicatesarerealandcanbeknowntobeso; anti-realistsdenythis.Thisdeniallinkswiththe viewthatmoralpropertiessuperveneonnatural ones,andtheproblemofsupervenienceis anotherrecentlinkbetweenethicsandepiste- mology. Pragmatisminethicsmaintainsthatamoral problemislikeanyprobleminthatitistheocca- sionforinquiryandmoraljudgmentsaretobe regardedashypothesestobetestedbyhowwell theyresolvetheproblem.Thisamountstoan attempttobypasstheis-oughtproblemandall such"dualisms."Soisconstructivism,adevelop- mentowingmuchtotheworkofRawls,which contrastswithmoralrealism.Constructivism maintainsthatmoralideasarehumanconstructs andthetaskisnotepistemologicalormetaphys- icalbutpracticalandtheoretical-thatofattain- ingreflectiveequilibriumbetweenconsidered moraljudgmentsandtheprinciplesthatcoordi- nateandexplainthem.Onthisviewthereareno moralfacts.Opponentsmaintainthatthisonly replacesafoundationalistviewofethicswitha coherenceconception. Thequestionwhetherquestionsofmoralepis- temologycaninthiswaybebypassedcanbe regardedasitselfaquestionofmoralepistemol- ogy.Andthequestionofthefoundationsof morality,andwhethertherearefoundations, canstillberegardedasaquestionofmoralepis- temology,asdistinctfromaquestionofthemost convenientandefficientarrangementofour moralideas. Seealsoethicalconstructivism, ETHICS,INTUITION,MORALREALISM,REFLEC- TIVEEQUILIBRIUM.M.G.S. moralevil.Seephilosophyofreligion. morality,aninformalpublicsystemapplyingto allrationalpersons,governingbehaviorthat affectsothers,havingthelesseningofevilor harmasitsgoal,andincludingwhatarecom- monlyknownasthemoralrules,moralideals, andmoralvirtues.Tosaythatitisapublicsys- temmeansthatallthosetowhomitappliesmust understanditandthatitmustnotbeirrational forthemtouseitindecidingwhattodoandin judgingotherstowhomthesystemapplies. Gamesaretheparadigmcasesofpublicsystems; allgameshaveapointandtherulesofagame applytoallwhoplayit.Allplayersknowthe pointofthegameanditsrules,anditisnotirra- tionalforthemtobeguidedbythepointand rulesandtojudgethebehaviorofotherplayers bythem. Tosaythatmoralityisinformalmeansthat thereisnodecisionprocedureorauthoritythat cansettleallitscontroversialquestions.Morality thusresemblesabackyardgameofbasketball morethanaprofessionalgame.Althoughthere isoverwhelmingagreementonmostmoralmat- ters,certaincontroversialquestionsmustbeset- tledinanadhocfashionornotsettledatall.For example,when,ifever,abortionisacceptableis anunresolvablemoralmatter,buteachsociety andreligioncanadoptitsownposition.That moralityhasnooneinapositionofauthorityis oneofthemostimportantrespectsinwhichit differsfromlawandreligion. Althoughmoralitymustincludethecom- monlyacceptedmoralrulessuchasthosepro- hibitingkillinganddeceiving,differentsocieties caninterprettheserulessomewhatdifferently. Theycanalsodifferintheirviewsaboutthe scopeofmorality,i.e.,aboutwhethermorality protectsnewborns,fetuses,ornon-humanani- mals.Thusdifferentsocietiescanhavesomewhat differentmoralities,althoughthisdifferencehas limits.Alsowithineachsociety,apersonmay havehisownviewaboutwhenitisjustifiedto breakoneoftherules,e.g.,abouthowmuch harmwouldhavetobepreventedinordertojus- tifydeceivingsomeone.Thusoneperson's moralitymaydiffersomewhatfromanother's, butbothwillagreeontheoverwhelmingnum- berofnon-controversialcases. Amoraltheoryisanattempttodescribe, explain,andifpossiblejustify,morality.Un- fortunately,mostmoraltheoriesattempttogen- eratesomesimplifiedmoralcode,ratherthanto describethecomplexmoralsystemthatis alreadyinuse.Moralitydoesnotresolvealldis- putes.Moralitydoesnotrequireonealwaysto actsoastoproducethebestconsequencesorto actonlyinthosewaysthatonewouldwill everyonetoact.Rathermoralityincludesboth moralrulesthatnooneshouldtransgressand moralidealsthatallareencouragedtofollow, butmuchofwhatonedoeswillnotbegoverned bymorality. 586 morality,slave moralrationalism Seealsoappliedethics,ethics,justice, MORALITY,UTILITARIANISM.B.Ge. morality,slave.Seenietzsche. moralpatient.Seemoralstatus. moralpointofview.Seeethics. moralpsychology,(1)thesubfieldofpsychology thattracesthedevelopmentövertimeofmoral reasoningandopinionsinthelivesofindividu- als(thissubdisciplineincludesworkofJean Piaget,LawrenceKohlberg,andCarolGilligan); (2)thepartofphilosophywherephilosophyof mindandethicsoverlap,whichconcernsallthe psychologicalissuesrelevanttomorality.There aremanydifferentpsychologicalmattersrele- vanttoethics,andeachmayberelevantinmore thanoneway.Differentethicaltheoriesimply differentsortsofconnections.Somoralpsychol- ogyincludesworkofmanyanddiversekinds. Butseveraltraditionaldustersofconcernare evident. Someelementsofmoralpsychologyconsider thepsychologicalmattersrelevanttometaethi- calissues,i.e.,toissuesaboutthegeneralnature ofmoraltruth,judgment,andknowledge.Dif- ferentmetaethicaltheoriesinvokementalphe- nomenaindifferentways:noncognitivism maintainsthatsentencesexpressingmoraljudg- mentsdonotfunctiontoreporttruthsorfalse- hoods,butrather,e.g.,toexpresscertain emotionsortoprescribecertainactions.Sosome formsofnoncognitivismimplythatanunder- standingofcertainsortsofemotions,orofspe- cialactivitieslikeprescribingthatmayinvolve particularpsychologicalelements,iscrucialtoa fullunderstandingofhowethicalsentencesare meaningful.Certainformsofcognitivism,the viewthatmoral(declarative)sentencesdo expresstruthsorfalsehoods,implythatmoral factsconsistofpsychologicalfacts,thatfor instancemoraljudgmentsconsistofexpressions ofpositivepsychologicalattitudesofsomepar- ticularkindtowardtheobjectsofthosejudg- ments.Andanunderstandingofpsychological phenomenalikesentimentiscrucialaccordingto certainsortsofprojectivism,whichholdthatthe supposedmoralpropertiesofthingsaremere misleadingprojectionsofoursentimentsonto theobjectsofthosesentiments.Certaintradi- tionalmoralsensetheoriesandcertaintradi- tionalformsofintuitionismhaveheldthat specialpsychologicalfacultiesarecrucialforour epistemicaccesstomoraltruth. Particularviewsinnormativeethics,particu- larviewsaboutthemoralstatusofacts,persons, andothertargetsofnormativeevaluation,also oftensuggestthatanunderstandingofcertain psychologicalmattersiscrucialtoethics.Actions, intentions,andcharacteraresomeofthetargets ofevaluationofnormativeethics,andtheir properunderstandinginvolvesmanyissuesin philosophyofmind.Also,manynormativethe- oristshavemaintainedthatthereisaclosecon- nectionbetweenpleasure,happiness,ordesire- satisfactionandaperson'sgood,andthesethings arealsoaconcernofphilosophyofmind.Inaddi- tion,therightnessofactionsisoftenheldtobe closelyconnectedtothemotives,beliefs,and otherpsychologicalphenomenathatliebehind thoseactions. Variousothertraditionalphilosophicalcon- cernslinkethicalandpsychologicalissues:the natureofthepattemsinthelong-termdevelop- mentinindividualsofmoralopinionsandrea- soning,theappropriateformformoraleducation andpunishment,theconnectionsbetween obligationandmotivation,i.e.,betweenmoral reasonsandpsychologicalcauses,andthenotion offreewillanditsrelationtomoralresponsibil- ityandautonomy.Someworkinphilosophyof mindalsosuggeststhatmoralphenomena,orat leastnormativephenomenaofsomekind,playa crucialroleinilluminatingorconstitutingpsy- chologicalphenomenaofvariouskinds,butthe traditionalconcernofmoralpsychologyhas beenwiththearticulationofthesortofphiloso- phyofmindthatcanbeusefultoethics. Seealsoakrasia,ethics,practicalrea- soning,self-deception.J.R.M. moralrationalism,theviewthatthesubstanceof morality,usuallyintheformofgeneralmoral principles,canbeknownapriori.Theviewis defendedbyKantinGroundworkoftheMetaphysic ofMorals,butitgoesbackatleasttoPlato.Both PlatoandKantthoughtthatapriorimoral knowledgecouldhaveanimpactonwhatwedo quiteindependentlyofanydesirethatwenap- pentohave.Thismotivationalviewisalsoordi- narilyassociatedwithmoralrationalism.It comesintwoquitedifferentforms.Thefirstis thatapriorimoralknowledgeconsistsinasui generismentalstatethatisbothbelief-likeand desire-like.ThisseemstohavebeenPlato'sview, forheheldthatthebeliefthatsomethingisgood isitselfadispositiontopromotethatthing.The secondisthatapriorimoralknowledgeconsists inabeliefthatiscapableofrationallyproducing adistinctdesire. 587 moralrealism moralrealism Rationalistswhomakethefirstclaimhavehad troubleaccommodatingthepossibilityofsome- one'sbelievingthatsomethingisgoodbut, throughweaknessofwill,notmusteringthe desiretodoit.Accordingly,theyhavebeen forcedtoassimilateweaknessofwilltoignorance ofthegood.Rationalistswhomakethesecond claimaboutreason'saction-producingcapacity facenosuchproblem.Forthisreason,theirview isoftenpreferred.Thebest-knownanti-rational- istaboutmoralityisHume.HisTreatiseofHuman Naturedeniesboththatmorality'ssubstancecan beknownbyreasonaloneandthatreasonalone iscapableofproducingaction. Seealsoakrasia,ethics,hume,kant, MORALSENSETHEORY,MOTIVATIONALIN- TERNALISM,RATIONALISM.M.Sm. moralrealism,ametaethicalviewcommittedto theobjectivityofethics.Ithas(I)metaphysical, (2)semantic,and(3)epistemologicalcompo- nents. (1)Itsmetaphysicalcomponentistheclaim thattherearemoralfactsandmoralproperties whoseexistenceandnatureareindependentof people'sbeliefsandattitudesaboutwhatisright orwrong.Inthisclaim,moralrealismcontrasts withanerrortheoryandwithotherformsof nihilismthatdenytheexistenceofmoralfacts andproperties.Itcontrastsaswellwithvarious versionsofmoralrelativismandotherformsof ethicalconstructivismthatmakemoralfactscon- sistinfactsaboutpeople'smoralbeliefsandatti- tudes. (2)Itssemanticcomponentisprimarilycogni- tivist.Cognitivismholdsthatmoraljudgments shouldbeconstruedasassertionsaboutthe moralpropertiesofactions,persons,policies,and otherobjectsofmoralassessment,thatmoral predicatespurporttorefertopropertiesofsuch objects,thatmoraljudgments(ortheproposi- tionsthattheyexpress)canbetrueorfalse,and thatcognizerscanhavethecognitiveattitudeof belieftowardthepropositionsthatmoraljudg- mentsexpress.Thesecognitivistclaimscontrast withthenoncognitiveclaimsofemotivismand prescriptivism,accordingtowhichtheprimary purposeofmoraljudgmentsistoexpressthe appraiser'sattitudesorcommitments,rather thantostatefactsorascribeproperties.Moral realismalsoholdsthattruthformoraljudgments isnon-epistemic;inthiswayitcontrastswith moralrelativismandotherformsofethicalcon- structivismthatmakethetruthofamoraljudg- mentepistemic. Themetaphysicalandsemanticthesesimply thattherearesometruemoralpropositions.An errortheoryacceptsthecognitivistsemantic claimsbutdeniestherealistmetaphysicalthesis. Itholdsthatmoraljudgmentsshouldbecon- struedascontainingreferringexpressionsand havingtruth-values,butinsiststhattheserefer- ringexpressionsareempty,becausethereareno moralfacts,andthatnomoralclaimsaretrue. Alsoonthistheory,commonsensemoral thoughtpresupposestheexistenceofmoralfacts andproperties,butissystematicallyinerror.In thisway,theerrortheoryståndstomoralreal- ismmuchasatheismståndstotheisminaworld oftheists.(J.L.Mackieintroducedanddefended theerrortheoryinhisEthics:InventingRightand Wrong,1977.) (3)Finally,ifmoralrealismistoavoidskepti- cismitmustclaimthatsomemoralbeliefsare true,thattherearemethodsforjustifyingmoral beliefs,andthatmoralknowledgeispossible. Whilemakingthesemetaphysical,semantic, andepistemologicalclaims,moralrealismis compatiblewithawidevarietyofothermeta- physical,semantic,andepistemologicalprinci- plesandsocantakemanydifferentforms.The moralrealistsintheearlypartofthetwentieth centuryweregenerallyintuitionists.Intuition- ismcombinedacommitmenttomoralrealism withafoundationalistmoralepistemology accordingtowhichmoralknowledgemustrest onself-evidentmoraltruthsandwiththenon- naturalistclaimthatmoralfactsandproperties aresuigenerisandnotreducibletoanynatural factsorproperties.Friendsofnoncognitivism foundthemetaphysicalandepistemological commitmentsofintuitionismextravagantandso rejectedmoralrealism.Låtermoralrealistshave generallysoughttodefendmoralrealismwith- outthemetaphysicalandepistemologicaltrap- pingsofintuitionism.Onesuchversionofmoral realismtakesanaturalisticform.Thisformof ethicalnaturalismclaimsthatourmoralbeliefs arejustifiedwhentheyformpartofanexplana- torilycoherentsystemofbeliefswithone anotherandwithvariousnon-moralbeliefs,and insiststhatmoralpropertiesarejustnatural propertiesofthepeople,actions,andpolicies thatinstantiatethem.Debatebetweenrealists andanti-realistsandwithintherealistcampcen- tersonsuchissuesastherelationbetweenmoral judgmentandaction,therationalauthorityof morality,moralepistemologyandmethodology, therelationbetweenmoralandnon-moralnat- uralproperties,theplaceofethicsinanaturalis- 588 MoralRearmamentMovement moralskepticism ticworldview,andtheparityofethicsandthe sciences. Seealsoemotivism,ethicalconstruc- TIVISM,ETHICALOBJECTIVISM,ETHICS,NATU- RALISM.D.O.B. MoralRearmamentMovement.Seebuchman- ISM. moralsensetheory,anethicaltheory,developed byeighteenth-centuryBritishphilosophers- notablyShaftesbury,Hutcheson,andHume- accordingtowhichthepleasureorpainaperson feelsuponthinkingabout(or"observing")cer- taincharactertraitsisindicativeofthevirtueor vice,respectively,ofthosefeatures.Itisatheory of"moralperception,"offeredinresponseto moralrationalism,theviewthatmoraldistinc- tionsarederivedbyreasonalone,andcombines Locke'sempiricistdoctrinethatallideasbeginin experiencewiththebelief,widelysharedatthe time,thatfeelingsplayacentralroleinmoral evaluationandmotivation.Onthistheory,our emotionalresponsestopersons'charactersare often"perceptions"oftheirmorality,justasour experiencesofanapple'srednessandsweetness areperceptionsofitscolorandtaste.Theseideas ofmoralityareseenasproductsofan"internal" sense,becausetheyareproducedinthe "observer"onlyaftersheformsaconceptofthe conductortraitbeingobserved(orcontem- plated)-aswhenapersonrealizesthatsheis seeingsomeoneintentionallyharmanotherand reactswithdispleasureatwhatshesees.The moralsenseisconceivedasbeinganalogousto, orpossiblyanaspectof,ourcapacitytorecognize varyingdegreesofbeautyinthings,whichmod- ernwriterscall"thesenseofbeauty." Rejectingthepopulärviewthatmoralityis basedonthewillofGod,Shaftesburymaintains ratherthatmoralitydependsonhumannature, andheintroducesthenotionofasenseof rightandwrong,possesseduniquelybyhuman beings,whoalonearecapableofreflection. Hutchesonarguesthattoapproveofacharacter istoregarditasvirtuous.Forhim,reason,which discoversrelationsofinanimateobjectstoratio- nalagents,isunabletoarouseourapprovalin theabsenceofamoralsense.Ultimately,wecan explainwhy,forexample,weapproveofsome- one^temperatecharacteronlybyappealingto ournaturaltendencytofeelpleasure(sometimes identifiedwithapproval)atthethoughtofchar- actersthatexhibitbenevolence,thetraitto whichallothervirtuescanbetraced.Thisdispo- sitiontofeelapproval(anddisapproval)iswhat Hutchesonidentifiesasthemoralsense. Humeemphasizesthattypicalhumanbeings makemoraldistinctionsonthebasisoftheirfeel- ingsonlywhenthosesentimentsareexperi- encedfromadisinterestedor"general"pointof view.Inotherwords,weturnourinitialsenti- mentsintomoraljudgmentsbycompensating forthefactthatwefeelmorestronglyabout thosetowhomweareemotionallyclosethan thosefromwhomwearemoredistant.Ona widelyheldinterpretationofHume,themoral senseprovidesnotonlyjudgments,butalso motivestoactaccordingtothosejudgments, sinceitsfeelingsmaybemotivatingpassionsor arousesuchpassions. RoderickFirth's(1917-87)twentieth-century idealobservertheory,accordingtowhichmoral goodisdesignatedbytheprojectedreactions ofahypotheticallyomniscient,disinterested observerpossessingotheridealtraits,aswellas Brandfscontemporarymoralspectatortheory, aredirectdescendantsofthemoralsensetheory. Seealsobutler,hume,hutcheson, SHAFTESBURY.E.S.R. moralskepticism,anymetaethicalviewthat raisesfundamentaldoubtsaboutmoralityasa whole.Differentkindsofdoubtsleadtodifferent kindsofmoralskepticism. Theprimarykindsofmoralskepticismare epistemological.Moraljustificationskepticismisthe claimthatnobodyeverhas(anyoradequate) justificationforbelievinganysubstantivemoral claim.Moralknowledgeskepticismistheclaimthat nobodyeverknowsthatanysubstantivemoral claimistrue.Ifknowledgeimpliesjustification, asisoftenassumed,thenmoraljustification skepticismimpliesmoralknowledgeskepticism. Butevenifknowledgerequiresjustification,it requiresmore,somoralknowledgeskepticism doesnotimplymoraljustificationskepticism. Anotherkindofskepticalviewinmetaethics restsonlinguisticanalysis.Someemotivists, expressivists,andprescriptivistsarguethatmoral claims(like"Cheatingismorallywrong")resem- bleexpressionsofemotionordesire(like"Boo, cheating")orprescriptionsforaction(like"Don't cheat"),whichareneithertruenorfalse,so moralclaimsthemselvesareneithertruenor false.Thislinguisticmoralskepticism,whichis sometimescallednoncognitivism,impliesmoral knowledgeskepticismifknowledgeimplies truth. Evenifsuchlinguisticanalysesarerejected, 589 moralstatus More,Henry onecanstillholdthatnomoralpropertiesor factsreallyexist.Thisontologicalmoralskepticism canbecombinedwiththelinguisticviewthat moralclaimsassertmoralpropertiesandfactsto yieldanerrortheorythatallpositivemoral claimsarefalse. Adifferentkindofdoubtaboutmoralityis oftenraisedbyasking,"WhyshouldIbemoral?" Practicalmoralskepticismanswersthatthereisnot alwaysanyreasonoranyadequatereasontobe moralortodowhatismorallyrequired.This viewconcernsreasonstoactratherthanreasons tobelieve. Moralskepticismofallthesekindsisoften seenasimmoral,butmoralskepticscanactand bemotivatedandevenholdmoralbeliefsin muchthesamewayasnon-skeptics.Moralskep- ticsjustdenythattheiroranyoneelse'smoral beliefsarejustifiedorknownortrue,orthatthey haveadequatereasontobemoral. Seealsoemotivism,ethics,justifica- TION,MORALEPISTEMOLOGY,PRESCRIP- TIVISM,SKEPTICISM.W.S.-A. moralstatus,thesuitabilityofabeingtobe viewedasanappropriateobjectofdirectmoral concern;thenatureordegreeofabeing'sability tocountasagroundofclaimsagainstmoral agents;themoralstanding,rank,orimportance ofa(kindof)being;theconditionofbeinga moralpatient;moralconsiderability. Ordinarymoralreflectioninvolvesconsidering others.Butwhichothersoughttobeconsidered? Andhowarethevariousobjectsofmoralcon- siderationtobeweighedagainstoneanother? Anythingmightbethetopicofmoraldiscussion, butnoteverythingisthoughttobeanappropri- ateobjectofdirectmoralconcern.Ifthereareany ethicalconstraintsonhowwemaytreata ceramicplate,theseseemtoderivefromconsid- erationsaboutotherbeings,notfromtheinter- estsorgoodornatureoftheplate.Thesame applies,presumably,toaclodofearth.Many philosophersviewalivingbutinsentientbeing, suchasadandelion,inthesameway;others havedoubts.Accordingtosome,evensentient animallifeislittlemoredeservingofmoralcon- siderationthantheclodorthedandelion.This tradition,whichrestrictssignificantmoralstatus tohumans,hascomeundervigorousandvaried attackbydefendersofanimalliberation.This attackcriticizesspeciesism,andarguesthat "humanism"isanalogoustotheoriesthatillegit- imatelybasemoralstatusonrace,gender,or socialclass. Somephilosophershavereferredtobeings thatareappropriateobjectsofdirectmoralcon- cernas"moralpatients."Moralagentsarethose beingswhoseactionsaresubjecttomoralevalu- ation;analogously,moralpatientswouldbethose beingswhosesuffering(inthesenseofbeingthe objectsoftheactionsofmoralagents)permitsor demandsmoralevaluation.Othersapplythe label'moralpatients'morenarrowly,justto thosebeingsthatareappropriateobjectsofdirect moralconcernbutarenot(also)moralagents. Theissueofmoralstatusconcemsnotonly whetherbeingscountatallmorally,butalsoto whatdegreetheycount.Afterall,beingswhoare moralpatientsmightstillhavetheirclaimsout- weighedbythepreferredclaimsofotherbeings whopossesssomespecialmoralstatus.Wemight, withNozick,propose"utilitarianismforanimals, Kantianismforpeople."Similarly,thebodily autonomyargumentindefenseofabortion, madefamousbyThomson,doesnotdenythat thefetusisamoralpatient,butinsiststhat her/his/itsclaimsarelimitedbythepregnant woman'spriorclaimtocontrolherbodilydestiny. Ithasoftenbeenthoughtthatmoralstatus shouldbetiedtotheconditionof"personhood." Theideahasbeeneitherthatonlypersonsare moralpatients,orthatpersonspossessaspecial moralstatusthatmakesthem(morally)more importantthannonpersons.Personhood,on suchtheories,isaminimalconditionformoral patiency.Why?Moralpatiencyissaidtobe"cor- relative"withmoralagency:acreaturehasboth orneither.Alternatively,personshavebeen viewednotastheonlymoralpatients,butasa speciallyprivilegedeliteamongmoralpatients, possessingrightsaswellasinterests. Seealsoethics,kant,personaliden- TITY,PERSONHOOD,RIGHTS.EJ. moralsubjectivism.Seeethics. More,Henry(1614-87),Englishphilosopher, theologian,andpoet,themostprolificofthe CambridgePlatonists.In1631heenteredChrisfs College,wherehespenttherestofhislifeafter becomingFellowin1641.Hewasprimarilyan apologistofanti-Calvinist,latitudinarianstamp whoseinalienablephilosophico-theologicalpur- posewastodemonstratetheexistenceand immortalityofthesoulandtocure"twoenor- mousdistempersofthemind,"atheismand "enthusiasm."Hedescribedhimselfas"aFisher forPhilosophers,desiroustodrawthemtoor retainthemintheChristianFaith."Hiseclectic methoddeployedNeoplatonism(notably PlotinusandFicino),mysticaltheologies,caba- 590 More,SirThomas motivation listicdoctrines(asMoremisconceivedthem), empiricalfindings(includingreportsofwitch- craftandghosts),thenewscience,andthenew philosophy,notablythephilosophyofDescartes. YetherejectedDescartes'sbeast-machinedoc- trine,hisversionofdualism,andthepretensions ofCartesianmechanicalphilosophytoexplainall physicalphenomena.Animalshavesouls;the universeisalivewithsouls.Bodyandspiritare spatiallyextended,theformerbeingessentially impenetrable,inert,anddiscerpible(divisibleinto parts),thelatteressentiallypenetrable,indiscerpi- ble,active,andcapableofaspiritualdensity, whichMorecalledessentialspissitnde,"theredou- blingorcontractingofsubstanceintolessspace thanitdoessometimesoccupy."Physical processesareactivatedandorderedbythespiritof natnre,ahylarchicprincipleand"thevicarious powerofGoduponthisgreatantomaton,the world."More'swritingsonnaturalphilosophy, especiallyhisdoctrineofinfinitespace,are thoughttohaveinfluencedNewton.More attackedHobbes'smaterialismand,inthe1660s and1670s,theimpietiesofDutchCartesianism, includingtheperceivedatheismofSpinozaand hiscircle.Heregrettedthe"enthusiasm"forand conversiontoQuakerismofAnneConway,his "extramural"tuteeandassiduouscorrespondent. Morehadapartialityforcoinagesandlinguis- ticexotica.Weowetohim'Cartesianism'(1662), coinedafewyearsbeforethefirstappearanceof theFrenchequivalent,andthesubstantive 'materialist'(1668). Seealsoboyle,Cambridgeplatonists, DESCARTES,NEOPLATONISM.A.G. More,SirThomas(1477or1478-1535),English humanist,statesman,martyr,andsaint.A lawyerbyprofession,heenteredroyalservicein 1517andbecamelordchancellorin1529.After refusingtosweartotheActofSupremacy,which namedHenryVIIItheheadoftheEnglish church,Morewasbeheadedasatraitor. Althoughhiswritingsincludebiography,po- etry,letters,andanti-hereticalträets,hisonly philosophicalwork,Utopia(publishedinLatin, 1516),ishismasterpiece.Coveringawidevari- etyofsubjectsincludinggovernment,education, punishment,religion,familylife,andeuthana- sia,UtopiacontrastsEuropeansocialinstitutions withtheircounterpartsontheimaginaryisland ofUtopia.InspiredinpartbyPlato'sRepitblic,the Utopiancommunalsystemisdesignedtoteach virtueandrewarditwithhappiness.The absenceofmoney,privateproperty,andmost socialdistinctionsallowsUtopianstheleisureto developthefacultiesinwhichhappinesscon- sists.BecauseofMore'sloveofirony,Utopiahas beensubjecttoquitedifferentinterpretations. J.W.A. Mosca,Gaetano(1858-1941),Italianpolitical scientistwhomadepioneeringcontributionsto thetheoryofdemocraticelitism.Combiningthe lifeofauniversityprofessorwiththatofapoliti- cian,hetaughtsuchsubjectsasconstitutional law,publiclaw,politicalscience,andhistoryof politicaltheory;atvarioustimeshewasalso aneditoroftheParliamentaryproceedings,an electedmemberoftheChamberofDeputies,an under-secretaryforcolonialaffairs,anewspaper columnist,andamemberoftheSenate. ForMosca'elitism'referstotheempiricalgen- eralizationthateverysocietyisruledbyanorga- nizedminority.Hisdemocraticcommitmentis embodiedinwhathecallsjuridicaldefense:the normativeprinciplethatpoliticaldevelopments aretobejudgedbywhetherandhowtheypre- ventanyoneperson,class,force,orinstitution fromdominatingtheothers.Histhirdmaincon- tributionisaframeworkconsistingoftwointer- sectingdistinctionsthatyieldfourpossibleideal types,definedasfollows:inautocracy,authority flowsfromtherulerstotheruled;inliberalism, fromtheruledtotherulers;indemocracy,the rulingclassisopentorenewalbymembersof otherclasses;inaristocracyitisnot.Hewasinflu- encedby,andinturninfluenced,positivism, fortheelitistthesispresumablyconstitutesthe fundamental"law"ofpolitical"science."Even deeperishisconnectionwiththetraditionof Machiavelli'spoliticalrealism.Thereisalso noquestionthathepracticedanempirical approach.Inthetraditionofelitism,hemaybe comparedandcontrastedwithPareto,Michels, andSchumpeter;andinthetraditionofItalian politicalphilosophy,toCroce,Gentile,and Gramsci. Seealsocroce,gentile,gramsci,machi- AVELLI,WEBER.M.A.F. MosesbenMaimon.Seemaimonides. MoTi.Seemotzu. motion.Seenewton. motivation,apropertycentralinmotivational explanationsofintentionalconduet.Toassert thatAnnisdrivingtoBostontodaybecauseshe wantstoseetheRedSoxplayandbelievesthat theyareplayingtodayinBostonistooffera 591 motivationalexplanation motivationalinternalism motivationalexplanationofthisaction.Ona populärinterpretation,theassertionmentions apairofattitudes:adesireandabelief.Ann's desireisaparadigmaticmotivationalattitudein thatitinclineshertobringaboutthesatisfaction ofthatveryattitude.Theprimaryfunctionof motivationalattitudesistobringabouttheirown satisfactionbyinducingtheagenttoundertakea suitablecourseofaction,and,arguably,anyatti- tudethathasthatfunctionis,ipsofacto,amoti- vationalone.Therelatedthesisthatonly attitudeshavingthisfunctionaremotiva- tional-or,moreprecisely,motivation-constitut- ing-isimplausible.AnnhopesthattheSoxwon yesterday.Plainly,herhopecannotbringabout itsownsatisfaction,sinceAnnhasnocontrol överthepast.Evenso,thehopeseeminglymay motivateaction(e.g.,Ann'ssearchingforsports newsonhercarradio),inwhichcasethehope ismotivation-constituting.Somephilosophers haveclaimedthatourbeliefsthatwearemorally requiredtotakeaparticularcourseofactionare motivation-constituting,andsuchbeliefsobvi- ouslydonothavethefunctionofbringingabout theirownsatisfaction(i.e.,theirtruth).How- ever,theclaimiscontroversial,asistherelated claimthatbeliefsofthiskindare"besires"-that is,notmerelybeliefsbutdesiresaswell.Seealso ACCIDIE,ACTIONTHEORY,MOTIVATIONAL EXPLANATION,MOTIVATIONALINTERNALISM. A.R.M. motivationalexplanation,atypeofexplanation ofgoal-directedbehaviorwheretheexplanans appealstothemotivesoftheagent.Theexpla- nationusuallyisinthefollowingform:Smith swamhärdinordertowintherace.Herethe descriptionofwhatSmithdididentifiesthe behaviortobeexplained,andthephrasethatfol- lows'inorderto'identifiesthegoalorthestate ofaffairstheobtainingofwhichwasthemoving forcebehindthebehavior.Thegeneralpre- sumptionisthattheagentwhosebehavioris beingexplainediscapableofdeliberatingand actingonthedecisionsreachedasaresultofthe deliberation.Thus,itisdubiouswhetherthe explanationcontainedin'Theplantturned towardthesuninordertoreceivemorelight'is amotivationalexplanation. Twoproblemsarethoughttosurroundmoti- vationalexplanations.First,sincethestateof affairssetasthegoalis,atthetimeoftheaction, non-existent,itcanonlyactasthe"moving force"byappearingastheintentionalobjectof aninnerpsychologicalstateoftheagent.Thus, motivesaregenerallydesiresforspecificobjects orstatesofaffairsonwhichtheagentacts.So motivationalexplanationisbasicallythetypeof explanationprovidedinfolkpsychology,andas suchitinheritsalltheallegedproblemsofthelat- ter.Andsecond,whatcountsasamotiveforan actionunderonedescriptionusuallyfailstobea motiveforthesameactionunderadifferent description.Mymotiveforsaying"hello"may havebeenmydesiretoanswerthephone,but mymotiveforsaying"hello"loudlywasto expressmyirritationatthepersoncallingmeso lateatnight. Seealsoactiontheory,explanation, FOLKPSYCHOLOGY,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND. B.E. motivationalinternalism,theviewthatmoral motivationisinternaltomoralduty(orthe senseofduty).Theviewrepresentsthecontem- poraryunderstandingofHume'sthesisthat moralityisessentiallypractical.Humewenton topointouttheapparentlogicalgapbetween statementsoffact,whichexpresstheoretical judgments,andstatementsaboutwhatoughtto bedone,whichexpresspracticaljudgments. Motivationalinternalismoffersoneexplanation forthisgap.Nomotivationisinternaltothe recognitionoffacts. Thespecificinternalrelationtheviewaffirms isthatofnecessity.Thus,motivationalinternal- istsholdthatifoneseesthatonehasadutytodo acertainactionorthatitwouldberighttodoit, thennecessarilyonehasamotivetodoit.For example,ifoneseesthatitisone'sdutytodonate blood,thennecessarilyonehasamotiveto donateblood.Motivationalexternalism,the opposingview,deniesthisrelation.Itsadherents holdthatitispossibleforonetoseethatonehas adutytodoacertainactionorthatitwouldbe righttodoityethavenomotivetodoit.Moti- vationalexternaliststypically,thoughnotuni- versally,denyanyrealgapbetweentheoretical andpracticaljudgments. Motivationalinternalismtakeseitheroftwo forms,rationalistandanti-rationalist.Rational- ists,suchasPlatoandKant,holdthatthecon- tentortruthofamoralrequirementguarantees inthosewhounderstanditamotiveofcompli- ance.Anti-rationalists,suchasHume,holdthat moraljudgmentnecessarilyhassomeaffectiveor volitionalcomponentthatsuppliesamotivefor therelevantactionbutthatrendersmoralityless amatterofreasonandtruththanoffeelingor commitment.Itisalsopossibleintheabstractto 592 MoTzu mysticism drawananalogousdistinctionbetweentwo formsofmotivationafexternalism,cognitivist andnoncognitivist,butbecausetheviewsprings fromaninterestinassimiiatingpracticaljudg- menttotheoreticaljudgment,itsonlyinfluential formhasbeencognitivist. Seealsoemotivism,ethics,hume.J.D. MoTzu,alsoknownasMasterMo,MoTi(fifth centuryb.c),Chinesephilosopherandfounder oftheMohistschoolofthought,whichwasa majorrivaltoConfucianisminancientChina. ThetextMoTzucontainsdifferentversionsofhis teachingsaswellassubsequentdevelopmentsof histhought.MoTzuregardedrightness(yi)as determinedbywhatbenefits(Ii)thepublic, wherebenefitisunderstoodintermsofsuch thingsasorderandincreasedresourcesinsoci- ety.Heopposedthemusicalactivitiesandritual practicesoftheConfuciansonthegroundthat suchpracticesaredetrimentaltothepublicgood. Heisprobablybestknownforadvocatingthe idealofanequalconcerntobenefitandavoid harmtoeveryhumanbeing.Practicingthisideal istothepublicgood,sincestrifeanddisorder stemfrompartialitytowardoneselforone'sfam- ilyorsocialgroup.Also,itbeingthewillof Heaven(t'ien)thatpeoplehaveequalconcern forall,onewillberewardedorpunishedby Heavenaccordingtowhetheronepracticesthis ideal.Inresponsetoworriesaboutthepractica- bilityoftheideal,MoTzuinsistedthatitwassim- pleandeasytoputtheidealintopractice,leaving himselfopentothechargethatheneglectedthe complexitiesofemotionalmanagement.See alsoCONFUCIANISM,MOHISM.K.-l.S. MouTsung-san(1909-95),Chinesephilosopher, perhapsthemostoriginalthinkeramongcon- temporaryNeo-Confucians.EducatedatPeking University,hefirststudiedWesternphilosophy butwasconvertedtoChinesephilosophyunder theinfluenceofHsiungShih-li.Hemadeagreat breakthroughinhisstudyofSung-MingNeo- Confucianphilosophy,arguingthatChuHsiwas reallyasidebranchthattookthepositionofthe orthodoxy.Hemaintainedthatallthreemajor Chinesetraditions,Confucian,Taoist,andBud- dhist,assertthathumanshavetheendowment forintellectualintuition,meaningpersonalpar- ticipationintao(theWay).Seealsochinese PHILOSOPHY,HSIUNGSHIH-LI,HSUFU-KUAN, neo-confucianism,t'angchun-i.S.-h.L. movingrowsparadox.Seezeno'sparadoxes. multiplerealizability.Seefunctionalism. multiple-relationtheory.Seeperception. mysticalexperience,anexperienceallegedto revealsomeaspectofrealitynotnormallyacces- sibletosensoryexperienceorcognition.The experience-typicallycharacterizedbyitspro- foundemotionalimpactontheonewhoexperi- encesit,itstranscendenceofspatialandtemporal distinctions,itstransitoriness,anditsinef- fability-isoftenbutnotalwaysassociatedwith somereligioustradition.Intheisticreligions, mysticalexperiencesareclaimedtobebrought aboutbyGodorbysomeothersuperhuman agent.Theisticmysticalexperiencesevokefeel- ingsofworshipfulawe.Theircontentcanvary fromsomethingnomorearticulatethanafeeling ofclosenesstoGodtosomethingasspecificasan itemofrevealedtheology,suchas,foraChristian mystic,avisionoftheTrinity.Non-theisticmysti- calexperiencesareusuallyclaimedtorevealthe metaphysicalunityofallthingsandtoprovide thosewhoexperiencethemwithasenseofinner peaceorbliss.Seealsomysticism.W.E.M. mysticism,adoctrineordisciplinemaintaining thatonecangainknowledgeofrealitythatisnot accessibletosenseperceptionortorational,con- ceptualthought.Generallyassociatedwithareli- gioustradition,mysticismcantakeatheistic form,asithasinJewish,Christian,andIslamic traditions,oranon-theisticform,asithasin BuddhismandsomevarietiesofHinduism.Mys- ticsclaimthatthemysticalexperience,thevehi- cleofmysticalknowledge,isusuallytheresultof spiritualtraining,involvingsomecombinationof prayer,meditation,fasting,bodilydiscipline,and renunciationofworldlyconcerns.Theisticvari- etiesofmysticismdescribethemysticalexperi- enceasgrantedbyGodandthusnotsubjectto thecontrolofthemystic.Althoughtheistsclaim tofeelclosenesstoGodduringthemysticalexpe- rience,theyregardassertionsofidentityofthe selfwithGodasheretical.Non-theisticvarieties aremoreapttodescribetheexperienceasone thatcanbeinducedandcontrolledbythemys- ticandinwhichdistinctionsbetweentheselfand reality,orsubjectandobject,arerevealedtobe illusory.Mysticsclaimthat,althoughveridical, theirexperiencescannotbeadequatelyde- scribedinlanguage,becauseordinarycommuni- cationisbasedonsenseexperienceandcon- ceptualdifferentiation:mysticalwritingsarethus characterizedbymetaphorandsimile.Itiscon- 593 mythofEr mythofthegiven troversialwhetherallmysticalexperiencesare basicallythesame,andwhethertheapparent diversityamongthemistheresultofinterpreta- tionsinfluencedbydifferentculturaltraditions. Seealsomysticalexperience,philosophy OFRELIGION.W.E.M. mythofEr,ataleattheendofPlato'sRepublicdra- matizingtherewardsofjusticeandphilosophy bydepictingtheprocessofreincamation.Com- plementingthemainargumentofthework,that itisintrinsicallybettertobejustthanunjust,this longestofPlato'smythsblendstraditionallore withspeculativecosmologytoshowthatjustice alsopays,usuallyinlifeandcertainlyinthe afterlife.Er,awarriorwhorevivedshortlyafter death,reportshowjudgesassignthesoulsofthe justtoheavenbutotherstopunishmentinthe underworld,andhowmostreturnafterathou- sandyearstobeholdthecelestialorder,tochoose theirnextlives,andtobebomanew.Seealso plato.S.A.W. mythofthegiven.Seesellars,wilfrid. 594 Nägärjuna(fl.earlysecondcenturya.d.),Indian MahayanaBuddhistphilosopher,founderofthe Mädhyamikaview.TheMulanadhyamakärikä Prajhä("TheFundamentalVersesontheMiddle Way")andtheSUnyätasaptati('TheSeptuagint onEmptiness")areperhapshismajorworks.He distinguishesbetween"twotruths":acondi- tionaltruth,whichisprovisionalandreflectsthe sortofdistinctionswemakeineverydayspeech andfindinordinaryexperience;andafinaltruth, whichisthatthereexistsonlyanineffableinde- pendentreality.Overcomingacceptanceofthe conventional,conditionaltruthisrequisitefor seeingthefinaltruthinenlightenment.Seealso MÄDHYAMIKA.K.E.Y. Nagel,Ernest(1901-85),Czech-bornAmerican philosopher,thepreeminentAmericanphiloso- pherofscienceintheperiodfromthemid-1930s tothe1960s.ArrivinginNewYorkasaten-year- oldimmigrant,heearnedhisB.S.degreefrom theCollegeoftheCityofNewYorkandhisPh.D. fromColumbiaUniversityin1931.Hewasa memberofthePhilosophyDepartmentat Columbiafrom1930to1970.Hecoauthoredthe influentialAnIntroductiontoLogicandScientific Methodwithhisformerteacher,M.R.Cohen.His manypublicationsincludetwowell-knownclas- sics:PrinciplesoftheTheoryofProbability(1939) andStructureofScience(1960). Nagelwassensitivetodevelopmentsinlogic, foundationsofmathematics,andprobabilitythe- ory,andhesharedwithRussellandwithmem- bersoftheViennaCirclelikeCarnapandPhillip Frankarespectfortherelevanceofscientific inquiryforphilosophicalreflection.Buthiswrit- ingalsorevealstheinfluencesofM.R.Cohen andthatstrandinthethinkingofthepragma- tismofPeirceandDeweywhichNagelhimself called"contextualistnaturalism."Hewasaper- suasivecriticofRussell'sviewsofthedataofsen- sationasasourceofnon-inferentialpremisesfor knowledgeandofcognateviewsexpressedby somemembersoftheViennaCircle.Unlike Frege,Russell,Camap,Popper,andothers,he rejectedtheviewthattakingaccountofcontext incharacterizingmethodthreatenedtotaint philosophicalreflectionwithanunacceptable psychologism.Thisstancesubsequentlyallowed himtoopposehistoricistandsociologist approachestothephilosophyofscience. Nagel'scontextualismisreflectedinhiscon- tentionthatideasofdeterminism,probability, explanation,andreduction"canbesignificantly discussedonlyiftheyaredirectedtothetheories orformidationsofascienceandnotitssubject matter"(PrinciplesoftheTheoryofProbability, 1939).Thisattitudeinfusedhisinfluentialdis- cussionsofcoveringlawexplanation,statistical explanation,functionalexplanation,andreduc- tionofonetheorytoanother,inbothnaturaland socialscience.Similarly,hiscontentionthatpar- ticipantsinthedebatebetweenrealismand instrumentalismshouldclarifytheimportof theirdifferencesfor(context-sensitive)scientific methodologyservedasthecoreofhisargument castingdoubtonthesignificanceofthedispute. Inadditiontohisextensivewritingsonscien- tificknowledgemethodology,Nagelwroteinflu- entialessaysonmeasurement,thehistoryof mathematics,andthephilosophyoflaw. Seealsocoveringlawmodel,philoso- phyOFSCIENCE,REDUCTION,VIENNACIRCLE. I.L. Nagel,Thomas(b.1937),Americanprofessorof philosophyandoflawatNewYorkUniversity, knownforhisimportantcontributionsinthe fieldsofmetaphysics,epistemology,ethics,and politicalphilosophy.Nagel'sworkintheseareas isunifiedbyaparticularvisionofperennial philosophicalproblems,accordingtowhichthey emergefromaclashbetweentwoperspectives fromwhichhumanbeingscanviewthemselves andtheworld.Fromanimpersonalperspective, whichresultsfromdetachingourselvesfromour particularviewpoints,westrivetoachievean objectiveviewoftheworld,whereasfromaper- sonalperspective,weseetheworldfromour particularpointofview.AccordingtoNagel, dominanceoftheimpersonalperspectiveintry- ingtounderstandrealityleadstoimplausible philosophicalviewsbecauseitfailstoaccommo- datefactsabouttheself,minds,agency,andval- uesthatarerevealedthroughengagedpersonal perspectives. Inthephilosophyofmind,forinstance,Nagel criticizesvariousreductiveaccountsofmentality 595 naiverealism naturalism resultingfromtakinganexclusivelyimpersonal standpointbecausetheyinevitablyfailto accountfortheirreduciblysubjectivecharacter ofconsciousness.Inethics,consequentialist moraltheories(likeutilitarianism),whichfea- turestrongimpartialistdemandsthatstemfrom takingadetached,impersonalperspective,find resistancefromthepersonalperspectivewithin whichindividualgoalsandmotivesareaccorded animportancenotfoundinstronglyimpartialist moraltheories.Anexaminationofsuchprob- lemsinmetaphysics,epistemologyandethicsis foundinhisMoralQuestions(1979)andTheView fromNowhere(1986).InEqualityandPartiality (1990)Nagelarguesthattheimpersonalstand- pointgivesrisetoanegalitarianformofimpar- tialregardforallpeoplethatoftenclasheswith thegoals,concerns,andaffectionsthatindividu- alsexperiencefromapersonalperspective.Quite generallythen,asNagelseesit,oneimportant philosophicaltaskistoexplorewaysinwhich thesetwostandpointsonboththeoreticaland practicalmattersmightbeintegrated. Nagelhasalsomadeimportantcontributions regardingthenatureandpossibilityofreasonor rationalityinbothitstheoreticalanditspracti- caluses.ThePossibilityofAltruism(1970)isan explorationofthestructureofpracticalreason inwhichNageldefendstherationalityofpru- denceandaltruism,arguingthatthepossibility ofsuchbehaviorisconnectedwithourcapaci- tiestoviewourselvesrespectivelypersisting throughtimeandrecognizingtherealityof otherpersons.TheLastWord(1998)isadefense ofreasonagainstskepticalviews,accordingto whichreasonisamerelycontingent,locally conditionedfeatureofparticularculturesand hencerelative. Seealsoethics,moralrationalism, PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,PRACTICALREASON. M.C.T. naiverealism.Seeperception. name,logicallyproper.Seerussell. names,causaltheoryof.Seecausaltheoryof propernames. names,descriptivisttheoryof.Seecausaltheory OFPROPERNAMES. narrowcontent.Seephilosophyofmind. narrowreflectiveequilibrium.Seereflective EQUILIBRIUM. nativism.Seefödor. Natorp,PaulGerhard.Seeneo-kantianism. naturaldeduction.Seededuction. naturalduty.Seeduty. naturalevil.Seephilosophyofreligion. naturalism,thetwofoldviewthat(1)everything iscomposedofnaturalentities-thosestudiedin thesciences(onsomeversions,thenaturalsci- ences)-whosepropertiesdetermineallthe propertiesofthings,personsincluded(abstracta likepossibiliaandmathematicalobjects,ifthey exist,beingconstructedofsuchabstractentities asthesciencesallow);and(2)acceptablemeth- odsofjustificationandexplanationarecontinu- ous,insomesense,withthoseinscience.Clause (1)ismetaphysicalorontological,clause(2) methodologicaland/orepistemological.Often naturalismisformulatedonlyforaspecificsub- jectmatterordomain.Thusethicalnaturalism holdsthatmoralpropertiesareequivalentto oratleastdeterminedbycertainnaturalproper- ties,sothatmoraljudgmentseitherformasub- classof,orare(non-reductively)determined bythefactualordescriptivejudgments,and theappropriatemethodsofmoraljustification andexplanationarecontinuouswiththosein science. AristotleandSpinozasometimesarecounted amongtheancestorsofnaturalism,asareDem- ocritus,Epicurus,Lucretius,andHobbes.Butthe majorimpetustonaturalisminthelasttwocen- turiescomesfromadvancesinscienceandthe growingexplanatorypowertheysignify.By the1850s,thesynthesisofurea,reflectionson theconservationofenergy,workon"animal electricity,"anddiscoveriesinphysiologysug- gestedtoFeuerbach,L.Buchner,andothersthat allaspectsofhumanbeingsareexplainablein purelynaturalterms.Darwin'stheoryhadeven greaterimpact,andbytheendofthenineteenth centurynaturalistphilosophiesweremaking inroadswhereidealismoncereignedunchal- lenged.NaturalisrrTsranksnowincludedH. Spencer,J.Tyndall,T.H.Huxley,W.K.Clifford, andE.Haeckel.Earlyinthetwentiethcentury, Santayana'snaturalismstronglyinfluenceda numberofAmericanphilosophers,asdid Dewey's.Stillotherversionsofnaturalismflour- ishedinAmericainthe1930sand1940s,includ- ingthoseofR.W.SellarsandM.Cohen.Today mostAmericanandotherphilosophersofmind 596 naturalism naturalism arenaturalistsofsomestripe,largelybecauseof whattheyseeasthelessonsofcontinuingscien- tificadvances,someofthemspectacular,partic- ularlyinthebrainsciences. Nonetheless,twentieth-centuryphilosophy hasbeenlargelyanti-naturalist.Bothphenome- nologyintheHusserliantraditionandanalytic philosophyintheFregeantradition,together withtheirdescendants,havebeenunitedinre- jectingpsychologism,aspeciesofnaturalismac- cordingtowhichempiricaldiscoveriesabout mentalprocessesarecrucialforunderstanding thenatureofknowledge,language,andlogic.In ordertodefendtheautonomyofphilosophy againstinroadsfromdescriptivescience,many philosophershavetriedtoturnthetablesby arguingforthepriorityofphilosophyöversci- ence,henceöveranyofitsallegednaturalistim- plications.Manycontinuetodoso,oftenonthe groundthatphilosophyalonecanilluminatethe normativityandintentionalityinvolvedin knowledge,language,andlogic;orontheground thatphilosophycanevaluatethenormativeand regulativepresuppositionsofscientificpractice whichscienceitselfiseitherblindtoorun- equippedtoanalyze;oronthegroundthatphi-1- osophyunderstandshowthelanguageofscience cannomorebeusedtogetoutsideitselfthanany other,hencecannomorebeknowntobein touchwiththeworldandourselvesthanany other;oronthegroundthatwould-bejustifica- tionsoffundamentalmethod,naturalistmethod certainlyincluded,arenecessarilycircularbe- causetheymustemploytheverymethodatissue. Naturalistsmayreplybyarguingthatnatural- ism^methodologicalclause(2)entailstheoppo- siteofdogmatism,requiringasitdoesanun- compromisingfallibilismaboutphilosophical mattersthatiscontinuouswiththeopen,self- criticalspiritofscience.Ifevidenceweretoaccu- mulateagainstnaturalism'smetaphysicalclause (1),(1)wouldhavetoberevisedorrejected,and thereisnoapriorireasonsuchevidencecouldin principleneverbefound;indeedmanynatural- istsrejecttheapriorialtogether.Likewise,(2) itselfmighthavetoberevisedorevenrejectedin lightofadverseargument,sothatinthisrespect (2)isself-referentiallyconsistent.Untilthen, (2)'shavingsurvivedrigorouscriticismtodateis justificationenough,asisthecasewithhypothe- sesinscience,whichoftenaredeployedwithout circularityinthecourseoftheirownevaluation, whetherpositiveornegative(H.I.Brown,"Cir- cularJustifications,"1994).Sotoocanlanguage beusedwithoutcircularityinexpressinghypo- thesesabouttherelationsbetweenlanguageand theprelinguisticworld(asillustratedbyR.Mil- likan^Language,ThoughtandOtherBiologicalCat- egories,1984;ef.Post,"Epistemology,"1996).As fornormativityandintentionality,naturalism doesnotentailmaterialismorphysicalism, accordingtowhicheverythingiscomposedof theentitiesorprocessesstudiedinphysics,and thepropertiesofthesebasicphysicalaffairs determineallthepropertiesofthings(asin Quine).Somenaturalistsdenythis,holdingthat morethingsthanaredreamtofinphysicsare requiredtoaccountfornormativityandinten- tionality-andconsciousness. Norneednaturalismbereduetive,inthesense ofequatingeverypropertywithsomenatural property.Indeedmanyphysicaliststhemselves explainhowthephysical,hencenatural,proper- tiesofthingsmightdetermineother,non-natural propertieswithoutbeingequivalenttothem(G. Hellman,T.Horgan,D.Lewis;seeJ.Post,The FacesofExistence,1987).Oftenthedetermining physicalpropertiesarenotallpropertiesofthe thingxthathasthenon-naturalproperties,but includepropertiesofitemsseparatedfromxin spaceandtimeorinsomecasesbearingnophys- icalrelationtoxthatdoesanyworkindetermin- ingx'sproperties(Post,"'Global'Supervenient Determination:TooPermissive?"1995).Thus naturalismallowsahighdegreeofholismand historicity,whichopensthewayforanon-reduc- tivenaturalistaccountofintentionalityandnor- mativity,suchasMillikan's,thatisimmunetothe usualobjections,whicharemostlyobjectionsto reduetion.Thealternativepsychosemantictheo- riesofDretskeandFödor,beinglargelyreduetive, remainvulnerabletosuchobjections. Intheseandotherwaysnon-reduetivenatu- ralismattemptstocombineamonismofenti- ties-thenaturalonesofwhicheverythingis composed-withapluralismofproperties,many ofthemirreducibleoremergent.Noteverything isnothingbutanaturalthing,norneednatural- ismaccordtotalizingprimacytothenaturalface ofexistence.Indeed,somenaturalistsregardthe universeashavingreligiousandmoraldimen- sionsthatenjoyacrucialkindofprimacy;and someoffertheologiesthataremoretraditionally theist(asdoH.N.Wieman,C.Hardwick,J.Post). Sofarfromexhibiting"reptilianindifference"to humansandtheirfäte,theuniversecanbean enchantedplaceofbelonging. Seealsoapriori,emergence,holism, INTENTIONALITY,METAPHYSICS,PHILOSOPHY OFMIND,PHYSICALISM,PROPERTY,PSYCHOL- OGISM,SUPERVENIENCE,THEOLOGICALNATU- RALISM.J.F.P. 597 naturalism,biological naturalisticepistemology naturalism,biological.Seesearle. naturalism,ethical.Seeethics,moralrealism. naturalism,metaphysical.Seemetaphysics,natu- ralism. naturalism,methodological.Seenaturalism. naturalism,reductive.Seenaturalism. naturalism,theological.Seetheologicalnatu- ralism. naturalisticepistemology,anapproachtoepiste- mologythatviewsthehumansubjectasanat- uralphenomenonandusesempiricalscienceto studyepistemicactivity.Thephrasewasintro- ducedbyQuine("EpistemologyNaturalized,"in OntologicalRelativityandOtherEssays,1969),who proposedthatepistemologyshouldbeachapter ofpsychology.Quineconstruedclassicalepiste- mologyasCartesianepistemology,anattemptto groundallknowledgeinafirmlylogicalwayon immediateexperience.Initstwentieth-century embodiment,ithopedtogiveatranslationofall discourseandadeductivevalidationofallsci- enceintermsofsenseexperience,logic,andset theory.Repudiatingthisdreamasforlorn,Quine urgedthatepistemologybeabandonedand replacedbypsychology.Itwouldbeascientific studyofhowthesubjecttakessensorystimula- tionsasinputanddeliversasoutputatheoryof thethree-dimensionalworld.Thisformulation appearstoeliminatethenormativemissionof epistemology.Inlåterwriting,however,Quine hassuggestedthatnormativeepistemologycan benaturalizedasachapterofengineering:the technologyofpredictingexperience,orsensory stimulations. Sometheoriesofknowledgearenaturalisticin theirdepictionofknowersasphysicalsystemsin causalinteractionwiththeenvironment.One suchtheoryisthecausaltheoryofknowing, whichsaysthatapersonknowsthatpprovided hisbeliefthatphasasuitablecausalconnection withacorrespondingstateofaffairs.Another exampleistheinformation-theoreticapproach developedbyDretske(KnowledgeandtheFlowof Information,1981).Thissaysthatapersonknows thatponlyifsomesignal"carries"thisinforma- tion(thatp)tohim,whereinformationiscon- struedasanobjectivecommoditythatcanbe processedandtransmittedviainstruments, gauges,neurons,andthelike.Informationis "carried"fromonesitetoanotherwhenevents locatedatthosesitesareconnectedbyasuitable lawfuldependence. Thenormativeconceptofjustificationhasalso beenthesubjectofnaturalisticconstruals. Whereasmanytheoriesofjustifiedbelieffocus onlogicalorprobabilisticrelationsbetweenevi- denceandhypothesis,naturalistictheoriesfocus onthepsychologicalprocessescausallyresponsi- bleforthebelief.Thelogicalstatusofabeliefdoes notfixitsjustificationalstatus.Beliefinatautol- ogy,forinstance,isnotjustifiedifitisformedby blindtrustinanignorantguru.Accordingto Goldman(EpistemologyandCognition,1986),a beliefqualifiesasjustifiedonlyifitisproducedby reliablebelief-formingprocesses,i.e.,processes thatgenerallyhaveahightruthratio.Goldman's largerprogramfornaturalisticepistemologyis called"epistemics,"aninterdisciplinaryenter- priseinwhichcognitivesciencewouldplaya majorrole.Epistemicswouldseektoidentifythe subsetofcognitiveoperationsavailabletothe humancognizerthatarebestfromatruth-bear- ingstandpoint.Relevanttruth-linkedproperties includeproblem-solvingpowerandspeed,i.e., theabilitiestoobtaincorrectanswerstoques- tionsofinterestandtodosoquickly. Closeconnectionsbetweenepistemologyand artificialintelligencehavebeenproposedby ClarkGlymour,GilbertHarman,JohnPollock, andPaulThagard.Harmanstressesthatprinci- plesofgoodreasoningarenotdirectlygivenby rulesoflogic.Modusponens,e.g.,doesnottellyou toinferqifyoualreadybelievepand'ifpthen q'.Insomecasesitisbettertosubtractabeliefin oneofthepremisesratherthanaddabeliefinq. Beliefrevisionalsorequiresattentiontothestor- ageandcomputationallimitationsofthemind. Limitsofmemorycapacity,e.g.,suggestaprinci- pleofclutteravoidance:notfillingone'smind withvästnumbersofuselessbeliefs(Harman, ChangeinView,1986). Otherconceptionsofnaturalisticepistemology focusonthehistoryofscience.LarryLaudan conceivesofnaturalisticepistemologyasascien- tificinquirythatgathersempiricalevidencecon- cerningthepasttrackrecordsofvariousscientific methodologies,withtheaimofdetermining whichofthesemethodologiescanbestadvance thechosencognitiveends. Naturalisticepistemologyneednotconfineits attentiontoindividualepistemicagents;itcan alsostudycommunitiesofagents.Thisperspec- tiveinvitescontributionsfromsciencesthat addressthesocialsideoftheknowledge-seeking enterprise.Ifnaturalisticepistemologyisanor- mativeinquiry,however,itmustnotsimply 598 naturalisticfallacy naturallaw describesocialpracticesorsocialinfluences;it mustanalyzetheimpactofthesefactorsonthe attainmentofcognitiveends.Philosopherssuch asDavidHull,NicholasRescher,PhilipKitcher, andAlvinGoldmanhavesketchedmodels inspiredbypopulationbiologyandeconomicsto exploretheepistemicconsequencesofaltema- tivedistributionsofresearchactivityanddiffer- entwaysthatprofessionalrewardsmightin- fluencethecourseofresearch. Seealsoartificialintelligence,episte- MOLOGY,NATURALISM,RELIABILISM. A.I.G. naturalisticfallacy.Seemoore. naturalkind,acategoryofentitiesclassicallycon- ceivedashavingmodalimplications;e.g.,if Socratesisamemberofthenaturalkindhuman being,thenheisnecessarilyahumanbeing.The ideathatnaturefixescertainsortals,suchas 'water'and'humanbeing',ascorrectclassifica- tionsthatappeartodesignatekindsofentities hasrootsgoingbackatleasttoPlatoandAris- totle.AnilGuptahasarguedthatsortalsaretobe distinguishedfrompropertiesdesignatedbysuch predicatesas'red'byincludingcriteriaforindi- viduatingtheparticulars(bitsoramountsformäss nouns)thatfallunderthemaswellascriteriafor sortingthoseparticularsintotheclass. Quineissalientamongthosewhofindthe modalimplicationsofnaturalkindsobjection- able.Hehasarguedthattheideaofnaturalkinds isrootedinprescientificintuitivejudgmentsof comparativesimilarity,andhehassuggested thatastheseintuitiveclassificationsarereplaced byclassificationsbasedonscientifictheories thesemodalimplicationsdröpaway.Kripkeand Putnamhavearguedthatscienceinfactuses naturalkindtermshavingthemodalimplica- tionsQuinefindssoobjectionable.Theyseean importantroleinscientificmethodologyforthe capacitytoreferdemonstrativelytosuchnatural kindsbypointingoutparticularsthatfallunder them.Certaininferenceswithinscience-such astheinferencetothechargeforelectronsgen- erallyfromthemeasurementofthechargeon oneorafewelectrons-seemtobeadditional aspectsofarolefornaturalkindtermsinscien- tificpractice.Otherrolesinthemethodologyof sciencefornaturalkindconceptshavebeendis- cussedinrecentworkbylanHackingand ThomasKuhn. Seealsocountnoun,essentialism,phi- LOSOPHYOFSCIENCE,QUALITATIVEPREDI- cate.W.Har. naturalIanguage.Seeformållanguage,philoso- PHYOFLANGUAGE. naturallaw,alsocalledlawofnature,inmoral andpoliticalphilosophy,anobjectivenormorset ofobjectivenormsgoverninghumanbehavior, similartothepositivelawsofahumanruler,but bindingonallpeoplealikeandusuallyunder- stoodasinvolvingasuperhumanlegislator. AncientGreekandRomanthought,particu- larlyStoicism,introducedideasofeternallaws directingtheactionsofallrationalbeingsand builtintotheverystructureoftheuniverse. Romanlawyersdevelopedadoctrineofalaw thatallcivilizedpeopleswouldrecognize,and madesomeefforttoexplainitintermsofanat- urallawcommontoanimalsandhumans.The mostinfluentialformsofnaturallawtheory, however,arosefromlåtereffortstouseStoicand legallanguagetoworkoutaChristiantheoryof moralityandpolitics.Theaimwastoshowthat theprinciplesofmoralscouldbeknownbyrea- sonalone,withoutrevelation,sothatthewhole humanracecouldknowhowtoliveproperly. Thelawofnatureapplies,onthisunderstanding, onlytorationalbeings,whocanobeyordisobey itdeliberatelyandfreely.Itisthusdifferentin kindfromthelawsGodlaiddownfortheinani- mateandirrationalpartsofcreation.Naturallaw theoristsoftensawcontinuitiesandanalogies betweennaturallawsforhumansandthosefor therestofcreationbutdidnotconfusethem. Themostenduringlyinfluentialnaturallaw writerwasAquinas.OnhisviewGod'seternal reasonordainslawsdirectingallthingstoactfor thegoodofthecommunityoftheuniverse,the declarationofHisownglory.Humanreasoncan participatesufficientlyinGod'seternalreasonto showusthegoodofthehumancommunity.The naturallawisthusoursharingintheeternallaw inawayappropriatetoourhumannature.God laysdowncertainotherlawsthroughrevelation; thesedivinelawspointustowardoureternal goal.Thenaturallawconcernsourearthlygood, andneedstobesupplementedbyhumanlaws. Suchlawscanvaryfromcommunitytocommu- nity,buttobebindingtheymustalwaysstay withinthelimitsofthelawofnature.God engravedthemostbasicprinciplesofthenatural lawinthemindsofallpeoplealike,buttheir detailedapplicationtakesreasoningpowersthat noteveryonemayhave. OpponentsofAquinas-calledvolun- tarists-arguedthatGod'swill,nothisintellect, isthesourceoflaw,andthatGodcouldhavelaid downdifferentnaturallawsforus.HugoGrotius 599 naturallight nature,lawof rejectedtheirposition,butunlikeAquinashe conceivedofnaturallawasmeantnottodirect ustobringaboutsomedefinitecommongood buttosetthelimitsonthewaysinwhicheach ofuscouldproperlypursueourownpersonal aims.ThisGrotianoutlookwasdevelopedby Hobbes,Pufendorf,andLockealongvoluntarist lines.Thomisticviewscontinuedtobeex- poundedbyProtestantaswellasRomanCath- olicwritersuntiltheendoftheseventeenth century.Thereafter,whilenaturallawtheory remainedcentraltoCatholicteaching,itceased toattractmajornewnon-Catholicproponents. NaturallawdoctrineinbothThomisticand Grotianversionstreatsmoralityasbasicallya matterofcompliancewithlaw.Obligationand duty,obedienceanddisobedience,meritand guilt,rewardandpunishment,arecentral notions.Virtuesaresimplyhabitsoffollowing laws.Thoughthelawissuitedtoourdistinctive humannatureandcanbediscoveredbythe properuseofreason,itisnotaself-imposedlaw. InfollowingitweareobeyingGod. Sincetheearlyeighteenthcentury,philosoph- icaldiscussionsofwhetherornotthereisan objectivemoralityhavelargelyceasedtocenter onnaturallaw.Theidearemainsalive,however, injurisprudence.Naturallawtheoriesare opposedtolegalpositivism,theviewthatthe onlybindinglawsarethoseimposedbyhuman sovereigns,whocannotbesubjecttohigherlegal constraints.Legaltheoristsarguingthatthereare rationalobjectivelimitstothelegislativepower ofrulersoftenthinkoftheselimitsintermsof naturallaw,evenwhentheirtheoriesdonot invokeorimplyanyofthereligiousaspectsof earliernaturallawpositions. Seealsoaquinas,grotius,hobbes,phi- LOSOPHYOFLAW,PUFENDORF.J.B.S. naturallight.Seedescartes. naturalmeaning.Seemeaning. naturalness.Seejuanchi. naturalnumber.Seemathematicalanalysis,math- EMATICALINDUCTION. naturalphilosophy,thestudyofnatureorofthe spatiotemporalworld.Thiswasregardedasa taskforphilosophybeforetheemergenceof modernscience,especiallyphysicsandastron- omy,andthetermisnowonlyusedwithrefer- encetopremoderntimes.Philosophicalques- tionsaboutnaturestillremain,e.g.,whether materialismistrue,buttheywouldusuallybe placedinmetaphysicsorinabranchofitthat maybecalledphilosophyofnature.Naturalphi- losophyisnottobeconfusedwithmetaphysical naturalism,whichisthemetaphysicalview(no partofscienceitself)thatallthatthereisisthe spatiotemporalworldandthattheonlywayto studyitisthatoftheempiricalsciences.Itisalso nottobeconfusedwithnaturaltheology,which alsomaybeconsideredpartofmetaphysics.See alsoMETAPHYSICS.P.Bu. naturalreligion,atermfirstoccurringinthesec- ondhalfoftheseventeenthcentury,usedin threerelatedsenses,themostcommonbeing(1) abodyoftruthsaboutGodandourdutythatcan bediscoveredbynaturalreason.Thesetruthsare sufficientforsalvationor(accordingtosome orthodoxChristians)wouldhavebeensufficient ifAdamhadnotsinned.Naturalreligioninthis senseshouldbedistinguishedfromnaturalthe- ology,whichdoesnotimplythis.Anaturalreli- gionmayalsobe(2)onethathasahuman, asdistinctfromadivine,origin.Itmayalsobe (3)areligionofhumannatureassuch,asdis- tinguishedfromreligiousbeliefsandpractices thathavebeendeterminedbylocalcircum- stances.Naturalreligioninthethirdsense isidentifiedwithhumanity'soriginalreligion. Inallthreesenses,naturalreligionincludesa beliefinGod'sexistence,justice,benevolence, andprovidentialgovernment;inimmortality; andinthedictatesofcommonmorality.While theconceptisassociatedwithdeism,itis alsosympatheticallytreatedbyChristianwriters likeClarke,whoarguesthatrevealedreligion simplyrestoresnaturalreligiontoitsoriginal purityandaddsinducementstocompliance.See alsoCLARKE,PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION. W.J.Wa. naturalright.Seerights. naturalselection.Seedarwinism. naturalsign.Seetheoryofsigns. naturaltheology.Seephilosophyofreligion,the- ologianaturalis. naturanaturans.Seespinoza. naturanaturata.Seespinoza. nature,lawof.Seenaturallaw,philosophyof science. 600 nature,rightof negation nature,rightof.Seehobbes. nature,stateof.Seehobbes. Naturphilosophie.Seeschelling. Naturwissenschaften.Seeweber. Néant.Seesartre. necessary.Seecontingent. necessarycondition.Seecondition. necessarytruth.Seenecessity. necessitarianism,thedoctrinethatnecessityisan objectivefeatureoftheworld.Naturallanguage permitsspeakerstoexpressmodalities:astateof affairscanbeactual(Paris'sbeinginFrance), merelypossible(chlorophyll'smakingthings blue),ornecessary(2+2=4).Anti-necessitari- ansbelievethatthesedistinctionsarenot groundedinthenatureoftheworld.Someof themclaimthatthedistinctionsaremerelyver- bal.Others,e.g.,Hume,believedthatpsycholog- icalfacts,likeourexpectationsoffutureevents, explaintheideaofnecessity.Yetotherscontend thatthemodalitiesreflectepistemicconsidera- tions;necessityreflectsthehighestlevelofan inquirer'scommitment.Somenecessitarians believetherearedifferentmodesofmetaphysi- calnecessity,e.g.,causalandlogicalnecessity. Certainproponentsofidealismbelievethateach factisnecessarilyconnectedwitheveryother factsothattheultimategoalofscientificinquiry isthediscoveryofacompletelyrigorousmathe- maticalsystemoftheworld.Seealsodeter- minism,FREEWILLPROBLEM.B.B. necessity,amodalpropertyattributabletoa wholeproposition(dictum)justwhenitisnot possiblethatthepropositionbefalse(thepropo- sitionbeingdedictonecessary).Narrowlycon- strued,apropositionPislogicallynecessary providedPsatisfiescertainsyntacticconditions, namely,thatP'sdenialisformallyself-contradic- tory.Morebroadly,Pislogicallynecessaryjust whenPsatisfiescertainsemanticconditions, namely,thatP'sdenialisfalse,andPtrue,inall possibleworlds.Thesesemanticconditionswere firstsuggestedbyLeibniz,refinedbyWittgen- steinandCarnap,andfullydevelopedasthepos- sibleworldssemanticsofKripke,Hintikka,etal., inthe1960s.Previously,philosophershadtorely largelyonintuitiontodeterminetheacceptabil- ityorotherwiseofformulasinvolvingtheneces- sityoperator,□,andwereatalossastowhichof variousaxiomaticsystemsformodallogic,as developedinthe1930sbyC.I.Lewis,bestcap- turedthenotionoflogicalnecessity.Therewas muchdebate,forinstance,överthecharacteris- tic(NN)thesisofLewis'ssystemS4,namely,DP D□DP(ifPisnecessarythenitisnecessarily necessary).ButgivenaLeibnizianaccountofthe truthconditionsforastatementoftheformDa namely(Rl)thatDaistrueprovidedaistruein allpossibleworlds,and(R2)thatDaisfalsepro- videdthereisatleastonepossibleworldinwhich aisfalse,aproofcanbeconstructedbyreductio adabsurdum.ForsupposethatDFDDDFisfalse insomearbitrarilychosenworldW.Thenits antecedentwillbetrueinW,andhence(byRl) itfollows(a)thatPwillbetrueinallpossible worlds.Butequallyitsconsequentwillbefalse inW,andhence(byR2)DPwillbefalseinåtleast onepossibleworld,fromwhich(againbyR2)it follows(b)thatPwillbefalseinatleastonepos- sibleworld,thuscontradicting(a).Asimilar proofcanbeconstructedforthecharacteristic thesisofS5,namely,~\3~PZ>□-□-?(ifPis possiblytruethenitisnecessarilypossible). NecessityisalsoattributabletoapropertyPof anobjectprovideditisnotpossiblethat(there isnopossibleworldinwhich)Oexistsandlacks F-Pbeingderenecessary,internaloressential to0.Forinstance,thenon-repeatable(haec- ceitist)propertyofbeingidenticaltoOisderenec- essary(essential)toO,andarguablythe repeatablepropertyofbeingextendedisderenec- essarytoallcoloredobjects. Seealsocontingent,essentialism, HAECCEITY,MODALLOGIC,POSSIBLEWORLDS. R.D.B. necessity,metaphysical.Seenecessity,philosophy OFMIND. necessity,nomic.Seelawlikegeneralization. negation,thelogicaloperationonpropositions thatisindicated,e.g.,bytheprefatoryclause'It isnotthecasethat...'.Negationisstandardly distinguishedsharplyfromtheoperationon predicatesthatiscalledcomplementationand thatisindicatedbytheprefix'non-'.Because negationcanalsobeindicatedbytheadverb 'not',adistinctionisoftendrawnbetweenexter- nalnegation,whichisindicatedbyattachingthe prefatory'Itisnotthecasethat...'toanasser- tion,andinternalnegation,whichisindicatedby insertingtheadverb'not'(alongwith,perhaps, 601 negation-complete Neo-Confucianism grammaticallynecessarywordslike'do'or 'does')intotheassertioninsuchawayastoindi- catethattheadverb'not'modifiestheverb.Ina numberofcases,thequestionarisesasto whetherexternalandinternalnegationyield logicallyequivalentresults.Forexample,'Itis notthecasethatSantaClausexists'wouldseem obviouslytobetrue,whereas'SantaClausdoes notexist'seemstosomephilosopherstopresup- posewhatitdenies,onthegroundthatnothing couldbetrulyassertedofSantaClausunlesshe existed.Seealsodoublenegation,truth TABLE.R.W.B. negation-complete.Seecompleteness. negativeduty.Seeduty. negativefeedback.Seecybernetics. negativefreedom.Seepositiveandnegative FREEDOM. negativeliberty.Seepositiveandnegativefree- dom. NemesiusofEmesa(fl.c.390-400),GreekChris- tianphilosopher.Histreatiseonthesoul,Onthe NatureofMan,translatedfromGreekintoLatin byAlphanusofSalernoandBurgundioofPisa (cl160),wasattributedtoGregoryofNyssain theMiddleAges,andenjoyedsomeauthority; thetreatiserejectsPlatoforunderplayingthe unityofsoulandbody,andAristotleformaking thesoulessentiallycorporeal.Thesoulisself- subsistent,incorporeal,andbynatureimmortal, butnaturallysuitedforunionwiththebody. NemesiusdrawsonAmmoniusSaccasandPor- phyry,aswellasanalogytotheunionofdivine andhumannatureinChrist,toexplainthe incorruptiblesoul'sperfectunionwiththecor- ruptiblebody.Hisreviewofthepowersofthe souldrawsespeciallyonGalenonthebrain.His viewthatrationalcreaturespossessfreewillin virtueoftheirrationalityinfluencedMaximus theConfessorandJohnofDamascus.J.Lo. Neo-Confucianism,Confucianismasrevivedin Chinaduringthelatetenthtomid-seventeenth centuries.IthasalsobeencalledTao-hsiieh (learningoftheWay)orLi-hsiieh(learningof principles)inthebroadersense.Itiswithoutany doubtConfucianism,sinceSung-MingConfu- cianistsalsofoundtheirultimatecommitmentin jen(humanityorhuman-heartedness)andreg- ulatedtheirbehaviorbyIi(propriety).Butit acquirednewfeatures,sinceitwasamovement inresponsetothechallengesfromBuddhism andNeo-Taoism.Thereforeitdevelopedsophis- ticatedtheoriesofhumanmindandnatureand alsocosmologyandmetaphysicsfarbeyondthe scopeofPre-Ch'inConfucianism.IftheConfu- cianidealmaybecharacterizedbynei-sheng-wai- wang(inwardsagelinessandoutwardking- liness),thentheNeo-Confucianistscertainly madegreatercontributionstothenei-shengside, astheyconsideredwei-chi-chih-hsiieh(learning forone'sself)astheirprimaryconcern,and developedsophisticateddisciplineofthemind comparabletothekindoftranscendentalmedi- tationpracticedbyBuddhistsandTaoists.They putemphasisonfindingresourceswithinthe self.HencetheymovedawayfromtheHantra- ditionofwritingextensivecommentariesonthe FiveClassics.Instead,theylookedforguidance totheso-calledFourBooks:theAnaleds,the Mencius,TheGreatLearning,andTheDoctrineofthe Mean.Theyalsobelievedthattheyshouldput whattheyhadlearnedfromthewordsofthe sagesandworthiesintopracticeinordertomake themselvesbetter.Thiswastostartanewtrend insharpcontrasttotheearlierFiveDynasties period(907-60),whenmoralstandardshad fallentoanewlow. AccordingtoChuHsi,themovementstarted withChouTun-yi(1017-73),who,alongwith ChangTsai(1020-77),gavenewinterpretations totheI-Ching(theBookofChanges)andTheDoc- trineoftheMeanincombinationwiththeAnalects andtheMenciussoastodevelopnewcosmolo- giesandmetaphysicsinresponsetothechal- lengesfromBuddhismandTaoism.Thenameof ShaoYung(1011-77),anexpertontheI-Ching, wasexcluded,ashisviewswereconsideredtoo Taoistic.Butthetruefoundersandleadersofthe movementwerethetwoCh'engbrothers- Ch'engHao(1032-85)andCh'engYi(1033- 1107).OnetimepupilsofChou,theydeveloped Ii(principle)intoaphilosophicalconcept.Even thoughHua-yenBuddhismhadusedtheterm first,theCh'engbrothersgaveitatotallynew interpretationfromaConfucianperspective. Låterscholarsfindthatthethoughtsofthetwo brothersdifferedbothinstyleandinsubstance. Ch'engHaobelievedini-pen(onefoundation), whileCh'engYidevelopedadualisticmeta- physicsofIi(principle)andch'i(materialforce). OnthesurfaceChuHsiwasthefollowerofthe Ch'engbrothers,butinfacthewasonlyfollow- ingtheleadofCh'engYi,andpromotedtheso- calledLi-hsiieh(learningofprinciples)inthe narrowersense.Hisyoungercontemporary 602 neo-Euclideangeometry neo-Kantianism LuHsiang-shan(1139-93)objectedtoChu's methodoflookingforprinciplesamongthings. Heurgedustorealizeprinciplewithinone'sown mind,wentbacktoMencius'steachingtoestab- lishthegreaterpartoftheselffirst,andpromoted theso-calledhsin-hsiieh(learningofthemind). ButChuHsi'scommentariesontheFourBooks wereadoptedasthebasisofcivilserviceexami- nationsintheYtiandynasty;Lu'sviewswere largelyignoreduntiltherewererevivedinthe Mingdynasty(1368-1644)byWangYang-ming (1472-1529),whoidentifiedthemindwith principleandadvocatedthatknowledgeand actionareone.SinceLu-Wang'sthoughtswere closertoMencius,whowashonoredtohaverep- resentedtheorthodoxlineoftransmissionofthe Way,MouTsung-sanadvancedthetheorythat ChuHsiwasthesidebranchtakingöverthe orthodoxy;healsobelievedthatHuHung (1100-55)andLiuTsung-chou(1578-1645) developedathirdbranchofNeo-Confucianism inadditiontothatofCh'engandChuandthatof LuandWang.Hisviewshavegeneratedmany controversies.Sung-MingNeo-Confucianism washailedascreatingthesecondgoldenperiod ofChinesephilosophysincethelateChou. HuangTsung-hsi(1610-95),apupilofLiu Tsung-chouandthelastimportantfigurein Sung-MingNeo-Confucianism,extensively studiedthemovementandwroteessentialworks onit. Seealsochuhsi,confucianism,confu- CIUS,HUANGTSUNG-HSI,LICHI,MENCIUS, SHAOYUNG,WANGYANG-MING.S.-h.L. neo-Euclideangeometry.Seeeuclideangeome- try. neo-FriesianSchool.Seeneo-kantianism. neo-Kantianism,thediverseKantianmovement thatemergedwithinGermanphilosophyinthe 1860s,gainedastrongacademicfootholdinthe 1870s,reacheditsheightduringthethree decadespriortoWorldWarI,anddisappeared withtheriseofNazism.Themovementwasini- tiallyfocusedonrenewedstudyandelaboration ofKanfsepistemologyinresponsetothegrow- ingepistemicauthorityofthenaturalsciences andasanaltemativetobothHegelianandspec- ulativeidealismandtheemergingmaterialism of,amongothers,LudwigBuchner(1824-99). Låterneo-KantianismexploredKanfswhole philosophy,appliedhiscriticalmethodtodisci- plinesotherthanthenaturalsciences,andde- velopeditsownphilosophicalsystems.Some originatorsand/orearlycontributorswereKuno Fischer(1824-1907),HermannvonHelmholtz (1821-94),FriedrichAlbertLange(1828-75), EduardZeller(1814-1908),andOttoLiebmann (1840-1912),whoseKantunddieEpigonen (1865)repeatedlystatedwhatbecameaneo- Kantianmotto,"BacktoKant!" Severalformsofneo-Kantianismaretobedis- tinguished.T.K.Oesterreich(1880-1949),in FriedrichUeberwegsGrundrissderGeschichteder Philosophie("F.U.'sCompendiumoftheHistory ofPhilosophy,"1923),developedthestandard, somewhatchronological,classification: (1)Thephysiologicalneo-Kantianismof HelmholtzandLange,whoclaimedthat physiologyis"developedorcorrectedKan- tianism." (2)Themetaphysicalneo-Kantianismofthe låterLiebmann,whoarguedforaKantian "criticalmetaphysics"(beyondepistemol- ogy)intheformof"hypotheses"aboutthe essenceofthings. (3)Therealistneo-KantianismofAloisRiehl (1844-1924),whoemphasizedthereal existenceofKanfsthing-in-itself. (4)Thelogistic-methodologicalneo-Kantian- ismoftheMarburgSchoolofHermann Cohen(1842-1918)andPaulNatorp (1854-1924). (5)Theaxiologicalneo-Kantianismofthe BadenorSouthwestGermanSchoolof Windelband(1848-1915)andHeinrich Rickert(1863-1936). (6)Therelativisticneo-KantianismofGeorg Simmel(1858-1918),whoarguedfor Kantiancategoriesrelativetoindividuals andcultures. (7)Thepsychologicalneo-Kantianismof LeonardNelson(1882-1927),originator oftheGöttingenSchool;alsoknownasthe neo-FriesianSchool,afterJakobFriedrich Fries(1773-1843),Nelson'sself-pro- claimedprecursor.LikeFries,Nelsonheld thatKantianaprioriprinciplescannotbe transcendentallyjustified,butcanbedis- coveredonlythroughintrospection. Oesterreich'sclassificationhasbeennarrowed ormodified,partlybecauseofconflictingviews onhowdistinctly"Kantian"aphilosophermust havebeentobecalled"neo-Kantian."Thevery term'neo-Kantianism'hasevenbeencalledinto question,assuggestingrealintellectualcom- monalitywherelittleornoneistobefound. Thereis,however,growingconsensusthatMar- 603 Neoplatonism Neoplatonism burgandBadenneo-Kantianismwerethemost importantandinfluential. MarburgSchool.Itsfounder,Cohen,devel- opeditscharacteristicKantianidealismofthenat- uralsciencesbyarguingthatphysicalobjectsare trulyknownonlythroughthelawsofthesesci- encesandthattheselawspresupposetheapplica- tionofKantianaprioriprinciplesandconcepts. Cohenelaboratedthisidealismbyeliminating Kanfsdualismofsensibilityandunder- standing,claimingthatspaceandtimearecon- structionmethodsof"purethought"ratherthana prioriformsofperceptionandthatthenotionof any"given"(perceptualdata)priortothe"activ- ity"of"purethought"ismeaningless.Accord- ingly,CohenreformulatedKanfsthing-in-itself astheregulativeideathatthemathematical descriptionoftheworldcanalwaysbeimproved. Cohenalsoemphasizedthat"purethought"refers nottoindividualconsciousess-onhisaccount Kanthadnotyetsufficientlyleftbehinda "subject-object"epistemology-butrathertothe contentofhisownsystemofaprioriprinciples, whichhesawassubjecttochangewiththe progressofscience.JustasCohenheldthatepiste- mologymustbebasedonthe"factofscience,"he argued,inadecisivestepbeyondKant,thatethics musttranscendentallydeduceboththemorallaw andtheidealmoralsubjectfromahumanisticsci- ence-morespecifically,fromjurisprudence's notionofthelegalperson.Thisanalysisledtothe viewthatthemorallawdemandsthatallinstitu- tions,includingeconomicenterprises,become democratic-sothattheydisplayunifiedwillsand intentionsastranscendentalconditionsofthe legalperson-andthatallindividualsbecomeco- legislators.ThusCohenarrivedathisfrequently citedclaimthatKant"isthetrueandrealorigina- torofGermansocialism."Otherimportant MarburgKantianswereCohen'scolleague Natorp,bestknownforhisstudiesonPlatoand philosophyofeducation,andtheirstudentsKarl Vorländer(1860-1928),whofocusedonKantian socialistethicsasacorrectiveoforthodox Marxism,andErnstCassirer(1874-1945). BadenSchool.Thebasictaskofphilosophy anditstranscendentalmethodisseenasidenti- fyinguniversalvaluesthatmakepossibleculture initsvariedexpressions.Thisfocusisevidentin Windelband'sinfluentialinsightthatthenatural sciencesseektoformulategenerallaws-nomo- theticknowledge-whilethehistoricalsciences seektodescribeuniqueevents-idiographic knowledge.Thisdistinctionisbasedontheval- ues(interests)ofmasteryofnatureandunder- standingandrelivingtheuniquepastinorderto affirmourindividuality.Windelband'sviewof thehistoricalsciencesasidiographicraisedthe problemofselectioncentraltohissuccessor Rickerfswritings:Howcanhistoriansobjectively determinewhichindividualeventsarehistori- callysignificant?Rickertarguedthatthisselec- tionmustbebasedonthevaluesthatare generallyrecognizedwithintheculturesunder investigation,notonthevaluesofhistorians themselves.Rickertalsodevelopedthetranscen- dentalargumentthattheobjectivityofthehis- toricalsciencesnecessitatestheassumptionthat thegenerallyrecognizedvaluesofdifferentcul- turesapproximateinvariousdegreesuniversally validvalues.Thisargumentwasrejectedby Weber,whosemethodologicalworkwasgreatly indebtedtoRickert. Seealsocassirer,cohen,kant,länge, TRANSCENDENTALARGUMENT,WINDELBAND. H.v.d.L. Neoplatonism,thatperiodofPlatonismfollow- ingonthenewimpetusprovidedbythephilo- sophicalspeculationsofPlotinus(a.d.204-69). Itextends,asaminimum,totheclosingofthe PlatonicSchoolinAthensbyJustinianin529, butmaximallythroughByzantium,withsuch figuresasMichaelPsellus(1018-78)andPletho (c.1360-1452),theRenaissance(Ficino,Pico, andtheFlorentineAcademy),andtheearly modernperiod(theCambridgePlatonists, ThomasTaylor),totheadventofthe"scientific" studyoftheworksofPlatowithSchleiermacher (1768-1834)atthebeginningofthenineteenth century.Thetermwasformerlyalsoused tocharacterizethewholeperiodfromthe OldAcademyofPlato'simmediatesuccessors, SpeusippusandXenocrates,throughwhatis nowtermedMiddlePlatonism(c.80b.c.-a.d. 220),downtoPlotinus.Thisaccountconfines itselftothe"minimum"interpretation. Neoplatonismpropermaybedividedinto threemainperiods:thatofPlotinusandhis immediatefollowers(thirdcentury);the"Syr- ian"SchoolofIamblichusandhisfollowers (fourthcentury);andthe"Athenian"School begunbyPlutarchofAthens,andincludingSyr- ianus,Proclus,andtheirsuccessors,downto Damascius(fifth-sixthcenturies). Plotinusandhisschool.Plotinus'sinnovations inPlatonism(developedinhisessays,the Emieads,collectedandeditedbyhispupilPor- phyryafterhisdeath),aremainlytwo:(a)above 604 Neoplatonism,Islamic neo-Scholasticism thetraditionalsupremeprincipleofearlierPla- tonism(andAristotelianism),aself-thinking intellect,whichwasalsoregardedastruebeing, hepostulatedaprinciplesuperiortointellectand being,totallyunitaryandsimple("theOne");(b) hesawrealityasaseriesoflevels(One,Intelli- gence,Soul),eachhigheroneoutflowingor radiatingintothenextlower,whilestillremain- ingunaffectedinitself,andtheloweronesfixing themselvesinbeingbysomehow"reflecting back"upontheirpriors.Thiseternalprocess givestheuniverseitsexistenceandcharacter. Intelligenceoperatesinastateofnon-temporal simultaneity,holdingwithinitselfthe"forms"of allthings.Soul,intum,generatestime,and receivestheformsintoitselfas"reasonprinci- ples"(logoi).Ourphysicalthree-dimensional worldistheresultoftheloweraspectofSoul (nature)projectingitselfuponakindofnegative fieldofforce,whichPlotinuscalls"matter."Mat- terhasnopositiveexistence,butissimplythe receptaclefortheunfoldingofSoulinitslowest aspect,whichprojectstheformsinthree-dimen- sionalspace.Plotinusoftenspeaksofmatteras "evil"(e.g.Enneadsn.8),andoftheSoulassuf- feringa"fall"(e.g.EnneadsV.1,1),butinfacthe seesthewholecosmicprocessasaninevitable resultofthesuperabundantproductivityofthe One,andthus"thebestofallpossibleworlds." Plotinuswashimselfamystic,buthearrived athisphilosophicalconclusionsbyperfectlylog- icalmeans,andhehadnotmuchuseforeither traditionalreligionoranyofthemorerecent superstitions.Hisimmediatepupils,Amelius (c.225-90)andPorphyry(234-C.305),while somewhatmorehospitabletothese,remained largelytruetohisphilosophy(thoughAmelius hadaweaknessfortriadicelaborationsinmeta- physics).Porphyrywastohavewideinfluence, bothintheLatinWest(throughsuchmenas MariusVictorinus,Augustine,andBoethius), andintheGreekEast(andeven,throughtrans- lations,onmedievalIslam),asthefounderofthe Neoplatonictraditionofcommentaryonboth PlatoandAristotle,butitismainlyasan expounderofPlotinus'sphilosophythatheis known.Headdedlittlethatisdistinctive,though thatlittleiscurrentlybecomingbetterappreci- ated. lamblichusandtheSyrianSchool.Iamblichus (c.245-325),descendantofanoldSyriannoble family,wasapupilofPorphyry's,butdissented fromhimonvariousimportantissues.Hesetup hisownschoolinApameainSyria,andattracted manypupils. Onechiefpointofdissentwastheroleof theurgy(reallyjustmagic,withphilosophical underpinnings,butnotunlikeChristiansacra- mentaltheology).Iamblichusclaimed,asagainst Porphyry,thatphilosophicalreasoningalone couldnotattainthehighestdegreeofenlighten- ment,withouttheaidoftheurgicrites,andhis viewonthiswasfollowedbyalllåterPlatonists. Healsoproducedametaphysicalschemefar moreelaboratethanPlotinus's,byaScholastic fillingin,normallywithsystemsoftriads,ofgaps inthe"chainofbeing"leftbyPlotinus'smore fluidanddynamicapproachtophilosophy.For instance,hepostulatedtwoOnes,onecom- pletelytranscendent,theotherthesourceofall creation,thus"resolving"atensioninPlotinus's metaphysics. Iamblichuswasalsoconcernedtofitasmany ofthetraditionalgodsaspossibleintohissystem, whichlåterattractedtheattentionofthe EmperorJulian,whobasedhimselfonIam- blichuswhenattemptingtosetupaHellenicreli- giontorivalChristianity,aprojectwhich, however,diedwithhimin363. TheAthenianSchool.Thepreciselinks betweenthepupilsofIamblichusandPlutarch (d.432),founderoftheAthenianSchool,remain obscure,buttheAtheniansalwaysretaineda greatrespectfortheSyrian.Plutarchhimselfisa dimfigure,butSyrianus(c.370-437),thoughlit- tleofhiswritingssurvives,canbeseenfromcon- stantreferencestohimbyhispupilProclus(412- 85)tobeamajorfigure,andthesourceofmost ofProclus'smetaphysicalelaborations. TheAtheniansessentiallydevelopedandsys- tematizedfurtherthedoctrinesofIamblichus, creatingnewlevelsofdivinity(e.g.intelligible- intellectualgods,and"henads"intherealmof theOne-thoughtheyrejectedthetwoOnes), thisprocessreachingitsculminationinthe thoughtofthelastheadoftheAthenianAcad- emy,Damascius(c.456-540). Thedrivetosystematizerealityandtoobjec- tivizeconcepts,exhibitedmostdramaticallyin Proclus'sElementsofTheology,isalastinglegacyof thelåterNeoplatonists,andhadasignificant influenceonthethought,amongothers,of Hegel. Seealsocommentariesonplato, ISLAMICNEOPLATONISM.J.M.D. Neoplatonism,Islamic.Seeislamicneoplaton- ism. neo-Scholasticism,themovementgivenimpetus 605 Neo-Taoism Neo-Taoism byPopeLeoXIII'sencyclicalAeterniPatris (1879),which,whilestressingAquinas,wasa generalrecommendationofthestudyof medievalScholasticismasasourceforthesolu- tionofvexingmodernproblems.Leoassumed thattherewasadoctrinecommontoAquinas, Bonaventure,AlbertusMagnus,andDunsSco- tus,andthatAquinaswasapreeminent spokesmanofthecommonview.MauriceDe Wulfemployedthephrase'perennialphiloso- phy'todesignatethiscommonmedievalcoreas wellaswhatofScholasticismisrelevanttolåter times.HistorianslikeMandonnet,Grabmann, andGilsonsooncontestedtheideathatthere wasasinglemedievaldoctrineanddrewatten- tiontotheprofounddifferencesbetweenthe greatmedievalmasters.ThediscussionofChris- tianphilosophyprecipitatedbyBrehierin1931 generatedavarietyofsuggestionsastowhat medievalthinkersandlåterChristianphiloso- phershaveincommon,butthiswasquitediffer- entfromtheassumptionofAeterniPatris.The pedagogicaldirectivesofthisandlåterencyclicals broughtaboutarevivalofThomismratherthan ofScholasticism,generallyinseminaries,eccle- siasticalcolleges,andCatholicuniversities. Louvain'sHigherInstituteofPhilosophy underthedirectionofCardinalMercierandits RevuedePhilosophieNéoscolastiquewereamong thefirstfruitsoftheThomisticrevival.Thestudia generaliaoftheDominicanordercontinuedata newpace,theSaulchoirpublishingtheRevue thomiste.IngraduatecentersinMilan,Madrid, LatinAmerica,Paris,andRome,menwere trainedforthetaskofteachingincollegesand seminaries,andscholarlyresearchbeganto flourishaswell.TheLeonineeditionofthewrit- ingsofAquinaswassoonjoinedbynewcritical editionsofBonaventure,DunsScotus,andOck- ham,aswellasAlbertusMagnus.Medievalstud- iesinthebroadersensegainedfromthequestfor manuscriptsandthegrowthofpaleographyand codicology. Besidesthehistoriansmentionedabove, JacquesMaritain(1882-1973),alaymanand converttoCatholicism,didmuchbothinhis nativeFranceandintheUnitedStatestopro- motethestudyofAquinas.ThePontificalInsti- tuteofMediaevalStudiesatToronto,withGilson regularlyandMaritainfrequentlyinresidence, becameasourceofcollegeanduniversityteach- ersinCanadaandtheUnitedStates,asLouvain and,inRome,theJesuitGregorianumandthe DominicanAngelicumalreadywere.Inthe 1940sAmericanstookdoctoratesintheology andphilosophyatLavalinQuebecandsoonthe influenceofCharlesDeKoninckwasfelt.Jesuits atSt.LouisUniversitybegantopublishTheMod- ernSchoolman,DominicansinWashingtonThe Thomist,andtheAmericanCatholicPhilosophi- calAssociationTheNewScholasticism.TheSchool ofPhilosophyatCatholicUniversity,longthe primarydomesticsourceofprofessorsandschol- ars,wascomplementedbygraduateprogramsat St.Louis,Georgetown,NotreDame,Fordham, andMarquette. InthegoldenperiodoftheThomisticrevival intheUnitedStates,fromthe1930suntiltheend oftheVaticanCouncilIIin1965,therewere varietiesofThomismbasedonthevarietyof viewsontherelationbetweenphilosophyand science.Bythe1960sThomisticphilosophywas aprominentpartofthecurriculumofallCatholic collegesanduniversities.By1970,ithadallbut disappearedunderthemistakennotionthatthis wastheintentofVaticanII.Thishadtheeffectof releasingAquinasintothewiderphilosophical world. Seealsoaquinas,neo-thomism,scho- lasticism.R.M. Neo-Taoism,inChinese,hsuan-hsileh('Profound Learning','MysteriousLearning',or'Dark Learning'),abroad,multifacetedrevivalof TaoistlearningthatdominatedChinesephiloso- phyfromthethirdtothesixthcenturya.d. Literally'darkred',hsiianisusedintheLaoTzu (TaoTeChing)todescribethesublimemysteryof thetao.Historically,hsiian-hsiiehformedamajor topicof"PureConversation"(ch'ing-t'an),where scholarsinatimeofpoliticalupheavalsoughtto arresttheperceiveddeclineofthetao.Whenthe WeidynastyreplacedtheHanina.d.220,afirst waveofNeo-Taoistphilosophersrepresentedby HoYen(c.190-249)andWangPi(226-49)rad- icallyreinterpretedtheclassicalheritagetobring tolightitsprofoundmeaning.TheConfucian orthodoxy-asdistinguishedfromtheoriginal teachingsofConfucius-wasdeemedineffectual andanobstacletorenewal.Oneofthemost importantdebatesinProfoundLearning-the debateon"wordsandmeaning"-criticizesHan scholarshipforitsliteralimaginationandcon- frontsthequestionofinterpretation.Wordsare necessarybutnotsufficientforunderstanding. TheancientsageshadaunifiedviewoftheTao, articulatedmostclearlyintheI-Ching,LaoTzu, andChuangTzu,butdistortedbyHanscholars. MostNeo-Taoistsconcentratedonthese"Three ProfoundTreatises"(san-hsiian).WangPiisbest knownforhiscommentariesontheI-Chingand theLaoTzu;andKuoHsiang(d.312),another 606 Neo-Taoism Neo-Taoism leadingNeo-Taoist,isarguablythemostimpor- tantChuangTzucommentatorinChinesehis- tory. Thetaoisthesourceofallbeing,butagainst identifyingthetaowithacreator"heaven"oran original"vitalenergy"(ch'i),WangPiarguesthat beingoriginatesfrom"non-being"(wu).The conceptofnon-being,takenfromtheLaoTzu, bringsoutthetranscendenceofthetao.Name- lessandwithoutform,thetaoassuchcanbe describedonlynegativelyaswu,literally"not having"anycharacteristics.Incontrast,forKuo Hsiang,non-beingdoesnotexplaintheoriginof beingbecause,asentirelyconceptual,itcannot createanything.Ifnon-beingcannotbringforth being,andiftheideaofacreatorremainsprob- lematic,theonlyalternativeistoregardthecre- atedorderascomingintoexistencespon- taneously.Thisimpliesthatbeingisetemal. Particularbeingscanbetracedtocontingent causes,butultimatelytheoriginofbeingcanbe understoodonlyintermsofaprocessof"self- transformation."Chinesesourcesoftencontrast WangPi's"valuingnon-being"(kuei-wu)with KuoHsiang's"exaltationofbeing"(ch'ung-yu). Inethicsandpolitics,Wangstressesthatthetao ismanifestinnatureasconstantprinciples(Ii). Thisiswhattheclassicsmeanbytzu-jan,natu- ralnessorliterallywhatisofitselfso.Thehierar- chicalstructureofsociopoliticalrelationsalsohas abasisintheorderofnature.WhileWang emphasizesunity,KuoHsiangchampionsdiver- sity.Theprincipleofnaturedictatesthatevery- onehasaparticular"share"ofvitalenergy,the creativepowerofthetaothatdeterminesone's physical,intellectual,andmoralcapacity.Indi- vidualdifferencesoughttobeaccepted,butdo notwarrantvaluediscrimination.Eachindivid- ualisinprinciplecompleteinhis/herownway, andconstitutesanindispensablepartinalarger whole.Taoistethicsthusconsistsinbeingtrueto oneself,andnourishingone'snature.Ingovern- ment,naturalnessfindsexpressioninnon-action (wu-wei),whichmaybecontrastedwithLegalist policiesemphasizingpunishmentandcontrol. ForWangPi,wu-weiaimsatpreservingthenat- uralordersothatthemyriadthingscanflourish. Practically,itinvolvestheeliminationofwillful interventionandareturnto"emptinessandqui- escence";i.e.,freedomfromthedictatesofdesire andalifeofguilelesssimplicity.Nottobecon- fusedwithtotalinaction,accordingtoKuo Hsiang,wu-weisignifiesamodeofbeingthatfully usesone'snaturalendowment.Whenoneis guidedbyinherentmoralprinciples,thereisno placeforartificialityorself-deceptioninthe Taoistwayoflife.Ethicalpuritydoesnotentail renunciation.Thoughthesagefindshimself alongthecorridorsofpower,hesafeguardshis natureandremainsemptyofdesire.Ingovern- ment,thesagerulernaturallyreducesarbitrary restrictions,adjustspoliciestosuitchanging needs,identifiestherightpeopleforoffice,and generallycreatesanenvironmentinwhichall underheavencandwellinpeaceandrealize theirpotential. HoYendiedavictimofpoliticalintrigue,atthe closeoftheCheng-shihreignperiod(240-49)of theWeidynasty.WangPidiedlåterinthesame year.Historiansreferto"Cheng-shihhstian- hsileh"tomarkthefirstphaseofNeo-Taoism. Låter,politicalpowerwascontrolledbytheSsu- mafamily,whoeventuallyfoundedtheChin dynastyina.d.265.DuringtheWei-Chintran- sition,agroupofintellectuals,the"SevenWor- thiesoftheBambooGrove,"cametorepresent thevoiceofProfoundLearning.Amongthem, HsiK'ang(223-62),JuanChi(210-63),and HsiangHsiu(c.227-80)areofparticularinterest tophilosophy.Indifferentways,theylookto naturalnessasabasisforrenewal.Debatesin ProfoundLeamingoftenrevolvearoundthe relationshipbetween"orthodoxteachings" (ming-chiao)andtzu-jan.ForWangPiandKuo Hsiang,governmentandsocietyshouldideally conformtonature.BothHsiK'angandJuanChi foundming-chiaoimpingingonnaturalness.This alsogaveimpetustothedevelopmentofacoun- terculture.Centraltothisistheplaceofemotion intheethicallife.HoYeniscreditedwiththe viewthatsagesarewithoutemotions(ch'ing), whoseexceptionalch'/-endowmenttranslates intoapurityofbeingthatexcludesemotional disturbance.HsiK'angalsovaluesdispassion, andHsiangHsiuurgesputtingpassionunderthe ruleofritual;butmanyappreciatedstrongemo- tionasasignofauthenticity,whichoftencon- travenedorthodoxteachings.AsPureConver- sationgainedcurrency,itbecamefashionableto givefreereintoone'simpulses;andmanyhoped toestablishareputationbyopposingorthodoxy. Thedebateonnaturalnessraisesthefurther questionoftalentorcapacity(ts'ai)anditsrela- tionshiptohumannature(hsing).InProfound Learning,fourdistinctpositionshavebeenpro- posed:thattalentandnatureareidentical (t'ung);different(i);harmonious(ho);andsepa- rate(Ii).Thisisimportantbecausetherighttal- entmustbeidentifiedtoservepoliticalends. Intheearlyfourthcentury,theChindynasty hadtofleeitscapitalandrebuildinsouthChina. Astheliteratiresettled,theylookedbacktothe 607 Neo-Thomism NewAcademy timeofHoYenandWangPiasthegoldenageof ProfoundLeaming.AlthoughPureConversation continuedwithundiminishedvigor,itdidnot introducemanynewideas.Asitentereditslast phase,anotherTaoistwork,theLieh-tzu,cameto rivalthe"ThreeProfoundTreatises."Chang Chan(c.330-400)wroteanimportantcommen- taryonthework,whichnotonlyrecapitulated manyoftheideasthatspannedthespectrumof Neo-TaoistphilosophybutalsoborrowedBud- dhistideas.Fromthefourthcenturyonward, BuddhistmastersfrequentlyengagedinPure Conversationandchallengedhsiian-hsuehschol- arsattheirowngame. Seealsobuddhism,chineselegalism, CHINESEPHILOSOPHY.A.K.L.C. Neo-Thomism,aphilosophical-theologicalmove- mentinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies manifestingarevivalofinterestinAquinas.It wasstimulatedbyPopeLeoXIIFsencyclical AeterniPatris(1879)callingforarenewed emphasisontheteachingofThomisticprinciples tomeettheintellectualandsocialchallengesof modernity.Themovementreacheditspeakin the1950s,thoughitsinfluencecontinuestobe seeninorganizationssuchastheAmerican CatholicPhilosophicalAssociation.Amongits majorfiguresareJosephKleutgen,Désiré Mercier,JosephMaréchal,PierreRousselot, RéginaldGarrigou-LaGrange,MartinGrab- mann,M.-D.Chenu,JacquesMaritain,Étienne Gilson,YvesR.Simon,JosefPieper,KarlRahner, CornelioFabro,EmerichCoreth,BernardLoner- gan,andW.NorrisClarke.Few,ifany,ofthese figureshavedescribedthemselvesasNeo- Thomists;someexplicitlyrejectedthedesigna- tion.Neo-Thomistshavelittleincommonexcept theircommitmenttoAquinasandhisrelevance tothecontemporaryworld.Theirinterestpro- ducedamorehistoricallyaccurateunderstand- ingofAquinasandhiscontributiontomedieval thought(Grabmann,Gilson,Chenu),including apreviouslyignoreduseofthePlatonicmeta- physicsofparticipation(Fabro).Thisricher understandingofAquinas,asforgingacreative synthesisinthemidstofcompetingtraditions, hasmadearguingforhisrelevanceeasier.Those Neo-Thomistswhoweresuspiciousofmodernity producedfreshreadingsofAquinas'stexts appliedtocontemporaryproblems(Pieper, Gilson).Theirinfluencecanbeseenintherevival ofvirtuetheoryandtheworkofAlasdairMac- Intyre.OtherssoughttodevelopAquinas's thoughtwiththeaidoflåterThomists(Maritain, Simon)andincorporatedtheinterpretationsof Counter-ReformationThomists,suchasCajetan andJeanPoinsot,toproducemoresophisticated, andcontroversial,accountsoftheintelligence, intentionality,semiotics,andpracticalknowl- edge.ThoseNeo-Thomistswillingtoengage modernthoughtonitsowntermsinterpreted modernphilosophysympatheticallyusingthe principlesofAquinas(Maréchal,Lonergan, Clarke),seekingdialogueratherthanconfronta- tion.However,somereadingsofAquinasareso thoroughlyintegratedintomodernphilosophy thattheycanseemassimilated(Rahner,Coreth); theirhighlyindividualizedmetaphysicsinspired asmuchbyotherphilosophicalinfluences,espe- ciallyHeidegger,asAquinas.Someofthelabels currentlyusedamongNeo-Thomistssuggesta divisioninthemovementövercritical,post- Kantianmethodology.'ExistentialThomism'is usedforthosewhoemphasizeboththerealdis- tinctionbetweenessenceandexistenceandthe roleofthesensibleinthemind'sfirstgraspof being."TranscendentalThomism'appliestofig- ureslikeMaréchal,Rousselot,Rahner,and Corethwhorelyupontheinherentdynamismof themindtowardthereal,rootedinAquinas's theoryoftheactiveintellect,fromwhichto deducetheirmetaphysicsofbeing.Seealso AQUINAS,GILSON,MARITAIN,MERCIER, THOMISM.D.W.H. Neumann,Johnvon.Seevonneumann. neuralnet.Seeconnectionism. neuralnetworkmodeling.Seeconnectionism. Neurath,Otto.Seeviennacircle. neurophilosophy.Seechurchland,patricia. neuroscience.Seecognitivescience. neustic.Seeprescriptivism. neutrality.Seeliberalism. neutralmonism.Seephilosophyofmind. NewAcademy,thenamegiventheAcademy,the schoolfoundedbyPlatoinAthens,duringthe timeitwascontrolledbyAcademicSkepticsafter about265b.c.Itsprincipalleadersinthisperiod wereArcesilaus(315-242)andCarneades(219- 129);ourmostaccessiblesourcefortheNew AcademyisCicero'sAcademica. Amasteroflogicaltechniquessuchassorites 608 Newcomb'sparadox Newman,JohnHenry (whichheleamedfromDiodorus),Arcesilaus attemptedtorevivethedialecticofPlato,usingit toachievethesuspensionofbeliefhelearnedto valuefromPyrrho.Låter,andespeciallyunder theleadershipofCarneades,theNewAcademy developedaspeciairelationshipwithStoicism:as theStoicsfoundnewwaystodefendtheirdoc- trineofthecriterion,Carneadesfoundnewways torefuteitintheStoics'ownterms.Carneades' visittoRomeini55b.c.withaStoicandaPeri- pateticmarksthebeginningofRome'sinterestin Greekphilosophy.Hisanti-Stoicargumentswere recordedbyhissuccessorClitomachus(d.cl10 b.c),whoseworkisknowntousthroughsum- mariesinCicero. ClitomachuswassucceededbyPhiloofLarisa (c.160-79b.c),whowastheteacherofAnti- ochusofAscalon(c.l30-c.67b.c).Philolåter attemptedtoreconciletheOldandtheNew AcademybysofteningtheSkepticismoftheNew andbyfosteringaSkepticalreadingofPlato. Angeredbythis,Antiochusbrokeawayinabout 87b.c.tofoundwhathecalledtheOldAcademy, whichisnowconsideredtobethebeginningof MiddlePlatonism.Probablyaboutthesametime, Aenesidemus(datesunknown)revivedthestrict SkepticismofPyrrhoandfoundedtheschool thatisknowntousthroughtheworkofSextus Empiricus.AcademicSkepticismdifferedfrom PyrrhonisminitssharpfocusonStoicpositions, andpossiblyinallowingforaweakassent(as opposedtobelief,whichtheysuspended)in whatisprobable;andPyrrhoniansaccusedAca- demicSkepticsofbeingdogmaticintheirrejec- tionofthepossibilityofknowledge.TheNew Academyhadamajorinfluenceonthedevelop- mentofmodemphilosophy,mostconspicuously throughHume,whoconsideredthathisbrandof mitigatedskepticismbelongedtothisschool. Seealsoacademy,islamicneoplaton- ISM,SKEPTICS.P.WO. Newcomb'sparadox,aconflictbetweentwo widelyacceptedprinciplesofrationaldecision, arisinginthefollowingdecisionproblem,known asNewcomb'sproblem.Twoboxesarebeforeyou. Thefirstcontainseither$1,000,000ornothing. Thesecondcontains$1,000.Youmaytakethe firstboxaloneorbothboxes.Someonewith uncannyforesighthaspredictedyourchoiceand fixedthecontentofthefirstboxaccordingtohis prediction.Ifhehaspredictedthatyouwilltake onlythefirstbox,hehasput$1,000,000inthat box;andifhehaspredictedthatyouwilltake bothboxes,hehasleftthefirstboxempty.The expectedutilityofanoptioniscommonly obtainedbymultiplyingtheutilityofitspossible outcomesbytheirprobabilitiesgiventheoption, andthenaddingtheproducts.Becausethepre- dictorisreliable,theprobabilitythatyoureceive $1,000,000giventhatyoutakeonlythefirstbox ishigh,whereastheprobabilitythatyoureceive $1,001,000giventhatyoutakebothboxesis low.Accordingly,theexpectedutilityoftaking onlythefirstboxisgreaterthantheexpected utilityoftakingbothboxes.Thereforetheprinci- pleofmaximizingexpectedutilitysaystotakeonly thefirstbox.However,theprincipleofdominance saysthatifthestatesdeterminingtheoutcomes ofoptionsarecausallyindependentofthe options,andthereisoneoptionthatisbetter thantheothersineachstate,thenyoushould adoptit.Sinceyourchoicedoesnotcausally influencethecontentsofthefirstbox,andsince choosingbothboxesyields$1,000inadditionto thecontentsofthefirstboxwhatevertheyare, theprinciplesaystotakebothboxes. Newcomb'sparadoxisnamedafteritsformu- lator,WilliamNewcomb.Nozickpublicizeditin "Newcomb'sProblemandTwoPrinciplesof Choice"(1969).Manytheoristshaveresponded totheparadoxbychangingthedefinitionofthe expectedutilityofanoptionsothatitissensitive tothecausalinfluenceoftheoptiononthestates thatdetermineitsoutcome,butisinsensitiveto theevidentialbearingoftheoptiononthose states. Seealsodecisiontheory,utilitarian- ism.P.We. Newcomb'sproblem.Seenewcomb'sparadox. Newman,JohnHenry(1801-90),Englishprelate andphilosopherofreligion.AsfellowatOriel College,Oxford,hewasaprominentmemberof theAnglicanOxfordMovement.Hebecamea RomanCatholicin1845,tookholyordersin 1847,andwasmadeacardinalin1879. Hismostimportantphilosophicalworkisthe GrammarofAssent(1870).HereNewman exploredthedifferencebetweenformålreason- ingandtheinformalornaturalmovementofthe mindindiscerningthetruthabouttheconcrete andhistorical.Concretereasoninginthemode ofnaturalinferenceisimplicitandunreflective;it dealsnotwithgeneralprinciplesassuchbutwith theiremploymentinparticularcircumstances. Thusascientistmustjudgewhetherthephe- nomenonheconfrontsisanovelsignificant datum,acoincidence,ormerelyaninsignificant variationinthedata. Theacquiredcapacitytomakejudgmentsof 609 NewRealism Newton,SirIsaac thissortNewmancalledtheillativesense,anintel- lectualskillshapedbyexperienceandpersonal insightandgenerallylimitedforindividualsto particularfieldsofendeavor.Theillativesense makespossibleajudgmentofcertitudeaboutthe matterconsidered,eventhoughtheformålargu- mentthatpartiallyoutlinestheprocesspossesses onlyobjectiveprobabilityforthenovice.Hence probabilityisnotnecessarilyopposedtocerti- tude. Inbecomingawareofitstacitdimension, Newmanspökeofrecognizingamodeofinformal inference.Hedistinguishedsuchreasoning, which,byvirtueoftheillativesense,culminates inajudgmentofcertitudeaboutthewaythings are(realassent),fromformålreasoningcondi- tionedbythecertaintyorprobabilityofthe premises,whichassentstotheconclusionthus conditioned(notionalassent).Inrealassent,the propositionfunctionsto"image"thereality,to makeitsrealitypresent. IntheDevelopmentofChristianDoctrine(1845), Newmananalyzedthewaysinwhichsomeideas unfoldthemselvesonlythroughhistoricaldevel- opment,withinatraditionofinquiry.Hesought todelineatethecommonpatternofsuchdevel- opmentinpolitics,science,philosophy,andreli- gion.Althoughhisfocalinterestwasinhow religiousdoctrinesdevelop,heemphasizesthe generalcharacterofsuchapatternofprogressive articulation.F.J.C. NewRealism,anearlytwentieth-centuryre- vival,bothinEnglandandintheUnitedStates, ofvariousformsofrealisminreactiontothe dominantidealismsinheritedfromthenine- teenthcentury.InAmericathisrevivaltooka cooperativeformwhensixphilosophers(Ralph BartonPerry,EdwinHolt,WilliamPepperell Montague,WalterPitkin,EdwardSpaulding, andWalterMarvin)published''AProgramand FirstPlatformofSixRealists"(1910),followed twoyearslåterbythecooperativevolumeThe NewRealism,inwhicheachauthoredanessay. Thisvolumegaverisetothedesignation'New Realists'forthesesixphilosophers. Althoughtheyclearlydisagreedonmanypar- ticulars,theyconcurredonseveralmattersof philosophicalstyleandepistemologicalsub- stance.Procedurallytheyendorsedacooperative andpiecemealapproachtophilosophicalprob- lems,andtheywereconstitutionallyinclinedto aclosenessofanalysisthatwouldpreparethe wayforlåterphilosophicaltendencies.Substan- tivelytheyagreedonseveralepistemological stancescentraltotherefutationofidealism. AmongthedoctrinesintheNewRealistplat- formweretherejectionofthefundamentalchar- acterofepistemology;theviewthattheentities investigatedinlogic,mathematics,andscience arenot"mental"inanyordinarysense;theview thatthethingsknownarenottheproductsofthe knowingrelationnorinanyfundamentalsense conditionedbytheirbeingknown;andtheview thattheobjectsknownareimmediatelyand directlypresenttoconsciousnesswhilebeing independentofthatrelation.NewRealismwasa versionofdirectrealism,whichviewedthe notionsofmediationandrepresentationin knowledgeasopeninggambitsontheslippery slopetoidealism. Theirrefutationofidealismfocusedonpoint- ingoutthefallacyofmovingfromthetruismthat everyobjectofknowledgeisknowntotheclaim thatitsbeingconsistsinitsbeingknown.Thatwe areobviouslyatthecenterofwhatweknow entailsnothingaboutthenatureofwhatwe know.Perrydubbedthisfact"theegocentric predicament,"andsupplementedthisobserva- tionwithargumentstotheeffectthattheobjects ofknowledgeareinfactindependentofthe knowingrelation. NewRealismasaversionofdirectrealism hadasitsprimaryconceptualobstacle"thefacts ofrelativity,"i.e.,error,illusion,perceptualvari- ation,andvaluation.Dealingwiththesephe- nomenawithoutinvoking"mentalinter- mediaries"provedtobethestumblingblock,and NewRealismsoongavewaytoasecondcooper- ativeventurebyanothergroupofAmerican philosophersthatcametobeknownasCritical Realism. Theterm'newrealism'isalsooccasionally usedwithregardtothoseBritishphilosophers (principalamongthemMooreandRussell)sim- ilarlyinvolvedinrefutingidealism.Although individuallymoresignificantthantheAmerican group,theirswasnotacooperativeeffort,sothe grouptermcametohaveprimarilyanAmerican referent. Seealsocriticalrealism,idealism,per- CEPTION.C.F.D. newriddleofinduction.Seegrueparadox. newtheoryofreference.Seeputnam. Newton,SirIsaac(1642-1727),Englishphysicist andmathematician,oneofthegreatestscientists ofalltime.BorninWoolsthorpe,Lincolnshire,he attendedCambridgeUniversity,receivingthe B.A.in1665;hebecameafellowofTrinityin 610 Newton,SirIsaac Newtonian 1667andLucasianProfessorofMathematicsin 1669.HewaselectedfellowoftheRoyalSociety in1671andservedasitspresidentfrom1703 untilhisdeath.In1696hewasappointedwarden ofthemint.Inhislåteryearshewasinvolvedin politicalandgovemmentalaffairsratherthanin activescientificwork.Asensitive,secretiveper- son,hewaspronetoirascibility-mostnotablyin adisputewithLeibnizöverpriorityofinvention ofthecalculus.Hisunparalleledscientificaccom- plishmentsovershadowadeepandsustained interestinancientchronology,biblicalstudy,the- ology,andalchemy. InhisearlytwentiesNewton'sgeniusasserted itselfinanastonishingperiodofmathematical andexperimentalcreativity.Intheyears1664- 67,hediscoveredthebinomialtheorem;the "methodoffluxions"(calculus);theprincipleof thecompositionoflight;andfundamentalsofhis theoryofuniversalgravitation. Newton'smasterpiece,PhilosophiaeNaturalis PrincipiaMathematica("TheMathematicalPrinci- plesofNaturalPhilosophy"),appearedin1687. Thisworksetsforththemathematicallawsof physicsand"thesystemoftheworld."Itsexpo- sitionismodeledonEuclideangeometry:propo- sitionsaredemonstratedmathematicallyfrom definitionsandmathematicalaxioms.Theworld systemconsistsofmaterialbodies(massescom- posedofhärdparticles)atrestorinmotionand interactingaccordingtothreeaxiomsorlawsof motion: (1)Everybodycontinuesinitsstateofrestor ofuniformmotioninastraightlineunless itiscompelledtochangethatstateby forcesimpresseduponit. (2)Thechangeofmotionisproportionaltothe motiveforceimpressedandismadeinthe directionofthestraightlineinwhichthat forceisimpressed.[Here,theimpressed forceequalsmässtimestheråteofchange ofvelocity,i.e.,acceleration.Hencethe familiarformula,F=ma.] (3)Toeveryactionthereisalwaysopposedan equalreaction;or,themutualactionoftwo bodiesuponeachotherisalwaysequaland directedtocontraryparts. Newton'sgenerallawofgravitation(inmod- ernrestatement)is: Everyparticleofmatterattractseveryother particlewithaforcevaryingdirectlyasthe productoftheirmassesandinverselyasthe squareofthedistancebetweenthem. Thestatementofthelawsofmotionispre- cededbyanequallyfamousscholiuminwhich Newtonenunciatestheultimateconditionsof hisuniversalsystem:absolutetime,space,place, andmotion.Hespeaksoftheseasindependently existing"quantities"accordingtowhichtrue measurementsofbodiesandmotionscanbe madeasdistinctfromrelative"sensiblemea- sures"andapparentobservations.Newtonseems tohavethoughtthathissystemofmathematical principlespresupposedandisvalidatedbythe absoluteframework.Thescholiumhasbeenthe subjectofmuchcriticaldiscussion.Themain problemconcernsthejustificationoftheab- soluteframework.Newtoncommendsadher- encetoexperimentalobservationandinduction foradvancingscientificknowledge,andhere- jectsspeculativehypotheses.Butabsolutetime andspacearenotobservable.(Inthescholium Newtondidofferarenownedexperimentusing arotatingpailofwaterasevidencefordistin- guishingtrueandapparentmotionsandproofof absolutemotion.)Ithasbeenremarkedthatcon- flictingstrainsofarationalism(anticipating Kant)andempiricism(anticipatingHume)are presentinNewton'sconceptionofscience.Some oftheseissuesarealsoevidentinNewton'sOptics (1704,especiallythefourthedition,1730), whichincludesaseriesofsuggestive"Queries" onthenatureoflight,gravity,matter,scientific method,andGod. ThetriumphantreceptiongiventoNewton's PrincipiainEnglandandontheContinentledto idealizationofthemanandhiswork.Thus AlexanderPope'sfamousepitaph: NatureandNature'slawslayhidinnight; Godsaid,"LetNewtonbe!"andallwaslight. Theterm'Newtonian',then,denotedtheviewof natureasauniversalsystemofmathematical reasonandorderdivinelycreatedandadminis- tered.Themetaphorofa"universalmachine" wasfrequentlyapplied.Theviewiscentralinthe eighteenth-centuryEnlightenment,inspiringa religionofreasonandthescientificstudyofsoci- etyandthehumanmind.Morenarrowly,'New- tonian'suggestsareductionofanysubject mattertoanontologyofindividualparticlesand thelawsandbasictermsofmechanics:mäss, length,andtime. Seealsofieldtheory,philosophyof SCIENCE,QUANTUMMECHANICS,SPACE,TIME. H.S.T. Newtonian.Seenewton. 611 NicholasKryfts NicholasofCusa NicholasKryfts.Seenicholasofcusa. NicholasofAutrecourt(c.l300-after1350), Frenchphilosopherandtheologian.Bornin Autrecourt,hewaseducatedatParisandearned bachelor'sdegreesintheologyandlawanda master'sdegreeinarts.Afteralistofpropositions fromhiswritingswascondemnedin1346,he wassentencedtoburnhisworkspubliclyand recant,whichhedidinParisthefollowingyear. HewasappointeddeanofMetzcathedralin 1350. Nicholas'secclesiasticaltroublesarosepartly fromnineletters(twoofwhichsurvive)which reducetoabsurditytheviewthatappearances provideasufficientbasisforcertainandevident knowledge.Onthecontrary,exceptfor"certi- tudeofthefaith,"wecanbecertainonlyofwhat isequivalentorreducibletotheprincipleofnon- contradiction.Heacceptsasaconsequenceof thisthatwecannevervalidlyinfertheexistence ofonedistinctthingfromanother,includingthe existenceofsubstancesfromqualities,orcauses fromeffects.Indeed,hefindsthat''inthewhole ofhisnaturalphilosophyandmetaphysics,Aris- totlehadsuch[evident]certaintyofscarcelytwo conclusions,andperhapsnotevenofone." Nicholasdevotesanotherwork,theExigitordo executionis(alsoknownasTheUniversalTreatise), toanextendedcritiqueofAristotelianism.It attackswhatseemedtohimtheblindadherence givenbyhiscontemporariestoAristotleand Averroes,showingthattheoppositeofmany conclusionsallegedtohavebeendemonstrated bythePhilosopher-e.g.,onthedivisibilityof continua,therealityofmotion,andthetruthof appearances-arejustasevidentorapparentas thoseconclusionsthemselves. Becausesofewofhiswritingsareextant,how- ever,itisdifficulttoascertainjustwhatNicholas's ownviewswere.Likewise,thereasonsforhis condemnationarenotwellunderstood,al- thoughrecentstudieshavesuggestedthathis troublesmighthavebeenduetoareactionto certainideasthatheappropriatedfromEnglish theologians,suchasAdamdeWodeham. Nicholas'sviewselicitedcommentnotonly fromchurchauthorities,butalsofromother philosophers,includingBuridan,Marsiliusof Inghen,AlbertofSaxony,andNicholasof Oresme.Despiteafewsurfacesimilarities,how- ever,thereisnoevidencethathisteachingson certaintyorcausalityhadanyinfluenceonmod- ernphilosophers,suchasDescartesorHume. Seealsoaristotle,ockham,rational- ism.J.A.Z. NicholasofCusa,alsocalledNicolausCusanus, NicholasKryfts(1401-64),Germanphiloso- pher,animportantRenaissancePlatonist.Born inKuesontheMoselle,heearnedadoctoratein canonlawin1423.HebecameknownforhisDe concordantiacatholica,writtenattheCouncilof Baselin1432,aworkdefendingtheconciliarist positionagainstthepope.Låter,hedecidedthat onlythepopecouldprovideunityforthechurch initsnegotiationswiththeEast,andalliedhim- selfwiththepapacy.In1437-38,returningfrom apapallegationtoConstantinople,hehadhis famousinsightintothecoincidenceofopposites (coincidentiaoppositorum)intheinfinite,upon whichhisOnLearnedIgnoranceisbased.His unceasinglaborwaschieffyresponsibleforthe ViennaConcordatwiththeEasternchurchin 1448.Hewasmadecardinalin1449asareward forhisefforts,andbishopofBrixen(Bressanone) in1450.HetraveledwidelyinGermanyasa papallegate(1450-52)beforesettlingdownin hissee. Cusa'scentralinsightwasthatalloppositions areunitedintheirinfinitemeasure,sothatwhat wouldbelogicalcontradictionsforfinitethings coexistwithoutcontradictioninGod,whoisthe measureof(i.e.,istheformoressenceof)all things,andidenticaltotheminasmuchasheis identicalwiththeirreality,quiddity,oressence. Consideredasitiscontractedtotheindividual,a thingisonlyanimageofitsmeasure,notareal- ityinitself.Hispositiondrewonmathematical models,arguing,forinstance,thataninfinite straightlinetangenttoacircleisthemeasureof thecurvedcircumference,sinceacircleofinfi- nitediameter,containingallthebeingpossiblein acircle,wouldcoincidewiththetangent.Ingen- eral,themeasureofathingmustcontainallthe possiblebeingofthatsortofthing,andsoisinfi- nite,orunlimited,initsbeing.Cusaattacked Aristoteliansfortheirunwillingnesstogiveup theprincipleofnon-contradiction.Hisepiste- mologyisaformofPlatonicskepticism.Our knowledgeisneverofreality,theinfinitemea- sureofthingsthatistheiressence,butonlyof finiteimagesofrealitycorrespondingtothefinite copieswithwhichwemustdeal.Theseimages areconstructedbyourownminds,anddonot representanimmediategraspofanyreality. Theirhighestformisfoundinmathematics,and itisonlythroughmathematicsthatreasoncan understandtheworld.Inrelationtotheinfinite real,theseimagesandthecontractedrealities theyenableustoknowhaveonlyaninfinitesi- malreality.Ourknowledgeisonlyamässofcon- jectures,i.e.,assertionsthataretrueinsofaras 612 Nietzsche,FriedrichWilhelm Nietzsche,FriedrichWilhelm theycapturesomepartofthetruth,butnever thewholetruth,theinfinitemeasure,asitreally isinitself.CusawasmuchreadintheRenais- sance,andissomethimessaidtohavehadsig- nificantinfluenceonGermanthoughtofthe eighteenthcentury,inparticularonLeibniz,and Germanidealism,butitisuncertain,despitethe considerableintrinsicmeritofhisthought,ifthis istrue. Seealsoplato.J.Lo. Nietzsche,FriedrichWilhelm(i844-i900),Ger- manphilosopherandculturalcritic.Bornina smalltowninthePrussianprovinceofSaxony, Nietzsche'searlyeducationemphasizedreligion andclassicallanguagesandliterature.Aftera yearattheuniversityatBonnhetransferredto Leipzig,wherehepursuedclassicalstudies. TherehehappeneduponSchopenhauer'sThe WorldasWillandRepresentation,whichpro- foundlyinfluencedhissubsequentconcernsand earlyphilosophicalthinking.Itwasasaclassical philologist,however,thathewasappointedpro- fessorattheSwissuniversityatBasel,beforehe hadevenreceivedhisdoctorate,attheastonish- inglyearlyageoftwenty-four. Ameretwentyyearsofproductivelifere- mainedtohim,endingwithamentalandphys- icalcollapseinJanuary1889,fromwhichhe neverrecovered.HeheldhispositionatBaselfor adecade,resigningin1879owingtothedeteri- orationofhishealthfromillnesseshehadcon- tractedin1870asavolunteermedicalorderlyin theFranco-Prussianwar.AtBaselhelecturedon avarietyofsubjectschieflyrelatingtoclassical studies,includingGreekandRomanphilosophy aswellasliterature.Duringhisearlyyearsthere healsobecameintenselyinvolvedwiththecom- poserRichardWagner;andhisfascinationwith Wagnerwasreflectedinseveralofhisearly works-mostnotablyhisfirstbook,TheBirthof Tragedy(1872),andhissubsequentessayRichard WagnerinBayreuth(1876).Hislåterbreakwith Wagner,culminatinginhispolemicTheCaseof Wagner(1888),wasbothprofoundandpainfulto him.WhileatfirstregardingWagnerasacreative geniusshowingthewaytoaculturalandspiri- tualrenewal,Nietzschecametoseehimandhis artasepitomizingandexacerbatingthefunda- mentalproblemwithwhichhebecameincreas- inglyconcemed. Thisproblemwasthepervasiveintellectual andculturalcrisisNietzschelåtercharacterized intermsofthe"deathofGod"andtheadventof "nihilism."Traditionalreligiousandmetaphysi- calwaysofthinkingwereonthewane,leaving avoidthatmodernsciencecouldnotfill,and endangeringthehealthofcivilization.Thedis- coveryofsomelife-affirmingalternativeto Schopenhauer'sradicallypessimisticresponseto thisdisillusionmentbecameNietzsche'sprimary concern.InTheBirthofTragedyhelookedtothe GreeksforcluesandtoWagnerforinspiration, believingthattheirartheldthekeytorenewed humanflourishingforahumanitybereftbothof theconsolationsofreligiousfaithandofconfi- denceinreasonandscienceassubstitutesforit. InhissubsequentseriesofUntimelyMeditations (1873-76)heexpandeduponhisthemeofthe needtoreorienthumanthoughtandendeavor tothisend,andcriticizedavarietyoftendencies detrimentaltoitthathediscernedamonghis contemporaries. BoththedeteriorationofNietzsche'shealth andtheshiftofhisinterestawayfromhisorigi- naldisciplinepreventedretentionofhisposition atBasel.Inthefirstyearsafterhisretirement,he completedhistransitionfromphilologistto philosopherandpublishedtheseveralpartsof Human,All-Too-Human(1878-90),Daybreak (1881),andthefirstfourpartsofTheGayScience (1882).Theseaphoristicwritingssharpenedand extendedhisanalyticalandcriticalassessmentof varioushumantendenciesandsocial,cultural, andintellectualphenomena.Duringthisperiod histhinkingbecamemuchmoresophisticated; andhedevelopedthephilosophicalstylesand concernsthatfoundmatureexpressioninthe writingsofthefinalyearsofhisbriefactivelife, followingthepublicationofthefourpartsofThus SpökeZarathustra(1883-85). Theselastremarkablyproductiveyearssaw theappearanceofBeyondGoodandEvil(1886),a fifthpartofTheGayScience,OntheGenealogyof Morals(1887),TheCaseofWagner(1888),anda seriesofprefacestohisearlierworks(1886-87), aswellasthecompletionofseveralbookspub- lishedafterhiscollapse-TwilightoftheIdols (1889),TheAntichrist(1895),andEcceHomo (1908).Hewasalsoamassingagreatdealof materialinnotebooks,ofwhichaselectionwas låterpublishedunderthetitleTheWilltoPower. (ThestatusandsignificanceofthismässofNach- lassmaterialaremattersofcontinuingcontro- versy.) Intheearly1880s,whenhewroteThusSpöke Zarathustra,Nietzschearrivedataconceptionof humanlifeandpossibility-andwithit,ofvalue andmeaning-thathebelievedcouldovercome theSchopenhauerianpessimismandnihilism thathesawasoutcomesofthecollapseoftradi- tionalmodesofreligiousandphilosophicalinter- 613 Nietzsche,FriedrichWilhelm Nietzsche,FriedrichWilhelm pretation.Heprophesiedaperiodofnihilismin theaftermathoftheirdeclineandfall;butthis prospectdeeplydistressedhim.Hewascon- vincedoftheuntenabilityofthe"Godhypothe- sis,"andindeedofallreligiousandmetaphysical interpretationsoftheworldandourselves;and yethewaswellawarethattheverypossibilityof theaffirmationoflifewasatstake,andrequired morethanthemereabandonmentofallsuch "lies"and"fictions."Hetookthebasicchallenge ofphilosophynowtobetoreinterpretlifeand theworldalongmoretenablelinesthatwould alsoovercomenihilism. WhatNietzschecalled"thedeathofGod"was bothaculturalevent-thewaningandimpend- ingdemiseofthe"Christian-moral"interpreta- tionoflifeandtheworld-andalsoaphil- osophicaldevelopment:theabandonmentof anythingliketheGod-hypothesis(alldemi- divineabsolutesincluded).Asaculturaleventit wasaphenomenontobereckonedwith,anda sourceofprofoundconcem;forhefeareda "nihilisticrebound"initswake,andworried abouttheconsequencesforhumanlifeandcul- tureifnocountermovementtoitwereforth- coming.Asaphilosophicaldevelopment,onthe otherhand,itwashispointofdeparture,which hetooktocallforaradicalreconsiderationof everythingfromlifeandtheworldandhuman existenceandknowledgetovalueandmorality. The"de-deificationofnature,"the"translationof manbackintonature,"the"revaluationofval- ues,"thetracingofthe"genealogyofmorals" andtheircritique,andtheelaborationof"natu- ralistic"accountsofknowledge,value,morality, andourentire"spiritual"naturethuscametobe hismaintasks.Hispublishedandunpublished writingscontainawealthofremarks,observa- tions,andsuggestionscontributingimportantly tothem. Itisamatterofcontroversy,evenamongthose withahighregardforNietzsche,whetherhe triedtoworkoutpositionsonissuesbearingany resemblancetothoseoccupyingotherphiloso- phersbeforeandafterhiminthemainstreamof thehistoryofphilosophy.Hewasharshlycritical ofmostofhispredecessorsandcontemporaries; andhebrokefundamentallywiththemandtheir basicideasandprocedures.Hisownwritings, moreover,bearlittleresemblancetothoseof mostotherphilosophers.Thosehehimselfpub- lished(aswellashisreflectionsinhisnotebooks) donotsystematicallysetoutanddevelopviews. Rather,theyconsistforthemostpartincollec- tionsofshortparagraphsandsetsofaphorisms, oftenonlylooselyifatallconnected.Manydeal withphilosophicaltopics,butinveryunconven- tionalways;andbecausehisremarksaboutthese topicsarescatteredthroughmanydifferent works,theyarealltooeasilytakeninisolation andmisunderstood.Onsometopics,moreover, muchofwhathewroteisfoundonlyinhisvery roughnotebooks,whichhefilledwiththoughts withoutindicatingtheextentofhisreflected commitmenttothem.Hislanguage,further- more,isbyturnscoollyanalytical,heatedly polemical,sharplycritical,andhighlymetaphor- ical;andheseldomindicatesclearlythescopeof hisclaimsandwhathemeansbyhisterms. Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatmany philosophershavefounditdifficulttoknow whattomakeofhimandtotakehimseri- ously-andthatsomehavetakenhimtorepu- diatealtogetherthetraditionalphilosophical enterpriseofseekingreasonedconclusionswith respecttoquestionsofthekindwithwhich philosophershavelongbeenconcemed,herald- ingthe"death"notonlyofreligiousandmeta- physicalthinking,butalsoofphilosophyitself. Othersreadhimverydifferently,ashaving soughttoeffectafundamentalreorientationof philosophicalthinking,andtoindicatebyboth preceptandexamplehowphilosophicalinquiry mightbetterbepursued.Thosewhoregard Nietzscheintheformerwaytakehiscriticisms ofhisphilosophicalpredecessorsandcontempo- rariestoapplytoanyattempttoaddresssuch matters.Theyseizeuponandconstruesomeof hismoresweepingnegativepronouncementson truthandknowledgeasindicatingthathe believedwecanonlyproducefictionsand merelyexpedient(orpossiblycreative)perspec- tivalexpressionsofourneedsanddesires,as groupsorasindividuals.Theythustakehimas aradicalnihilist,concernedtosubverttheentire philosophicalenterpriseandreplaceitwitha kindofthinkingmoreakintotheliteraryexplo- rationofhumanpossibilitiesintheserviceof life-akindofartisticplayliberatedfromcon- cernwithtruthandknowledge.Thosewhoview himinthelatterway,ontheotherhand,take seriouslyhisconcerntofindawayofovercoming thenihilismhebelievedtoresultfromtradi- tionalwaysofthinking;hisretentionofrecast notionsoftruthandknowledge;andhisevident concern-especiallyinhislåterwritings-to contributetothecomprehensionofabroad rangeofphenomena.Thiswayofunderstanding him,liketheformer,remainscontroversial;but itpermitsaninterpretationofhiswritingsthatis philosophicallymorefruitful. Nietzscheindisputablyinsistedupontheinter- 614 Nietzsche,FriedrichWilhelm Nietzsche,FriedrichWilhelm pretivecharacterofallhumanthought;andhe calledfor"newphilosophers"whowouldfollow himinengaginginmoreself-consciousand intellectuallyresponsibleattemptstoassessand improveuponprevailinginterpretationsof humanlife.Healsowasdeeplyconcernedwith howthesemattersmightbetterbeevaluated,and withthevaluesbywhichhumanbeingsliveand mightbetterdoso.Thushemademuchofthe needforarevaluationofallreceivedvalues,and forattentiontotheproblemsofthenature,sta- tus,andstandardsofvalueandevaluation.One formofinquiryhetooktobeofgreatutilityin connectionwithbothofthesetasksisgenealogi- calinquiryintotheconditionsunderwhichvar- iousmodesofinterpretationandevaluation havearisen.Itisonlyoneofthekindsofinquiry heconsiderednecessaryinbothcases,however, servingmerelytoprepareforothersthatmustbe broughttobearbeforeanyconclusionsarewar- ranted. Nietzschefurtheremphasizedtheperspectival characterofallthinkingandthemerelyprovi- sionalcharacterofallknowing,rejectingtheidea oftheverypossibilityofabsoluteknowledge transcendingallperspectives.However,because healsorejectedtheideathatthings(andvalues) haveabsoluteexistence"inthemselves"apart fromtherelationsinwhichhesupposestheir realitytoconsist,heheldthat,ifviewedinthe multiplicityofperspectivesfromwhichvarious oftheserelationscometolight,theyadmitofa significantmeasureofcomprehension.Thisper- spectivismthusdoesnotexcludethepossibilityof anysortofknowledgedeservingofthename, butratherindicateshowitistobeconceivedand achieved.Hiskindofphilosophy,whichhechar- acterizesasfröhlicheWissenschaft(cheerfulsci- ence),proceedsbywayofavarietyofsuch "perspectival"approachestothevariousmatters withwhichhedeals. ThusforNietzschethereisno"truth"inthe senseofthecorrespondenceofanythingwe mightthinkorsayto"being,"andindeedno "trueworldofbeing"towhichitmayevenbe imaginedtofailtocorrespond;no"knowledge" conceivedintermsofanysuchtruthandreality; and,further,noknowledgeatall-evenofour- selvesandtheworldofwhichwearea part-thatisabsolute,non-perspectival,andcer- tain.Butthatisnottheendofthematter.There are,e.g.,waysofthinkingthatmaybemoreor lesswellwarrantedinrelationtodifferingsorts ofinterestandpractice,notonlywithinthecon- textofsociallifebutalsoinourdealingswithour environingworld.Nietzsche'sreflectionsonthe reconceptualizationoftruthandknowledgethus pointinthedirectionofanaturalisticepistemol- ogythathewouldhavereplacetheconceptions oftruthandknowledgeofhispredecessors,and fillthenihilisticvoidseeminglyleftbytheir bankruptcy.Thereis,moreover,agooddeal aboutourselvesandourworldthathebecame convincedwecancomprehend.Ourcompre- hensionmayberestrictedtowhatlifeandthe worldshowthemselvestobeandinvolveinour experience;butiftheyaretheonlykindofreal- ity,thereisnolongeranyreasontodivorcethe notionsoftruth,knowledge,andvaluefrom them.Thequestionthenbecomeshowbestto interpretandassesswhatwefindasweproceed toexplorethem.Itistothesetasksofinterpreta- tionand"revaluation"thatNietzschedevoted hismaineffortsinhislåterwritings. InspeakingofthedeathofGod,Nietzschehad inmindnotonlytheabandonmentoftheGod- hypothesis(whichheconsideredtobeutterly "unworthyofbelief,"owingitsinventionand appealentirelytonaiveté,error,all-too-human need,andulteriormotivation),butalsothe demiseofallmetaphysicalsubstitutesforit.He likewisecriticizedandrejectedtherelatedpostu- lationsofsubstantial"souls"andself-contained "things,"takingbothnotionstobeontological fictionsmerelyreflectingourartificial(though convenient)linguistic-conceptualshorthandfor functionallyunitaryproducts,processes,andsets ofrelations.Inplaceofthisdusteroftraditional ontologicalcategoriesandinterpretations,he conceivedtheworldintermsofaninterplayof forceswithoutanyinherentstructureorfinal end.Itceaselesslyorganizesandreorganizes itself,asthefundamentaldispositionhecalled willtopowergivesrisetosuccessivearraysof powerrelationships."Thisworldisthewillto power-andnothingbesides,"hewrote;"and youyourselvesarealsothiswilltopower-and nothingbesides!" Nietzsche'sideaoftheeternalreturn(oreternal recurrence)underscoresthisconceptionofa worldwithoutbeginningorend,inwhichthings happenrepeatedlyinthewaytheyalwayshave. Hefirstintroducedthisideaasatestofone'sabil- itytoaffirmone'sownlifeandthegeneralchar- acteroflifeinthisworldastheyare,without reservation,qualification,orappealtoanything transcendingthem.Helåterentertainedthe thoughtthatalleventsmightactuallyrecureter- nallyinexactlythesamesequence,andexperi- mentedinhisunpublishedwritingswith argumentstothiseffect.Forthemostpart,how- ever,herestrictedhimselftolessproblematic 615 Neitzsche,FriedrichWilhelm Nietzsche,FriedrichWilhelm usesoftheideathatdonotpresupposeitsliteral truthinthisradicalform.Hisrhetoricalembell- ishmentsandexperimentalelaborationsofthe ideamayhavebeenintendedtomakeitmore vividandcompelling;butheemployeditchiefly todepicthisconceptionoftheradicallynon-lin- earcharacterofeventsinthisworldandtheir fundamentalhomogeneityandtoprovideaway oftestingourabilitytolivewithit.Ifwearesuf- ficientlystrongandwelldisposedtolifetoaffirm itevenonthesuppositionthatitwillonlybethe samesequenceofeventsrepeatedeternallywe havewhatittakestoendureandflourishinthe kindofworldinwhichNietzschebelievedwe findourselvesintheaftermathofdisillusion- ment. Nietzscheconstruedhumannatureandexis- tencenaturalistically,intermsofthewilltopower anditsramificationsintheestablishmentand expressionofthekindsofcomplexsystemsof dynamicquantainwhichhumanbeingsconsist. "Thesoulisonlyawordforsomethingaboutthe body,"hehasZarathustrasay;andthebodyis fundamentallyaconfigurationofnaturalforces andprocesses.Atthesametime,heinsistedon theimportanceofsocialarrangementsandinter- actionsinthedevelopmentofhumanformsof awarenessandactivity.Healsoemphasizedthe possibilityoftheemergenceofexceptional humanbeingscapableofanindependenceand creativityelevatingthemabovethelevelofthe generalhumanrule.Sohestressedthedifference between"highermen"and"theherd,"and throughZarathustraproclaimedtheUbermensch ('överman'or'superman')tobe"themeaningof theearth,"employingthisimagetoconveythe idealoftheovercomingofthe"all-too-human" andthefullestpossiblecreative"enhancementof life."Farfromseekingtodiminishourhumanity bystressingouranimality,hesoughttodirect oureffortstotheemergenceofa"higherhuman- ity"capableofendowingexistencewitha humanredemptionandjustification,aboveall throughtheenrichmentofculturallife. Notwithstandinghisfrequentcharacterization asanihilist,therefore,Nietzscheinfaetsoughtto counterandovercomethenihilismheexpected toprevailintheaftermathofthecollapseand abandonmentoftraditionalreligiousandmeta- physicalmodesofinterpretationandevaluation. Whilehewashighlycriticalofthelatter,itwas nothisintentionmerelytoopposethem;forhe furtherattemptedtomakeoutthepossibilityof formsoftruthandknowledgetowhichphilo- sophicalinterpretersoflifeandtheworldmight aspire,andespouseda"Dionysianvalue-stan- dard"inplaceofallnon-naturalisticmodesof valuation.Inkeepingwithhisinterpretationof lifeandtheworldintermsofhisconception ofwilltopower,Nietzscheframedthisstandard intermsofhisinterpretationofthem.Theonly tenablealternativetonihilismmustbebased uponarecognitionandaffirmationoftheworld's fundamentalcharacter.Thismeantpositingasa generalstandardofvaluetheattainmentofa kindoflifeinwhichthewilltopowerasthecre- ativetransformationofexistenceisraisedtoits highestpossibleintensityandqualitativeexpres- sion.Thisinturnledhimtotakethe"enhance- mentoflife"andcreativitytobetheguiding ideasofhisrevaluationofvaluesanddevelop- mentofanaturalisticvaluetheory. ThiswayofthinkingcarriedöverintoNie- tzsche^thinkingaboutmorality.Insistingthat moralitiesaswellasothertraditionalmodesof valuationoughttobeassessed"intheperspec- tiveoflife,"hearguedthatmostofthemwere contrarytotheenhancementoflife,reflecting theall-too-humanneedsandweaknessesand fearsoflessfavoredhumangroupsandtypes. Distinguishingbetween"master"and"slave" moralities,hefoundthelattertohavebecome thedominanttypeofmoralityinthemodern world.Heregardedpresent-daymoralityasa "herd-animalmorality,"wellsuitedtothe requirementsandvulnerabilitiesofthemediocre whoarethehumanrule,butstultifyingand detrimentaltothedevelopmentofpotential exceptionstothatrule.Accordingly,hedrew attentiontotheoriginsandfunctionsofthistype ofmorality(asasocial-controlmechanismand devicebywhichtheweakdefendandavenge andassertthemselvesagainsttheactuallyor potentiallystronger).Hefurthersuggestedthe desirabilityofa"highermorality"fortheexcep- tions,inwhichthecontrastofthebasic "slave/herdmorality"categoriesof"goodand evil"wouldbereplacedbycategoriesmoreakin tothe"goodandbad"contrastcharacteristicof "mastermorality,"witharevised(andvariable) contentbetterattunedtotheconditionsand attainablequalitiesoftheenhancedformsoflife suchexceptionalhumanbeingscanachieve. ThestronglycreativeflavorofNietzsche's notionsofsucha"higherhumanity"andassoci- ated"highermorality"reflectshislinkageof bothtohisconceptionofart,towhichhe attachedgreatimportance.Art,forNietzsche,is fundamentallycreative(ratherthancognitive), servingtopreparefortheemergenceofasensi- 616 Nihilestinintellectuquodnonpriusfueritinsensu noetic bilityandmanneroflifereflectingthehighest potentialityofhumanbeings.Art,asthecreative transformationoftheworldaswefindit(andof ourselvesthereby)onasmallscaleandinpar- ticularmedia,affordsaglimpseofakindoflife thatwouldbelivedmorefullyinthismanner, andconstitutesasteptowardemergence.Inthis way,Nietzsche'smaturethoughtthusexpands upontheideaofthebasicconnectionbetween artandthejustificationoflifethatwashisgen- eralthemeinhisfirstmajorwork,TheBirthof Tragedy. Seealsoexistentialism,hegel,kant, SCHOPENHAUER.R.Sc. Nihilestinintellectuquodnonpriusfueritin sensu(Latin,'Nothingisintheunderstanding thathadnotpreviouslybeeninthesenses'),a principaltenetofempiricism.Aweakinterpreta- tionoftheprinciplemaintainsthatallconcepts areacquiredfromsensoryexperience;nocon- ceptsareinnateorapriori.Astrongerinterpreta- tionaddsthatallpropositionalknowledgeis derivedfromsenseexperience.Theweakinter- pretationwasheldbyAquinasandLocke,who thoughtneverthelessthatwecanknowsome propositionstobetrueinvirtueoftherelations betweentheconceptsinvolved.Thestronger interpretationwasendorsedbyJ.S.Mill,who arguedthateventhetruthsofmathematicsare inductivelybasedonexperience.Seealso empiricism.W.E.M. Nihilexnihilofit(Latin,'Nothingarisesfrom nothing'),anintuitivemetaphysicalprinciple firstenunciatedintheWestbyParmenides,often heldequivalenttothepropositionthatnothing ariseswithoutacause.CreationexnihiloisGod's productionoftheworldwithoutanynaturalor materialcause,butinvolvesasupernatural cause,andsoitwouldnotviolatetheprinciple. J.Lo. nihilism,ethical.Seerelativism. nihilism,philosophical.Seenietzsche,russian NIHILISM. nihilism,Russian.Seerussiannihilism. nihilism,semantic.Seesemanticholism. nirodha-samapätti,alsoknownassamjnä- vedayita-nirodha(Sanskrit,'attainmentofcessa- tion'),atermusedbyIndianBuddhiststodenote astateproducedbymeditationinwhichnomen- taleventsofanykindoccur.Whatceasesin nirodha-samäpattiisalltheoperationsofthe mind;allthatremainsisthemindlessbody. SomeBuddhiststookthisstatetohavesalvific significance,andsolikenedittoNirvana.Butits principalphilosophicalinterestliesinthepuzzle itproducedforBuddhisttheorists:Whatcausal accountcanbegiventhatwillmakesenseofthe reemergenceofmentaleventsfromacontinuum inwhichnoneexist,giventhepan-Buddhist assumptionthatallexistentsaremomentary? P.J.G. NNthesis.Seenecessity. noema.Seehusserl,noetic. noematamoralia.Seemore,thomas. noematicanalysis.Seehusserl. noesis.Seedividedline,husserl. noetic(fromGreeknoetikos,fromnoetos,'per- ceiving'),oforrelatingtoapprehensionbythe intellect.Inastrictsensethetermreferstonon- sensuousdatagiventothecognitivefaculty, whichdisclosestheirintelligiblemeaningasdis- tinguishedfromtheirsensibleapprehension.We hearasentencespöken,butitbecomesintelligi- bleforusonlywhenthesoundsfunctionasa foundationfornoeticapprehension. ForPlato,theobjectsofsuchapprehension (noetå)aretheForms(eide)withrespecttowhich thesensiblephenomenaareonlyoccasionsof manifestation:theFormsinthemselvestran- scendthesensibleandhavetheirbeingina realmapart.Forempiricistthinkers,e.g.,Locke, thereisstrictlyspeakingnodistinctnoeticaspect, since"ideas"areonlyfaintsenseimpressions.In aloosersense,however,onemayspeakofideas asindependentofreferencetoparticularsense impressions,i.e.independentoftheirorigin,and thenanideacanbetakentosignifyaclassof objects. Husserlusesthetermtodescribetheinten- tionalityordyadiccharacterofconsciousnessin general,i.e.includingbotheideticorcategorial andperceptualknowing.Hespeaksofthecorre- lationofnoesisorintendingandnoemaorthe intendedobjectofawareness.Thecategorialor eideticistheperceptualobjectasintellectually cognized;itisnotarealmapart,butratherwhat isdisclosedormadepresent("constituted") 617 noeticanalysis non-Euclideangeometry whenthemodeofappearanceoftheperceptual objectisintendedbyacategorialnoesis. Seealsohusserl,nous.F.J.C. noeticanalysis.Seehusserl. noise.Seeinformationtheory. nomic.Seelawlikegeneralization. nomicnecessity.Seelawlikegeneralization. nominaldefinition.Seedefinition. nominalessence.Seeessentialism. nominalism.Seemetaphysicalrealism,prop- ERTY. nominalization.Seestateofaffairs. nominatum.Seeobliquecontext. nomological.Seelawlikegeneralization. nomothetic.Seewindelband. non-action.Seewuwei. noncausaprocausa.Seeinformalfallacy. noncognitivism.Seeemotivism,ethics. non-contradiction,principleof.Seeprincipleof contradiction. non-duplicationprinciple.Seephilosophyof mind. non-embodiment.Seedisembodiment. non-epistemic.Seeperception. non-Euclideangeometry,thoseaxiomatizedver- sionsofgeometryinwhichtheparallelaxiomof Euclideangeometryisrejected,aftersomany unsuccessfuiattemptstoproveit.Asinsomany branchesofmathematics,C.F.Gausshad thoughtoutmuchofthematterfirst,buthekept mostofhisideastohimself.Asaresult,creditis giventoJ.BolyaiandN.Lobachevsky,who workedindependentlyfromthelate1820s. Insteadofassumingthatjustonelinepasses throughapointinaplaneparalleltoanon-coin- cidentcoplanarline,theyofferedageometryin whichalineadmitsmorethanoneparallel,and thesumofthe"angles"betweenthe"sides"ofa "triangle"liesbelow180°.Theninmid-century G.F.B.Riemannconceivedofageometryin whichlinesalwaysmeet(sonoparallels),and thesumofthe"angles"exceeds180°.Inthis connectionhedistinguishedbetweentheun- boundednessofspaceasapropertyofitsextent, andthespecialcaseoftheinfinitemeasureöver whichdistancemightbetaken(whichisdepen- dentuponthecurvatureofthatspace). Pursuingthe(published)insightofGauss,that thecurvatureofasurfacecouldbedefinedin termsonlyofpropertiesdependentsolelyonthe surfaceitself(andlåtercalled"intrinsic"),Rie- mannalsodefinedthemetriconasurfaceina verygeneralandintrinsicway,intermsofthe differentialarelength.Therebyheclarifiedthe ideasof"distance"thathisnon-Euclideanpre- cursorshadintroduced(drawingontrigonomet- ricandhyperbolicfunctions);arelengthwas nowunderstoodgeodesicallyastheshortest "distance"betweentwo"points"onasurface, andwasspecifiedindependentofanyassump- tionsofageometrywithinwhichthesurfacewas embedded.Furtherproperties,suchasthatper- tainingtothe"volume"ofathree-"dimensional" solid,werealsostudied. Thetwomaintypesofnon-Euclideangeome- try,anditsEuclideanparent,maybesumma- rizedasfollows: Discoverer Parallels Curvature Anglesum [Euclidean] One Zero =180° Bolyai, Twoor Negative <180° Lobachevsky more Riemann Zero Positive >180° Reactiontothesegeometrieswasslowto develop,buttheirimpactgraduallyemerged.As mathematics,theirlegitimacywasdoubted;but in1868E.Beltramiproducedamodelofa Bolyai-typetwo-dimensionalspaceinsideapla- narcircle.Theimportanceofthismodelwasto showthattheconsistencyofthisgeometry dependeduponthatoftheEuclideanversion, therebydispellingthefearthatitwasaninconsis- tentflashoftheimagination.Duringthelast thirtyyearsofthenineteenthcenturyavarietyof variantgeometrieswereproposed,andtherela- tionshipsbetweenthemwerestudied,together withconsequencesforprojectivegeometry. Ontheempiricalside,thesegeometries,and especiallyRiemann'sapproach,affectedthe understandingoftherelationshipbetween geometryandspace;inparticular,itposedthe questionwhetherspaceiscurvedornot(thelat- 618 non-monotoniclogic nonviolence terbeingtheEuclideananswer).Thegeometries thusplayedaroleintheemergenceandarticu- lationofrelativitytheory,especiallythedifferen- tialgeometryandtensorialcalculuswithin whichitsmathematicalpropertiescouldbe expressed. Philosophicallythenewgeometriesstressed thehypotheticalnatureofaxiomatizing,incon- trasttothecustomaryviewofmathematicalthe- oriesastrueinsome(usually)unclearsense. Thisfeatureledtothename'metageometry'for them;itwasintended(asanironicalproposalof opponents)tobeinlinewiththehypothetical characterofmetaphysicsinphilosophy.They alsohelpedtoencourageconventionalistphilos- ophyofscience(withPoincaré,e.g.),andput freshlightontheage-oldquestionofthe (im)possibilityofaprioriknowledge. Seealsoeuclideangeometry,philoso- phyOFMATHEMATTCS.I.G.-G. non-monotoniclogic,alogicthatfailstobe monotonic,i.e.,inproof-theoreticterms,failsto meettheconditionthatforallstatementsv,... vn,0,\jf,if'Uj,...vn\-(j)',then,foranyy/,'vr... V,\ff\->'.(Equivalently,letJ^representacollec- tionofstatements,vl...v,andsaythatin monotoniclogic,ifTh0',then,foranyi//,T,y/ \-0'andsimilarlyinothercases.)Anon-mono- toniclogicisanylogicwiththefollowingprop- erty:Forsomer,0,andi//,'-TLML

Gy)and(x)(3y)(z)((FxyvGyz)D Dxyz)areinprenexnormalform.Theformula maycontainfreevariables;thus,(Bx)(y)(FxyzD Gwyx)isalsoinprenexnormalform.Thefol- lowing,however,arenotinprenexnormalform: (x)(3y)(FxDGx);(x)(y)FxyDGxy.Everyfor- mulaofpredicatelogichasanequivalentfor- mulainprenexnormalform. Skokmnormalform.AformulaFinpredicate logicisinSkolemnormalformprovided(1)i7is inprenexnormalform,(2)everyexistential quantifierprecedesanyuniversalquantifier,(3) Fcontainsatleastoneexistentialquantifier,and (4)Fcontainsnofreevariables.Thus,(3x)(3y) (z)(FxyDGyz)and(3x)(3y)(3z)(w)(FxyVFyzV Fzw)areinSkolemnormalform;however,(3x) (y).Fxyzand(x)(y)(FxyVGyx)arenot.Anyfor- mulahasanequivalentSkolemnormalform; thishasimplicationsforthecompletenessof predicatelogic. Seealsocompleteness.V.K. normative.Seedefinist. normativeethics.Seeethics. normativereason.Seereasonsforaction,rea- sonsFORBELIEF. normativerelativism.Seerelativism. 620 notation,logical Nozick,Robert notation,logical.Seelogicalnotation. notion.Seeberkeley. notionalassent.Seenewman. notumperse(Latin,'knownthroughitself), self-evident.Thistermcorrespondsroughlyto theterm'analytic'.InThomistictheology,there aretwowaysforathingtobeself-evident,secun- dumse(initself)andquoadnos(tous).Thepropo- sitionthatGodexistsisself-evidentinitself, becauseGod'sexistenceisidenticalwithhis essence;butitisnotself-evidenttous(humans), becausehumansarenotdirectlyacquaintedwith God'sessence.SeeAquinas'sSummatheologiaeI, q.2,a.l,c.Seealsoanalytic-syntheticdis- TINCTION,AQUINAS,SELF-EVIDENCE. A.RM. noumenalworld.Seekant. noumenon.Seekant. nods,Greektermformindorthefacultyofrea- son.Notisisthehighesttypeofthinking,thekind agodwoulddo.Sometimescalledthefacultyof intellectualintuition,itisatworkwhensome- oneunderstandsdefinitions,concepts,andany- thingelsethatisgraspedallatonce.Notisstånds incontrastwithanotherintellectualfaculty, dianoia.Whenweworkthroughthestepsofan argument,weexercisedianoia;tobecertainthe conclusionistruewithoutargument-tojust "see"it,as,perhaps,agodmight-istoexercise notis.Justwhichobjectscouldbeapprehended bynotiswascontroversial.E.C.H. Novalis,pseudonymofFriedrichvonHarden- berg(1772-1801),Germanpoetandphiloso- pherofearlyGermanRomanticism.Hisstarting pointwasFichte'sreflectivetypeoftranscenden- talphilosophy;heattemptedtocomplement Fichte'sfocusonphilosophicalspeculationby includingotherformsofintellectualexperience suchasfaith,love,poetry,andreligion,and exhibittheirequallyautonomousstatusofexis- tence.Ofspecialimportanceinthisregardishis analysisoftheimaginationincontrasttoreason, ofthepoeticpowerindistinctionfromtherea- sonablefaculties.Novalisinsistsonacomple- mentaryinteractionbetweenthesetwospheres, onaunionofphilosophyandpoetry.Another importantaspectofhisspeculationconcemsthe relationbetweentheinnerandtheouterworld, subjectandobject,thehumanbeingandnature. Novalisattemptedtorevealthecorrespondence, evenunitybetweenthesetworealmsandtopre- senttheworldasa"universaltrope"ora"sym- bolicimage"ofthehumanmindandviceversa. Heexpressedhisphilosophicalthoughtmostlyin fragments.Seealsofichte.E.Beh. Nozick,Robert(b.1938),Americanphilosopher currentlyatHarvardUniversity,bestknownfor Anarchy,State,andUtopia(1974),whichdefends thelibertarianpositionthatonlyaminimalstate (limitedtoprotectingrights)isjust.Nozick arguesthataminimalstate,butnotamore extensivestate,couldarisewithoutviolating rights.DrawingonKanfsdictumthatpeople maynotbeusedasmeremeans,Nozicksaysthat people'srightsareinviolable,nomatterhow usefulviolationsmightbetothestate.Hecriti- cizesprinciplesofredistributivejusticeonwhich theoristsbasedefensesofextensivestates,such astheprincipleofutility,andRawls'sprinciple thatgoodsshouldbedistributedinfavörof theleastwell-off.Enforcingtheseprinciples requireseliminatingthecumulativeeffectsof freeexchanges,whichviolates(permanent,be- queathable)propertyrights.Nozick'sownenti- tlementtheorysaysthatadistributionof holdingsisjustifpeopleunderthatdistribution areentitledtowhattheyhold.Entitlements,in turn,wouldbeclarifiedusingprinciplesofjustice inacquisition,transfer,andrectification. Nozick'sotherworksincludePhilosophical Explanations(1981),TheExaminedLife(1989), TheNatureofRationality(1993),andSocraticPuz- zles(1997).Thesearecontributionstorational choicetheory,epistemology,metaphysics,phi- losophyofmind,philosophyofreligion,and ethics.PhilosophicalExplanationsfeaturestwo especiallyimportantcontributions.Thefirstis Nozick's(reliabilist,causal)viewthatbeliefsthat constituteknowledgemusttrackthetruth.My beliefthat(say)acatisonthemattracksthe truthonlyif(a)Iwouldnotbelievethisifacat werenotonthemat,and(b)Iwouldbelievethis ifacatwerethere.Thetrackingaccountposi- tionsNozicktorejecttheprinciplethatpeople knowallofthethingstheybelieveviadeduc- tionsfromthingstheyknow,andtorejectver- sionsofskepticismbasedonthisprincipleof closure.ThesecondisNozick'sclosestcontinuer theoryofidentity,accordingtowhichA'siden- tityatalåtertimecandependonfactsabout otherexistingthings,foritdependson(1)what continuesAcloselyenoughtobeAand(2)what 621 n-tuple Nussbaum,MarthaC(raven) continuesAmorecloselythananyotherexisting thing.Nozick's1969essay"Newcomb'sProblem andTwoPrinciplesofChoice"isanotherimpor- tantcontribution.ItisthefirstdiscussionofNew- comb'sproblem,aproblemindecisiontheory, andpresentsmanypositionsprominentinsub- sequentdebate. Seealsoclosure,newcomb'sparadox, POLITICALPHILOSOPHY,RAWLS.S.L. n-tuple.Seesettheory. nullclass.Seesettheory. nullrelation.Seerelation. number.Seemathematicalanalysis,philosophy OFMATHEMATICS,qualities. number,natural.Seemathematicalanalysis, mathematicalinduction. number,rational.Seemathematicalanalysis. number,real.Seemathematicalanalysis. number,transcendental.Seemathematicalanaly- sis. numbers,lawofIarge.Seebernoulli'stheorem. numbertheory.Seephilosophyofmathematics. NumeniusofApamea(fl.mid-secondcentury a.d.),GreekPlatonistphilosopherofneo- Pythagoreantendencies.Verylittleisknownof hislifeapartfromhisresidenceinApamea, Syria,buthisphilosophicalimportanceiscon- siderable.Hissystemofthreelevelsofspiritual reality-aprimalgod(theGood,theFather), whoisalmostsupra-intellectual;asecondary, creatorgod(thedemiurgeofPlato'sTimaeus); andaworldsoul-largelyanticipatesthatof Plotinusinthenextcentury,thoughhewas morestronglydualistthanPlotinusinhisatti- tudetothephysicalworldandmatter.Hewas muchinterestedinthewisdomoftheEast,and incomparativereligion.Hismostimportant work,fragmentsofwhicharepreservedbyEuse- bius,isadialogueOntheGood,buthealsowrote apolemicworkOntheDivergenceoftheAcademics fromPlato,whichshowshimtobealivelycon- troversialist.J.M.D. numericalidentity.Seeidentity. nungchia.Seehsuhsing. Nussbaum,MarthaC(raven)(b.1947),American philosopher,classicist,andpublicintellectual withinfluentialviewsonthehumangood,the emotionsandtheirplaceinpracticalreasoning, andtherightsofwomenandhomosexuals.After trainingatHarvardinclassicalphilology,she publishedacriticaledition,withtranslationand commentary,ofAristotle'sMotionofAnimals (1978).Itsessaysformulatedideasthatshehas continuedtoarticulate:thatperceptionistrain- able,imaginationinterpretive,anddesirea reachingoutforthegood.Viaprovocativeread- ingsofPlato,Aristotle,Aeschylus,Sophocles, andEuripides,TheFragilityofGoodness(1986) arguesthatmanytruegoodssuccumbtofortune, lackanycommonmeasure,anddemandfine- tuneddiscernment.TheessaysinLove'sKnowl- edge(1990)-onProust,Dickens,Beckett,Henry James,andothers-exploretheemotionalimpli- cationsofourfragilityandtheparticularismof practicalreasoning.Theyalsoundertakeabrief againstPlato'sancientcriticismofthepoets,an argumentthatNussbaumcarriedonyearslåter indebateswithJudgeRichardPosner.TheTher- apyofDesire(1994)dissectstheStoics'conviction thatourvulnerabilitycallsforphilosophical therapytoextirpatetheemotions.WhileNuss- baumholdsthattheStoicsweremistakenabout thegood,shehasadoptedandstrengthened theirviewthatemotionsembodyjudgments- mostnotablyinherGiffordLecturesof1993, UpheavalsofThought. AturningpointinNussbaum'scareercamein 1987,whenshebecameapart-timeresearch adviserattheUnitedNations-sponsoredWorld InstituteforDevelopmentEconomicsResearch. ShethereadaptedherAristotelianaccountof thehumangoodtohelpgroundthe"capabilities approach"thattheeconomistandphilosopher AmartyaSenwasdevelopingforpolicymakers touseinassessingindividuals'well-being. Nussbaumspellsoutthehumancapabilities essentialtoleadingagoodlife,integratingthem withinanuancedliberalismofuniversalist appeal.Thisviewhasramified:PoeticJustice (1996)arguesthatitslegalrealizationmust avoidtheoversimplificationsthatutilitarianism andeconomicsencourageandinsteadbalance generalitywithemotionallysensitiveimagina- tion.SexandSocialJustice(1998)exploresher view'simplicationsforproblemsofsexual inequality,gayrights,andsexualobjectification. FeministInternationalism,her1998SeeleyLec- 622 Nyaya-Vaishesika Nyaya-Vaishesika tures,arguesthataneffectiveinternationalfem- inismmustchampionrights,eschewrelativism, andstudylocaltraditionssufficientlycloselyto seetheirdiversity. Seealsoaesthetics,aristotle,emo- tion,PRACTICALREASONING,VIRTUE ETHICS.H.S.R. Nyäya-Vaishesika,oneoftheorthodoxschoolsof Hinduism.Itholdsthatearth,air,fire,andwater arethefourtypesofatoms.Spaceisasubstance andacontainerofatoms.Theatomsareever- lastingandetemal,thoughtheircombinations areneither.Propertiesofcomplexesare explainedintermsofthepropertiesoftheircom- ponents.Thereareemergentpropertiesthecau- sationofwhichdoesnotrequirethatsomething comefromnothing;oneneedonlygrantbrute causalconnections. Nyäyaisamonotheisticperspectiveand NyäyaphilosopherUdanawroteatext-Kus- mänjali('TheHandfulofFlowers")-innatural theology;thistenth-centuryworkisanIndian classiconthesubject.Inadditiontomaterial thingscomposedofatoms,thereareimmaterial persons.Eachpersonisanenduring,substantial selfwhosenatureistobeconsciousandwhois capableofloveandaversion,offeelingpleasure andpain,andofmakingchoices;selvesdiffer fromoneanotherevenwhennotembodiedby virtueofbeingdifferentcentersofconsciousness, notmerelyintermsofhavinghaddiversetrans- migratorybiographies.Nyäya-Vaishesikaisthe HinduschoolmostlikeAnglo-Americanphilos- ophy,asevidencedinitsstudiesofinferenceand perception. Seealsohinduism.K.E.Y. 623 Oakeshott,Michael(1900-91),Britishphiloso- pherandpoliticaltheoristtrainedatCambridge andinGermany.HetaughtfirstatCambridge andOxford;from1951hewasprofessorofpolit- icalscienceattheLondonSchoolofEconomics andPoliticalScience.HisworksincludeExperi- enceandItsModes(1933),RationalisminPolitics (1962),OnHumanConduct(1975),andOnHistory (1983). Oakeshotfsmisleadinggeneralreputation, basedonRationalisminPolitics,isasaconserva- tivepoliticalthinker.ExperienceandItsModesisa systematicworkinthetraditionofHegel.Hu- manexperienceisexclusivelyofaworldofideas intelligibleinsofarasitiscoherent.Thisworld dividesintomodes(historical,scientific,practi- cal,andpoeticexperience),eachbeingpartly coherentandcategoriallydistinctfromallothers. Philosophyistheneverentirelysuccessful attempttoarticulatethecoherenceoftheworld ofideasandtheplaceofmodallyspecificexperi- encewithinthatwhole. Hislåterworksexaminethepostulatesofhis- toricalandpracticalexperience,particularly thoseofreligion,morality,andpolitics.Allcon- ductinthepracticalmodepostulatesfreedom andisan"exhibitionofintelligence"byagents whoappropriateinheritedlanguagesandideas tothegenericactivityofself-enactment.Some conductpursuesspecificpurposesandoccursin "enterpriseassociations"identifiedbygoals sharedamongthosewhoparticipateinthem. Themostestimableformsofconduct,exempli- fiedby"conversafion,"havenosuchpurpose andoccurin''civilsocieties"underthepurely "adverbial"considerationsofmoralityandlaw. "Rationalists"illicitlyusephilosophytodictateto practicalexperienceandsubordinatehuman conducttosomemasterpurpose.Oakeshotfs distinctiveachievementistohavemeldedholis- ticidealismwithamoralityandpoliticsradicalin theiraffirmationofindividuality. Seealsopoliticaltheory.R.E.F. obiectumquo(Latin,'objectbywhich'),in medievalandScholasticepistemology,theobject bywhichanobjectisknown.Itshouldbeunder- stoodincontrastwithobiectumquod,whichrefers totheobjectthatisknown.Forexample,when apersonknowswhatanäppleis,theäppleisthe obiectumquodandhisconceptoftheäppleisthe obiectumquo.Thatis,theconceptisinstrumental toknowingtheäpple,butisnotitselfwhatis known.Humanbeingsneedconceptsinorderto haveknowledge,becausetheirknowledgeis receptive,incontrastwithGod'swhichispro- ductive.(Godcreateswhatheknows.)Human knowledgeismediated;divineknowledgeis immediate. Scholasticphilosophersbelievethatthedis- tinctionbetweenobiectumquodandobiectumquo exposesthecrucialmistakeofidealism.Accord- ingtoidealists,theobjectofknowledge,i.e., whatapersonknows,isanidea.Incontrast,the Scholasticsmaintainthatidealistsconflatethe objectofknowledgewiththemeansbywhich humanknowledgeismadepossible.Humans mustbeconnectedtotheobjectofknowledgeby something(obiectumquo),butwhatconnects themisnotthattowhichtheyareconnected. A.P.M. object,intentional.SeeBRENTANo. object,propositional.Seeproposition. objectivebody.Seeembodiment. objectiveprobability.Seeprobability. objectivereality.Seedescartes,reality. objectivereason.Seereasonsforaction. objectiverightness.Inethics,anactionisobjec- tivelyrightforapersontoperform(onsome occasion)iftheagenfsperformingit(onthat occasion)reallyisright,whetherornotthe agent,oranyoneelse,believesitis.Anactionis subjectivelyrightforapersontoperform(onsome occasion)iftheagentbelieves,orperhapsjusti- fiablybelieves,ofthatactionthatitis(objec- tively)right.Forexample,accordingtoaversion ofutilitarianism,anactionisobjectivelyright providedtheactionisoptimificinthesensethat theconsequencesthatwouldresultfromitsper- 624 objectivism obliquecontext formanceareatleastasgoodasthosethatwould resultfromanyalternativeactiontheagent couldinsteadperform.Werethistheorycorrect, thenanactionwouldbeanobjectivelyright actionforanagenttoperform(onsomeocca- sion)ifandonlyifthatactionisinfactoptimific. Anactioncanbebothobjectivelyandsubjec- tivelyrightorneither.Butanactioncanalsobe subjectivelyright,butfailtobeobjectivelyright, aswheretheactionfailstobeoptimific(again assumingthatautilitariantheoryiscorrect),yet theagentbelievestheactionisobjectivelyright. Andanactioncanbeobjectivelyrightbutnot subjectivelyright,where,despitetheobjective rightnessoftheaction,theagenthasnobeliefs aboutitsrightnessorbelievesfalselythatitisnot objectivelyright. Thisdistinctionisimportantinourmoral assessmentsofagentsandtheiractions.Incases wherewejudgeaperson'sactiontobeobjec- tivelywrong,weoftenmitigateourjudgmentof theagentwhenwejudgethattheactionwas,for theagent,subjectivelyright.Thissameobjec- tive-subjectivedistinctionappliestootherethi- calcategoriessuchaswrongnessandobliga- toriness,andsomephilosophersextenditto itemsotherthanactions,e.g.,emotions. Seealsoethicalobjectivism,subjec- TIVISM,UTILITARIANISM.M.C.T. objectivism.Seeethicalobjectivism. objectIanguage.Seemetalanguage. objectualquantification.Seequantification. obligatingreason.Seereasonsforaction. obligation.Seedeonticlogic,ethics. obligation,political.Seepoliticalphilosophy. obligationes,thestudyofinferentiallyin- escapable,yetlogicallyoddarguments,usedby latemedievallogiciansinanalyzinginferential reasoning.InTopicsVIII.3Aristotledescribesa respondenfstaskinaphilosophicalargumentas providinganswerssothat,iftheymustdefend theimpossible,theimpossibilityliesinthe natureoftheposition,andnotinitslogical defense.InPriorAnalytics1.13Aristotleargues thatnothingimpossiblefollowsfromthepossi- ble.Burley,whoselogicexemplifiesearlyfour- teenth-centuryobligationesliterature,described theresultinglogicalexerciseasacontest betweeninterlocutorandrespondent.Theinter- locutormustforcetherespondentintomain- tainingcontradictorystatementsindefendinga position,andtherespondentmustavoidthis whileavoidingmaintainingtheimpossible, whichcanbeeitherapositionlogicallyincom- patiblewiththepositiondefendedorsomething impossibleinitself.Especiallyinterestingto Scholasticlogiciansweretheparadoxesofdis- putationinherentinsuchdisputes.Assuming thatarespondenthassuccessfullydefendedhis position,theinterlocutormaybeabletopropose acommonplacepositionthattherespondentcan neitheracceptnorreject,giventhetruthofthe first,successfullydefendedposition. RogerSwinesheadintroducedacontroversial innovationtoobligationesreasoning,låterre- jectedbyPaulofVenice.Inthetraditionalstyle ofobligation,apremisewasrelevanttotheargu- mentonlyifitfollowedfromorwasinconsistent witheither(a)thepropositiondefendedor(b) allthepremisesconsequenttotheformerand priortothepremiseinquestion.Byadmitting anypremisethatwaseitherconsequenttoor inconsistentwiththepropositiondefended alone,withoutregardtointermediatepremises, Swinesheadeliminatedconcernwiththeorder ofsentencesproposedbytheinterlocutor,mak- ingtherespondenfstaskharder. Seealsoaristotle,burley,kilvington, OXFORDCALCULATORS,PAULOFVENICE. S.E.L. obliquecontext.AsexplainedbyFregein"Uber SinnundBedeutung"(1892),alinguisticcontext isoblique(ungerade)ifandonlyifanexpression (e.g.,propername,dependentclause,orsen- tence)inthatcontextdoesnotexpressitsdirect (customary)sense.ForFrege,thesenseofanex- pressionisthemodeofpresentationofitsnomi- natum,ifany.Thusindirectspeech,thedirect (customary)senseofanexpressiondesignatesits direct(customary)nominatum.Forexample,the contextofthepropername'Kepler'in (1)Keplerdiedinmisery. isnon-oblique(i.e.,direct)sincetheproper nameexpressesitsdirect(customary)sense,say, thesenseof'themanwhodiscoveredtheellip- ticalplanetaryorbits',therebydesignatingits direct(customary)nominatum,Keplerhimself. Moreover,theentiresentenceexpressesitsdirect sense,namely,thepropositionthatKeplerdied inmisery,therebydesignatingitsdirectnomina- tum,atruth-value,namely,thetrue.Bycontrast, 625 obliqueintention occasionalism inindirectspeechanexpressionneither expressesitsdirectsensenor,therefore,desig- natesitsdirectnominatum.Onesuchsortof obliquecontextisdirectquotation,asin (2)'Kepler'hassixletters. Thewordappearingwithinthequotationmarks neitherexpressesitsdirect(customary)sense nor,therefore,designatesitsdirect(customary) nominatum,Kepler.Rather,itdesignatesaword, apropername.Anothersortofobliquecontext isengenderedbytheverbsofpropositionalatti- tude.Thus,thecontextofthepropername 'Kepler'in (3)FregebelievedKeplerdiedinmisery. isoblique,sincethepropernameexpressesits indirectsense,say,thesenseofthewords'the manwidelyknownasKepler',therebydesignat- ingitsindirectnominatum,namely,thesenseof 'themanwhodiscoveredtheellipticalplanetary orbits'.Notethattheindirectnominatumof 'Kepler'in(3)isthesameasthedirectsenseof 'Kepler'in(1).Thus,while'Kepler'in(1)desig- natesthemanKepler,'Kepler'in(3)designates thedirect(customary)senseoftheword'Kepler' in(f).Similarly,in(3)thecontextofthedepen- dentclause'Keplerdiedinmisery'isoblique sincethedependentclauseexpressesitsindirect sense,namely,thesenseofthewords'thepropo- sitionthatKeplerdiedinmisery',therebydesig- natingitsindirectnominatum,namely,the propositionthatKeplerdiedinmisery.Notethat theindirectnominatumof'Keplerdiedinmis- ery'in(3)isthesameasthedirectsenseof 'Keplerdiedinmisery'in(1).Thus,while 'Keplerdiedinmisery'in(1)designatesatruth- value,'Keplerdiedinmisery'in(3)designatesa proposition,thedirect(customary)senseofthe words'Keplerdiedinmisery'in(1). Seealsoindirectdiscourse,meaning, QUANTIFYINGIN.R.F.G. obliqueintention.Seeintention. observation.Seephilosophyofscience. observationlanguage.Seeincommensurability. observationsentence.Seephilosophyofscience. observationterm.Seephilosophyofscience. obversion,asortofimmediateinferencethat allowsatransformationofaffirmativecategorical A-propositionsandI-propositionsintothecorre- spondingnegativeE-propositionsandO-propo- sitions,andofE-andO-propositionsintothe correspondingA-andI-propositions,keepingin eachcasetheorderofthesubjectandpredicate terms,butchangingtheoriginalpredicateintoits complement,i.e.,intoanegatedterm.For example,'Everymanismortal'-'Nomanis non-mortal';'Somestudentsarehappy'-'Some studentsarenotnon-happy';'Nodögsarejeal- ous'-'Alldögsarenon-jealous';and'Some bankersarenotrich'-'Somebankersarenot non-rich'.Seealsosquareofopposition, SYLLOGISM.I.BO. obviousness.Seeself-evidence. Occam,William.Seeockham. occasionalism,atheoryofcausationheldbya numberofimportantseventeenth-centuryCar- tesianphilosophers,includingJohannesClau- berg(1622-65),GérauddeCordemoy(1626- 84),ArnoldGeulincx(1624-69),Louisdela Forge(1632-66),andNicolasMalebranche (1638-1715).Initsmostextremeversion,occa- sionalismisthedoctrinethatallfinitecreated entitiesaredevoidofcausalefficacy,andthat Godistheonlytruecausalagent.Bodiesdonot causeeffectsinotherbodiesnorinminds;and mindsdonotcauseeffectsinbodiesnoreven withinthemselves.Godisdirectly,immediately, andsolelyresponsibleforbringingaboutallphe- nomena.Whenaneedleprickstheskin,the physicaleventismerelyanoccasionforGodto causetherelevantmentalstate(pain);avolition inthesoultoraiseanarmortothinkofsome- thingisonlyanoccasionforGodtocausethe armtoriseortheideastobepresenttothemind; andtheimpactofonebilliardballuponanother isanoccasionforGodtomovethesecondball. Inallthreecontexts-mind-body,body-body, andmindalone-God'subiquitouscausalactiv- ityproceedsinaccordancewithcertaingeneral laws,and(exceptformiracles)heactsonlywhen therequisitematerialorpsychicconditions obtain.Lessthoroughgoingformsofoccasional- ismlimitdivinecausation(e.g.,tomind-bodyor body-bodyalone).Farfrombeinganadhoc solutiontoaCartesianmind-bodyproblem,asit isoftenconsidered,occasionalismisarguedfor fromgeneralphilosophicalconsiderationsre- gardingthenatureofcausalrelations(consider- ationsthatlåterappear,modified,inHume), fromananalysisoftheCartesianconceptofmat- 626 occurrent Ockham,William terandofthenecessaryimpotenceoffinitesub- stance,and,perhapsmostimportantly,fromthe- ologicalpremisesabouttheessentialontological relationbetweenanomnipotentGodandthe createdworldthathesustainsinexistence.Occa- sionalismcanalsoberegardedasawayof providingametaphysicalfoundationforexpla- nationsinmechanisticnaturalphilosophy.Occa- sionalistsarearguingthatmotionmustulti- matelybegroundedinsomethinghigherthan thepassive,inertextensionofCartesianbodies (emptiedofthesubstantialformsoftheScholas- tics);itneedsacausalgroundinanactivepower. Butifabodyconsistsinextensionalone,motive forcecannotbeaninherentpropertyofbodies. Occasionaliststhusidentifyforcewiththewillof God.Inthisway,theyaresimplydrawingoutthe implicationsofDescartes'sownmetaphysicsof matterandmotion.Seealsocordemoy, GEULINCX,LEIBNIZ,MALEBRANCHE.S.N. occurrent.Seedisposition. occurrentbelief.Seebelief. occurrentmemory.Seememory. occurrentstate.Seestate. Ockham,William(c.1285-1347),alsowritten WilliamOccam,knownastheMorethanSubtle Doctor,EnglishScholasticphilosopherknown equallyasthefatherofnominalismandforhis roleintheFranciscandisputewithPopeJohn XXIIöverpoverty.Bornprobablyinthevillageof OckhamnearLondon,WilliamOckhamentered theFranciscanorderatanearlyageandstudied atOxford,attainingtherankofbaccalariusforma- tus.Hisbrilliantbutcontroversialcareerwascut shortwhenJohnLutterell,formerchancellorof OxfordUniversity,presentedthepopewithalist offifty-sixallegedlyhereticalthesesextracted fromOckham'swritings.Thepapalcommission studiedthemfortwoyearsandfoundfifty-one opentocensure,butnonewasformallycon- demned.WhileinAvignon,Ockhamresearched previouspapalconcessionstotheFranciscans regardingcollectivepoverty,eventuallyconclud- ingthatJohnXXIIcontradictedhispredecessors andhencewas"notruepope."Aftercommitting thesechargestowriting,OckhamHedwith MichaelofCesena,thenministergeneralofthe order,firsttoPisaandultimatelytoMunich, whereheliveduntilhisdeath,writingmany treatisesaboutchurch-staterelations.Although departuresfromhiseminentpredecessorshave combinedwithecclesiasticaldifficultiestomake Ockhamunjustlynotorious,histhought remains,bycurrentlights,philosophicallyand theologicallyconservative. Onmostmetaphysicalissues,Ockhamfancied himselfthetrueinterpreterofAristotle.Reject- ingthedoctrinethatuniversalsarerealthings otherthannamesorconceptsas"theworsterror ofphilosophy,"OckhamdismissednotonlyPla- tonism,butalso"modernrealist"doctrines accordingtowhichnaturesenjoyadoublemode ofexistenceandareuniversalintheintellectbut numericallymultipliedinparticulars.Heargues thateverythingrealisindividualandparticular, whileuniversalityisapropertypertainingonly tonamesandthatbyvirtueoftheirsignification relations.BecauseOckhamunderstandsthepri- marynamestobemental(i.e.,naturallysignifi- cantconcepts),hisowntheoryofuniversalsis bestclassifiedasaformofconceptualism. Ockhamrejectsatomism,anddefendsAris- totelianhylomorphisminphysicsandmeta- physics,completewithitsdistinctionbetween substantialandaccidentalforms.Yet,heopposes thereifyingtendencyofthe"moderns"(un- namedcontemporaryopponents),whopositeda distinctkindofthing(res)foreachofAristotle's tencategories;hearguesthat-fromapurely philosophicalpointofview-itisindefensibleto positanythingbesidesparticularsubstancesand qualities.OckhamfollowedtheFranciscan schoolinrecognizingapluralityofsubstantial formsinlivingthings(inhumans,theformsof corporeity,sensorysoul,andintellectualsoul), butdivergedfromDunsScotusinassertinga real,notaformål,distinctionamongthem. Aristotlehadreachedbehindregularcorrela- tionsinnaturetopositsubstance-thingsandacci- dent-thingsasprimitiveexplanatoryentitiesthat essentiallyareorgiverisetopowers(virtus)that producetheregularities;similarly,Ockhamdis- tinguishesefficientcausalityproperlyspeaking fromsinequanoncausality,dependingon whetherthecorrelationbetweenA'sandB'sis producedbythepowerofAorbythewillof another,andexplicitlydeniestheexistenceof anysinequanoncausationinnature.Further, Ockhaminsists,inAristotelianfashion,thatcre- atedsubstance-andaccident-naturesareessen- tiallythecausalpowerstheyareinandof themselvesandhenceindependentlyoftheir relationstoanythingelse;sothatnotevenGod canmakeheatnaturallyacoolant.Yet,ifGod cannotchange,Heshareswithcreatedthingsthe 627 Ockham,William Ockham,William abilitytoobstructsuch"Aristotelian"productive powersandpreventtheirnormaloperation. Ockham'snominalisticconceptualismaboutuni- versalsdoesnotkeephimfromendorsingthe uniformityofnatureprinciple,becauseheholds thatindividualnaturesarepowersandhence thatco-specificthingsaremaximallysimilar powers.Likewise,heisconventionalinappeal- ingtoseveralotheraprioricausalprinciples: "Everythingthatisinmotionismovedbysome- thing,""Beingcannotcomefromnon-being/' "Whateverisproducedbysomethingisreally conservedbysomethingaslongasitexists."He evenrecognizesakindofnecessaryconnection betweencreatedcausesandeffects-e.g.,while Godcouldactalonetoproduceanycreated effect,aparticularcreatedeffectcouldnothave hadanothercreatedcauseofthesamespecies instead.Ockham'smaininnovationonthetopic ofcausalityishisattackonDunsScotus'sdistinc- tionbetween"essential"and"accidental"orders andcontrarycontentionthateverygenuineeffi- cientcauseisanimmediatecauseofitseffects. OckhamisanAristotelianreliabilistinepiste- mology,takingforgrantedashedoesthat humancognitivefaculties(thesensesandintel- lect)workalwaysorforthemostpart.Ockham infersthatsincewehavecertainknowledgeboth ofmaterialthingsandofourownmentalacts, theremustbesomedistinctivespeciesofactsof awareness(intuitivecognitions)thatarethe powertoproducesuchevidentjudgments.Ock- hamismatter-of-factbothaboutthedisruption ofhumancognitivefunctionsbycreatedobsta- cles(asinsensoryillusion)andaboutdivine powertointerveneinmanyways.Suchfacts carrynoskepticalconsequencesforOckham, becausehedefinescertaintyintermsoffreedom fromactualdoubtanderror,notfromthelogical, metaphysical,ornaturalpossibilityoferror. Inactiontheory,Ockhamdefendstheliberty ofindifferenceorcontingencyforallrational beings,createdordivine.OckhamsharesDuns Scotus'sunderstandingofthewillasaself-deter- miningpowerforopposites,butnothisdistaste forcausalmodels.Thus,Ockhamallowsthat(1) unfreeactsofwillmaybenecessitated,eitherby theagenfsownnature,byitsotheracts,orby anexternalcause;andthat(2)theefficient causesoffreeactsmayincludetheagenfsintel- lectualandsensorycognitionsaswellasthewill itself.Whilerecognizinginnatemotivational tendenciesinthehumanagent-e.g.,theincli- nationtoseeksensorypleasureandavoidpain, theaffectiocommodi(tendencytoseekitsown advantage),andtheaffectioiustitiae(inclination tolovethingsfortheirownintrinsicworth)-he deniesthattheselimitthewill'sscope.Thus, OckhamgoesbeyondDunsScotusinassigning thewillthepower,withrespecttoanyoption, towillforit(velie),towillagainstit(nolle),or nottoactatall.Inparticular,Ockhamconcludes thatthewillcanwillagainst(nolle)thegood, whetherignorantlyorperversely-byhating Godorbywillingagainstitsownhappiness,the good-in-general,theenjoymentofaclearvision ofGod,oritsownultimateend.Thewillcanalso will(velie)evils-theoppositeofwhatrightrea- sondictates,unjustdeedsquaunjust,dishonest, andcontrarytorightreason,andevilunderthe aspectofevil. Ockhamenforcesthetraditionaldivisionof moralscienceintonon-positivemoralityor ethics,whichdirectsactsapartfromanyprecept ofasuperiorauthorityanddrawsitsprinciples fromreasonandexperience;andpositivemoral- ity,whichdealswithlawsthatobligeustopursue oravoidthings,notbecausetheyaregoodorevil inthemselves,butbecausesomelegitimatesupe- riorcommandsthem.ThenotionthatOckham sponsorsanunmodifieddivinecommandtheory ofethicsrestsonconflationandconfusion. Rather,intheareaofnon-positivemorality, Ockhamadvanceswhatwemightlabela"modi- fiedrightreasontheory,"whichbeginswiththe Aristotelianidealofrationalself-government, accordingtowhichmorallyvirtuousaction involvestheagenfsfreecoordinationofchoice withrightreason.Hethenobservesthatsuitably informedrightreasonwoulddictatethatGod,as theinfinitegood,oughttobelovedabovealland forhisownsake,andthatsuchloveoughttobe expressedbytheefforttopleasehimineveryway (amongotherthings,byobeyingallhiscom- mands).Thus,ifrightreasonistheprimarynorm inethics,divinecommandsareasecondary, derivativenorm.Onceagain,Ockhamisutterly unconcernedaboutthelogicalpossibilityopened bydivinelibertyofindifference,thatthesetwin normsmightconflict(say,ifGodcommandedus toactcontrarytorightreason);forhim,theirde factocongruencesufficesforthemorallife.Inthe areaofsoteriologicalmeritanddemerit(abranch ofpositivemorality),thingsaretheotherway around:divinewillistheprimarynorm;yet becauseGodincludesfollowingthedictatesof rightreasonamongthecriteriafordivineaccep- tance(therebygivingthemorallifeeternalsig- nificance),rightreasonbecomesasecondaryand derivativenormthere. Seealsoaristotle,divinecommand ETHICS,DUNSSCOTUS.M.M.A. 628 Ockham'srazor omega Ockham'srazor,alsocalledtheprincipleofpar- simony,amethodologicalprinciplecommending abiastowardsimplicityintheconstructionof theories.Theparameterswhosesimplicityissin- gledoutforattentionhavevariedconsiderably, fromkindsofentitiestothenumberofpresup- posedaxiomstothenatureofthecurvedrawn betweendatapoints.FoundalreadyinAristotle, thetag"entitiesshouldnotbemultipliedbeyond necessity"becameassociatedwithWilliamOck- ham(althoughheneverstatesthatversion,and evenifnon-contradictionratherthanparsimony ishisfavoriteweaponinmetaphysicaldisputes), perhapsbecauseitcharacterizedthespiritofhis philosophicalconclusions.Opponents,who thoughtparsimonywasbeingcarriedtoofar,for- mulatedan"anti-razor":wherefewerentitiesdo notsuffice,positmorelSeealsocurve-fitting PROBLEM,OCKHAM.M.M.A. oligarchy.Seepoliticalphilosophy. Olivi,PeterJohn(c.1247-98),Frenchphiloso- pher-theologianwhoseviewsonthetheoryand practiceofFranciscanpovertyledtoalongseries ofinvestigationsofhisorthodoxy.Olivi'sprefer- enceforhumility,aswellasthesuspicionwith whichhewasregarded,preventedhisbecoming amasteroftheologyatParis.After1285,hewas effectivelyvindicatedandpermittedtoteachat FlorenceandMontpellier.Butafterhisdeath, probablyinpartbecausehisremainswereven- eratedandhisviewswerechampionedbythe FranciscanSpirituals,hisorthodoxywasagain examined.TheCouncilofVienne(1311-12) condemnedthreeunrelatedtenetsassociated withOlivi.Finally,in1326,PopeJohnXXIIcon- demnedaseriesofstatementsbasedonOlivi's Apocalypsecommentary. Olivithoughtofhimselfchieflyasatheolo- gian,writingcopiousbiblicalcommentaries;his philosophyofhistorywasinfluencedbyJoachim ofFiore.Hisviewsonpovertyinspiredtheleader oftheFranciscanObservantreformmovement, St.BernardinoofSiena.Apartfromhisviewson poverty,Oliviisbestknownforhisphilosophical independencefromAristotle,whomhecon- demnedasamaterialist.ContrarytoAristotle's theoryofprojectilemotion,Oliviadvocateda theoryofimpetus.Heunderminedorthodox viewsonAristoteliancategories.Hisattackon thecategoryofrelationwasthoughttohave dangerousimplicationsinTrinitariantheology. Ockham'stheoryofquantityisinpartadefense ofviewspresentedbyOlivi.Oliviwascriticalof AugustinianaswellasAristotelianviews;he abandonedthetheoriesofseminalreasonand divineillumination.Healsoarguedagainstposit- ingimpressedsensibleandintelligiblespecies, claimingthatonlythesoul,notperceptual objects,playedanactiveroleinperception.Böld ashisphilosophicalviewswere,hepresented themtentatively. Avoluntarist,heemphasizedtheimportance ofwill.Heclaimedthatanactofunderstanding wasnotpossibleintheabsenceofanactofwill. Heprovidedanimportantexperientialargument forthefreedomofthewill. Histreatisesoncontractsrevealedasophisti- catedunderstandingofeconomics.Histreatise onevangelicalpovertyincludesthefirstdefense ofatheoryofpapalinfallibility.R.W. Olympiodorus.Seeneoplatonism. omega,thelastletteroftheGreekalphabet(m). FollowingCantor(1845-1911),itisusedinlow- ercaseasapropernameforthefirstinfiniteordi- nalnumber,whichistheordinalofthenatural orderingofthesetoffiniteordinals.Byextension itisalsousedasapropernameforthesetoffinite ordinalsitselforevenforthesetofnaturalnum- bers.FollowingGödel(1906-78),itisusedasa prefixinnamesofvariouslogicalpropertiesof setsofsentences,mostnotablyomega-complete- nessandomega-consistency. Omega-completeness,intheoriginalsensedueto Tarski,isasyntacticalpropertyofsetsofsen- tencesinaformålarithmeticlanguageinvolving asymbol'0'forthenumberzeroandasymbolV fortheso-calledsuccessorfunction,resultingin eachnaturalnumberbeingnamedbyanexpres- sion,calledanumeral,inthefollowingseries:'0', 's0','ssO',andsoon.Forexample,fiveisdenoted by'sssssO'.Asetofsentencesissaidtobeomega- completeifit(deductively)yieldseveryuniversal sentenceallofwhosesingularinstancesityields. Inthisframework,asusual,everyuniversalsen- tence,'foreveryn,nhasP'yieldseachandevery oneofitssingularinstances,'0hasP','s0hasP', 'ssOhasP',etc.However,ashadbeenknownby logiciansatleastsincetheMiddleAges,thecon- verseisnottrue,i.e.,itisnotingeneralthecase thatauniversalsentenceisdeduciblefromtheset ofitssingularinstances.Thusoneshouldnot expecttofindomega-completenessexceptin exceptionalsets.Thesetofalltruesentencesof arithmeticissuchanexceptionalset;thereason isthesemanticfactthateveryuniversalsentence (whetherornotinarithmetic)ismaterially equivalenttothesetofallitssingularinstances.A setofsentencesthatisnotomega-completeis 629 omega,ordertype oneövermany saidtobeomega-incomplete.Theexistenceof omega-incompletesetsofsentencesisaphenom- enonatthecoreofthe1931Gödelincomplete- nessresult,whichshowsthatevery"effective" axiomsetforarithmeticisomega-incomplete andthushasastheoremsallsingularinstancesof auniversalsentencethatisnotoneofitstheo- rems.Althoughthisisaremarkablefact,theexis- tenceofomega-incompletesetsperseisfarfrom remarkable,assuggestedabove.Infact,the emptysetandequivalentlythesetofalltautolo- giesareomega-incompletebecauseeachyields allsingularinstancesofthenon-tautologicalfor- malsentence,herecalledFS,thatexpressesthe propositionthateverynumberiseitherzeroora successor. Omega-consistencybelongstoasetthatdoesnot yieldthenegationofanyuniversalsentenceall ofwhosesingularinstancesityields.Asetthatis notomega-consistentissaidtobeomega-incon- sistent.Omega-inconsistencyofcourseimplies consistencyintheordinarysense;butitiseasy tofindconsistentsetsthatarenotomega-consis- tent,e.g.,thesetwhoseonlymemberisthe negationoftheformålsentenceFSmentioned above.Correspondingtothesyntacticalproper- tiesjustmentionedthereareanalogousseman- ticpropertieswhosedefinitionsareobtainedby substituting'(semantically)implies'for'(deduc- tively)yields'. TheGreekletteromegaanditsEnglishname havemanyotherusesinmodernlogic.Camap introducedanon-effective,non-logicalrule, calledtheomegarule,for"inferring"auniversal sentencefromitssingularinstances;addingthe omegaruletoastandardaxiomatizationof arithmeticproducesacompletebutnon-effec- tiveaxiomatization.Anomega-valuedlogicis amany-valuedlogicwhosesetoftruth-values isoristhesamesizeasthesetofnaturalnum- bers. Seealsocompleteness,consistency, GÖDEI/SINCOMPLETENESSTHEOREMS. J.COR. omega,ordertype.Seeordertypeomega. omega-complete.Seecompleteness,formållog- ic,OMEGA. omega-consistent.Seeformållogic,omega. omegarule.Seeomega. omega-valued.Seeomega. omission.Seeactiontheory. omnibenevolence.Seedivineattributes. omnipotence.Seedivineattributes,paradoxes ofomnipotence. omnipotence,paradoxesof.Seeparadoxesof omnipotence. omniscience.Seedivineattributes,privileged access. omniscience,logical.Seedivineattributes. one-manyproblem,alsocalledone-and-many problem,thequestionwhetherallthingsareone ormany.AccordingtobothPlatoandAristotle thiswasthecentralquestionforpre-Socratic philosophers.Thosewhoanswered"one,"the monists,ascribedtoallthingsasinglenature suchaswater,air,oronenessitself.Theyappear nottohavebeentroubledbythenotionthat numericallymanythingswouldhavethisone nature.Thepluralists,ontheotherhand,distin- guishedmanyprinciplesormanytypesofprin- ciples,thoughtheyalsomaintainedtheunityof eachprinciple.Somemonistsunderstoodthe unityofallthingsasadenialofmotion,andsome pluralistsadvancedtheirviewasawayofrefut- ingthisdenial.Tojudgefromoursources,early Greekmetaphysicsrevolvedaroundtheproblem oftheoneandthemany.Inthemodernperiod thedisputebetweenmonistsandpluralistscen- teredonthequestionwhethermindandmatter constituteoneortwosubstancesand,ifone, whatitsnatureis.Seealsopre-socratics, spinoza.E.C.H. oneövermany,auniversal;especially,aPlatonic Form.AccordingtoPlato,ifthereare,e.g.,many largethings,theremustbesomeonelargeness itselfinrespectofwhichtheyarelarge;this"one övermany"(henepipollön)isanintelligible entity,aForm,incontrastwiththesensible many.Platohimselfrecognizesdifficultiesex- plaininghowtheonecharactercanbepresent tothemanyandwhytheoneandthemany donottogetherconstitutestillanothermany (e.g.,Parmenides131a-133b).Aristotle'ssus- tainedcritiqueofPlato'sForms(Metaphysics A9,Z13-15)includestheseandotherprob- lems,anditishe,morethanPlato,whoregu- larlyuses'oneövermany'torefertoPlatonic Forms.Seealsoaristotle,one-manyprob- lem,plato.E.C.H. 630 one-wayreductionsentence opentexture one-wayreductionsentence.Seereductionsen- tence. ontologicalargument.Seephilosophyofreli- gion. ontologicalcommitment,theobjectorobjects commontotheontologyfulfillingsome(regi- mented)theory(atermfashionedbyQuine). Theontologyofa(regimented)theoryconsistsin theobjectsthetheoryassumestheretobe.In ordertoshowthatatheoryassumesagiven object,orobjectsofagivendass,wemustshow thatthetheorywouldbetrueonlyifthatobject existed,orifthatclassisnotempty.Thiscanbe shownintwodifferentbutequivalentways:if thenotationofthetheorycontainstheexisten- tialquantifier'(Ex)'offirst-orderpredicatelogic, thenthetheoryisshowntoassumeagiven object,orobjectsofagivenclass,providedthat objectisrequiredamongthevaluesofthebound variables,or(additionally)isrequiredamongthe valuesofthedomainofagivenpredicate,in orderforthetheorytobetrue.Thus,ifthetheory entailsthesentence'(Ex)(xisadog)',thenthe valuesöverwhichtheboundvariable'x'ranges mustincludeatleastonedog,inorderforthe theorytobetrue.Alternatively,ifthenotationof thetheorycontainsforeachpredicateacomple- mentarypredicate,thenthetheoryassumesa givenobject,orobjectsofagivenclass,provided somepredicateisrequiredtobetrueofthat object,inorderforthetheorytobetrue.Thus,if thetheorycontainsthepredicate'isadog',then theextensionof'isadog'cannotbeempty,ifthe theoryistobetrue.However,itispossiblefordif- ferent,evenmutuallyexclusive,ontologiesto fulfillatheoryequallywell.Thus,anontology containingcolliestotheexclusionofspanielsand onecontainingspanielstotheexclusionofcollies mighteachfulfillatheorythatentails'(Ex)(xisa dog)'.Itfollowsthatsomeoftheobjectsatheory assumes(initsontology)maynotbeamong thosetowhichthetheoryisontologicallycom- mitted.Atheoryisontologicallycommittedtoa givenobjectonlyifthatobjectiscommontoallof theontologiesfulfillingthetheory.Andthethe- oryisontologicallycommittedtoobjectsofa givenclassprovidedthatclassisnotempty accordingtoeachoftheontologiesfulfillingthe theory.Seealsoquantification,theoryof DESCRIPTIONS.R.F.G. ontologicaldependence.Seedependence. ontologicalpriority.Seedependence. ontologicalsolipsism.Seesolipsism. ontologism.Seegioberti. ontology.Seemetaphysics. onto-theology.Seederrida. opacity.Seequantifyingin,referentiallytrans- parent. opacity,referential.Seereferentiallytranspar- ent. opaqueconstruction.Seequantifyingin. opaquecontext.Seequantifyingin. openformula,alsocalledopensentence,asen- tencewithafreeoccurrenceofavariable.A closedsentence,sometimescalledastatement, hasnofreeoccurrencesofvariables. Inalanguagewhoseonlyvariable-binding operatorsarequantifiers,anoccurrenceofavari- ableinaformulaisboundprovidedthatoccur- renceeitheriswithinthescopeofaquantifier employingthatvariableoristheoccurrencein thatquantifier.Anoccurrenceofavariableina formulaisfreeprovideditisnotbound.Thefor- mula'xy>O'isopenbecauseboth'x'and'y' occurasfreevariables.In'Forsomerealnumber y,xy>O',nooccurrenceof'y'isfree;butthe occurrenceof'x'isfree,sotheformulaisopen. Thesentence'Foreveryrealnumberx,forsome realnumbery,xy>O'isclosed,sincenoneofthe variablesoccurfree. Semantically,anopenformulasuchas'xy>0' isneithertruenorfalsebutrathertrueoforfalse o/eachassignmentofvaluestoitsfree-occurring variables.Forexample,'xy>0'istrueofeach assignmentoftwopositiveortwonegativereal numbersto'x'andto'y'anditisfalseofeach assignmentoftoeitherandfalseateachassign- mentofapositiverealtooneofthevariablesand anegativetotheother. Seealsoquantification,scope.C.S. openloop.Seecybernetics. openquestionargument.Seemoore. opensentence.Seeopenformula. opensociety.Seepopper. opentexture,thepossibilityofvagueness.Frie- 631 operantconditioning operator drichWaismann("Verifiability,"Proceedingsofthe AristotelianSociety,1945)introducedtheconcept, claimingthatopentextureisauniversalprop- ertyofempiricalterms.Waismannclaimedthat aninexhaustiblesourceofvaguenessremains evenaftermeasuresaretakentomakean expressionprecise.Hisgroundswere,first,that thereareanindefinitenumberofpossibilitiesfor whichitisindeterminatewhethertheexpres- sionapplies(i.e.,forwhichtheexpressionis vague).Thereis,e.g.,nodefiniteanswer whetheracatlikecreaturethatrepeatedlyvan- ishesintothinair,thenreappears,isacat. Waismann'sexplanationisthatwhenwedefine anempiricalterm,weframecriteriaofitsappli- cabilityonlyforforeseeablecircumstances.Not allpossiblesituationsinwhichwemayusethe term,however,canbeforeseen.Thus,inunan- ticipatedcircumstances,realormerely possible,aterm'scriteriaofapplicabilitymay yieldnodefiniteanswertowhetheritapplies. Second,evenfortermssuchas'gold',forwhich thereareseveralprecisecriteriaofapplica- tion(specificgravity,X-rayspectrograph,solu- bilityinaquaregia),applyingdifferentcriteria canyielddivergentverdicts,theresultbeing vagueness. Waismannusestheconceptofopentextureto explainwhyexperientialstatementsarenotcon- clusivelyverifiable,andwhyphenomenalist attemptstotranslatematerialobjectstatements fail. Seealsophenomenalism,vagueness, VERIFICATIONISM.W.K.W. operantconditioning.Seeconditioning. operationaldefinition.Seeoperationalism. operationalism,aprograminphilosophyofsci- encethataimstointerpretscientificconceptsvia experimentalproceduresandobservationalout- comes.P.W.Bridgmanintroducedtheterminol- ogywhenherequiredthattheoreticalconcepts beidentifiedwiththeoperationsusedtomeasure them.Logicalpositivism'scriteriaofcognitive significanceincorporatedthenotion:Bridgman's operationalismwasassimilatedtothepositivistic requirementthattheoreticaltermsTbeexplicitly definedvia(logicallyequivalentto)directlyob- servableconditionsO.Explicitdefinitionsfailed toaccommodatealternativemeasurementpro- ceduresforthesameconcept,andsowerere- placedbyredudionsentencesthatpartiallydefined individualconceptsinobservationaltermsvia sentencessuchas'Underobservablecircum- stancesC,xisTifandonlyif0'.Låterthiswas weakenedtoallowensemblesoftheoreticalcon- ceptstobepartiallydefinedviainterpretativesys- temsspecifyingcollectiveobservableeffectsofthe conceptsratherthaneffectspeculiartosingle concepts. Thesecognitivesignificancenotionswere incorporatedintovariousbehaviorisms,al- thoughtheterm'operationaldefinition'israrely usedbyscientistsinBridgman'sortheexplicit definitionsenses:interveningvariablesaretheo- reticalconceptsdefinedviareductionsentences andhypotheticalconstructsaredefmableby interpretativesystemsbutnotreductionsen- tences.Inscientificcontextsobservableterms oftenarecalleddependentormdependentvariables. When,asinscience,theconceptsintheoreti- calassertionsareonlypartiallydefined,observa- tionalconsequencesdonotexhausttheir content,andsoobservationaldataunderdeter- minesthetruthofsuchassertionsinthesense thatmorethanonetheoreticalassertionwill becompatiblewithmaximalobservational data. Seealsobehaviorism,reduction,re- ductionSENTENCE,THEORETICALTERM. F.S. operator,aone-placesententialconnective;i.e., anexpressionthatmaybeprefixedtoanopen orclosedsentencetoproduce,respectively,a newopenorclosedsentence.Thus'itisnotthe casethat'isa(truth-functional)operator.The mostthoroughlyinvestigatedoperatorsarethe intensionalones;anintensionaloperatorO, whenprefixedtoanopenorclosedsentenceE, producesanopenorclosedsentenceOE,whose extensionisdeterminednotbytheextensionof EbutbysomeotherpropertyofE,whichvaries withthechoiceofO.Forexample,theextension ofaclosedsentenceisitstruth-valueA,butifthe modaloperator'itisnecessarythat'isprefixed toA,theextensionoftheresultdependson whetherA'sextensionbelongstoitnecessarily orcontingently.ThispropertyofAisusually modeledbyassigningtoAasubsetXofadomain ofpossibleworldsW.IfX=Wthen'itisneces- sarythatA'istrue,butifXisapropersubsetof W,itisfalse.Anotherexampleinvolvestheepis- temicoperator'itisplausiblethat'.Sinceatrue sentencemaybeeitherplausibleorimplausible, thetruth-valueof'itisplausiblethatA'isnot fixedbythetruth-valueofA,butratherbythe bodyofevidencethatsupportsArelativetoa thinkerinagivencontext.Thismayalsobe modeledinapossibleworldsframework,by 632 operator,deontic orderedpair stipulating,foreachworld,whichworlds,ifany, areplausiblerelativetoit.Thetopicofinten- sionaloperatorsiscontroversial,anditiseven disputablewhetherstandardexamplesreallyare operatorsatthecorrectleveloflogicalform.For instance,itcanbearguedthat'itisnecessary that',uponanalysis,turnsouttobeauniversal quantifieröverpossibleworlds,orapredicateof expressions.Ontheformerview,insteadof'itis necessarythatA'weshouldwrite'foreverypos- sibleworldw,A(w)',and,onthelatter,'Aisnec- essarilytrue'.Seealsointensionallogic, MODALLOGIC,POSSIBLEWORLDS.G.Fo. operator,deontic.Seedeonticlogic. operator,propositional.Seesententialconnec- TIVE. operator,scopeof.Seeambiguity,scope. operator,sentential.Seesententialconnective. operatortheoryofadverbs,atheorythattreats adverbsandotherpredicatemodifiersaspredi- cate-formingoperatorsonpredicates.Thetheory expandsthesyntaxoffirst-orderlogicbyadding operatorsofvariousdegrees,andmakescorre- spondingadditionstothesemantics.Romane Clark,TerenceParsons,andRichardMontague (withHansKamp)developedthetheoryinde- pendentlyintheearly1970s.Forexample:'John rimsquicklythroughthekitchen'containsa simpleone-placepredicate,'rims'(appliedto John);azero-placeoperator,'quickly',anda one-placeoperator,'through()'(with'the kitchen'Ellingitsplace).Thelogicalformofthe sentencebecomes [0,1(3)[O/[P(b)]]], whichcanberead: [through(thekitchen)[quickly[runs (John)]]]. Semantically'quickly'willbeassociatedwithan operationthattakesusfromtheextensionof 'runs'toasubsetofthatextension.'Johnruns quickly'willimply'Johnruns'.'Through(the kitchen)'andotheroperatorsarehandledsimi- larly.Thewidevarietyofpredicatemodifiers complicatestheinferentialconditionsand semanticsoftheoperators.'Johnisfinallydone' implies'Johnisdone'.'Johnisnearlydone' implies'Johnisnotdone'.Clarktriestodistin- guishvarioustypesofpredicatemodifiersand providesadifferentsemanticanalysisforopera- torsofdifferentsorts.Thetheorycaneasilychar- acterizesyntacticaspectsofpredicatemodifier iteration.Inaddition,afterbeingmodifiedthe originalpredicatesremainaspredicates,and maintaintheiroriginaldegree.Further,thereis noneedtoforceJohn'srunningintosubject positionasmightbethecaseifwetrytomake 'quickly'anordinarypredicate.T.J.D. O-proposition.Seesyllogism. oratioobliqua.Seeindirectdiscourse. order,thelevelofalogicasdeterminedbythe typeofentityöverwhichthefreevariablesof thatlogicrange.Entitiesofthelowesttype,usu- allycalledtypeO,areknownasindividuals,and entitiesofhighertypeareconstructedfromenti- tiesoflowertype.Forexample,type1entities are(i)functionsfromindividualsor»-tuplesof individualstoindividuals,and(ii)»-placerela- tionsonindividuals.First-orderlogicisthatlogic whosevariablesrangeöverindividuals,anda modelforfirst-orderlogicincludesadomainof individuals.Theotherlogicsareknownas higher-orderlogics,andthefirstoftheseissec- ond-orderlogic,inwhichtherearevariables thatrangeövertype1entities.Inamodelfor second-orderlogic,thefirst-orderdomaindeter- minesthesecond-orderdomain.Foreverysen- tencetohaveadefinitetruth-value,onlytotally definedfunctionsareallowedintherangeof second-orderfunctionvariables,sothesevari- ablesrangeöverthecollectionoftotalfunctions fromK-tuplesofindividualstoindividuals,for everyvalueofn.Thesecond-orderpredicate variablesrangeöverallsubsetsofK-tuplesof individuals.ThusifDisthedomainofindividu- alsofamodel,thetype1entitiesaretheunion ofthetwosets{X:3n:XCD"XD],{X:3n:XC D"}.Quantifiersmaybindsecond-ordervariables andaresubjecttointroductionandelimination rules.Thuswhereasinfirst-orderlogiconemay infer'Someoneiswise,'(3x)Wxr,from'Socrates iswise','Ws',insecond-orderlogiconemayalso infer'thereissomethingthatSocratesis', 'C3X)Xs'.Thestepfromfirst-tosecond-order logiciterates:ingeneral,typenentitiesarethe domainofn+lth-ordervariablesinn+lth- orderlogic,andthewholehierarchyisknown asthetheoryoftypes.Seealsotypetheory. G.Fo. orderedn-tuple.Seesettheory. orderedpair.Seesettheory. 633 ordering ordinallogic ordering,anarrangementoftheelementsofaset sothatsomeofthemcomebeforeothers.IfXis aset,itisusefultoidentifyanorderingRofX withasubsetRofXXX,thesetofallordered pairswithmembersinX.IfGRthenx comesbeforeyintheorderingofXbyR,andif £Rand£R,thenxandyare incomparable.OrdersonXarethereforerela- tionsonX,sincearelationonasetXisanysub- setofXXX.Someminimalconditionsarelation mustmeettobeanorderingare(i)reflexivity: (\/x)Rxx;(ii)antisymmetry:(Vx)(Vy)((ffxy&Ryx) Dx=y);and(iii)transitivity:(Vx)(Vy)(Vz)((Rxy &Ryz)Dito).Arelationmeetingthesethree conditionsisknownasapartialorder(alsoless commonlycalledasemi-order),andifreflexivity isreplacedbyirreflexivity,(\/x)~Rxx,asastrid partialorder. Otherordersarestrengtheningsofthese.Thus atree-orderingofXisapartialorderwithadis- tinguishedrootelementa,i.e.(Wx)Rax,andthat satisfiesthebackwardlinearityconditionthat fromanyelementthereisauniquepathbackto a:(Vx)(Vy)(\/z)({Ryx&Rzx)D(RyzVRzy).Atotal orderonXisapartialordersatisfyingthecon- nectednessrequirement:(\/x)(\/y)(RxyVRyx). Totalorderingsaresometimesknownasstrict linearorderings,contrastingwithweaklinear orderings,inwhichtherequirementofantisym- metryisdropped.Thenaturalnumberlineinits usualorderisastrictlinearorder;aweaklinear orderingofasetXisastrictlinearorderoflev- elsonwhichvariousmembersofXmaybe found,whileaddingantisymmetrymeansthat eachlevelcontainsonlyonemember. Twootherimportantordersaredense(partial ortotal)orders,inwhich,betweenanytwoele- ments,thereisathird;andwell-orders.AsetXis saidtobewell-orderedbyi?ifi?istotalandevery non-emptysubsetofYofXhasanR-leastmem- ber:(VFCX)[Y+D(3zGF)(VwEY)Rzw]. Well-orderingrulesoutinfinitedescending sequences,whileastrictwell-ordering,whichis irreflexiveratherthanreflexive,rulesoutloops. Thebest-knownexampleisthemembership relationofaxiomaticsettheory,inwhichthere arenoloopssuchasxGyGxorxGx,andno infinitedescendingchains...x2G^GxQ. Seealsorelation,settheory.G.Fo. ordering,Archimedian.Seelexicalordering. ordertypeomega,inmathematics,theordertype oftheinfinitesetofnaturalnumbers.Thelastlet- teroftheGreekalphabet,co,isusedtodenotethis ordertype;coisthusthefirstinfiniteordinal number.Itcanbedefinedasthesetofallfinite ordinalnumbersorderedbymagnitude;thatis, co={0,1,2,3...}.Asethasordertypecoprovided itisdenumerablyinfinite,hasafirstelementbut notalastelement,hasforeachelementaunique successor,andhasjustoneelementwithno immediatepredecessor.Thesetofevennumbers orderedbymagnitude,(2,4,6,8...},isoforder typeco.Thesetofnaturalnumberslistingfirstall evennumbersandthenalloddnumbers, {2,4,6,8...;1,3,5,7...},isnotofordertypeco, sinceithastwoelements,1and2,withno immediatepredecessor.Thesetofnegativeinte- gersorderedbymagnitude,{...-3,-2,-1j,isalso notofordertypeco,sinceithasnofirstelement. V.K. ordinallogic,anymeansofassociatingeffectively anduniformlyalogic(inthesenseofaformål axiomaticsystem)Switheachconstructive ordinalnotationa.Thisnotionandtermforit wasintroducedbyAlanTuringinhispaper"Sys- temsofLogicBasedonOrdinals"(1939).Tur- ing^aimwastotrytoovercomethein- completenessofformålsystemsdiscoveredby Gödelin1931,bymeansofthetransfinitelyiter- ated,successiveadjunctionofunprovablebut correctprinciples.Forexample,accordingto Gödel'ssecondincompletenesstheorem,for eacheffectivelypresentedformålsystemScon- tainingamodicumofelementarynumberthe- ory,ifSisconsistentthenSdoesnotprovethe purelyuniversalarithmeticalpropositionCons expressingtheconsistencyofS(viatheGödel- numberingofsymbolicexpressions),even thoughConiscorrect.However,itmaybethat theresult5"ofadjoiningConstoSisinconsistent. Thiswillnothappenifeverypurelyexistential statementprovableinSiscorrect;callthiscon- dition(E-C).ThenifSsatisfies(E-C),soalsodoes S'=S+Con;nowS'isstillincompleteby Gödel'stheorem,thoughitismorecomplete thanS.ClearlythepassagefromStoS'canbe iteratedanyfinitenumberoftimes,beginning withanySsatisfying(E-C),toformSl=S',S2 =S',etc.Butthisprocedurecanalsobe extendedintothetransfinite,bytakingStobe theunionofthesystemsSforn=0,1,2...and thenS,,=S',S,,=S'...etc;condition(E- (0+1OJ'co+2co+1''v C)ispreservedthroughout. Toseehowfarthisandothereffectiveexten- sionproceduresofanyeffectivelypresentedsys- temStoanotherS'canbeiteratedintothe transfinite,oneneedsthenotionofthesetOof constructiveordinalnotations,duetoAlonzo ChurchandStephenC.Kleenein1936.Oisaset 634 ordinalutility organicism ofnaturalnumbers,andeachflinOdenotesan ordinala,writtenas\a\.ThereisinOanotation for0,andwitheachflinOisassociatedanota- tionsc(fl)inOwith|sc(«)|=Ifll+1;finally,if/ isanumberofaneffectivefunction[/)suchthat foreachn,\f\(n)=aisinOandflB)—>A)—>A', whichholdsinclassicallogicbutfailsintheeyes ofrelevancelogicianswhen'—>'isreadas 'entails'.Seealsoimplication,relevance logic.G.F.S. Pelagianism,thedoctrineinChristiantheology that,throughtheexerciseoffreewill,human beingscanattainmoralperfection.Abroad movementdevotedtothispropositionwasonly looselyassociatedwithitseponymousleader. Pelagius(c.354-c.425),alaytheologianfrom BritainorIreland,taughtinRomepriortoits sackingin410.HeandhisdiscipleCelestius foundaforcefuladversaryinAugustine,whom theyprovokedtostiffenhisstanceonoriginal sin,thebondageofthewill,andhumanity'stotal relianceuponGod'sgraceandpredestinationfor salvation.ToPelagius,thisconstitutedfatalism andencouragedmoralapathy.Godwouldnot demandperfection,astheBiblesometimessug- gested,werethatimpossibletoattain.Rather gracemadethestruggleeasierforasanctitythat wouldnotbeunreachableeveninitsabsence. Thoughinthehabitofsinning,inconsequence ofthefall,wehavenotforfeitedthecapacityto overcomethathabitnorbeenreleasedfromthe imperativetodoso.Forallitsmoralearnestness thisteachingseemstobeinconflictwithmuch oftheNewTestament,especiallyasinterpreted byAugustine,anditwascondemnedasheresy in418.Thebondageofthewillhasoftenbeen reaffirmed,perhapsmostnotablybyLutherin disputewithErasmus.YetChristiantheology andpracticehavealwayshadtheirsympathizers withPelagianismandwithitsreluctancetoattest thelossoffreewill,theinevitabilityofsin,and theutternecessityofGod'sgrace.A.E.L. Pelagius.Seepelagianism. peraccidens(Latin,'byaccident'),by,as,or beinganaccidentornon-essentialfeature.Aper accidenspredicationisoneinwhichanaccidentis predicatedofasubstance.(Theterminologyis medieval.Notethattheaccidentandsubstance themselves,notwordsstandingforthem,arethe termsofthepredicationrelation.)Anens(entity) peraccidensiseitheranaccidentorthe"acciden- talunity"ofasubstanceandanaccident (Descartes,e.g.,insiststhatapersonisnotaper accidensunionofbodyandmind.)Seealso ACCIDENT,ESSENTIALISM,PROPERTY.S.J.W. percept.Seeperception. perception,theextractionanduseofinforma- tionaboutone'senvironment(exteroception) andone'sownbody(interoception).Thevarious externalsenses-sight,hearing,touch,smell, andtaste-thoughtheyoverlaptosomeextent, aredistinguishedbythekindofinformation (e.g.,aboutlight,sound,temperature,pressure) theydeliver.Proprioception,perceptionofthe self,concernsstimuliarisingwithin,andcarry- inginformationabout,one'sownbody-e.g., acceleration,position,andorientationofthe limbs. Therearedistinguishablestagesintheextrac- tionanduseofsensoryinformation,one(anear- lierstage)correspondingtoourperceptionof objects(andevents),theother,alåterstage,to theperceptionoffactsabouttheseobjects.We see,e.g.,boththecatonthesofa(anobject)and thatthecatisonthesofa(afact).Seeinganobject (orevent)-acatonthesofa,apersononthe street,oravehicle'smovement-doesnot requirethattheobject(event)beidentifiedor recognizedinanyparticularway(perhaps, thoughthisiscontroversial,inanywaywhatso- ever).Onecan,e.g.,seeacatonthesofaandmis- takeitforarumpledsweater.Airplanelightsare oftenmisidentifiedasstars,andonecanseethe movementofanobjecteitherasthemovement ofoneselfor(undersomeviewingconditions)as 654 perception perception expansion(orcontraction).Seeingobjectsand eventsis,inthissense,non-epistemic:onecansee Owithoutknowing(orbelieving)thatitisOthat oneisseeing.Seeingfacts,ontheotherhand,is epistemic;onecannotseethatthereisacatonthe sofawithout,thereby,comingtoknowthatthere isacatonthesofa.Seeingafactiscomingto knowthefactinsomevisualway.Onecansee objects—theflyinone'ssoup,e.g.,-withoutreal- izingthatthereisaflyinone'ssoup(thinking, perhaps,itisabeanoracrouton);buttoseea fact,thefactthatthereisaflyinone'ssoupis, necessarily,toknowitisafly.Thisdistinction appliestotheothersensemodalitiesaswell.One canhearthetelephoneringingwithoutrealizing thatitisthetelephone(perhapsifstheTVorthe doorbell),buttohearafact,thatitisthetele- phone(thatisringing),is,ofnecessity,toknow thatitisthetelephonethatisringing. Theotherwayswehaveofdescribingwhatwe perceiveareprimarilyvariationsonthesetwo fundamentalthemes.Inseeingwhere(hewent), when(heleft),who(wentwithhim),andhowhe wasdressed,e.g.,wearedescribingthepercep- tionofsomefactofacertainsortwithoutreveal- ingexactlywhichfactitis.IfMarthasawwhere hewent,thenMarthasaw(hence,cameto know)somefacthavingtodowithwherehe went,somefactoftheform'hewentthere'.In speakingofstatesandconditions(thecondition ofhisroom,herinjury),andproperties(thecolor ofhistie,theheightofthebuilding),wesome- times,asinthecaseofobjects,meantobe describinganon-epistemicperceptualact,one thatcarriesnoimplicationsforwhat(ifany- thing)isknown.Inothercases,aswithfacts,we meantobedescribingtheacquisitionofsome pieceofknowledge.Onecanseeorhearaword withoutrecognizingitasaword(itmightbein aforeignlanguage),butcanoneseeamisprint andnotknowitisamisprint?Itobviously dependsonwhatoneuses'misprint'toreferto: anobject(awordthatismisprinted)orafact(the factthatitismisprinted). Inexaminingandevaluatingtheories (whetherphilosophicalorpsychological)ofper- ceptionitisessentialtodistinguishfactperception fromobjectperception.Foratheorymightbea plausibletheoryabouttheperceptionofobjects (e.g.,psychologicaltheoriesof"earlyvision")but notatallplausibleaboutourperceptionoffacts. Factperception,involving,asitdoes,knowledge (and,hence,belief)bringsintoplaytheentire cognitivesystem(memory,concepts,etc.)ina waytheformerdoesnot.Perceptualrelativity- e.g.,theideathatwhatweperceiveisrelativeto ourlanguage,ourconceptualscheme,orthesci- entifictheorieswehaveavailableto"interpret" phenomena-isquiteimplausibleasatheory aboutourperceptionofobjects.Apersonlacking awordfor,say,kumquats,lackingthisconcept, lackingascientificwayofclassifyingthese objects(aretheyafruit?avegetable?anani- mal?),canstillsee,touch,smell,andtaste kumquats.Perceptionofobjectsdoesnotdepend on,andisthereforenotrelativeto,theobserver's linguistic,conceptual,cognitive,andscientific assetsorshortcomings.Factperception,how- ever,isanothermatter.Clearlyonecannotsee thattherearekumquatsinthebasket(as opposedtoseeingtheobjects,thekumquats,in thebasket)ifonehasnoideaof,noconceptof, whatakumquatis.Seeingfactsismuchmore sensitive(and,hence,relative)totheconceptual resources,thebackgroundknowledgeandscien- tifictheories,oftheobserver,andthisdifference mustbekeptinmindinevaluatingclaimsabout perceptualrelativity.Thoughitdoesnotmake objectsinvisible,ignorancedoestendtomake factsperceptuallyinaccessible. Therearecharacteristicexperiencesassociated withthedifferentsenses.Tastingakumquatis notatalllikeseeingakumquatalthoughthe sameobjectisperceived(indeed,thesame fact-thatitisakumquat-maybeperceived). Thedifference,ofcourse,isinthesubjective experienceonehasinperceivingthekumquat. Acausaltheoryofperception(ofobjects)holdsthat theperceptualobject,whatitiswesee,taste, smell,orwhatever,isthatobjectthatcausesus tohavethissubjectiveexperience.Perceivingan objectisthatobjecfscausing(intherightway) onetohaveanexperienceoftheappropriate sort.Iseeabeaninmysoupifitis,infact (whetherIknowitornotisirrelevant),abeanin mysoupthatiscausingmetohavethisvisual experience.Itasteabeanif,inpointoffact,itis abeanthatiscausingmetohavethekindoftaste experienceIamnowhaving.Ifitis(unknownto me)abug,notabean,thatiscausingtheseexpe- riences,thenIam(unwittingly)seeingandtast- ingabug-perhapsabugthatlooksandtastes likeabean.Whatobjectwesee(taste,smell,etc.) isdeterminedbythecausalfactsinquestion. Whatweknowandbelieve,howweinterpret theexperience,isirrelevant,althoughitwill,of course,determinewhatwesayweseeandtaste. Thesameistobesaid,withappropriatechanges, forourperceptionoffacts(themostsignificant changebeingthereplacementofbeliefforexpe- rience).Iseethatthereisabuginmysoupifthe factthatthereisabuginmysoupcausesmeto 655 perception perception believethatthereisabuginmysoup.Icantaste thatthereisabuginmysoupwhenthisfact causesmetohavethisbeliefviasometastesen- sation. Acausaltheoryofperceptionismorethanthe claimthatthephysicalobjectsweperceivecause ustohaveexperiencesandbeliefs.Thismuchis fairlyobvious.Itistheclaimthatthiscausalrela- tionisconstitutiveofperception,thatnecessarily,if SseesO,thenOcausesacertainsortofexperi- enceinS.Itis,accordingtothistheory,impossi- ble,onconceptualgrounds,toperceivesome- thingwithwhichonehasnocausalcontact.If, e.g.,futureeventsdonotcausepresentevents,if thereisnobackwardcausation,thenwecannot perceivefutureeventsandobjects.Whetheror notfuturefactscanbeperceived(orknown) dependsonhowliberallythecausalconditionon knowledgeisinterpreted. Thoughconcedingthatthereisaworldof mind-independentobjects(trees,stars,people) thatcauseustohaveexperiences,somephiloso- phers-traditionallycalledrepresentativerealists— arguethatwenonethelessdonotdirectlyper- ceivetheseexternalobjects.Whatwedirectly perceivearetheeffectstheseobjectshaveon us-aninternalimage,idea,orimpression,a moreorless(dependingonconditionsofobser- vation)accuraterepresentationoftheexternal realitythathelpsproduceit.Thissubjective, directlyapprehendedobjecthasbeencalledby variousnames:asensation,percept,sense- datum,sensum,andsometimes,toemphasizeits representationalaspect,Vorstellung(German, 'representation').Justastheimagesappearing onatelevisionscreenrepresenttheirremote causes(theeventsoccurringatsomedistantcon- certhallorplayingfield),theimages(visual, auditory,etc.)thatoccurinthemind,thesense- dataofwhichwearedirectlyawareinnormal perception,represent(orsometimes,when thingsarenotworkingright,/wzsrepresent)their externalphysicalcauses. Therepresentativerealisttypicallyinvokes argumentsfromillusion,factsabouthallucina- tion,andtemporalconsiderationstosupporthis view.Hallucinationsaresupposedtoillustrate thewaywecanhavethesamekindofexperience wehavewhen(aswecommonlysay)weseea realbugwithouttherebeingarealbug(inour souporanywhereelse)causingustohavethe experience.Whenwehallucinate,thebugwe "see"is,infact,afigmentofourownimagina- tion,animage(i.e.,sense-datum)inthemind that,becauseitsharessomeofthepropertiesofa realbug(shape,color,etc),wemightmistakefor arealbug.Sincethesubjectiveexperiencescan beindistinguishablefromthatwhichwehave when(aswecommonlysay)wereallyseeabug, itisreasonabletoinfer(therepresentativereal- istargues)thatinnormalperception,whenwe takeourselvestobeseeingarealbug,wearealso directlyawareofabuglikeimageinthemind.A hallucinationdiffersfromanormalperception, notinwhatweareawareof(inbothcasesitisa sense-datum)butinthecauseoftheseexperi- ences.Innormalperceptionitisanactualbug; inhallucinationitis,say,drugsintheblood- stream.Inbothcases,though,wearecausedto havethesamething:anawarenessofabuglike sense-datum,anobjectthat,innormalpercep- tion,wenaivelytaketobearealbug(thussay- ing,andencouragingourchildrentosay,thatwe seeabug). Theargumentfromillusionpointstothefact thatourexperienceofanobjectchangeseven whentheobjectthatweperceive(orsayweper- ceive)remainsunchanged.Thoughthephysical object(thebugorwhatever)remainsthesame color,size,andshape,whatweexperience (accordingtothisargument)changescolor, shape,andsizeaswechangethelighting,our viewingangle,anddistance.Hence,itiscon- cluded,whatweexperiencecannotreallybethe physicalobjectitself.Sinceitvarieswithchanges inbothobjectandviewingconditions,whatwe experiencemustbeacausalresult,aneffect,of boththeobjectwecommonlysaywesee(the bug)andtheconditionsinwhichweviewit.This internaleffect,itisconcluded,isasense-datum. Representativerealistshavealsoappealedto thefactthatperceivingaphysicalobjectisa causalprocessthattakestime.Thistemporallag ismostdramaticinthecaseofdistantobjects (e.g.,stars),butitexistsforeveryphysicalobject (ittakestimeforaneuralsignaltobetransmit- tedfromreceptorsurfacestothebrain).Conse- quently,atthemoment(ashorttimeafterlight leavestheobjecfssurface)weseeaphysical object,theobjectcouldnolongerexist.Itcould haveceasedtoexistduringthetimelightwas beingtransmittedtotheeyeorduringthetime ittakestheeyetocommunicatewiththebrain. Yet,eveniftheobjectceasestoexistbeforewe becomeawareofanything(beforeavisualexpe- rienceoccurs),weare,orsoitseems,awareof somethingwhenthecausalprocessreachesitscli- maxinthebrain.Thissomethingofwhichwe areaware,sinceitcannotbethephysicalobject (itnolongerexists),mustbeasense-datum.The representationalistconcludesinthis"time-lag argument,"therefore,thatevenwhenthephys- 656 perception perception icalobjectdoesnotceasetoexist(this,ofcourse, isthenormalsituation),wearedirectlyaware, notofit,butofits(slightlylater-occurring)rep- resentation. Representativerealistsdifferamongthem- selvesaboutthequestionofhowmuch(ifatall) thesense-dataofwhichweareawareresemble theexternalobjects(ofwhichwearenotaware). Sometaketheexternalcausetohavesomeofthe properties(theso-calledprimaryproperties)of thedatum(e.g.,extension)andnotothers(the so-calledsecondaryproperties-e.g.,color). Direct(ornaive)realismshareswithrepresenta- tiverealismacommitmenttoaworldofinde- pendentlyexistingobjects.Boththeoriesare formsofperceptualrealism.Itdiffers,however, initsviewofhowwearerelatedtotheseobjects inordinaryperception.Directrealistsdenythat weareawareofmentalintermediaries(sense- data)when,asweordinarilysay,weseeatreeor hearthetelephonering.Thoughdirectrealists differintheirdegreeofnaivetéabouthow(and inwhatrespect)perceptionissupposedtobe direct,theyneednotbesonaive(assometimes depicted)astodenythescientificfactsaboutthe causalprocessesunderlyingperception.Direct realistscaneasilyadmit,e.g.,thatphysicalob- jectscauseustohaveexperiencesofaparticular kind,andthattheseexperiencesareprivate,sub- jective,ormental.Theycanevenadmitthatitis thiscausalrelationship(betweenobjectand experience)thatconstitutesourseeingandhear- ingphysicalobjects.Theyneednot,inother words,denyacausaltheoryofperception.What theymustdeny,iftheyaretoremaindirectreal- ists,however,isananalysisofthesubjective experience(thatobjectscauseustohave)intoan awarenesso/someobject.Fortounderstandthis experienceasanawarenessofsomeobjectis, giventhewhollysubjective(mental)characterof theexperienceitself,tointerposeamentalentity (whattheexperienceisanawarenessof) betweentheperceiverandthephysicalobject thatcauseshimtohavethisexperience,the physicalobjectthatissupposedtobedirectlyper- ceived. Directrealists,therefore,avoidanalyzinga perceptualexperienceintoanact(sensing,being awareof,beingacquaintedwith)andanobject (thesensum,sense-datum,sensation,mental representation).Theexperiencewearecaused tohavewhenweperceiveaphysicalobjector eventis,instead,tobeunderstoodinsomeother way.Theadverbialtheoryisonesuchpossibility. Asthenamesuggests,thistheorytakesitscue fromthewaynounsandadjectivescansome- timesbeconvertedintoadverbswithoutlossof descriptivecontent.So,forinstance,itcomesto prettymuchthesamethingwhetherwe describeaconversationasanimated(adjective) orsaythatweconversedanimatedly(an adverb).So,also,accordingtoanadverbialist, when,aswecommonlysay,weseearedball, theredballcausesinus(amomentlåter)an experience,yes,butnot(astherepresentative realistsays)anawareness(mentalact)ofa sense-datum(mentalobject)thatisredandcir- cular(adjectives).Theexperienceisbetter understoodasoneinwhichthereisnoobjectat all,assensingredlyandcircularly(adverbs).The adverbialtheoristinsiststhatonecanexperience circularlyandredlywithouttherebeing,inthe mindoranywhereelse,redcircles(this,infact, iswhattheadverbialistthinksoccursindreams andhallucinationsofredcircles).Toexperience redlyisnottohavearedexperience;norisitto experienceredness(inthemind).Itis,saysthe adverbialist,awayoramannerofperceiving ordinaryobjects(especiallyredonesseeninnor- mallight).Justasdancinggracefullyisnota thingwedance,soperceivingredlyisnota thing-andcertainlynotaredthinginthe mind-thatweexperience. Theadverbialtheoryisonlyoneoptionthe directrealisthasofacknowledgingthecausal basisofperceptionwhile,atthesametime, maintainingthedirectnessofourperceptual relationwithindependentlyexistingobjects. Whatisimportantisnotthattheexperiencebe construedadverbially,butthatitnotbeinter- preted,asrepresentativerealistsinterpretit,as awarenessofsomeinternalobject.Foradirect realist,theappearances,thoughtheyaresubjec- tive(mind-dependent)arenotobjectsthatinter- posethemselvesbetweentheconsciousmind andtheexternalworld. Asclassicallyunderstood,bothnaiveandrep- resentativerealismaretheoriesaboutobjectper- ception.Theydifferaboutwhetheritisthe externalobjectoranintemalobject(anideain themind)thatwe(mostdirectly)apprehendin ordinarysenseperception.Buttheyneednot (althoughtheyusuallydo)differintheiranaly- sisofourknowledgeoftheworldaroundus,in theiraccountoffactperception.Adirectrealist aboutobjectperceptionmay,e.g.,beanindirect realistaboutthefactsthatweknowaboutthese objects.Tosee,notonlyaredballinfrontofone, butthatthereisaredballinfrontofone,itmay benecessary,evenonadirecttheoryof(object) perception,toinfer(orinsomewayderive)this factfromfactsthatareknownmoredirectly 657 perceptualrealism perfectcompetition aboutone'sexperiencesoftheball.Since,e.g.,a directtheoristmaybeacausaltheorist,may thinkthatseeingaredballis(inpart)constituted bythehavingofcertainsortsofexperience,she mayinsistthatknowledgeofthecauseofthese experiencesmustbederivedfromknowledgeof theexperienceitself.Ifoneisanadverbialist, e.g.,onemightinsistthatknowledgeofphysical objectsisderivedfromknowledgeofhow(redly? bluely?circularly?squarely?)oneexperiences theseobjects. Bythesametoken,arepresentativerealist couldadoptadirecttheoryoffactperception. Thoughtheobjectswedirectlyseearemental,the factswecometoknowbyexperiencingthese subjectiveentitiesarefactsaboutordinaryphysi- calobjects.Wedonotinfer(atleastatnocon- sciouslevel)thatthereisabuginoursoupfrom facts(knownmoredirectly)aboutourowncon- sciousexperiences(fromfactsaboutthesensa- tionsthebugcausesinus).Rather,oursensations causeus,directly,tohavebeliefsaboutoursoup. Thereisnointermediatebelief;hence,thereisno intermediateknowledge;hence,nointermediate factperception.Factperceptionis,inthissense, direct.Orsoarepresentativerealistcanmaintain eventhoughcommittedtotheindirectpercep- tionoftheobjects(bugandsoup)involvedinthis fact.Thismerelyillustrates,onceagain,the necessityofdistinguishingobjectperception fromfactperception. Seealsodirectrealism,epistemology, METAPHYSICALREALISM,PHILOSOPHYOF MIND,SKEPTICISM,THEORYOFAPPEARING. F.D. perceptualrealism.Seeperception. perceptualrelativity.Seeperception. Percival,Thomas(1740-1804),Englishphysi- cianandauthorofMedicalEthics(1803).Hewas centralinbringingtheWesterntraditionsof medicalethicsfromprayersandoaths(e.g.,the Hippocraticoath)towardmoredetailed,modern codesofproperprofessionalconduct.Hiswriting onthenormativeaspectsofmedicalpracticewas partethics,partprudentialadvice,partprofes- sionaletiquette,andpartjurisprudence.Medical Ethicstreatedstandardsfortheprofessionalcon- ductofphysiciansrelativetosurgeonsand apothecaries(pharmacistsandgeneralpracti- tioners),aswellashospitals,privatepractice,and thelaw.TheissuesPercivaladdressedinclude privacy,truthtelling,rulesforprofessionalcon- sultation,humanexperimentation,publicand privatetrust,compassion,sanity,suicide,abor- tion,capitalpunishment,andenvironmental nuisances.Percivalhadhisgreatestinfluencein EnglandandAmerica.Atitsfoundingin1847, theAmericanMedicalAssociationusedMedical Ethicstoguideitsownfirstcodeofmedicalethics. M.J.M. perdurance,inonecommonphilosophicaluse, thepropertyofbeingtemporallycontinuousand havingtemporalparts.Thereareatleasttwo conflictingtheoriesabouttemporallycontinuous substances.Accordingtothefirst,temporally continuoussubstanceshavetemporalparts(they perdure),whileaccordingtothesecond,theydo not.Inoneordinaryphilosophicaluse,endurance isthepropertyofbeingtemporallycontinuous andnothavingtemporalparts.Therearemodal versionsoftheaforementionedtwotheories:for example,oneversionofthefirsttheoryisthat necessarily,temporallycontinuoussubstances havetemporalparts,whileanotherversion impliesthatpossibly,theydonot.Someversions ofthefirsttheoryholdthatatemporallycontin- uoussubstanceiscomposedofinstantaneous temporalpartsor"object-stages,"whileonother versionstheseobject-stagesarenotpartsbut boundaries.Seealsoidentity,metaphysics, PERSONALIDENTITY.J.Ho.&G.Ro. perfectcompetition,thestateofanidealmärket underthefollowingconditions:(a)everycon- sumerinthemärketisaperfectlyrationalmax- imizerofutility;(b)everyproducerisaperfect maximizerofprofit;(c)thereisaverylarge(ide- allyinfinite)numberofproducersofthegoodin question,whichensuresthatnoproducercanset thepriceforitsoutput(otherwise,animperfect competitivestateofoligopolyormonopoly obtains);and(d)everyproducerprovidesaprod- uctperfectlyindistinguishablefromthatofother producers(ifconsumerscoulddistinguishprod- uctstothepointthattherewasnolongeravery largenumberofproducersforeachdistinguish- ablegood,competitionwouldagainbeimper- fect). Undertheseconditions,themärketpriceis equaltothemarginalcostofproducingthelast unit.Thisintumdeterminesthemärketsupply ofthegood,sinceeachproducerwillgainby increasingproductionwhenpriceexceedsmar- ginalcostandwillgenerallycutlossesby decreasingproductionwhenmarginalcost exceedsprice.Perfectcompetitionissometimes 658 perfectduty PeripateticSchool thoughttohavenormativeimplicationsforpolit- icalphilosophy,sinceitresultsinParetoopti- mality. Theconceptofperfectcompetitionbecomes extremelycomplicatedwhenamarkefsevolu- tionisconsidered.Producerswhocannotequate marginalcostwiththemärketpricewillhave negativeprofitandmustdröpoutofthemärket. Ifthishappensveryoften,thenthenumberof producerswillnolongerbelargeenoughtosus- tainperfectcompetition,sonewproducerswill needtoenterthemärket. Seealsophilosophyofeconomics,pro- DUCTIONTHEORY.A.N. perfectduty.Seeduty,kant. perfectionism,anethicalviewaccordingto whichindividualsandtheiractionsarejudgedby amaximalstandardofachievement-specifically, thedegreetowhichtheyapproachidealsofaes- thetic,intellectual,emotional,orphysical"per- fection."Perfectionism,then,maydepartfrom, orevendispensewith,standardsofconventional moralityinfavörofstandardsbasedonwhat appeartobenon-moralvalues.Thesestandards reflectanadmirationforcertainveryrarelevels ofhumanachievement.Perhapsthemostchar- acteristicofthesestandardsareartisticandother formsofcreativity;buttheyprominentlyinclude avarietyofotheractivitiesandemotionalstates deemed''noble"-e.g.,heroicenduranceinthe faceofgreatsuffering.Theperfectionist,then, wouldalsotendtowardarathernon-egalitar- ian-evenaristocratic-viewofhumankind.The raregenius,theinspiredfew,thesufferingbut courageousartist-theseexamplesofhuman perfectionaregenuinelyworthyofourestima- tion,accordingtothisview. Althoughnofullyworked-outsystemof"per- fectionistphilosophy"hasbeenattempted, aspectsofallofthesedoctrinesmaybefoundin suchphilosophersasNietzsche.Aristotle,aswell, appearstoendorseaperfectionistideainhis characterizationofthehumangood.Justasthe goodlyreplayernotonlyexhibitsthecharacter- isticactivitiesofthisprofessionbutachieves standardsofexcellencewithrespecttothese,the goodhumanbeing,forAristotle,mustachieve standardsofexcellencewithrespecttothevirtue orvirtuesdistinctiveofhumanlifeingeneral. Seealsoaristotle,nietzsche,virtue ETHICS.J.A.M. perfectionism,Emersonian.Seecavell. perfectright.Seegrotius,rights. performance,linguistic.Seephilosophyoflan- GUAGE. performative.Seespeechacttheory. performativefallacy.Seeinformalfallacy. pergenusetdifferentiam.Seedefinition. PeripateticSchool,alsocalledPeripatos,the philosophicalcommunityfoundedbyAristotle atapublicgymnasium(theLyceum)afterhis returntoAthensinc.335b.c.Thederivationof 'Peripatetic'fromtheallegedAristoteliancustom of"walkingabout"(peripatein)isprobably wrong.Thenameshouldbeexplainedbyrefer- encetoa"coveredwalkinghall"(peripatos) amongtheschoolfacilities.Ascholarchorhead- masterpresidedöverroughlytwoclassesof members:thepresbyteroiorseniors,whoproba- blyhadsometeachingduties,andtheneaniskoi orjuniors.Noevidenceoffemalephilosophersin theLyceumhassurvived. DuringAristotle'slifetimehisownlectures, whetherfortheinnercircleoftheschoolorfor thecityatlarge,wereprobablythekeyattraction andcoreactivity;butgivenAristotle'sknackfor organizinggroupresearchprojects,wemay assumethatyoungandoldPeripateticsspent muchoftheirtimeworkingontheirownspecific assignmentseitheratthelibrary,wherethey couldconsultworksofearlierwriters,oratsome kindofrepositoryforspecimensusedinzoolog- icalandbotanicalinvestigations.Asaresident alien,AristotlecouldnotownpropertyinAthens andhencewasnotthelegalowneroftheschool. UponhisfinaldeparturefromAthensin322,his longtimecollaboratorTheophrastusofEresusin Lesbos(c.370-287)succeededhimasscholarch. TheophrastuswasanableAristotelianwho wroteextensivelyonmetaphysics,psychology, physiology,botany,ethics,politics,andthehis- toryofphilosophy.WiththehelpofthePeri- pateticdictatorDemetriusofPhaleron,hewas abletosecurepropertyrightsöverthephysical facilitiesoftheschool.UnderTheophrastus,the Peripatoscontinuedtoflourishandissaidto havehad2,000students,surelynotallatthe sametime.Hissuccessor,StratoofLampsakos (c.335-269),hadnarrowerinterestsandaban- donedkeyAristoteliantenets.Withhimapro- gressivedeclinesetin,towhichtheearlylossof Aristotle'spersonallibrary,takentoAsiaMinor 659 Peripatos personalidentity byNeleusofSkepsis,certainlycontributed.By thefirstcenturyb.c.thePeripatoshadceasedto exist.Philosophersoflåterperiodssympathetic toAristotle'sviewshavealsobeencalledPeri- patetics. Seealsoaristotle,lyceum.A.G.-L. Peripatos.Seehellenisticphilosophy,peri- PATETICSCHOOL. perlocutionaryact.Seespeechacttheory. permissibility.Seedeonticlogic,epistemology. Perry,RalphBarton(1876-1957),American philosopherwhotaughtatHarvardUniversity andwroteextensivelyinethics,socialphiloso- phy,andthetheoryofknowledge.Hereceiveda PulitzerPrizein1936forTheThoughtandChar- acterofWilliamJames,abiographyofhisteacher andcolleague.Perry'sothermajorworks include:TheMoralEconomy(1909),GeneralThe- oryofValue(1926),PuritanismandDemocracy (1944),andRealmsofValue(1954).Heisperhaps bestknownforhisviewsonvalue.Hewritesin GeneralTheoryofValue,"Anyobject,whateverit be,acquiresvaluewhenanyinterest,whatever itbe,istakeninit;justasanythingwhatsoever becomesatargetwhenanyonewhosoeveraims atit."Something'shavingvalueisnothingbutits beingtheobjectofsomeinterest,andtoknow whetherithasvalueoneneedonlyknow whetheritistheobjectofsomeone'sinterest. Moralityaimsatthepromotionofthemoral good,whichhedefinesas"harmonioushappi- ness."Thisconsistsinthereconciliation,harmo- nizing,andfulfillmentofallinterests. Perry'sepistemologicalandmetaphysical viewswerepartofarevoltagainstidealismand dualism.Alongwithfiveotherphilosophers,he wroteTheNewRealism(1912).The"NewReal- ists"heldthattheobjectsofperceptionand memoryaredirectlypresentedtoconsciousness andarejustwhattheyappeartobe;nothing intervenesbetweentheknowerandtheexternal world.Theviewthattheobjectsofperception andmemoryarepresentedbymeansofideas leads,theyargued,toidealism,skepticism,and absurdity.Perryisalsoknownforhavingdevel- oped,alongwithE.B.Holt,the"specific response"theory,whichisanattempttocon- struebeliefandperceptionintermsofbodily adjustmentandbehavior. Seealsonewrealism,value.N.M.L. perse.Seeessentialism,peraccidens. perseity.Seedivineattributes. personalidentity,the(numerical)identityöver timeofpersons.Thequestionofwhatpersonal identityconsistsinisthequestionofwhatitis (whatthenecessaryandsufficientconditions are)forapersonexistingatonetimeandaperson existingatanothertimetobeoneandthesame person.Herethereisnoquestionoftherebeing anyentitythatisthe"identity"ofaperson;tosay thataperson'sidentityconsistsinsuchandsuch isjustshorthandforsayingthatfactsaboutper- sonalidentity,i.e.,factstotheeffectthatsome- oneexistingatonetimeisthesameassomeone existingatanothertime,consistinsuchandsuch. (Thisshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeusage, commoninordinaryspeechandinpsychology, inwhichpersonsaresaidtohaveidentities,and, sometimes,toseek,lose,orregaintheiridenti- ties,whereone's"identity"intimatelyinvolvesa setofvaluesandgoalsthatstructureone'slife.) Thewords'identical'and'same'meannoth- ingdifferentinjudgmentsaboutpersonsthanin judgmentsaboutotherthings.Theproblemof personalidentityisthereforenotoneofdefining aspecialsenseof'identical,'anditisatleastmis- leadingtocharacterizeitasdefiningaparticular kindofidentity.ApplyingQuine'sslogan"no entitywithoutidentity,"onemightsaythatchar- acterizinganysortofentityinvolvesindicating whattheidentityconditionsforentitiesofthat sortare(so,e.g.,partoftheexplanationofthe conceptofasetisthatsetshavingthesame membersareidentical),andthataskingwhatthe identityofpersonsconsistsinisjustawayofask- ingwhatsortsofthingspersonsare.Butthemain focusintraditionaldiscussionsofthetopichas beenononekindofidentityjudgmentabout persons,namelythoseasserting"identityöver time";thequestionhasbeenaboutwhattheper- sistenceofpersonsövertimeconsistsin. Whathasmadetheidentity(persistence)of personsofspecialphilosophicalinterestispartly itsepistemologyandpartlyitsconnectionswith moralandevaluativematters.Thecrucialepiste- mologicalfactisthatpersonshave,inmemory, anaccesstotheirownpasthistoriesthatisunlike theaccesstheyhavetothehistoriesofother things(includingotherpersons);whenone remembersdoingorexperiencingsomething, onenormallyhasnoneedtoemployanycrite- rionofidentityinordertoknowthatthesubject oftherememberedactionorexperienceis(i.e., isidenticalwith)oneself.Themoralandevalua- tivemattersincludemoralresponsibility(some- onecanbeheldresponsibleforapastactiononly 660 personalism personalism ifheorsheisidenticaltothepersonwhodidit) andourconcernforourownsurvivalandfuture well-being(sinceitseems,althoughthishas beenquestioned,thatwhatonewantsinwant- ingtosurviveisthatthereshouldexistinthe futuresomeonewhoisidenticaltooneself). Themodernhistoryofthetopicofpersonal identitybeginswithLocke,whoheldthatthe identityofapersonconsistsneitherintheiden- tityofanimmaterialsubstance(asdualistsmight beexpectedtohold)norintheidentityofa materialsubstanceor"animalbody"(asmateri- alistsmightbeexpectedtohold),andthatitcon- sistsinsteadin"sameconsciousness."Hisview appearstohavebeenthatthepersistenceofa personthroughtimeconsistsinthefactthatcer- tainactions,thoughts,experiences,etc,occur- ringatdifferenttimes,aresomehowunitedin memory.Moderntheoriesdescendedfrom Locke'stakememorycontinuitytobeaspecial caseofsomethingmoregeneral,psychological continuity,andholdthatpersonalidentitycon- sistsinthis.Thisissometimesputintermsofthe notionofa"person-stage,"i.e.,amomentary "timeslice"ofthehistoryofaperson.Aseriesof person-stageswillbepsychologicallycontinuous ifthepsychologicalstates(includingmemories) occurringinlåtermembersoftheseriesgrowout of,incertaincharacteristicways,thoseoccurring inearliermembersofit;andaccordingtothe psychologicalcontinuityviewofpersonaliden- tity,person-stagesoccurringatdifferenttimes arestagesofthesamepersonprovidedthey belongtoasingle,non-branching,psychologi- callycontinuousseriesofperson-stages. OpponentsoftheLockeanandneo-Lockean (psychologicalcontinuity)viewtendtofallinto twocamps.Some,followingButlerandReid, holdthatpersonalidentityisindefinable,and thatnothinginformativecanbesaidaboutwhat itconsistsin.Othersholdthattheidentityofa personconsistsinsomesortofphysicalcontinu- ity-perhapstheidentityofalivinghuman organism,ortheidentityofahumanbrain. Intheactualcasesweknowabout(putting asideissuesaboutnon-bodilysurvivalofdeath), psychologicalcontinuityandphysicalcontinuity gotogether.Muchofthedebatebetweenpsy- chologicalcontinuitytheoriesandphysical continuitytheorieshascenteredonthein- terpretationofthoughtexperimentsinvolving braintransplants,brain-statetransfers,etc,in whichthesecomeapart.Suchexamplesmake vividthequestionofwhetherourfundamental criteriaofpersonalidentityarepsychological, physical,orboth. Recentlyphilosophicalattentionhasshifted somewhatfromthequestionofwhatpersonal identityconsistsintoquestionsaboutitsimpor- tance.Theconsiderationofhypotheticalcasesof "fission"(inwhichtwopersonsatalåtertimeare psychologicallycontinuouswithonepersonat anearliertime)hassuggestedtosomethatwe canhavesurvival-oratanyråtewhatmatters insurvival-withoutpersonalidentity,andthat ourself-interestedconcernforthefutureisreally aconcernforwhateverfuturepersonsarepsy- chologicallycontinuouswithus. Seealsophilosophyofmind.S.Sho. personalism,aversionofpersonalidealismthat flourishedintheUnitedStates(principallyat BostonUniversity)fromthelatenineteenthcen- turytothemid-twentiethcentury.Itsprincipal proponentswereBordenParkerBowne(1847- 1910)andthreeofhisstudents:AlbertKnudson (1873-1953);RalphFlewelling(1871-1960), whofoundedThePersonalist;and,mostimpor- tantly,EdgarSheffieldBrightman(1884-1953). Theirpersonalismwasbothidealisticandtheis- ticandwasinfluentialinphilosophyandinthe- ology.Personalismtraceditsphilosophical lineagetoBerkeleyandLeibniz,andhadasits foundationalinsighttheviewthatallrealityis ultimatelypersonal.Godisthetranscendentper- sonandthegroundorcreatorofallotherper- sons;natureisasystemofobjectseitherfororin themindsofpersons. BothBowneandBrightmanconsideredthem- selvesempiricistsinthetraditionofBerkeley. Immediateexperienceisthestartingpoint,but thisexperienceinvolvesafundamentalknowl- edgeoftheselfasapersonalbeingwithchang- ingstates.Giventhispluralism,thecoherence, order,andintelligibilityoftheuniverseareseen toderivefromGod,theuncreatedperson. Bowne'sGodistheeternalandomnipotent beingofclassicaltheism,butBrightmanargued thatifGodisarealpersonhemustbeconstrued asbothtemporalandfinite.Giventhefactofevil, Godisseenasgraduallygainingcontrolöverhis createdworld,withregardtowhichhiswillis intrinsicallylimited. Anotherversionofpersonalismdevelopedin Franceoutoftheneo-Scholastictradition.E. Mounier(1905-50),Maritain,andGilsoniden- tifiedthemselvesaspersonalists,inasmuchas theyviewedtheinfiniteperson(God)andfinite personsasthesourceandlocusofintrinsicvalue. Theydidnot,however,viewthenaturalorderas intrinsicallypersonal. Seealsoidealism,neo-thomism.C.F.D. 661 personality PeterofSpain personality.Seecharacter. personalsupposition.Seesuppositio. personhood,theconditionorpropertyofbeinga person,especiallywhenthisisconsideredto entailmoraland/ormetaphysicalimportance. Personhoodhasbeenthoughttoinvolvevarious traits,including(moral)agency;reasonorratio- nality;language,orthecognitiveskillslanguage maysupport(suchasintentionalityandself-con- sciousness);andabilitytoenterintosuitablerela- tionswithotherpersons(viewedasmembersof aself-defininggroup).Buberemphasizedthedif- ferencebetweentheI-Itrelationshiphold- ingbetweenoneselfandanobject,andtheI- Thourelationship,whichholdsbetweenoneself andanotherpersow(whocanbeaddressed).Den- netthasconstruedpersonsintermsofthe "intentionalstance,"whichinvolvesexplaining another'sbehaviorintermsofbeliefs,desires, intentions,etc. Questionsaboutwhenpersonhoodbeginsand whenitendshavebeencentraltodebatesabout abortion,infanticide,andeuthanasia,sinceper- sonhoodhasoftenbeenviewedasthemark,if notthebasis,ofabeing'spossessionofspecial moralstatus. Seealsoethics,moralstatus,personal IDENTITY,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND.EJ. personstage.Seepersonalidentity. perspectivism.Seenietzsche,ortegaygasset, TEICHMULLER. persuasivedefinition.Seedefinition. PeterAbelard.Seeabelard. PeterLombard(c.1095-1160),Italiantheolo- gianandauthoroftheBookofSentences(Libersen- tentiarum),arenownedtheologicalsourcebook inthelåterMiddleAges.Peterwaseducatedat Bologna,Reims,andParisbeforeteachinginthe schoolofNotreDameinParis.Hebecamea canonatNotreDamein1144-45andwas electedbishopofParisin1159.Hisextantworks includecommentariesonthePsalms(writtenin themid-1130s)andontheepistlesofPaul (c.1139-41);acollectionofsermons;andhis one-volumesummaryofChristiandoctrine,the Sentences(completedby1158). TheSentencesconsistsoffourbooks:BookI,On theTrinity;BookII,OntheCreationofThings;Book III,OntheIncarnation;andBookIV,OntheDoc- trineofSigns(orSacraments).Hisdiscussionis organizedaroundparticularquestionsorissues e.g.,"OnKnowledge,Foreknowledge,andProv- idence"(BookI),"IsGodtheCauseofEviland Sin?"(BookII).ForagivenissuePetertypically presentsabriefsummary,accompaniedbyshort quotations,ofmainpositionsfoundinScripture andinthewritingsofthechurchfathersanddoc- tors,followedbyhisowndeterminationoradju- dicationofthematter.Himselfatheological conservative,Peterseemstohaveintendedthis sortofcompilationofscripturalandancientdoc- trinalteachingasacountertothepopularity, fueledbytherecentrecoveryofimportantparts ofAristotle'slogic,oftheapplicationofdialectic totheologicalmatters. TheSentencesenjoyedwidecirculationand admirationfromthebeginning,andwithina centuryofitscompositionitbecameastandard textinthetheologycurriculum.Fromthemid- thirteenththroughthemid-fourteenthcentury everystudentoftheologywasrequired,asthe laststageinobtainingthehighestacademic degree,tolectureandcommentonPeter'stext. LåtermedievalthinkersoftenreferredtoPeteras "theMaster"(magister),therebytestifyingtothe Sentences'preeminenceintheologicaltraining.In lecturesandcommentaries,thegreatestmindsof thisperiodusedPeter'stextasaframeworkin whichtodeveloptheirownoriginalpositions anddebatewiththeircontemporaries.Asaresult theSentences-commentarytraditionisanextraor- dinarilyrichrepositoryoflåtermedievalphilo- sophicalandtheologicalthought.S.Ma. PeterofSpain.Itisnowthoughtthattherewere twoPetersofSpain.TheSpanishprelateand philosopher(c.1205-77)wasborninLisbon, studiedatParis,andtaughtmedicineatSiena (1248-50).Heservedinvariousecclesiastical postsinPortugalandItaly(1250-73)before beingelectedpopeasJohnXXIin1276.He wroteseveralbooksonphilosophicalpsychology andcompiledthefamousmedicalworkThe- sauruspauperum. ThesecondPeterofSpainwasaSpanish DominicanwhoIivedduringthefirsthalfofthe thirteenthcentury.HisTractatus,låtercalledSum- mulaelogicales,receivedöver166printingsdur- ingsubsequentcenturies.TheTractatuspresents theessentialsofAristotelianlogic(propositions, universals,categories,syllogism,dialecticaltop- ics,andthesophisticalfållades)andimproveson themnemonicversesofWilliamSherwood;he thenintroducesthesubjectsoftheso-called parvalogicalia(supposition,relatives,ampliation, 662 petitioprincipii phenomenalism appellation,restriction,distribution),allof whichwereextensivelydevelopedinthelåter MiddleAges.Thereisnotsufficientevidenceto claimthatPeterwroteaspecialtreatiseoncon- sequences,buthisunderstandingofconditionals asassertionsofnecessaryconnectionundoubt- edlyplayedanimportantroleintherulesofsim- ple,asopposedtoas-of-now,consequences. I.Bo. petitioprincipii.Seeinformalfallacy. phalanx.Seefourier. phantasia(Greek,'appearance','imagination'), (1)thestateweareinwhensomethingappears toustobethecase;(2)thecapacityinvirtueof whichthingsappeartous.Althoughfrequently usedofconsciousandimagisticexperiences, 'phantasia'isnotlimitedtosuchstates;inpartic- ular,itcanbeappliedtoanypropositionalatti- tudewheresomethingistakentobethecase. ButjustastheEnglish'appears'connotesthat onehasepistemicreservationsaboutwhatis actuallythecase,so'phantasia'suggeststhepos- sibilityofbeingmisledbyappearancesandis thusoftenasubjectofcriticism.Accordingto Plato,phantasiaisa"mixture"ofsensationand belief;inAristotle,itisadistinctfacultythat makestruthandfalsehoodpossible.TheStoics takeaphantasiatoconstituteoneofthemost basicmentalstates,intermsofwhichothermen- talstatesaretobeexplained,andinrationalani- malsitbearsthepropositionalcontentexpressed inlanguage.Thislastusebecomesprominentin ancientliteraryandrhetoricaltheorytodesig- natetheabilityoflanguagetomoveusandcon- veysubjectsvividlyaswellastorangebeyond theboundsofourimmediateexperience.Here lietheoriginsofthemodernconceptofimagi- nation(althoughnottheRomanticdistinction betweenfancyandimagination).LåterNeopla- tonists,suchasProclus,takephantasiatobenec- essaryforabstractstudiessuchasgeometry,by enablingustoenvisionspatialrelations.See alsoIMAGINATION.V.C. phasespace.Seestate. phenomena.Seekant. phenomenalbody.Seeembodiment. phenomenalism,theviewthatpropositions assertingtheexistenceofphysicalobjectsare equivalentinmeaningtopropositionsasserting thatsubjectswouldhavecertainsequencesof sensationsweretheytohavecertainothers.The basicideabehindphenomenalismiscompatible withanumberofdifferentanalysesoftheselfor conscioussubject.Aphenomenalistmight understandtheselfasasubstance,aparticular, oraconstructoutofactualandpossibleexperi- ence.Theviewalsoiscompatiblewithanynum- berofdifferentanalysesofthevisual,tactile, auditory,olfactory,gustatory,andkinesthetic sensationsdescribedintheantecedentsandcon- sequentsofthesubjunctiveconditionalsthatthe phenomenalistusestoanalyzephysicalobject propositions(asillustratedinthelastparagraph). Probablythemostcommonanalysisofsensa- tionsadoptedbytraditionalphenomenalistsisa sense-datumtheory,withthesense-dataconstrued asmind-dependententities.Butthereisnothing topreventaphenomenalistfromacceptingan adverbialtheoryortheoryofappearinginstead. Theoriginsofphenomenalismaredifficultto trace,inpartbecauseearlystatementsofthe viewwereusuallynotcareful.InhisDialogues, Berkeleyhintedatphenomenalismwhenhehad Philonousexplainhowhecouldreconcilean ontologycontainingonlymindsandideaswith thestoryofacreationthattookplacebeforethe existenceofpeople.Philonousimaginesthatif hehadbeenpresentatthecreationheshould haveseenthings,i.e.,hadsensations,inthe orderdescribedintheBible.Itcanalsobe argued,however,thatJ.S.MillinAnExamina- tionofSirWilliamHamilton'sPhilosophywasthe firsttoputforthaclearlyphenomenalisticanaly- siswhenheidentifiedmatterwiththe"perma- nentpossibilityofsensation."WhenMill explainedwhatthesepermanentpossibilities are,hetypicallyusedconditionalsthatdescribe thesensationsonewouldhaveifonewere placedincertainconditions. Theattractionofclassicalphenomenalism grewwiththeriseoflogicalpositivismandits acceptanceoftheverifiabilitycriterionofmean- ing.Phenomenalistswereusuallyfoundationalists whowereconvincedthatjustifiedbeliefinthe physicalworldrestedultimatelyonournon- inferentiallyjustifiedbeliefsaboutoursensa- tions.Implicitlycommittedtotheviewthatonly deductiveandinductiveinferencesarelegiti- mate,andfurtherassumingthattobejustifiedin believingonepropositionPonthebasisof anotherE,onemustbejustifiedinbelievingboth EandthatEmakesPprobable,thephenome- nalistsawaninsuperabledifficultyinjustifying beliefinordinarystatementsaboutthephysical worldgivenprevalentconceptionsofphysical 663 phenomenalproperty phenomenology objects.Ifallweultimatelyhaveasourevidence forbelievinginphysicalobjectsiswhatweknow abouttheoccurrenceofsensation,howcanwe establishsensationasevidencefortheexistence ofphysicalobjects?Weobviouslycannotdeduce theexistenceofphysicalobjectsfromanyfinite sequenceofsensations.Thesensationscould, e.g.,behallucinatory.Nor,itseems,canwe observeacorrelationbetweensensationand somethingelseinordertogeneratethepremises ofaninductiveargumentfortheconclusionthat sensationsarereliableindicatorsofphysical objects.Thekeytosolvingthisproblem,thephe- nomenalistargues,istoreduceassertionsabout thephysicalworldtocomplicatedassertions aboutthesequencesofsensationsasubject wouldhavewerehetohavecertainothers.The truthofsuchconditionals,e.g.,thatifIhavethe clearvisualimpressionofacat,thenthereisone beforeme,mightbemind-independentinthe wayinwhichonewantsthetruthofassertions aboutthephysicalworldtobemind-indepen- dent.Andtothephenomenalisfsgreatrelief,it wouldseemthatwecouldjustifyourbeliefin suchconditionalstatementswithouthavingto correlateanythingbutsensations. Manyphilosopherstodayrejectsomeofthe epistemological,ontological,andmetaphilo- sophicalpresuppositionswithwhichphenome- nalistsapproachedtheproblemofunderstanding ourrelationtothephysicalworldthroughsen- sation.Buttheargumentthatwashistorically mostdecisiveinconvincingmanyphilosophers toabandonphenomenalismwastheargument fromperceptualrelativityfirstadvancedby Chisholmin"TheProblemofPerception." Chisholmoffersastrategyforattackinganyphe- nomenalisticanalysis.Thefirstmoveistoforce thephenomenalisttostateaconditionaldescrib- ingonlysensationsthatisanallegedconse- quenceofaphysicalobjectproposition.C.I. Lewis,e.g.,inAnAnalysisofKnowledgeandValu- ation,claimsthattheassertion(P)thatthereisa doorknobbeforemeandtotheleftentails(C) thatifIweretoseemtoseeadoorknobandseem toreachoutandtouchitthenIwouldseemto feelit.ChisholmarguesthatifPreallydidentail CthentherecouldbenoassertionRthatwhen conjoinedwithPdidnotentailC.Thereis,how- ever,suchanassertion:Iamunabletomovemy limbsandmyhandsbutamsubjecttodelusions suchthatIthinkIammovingthem;Ioftenseem tobeinitiatingagraspingmotionbutwithno feelingofcontactinganything.Chisholmargues, ineffect,thatwhatsensationsonewouldhaveif oneweretohavecertainothersalwaysdepends inpartontheintemalandexternalphysicalcon- ditionsofperceptionandthatthisfaetdoomsany attempttofindnecessaryandsufficientcondi- tionsforthetruthofaphysicalobjectproposi- tioncouchedintermsthatdescribeonly connectionsbetweensensations. Seealsoberkeley;lewis,c.i.;logical positivism;perception.R.A.F. phenomenalproperty.Seequalia. phenomenalworld.Seekant. phenomenologicalattitude.Seehusserl. phenomenologicalreduetion.Seehusserl. phenomenology,inthetwentiethcentury,the philosophydevelopedbyHusserlandsomeofhis followers.Thetermhasbeenusedsincethemid- eighteenthcenturyandreceivedacarefully definedtechnicalmeaningintheworksofboth KantandHegel,butitisnotnowusedtoreferto ahomogeneousandsystematicallydeveloped philosophicalposition.Thequestionofwhat phenomenologyismaysuggestthatphenome- nologyisoneamongthemanycontemporary philosophicalconceptionsthathaveaclearly delineatedbodyofdoctrinesandwhoseessential characteristicscanbeexpressedbyasetofwell- chosenstatements.Thisnotionisnotcorrect, however.Incontemporaryphilosophythereis nosystemorschoolcalled"phenomenology," characterizedbyaclearlydefinedbodyofteach- ings.Phenomenologyisneitheraschoolnora trendincontemporaryphilosophy.Itisrathera movementwhoseproponents,forvariousrea- sons,havepropelleditinmanydistinctdirec- tions,withtheresultthattodayitmeans differentthingstodifferentpeople. Whilewithinthephenomenologicalmove- mentasawholethereareseveralrelatedcur- rents,they,too,arebynomeanshomogeneous. Thoughthesecurrentshaveacommonpointof departure,theydonotprojecttowardthesame destination.Thethinkingofmostphenomenol- ogistshaschangedsogreatlythattheirrespective viewscanbepresentedadequatelyonlyby showingthemintheirgradualdevelopment. ThisistruenotonlyforHusserl,founderofthe phenomenologicalmovement,butalsoforsuch låterphenomenologistsasScheler,N.Hartmann, Heidegger,Sartre,andMerleau-Ponty. Toanyonewhostudiesthephenomenological movementwithoutprejudicethedifferences amongitsmanycurrentsareobvious.Ithasbeen 664 phenomenology phenomenology saidthatphenomenologyconsistsinananalysis anddescriptionofconsciousness;ithasbeen claimedalsothatphenomenologysimplyblends withexistentialism.Phenomenologyisindeed thestudyofessences,butitalsoattemptstoplace essencesbackintoexistence.Itisatranscenden- talphilosophyinterestedonlyinwhatis"left behind"afterthephenomenologicalreductionis performed,butitalsoconsiderstheworldtobe alreadytherebeforereflectionbegins.Forsome philosophersphenomenologyisspeculationon transcendentalsubjectivity,whereasforothersit isamethodforapproachingconcreteexistence. Someusephenomenologyasasearchforaphi- losophythataccountsforspace,time,andthe world,justasweexperienceand"live"them. Finally,ithasbeensaidthatphenomenologyis anattempttogiveadirectdescriptionofour experienceasitisinitselfwithouttakinginto accountitspsychologicaloriginanditscausal explanation;butHusserlspeaksofa"genetic"as wellasa"constitutive"phenomenology. Tosomepeople,findingsuchanabundanceof ideasaboutoneandthesamesubjectconstitutes asträngesituation;forothersitisannoyingto contemplatethe"confusion";andtherewillbe thosewhoconcludethataphilosophythatcan- notdefineitsownscopedoesnotdeservethedis- cussionthathasbeencarriedoninitsregard.In theopinionofmany,notonlyisthislatteratti- tudenotjustified,butpreciselytheoppositeview defendedbyThevenazshouldbeadopted.Asthe term'phenomenology'signifiesfirstandfore- mostamethodicalconception,Thevenazargues thatbecausethismethod,originallydeveloped foraveryparticularandlimitedend,hasbeen abletobranchoutinsomanyvaryingforms,it manifestsalatenttruthandpowerofrenewal thatimpliesanexceptionalfecundity. Speakingofthegreatvarietyofconceptions withinthephenomenologicalmovement,Mer- leau-Pontyremarkedthattheresponsible philosophermustrecognizethatphenomenol- ogymaybepracticedandidentifiedasamanner orastyleofthinking,andthatitexistedasa movementbeforearrivingatacompleteaware- nessofitselfasaphilosophy.Ratherthanforcea livingmovementintoasystem,then,itseems moreinkeepingwiththeidealofthehistorian aswellasthephilosophertofollowthemove- mentinitsdevelopment,andattempttodescribe andevaluatethemanybranchesinandthrough whichithasunfoldeditself.Inrealitythepicture isnotasdarkasitmayseematfirstsight. Notwithstandingtheobviousdifferences,most phenomenologistssharecertaininsightsthatare veryimportantfortheirmutualphilosophical conceptionasawhole.Inthisconnectionthefol- lowingmustbementioned: (1)Mostphenomenologistsadmitaradicaldif- ferencebetweenthe"natural"andthe"philo- sophical"attitude.Thisleadsnecessarilytoan equallyradicaldifferencebetweenphilosophy andscience.Incharacterizingthisdifference somephenomenologists,inagreementwith Husserl,stressonlyepistemologicalissues, whereasothers,inagreementwithHeidegger, focustheirattentionexclusivelyonontological topics. (2)Notwithstandingthisradicaldifference, thereisacomplicatedsetofrelationships betweenphilosophyandscience.Withinthe contextoftheserelationshipsphilosophyhasin somesenseafoundationaltaskwithrespectto thesciences,whereasscienceofferstophiloso- phyatleastasubstantialpartofitsphilosophical problematic. (3)Toachieveitstaskphilosophymustper- formacertainreduction,orepoche,aradical changeofattitudebywhichthephilosopher turnsfromthingstotheirmeanings,fromthe ontictotheontological,fromtherealmofthe objectifiedmeaningasfoundinthesciencesto therealmofmeaningasimmediatelyexperi- encedinthe"life-world."Inotherwords, althoughitremainstruethatthevariousphe- nomenologistsdifferincharacterizingthereduc- tion,nooneseriouslydoubtsitsnecessity. (4)Allphenomenologistssubscribetothedoc- trineofintentionality,thoughmostelaborate thisdoctrineintheirownway.ForHusserlinten- tionalityisacharacteristicofconsciousphenom- enaoracts;inadeepersense,itisthecharac- teristicofafiniteconsciousnessthatoriginally findsitselfwithoutaworld.ForHeideggerand mostexistentialistsitisthehumanrealityitself thatisintentional;asBeing-in-the-worldits essenceconsistsinitsek-sistence,i.e.,initsstand- ingouttowardtheworld. (5)Allphenomenologistsagreeonthefunda- mentalideathatthebasicconcernofphilosophy istoanswerthequestionconcerningthe"mean- ingandBeing"ofbeings.Allagreeinaddition thatintryingtomaterializethisgoalthephiloso- phershouldbeprimarilyinterestednotinthe ultimatecauseofallfinitebeings,butinhowthe BeingofbeingsandtheBeingoftheworldareto beconstituted.Finally,allagreethatinanswer- ingthequestionconcerningthemeaningof Beingaprivilegedpositionistobeattributedto subjectivity,i.e.,tothatbeingwhichquestions theBeingofbeings.Phenomenologistsdiffer, 665 phenotext Philolaus however,themomenttheyhavetospecifywhat ismeantbysubjectivity.Asnotedabove, whereasHusserlconceivesitasaworldless monad,Heideggerandmostlåterphenomenol- ogistsconceiveitasbeing-in-the-world.Referring toHeidegger'sreinterpretationofhisphenome- nologyHusserlwrites: onemisinterpretsmyphenomenologyback- wardsfromalevelwhichitwasitsverypur- posetoovercome,inotherwords,onehas failedtounderstandthefundamentalnovelty ofthephenomenologicalreductionand hencetheprogressfrommundanesubjectiv- ity(i.e.,man)totranscendentalsubjectivity; consequentlyonehasremainedstuckinan anthropology...whichaccordingtomydoc- trinehasnotyetreachedthegenuinephilo- sophicallevel,andwhoseinterpretationas philosophymeansalapseinto"transcenden- talanthropologism,"thatis,"psychologism." (6)Allphenomenologistsdefendacertain formofintuitionismandsubscribetowhat Husserlcallsthe"principleofallprinciples": "whateverpresentsitselfinintuition'inprimor- dialform(asitwereinitsbodilyreality),issim- plytobeacceptedasitgivesitselfouttobe, thoughonlywithinthelimitsinwhichitthen presentsitself."Hereagain,however,eachphe- nomenologistinterpretsthisprincipleinkeeping withhisgeneralconceptionofphenomenology asawhole. Thus,whilephenomenologistsdosharecer- taininsights,thedevelopmentofthemovement hasneverthelessbeensuchthatitisnotpossible togiveasimpledefinitionofwhatphenomenol- ogyis.Thefactremainsthattherearemanyphe- nomenologistsandmanyphenomenologies. Therefore,onecanonlyfaithfullyreportwhat onehasexperiencedofphenomenologybyread- ingthephenomenologists. Seealsoheidegger,husserl,merleau- PONTY,SARTRE,SCHELER.J.J.K. phenotext.Seekristeva. Philodemus.Seeepicureanism. PhiloJudaeus(c.20b.c.-a.d.40),JewishHel- lenisticphilosopherofAlexandriawhocom- posedthebulkofhisworkintheformof commentariesanddiscoursesonScripture.He madethefirstknownsustainedattempttosyn- thesizeitsrevealedteachingswiththedoctrines ofclassicalphilosophy.Althoughhewasnotthe firsttoapplythemethodsofallegoricalinterpre- tationtoScripture,thenumberandvarietyofhis interpretationsmakePhilounique.Withthis interpretivetool,hetransformedbiblicalnarra- tivesintoPlatonicaccountsofthesoul'squestfor Godanditsstruggleagainstpassion,andthe Mosaiccommandmentsintospecificmanifesta- tionsofgenerallawsofnature. Philo'smostinfluentialideawashisconcep- tionofGod,whichcombinesthepersonal,ethi- caldeityoftheBiblewiththeabstract,transcen- dentalisttheologyofPlatonismandPythagore- anism.ThePhilonicdeityisboththeloving,just GodoftheHebrewPatriarchsandtheeternal Onewhoseessenceisabsolutelyunknowable andwhocreatesthematerialworldbywillfrom primordialmatterwhichHecreatesexnihilo. Besidestheintelligiblerealmofideas,which Philoistheearliestknownphilosophertoiden- tifyasGod'sthoughts,hepositedanintermedi- atedivinebeingwhichhecalled,adopting scripturallanguage,thelogos.Althoughtheexact natureofthelogosishärdtopindown-Philo variouslyand,withoutanyconcernforconsis- tency,calleditthe"first-begottenSonofthe uncreatedFather,""SecondGod,""ideaof ideas,""archetypeofhumanreason,"and"pat- ternofcreation"-itsmainfunctionsareclear:to bridgethehugegulfbetweenthetranscendent deityandthelowerworldandtoserveasthe unifyinglawoftheuniverse,thegroundofits orderandrationality.Aphilosophicaleclectic, PhilowasunknowntomedievalJewishphiloso- phersbut,beyondhisanticipationsofNeopla- tonism,hehadalastingimpactonChristianity throughClementofAlexandria,Origen,and Ambrose. Seealsohellenisticphilosophy.J.Ste. Philolaus(4707-390?b.c),pre-SocraticGreek philosopherfromCrotoninsouthernItaly,the firstPythagoreantowriteabook.Thesurviving fragmentsofitaretheearliestprimarytextsfor Pythagoreanism,butnumerousspuriousfrag- mentshavealsobeenpreserved. Philolaus'sbookbeginswithacosmogonyand includesastronomical,medical,andpsychologi- caldoctrines.Hismajorinnovationwastoargue thatthecosmosandeverythinginitisacombi- nationnotjustofunlimlteds(whatisstruetured andordered,e.g.materialelements)butalsoof limiters(strueturalandorderingelements,e.g. shapes).Theseelementsareheldtogetherina harmonia(fittingtogether),whichcomestobein accordwithperspicuousmathematicalrelation- ships,suchasthewholenumberratiosthatcor- respondtotheharmonicintervals(e.g.octave= 666 PhiloofLarisa philosophicalanthropology 1:2).Hearguedthatsecureknowledgeispossi- bleinsofaraswegraspthenumberinaccordance withwhichthingsareputtogether.Hisastro- nomicalsystemisfamousasthefirsttomakethe earthaplanet.Alongwiththesun,moon,fixed stars,fiveplanets,andcounter-earth(thusmak- ingtheperfectnumberten),theearthcirclesthe centralfire(acombinationofthelimiter"center" andtheunlimited"fire").Philolaus'sinfluenceis seeninPlato'sPhilebus;heistheprimarysource forAristotle'saccountofPythagoreanism. Seealsopythagoras.C.A.H. PhiloofLarisa.Seeacademy. Philoponus,John.SeeJohannesphiloponus. phiIosopher'sstone.Seealchemy. philosophes.Seeencyclopedia. philosophiaperennis(Latin,'perennialphiloso- phy'),asupposedbodyoftruthsthatappearin thewritingsofthegreatphilosophers,orthe truthscommontoopposedphilosophicalview- points.Thetermisderivedfromthetitleofa book(Deperenniphilosophia)publishedby AgostinoSteucoofGubbioin1540.Itsuggests thatthedifferencesbetweenphilosophersare inessentialandsuperficialandthatthecommon essentialtruthemerges,howeverpartially,inthe majorphilosophicalschools.AldousHuxley employeditasatitle.L.Lavelle,N.Hartmann, andK.Jaspersalsoemploythephrase.M.De Wulfandmanyothersusethephrasetocharac- terizeNeo-Thomismasthechosenvehicleof essentialphilosophicaltruths.R.M. philosophicalanthropology,philosophicalin- quiryconcerninghumannature,oftenstarting withthequestionofwhatgenerallycharacter- izeshumanbeingsincontrasttootherkindsof creaturesandthings.Thusbroadlyconceived,it isakindofinquiryasoldasphilosophyitself, occupyingphilosophersfromSocratestoSartre; anditembracesphilosophicalpsychology,the philosophyofmind,philosophyofaction,and existentialism.Suchinquirypresupposesno immutable"essenceofman,"butonlythemean- ingfulnessofdistinguishingbetweenwhatis "human"andwhatisnot,andthepossibilitythat philosophyaswellasotherdisciplinesmaycon- tributetoourself-comprehension.Itleavesopen thequestionofwhetherotherkindsofnaturally occurringorartificiallyproducedentitymaypos- sessthehallmarksofourhumanity,andcounte- nancesthepossibilityofthebiologicallyevolved, historicallydeveloped,andsociallyandindivid- uallyvariablecharacterofeverythingaboutour attainedhumanity. Morenarrowlyconceived,philosophicalan- thropologyisaspecificmovementinrecent Europeanphilosophyassociatedinitiallywith SchelerandHelmuthPlessner,andsubsequently withsuchfiguresasArnoldGehlen,Cassirer,and thelåterSartre.Itinitiallyemergedinthelate 1920sinGermany,simultaneouslywiththeexis- tentialphilosophyofHeideggerandthecritical socialtheoryoftheFrankfurtSchool,withwhich itcompetedasGermanphilosophersturnedtheir attentiontothecomprehensionofhumanlife. Thismovementwasdistinguishedfromtheout- setbyitsattempttointegratetheinsightsofphe- nomenologicalanalysiswiththeperspectives attainablethroughattentiontohumanandcom- parativebiology,andsubsequentlytosocial inquiryaswell.Thistumtoamorenaturalistic approachtotheunderstandingofourselves,asa particularkindoflivingcreatureamongothers, isreflectedinthetitlesofthetwoworkspub- lishedin1928thatinauguratedthemovement: Scheler'sMan'sPlaceinNatureandPlessner'sThe LevelsoftheOrganicandMan.ForbothSchelerand Plessner,however,asforthosewhofollowed them,ournaturemustbeunderstoodbytaking furtheraccountofthesocial,cultural,andintel- lectualdimensionsofhumanlife.Eventhoselike Gehlen,whoseDerMensch(1940)exhibitsa stronglybiologicalorientation,devotedmuch attentiontothesedimensions,whichourbiolog- icalnaturebothconstrainsandmakespossible. Forallofthem,therelationbetweenthebiolog- icalandthesocialandculturaldimensionsof humanlifeisacentralconcernandakeytocom- prehendingourhumannature. Oneofthecommonthemesofthelåterphilo- sophical-anthropologicalliterature-e.g.,Cas- sirer^AnEssayonMan(1945)andSartre's CritiqueofDialecticalReason(1960)aswellas Plessner'sContitioHumana(1965)andGehlen's EarlyManandLateCulture(1963)-istheplastic- ityofhumannature,madepossiblebyourbio- logicalconstitution,andtheresultinggreat differencesinthewayshumanbeingslive.Yet thisisnottakentoprecludesayinganything meaningfulabouthumannaturegenerally; rather,itmerelyrequiresattentiontothekinds ofgeneralfeaturesinvolvedandreflectedin humandiversityandvariability. Criticsoftheveryideaandpossibilityofa philosophicalanthropology(e.g.,Althusserand Foucault)typicallyeitherdenythatthereareany 667 philosophicalbehaviorism philosophyofbiology suchgeneralfeaturesormaintainthatthereare noneoutsidetheprovinceofthebiologicalsci- ences(towhichphilosophycancontributenoth- ingsubstantive).Bothclaims,however,areopen todispute;andtheenterpriseofaphilosophical anthropologyremainsaviableandpotentially significantone. SeealsoFrankfurtschool,nietzsche. R.Sc. philosophicalbehaviorism.Seebehaviorism. philosophicalpsychology.Seephilosophyofmind. philosophicaltheology.Seemetaphysics. philosophy,critical.Seebroad,kant. philosophy,LatinAmerican.Seelatinamerican PHILOSOPHY. philosophy,speculative.Seespeculativephiloso- phy. philosophyofaction.Seeactiontheory. philosophyofart.Seeaesthetics. philosophyofbiology,thephilosophyofscience appliedtobiology.Onaconservativeviewofthe philosophyofscience,thesameprinciplesapply throughoutscience.Biologysuppliesadditional examplesbutdoesnotprovideanyspecialprob- lemsorrequirenewprinciples.Forexample,the reductionofMendeliangeneticstomolecular biologyexemplifiesthesamesortofrelationas thereductionofthermodynamicstostatistical mechanics,andthesamegeneralanalysisof reductionappliesequallytoboth.Moreradical philosophersarguethatthesubjectmatterof biologyhascertainuniquefeatures;hence,the philosophyofbiologyisitselfunique.Thethree featuresofbiologymostoftencitedbythosewho maintainthatphilosophyofbiologyisuniqueare functionalorganization,embryologicaldevelop- ment,andthenatureofselection.Organismsare functionallyorganized.Theyarecapableof maintainingtheiroverallorganizationintheface offairlyextensivevariationintheirenvison- ments.Organismsalsoundergoontogenetic developmentresultingfromextremelycomplex interactionsbetweenthegeneticmakeupofthe organismanditssuccessiveenvironments.At eachstep,thecoursethatanorganismtakesis determinedbyaninterplaybetweenitsgenetic makeup,itscurrentstateofdevelopment,and theenvironmentithappenstoconfront.The complexityoftheseinteractionsproducesthe nature-nurtureproblem.Exceptforhumanarti- facts,similarorganizationdoesnotoccurinthe non-livingworld. Thespeciesproblemisanotherclassicissuein thephilosophyofbiology.Biologicalspecieshave beenaparadigmexampleofnaturalkindssince Aristotle.Accordingtonearlyallpre-Darwinian philosophers,speciesarepartofthebasic makeupoftheuniverse,likegravityandgold. Theywereheldtobeaseternal,immutable,and discreteastheseotherexamplesofnaturalkinds. IfDarwinwasright,speciesarenoteternal.They comeandgo,andoncegonecannomore reemergethanAristotlecanonceagainwalkthe streetsofAthens.Norarespeciesimmutable.A sampleofleadcanbetransmutedintoasample ofgold,buttheseelementsaselementsremain immutableinthefaceofsuchchanges.However, Darwininsistedthatspeciesthemselves,not merelytheirinstances,evolved.Finally,because Darwinthoughtthatspeciesevolvedgradually, theboundariesbetweenspeciesarenotsharp, castingdoubtontheessentialistdoctrinesso commoninhisday.Inshort,ifspeciesevolve, theyhavenoneofthetraditionalcharacteristics ofspecies.Philosophersandbiologiststothisday areworkingouttheconsequencesofthisradical changeinourworldview. Thetopicthathasreceivedthegreatestatten- tionbyphilosophersofbiologyintherecentlit- eratureisthenatureofevolutionarytheory,in particularselection,adaptation,fitness,andthe populationstructureofspecies.Inorderfor selectiontooperate,variationisnecessary,suc- cessivegenerationsmustbeorganizedgenealog- ically,andindividualsmustinteractdifferentially withtheirenvironments.Inthesimplestcase, genespassontheirstructurelargelyintact.In addition,theyprovidetheinformationnecessary toproduceorganisms.Certainoftheseorgan- ismsarebetterabletocopewiththeirenviron- mentsandreproducethanareotherorganisms. Asaresult,genesareperpetuateddifferentially throughsuccessivegenerations.Thosecharac- teristicsthathelpanorganismcopewithitsenvi- ronmentsaretermedadaptations.Inamore restrictedsense,onlythosecharacteristicsthat arosethroughpastselectiveadvantagecountas adaptations. JustasthenotionofIQwasdevisedasasin- glemeasureforacombinationofthefactorsthat influenceourmentalabilities,fitnessisamea- sureofrelativereproductivesuccess.Claims aboutthetautologicalcharacteroftheprinciple 668 philosophyofeconomics philosophyofeconomics ofthesurvivalofthefitteststemfromtheblunt assertionthatfitnessjustisrelativereproductive success,asifintelfigencejustiswhatIQtests measure.Philosophersofbiologyhavecollabo- ratedwithbiologiststoanalyzethenotionoffit- ness.Thisliteraturehasconcentratedontherole thatcausationplaysinselectionand,hence, mustplayinanyadequateexplicationoffitness. Oneimportantdistinctionthathasemergedis betweenreplicationanddifferentialinteraction withtheenvironment.Selectionisafunctionof theinterplaybetweenthesetwoprocesses. Becauseoftheessentialroleofvariationinselec- tion,alltheorganismsthatbelongtothesame specieseitheratanyonetimeorthroughtime cannotpossiblybeessentiallythesame.Norcan speciesbetreatedadequatelyintermsofthesta- tisticalcovarianceofeithercharactersorgenes. Thepopulationalstructureofspeciesiscrucial. Forexample,speciesthatformnumerous,par- tiallyisolateddemesaremuchmorelikelytospe- ciatethanthosethatdonot.Oneespecially controversialquestioniswhetherspeciesthem- selvescanfunctionintheevolutionaryprocess ratherthansimplyresultingfromit. Althoughphilosophersofbiologyhaveplayed anincreasinglyimportantroleinbiologyitself, theyhavealsoaddressedmoretraditionalphilo- sophicalquestions,especiallyinconnectionwith evolutionaryepistemologyandethics.Advocates ofevolutionaryepistemologyarguethatknowledge canbeunderstoodintermsoftheadaptivechar- acterofaccurateknowledge.Thoseorganisms thatholdfalsebeliefsabouttheirenvironment, includingotherorganisms,arelesslikelyto reproducethemselvesthanthosewithmore accuratebeliefs.Totheextentthatthisargument hasanyforceatall,itappliesonlytohuman- sizedentitiesandevents.Onecommonresponse toevolutionaryepistemologyisthatsometimes peoplewhoholdmanifestlyfalsebeliefsflourish attheexpenseofthosewhoholdmorerealistic viewsoftheworldinwhichwelive.Onanother versionofevolutionaryepistemology,knowl- edgeacquisitionisviewedasjustonemore instanceofaselectionprocess.Theissueisnotto justifyourbeliefsbuttounderstandhowthey aregeneratedandproliferated.Advocatesofevo- lutionaryethicsattempttojustifycertainethical principlesintermsoftheirsurvivalvalue.Any behaviorthatincreasesthelikelihoodofsurvival andreproductionis"good,"andanythingthat detractsfromtheseendsis"bad."Themain objectiontoevolutionaryethicsisthatitviolates theis-oughtdistinction.Accordingtomosteth- icalsystems,weareaskedtosacrificeourselves forthegoodofothers.Iftheseotherswerelim- itedtoourbiologicalrelatives,thenthebiologi- calnotionofinclusivefitnessmightbeadequate toaccountforsuchaltruisticbehavior,butthe scopeofethicalsystemsextendspastone'sbio- logicalrelatives.Advocatesofevolutionary ethicsarehärdpressedtoexplainthefullrange ofbehaviorthatistraditionallyconsideredasvir- tuous.Eitherbiologicalevolutioncannotprovide anadequatejustificationforethicalbehavioror elseethicalsystemsmustbedrasticallyreduced intheirscope. Seealsodarwinism,essentialism,mech- ANISTICEXPLANATIONS,MENDEL,PHILOSO- PHYOFSCIENCE.D.L.H. philosophyofeconomics,thestudyofmethod- ologicalissuesfacingpositiveeconomictheory andnormativeproblemsontheintersectionof welfareeconomicsandpoliticalphilosophy. Methodologicalissues.Applyingapproaches andquestionsinthephilosophyofsciencespecif- icallytoeconomics,thephilosophyofeconomics exploresepistemologicalandconceptualprob- lemsraisedbytheexplanatoryaimsandstrategy ofeconomictheory:Doitsassumptionsabout individualchoiceconstitutelaws,anddothey explainitsderivedgeneralizationsaboutmärkets andeconomies?Arethesegeneralizationslaws, andifso,howaretheytestedbyobservationof economicprocesses,andhowaretheoriesin thevariouscompartmentsofeconomics-micro- economics,macroeconomics-relatedtoone anotherandtoeconometrics?Howarethevari- ousschools-neoclassical,institutional,Marx- ian,etc.-relatedtooneanother,andwhatsorts oftestsmightenableustochoosebetweentheir theories? Historically,thechiefissueofinterestinthe developmentofthephilosophyofeconomicshas beentheempiricaladequacyoftheassumptions ofrational"economicman":thatallagentshave completeandtransitivecardinalorordinalutil- ityrankingsorpreferenceordersandthatthey alwayschoosethatavailableoptionwhichmax- imizestheirutilityorpreferences.Sincethe actualbehaviorofagentsappearstodisconfirm theseassumptions,theclaimthattheyconstitute causallawsgovemingeconomicbehaviorisdif- ficulttosustain.Ontheotherhand,theassump- tionofpreference-maximizingbehaviorisin- dispensabletotwentieth-centuryeconomics. Thesetwoconsiderationsjointlyunderminethe claimthateconomictheoryhonorscriteriaon explanatorypowerandevidentialprobitydrawn 669 philosophyofeducation philosophyofeducation fromphysicalscience.Muchworkbyeconomists andphilosophershasbeendevotedthereforeto disputingtheclaimthattheassumptionsofratio- nalchoicetheoryarefalseortodisputingthe inferencefromthisclaimtotheconclusionthat thecognitivestatusofeconomictheoryasempir- icalscienceistherebyundermined.Mostfre- quentlyithasbeenheldthattheassumptionsof rationalchoiceareasharmlessandasindispens- ableasidealizationsareelsewhereinscience. Thisviewmustdealwiththeallegationthat unliketheoriesembodyingidealizationelse- whereinscience,economictheorygainslittle moreinpredictivepowerfromtheseassump- tionsaboutagents'calculationsthanitwould securewithoutanyassumptionsaboutindivid- ualchoice. Normativeissues.Botheconomistsandpolit- icalphilosophersareconcernedwithidentifying principlesthatwillensurejust,fair,orequitable distributionsofscarcegoods.Forthisreasonneo- classicaleconomictheorysharesahistorywith utilitarianisminmoralphilosophy.Contempo- rarywelfareeconomicscontinuestoexplorethe limitsofutilitarianprescriptionsthatoptimal economicandpoliticalarrangementsshould maximizeand/orequalizeutility,welfare,or somesurrogate.Italsoexaminestheadequacyof alternativestosuchutilitarianprinciples.Thus, economicssharesanagendaofinterestswith politicalandmoralphilosophy.Utilitarianismin economicsandphilosophyhasbeenconstrained byanearlyrealizationthatUtilitiesareneither cardinallymeasurablenorinterpersonallycom- parable.Thereforetheprescriptiontomaximize and/orequalizeutilitycannotbedetermina- tivelyobeyed.Welfaretheoristshaveneverthe- lessattemptedtoestablishprinciplesthatwill enableustodeterminetheequity,fairness,or justiceofvariouseconomicarrangements,and thatdonotrelyoninterpersonalcomparisons requiredtomeasurewhetheradistributionis maximalorequalintheutilityitaccordsall agents.Inspiredbyphilosopherswhohavesur- renderedutilitarianismforotherprinciplesof equality,fairness,orjusticeindistribution,wel- fareeconomistshaveexploredKantian,social contractarian,andcommunitarianalternatives inaresearchprogramthatcutsclearlyacross bothdisciplines. Politicalphilosophyhasalsoprofitedasmuch frominnovationsineconomictheoryaswelfare economicshasbenefitedfrommoralphilosophy. Theoremsfromwelfareeconomicsthatestablish theefficiencyofmärketsinsecuringdistributions thatmeetminimalconditionsofoptimalityand fairnesshaveledmoralphilosopherstoreexam- inethemoralstatusoffree-marketexchange. Moreover,philosophershavecometoappreciate thatcoercivesocialinstitutionsaresometimes bestunderstoodasdevicesforsecuringpublic goods-goodslikepoliceprotectionthatcannot beprovidedtothosewhopayforthemwithout alsoprovidingthemtofreeriderswhodeclineto doso.Therecognitionthateveryonewouldbe worseoff,includingfreeriders,werethecoer- cionrequiredtopayforthesegoodsnotimposed, isduetowelfareeconomicsandhasledtoasig- nificantrevivalofinterestintheworkofHobbes, whoappearstohaveprefiguredsucharguments. Seealsodecisiontheory,philosophyof THESOCIALSCIENCES,POLITICALPHILOSO- PHY,SOCIALCHOICETHEORY,UTILITARIAN- ISM.A.R. philosophyofeducation,abranchofphilosophy concernedwithvirtuallyeveryaspectofthe educationalenterprise.Itsignificantlyoverlaps other,moremainstreambranches(especially epistemologyandethics,butevenlogicand metaphysics).Thefieldmightalmostbecon- struedasa"seriesoffootnotes"toPlato'sMeno, whereinareraisedsuchfundamentalissuesas whethervirtuecanbetaught;whatvirtueis; whatknowledgeis;whattherelationbetween knowledgeofvirtueandbeingvirtuousis;what therelationbetweenknowledgeandteachingis; andhowandwhetherteachingispossible.While fewpeoplewouldsubscribetoPlato'sdoctrine (orconvenientfiction,perhaps)inMenothat learningbybeingtaughtisaprocessofrecollec- tion,theparadoxofinquirythatpromptsthis doctrineisatoncetheroottextoftheperennial debatebetweenrationalismandempiricismand aprofoundlyunsettlingindicationthatteaching passethunderstanding. Mainstreamphilosophicaltopicsconsidered withinaneducationalcontexttendtotakeona decidedlygeneticcast.So,e.g.,epistemology, whichanalyticphilosophyhastendedtoviewas ajustificatoryenterprise,becomesconcernedif notwiththehistoricaloriginsofknowledge claimsthenwiththeirgenesiswithinthemental economyofpersonsgenerally-inconsequence oftheireducations.Andevenwhenphiloso- phersofeducationcometoendorsesomething akintoPlato'sclassicaccountofknowledgeas justifiedtruebelief,theyareinclinedtosuggest, then,thattheconveyanceofknowledgevia instructionmustsomehowprovidethestudent withthejustificationalongwiththetrue 670 philosophyofhistory philosophyofhistory belief-therebyreintroducingageneticdimen- siontoatopiclonglackingone.Perhaps,indeed, analyticphilosophy'sgeneral(thoughnotuni- versal)neglectofphilosophyofeducationis traceableinsomemeasuretothelatter'salmost inevitablygeneticperspective,whichtheformer tendedtodecryasarmchairscienceandasa threattotheautonomyandintegrityofproper philosophicalinquiry.Ifthishasbeenabasisfor neglect,thenphilosophy'smorerecent,postan- alyticturntowardnaturalizedinquiriesthat rejectanydichotomybetweenempiricaland philosophicalinvestigationsmaymakephiloso- phyofeducationamoreinvitingarea. AlfredNorthWhitehead,himselfaleading lightinthephilosophyofeducation,once remarkedthatwearelivingintheperiodofedu- cationalthoughtsubjecttotheinfluenceof Dewey,andthereisstillnodenyingtheobserva- tion.Dewey'sinstrumentalism,hisspecialbrand ofpragmatism,informshisextraordinarilycom- prehensiveprogressivephilosophyofeducation; andheoncewentsofarastodefineallofphi- losophyasthegeneraltheoryofeducation.He identifiestheeducativeprocesswiththegrowth ofexperience,withgrowingasdeveloping- whereexperienceistobeunderstoodmorein activeterms,asinvolvingdoingthingsthat changeone'sobjectiveenvironmentandinternal conditions,thaninthepassiveterms,say,of Locke's"impression"modelofexperience.Even traditionalisticphilosophersofeducation,most notablyMaritain,haveacknowledgedthewis- domofDeweyaneducationalmeans,andhave, inthefaceofDewey'scommandingphilosophi- calpresence,reframedthedebatewithprogres- sivistsasoneaboutappropriateeducational ends-therebyinsufficientlyacknowledging Dewey'strenchantcritiqueofthemeans-end distinction.Andevensomerecentanalytic philosophersofeducation,suchasR.S.Peters, canbereadasiftranslatingDeweyaninsights (e.g.,abouttheaimofeducation)intoanana- lyticidiom. Analyticphilosophyofeducation,ascharted byPeters,IsraelScheffler,andothersinthe Anglo-Americanphilosophicaltradition,has usedthetoolsoflinguisticanalysisonawide varietyofeducationalconcepts(learning,teach- ing,training,conditioning,indoctrinating,etc.) andinvestigatedtheirinterconnections:Does teachingentaillearning?Doesteaching inevitablyinvolveindoctrinating?etc.Thiscare- ful,subtle,andphilosophicallysophisticated workhasmadepossibleamuch-neededconcep- tualprecisionineducationaldebates,thoughthe debaterswhomostinfluencepublicopinionand policyhaverarelyavailedthemselvesofthatpre- cisification.Recentworkinphilosophyofeduca- tion,however,hastakenupsomemajor educationalobjectives-moralandothervalues, criticalandcreativethinking-inawaythat promisestohaveanimpactontheactualcon- ductofeducation.Philosophyofeducation,long isolated(inschoolsofeducation)fromtherestof theacademicphilosophicalcommunity,hasalso beensomewhatestrangedfromtheprofessional educationalmainstream.Deweywouldsurely haveapprovedofachangeinthisstatusquo. Seealsodewey,epistemology,piaget, PLATO,PRAGMATISM,VIRTUEETHICS.D.M.S. philosophyofhistory,thephilosophicalstudyof humanhistoryandofattemptstorecordand interpretit.'History'inEnglish(anditsequiva- lentinmostmodernEuropeanlanguages)has twoprimarysenses:(I)thetemporalprogression oflarge-scalehumaneventsandactions,pri- marilybutnotexclusivelyinthepast;and(2)the disciplineorinquiryinwhichknowledgeofthe humanpastisacquiredorsought.Thishasledto twosensesof'philosophyofhistory',depending onwhich"history"hasbeentheobjectof philosophers'attentions.Philosophyofhistory inthefirstsenseisoftencalledsubstantive(or speculative),andplacedundermetaphysics.Phi- losophyofhistoryinthesecondsenseiscalled critical(oranalytic)andcanbeplacedinepiste- mology. Substantivephilosophyofhistory.IntheWest, substantivephilosophyofhistoryisthoughtto beginonlyintheChristianera.IntheCityofGod, AugustinewonderswhyRomeflourishedwhile pagan,yetfellintodisgraceafteritsconversion toChristiantity.Divinerewardandpunishment shouldapplytowholepeoples,notjusttoindi- viduals.Theunfoldingofeventsinhistory shouldexhibitaplanthatisintelligibleratio- nally,morally,and(forAugustine)theologically. AsabelieverAugustineisconvincedthatthere issuchaplan,thoughitmaynotalwaysbeevi- dent.Inthemodernperiod,philosopherssuchas VicoandHerderalsosoughtsuchintelligibilityin history.Theyalsobelievedinalong-termdirec- tionorpurposeofhistorythatisoftenopposed toandmakesuseofthepurposesofindividuals. Themostelaborateandbest-knownexampleof thisapproachisfoundinHegel,whothought thatthegradualrealizationofhumanfreedom couldbediscernedinhistoryevenifmuchslav- ery,tyranny,andsufferingarenecessaryinthe 671 philosophyofhistory philosophyofhistory process.Marx,too,claimedtoknowthe laws-inhiscaseeconomic-accordingtowhich historyunfolds.Similarsearchesforoverall "meaning"inhumanhistoryhavebeenunder- takeninthetwentiethcentury,notablyby ArnoldToynbee(1889-1975),authorofthe twelve-volumeStudyofHistory,andOswald Spengler(1880-1936),authorofDeclineofthe West.Butthewholeenterprisewasdenounced bythepositivistsandneo-Kantiansofthelate nineteenthcenturyasirresponsiblemetaphysi- calspeculation.Thisattitudewassharedby twentieth-centuryneopositivistsandsomeof theirheirsintheanalytictradition.Thereissome ironyinthis,sincepositivism,explicitlyin thinkerslikeComteandimplicitlyinothers, involvesbeliefinprogressivelyenlightened stagesofhumanhistorycrownedbythemodern ageofscience. Criticalphilosophyofhistory.Thecriticalphi- losophyofhistory,i.e.,theepistemologyofhis- toricalknowledge,canbetracedtothelate nineteenthcenturyandhasbeendominatedby theparadigmofthenaturalsciences.Thosein thepositivist,neopositivist,andpostpositivist tradition,inkeepingwiththeideaoftheunityof science,believethattoknowthehistoricalpast istoexplaineventscausally,andallcausalexpla- nationisultimatelyofthesamesort.Toexplain humaneventsistoderivethemfromlaws, whichmaybesocial,psychological,andperhaps ultimatelybiologicalandphysical.Againstthis reductionism,theneo-KantiansandDilthey arguedthathistory,likeotherhumanisticdisci- plines(Geisteswissenschaften),followsirreducible rulesofitsown.Itisconcernedwithparticular eventsordevelopmentsfortheirownsake,not asinstancesofgenerallaws,anditsaimisto understand,ratherthanexplain,humanactions. Thisdebatewasresurrectedinthetwentieth centuryintheEnglish-speakingworld.Philoso- pherslikeHempelandMortonWhite(b.1917) elaboratedonthenotionofcausalexplanationin history,whileCollingwoodandWilliamDray (b.1921)describedthe"understanding"ofhis- toricalagentsasgraspingthethoughtbehindan actionordiscoveringitsreasonsratherthanits causes.Thecomparisonwithnaturalscience,and thedebatebetweenreductionistsandanti- reductionists,dominatedotherquestionsaswell: Canorshouldhistorybeobjectiveandvalue- free,assciencepurportedlyis?Whatisthesig- nificanceofthefactthathistorianscannever perceivetheeventsthatinterestthem,sincethey areinthepast?Aretheynotlimitedbytheir pointofview,theirplaceinhistory,inawaysci- entistsarenot?Somepositivistswereinclinedto excludehistoryfromscience,ratherthanmake itintoone,relegatingitto"literature"becauseit couldnevermeetthestandardsofobjectivityand genuineexplanation;itwasoftentheanti-posi- tivistswhodefendedthecognitivelegitimacyof ourknowledgeofthepast. Inthenon-reductionisttradition,philoso- phershaveincreasinglystressedthenarrative characterofhistory:tounderstandhuman actionsgenerally,andpastactionsinparticular, istotellacoherentstoryaboutthem.History, accordingtoW.B.Gallie(b.1912),isaspeciesof thegenusStory.Historydoesnotthereby becomefiction:narrativeremainsa"cognitive instrument"(LouisMink,1921-83)justas appropriatetoitsdomainastheoryconstruction istoscience.Nevertheless,conceptspreviously associatedwithfictionalnarratives,suchasplot structureandbeginning-middle-end,areseenas applyingtohistoricalnarrativesaswell.Thistra- ditioniscarriedfurtherbyHaydenWhite (b.1928),whoanalyzesclassicalnineteenth-cen- turyhistories(andevensubstantivephilosophies ofhistorysuchasHegel's)asinstancesof romance,comedy,tragedy,andsatire.InWhite's workthismodeofanalysisleadshimtosome skepticismabouthistory'scapacityto"represent" therealityofthepast:narrativesseemtobe imposeduponthedata,oftenforideologicalrea- sons,ratherthandrawnfromthem.Tosome extentWhite'sviewjoinsthatofsomepositivists whobelievethathistory'sliterarycharacter excludesitfromtherealmofscience.Butfor Whitethisishardlyadefect.Somephilosophers havecriticizedtheemphasisonnarrativeindis- cussionsofhistory,sinceitneglectssearchand discovery,decipheringandevaluatingsources, etc,whichismoreimportanttohistoriansthan thewaythey"writeup"theirresults.Further- more,notallhistoryispresentedinnarrative form.Thedebatebetweenpro-andanti-narra- tivistsamongphilosophersofhistoryhasitspar- allelinasimilardebateamonghistorians themselves.Academichistoryinrecenttimeshas seenastrongtumawayfromtraditionalpoliti- calhistorytowardsocial,cultural,andeconomic analysesofthehumanpast.Narrativeisassoci- atedwiththesupposedlyoutmodedfocusonthe doingsofkings,popes,andgenerals.Theseare considered(e.g.bytheFrenchhistorianFernand Braudel,1902-85)merelysurfaceripplescom- paredtothedeeper-lyingandslower-moving currentsofsocialandeconomicchange.Itisthe methodsandconceptsofthesocialsciences,not 672 philosophyoflanguage philosophyoflanguage theartofthestoryteller,onwhichthehistorian mustdraw.Thisdebatehasnowlöstsomeofits steamandnarrativehistoryhasmadesomething ofacomebackamonghistorians.Amongphi- losophersPaulRicoeurhastriedtoshowthat evenostensiblynon-narrativehistoryretains narrativefeatures. Historicity.Historicity(orhistoricality: Geschichtlichkeit)isatermusedinthephenome- nologicalandhermeneutictradition(from DiltheyandHusserlthroughHeideggerand Gadamer)toindicateanessentialfeatureof humanexistence.Personsarenotmerelyinhis- tory;theirpast,includingtheirsocialpast,figures intheirconceptionofthemselvesandtheir futurepossibilities.Someawarenessofthepast isthusconstitutiveoftheself,priortobeing formedintoacognitivediscipine. Modernismandthepostmodern.Itispossible toviewsomeofthedebatesöverthemodernand postmoderninrecentContinentalphilosophyas anewkindofphilosophyofhistory.Philoso- pherslikeLyotardandFoucaultseethemodern astheperiodfromtheEnlightenmentandRo- manticismtothepresent,characterizedchiefly bybeliefin"grandnarratives"ofhistorical progress,whethercapitalist,Marxist,orposi- tivist,with"man"asthetriumphantheroofthe story.Suchbeliefisnowbeing(orshouldbe) abandoned,bringingmodernismtoanend.In onesensethisislikeearlierattacksonthesub- stantivephilosophyofhistory,sinceitunmasks asunjustifiedmoralizingcertainbeliefsabout large-scalepatternsinhistory.Itgoesevenfur- therthantheearlierattack,sinceitfindsthese beliefsatworkevenwheretheyarenotexplic- itlyexpressed.Inanothersensethisisacontin- uationofthesubstantivephilosophyofhistory, sinceitmakesitsowngrandclaimsaboutlarge- scalehistoricalpatterns.Inthisitjoinshands withotherphilosophersofourdayinageneral historicizationofknowledge(e.g.,thephiloso- phyofsciencemergeswiththehistoryofsci- ence)andevenofphilosophyitself.Thusthe låterHeidegger-andmorerecentlyRichard Rorty-viewphilosophyitselfasalarge-scale episodeinWesternhistorythatisnearingorhas reacheditsend.Philosophythusmergeswiththe historyofphilosophy,butonlythankstoaphilo- sophicalreflectiononthishistoryaspartofhis- toryasawhole. Seealsoexplanation,hegel,histori- CISM,PHILOSOPHYOFTHESOCIALSCIENCES, VERSTEHEN.D.C. philosophyoflanguage,thephilosophicalstudy ofnaturallanguageanditsworkings,particularly oflinguisticmeaningandtheuseoflanguage.A naturallanguageisanyoneofthethousandsof varioustonguesthathavedevelopedhistorically amongpopulationsofhumanbeingsandhave beenusedforeverydaypurposes-including English,Italian,Swahili,andLatin-asopposed totheformålandotherartificial"languages" inventedbymathematicians,logicians,andcom- puterscientists,suchasarithmetic,thepredicate calculus,andLISPorCOBOL.Thereareinter- mediatecases,e.g.,Esperanto,PigLatin,andthe sortof"philosophese"thatmixesEnglishwords withlogicalsymbols.Contemporaryphilosophy oflanguagecentersonthetheoryofmeaning, butalsoincludesthetheoryofreference,thethe- oryoftruth,philosophicalpragmatics,andthe philosophyoflinguistics. Themainquestionaddressedbythetheoryof meaningis:Invirtueofwhatarecertainphysi- calmarksornoisesmeaningfullinguisticexpres- sions,andinvirtueofwhatdoesanyparticular setofmarksornoiseshavethedistinctivemean- ingitdoes?Atheoryofmeaningshouldalsogive acomprehensiveaccountofthe"meaningphe- nomena,"orgeneralsemanticpropertiesofsen- tences:synonymy,ambiguity,entailment,and thelike.Sometheoristshavethoughttoexpress thesequestionsandissuesintermsoflanguage- neutralitemscalledpropositions:'Invirtueof whatdoesaparticularsetofmarksornoises expressthepropositionitdoes?';ef.'"Laneigeest blanche"expressesthepropositionthatsnowis white',and'Synonymoussentencesexpressthe sameproposition'.Onthisview,tounderstanda sentenceisto"grasp"thepropositionexpressed bythatsentence.Buttheexplanatoryroleand eventheexistenceofsuchentitiesaredisputed. Ithasoftenbeenmaintainedthatcertainspe- cialsentencesaretruesolelyinvirtueoftheir meaningsand/orthemeaningsoftheircompo- nentexpressions,withoutregardtowhatthe nonlinguisticworldislike('Nobachelorismar- ried';'Ifathingisblueitiscolored').Suchvacu- ouslytruesentencesarecalledanalytic.However, Quineandothershavedisputedwhetherthere reallyissuchathingasanalyticity. Philosophershaveofferedanumberofsharply competinghypothesesastothenatureofmean- ing,including:(1)thereferentialviewthat wordsmeanbystandingforthings,andthata sentencemeanswhatitdoesbecauseitsparts correspondreferentiallytotheelementsofan actualorpossiblestateofaffairsintheworld;(2) ideationalormentalisttheories,accordingto 673 philosophyoflanguage philosophyoflanguage whichmeaningsareideasorotherpsychological phenomenainpeople'sminds;(3)"use"theo- ries,inspiredbyWittgensteinandtoalesser extentbyJ.L.Austin:alinguisticexpression's "meaning"isitsconventionallyassignedroleas agame-piece-liketokenusedinoneormore existingsocialpractices;(4)Grice'shypothesis thatasentence'sorword'smeaningisafunction ofwhataudienceresponseatypicalspeaker wouldintendtoelicitinutteringit;(5)inferen- tialroletheories,asdevelopedbyWilfridSellars outofCarnap'sandWittgenstein'sviews:asen- tence'smeaningisspecifiedbythesetofsen- tencesfromwhichitcancorrectlybeinferred andthesetofthosewhichcanbeinferredfrom it(Sellarshimselfprovidedfor"language-entry" and"language-exit"movesaspartlyconstitutive ofmeaning,inadditiontoinferences);(6)verifi- cationism,theviewthatasentence'smeaningis thesetofpossibleexperiencesthatwouldcon- firmitorprovideevidenceforitstruth;(7)the truth-conditionaltheory:asentence'smeaning isthedistinctiveconditionunderwhichitistrue, thesituationorstateofaffairsthat,ifitobtained, wouldmakethesentencetrue;(8)thenull hypothesis,oreliminativistview,that"meaning" isamythandthereisnosuchthing-aradical claimthatcanstemeitherfromQuine'sdoctrine oftheindeterminacyoftranslationorfromelim- inativematerialisminthephilosophyofmind. FollowingtheoriginalworkofCarnap,Alonzo Church,Hintikka,andRichardMontagueinthe 1950s,thetheoryofmeaninghasmadeincreas- inguseof"possibleworlds"-basedintensional logicasananalyticalapparatus.Propositions (sentencemeaningsconsideredasentities),and truthconditionsasin(7)above,arenowcom- monlytakentobestructuredsetsofpossible worlds-e.g.,thesetofworldsfwwhichAristotle's maternalgrandmotherhatesbroccoli.Andthe structureimposedonsuchaset,corresponding totheintuitiveconstituentstructureofapropo- sition(astheconcepts'grandmother'and'hate' areconstituentsoftheforegoingproposition), accountsforthemeaning-propertiesofsen- tencesthatexpresstheproposition. Theoriesofmeaningcanalsobecalledseman- tics,asin"Griceansemantics"or"Verificationist semantics,"thoughthetermissometimesre- strictedtoreferentialand/ortruth-conditional theories,whichpositmeaning-constitutiverela- tionsbetweenwordsandthenonlinguistic world.Semanticsisoftencontrastedwithsyntax, thestructureofgrammaticallypermissibleorder- ingrelationsbetweenwordsandotherwordsin well-formedsentences,andwithpragmatics,the rulesgoverningtheuseofmeaningfulexpres- sionsinparticularspeechcontexts;butlinguists havefoundthatsemanticphenomenacannotbe keptpurelyseparateeitherfromsyntacticor frompragmaticphenomena. Inastillmorespecializedusage,linguistic semanticsisthedetailedstudy(typicallywithin thetruth-conditionalformat)ofparticulartypes ofconstructioninparticularnaturallanguages, e.g.,belief-clausesinEnglishoradverbial phrasesinKwakiutl.Linguisticsemanticsinthat senseispracticedbysomephilosophersoflan- guage,bysomelinguists,andoccasionallyby bothworkingtogether.Montaguegrammarand situationsemanticsarecommonformatsfor suchwork,bothbasedonintensionallogic. Thetheoryofreferenceispursuedwhetherornot oneacceptseitherthereferentialorthetruth- conditionaltheoryofmeaning.Itsmainquestion is:Invirtueofwhatdoesalinguisticexpression designateoneormorethingsintheworld?(Prior totheorizinganddefiningoftechnicaluses,'des- ignate','denote',and'refer'areusedinter- changeably.)Denotingexpressionsaredivided intosingularterms,whichpurporttodesignate particularindividualthings,andgeneralterms, whichcanapplytomorethanonethingatonce. Singulartermsincludepropernames('Cindy', 'Bangladesh'),definitedescriptions('my brother','thefirstbabybornintheNewWorld'), andsingularpronounsofvarioustypes('this', 'you','she').Generaltermsincludecommon nouns('horse','trashcan'),mässterms('water', 'graphite'),andpluralpronouns('they','those'). Thetwentiethcentury'sdominanttheoryof referencehasbeenthedescriptiontheory,theview thatlinguistictermsreferbyexpressingdescrip- tivefeaturesorproperties,thereferentbeingthe itemoritemsthatinfactpossessthoseproper- ties.Forexample,adefinitedescriptiondoesthat directly:'Mybrother'denoteswhateverperson doeshavethepropertyofbeingmybrother. Accordingtothedescriptiontheoryofproper names,defendedmostarticulatelybyRussell, suchnamesexpressidentifyingpropertiesindi- rectlybyabbreviatingdefinitedescriptions.A generaltermsuchas'horse'wasthoughtofas expressingadusterofpropertiesdistinctiveof horses;andsoforth.Butthedescriptiontheory cameunderheavyattackinthelate1960s,from KeithDonnellan,Kripke,andPutnam,andwas generallyabandonedoneachofseveral grounds,infavörofthecausal-historicaltheoryof reference.Thecausal-historicalideaisthatapar- ticularuseofalinguisticexpressiondenotesby beingetiologicallygroundedinthethingor 674 philosophyoflanguage philosophyoflanguage groupthatisitsreferent;ahistoricalcausalchain ofacertainshapeleadsbackwardintimefrom theactofreferringtothereferent(s).More recently,problemswiththecausal-historical theoryasoriginallyformulatedhaveledre- searcherstobackpedalsomewhatandincorpo- ratesomefeaturesofthedescriptiontheory. Otherviewsofreferencehavebeenadvocatedas well,particularlyanaloguesofsomeofthethe- oriesofmeaninglistedabove-chiefly(2)-(6) and(8). Modalandpropositional-attitudecontexts createspecialproblemsinthetheoryofrefer- ence,forreferringexpressionsseemtoaltertheir normalsemanticbehaviorwhentheyoccur withinsuchcontexts.Muchinkhasbeenspilled överthequestionofwhyandhowthesubstitu- tionofatermforanothertermhavingexactly thesamereferentcanchangethetruth-valueof acontainingmodalorpropositional-attitude sentence. Interestingly,thetheoryoftruthhistorically predatesarticulatestudyofmeaningorofrefer- ence,forphilosophershavealwayssoughtthe natureoftruth.Ithasoftenbeenthoughtthata sentenceistrueinvirtueofexpressingatrue belief,truthbeingprimarilyapropertyofbeliefs ratherthanoflinguisticentities;butthemain theoriesoftruthhavealsobeenappliedtosen- tencesdirectly.Thecorrespondencetheorymain- tainsthatasentenceistrueinvirtueofits elements'mirroringafactoractualstateof affairs.Thecoherencetheoryinsteadidentifies truthasarelationofthetruesentencetoother sentences,usuallyanepistemicrelation.Prag- matictheorieshaveitthattruthisamattereither ofpracticalutilityorofidealizedepistemicwar- rant.Deflationaryviews,suchasthetraditional redundancytheoryandD.Grover,J.Camp,and N.D.Belnap'sprosententialtheory,denythattruth comestoanythingmoreimportantorsubstan- tivethanwhatisalreadycodifiedinarecursive Tarskiantruth-definitionforalanguage. Pragmaticsstudiestheuseoflanguageincon- text,andthecontext-dependenceofvarious aspectsoflinguisticinterpretation.First,oneand thesamesentencecanexpressdifferentmean- ingsorpropositionsfromcontexttocontext, owingtoambiguityortoindexicalityorboth.An ambiguoussentencehasmorethanonemeaning, eitherbecauseoneofitscomponentwordshas morethanonemeaning(as'bank'has)or becausethesentenceadmitsofmorethanone possiblesyntacticanalysis('Visitingdoctorscan betedious','Themousetoreupthestreet').An indexicalsentencecanchangeintruth-value fromcontexttocontextowingtothepresenceof anelementwhosereferencefluctuates,suchasa demonstrativepronoun('Shetoldhimoffyes- terday','It'stimeforthatmeetingnow').One branchofpragmaticsinvestigateshowcontext determinesasinglepropositionalmeaningfora sentenceonaparticularoccasionofthatsen- tence^use. Speechacttheoryisasecondbranchofpragmat- icsthatpresumesthepropositionalor"locution- ary"meaningsofutterancesandstudieswhat J.L.Austincalledtheillocutionaryforcesof thoseutterances,thedistinctivetypesoflinguis- ticactthatareperformedbythespeakerinmak- ingthem.(E.g.,inuttering'Iwillbethere tonight',aspeakermightbeissuingawarning, utteringathreat,makingapromise,ormerely offeringaprediction,dependingonconventional andothersocialfeaturesofthesituation.Acrude testofillocutionaryforceisthe"hereby"crite- rion:one'sutterancehastheforceof,say,a warning,ifitcouldfairlyhavebeenparaphrased bythecorresponding"explicitlyperformative" sentencebeginning'Iherebywarnyouthat ...'.)Speechacttheoryinteractstosomeextent withsemantics,especiallyinthecaseofexplicit performatives,andithassomefairlydramatic syntacticeffectsaswell. Athirdbranchofpragmatics(notaltogether separatefromthesecond)isthetheoryofconver- salionortheoryofimplicature,foundedinthe 1960sbyGrice.Gricenotedthatsentences, whenutteredinparticularcontexts,oftengen- erate"implications"thatarenotlogicalconse- quencesofthosesentences('IsJonesagood philosopher?'-'Hehasveryneathandwriting'). Suchimplicationscanusuallybeidentifiedas whatthespeakermeantinutteringhersentence; thus(forthatreasonandothers),whatGrice callsutterer'smeaningcandivergesharplyfrom sentence-meaningor"timeless"meaning.To explainthosenon-logicalimplications,Grice offeredanowwidelyacceptedtheoryofconversa- tionalimplicature.Conversationalimplicatures arisefromtheinteractionofthesentenceuttered withmutuallysharedbackgroundassumptions andcertainprinciplesofefficientandcooperative conversation. Thephilosophyoflinguisticsstudiestheaca- demicdisciplineoflinguistics,particularlytheo- reticallinguisticsconsideredasascienceor purportedscience;itexaminesmethodologyand fundamentalassumptions,andalsotriesto incorporatelinguists'findingsintotherestof philosophyoflanguage.Theoreticallinguistics concentratesonsyntax,andtookitscontempo- 675 philosophyoflaw philosophyoflaw raryforminthe1950sunderZelligHarrisand Chomsky:itseekstodescribeeachnaturallan- guageintermsofagenerativegrammarforthat language,i.e.,asetofrecursiverulesforcom- biningwordsthatwillgenerateallandonlythe "well-formedstrings"orgrammaticalsentences ofthatlanguage.Thesetmustbefiniteandthe rulesrecursivebecause,whileourinformation- processingresourcesforrecognizinggrammati- calstringsassucharenecessarilyfinite(being subagenciesofourbrains),thereisnolimitin anynaturallanguageeithertothelengthofasin- glegrammaticalsentenceortothenumberof grammaticalsentences;asmalldevicemusthave infmitegenerativeandparsingcapacity.Many grammarsworkbygeneratingsimple"deep structures"(akindoftreediagram),andthen producingmultiple"surfacestructures"asvari- antsofthosedeepstructures,bymeansofrules thatrearrangetheirparts.Thesurfacestructures aresyntacticparsingsofnatural-languagesen- tences,andthedeepstructuresfromwhichthey deriveencodebothbasicgrammaticalrelations betweenthesentences'majorconstituentsand, onsometheories,thesentences'mainsemantic propertiesaswell;thus,sentencesthatsharea deepstructurewillsharesomefundamental grammaticalpropertiesandallormostoftheir semantics. AsPaulZiffandDavidsonsawinthe1960s,the foregoingsyntacticproblemanditssolutionhad semanticanalogues.Fromsmallresources, humanspeakersunderstand-computethe meaningsof-arbitrarilylongandnovelsen- tenceswithoutlimit,andalmostinstanta- neously.Thisabilityseemstorequiresemantic compositionality,thethesisthatthemeaningofa sentenceisafunctionofthemeaningsofits semanticprimitivesorsmallestmeaningfulparts, builtupbywayofsyntacticcompounding.Com- positionalityalsoseemstoberequiredbylearn- ability,sinceanormalchildcanlearnan infinitelycomplexdialectinatmosttwoyears, butmustleamsemanticprimitivesoneatatime. Agrammarforanaturallanguageiscom- monlytakentobeapieceofpsychology,partof anexplanationofspeakers'verbalabilitiesand behavior.Assuch,however,itisaconsiderable idealization:itisatheoryofspeakers'linguistic "competence"ratherthanoftheiractualverbal performance.Thelatterdistinctionisrequiredby thefactthatspeakers'considered,reflective judgmentsofgrammaticalcorrectnessdonot lineupverywellwiththeclassofexpressions thatactuallyareutteredandunderstoodunre- flectivelybythosesamespeakers.Somegram- maticalsentencesaretoohärdforspeakersto parsequickly;somearetoolongtofinishparsing atall;speakerscommonlyutterwhattheyknow tobeformallyungrammaticalstrings;andreal speechisusuallyfragmentary,interspersedwith vocalizations,falsestarts,andthelike.Actual departuresfromformålgrammaticalityare ascribedbylinguiststo"performancelimita- tions,"i.e.,psychologicalfactorssuchasmemory failure,weakcomputationalcapacity,orheed- lessness;thus,actualverbalbehavioristobe explainedasresultingfromtheperturbationof competencebyperformancelimitations. Seealsogrammar,meaning,speechact THEORY,THEORYOFDESCRIPTIONS,TRUTH. W.G.L. philosophyoflaw,alsocalledgeneraljurispru- dence,thestudyofconceptualandtheoretical problemsconcemingthenatureoflawassuch, orcommontoanylegalsystem. Problemsinthephilosophyoflawfallroughly intotwogroups.Thefirstcontainsproblems internaltolawandlegalsystemsassuch.These include(a)thenatureoflegalrules;thecondi- tionsunderwhichtheycanbesaidtoexistand toinfluencepractice;theirnormativecharacter, asmandatoryoradvisory;andthe(in)determi- nacyoftheirlanguage;(b)thestructureandlog- icalcharacteroflegalnorms;theanalysisoflegal principlesasaclassoflegalnorms;andtherela- tionbetweenthenormativeforceoflawand coercion;(c)theidentityconditionsforlegalsys- tems;whenalegalsystemexists;andwhenone legalsystemendsandanotherbegins;(d)the natureofthereasoningusedbycourtsinadjudi- catingcases;(e)thejustificationoflegaldeci- sions;whetherlegaljustificationisthrougha chainofinferencesörbythecoherenceofnorms anddecisions;andtherelationbetweenintrale- galandextralegaljustification;(f)thenatureof legalvalidityandofwhatmakesanormavalid law;therelationbetweenvalidityandefficacy, thefactthatthenormsofalegalsystemare obeyedbythenorm-subjects;(g)propertiesof legalsystems,includingcomprehensiveness(the claimtoregulateanybehavior)andcomplete- ness(theabsenceofgapsinthelaw);(h)legal rights;underwhatconditionscitizenspossess them;andtheiranalyticalstructureasprotected normativepositions;(i)legalinterpretation; whetheritisapervasivefeatureoflaworis foundonlyincertainkindsofadjudication;its rationalityorotherwise;anditsessentiallyideo- logicalcharacterorotherwise. Thesecondgroupofproblemsconcernsthe 676 philosophyofliberation philosophyofliterature relationbetweenlawasoneparticularsocial institutioninasocietyandthewiderpoliticaland morallifeofthatsociety:(a)thenatureoflegal obligation;whetherthereisanobligation,prima facieorfinal,toobeythelawassuch;whether thereisanobligationtoobeythelawonlywhen certainstandardsaremet,andifso,whatthose standardsmightbe;(b)theauthorityoflaw;and theconditionsunderwhichalegalsystemhas politicalormoralauthorityorlegitimacy;(c)the functionsoflaw;whethertherearefunctions performedbyalegalsysteminasocietythatare internaltothedesignoflaw;andanalysesfrom theperspectiveofpoliticalmoralityofthefunc- tioningoflegalsystems;(d)thelegalconceptof responsibility;itsanalysisanditsrelationto moralandpoliticalconceptsofresponsibility;in particular,theplaceofmentalelementsand causalelementsintheassignmentofresponsi- bility,andtheanalysisofthoseelements;(e)the analysisandjustificationoflegalpunishment;(f) legalliberty,andtheproperlimitsorotherwise oftheintrusionofthelegalsystemintoindivid- ualliberty;theplausibilityoflegalmoralism;(g) therelationbetweenlawandjustice,andthe roleofalegalsysteminthemaintenanceofsocial justice;(h)therelationbetweenlegalrightsand politicalormoralrights;(i)thestatusoflegalrea- soningasaspeciesofpracticalreasoning;andthe relationbetweenlawandpracticalreason;(j) lawandeconomics;whetherlegaldecisionmak- inginfacttracks,orotherwiseoughttotrack, economicefficiency;(k)legalsystemsassources ofandembodimentsofpoliticalpower;andlaw asessentiallygendered,orimbuedwithraceor classbiases,orotherwise. Theoreticalpositionsinthephilosophyoflaw tendtogroupintothreelargekinds-legalposi- tivism,naturallaw,andlegalrealism.Legalpos- itivismconcentratesonthefirstsetofproblems, andtypicallygivesformålorcontent-indepen- dentsolutionstosuchproblems.Forexample, legalpositivismtendstoregardlegalvalidityasa propertyofalegalrulethattherulederives merelyfromitsformålrelationtootherlegal rules;amorallyiniquitouslawisstillforlegal positivismavalidlegalruleifitsatisfiesthe requiredformålexistenceconditions.Legal rightsexistasnormativeconsequencesofvalid legalrules;noquestionsofthestatusoftheright fromthepointofviewofpoliticalmoralityarise. Legalpositivismdoesnotdenytheimportanceof thesecondsetofproblems,butassignsthetask oftreatingthemtootherdisciplines-political philosophy,moralphilosophy,sociology,psy- chology,andsoforth.Questionsofhowsociety shoulddesignitslegalinstitutions,forlegalpos- itivism,arenottechnicallyspeakingproblemsin thephilosophyoflaw,althoughmanylegalpos- itivistshavepresentedtheirtheoriesaboutsuch questions. Naturallawtheoryandlegalrealism,bycon- trast,regardthesharpdistinctionbetweenthe twokindsofproblemasanartifactoflegalposi- tivismitself.Theiranswerstothefirstsetofprob- lemstendtobesubstantiveorcontent-depen- dent.Naturallawtheory,forexample,would regardthequestionofwhetheralawwasconso- nantwithpracticalreason,orwhetheralegal systemwasmorallyandpoliticallylegitimate,as inwholeorinpartdeterminativeoftheissueof legalvalidity,orofwhetheralegalnormgranted alegalright.Thetheorywouldregardtherela- tionbetweenalegalsystemandlibertyorjustice asinwholeorinpartdeterminativeofthenor- mativeforceandthejustificationforthatsystem anditslaws.Legalrealism,especiallyinitscon- temporarypoliticizedform,seestheclaimedrole ofthelawinlegitimizingcertaingender,race,or classinterestsastheprimesalientpropertyoflaw fortheoreticalanalysis,andquestionsofthe determinacyoflegalrulesoroflegalinterpreta- tionorlegalrightasofvalueonlyintheservice oftheprojectofexplainingthepoliticalpowerof lawandlegalsystems. Seealsodworkin,hart,jurisprudence, LEGALMORALISM,LEGALPOSITIVISM,LEGAL REALISM,NATURALLAW,POLITICALPHILOSO- PHY.R.A.Sh. philosophyofliberation.Seelatinamericanphi- losophy. philosophyofIinguistics.Seephilosophyoflan- GUAGE. philosophyofliterature,literarytheory.How- ever,whiletheliterarytheorist,whoisoftena literarycritic,isprimarilyinterestedinthecon- ceptualfoundationsofpracticalcriticism,philos- ophyofliterature,usuallydonebyphilosophers, ismoreoftenconcernedtoplaceliteratureinthe contextofaphilosophicalsystem.Plato'sdia- logueshavemuchtosayaboutpoetry,mostlyby wayofaligningitwithPlato'smetaphysical,epis- temological,andethico-politicalviews.Aris- totle'sPoetics,theearliestexampleofliterary theoryintheWest,isalsoanattempttoaccom- modatethepracticeofGreekpoetstoAristotle's philosophicalsystemasawhole.Drawingonthe thoughtofphilosopherslikeKantandSchelling, SamuelTaylorColeridgeoffersinhisBiographia 677 philosophyofliterature philosophyofliterature Literariaaphilosophyofliteraturethatisto RomanticpoeticswhatAristotle'streatiseisto classicalpoetics:aliterarytheorythatiscon- firmedbothbythepoetswhoseworkitlegiti- matesandbythemetaphysicsthatrecommends it.Manyphilosophers,amongthemHume, Schopenhauer,Heidegger,andSartre,havetried tomakeroomforliteratureintheirphilosophi- caledifices.Somephilosophers,e.g.,theGerman Romantics,havemadeliterature(andtheother arts)thecornerstoneofphilosophyitself.(See PhilippeLacoue-LabartheandJean-LucNancy, TheLiteraryAbsolute,1988.) Sometimes'philosophyofliterature'isunder- stoodinasecondsense:philosophyandlitera- ture;i.e.,philosophyandliteraturetakentobe distinctandessentiallyautonomousactivities thatmaynonethelesssustaindeterminaterela- tionstoeachother.Philosophyofliterature, understoodinthisway,istheattempttoidentify thedifferentiaethatdistinguishphilosophyfrom literatureandtospecifytheirrelationshipsto eachother.Sometimesthetwoaredistinguished bytheirsubjectmatter(e.g.,philosophydeals withobjectivestructures,literaturewithsubjec- tivity),sometimesbytheirmethods(philosophy isanactofreason,literaturetheproductofimag- ination,inspiration,ortheunconscious),some- timesbytheireffects(philosophyproduces knowledge,literatureproducesemotionalfulfill- mentorrelease),etc.Theirrelationshipsthen tendtooccupythearea(s)inwhichtheyarenot essentiallydistinct.Iftheirsubjectmattersare distinct,theireffectsmaybethesame(philoso- phyandliteraturebothproduceunderstanding, theoneoffactandtheotheroffeeling);iftheir methodsaredistinct,theymaybeapproaching thesamesubjectmatterindifferentways;andso on.ForAquinas,e.g.,philosophyandpoetrymay dealwiththesameobjects,theonecommunicat- ingtruthabouttheobjectinsyllogisticform,the otherinspiringfeelingsaboutitthroughfigura- tivelanguage.ForHeidegger,thephilosopher investigatesthemeaningofbeingwhilethepoet namestheholy,buttheirpreoccupationstendto convergeatthedeepestlevelsofthinking.For Sartre,literatureisphilosophyengagé,existen- tial-politicalactivityintheserviceoffreedom. 'Philosophyofliterature'mayalsobetakenin athirdsense:philosophyinliterature,the attempttodiscovermattersofphilosophical interestandvalueinliterarytexts.Thephiloso- phermayundertaketoidentify,examine,and evaluatethephilosophicalcontentofliterary textsthatcontainexpressionsofphilosophical ideasanddiscussionsofphilosophicalprob- lems-e.g.,thedebatesonfreewillandtheodicy inFyodorDostoevsky'sTheBrothersKaramazov. Manyifnotmostcollegecoursesonphilosophy ofliteraturearetaughtfromthispointofview. Muchinterestingandimportantworkhasbeen doneinthisvein;e.g.,Santayana'sThreePhilo- sophicalPoets(1910),Cavell'sessaysonEmerson andThoreau,andNussbaum'sLove'sKnowledge (1989).Itshouldbenoted,however,thatto approachthematterinthiswaypresupposesthat literatureandphilosophyaresimplydifferent formsofthesamecontent:whatphilosophy expressesintheformofargumentliterature expressesinlyric,dramatic,ornarrativeform. Thephilosopher'streatmentofliteratureimplies thatheisuniquelypositionedtoexplicatethe subjectmattertreatedinbothliteraryandphilo- sophicaltexts,andthatthelanguageofphiloso- phygivesoptimalexpressiontoacontentless adequatelyexpressedinthelanguageoflitera- ture.Themodelforthisapproachmaywellbe Hegel'sPhenomenologyofSpirit,whichtreatsart (alongwithreligion)asimperfectadumbrations ofatruththatisfullyandproperlyarticulated onlyintheconceptualmodeofphilosophical dialectic. Dissatisfactionwiththispresupposition(and itsimplicitprivilegingofphilosophyöverlitera- ture)hasledtoadifferentviewoftherelation betweenphilosophyandliteratureandsotoa differentprogramforphilosophyofliterature. Theself-consciouslyliteraryformofKierke- gaard'swritingisanintegralpartofhispolemic againstthephilosophicalimperialismofthe Hegelians.Inthiscentury,theworkofphiloso- pherslikeDerridaandthephilosophersandcrit- icswhofollowhisleadsuggeststhatitis mistakentoregardphilosophyandliteratureas alternativeexpressionsofanidenticalcontent, andseriouslymistakentothinkofphilosophyas themasterdiscourse,the"proper"expressionof acontent"improperly"expressedinliterature. Alltexts,onthisview,havea"literary"form,the textsofphilosophersaswellasthetextsofnov- elistsandpoets,andtheircontentisinternally determinedbytheir"meansofexpression." Thereisjustasmuch"literatureinphilosophy" asthereis"philosophyinliterature."Conse- quently,thephilosopherofliteraturemayno longerbeablesimplytoextractphilosophical matterfromliteraryform.Rather,themodesof literaryexpressionconfrontthephilosopher withproblemsthatbearonthepresuppositions ofhisownenterprise.E.g.,fictionalmimesis (especiallyintheworksofpostmodernwriters) raisesquestionsaboutthepossibilityandthepre- 678 philosophyoflogic philosophyoflogic sumednormativenessoffactualrepresentation, andinsodoingtendstounderminethetradi- tionalhierarchythatelevates"fact"över"fic- tion." Philosophers'perplexityöverthetruth-value offictionalstatementsisanexampleofthekind ofproblemsthestudyofliteraturecancreatefor thepracticeofphilosophy(seeRorty,Conse- quencesofPragmatism,1982,ch.7).Oragain,the self-reflexivityofcontemporaryliterarytextscan leadphilosopherstoreflectcriticallyontheir ownundertakingandmayseriouslyunsettletra- ditionalnotionsofself-referentiality.Whenitis notregardedasanother,attractivebutperhaps inferiorsourceofphilosophicalideas,literature presentsthephilosopherwithepistemological, metaphysical,andmethodologicalproblemsnot encounteredinthecourseof"normal"philoso- phizing. Seealsoaesthetics,literarytheory, POSTMODERN.L.H.M. philosophyoflogic,thearenaofphilosophy devotedtoexaminingthescopeandnatureof logic.Aristotleconsideredlogicanorganon,or foundation,ofknowledge.Certainly,inferenceis thesourceofmuchhumanknowledge.Logic judgesinferencesgoodorbadandtriestojustify thosethataregood.Oneneednotagreewith Aristotle,therefore,toseelogicasessentialto epistemology.PhilosopherssuchasWittgenstein, additionally,haveheldthatthestructureoflan- guagereflectsthestructureoftheworld.Because inferenceshaveelementsthatarethemselves linguisticorareatleastexpressibleinlanguage, logicrevealsgeneralfeaturesofthestructureof language.Thismakesitessentialtolinguistics, and,onaWittgensteinianview,tometaphysics. Moreover,manyphilosophicalbattleshavebeen foughtwithlogicalweaponry.Foralltheserea- sons,philosophershavetriedtounderstand whatlogicis,whatjustifiesit,andwhatittellsus aboutreason,language,andtheworld. Thenatureoflogic.Logicmightbedefinedas thescienceofinference;inference,intum,asthe drawingofaconclusionfrompremises.Asimple argumentisasequence,oneelementofwhich, theconclusion,theothersarethoughttosup- port.Acomplexargumentisaseriesofsimple arguments.Logic,then,isprimarilyconcerned witharguments.Already,however,severalques- tionsarise.(1)Whothinksthatthepremises supporttheconclusion?Thespeaker?Theaudi- ence?Anycompetentspeakerofthelanguage? (2)Whataretheelementsofarguments? Thoughts?Propositions?Philosophersfollowing Quinehavefoundtheseanswersunappealing forlackofclearidentitycriteria.Sentencesare moreconcreteandmoresharplyindividuated. Butshouldweconsidersentencetokensorsen- tencetypes?Contextoftenaffectsinterpretation, soitappearsthatwemustconsidertokensor types-in-context.Moreover,manysentences, evenwithcontextualinformationsupplied,are ambiguous.Isasequencewithanambiguous sentenceoneargument(whichmaybegoodon somereadingsandbadonothers)orseveral? Forreasonsthatwillbecomeclear,theelements ofargumentsshouldbetheprimarybearersof truthandfalsehoodinone'sgeneraltheoryof language.(3)Finally,andperhapsmostimpor- tantly,whatdoes'support'mean? Logicevaluatesinferencesbydistinguishing goodfrombadarguments.Thisraisesissues aboutthestatusoflogic,formanyofitspro- nouncementsareexplicitlynormative.Thephi- losophyoflogicthusincludesproblemsofthe natureandjustificationofnormsakintothose arisinginmetaethics.Thesolutions,moreover, mayvarywiththelogicalsystemathand.Some logiciansattempttocharacterizereasoningin naturallanguage;otherstrytosystematizerea- soninginmathematicsorothersciences.Still otherstrytodeviseanidealsystemofreasoning thatdoesnotfullycorrespondtoanyofthese. Logiciansconcernedwithinferenceinnatural, mathematical,orscientificlanguagestendtojus- tifytheirnormsbydescribinginferentialprac- ticesinthatlanguageasactuallyusedbythose competentinit.Thesedescriptionsjustifynorms partlybecausethepracticestheydescribeinclude evaluationsofinferencesaswellasinferences themselves. Thescopeoflogic.Logicalsystemsmeantto accountfornaturallanguageinferenceraise issuesofthescopeoflogic.Howdoeslogicdiffer fromsemantics,thescienceofmeaningingen- eral?Logicianshaveoftentreatedonlyinfer- encesturningoncertaincommonlyusedwords, suchas'not','if','and','or','all',and'some',tak- ingthem,oritemsinasymboliclanguagethat correspondtothem,aslogicalconstants.They haveneglectedinferencesthatdonotturnon them,suchas Mybrotherismarried. Therefore,Ihaveasister-in-law. Increasingly,however,semanticistshaveused 'logic'morebroadlyspeakingofthelogicof belief,perception,abstraction,orevenkinship. 679 philosophyoflogic philosophyoflogic Suchusesseemtotreatlogicandsemanticsas coextensive.Philosopherswhohavesoughtto maintainadistinctionbetweenthesemantics andlogicofnaturallanguagehavetriedto developnon-arbitrarycriteriaoflogicalcon- stancy. Anargumentisvalidprovidedthetruthofits premisesguaranteesthetruthofitsconclusion. Thisdefinitionreliesonthenotionoftruth, whichraisesphilosophicalpuzzlesofitsown. Furthermore,itisnaturaltoaskwhatkindof connectionmustholdbetweenthepremisesand conclusion.Oneanswerspecifiesthatanargu- mentisvalidprovidedreplacingitssimplecon- stituentswithitemsofsimilarcategorieswhile leavinglogicalconstantsintactcouldneverpro- ducetruepremisesandafalseconclusion.On thisview,validityisamatterofform:anargu- mentisvalidifitinstantiatesavalidform.Logic thusbecomesthetheoryoflogicalform.On anotherview,anargumentisvalidifitsconclu- sionistrueineverypossibleworldormodelin whichitspremisesaretrue.Thisconceptionneed notrelyonthenotionofalogicalconstantand soiscompatiblewiththeviewthatlogicand semanticsarecoextensive. Manyissuesinthephilosophyoflogicarise fromtheplethoraofsystemslogicianshave devised.Someofthesearedeviantlogics,i.e.,log- icsthatdifferfromclassicalorstandardlogic whileseemingtotreatthesamesubjectmatter. Intuitionisticlogic,forexample,whichinterprets theconnectivesandquantifiersnon-classically, rejectingthelawofexcludedmiddleandthe interdefinabilityofthequantifiers,hasbeensup- portedwithbothsemanticandontologicalargu- ments.Brouwer,Heyting,andothershave defendeditastheproperlogicoftheinfinite; Dummetthasdefendeditasthecorrectlogicof naturallanguage.Freelogicallowsnon-denot- ingreferringexpressionsbutinterpretsthe quantifiersasrangingonlyöverexistingobjects. Many-valuedlogicsuseatleastthreetruth- values,rejectingtheclassicalassumptionof bivalence-thateveryformulaiseithertrueor false. Manylogicalsystemsattempttoextendclassi- callogictoincorporatetense,modality,abstrac- tion,higher-orderquantification,propositional quantification,complementconstructions,orthe truthpredicate.Theseprojectsraiseimportant philosophicalquestions. Modalandtenselogics.Tenseisapervasive featureofnaturallanguage,andhasbecomeim- portanttocomputerscientistsinterestedincon- currentprograms.Modalitiesofseveralsorts- alethic(possibility,necessity)anddeontic(obli- gation,permission),forexample-appearinnat- urallanguageinvariousgrammaticalguises. Provability,treatedasamodality,allowsfor revealingformalizationsofmetamathematics. Logicianshaveusuallytreatedmodalitiesand tensesassententialoperators.C.I.Lewisand Langfordpioneeredsuchapproachesforalethic modalities;vonWright,fordeonticmodalities; andPrior,fortense.Ineacharea,manycompet- ingsystemsdeveloped;bythelate1970s,there wereövertwohundredaxiomsystemsinthelit- eratureforpropositionalalethicmodallogic alone. Howmightcompetingsystemsbeevaluated? Kripke'ssemanticsformodallogichasproved veryhelpful.Kripkesemanticsineffecttreats modaloperatorsasquantifiersöverpossible worlds.NecessarilyA,e.g.,istrueataworldif andonlyifAistrueinallworldsaccessiblefrom thatworld.Kripkeshowedthatcertainpopulär axiomsystemsresultfromimposingsimplecon- ditionsontheaccessibilityrelation.Hiswork spawnedafield,knownascorrespondencethe- ory,devotedtostudyingtherelationsbetween modalaxiomsandconditionsonmodels.Ithas helpedphilosophersandlogicianstounderstand theissuesatstakeinchoosingamodallogicand hasraisedthequestionofwhetherthereisone truemodallogic.Modalidiomsmaybeambigu- ousorindeterminatewithrespecttosomeprop- ertiesoftheaccessibilityrelation.Possibleworlds raiseadditionalontologicalandepistemological questions. Modalitiesandtensesseemtobelinkedinnat- urallanguage,butattemptstobringtenseand modallogictogetherremainyoung.Thesensi- tivityoftensetointrä-andextralinguisticcon- texthascastdoubtontheprojectofusing operatorstorepresenttenses.Kamp,e.g.,has representedtenseandaspectintermsofevent structure,buildingonearlierworkbyReichen- bach. Truth.Tarski'stheoryoftruthshowsthatitis possibletodefinetruthrecursivelyforcertain languages.Languagesthatcanrefertotheirown sentences,however,permitnosuchdefinition givenTarski'sassumptions-fortheyallowthe formulationoftheliarandsimilarparadoxes. Tarskiconcludedthat,ingivingthesemanticsfor suchalanguage,wemustascendtoamorepow- erfulmetalanguage.Kripkeandothers,how- ever,haveshownthatitispossibleforalanguage permittingself-referencetocontainitsowntruth 680 philosophyofmathematics philosophyofmathematics predicatebysurrenderingbivalenceortakingthe truthpredicateindexically. Higher-orderlogic.First-orderpredicatelogic allowsquantificationonlyöverindividuals. Higher-orderlogicsalsopermitquantification överpredicatepositions.Naturallanguageseems topermitsuchquantification:'Maryhasevery qualitythatJohnadmires'.Mathematics,more- over,maybeexpressedelegantlyinhigher-order logic.PeanoarithmeticandZermelo-Fraenkel settheorye.g.,requireinfiniteaxiomsetsinfirst- orderlogicbutarefinitelyaxiomatizable-and categorical,determiningtheirmodelsuptoiso- morphism-insecond-orderlogic. Becausetheyquantifyöverpropertiesand relations,higher-orderlogicsseemcommittedto Platonism.Mathematicsreducestohigher-order logic;Quineconcludesthatthelatterisnotlogic. Itsmostnaturalsemanticsseemstopresuppose apriorunderstandingofpropertiesandrelations. Also,onthissemantics,itdiffersgreatlyfrom first-orderlogic.Likesettheory,itisincomplete; itisnotcompact.Thisraisesquestionsaboutthe boundariesoflogic.Mustlogicbeaxiomatizable? Mustitbepossible,i.e.,todevelopalogicalsys- tempowerfulenoughtoproveeveryvalidargu- mentvalid?Couldtherebevalidargumentswith infinitelymanypremises,anyfinitefragmentof whichwouldbeinvalid? Withanoperatorforformingabstractterms frompredicates,higher-orderlogicseasilyallow theformulationofparadoxes.RussellandWhite- headforthisreasonadoptedtypetheory,which, likeTarski'stheoryoftruth,usesaninfinitehier- archyandcorrespondingsyntacticrestrictionsto avoidparadox.Type-freetheoriesavoidboththe restrictionsandtheparadoxes,aswithtruth,by rejectingbivalenceorbyunderstandingabstrac- tionindexically. Seealso,formållogic,freelogic, MODALLOGIC,RELEVANCELOGIC, LOGIC,TYPETHEORY. TENSE D.Bo. philosophyofmathematics,thestudyofontolog- icalandepistemologicalproblemsraisedbythe contentandpracticeofmathematics.Thepresent agendainthisfieldevolvedfromcriticaldevelop- ments,notablythecollapseofPythagoreanism, thedevelopmentofmoderncalculus,andan earlytwentieth-centuryfoundationalcrisis, whichforcedmathematiciansandphilosophers toexaminemathematicalmethodsandpresup- positions. Creekmathematics.ThePythagoreans,who representedtheheightofearlydemonstrative Greekmathematics,believedthatallscientific relationsweremeasureablebynaturalnumbers (1,2,3,etc.)orratiosofnaturalnumbers,and thustheyassumeddiscrete,atomicunitsforthe measurementofspace,time,andmotion.The discoveryofirrationalmagnitudesscotchedthe firstofthesebeliefs.Zeno'sparadoxesshowed thatthesecondwasincompatiblewiththenat- uralassumptionthatspaceandtimeareinfi- nitelydivisible.TheGreekreaction,ultimately codifiedinEuclid'sElements,includedPlato'ssep- arationofmathematicsfromempiricalscience and,withinmathematics,distinguishednumber theory-astudyofdiscretelyorderedentities- fromgeometry,whichconcemscontinua.Fol- lowingAristotle(andemployingmethodsper- fectedbyEudoxus),Euclid'sproofsusedonly "potentiallyinfinite"geometricandarithmetic procedures.TheElements'axiomaticformandits constructiveproofssetastandardforfuture mathematics.Moreover,itsdependenceon visualintuition(whoseconsequentdeductive gapswerealreadynotedbyArchimedes),to- getherwiththechallengeofEuclid'sinfamous fifthpostulate(aboutparallellines),andthe famousunsolvedproblemsofcompassand straightedgeconstruction,establishedanagenda forgenerationsofmathematicians. Thecalculus.Thetwomillenniafollowing Euclidsawnewanalyticaltools(e.g.,Descartes's geometry)thatweddedarithmeticandgeomet- ricconsiderationsandtoyedwithinfinitesimally smallquantities.These,togetherwiththe demandsofphysicalapplication,temptedmath- ematicianstoabandonthepristineGreek dichotomies.MatterscametoaheadwithNew- ton^andLeibniz's(almostsimultaneous)dis- coveryofthepowerfulcomputationaltech- niquesofthecalculus.Whiletheseunifiedphys- icalscienceinanunprecedentedway,their dependenceonunclearnotionsofinfinitesimal spatialandtemporalincrementsemphasized theirshakyphilosophicalfoundation.Berkeley, forinstance,condemnedthecalculusforits unintuitability.However,thistimethepowerof thenewmethodsinspiredadecidedlyconserva- tiveresponse.Kant,inparticular,triedtoanchor thenewmathematicsinintuition.Mathemati- cians,heclaimed,constructtheirobjectsinthe "pureintuitions"ofspaceandtime.Andthese mathematicalobjectsaretheaprioriformsof transcendentallyidealempiricalobjects.For Kantthiscombinationofepistemicempiricism andontologicalidealismexplainedthephysical 681 philosophyofmathematics philosophyofmathematics applicabilityofmathematicsandthusgranted "objectivevalidity"(i.e.,scientificlegitimacy)to mathematicalprocedures. Twonineteenth-centurydevelopmentsun- dercutthisKantianconstructivisminfavörofa moreabstractconceptualpictureofmathemat- ics.First,JanosBolyai,CarlF.Gauss,Bernhard Riemann,NikolaiLobachevskyandotherspro- ducedconsistentnon-Euclideangeometries, whichundidtheKantianpictureofasingleapri- oriscienceofspace,andonceagainopenedarift betweenpuremathematicsanditsphysical applications.Second,CantorandDedekind definedtherealnumbers(i.e.,theelementsof thecontinuum)asinfmitesetsofrational(and ultimatelynatural)numbers.Thustheyfounded mathematicsontheconceptsofinfmitesetand naturalnumber.Cantor'ssettheorymadethe firstconceptrigorouslymathematical;while PeanoandFrege(bothofwhomadvocated securingrigorbyusingformållanguages)did thatforthesecond.Peanoaxiomatizednumber theory,andFregeontologicallyreducedthenat- uralnumberstosets(indeedsetsthatarethe extensionsofpurelylogicalconcepts).Frege's Platonisticconceptionofnumbersasunintu- itableobjectsandhisclaimthatmathematical truthsfollowanalyticallyfrompurelylogicaldef- initions-thethesisoflogicism-arebothhighly anti-Kantian. Foundationalcrisisandmovements.Butanti- Kantianismhaditsownproblems.Foronething, LeopoldKronecker,who(followingPeterDirich- let)wantedmathematicsreducedtoarithmetic andnofurther,attackedCantor'sabstractset theoryondoctrinalgrounds.Worseyet,thedis- coveryofintemalantinomieschallengedthe veryconsistencyofabstractfoundations.The mostfamousofthese,Russell'sparadox(theset ofallsetsthatarenotmembersofthemselves bothisandisn'tamemberofitself),undermined Frege'sbasicassumptionthateverywell-formed concepthasanextension.Thiswasafull-scale crisis.Tobesure,Russellhimself(togetherwith Whitehead)preservedthelogicistfoundational approachbyorganizingtheuniverseofsetsinto ahierarchyoflevelssothatnosetcanbeamem- berofitself.(Thisistypetheory.)However,the crisisencouragedtwoexplicitlyKantianfounda- tionalprojects.Thefirst,HilberfsProgram,at- temptedtosecurethe"ideal"(i.e.,mfinitary) partsofmathematicsbyformalizingthemand thenprovingtheresultantformålsystemstobe conservative(andhenceconsistent)extensions offinitarytheories.Sincetheproofitselfwasto usenoreasoningmorecomplicatedthansimple numericalcalculations-/m/toryreasoning-the wholemetamathematicalprojectbelongedto theuntainted("contentual")partofmathemat- ics.Finitaryreasoningwassupposedtoupdate Kanfsintuition-basedepistemology,andHil- berfsconsistencyproofsmimicKanfsnotionof objectivevalidity.Thesecondproject,Brouwer's intuitionism,rejectedformalization,andwasnot onlyepistemologicallyKantian(restingmathe- maticalreasoningontheaprioriintuitionof time),butontologicallyKantianaswell.For intuitionismgeneratedboththenaturalandthe realnumbersbytemporallyorderedconscious acts.Thereals,inparticular,stemfromchoice sequences,whichexploitBrouwer'sepistemic assumptionsabouttheopenfuture. Thesefoundationalmovementsultimately failed.Typetheoryrequiredadhocaxiomsto expresstherealnumbers;HilberfsProgram founderedonGödel'stheorems;andintuition- ismremainedonthefringesbecauseitrejected classicallogicandstandardmathematics.Never- thelessthelegacyofthesemovements-their formålmethods,indeedtheirphilosophical agenda-stillcharacterizesmodernresearchon theontologyandepistemologyofmathematics. Settheory,e.g.(despiterecentchallengesfrom categorytheory),isthelinguafrancaofmodern mathematics.Andformållanguageswiththeir precisesemanticsareubiquitousintechnicaland philosophicaldiscussions.Indeed,evenintu- itionisticmathematicshasbeenformalized,and MichaelDummetthasrecastitsontologicalide- alismasasemanticantirealismthatdefinestruth aswarrantedassertability.Inasimilarsemantic vein,PaulBenacerrafproposedthatthephilo- sophicalproblemwithHilberfsapproachis inabilitytoprovideauniformrealistic(i.e.,ref- erential,non-epistemic)semanticsforthe allegedlyidealandcontentualpartsofmathe- matics;andtheproblemwithPlatonismisthatits semanticsmakesitsobjectsunknowable. Ontologicalissues.Fromthismodernper- spective,thesimplestrealismistheoutrightPla- tonismthatattributesastandardmodel consistingof"independent"objectstoclassical theoriesexpressedinafirst-orderlanguage(i.e., alanguagewhosequantifiersrangeöverobjects butnotproperties).Butinfactrealismadmits variationsoneachaspect.Foronething,the Löwenheim-Skolemtheoremshowsthatfor- malizedtheoriescanhavenon-standardmodels. Thereareexpansivenon-standardmodels:Abra- hamRobinson,e.g.,usedmfinitarynon-stan- 682 philosophyofmathematics philosophyofmathematics dardmodelsofPeano'saxiomstorigorously reintroduceinfmitesimals.(Roughly,aninfini- tesimalisthereciprocalofaninfiniteelementin suchamodel.)Andtherearealso"constructive" models,whoseobjectsmustbeexplicitlydefin- able.Predicativetheories(inspiredbyPoincaré andHermannWeyl),whosestage-by-stagedefi- nitionsreferonlytopreviouslydefinedobjects, produceonevarietyofsuchmodels.Gödel'scon- structiveuniverse,whichuseslessrestricteddef- initionstomodelapparentlynon-constructive axiomsliketheaxiomofchoice,exemplifies anothervariety.Buttherearealsoviews(vari- ousformsofstructuralism)whichdenythatfor- maltheorieshaveuniquestandardmodelsatall. Theseviews-inspiredbythefact,alreadysensed byDedekind,thattherearemultipleequivalid realizationsofformålarithmetic-allowamath- ematicaltheorytocharacterizeonlyabroadfam- ilyofmodelsanddenyuniquereferenceto mathematicalterms.Finally,somerealistic approachesadvocateformalizationinsecond- orderlanguages,andsomeeschewordinary semanticsaltogetherinfavörofsubstitutional quantification.(Theselatterarestillrealistic,for theystilldistinguishtruthfromknowledge.) Strictfinitists—inspiredbyWittgenstehVsmore stringentepistemicconstraints-rejecteventhe open-futuredobjectsadmittedbyBrouwer,and countenanceonlyfinite(orevenonly"feasible") objects.Intheotherdirection,A.A.Markovand hisschoolinRussiaintroducedasyntacticnotion ofalgorithmfromwhichtheydevelopedthefield of"constructiveanalysis."AndtheAmerican mathematicianErrettBishop,startingfroma Brouwer-likedisenchantmentwithmathemati- calrealismandwithstrictlyformålapproaches, recoveredlargepartsofclassicalanalysiswithin anon-formalconstructiveframework. Alloftheseapproachesassumeabstract(i.e., causallyisolated)mathematicalobjects,andthus theyhavedifficultyexplainingthewideapplica- bilityofmathematics(constructiveorotherwise) withinempiricalscience.Oneresponse,Quine's "indispensability"view,integratesmathematical theoriesintothegeneralnetworkofempirical science.ForQuine,mathematicalobjects-just likeordinaryphysicalobjects-existsimplyin virtueofbeingreferentsfortermsinourbestsci- entifictheory.BycontrastHartryField,who deniesthatanyabstractobjectsexist,alsodenies thatanypurelymathematicalassertionsarelit- erallytrue.Fieldattemptstorecastphysicalsci- enceinarelationallanguagewithoutmath- ematicaltermsandthenuseHilbert-stylecon- servativeextensionresultstoexplaintheevident utilityofabstractmathematics.HilaryPutnam andCharlesParsonshaveeachsuggestedviews accordingtowhichmathematicshasnoobjects propertoitself,butratherconcernsonlythepos- sibilitiesofphysicalconstructions.Recently, GeoffreyHellmanhascombinedthismodal approachwithstructuralism. Epistemologicalissues.Theequivalence(proved inthe1930s)ofseveraldifferentrepresentations ofcomputabilitytothereasoningrepresentable inelementaryformalizedarithmeticledAlonzo Churchtosuggestthatthenotionoffmitaryrea- soninghadbeenpreciselydefined.Church'sthe- sis(sonamedbyStephenKleene)inspiredGeorg Kreisel'sinvestigations(inthe1960sand70s)of thegeneralconditionsforrigorouslyanalyzing otherinformalphilosophicalnotionslikeseman- ticconsequence,Brouwerianchoicesequences, andtheverynotionofaset.SolomonFeferman hassuggestedmorerecentlythatthissortof piecemealconceptualanalysisisalreadypresent inmathematics;andthatthisratherthanany globalfoundationisthetrueroleoffoundational research.Inthisspirit,therelativeconsistency argumentsofmodernprooftheory(acontinua- tionofHilberfsProgram)provideinformation abouttheepistemicgroundsofvariousmathe- maticaltheories.Thus,ontheonehand,proofs thataseeminglyproblematicmathematicalthe- oryisaconservativeextensionofamoresecure theoryprovidesomeepistemicsupportforthe former.Intheotherdirection,thefactthatclas- sicalnumbertheoryisconsistentrelativetointu- itionisticnumbertheoryshows(contraHilbert) thathisviewofconstructivereasoningmustdif- ferfromthatoftheintuitionists. Gödel,whodidnotbelievethatmathematics requiredanytiestoempiricalperception,sug- gestedneverthelessthatwehaveaspecialnon- sensoryfacultyofmathematicalintuitionthat, whenproperlycultivated,canhelpusdecide amongformallyindependentpropositionsofset theoryandotherbranchesofmathematics. CharlesParsons,incontrast,hasexaminedthe placeofperception-likeintuitioninmathemati- calreasoning.Parsonshimselfhasinvestigated modelsofarithmeticandofsettheorycomposed ofquasi-concreteobjects(e.g.,numeralsand othersigns).Others(consistentwithsomeof Parsons'sobservations)havegivenaHusserl- stylephenomenologicalanalysisofmathemati- calintuition. Frege'sinfluenceencouragedthelogicalposi- tivistsandotherphilosopherstoviewmathe- maticalknowledgeasanalyticorconventional. 683 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind Poincarérespondedthattheprincipleofmathe- maticalinductioncouldnotbeanalytic,and Wittgensteinalsoattackedthisconventionalism. Inrecentyears,variousformålindependence resultsandQuine'sattackonanalyticityhave encouragedphilosophersandhistoriansof mathematicstofocusoncasesofmathematical knowledgethatdonotstemfromconceptual analysisorstrictformålprovability.Somewriters (notablyMarkSteinerandPhilipKitcher) emphasizetheanalogiesbetweenempiricaland mathematicaldiscovery.Theystresssuchthings asconceptualevolutioninmathematicsand instancesofmathematicalgeneralizationssup- portedbyindividualcases.Kitcher,inparticular, discussestheanalogybetweenaxiomatizationin mathematicsandtheoreticalunification.Pene- lopeMaddyhasinvestigatedtheintramathemat- icalgroundsunderlyingtheacceptanceof variousaxiomsofsettheory.Moregenerally, ImreLakatosarguedthatmostmathematical progressstemsfromaconcept-stretchingprocess ofconjecture,refutation,andproof.Thisview hasspawnedahistoricaldebateaboutwhether criticaldevelopmentssuchasthosementioned aboverepresentKuhn-stylerevolutionsoreven crises,orwhethertheyarenaturalconceptual advancesinauniformlygrowingscience. Seealsocalculus,gödel'sincomplete- NESSTHEOREMS,HILBERT'SPROGRAM,LOGI- CISM,MATHEMATICALINTUITIONISM,SET THEORY.C.J.P. philosophyofmind,thebranchofphilosophy thatincludesthephilosophyofpsychology, philosophicalpsychology,andtheareaofmeta- physicsconcernedwiththenatureofmental phenomenaandhowtheyfitintothecausal structureofreality.Philosophyofpsychology,a branchofthephilosophyofscience,examines whatpsychologysaysaboutthenatureofpsy- chologicalphenomena;examinesaspectsofpsy- chologicaltheorizingsuchasthemodelsused, explanationsoffered,andlawsinvoked;and examineshowpsychologyfitswiththesocialsci- encesandnaturalsciences.Philosophicalpsy- chologyinvestigatesfolkpsychology,abodyof commonsensical,protoscientificviewsabout mentalphenomena.Suchinvestigationsattempt toarticulateandrefineviewsfoundinfolkpsy- chologyaboutconceptualization,memory,per- ception,sensation,consciousness,belief,desire, intention,reasoning,action,andsoon.The mind-bodyproblem,acentralmetaphysicalonein thephilosophyofmind,istheproblemof whethermentalphenomenaarephysicaland,if not,howtheyarerelatedtophysicalphenom- ena.Othermetaphysicalproblemsinthephilos- ophyofmindincludethefreewillproblem,the problemofpersonalidentity,andtheproblemof how,ifatall,irrationalphenomenasuchasakra- siaandself-deceptionarepossible. Mind-bodydualism Cartesiandualism.Thedoctrinethatthesoul isdistinctfromthebodyisfoundinPlatoanddis- cussedthroughoutthehistoryofphilosophy,but Descartesisconsideredthefatherofthemodern mind-bodyproblem.Hemaintainedthatthe essenceofthephysicalisextensioninspace. Mindsareunextendedsubstancesandthusare distinctfromanyphysicalsubstances.The essenceofamentalsubstanceistothink.This twofoldviewiscalledCartesiandualism.Descartes waswellawareofanintimaterelationship betweenmindandthebrain.(Thereisnoapri- orireasontothinkthatthemindisintimately relatedtothebrain;Aristotle,e.g.,didnotasso- ciatethem.)Descartes(mistakenly)thoughtthe seatoftherelationshipwasinthepinealgland. Hemaintained,however,thatourmindsarenot ourbrains,lackspatiallocation,andcancon- tinuetoexistafterthedeathanddestructionof ourbodies. Cartesiandualisminvitesthequestion:What connectsthemindandbrain?Causationis Descartes'sanswer:statesofourmindscausally interactwithstatesofourbrains.Whenbodily sensationssuchasaches,pains,itches,andtick- lescauseustomoan,wince,scratch,orlaugh, theydosobycausingbrainstates(events, processes),whichinturncausebodilymove- ments.Indeliberateaction,weactonour desires,motives,andintentionstocarryoutour purposes;andactingonthesementalstates involvestheircausingbrainstates,whichinturn causeourbodiestomove,therebycausallyinflu- encingthephysicalworld.Thephysicalworld,in turn,influencesourmindsthroughitsinfluence onourbrains.Perceptionofthephysicalworld withfivesenses-sight,hearing,smell,taste,and touch-involvescausaltransactionsfromthe physicaltothemental:whatweperceive(i.e., see,hear,etc.)causesasenseexperience(i.e.,a visualexperience,auralexperience,etc).Thus, Descartesheldthatthereistwo-waypsy- chophysicalcausalinteraction:fromthemental tothephysical(asinaction)andfromthephys- icaltothemental(asinperception).Thecon- junctionofCartesiandualismandthedoctrineof two-waypsychophysicalcausalinteractionis calledCartesianinteractionism. 684 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind Perhapsthemostwidelydiscusseddifficulty forthisviewishowstatesofanon-spatialsub- stance(amind)cancausallyinteractwithstates ofasubstancethatisinspace(abrain).Such interactionshaveseemedutteriymysteriousto manyphilosophers.Mysterywouldremaineven ifanunextendedmindislocatableatapointin space(saythecenterofthepinealgland).For Cartesianinteractionismwouldstillhaveto maintainthatcausaltransactionsbetweenmen- talstatesandbrainstatesarefundamental,i.e., unmediatedbyanyunderlyingmechanism. Brainstatescausallyinteractwithmentalstates, butthereisnoanswertothequestionofhow theydoso.Theinteractionsarebrutefacts. Manyphilosophers,includingmanyof Descartes'scontemporaries,havefoundthatdif- ficulttoaccept. Parallelism.MalebrancheandLeibniz,among others,rejectedthepossibilityofpsychophysical causalinteraction.Theyespousedversionsof parallelism:theviewthatthementalandphysi- calrealmsruninparallel,inthattypesofmental phenomenaco-occurwithcertaintypesofphys- icalphenomena,buttheseco-occurrencesnever involvecausalinteractions.Onallextantver- sions,theparallelsholdbecauseofGod'scre- ation.Leibniz'sparallelismispreestablished harmony:theexplanationofwhymentaltypes andcertainphysicaltypesco-occuristhatinthe possibleworldGodactualized(i.e.,thisworld) theyco-occur.Indiscussingtherelationbetween thementalandphysicalrealms,Leibnizusedthe analogyoftwosynchronizedbutunconnected clocks.Theanalogyis,however,somewhatmis- leading;suggestingcausalmechanismsinternal toeachclockandintramentalandintraphysical (causal)transactions.ButLeibniz'smonadology doctrineexcludesthepossibilityofsuchtransac- tions:mentalandphysicalphenomenahaveno effectsevenwithintheirownrealms.Male- brancheisassociatedwithoccasionalism,accord- ingtowhichonlyGod,throughhiscontinuous activities,causesthingstohappen:non-divine phenomenanevercauseanything.Occasional- ismdiffersfrompreestablishedharmonyinhold- ingthatGodiscontinuallyengagedinactsof creation;eachmomentcreatingtheworldanew, insuchawaythatthecorrelationshold. Bothbrandsofparallelismfaceformidabledif- ficulties.First,bothrestonhighlycontentious, obscuretheologicalhypotheses.Thecontention thatGodexistsandthecreationstoriesinques- tionrequireextensivedefenseandexplanation. God'srelationshiptotheworldcanseematleast asmysteriousastherelationshipDescartesposits betweenmindsandbrains.Second,sinceparal- lelismdeniesthepossibilityofpsychophysical interaction,itsproponentsmustofferalterna- tivestothecausaltheoryofperceptionandthe causaltheoryofactionorelsedenythatwecan perceiveandthatwecanactintentionally.Third, sinceparallelismrejectsintramentalcausation,it musteitherdenythatreasoningispossibleor explainhowitispossiblewithoutcausalcon- nectionsbetweenthoughts.Fourth,sinceparal- lelismrejectsphysicaltransactions,itishärdto seehowitcanallow,e.g.,thatonephysicalthing evermovesanother;forthatwouldrequire causingachangeinlocation.Perhapsnoneof theseweightydifficultiesisultimatelyinsupera- ble;inanycase,parallelismhasbeenaban- doned. Epiphenomenalism.Empiricalresearchgives everyindicationthattheoccurrenceofanybrain statecan,inprinciple,becausallyexplainedby appealsolelytootherphysicalstates.Toaccom- modatethis,somephilosophersespousedepiphe- nomenalism,thedoctrinethatphysicalstates causementalstates,butmentalstatesdonot causeanything.(Thisthesiswasdiscussedunder thename'consciousautomatism'byHuxleyand Hogesoninthelatenineteenthcentury.William Jameswasthefirsttousetheterm'epiphenom- ena'tomeanphenomenathatlackcausaleffi- cacy.AndJamesWardcoinedtheterm 'epiphenomenalism'in1903.)Epiphenomenal- ismimpliesthatthereisonlyone-waypsy- chophysicalaction-fromthephysicaltothe mental.Sinceepiphenomenalismallowssuch causalaction,itcanembracethecausaltheoryof perception.However,whencombinedwith Cartesiandualism,epiphenomenalism,like Cartesianinteractionism,impliestheproblem- aticthesisthatstatesofanextendedsubstance canaffectstatesofanunextendedsubstance.An epiphenomenalistcanavoidthisproblemby rejectingtheviewthatthemindisanunex- tendedsubstancewhilemaintainingthatmen- talstatesandeventsarenonethelessdistinct fromphysicalstatesandevents.Still,formidable problemswouldremain.Itishärdtoseehow epiphenomenalismcanallowthatweareever intentionalagents.Forintentionalagencyre- quiresactingonreasons,which,accordingtothe causaltheoryofaction,requiresacausalcon- nectionbetweenreasonsandactions.Since epiphenomenalismdeniesthatsuchcausalcon- nectionsarepossible,itmusteithermaintain thatoursenseofagencyisillusoryorofferan alternativetothecausaltheoryofaction.Simi- larly,itmustexplainhowthinkingispossible 685 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind giventhattherearenocausalconnections betweenthoughts. Monism Thedual-aspecttheory.Manyphilosophers rejectDescartes'sbifurcationofrealityintomen- talandphysicalsubstances.Spinozaheldadual- attributetheory-alsocalledthedual-aspect theory-accordingtowhichthementalandthe physicalaredistinctmodesofasinglesubstance, God.Thementalandthephysicalareonlytwo ofinfinitelymanymodesofthisonesubstance. Manyphilosophersoptedforathoroughgoing monism,accordingtowhichallofrealityisreally ofonekind.Materialism,idealism,andneutral monismarethreebrandsofmonism.Hobbes,a contemporaryofDescartes,espousedmaterial- ism,thebrandofmonismaccordingtowhich everythingismaterialorphysical.Berkeleyis associatedwithidealism,thebrandofmonism accordingtowhicheverythingismental.Heheld thatbothmentalandphysicalphenomenaare perceptionsinthemindofGod.ForHegel'side- alism,everythingispartoftheWorldSpirit.The earlytwentieth-centuryBritishphilosophers BradleyandMcTaggartalsoheldaversionofide- alism.Neutralmonismisthedoctrinethatallof realityisultimatelyofonekind,whichisneither mentalnorphysical.Humewasaneutralmonist, maintainingthatmentalandphysicalsubstances arereallyjustbundlesoftheneutralentities. Versionsofneutralmonismwerelåterheldby Machand,forashorttime,Russell.Russellcalled hisneutralentitiessensibiliaandclaimedthat mindsandphysicalobjectsarelogicalconstruc- tionsoutofthem. Phenomenalism.Thisview,espousedinthe twentiethcenturyby,amongothers,Ayer, arguesthatallempiricalstatementsaresynony- mouswithstatementssolelyaboutphenomenal appearances.Whilethedoctrineisaboutstate- ments,phenomenalismiseitheraneutral monismoranidealism,dependingonwhether phenomenalappearancesareclaimedtobenei- thermentalnorphysicalor,instead,mental.The requiredtranslationsofphysicalstatementsinto phenomenalonesprovednottobeforthcoming, however.Chisholmofferedareasonwhythey wouldnotbe:whatappearancesaphysicalstate ofaffairs(e.g.,objectsarrayedinaroom)has dependsbothonphysicalconditionsofobserva- tion(e.g.,lighting)andphysicalconditionsofthe perceiver(e.g.,ofthenervoussystem).Atbest,a statementsolelyaboutphenomenalappearances isequivalenttooneaboutaphysicalstateof affairs,onlywhencertainphysicalconditions ofobservationandcertainphysicalconditionsof theperceiverobtain. Materialism.Twoproblemsfaceanymonism: itmustcharacterizethephenomenaittakesas basic,anditmustexplainhowthefundamental phenomenamakeupnon-basicphenomena. Theidealistandneutralmonisttheoriespro- posedthusfarhavefalteredononeorboth counts.Largelybecauseofscientificsuccessesof thetwentiethcentury,suchastherebirthofthe atomictheoryofmatter,andthesuccessesof quantummechanicsinexplainingchemistryand ofchemistryinturninexplainingmuchofbiol- ogy,manyphilosopherstodayholdthatmateri- alismwillultimatelysucceedwhereidealismand neutralmonismapparentlyfailed.Materialism, however,comesinmanydifferentvarietiesand eachfacesformidabledifficulties. Logicalbehaviorism.RyleridiculedCarte- sianismastheviewthatthereisaghostinthe machine(thebody).Heclaimedthattheview thatthemindisasubstancerestsonacategory mistake:'mind'isanoun,butdoesnotnamean object.Cartesianismconfusesthelogicofdis- courseaboutmindswiththelogicofdiscourse aboutbodies.Tohaveamindisnottopossessa specialsortofentity;itissimplytohavecertain capacitiesanddispositions.(Comparethethesis thattobealiveistopossessnotacertainentity,an entelechyorelanvital,butrathercertaincapaci- tiesanddispositions.)Rylemaintained,more- over,thatitwasamistaketoregardmentalstates suchasbelief,desire,andintentionasinternal causesofbehavior.Thesestates,heclaimed,are dispositionstobehaveinovertways. Inpartinresponsetothedualistpointthatone canunderstandourordinarypsychological vocabulary('belief,'desire','pain',etc.)and knownothingaboutthephysicalstatesand eventsinthebrain,logicalbehaviorismhasbeen proposedasamaterialistdoctrinethatexplains thisfact.Onthisview,talkofmentalphenom- enaisshorthandfortalkofactualandpotential overtbodilybehavior(i.e.,dispositionstoovert bodilybehavior).Logicalbehaviorismwasmuch discussedfromroughlythe1930suntiltheearly 1960s.(WhileRyleissometimescountedasa logicalbehaviorist,hewasnotcommittedtothe thesisthatallmentaltalkcanbetranslatedinto behavioraltalk.) Thetranslationspromisedbylogicalbehavior- ismappearunachievable.AsPutnamandothers pointedout,onecanfakebeinginpainandone canbeinpainandyetnotbehaveorbedisposed tobehaveasifonewereinpain(e.g.,onemight 686 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind beparalyzedormightbea"super-spartan"). Logicalbehaviorismfacessimilardifficultiesin translatingsentencesabout(whatRussellcalled) propositionalattitudes(i.e.,beliefsthatp,desires thatp,hopesthatp,intentionsthatp,andthe like).Considerthefollowingsampleproposal (similartooneofferedbyCarnap):onebelieves thatthecatisonthematifandonlyifoneisdis- posedtoassentto'Thecatisonthemat'.First, theproposedtranslationmeetstheconditionof beingpurelybehavioralonlyifassentingis understandableinpurelybehavioralterms.That isdoubtful.Theproposalalsofailstoprovidea sufficientoranecessarycondition:someonemay assentto'Thecatisonthemat'andyetnot believethecatisonthemat(forthepersonmay betryingtodeceive);andabeliefthatthecatis onthematwilldisposeonetoassentto'Thecat isonthemat'onlyifoneunderstandswhatis beingasked,wantstoindicatethatonebelieves thecatisonthemat,andsoon.Butnoneof theseconditionsisrequiredforbelievingthatthe catisonthemat.Moreover,toinvokeanyof thesementalisticconditionsdefeatstheattempt toprovideapurelybehavioraltranslationofthe beliefsentence. Althoughtheprojectoftranslationhasbeen abandoned,inrecentyearsDennetthas defendedaviewinthespiritoflogicalbehavior- ism,intentionalsystemstheory:belief-desiretalk functionstocharacterizeoverallpatternsofdis- positionstoovertbehavior(inanenvironmen- talcontext)forthepurposesofpredictingovert behavior.Thetheoryissometimescharacterized assupervenientbehaviorismsinceitimpliesthat whetheranindividualhasbeliefs,desires,inten- tionsandthelikesupervenesonhisdispositions toovertbehavior:iftwoindividualsareexactly alikeinrespectoftheirdispositionstoovert behavior,theonehasintentionalstatesifand onlyiftheotherdoes.(Thisviewallows,how- ever,thatthecontentsofanindividual'sinten- tionalstates-whattheindividualbelieves, desires,etc.-maydependonenvironmental factors.Soitisnotcommittedtothesuperve- nienceofthecontentsofintentionalstateson dispositionstoovertbehavior.Seethediscussion ofcontentexternalismbelow.)Oneobjectionto thisview,duetoNedBlock,isthatitwouldmis- takenlycountasanintentionalagentagiant look-uptable-"aBlockhead"-thathasthe samedispositionstoperipheralbehaviorasa genuineintentionalagent.(Alook-uptableisa simplemechanicaldevicethatlooksupprepro- grammedresponses.) Identitytheories.Intheearly1950s,Herbert Feiglclaimedthatmentalstatesarebrainstates. Hepointedoutthatifmentalpropertiesorstate typesaremerelynomologicallycorrelatedwith physicalpropertiesorstatetypes,theconnecting lawswouldbe"nomologicaldanglers":irre- ducibletophysicallaws,andthusadditionalfun- damentallaws.Accordingtotheidentitytheory, theconnectinglawsarenotfundamentallaws (andsonotnomologicaldanglers)sincetheycan beexplainedbyidentifyingthementalandphys- icalpropertiesinquestion. Inthelate1950sandtheearly1960s,the philosopherSmartandthepsychologistU.T. Placedefendedthematerialistviewthatsensa- tionsareidenticalwithbrainprocesses.Smart claimedthatwhilementaltermsdifferinmean- ingfromphysicalterms,scientificinvestigation revealsthattheyhavethesamereferentsascer- tainphysicalterms.(Comparethefactthatwhile 'theMorningStår'and'theEveningStår'differ inmeaningempiricalinvestigationrevealsthe samereferent:Venus.)SmartandPlaceclaimed thatfeelingpain,e.g.,issomebrainprocess, exactlywhichonetobedeterminedbyscientific investigation.Smartclaimedthatsensationtalk isparaphraseableintopic-neutralterms;i.e.,in termsthatleaveopenwhethersensationalprop- ertiesarementalorphysical.'Ihaveanorange afterimage'isparaphraseable(roughly)as: 'Thereissomethinggoingonlikewhatisgoing onwhenIhavemyeyesopen,amawake,and thereisanorangeilluminatedingoodlightin frontofme,i.e.,whenIreallyseeanorange'.The descriptionistopic-neutralsinceitleavesopen whetherwhatisgoingonismentalorphysical. Smartmaintainedthatscientificinvestigation revealsthatwhatinfactmeetsthetopic-neutral descriptionisabrainprocess.Heheldthatpsy- chophysicalidentitystatementssuchas'Painis C-fiberfiring'arecontingent,likeningtheseto, e.g.,'Lightningiselectricaldischarge',whichis contingentandknowableonlythroughempiri- calinvestigation. Centralstatematerialism.Thisbrandofmate- rialismwasdefendedinthelate1960sandthe early1970sbyArmstrongandothers.Onthis view,mentalstatesarestatesthatareapttopro- duceacertainrangeofbehavior.Centralstate materialistsmaintainthatscientificinvestigation revealsthatsuchstatesarestatesofthecentral nervoussystem,andthusthatmentalstatesare contingentlyidenticalwithstatesofthecentral nervoussystem.Unlikelogicalbehaviorism,cen- tralstatematerialismdoesnotimplythatmental sentencescanbetranslatedintophysicalsen- tences.Unlikebothlogicalbehaviorismand 687 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind intentionalsystemstheory,centralstatemateri- alismimpliesthatmentalstatesareactualinter- nalstateswithcausaleffects.Andunlike Cartesianinteractionism,itholdsthatpsy- chophysicalinteractionisjustphysicalcausal interaction. Somecentralstatematerialistsheldinaddition thatthemindisthebrain.However,ifthemind werethebrain,everychangeinthebrainwould beachangeinthemind;andthatseemsfalse: noteverylittlebrainchangeamountstoa changeofmind.Indeed,themindceasestoexist whenbraindeathoccurs,whilethebraincon- tinuestoexist.Themoralthatmostmaterialists nowadaysdrawfromsuchconsiderationsisthat themindisnotanyphysicalsubstance,sinceitis notasubstanceofanysort.Tohaveamindisnot topossessaspecialsubstance,butrathertohave certaincapacities-tothink,feel,etc.Tothat extent,Rylewasright.However,centralstate materialistsinsistthattheproperlyfunctioning brainisthematerialseatofmentalcapacities, thattheexerciseofmentalcapacitiesconsistsof brainprocesses,andthatmentalstatesarebrain statesthatcanproducebehavior. Epistemologicalobjectionshavebeenraisedto identitytheories.Asself-consciousbeings,we haveakindofprivilegedaccesstoourownmen- talstates.Theexactavenueofprivilegedaccess, whetheritisintrospectionornot,iscontrover- sial.Butithasseemedtomanyphilosophersthat ouraccesstoourownmentalstatesisprivileged inbeingopenonlytous,whereaswelackany privilegedaccesstothestatesofourcentralner- voussystems.Wecometoknowaboutcentral nervoussystemstatesinthesamewaywecome toknowaboutthecentralnervoussystemstates ofothers.So,againstcentralstatematerialism andtheidentitytheory,itisclaimedthatmental statescannotbestatesofourcentralnervoussys- tems. Takingprivilegedaccesstoimplythatwehave incorrigibleknowledgeofourconsciousmental states,anddespairingofsquaringprivileged accesssounderstoodwithmaterialism,Rorty advocatedeliminativematerialism,thethesisthat thereactuallyarenomentalphenomena.A morecommonmaterialistresponse,however,is todenythatprivilegedaccessentailsincorrigibil- ityandtomaintainthatprivilegedaccessiscom- patiblewithmaterialism.Somematerialists maintainthatwhilecertaintypesofmentalstates (e.g.,sensations)aretypesofneurologicalstates, itwillbeknowableonlybyempiricalinvestiga- tionthattheyare.Supposepainisaneuralstate N.Itwillbeonlyaposterioriknowablethatpain isN.Viatheavenueofprivilegedaccess,one comestobelievethatoneisinapainstate,but notthatoneisinaniV-state.Onecanbelieveone isinapainstatewithoutbelievingthatoneisin anN-statebecausetheconceptofpainisdiffer- entfromtheconceptofN.Nevertheless,painis N.(ComparethefactthatwhilewaterisH20,the conceptofwaterisdifferentfromthatofH20. Thus,whilewaterisH20,onecanbelievethere iswaterintheglasswithoutbelievingthatthere isH2init.Theavenueofprivilegedaccesspre- sentsNconceptualizedaspain,butneverasneu- rologicalstateN.Theavenueofprivilegedaccess involvestheexerciseofmental,butnotneuro- physiological,concepts.However,ourmental conceptsanswerto-applyinvirtueof-the sameproperties(statetypes)asdocertainofour neurophysiologicalconcepts. Theidentitytheoryandcentralstatematerial- ismbothholdthattherearecontingentpsy- chophysicalpropertyandtypeidentities.Some theoristsinthistraditiontriedtodistinguisha notionoftheoreticalidentityfromthenotionof strictidentity.Theyheldthatmentalstatesare theoretically,butnotstrictly,identicalwithbrain states.Againstanysuchdistinction,Kripke arguedthatidentitiesaremetaphysicallyneces- sary,i.e.,holdineverypossibleworld.IfA=B, thennecessarilyA=B.Kripkeacknowledged thattherecanbecontingentstatementsofiden- tity.Butsuchstatements,heargued,willemploy atleastonetermthatisnotarigiddesignator,i.e., atermthatdesignatesthesamethinginevery worldinwhichitdesignatesanything.Thus, since'theinventorofbifocals'isanon-rigiddes- ignator,'BenjaminFranklinistheinventorof bifocals'iscontingent.WhileFranklinisthe inventorofbifocals,hemightnothavebeen. However,statementsofidentityinwhichthe identitysignisflankedbyrigiddesignatorsare,if true,metaphysicallynecessary.Kripkeheldthat propernamesarerigiddesignators,andhence, thetrueidentitystatement'CiceroisTully'is metaphysicallynecessary.Nonetheless,ameta- physicallynecessaryidentitystatementcanbe knowableonlyaposteriori.Indeed,'Cicerois Tully'isknowableonlyaposteriori.Both'water' and'H20',hemaintained,arerigiddesignators: eachdesignatesthesamekindofstuffinevery possibleworld.Andhethusmaintainedthatitis metaphysicallynecessarythatwaterisH20, despiteitsnotbeingaprioriknowablethatwater isH20.OnKripke'sview,anypsychophysical identitystatementthatemploysmentalterms andphysicaltermsthatarerigiddesignatorswill alsobemetaphysicallynecessary,iftrue. 688 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind Centralstatematerialistsmaintainthatmental conceptsareequivalenttoconceptswhose descriptivecontentisthestatethatisapttopro- ducesuch-and-suchbehaviorinsuch-and-such circumstances.Thesedefiningdescriptionsfor mentalconceptsareintendedtobemeaning-giv- ing,notcontingentreference-fixingdescriptions; theyare,moreover,notrigiddesignators.Thus, thecentralstatematerialistscanconcedethatall identitiesarenecessary,butmaintainthatpsy- chophysicalclaimsofidentityarecontingent claimsofidentitysincethementaltermsthatfig- ureinthosestatementsarenotrigiddesignators. However,Kripkemaintainedthatourconcepts ofsensationsandotherqualitativestatesarenot equivalenttothesortsofdescriptionsinques- tion.Theterm'pain',hemaintained,isarigid designator.Thispositionmightberefutedbya successfulfunctionalanalysisoftheconceptof paininphysicaland/ortopic-neutralterms. However,nosuccessfulanalysisofthissorthas yetbeenproduced.(Seethesectiononcon- sciousnessbelow.) AmaterialistcangrantKripkethat'pain'isa rigiddesignatorandclaimthatastatementsuch as'PainisC-fiberfiring'willbemetaphysically necessaryiftrue,butonlyaposterioriknowable. However,Kripkeraisedaformidableproblemfor thismaterialism.Hepointedoutthatifastate- mentismetaphysicallynecessarybutonlyapos- terioriknowable,itsappearanceofcontingency callsforexplanation.Despitebeingmetaphysi- callynecessary,'WaterisH70'appearscontin- gent.AccordingtoKripke,weexplainthis appearancebynotingthatonecancoherently imagineaworldinwhichsomethinghasallthe phenomenalpropertiesofwater,andsoisan "epistemiccounterpart"ofit,yetisnotH20.The factthatwecancoherentlyimaginesuchepis- temiccounterpartsexplainswhy'WaterisH20' appearscontingent.Butnosuchexplanationis availablefor(e.g.)'PainisC-fiberfiring'.Foran epistemiccounterpartofpain,somethingwith thephenomenalpropertiesofpain-thefeelof pain-ispain.Somethingcanlook,smell,taste, andfeellikewateryetnotbewater.Butwhat- everfeelslikepainispain:painisafeeling.In contrast,wecanexplaintheapparentcontin- gencyofclaimslike'WaterisH2Cbecausewater isnotconstitutedbyitsphenomenalproperties; ourconceptofwaterallowsthatitmayhavea "hiddenessence,"i.e.,anessentialmicrostruc- ture.IfKripkeisright,thenanyonewhomain- tainsthatastatementofidentityconcerninga typeofbodilysensationandatypeofphysical stateismetaphysicallynecessaryyetaposteriori, mustexplaintheappearanceofcontingencyina waythatdiffersfromthewayKripkeexplains theappearanceofcontingencyof'WaterisH20'. Thisisaformidablechallenge.(Thefinalsection, onconsciousness,sketchessomematerialist responsestoit.) Thegeneralissueofpropertyandstatetype identityiscontroversial.Theclaimthatwateris H2despitethefactthattheconceptofwateris distinctfromtheconceptofH7seemsplausible. However,propertyorstatetypeidentityismore controversialthantheidentityoftypesofsub- stances.Forpropertiesorstatetypes,thereare nogenerallyaccepted"non-duplicationprinci- ples"-touseaphraseofDavidLewis's.(Anon- duplicationprincipleforA'swillsaythatnotwo A'scanbeexactlyalikeinacertainrespect;e.g., notwosetscanhaveexactlythesamemembers.) Itiswidelydenied,forinstance,thatnotwo propertiescanbepossessedbyexactlythesame things.Twoproperties,itisclaimed,canbepos- sessedbythesamethings;likewise,twostate typescanoccurinthesamespace-timeregions. Evenassumingthatmentalconceptsaredistinct fromphysicalconcepts,theissueofwhether mentalstatetypesarephysicalstatetypesraises thecontroversialissueofthenon-duplication principleforstatetypes. Tokenandtypephysicalisms.Tokenphysicalism isthethesisthateveryparticularisphysical.Type physicalismisthethesisthateverytypeorkindof entityisphysical;thus,theidentitythesisand centralstatematerialismaretypephysicalistthe- sessincetheyimplythattypesofmentalstates aretypesofphysicalstates.Typephysicalism impliestokenphysicalism:giventheformer, everytokenfallsundersomephysicaltype,and thereforeistoken-tokenidenticalwithsome tokenofaphysicaltype.Buttokenphysicalism doesnotimplytypephysicalism;theformer leavesopenwhetherphysicaltokensfallunder non-physicaltypes.Somedoctrinesbilledas materialistorphysicalistembracetokenepiphe- nomenalism,butrejecttypephysicalism. Non-reductivematerialism.Thisformofma- terialismimpliestokenphysicalism,butdenies typephysicalismand,aswell,thatmentaltypes (properties,etc.)arereducibletophysicaltypes. Thisdoctrinehasbeendiscussedsinceatleastthe latenineteenthcenturyandwaswidelydis- cussedinthefirstthirdofthetwentiethcentury. TheBritishphilosophersGeorgeHenryLewes, SamuelAlexander,LloydMorgan,andC.D. Broadallheldorthoughtplausibleacertainver- sionofnon-reductivematerialism.Theyheldor sympathizedwiththeviewthateverysubstance 689 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind eitherisoriswhollymadeupofphysicalparti- cles,thatthewell-functioningbrainisthemate- rialseatofmentalcapacities,andthattoken mentalstates(events,processes,etc.)aretoken neurophysiologicalstates(events,processes, etc.).However,theyeitherheldorthoughtplau- sibletheviewthatmentalcapacities,properties, etc,emergefrom,andthusdonotreduceto, physicalcapacities,properties,etc.Lewescoined theterm'emergence';andBroadlåterlabeled thedoctrineemergentmaterialism.Emergent materialistsmaintainthatlawscorrelatingmen- talandphysicalpropertiesareirreducible.(These lawswouldbewhatFeiglcallednomological danglers.)Emergentistsmaintainthat,despite theiruntidiness,suchlawsmustbeaccepted withnaturalpiety. Davidson'sdoctrineofanomalousmonismisa currentbrandofnon-reductivematerialism.He explicitlyformulatesthismaterialistthesisfor events;andhisirreducibilitythesisisrestrictedto intentionalmentaltypes-e.g.,believings,desir- ings,andintendings.Anomalousmonismsays thateveryeventtokenisphysical,butthatinten- tionalmentalpredicatesandconcepts(ones expressingpropositionalattitudes)donot reduce,bylawordefinition,tophysicalpredi- catesorconcepts.Davidsonoffersanoriginal argumentforthisirreducibilitythesis.Mental predicatesandconceptsare,heclaims,govemed byconstitutiveprinciplesofrationality,butphys- icalpredicatesandconceptsarenot.Thisdiffer- ence,hecontends,excludesthepossibilityof reductionofmentalpredicatesandconceptsto physicalones.Davidsondenies,moreover,that therearestrictpsychologicalorpsychophysical laws.Hecallstheconjunctionofthisthesisand hisirreducibilitythesistheprincipleofthe anomalismofthemental.Hisargumentfor tokenphysicalism(forevents)appealstothe principleoftheanomalismofthementalandto theprincipleofthenomologicalcharacterof causality:whentwoeventsarecausallyrelated, theyaresubsumedbyastrictlaw.Hemaintains thatallstrictlawsarephysical.Giventhatclaim, andgiventheprincipleofthenomologicalchar- acterofcausality,itfollowsthateveryeventthat isacauseoreffectisaphysicalevent.Onthis view,psychophysicalcausationisjustcausation betweenphysicalevents.StephenSchifferhas alsomaintainedanon-reductivematerialism, onehecallsontologicalphysicalismandsentential dualism:everyparticularisphysical,butmental truthsareirreducibletophysicaltruths. Non-reductivematerialismpresupposesthat mentalstate(event)tokenscanfallunderphys- icalstatetypesand,thereby,countasphysical statetokens.Thispresuppositioniscontroversial; nouncontroversialnon-duplicationprinciplefor statetokenssettlestheissue.Suppose,however, thatmentalstatetokensarephysicalstate tokens,despitementalstatetypesnotbeing physicalstatetypes.Theissueofhowmental statetypesandphysicalstatetypesarerelated remains.Supposethatsomephysicaltokenxis ofamentaltypeM(say,abeliefthatthecatison themat)andsomeotherphysicaltokenyisnot oftypeM.Theremust,itseems,besomediffer- encebetweenxandyinvirtueofwhichxis,and yisnot,oftypeM.Otherwise,itissimplyabrute factthatxisandyisnotoftypeM.That,how- ever,seemsimplausible.Theclaimthatcertain physicalstatetokensfallundermentalstate typessimplyasamatterofbrutefactwouldleave thedifferenceinquestionutterlymysterious. Butifitisnotabrutefact,thenthereissome explanationofwhyacertainphysicalstateisa mentalstateofacertainsort.Thenon-reductive materialistowesusanexplanationthatdoesnot implypsychophysicalreduction. Moreover,eventhoughthenon-reductive materialistcanclaimthatmentalstatesare causesbecausetheyarephysicalstateswith physicaleffects,thereissomequestionwhether mentalstatetypesarerelevanttocausalrela- tions.Supposeeverystateisaphysicalstate. Giventhatphysicalstatescausallyinteractin virtueoffallingunderphysicaltypes,itfollows thatwheneverstatescausallyinteracttheydoso invirtueoffallingunderphysicaltypes.That raisestheissueofwhetherstatesareevercauses invirtueoffallingundermentaltypes.Type epiphenomenalismisthethesisthatnostatecan causeanythinginvirtueoffallingunderamen- taltype.Tokenepiphenomenalism,thethesisthat nomentalstatecancauseanything,impliestype epiphenomenalism,butnotconversely.Non- reductivematerialistsarenotcommittedto tokenphysicalism.However,tokenepiphenom- enalismmaybefalsebuttypeepiphenomenal- ismtruesincementalstatesmaybecausesonly invirtueoffallingunderphysicaltypes,neverin virtueoffallingundermentaltypes.Broadraised theissueoftypeepiphenomenalismanddis- cussedwhetheremergentmaterialismiscom- mittedtoit.TedHonderich,JaegwonKim, ErnestSosa,andothershaveinrecentyears raisedtheissueofwhethernon-reductivemate- rialismiscommittedtotypeepiphenomenalism. BrianMcLaughlinhasarguedthattheclaimthat aneventactsasacauseinvirtueoffallingunder acertainphysicaltypeisconsistentwiththe 690 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind claimthatitalsoactsasacauseinvirtueoffalling underacertainmentaltype,evenwhenthe mentaltypeisnotidenticalwiththephysical type.Butevenifthisisso,therelationship betweenmentaltypesandphysicaltypesmust beaddressed.EmestLePoreandBarryLoewer, FrankJacksonandPhilipPettit,StephenYablo, andothershaveattemptedtocharacterizearela- tionbetweenmentaltypesandphysicaltypes thatallowsforthecausalrelevanceofmental types.Butwhetherthereisarelationbetween mentalandphysicalpropertiesthatisbothade- quatetosecurethecausalrelevanceofmental propertiesandavailabletonon-reductivemate- rialistsremainsanopenquestion. Davidson'sanomalousmonismmayappearto beakindofdual-aspecttheory:thereareevents andtheycanhavetwosortsofautonomous aspects,mentalandphysical.However,while Davidsonholdsthatmentalproperties(ortypes) donotreducetophysicalones,healsoholdsthat thementalpropertiesofaneventdependonits physicalpropertiesinthattheformersupervene onthelatterinthissense:notwoeventscanbe exactlyalikeineveryphysicalrespectandyet differinsomementalrespect.Thisproposal introducedthenotionofsupervenienceinto contem-poraryphilosophyofmind.Oftennon- reductivematerialistsarguethatmentalproper- ties(types)superveneonphysicalproperties (types).Kim,however,hasdistinguishedvarious superveniencerelations,andarguesthatsome aretooweaktocountasversionsofmaterialism (asopposedto,say,dual-aspecttheory),while othersuperveniencerelationsaretoostrongto usetoformulatenon-reductivematerialism sincetheyimplyreducibility.AccordingtoKim, non-reductivematerialismisanunstableposi- tion. Materialismasasuperveniencethesis.Several philosophershaveinrecentyearsattemptedto definethethesisofmaterialismusingaglobal superveniencethesis.Theiraimisnottoformulate abrandofnon-reductivematerialism;they maintainthattheirsuperveniencethesismay wellimplyreducibility.Theiraimis,rather,to formulateathesistowhichanyonewhocounts asagenuinematerialistmustsubscribe.David Lewishasmaintainedthatmaterialismistrueif andonlyifanynon-alienpossibleworldsthatare physicallyindiscerniblearementallyindis- cernibleaswell.Non-alienpossibleworldsare worldsthathaveexactlythesameperfectlynat- uralpropertiesastheactualworld.FrankJackson hasofferedthisproposal:materialismistrueif andonlyifanyminimalphysicalduplicateofthe actualworldisaduplicatesimpliciterofthe actualworld.Aworldisaphysicalduplicateof theactualworldifandonlyifitisexactlylikethe actualworldineveryphysicalrespect(physical particularforphysicalparticular,physicalprop- ertyforphysicalproperty,physicalrelationfor physicalrelation,etc);andaworldisaduplicate simpliciteroftheactualworldifandonlyifitis exactlyliketheactualworldineveryrespect.A minimalphysicalduplicateoftheactualworldis aphysicalduplicatethatcontainsnothingelse (bywayofparticulars,kinds,properties,etc.) thanitmustinordertobeaphysicalduplicateof theactualworld.Twoquestionsariseforanyfor- mulationofthethesisofmaterialism.Isitade- quatetomaterialism?And,ifitis,isittrue? Functionalism.Thenineteenth-centuryBrit- ishphilosopherGeorgeHenryLewesmaintained thatwhilenoteveryneurologicaleventismen- tal,everymentaleventisneurological.He claimedthatwhatmakescertainneurological eventsmentaleventsistheircausalroleinthe organism.Thisisaveryearlyversionoffunc- tionalism,nowadaysaleadingapproachtothe mind-bodyproblem. Functionalismimpliesananswertotheques- tionofwhatmakesastatetokenamentalstate ofacertainkindM:namely,thatitisaninstance ofsomefunctionalstatetypeidenticalwithM. Therearetwoversionsofthisproposal.Onone, amentalstatetypeMofasystemwillbeidenti- calwiththestatetypethatplaysacertaincausal roleRinthesystem.Thedescription'thestate typethatplaysRinthesystem'willbeanon- rigiddesignator;moreover,differentstatetypes mayplayRindifferentorganisms,inwhichcase thementalstateismultiplyrealizable.Onthesec- ondversion,amentalstatetypeMisidentical withasecond-orderstatetype,thestateofbeing insomefirst-orderstatethatplayscausalroleR. Morethanonefirst-orderstatemayplayroleR, andthusMmaybemultiplyrealizable.Oneither version,iftherelevantcausalrolesarespecifiable inphysicalortopic-neutralterms,thenthefunc- tionaldefinitionsofmentalstatetypeswillbe,in principle,physicallyreductive.Sincetheroles wouldbespecifiedpartlyintopic-neutralterms, theremaywellbepossibleworldsinwhichthe mentalstatesarerealizedbynon-physicalstates; thus,functionalismdoesnotimplytokenphysi- calism.However,functionaliststypicallymain- tainthat,ontheempiricalevidence,mental statesarerealized(inourworld)onlybyphysi- calstates.Functionalismcomesinmanyvari- eties. 691 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind Smarfstopic-neutralanalysisofourtalkof sensationsisinthespiritoffunctionalism.And Armstrong'scentralstatematerialismcountsasa kindoffunctionalismsinceitmaintainsthat mentalstatesarestatesapttoproduceacertain rangeofbehavior,andthusidentifiesstatesas mentalstatesbytheirperformingthiscausal role.However,functionaliststodaytypicallyhold thatthedefiningcausalrolesincludecausalroles vis-å-visinputstatetypes,aswellasoutputstate types,andalsovis-å-visotherinternalstatetypes ofthesysteminquestion. Inthe1960sDavidLewisproposedafunc- tionalisttheory,analyticalfunctionalism,according towhichdefinitionsofmentalpredicatessuchas 'belief,'desire',andthelike(thoughnotpredi- catessuchas'believesthatp'or'desiresthatq') canbeobtainedbyconjoiningtheplatitudesof commonsensepsychologyandformulatingthe Ramseysentencefortheconjunction.Therelevant Ramseysentenceisasecond-orderquantifica- tionalsentencethatquantifiesöverthemental predicatesintheconjunctionofcommonsense psychologicalplatitudes,andfromitonecan derivedefinitionsofthementalpredicates.On thisview,itwillbeanalyticthatacertainmental state(e.g.,belief)isthestatethatplaysacertain causalrolevis-å-visotherstates;anditisamat- terofempiricalinvestigationwhatstateplaysthe role.Lewisclaimedthatsuchinvestigation revealsthatthestatetypesthatplaytherolesin questionarephysicalstates. Intheearly1960s,Putnamproposedaversion ofscientificfunctionalism,machinestatefunction- alism:accordingtothisview,mentalstatesare typesofTuringmachinetablestates.Turing machinesaremechanicaldevicesconsistingofa tapewithsquaresonitthateitherareblankor containsymbols,andanexecutivethatcanmove onesquaretotheleft,oronesquaretotheright, orstaywhereitis.Anditcaneitherwriteasym- bolonasquare,eraseasymbolonasquare,or leavethesquareasitis.(Accordingtothe Church-Turingthesis,everycomputablefunc- tioncanbecomputedbyaTuringmachine.)Now therearetwofunctionsspecifyingsucha machine:onefrominputstatestooutputstates, theotherfrominputstatestoinputstates.And thesefunctionsareexpressiblebycounterfactu- als(e.g.,Tfthemachineisinstateslandreceives inputI,itwillemitoutputandenterstates2'). Machinetablesarespecifiedbythecounterfactu- alsthatexpressthefunctionsinquestion.Sothe mainideaofmachinestatefunctionalismisthat anygivenmentaltypeisdefmableasthestate typethatparticipatesincertaincounterfactual relationshipsspecifiedintermsofpurelyformål, andsonotsemanticallyinterpreted,statetypes. Anysystemwhoseinputs,outputs,andinternal statesarecounterfactuallyrelatedintheway characterizedbyamachinetableisarealization ofthattable.Thisversionofmachinestatefunc- tionalismhasbeenabandoned:noonemaintains thatthemindhasthearchitectureofaTuring machine.However,computationalpsychology,a branchofcognitivepsychology,presupposesa scientificfunctionalistviewofcognitivestates:it takesthemindtohaveacomputationalarchi- tecture.(Seethesectiononcognitivepsychology below.) Functionalism-theviewthatwhatmakesa statearealizationofamentalstateisitsplaying acertaincausalrole-remainsaleadingtheory ofmind.Butfunctionalismfacesformidabledif- ficulties.Blockhaspinpointedone.Ontheone hand,iftheinputandoutputstatesthatfigurein thecausalroleallegedtodefineacertainmental statearespecifiedininsufficientdetail,thefunc- tionaldefinitionwillbetooliberal:itwillmis- takenlyclassifycertainstatesasofthatmental type.Ontheotherhand,iftheinputandoutput statesarespecifiedintoomuchdetail,thefunc- tionaldefinitionwillbechauvinistic:itwillfailto countcertainstatesasinstancesofthemental statethatareinfactsuchinstances.Moreover,it hasalsobeenarguedthatfunctionalismcannot captureconsciousstatessincetypesofconscious statesdonotadmitoffunctionaldefinitions. Cognitivepsychology,content,and consciousness Cognitivepsychology.Manyclaimthatone aimofcognitivepsychologyistoprovideexpla- nationsofintentionalcapacities,capacitiestobe inintentionalstates(e.g.,believing)andto engageinintentionalactivities(e.g.,reasoning). Födorhasarguedthatclassicalcognitivepsy- chologypostulatesacognitivearchitecturethat includesalanguageofthought:asystemofmen- talrepresentationwithacombinatorialsyntax andsemantics,andcomputationalprocesses definedöverthesementalrepresentationsin virtueoftheirsyntacticstructures.Onthisview, cognitionisrule-governedsymbolmanipula- tion.Mentalsymbolshavemeanings,butthey participateincomputationalprocessessolelyin virtueoftheirsyntacticorformålproperties.The mindis,sotospeak,asyntacticengine.Theview impliesakindofcontentparallelism:syntax- sensitivecausaltransitionsbetweensymbolswill preservesemanticcoherence.Födorhasmain- 692 philosophyofmind philosophyofmind tainedthat,onthislanguage-of-thoughtviewof cognition(theclassicalview),beinginabelief- that-pstatecanbeunderstoodasconsistingin bearingacomputationalrelation(onethatis constitutiveofbelief)toasentenceinthelan- guageofthoughtthatmeansthatp;andsimilarly fordesire,intention,andthelike.Theexplana- tionofintentionalcapacitieswillbeprovidedby acomputationaltheoryformentalsentencesin conjunctionwithapsychosemantictheory,atheory ofmeaningformentalsentences. Aresearchprogramincognitivesciencecalled connectionismpostulatesnetworksofneuron-like units.Theunitscanbeeitheronoroff,orcan havecontinuouslevelsofactivation.Unitsare connected,theconnectionshavevariousdegrees ofstrength,andtheconnectionscanbeeither inhibitoryorexcitatory.Connectionismhaspro- videdfruitfulmodelsforstudyinghowneural networkscomputeinformation.Moreover,con- nectionistshavehadmuchsuccessinmodeling patternrecognitiontasks(e.g.,facialrecogni- tion)andtasksconsistingoflearningcategories fromexamples.Someconnectionistsmaintain thatconnectionismwillyieldanalternativeto theclassicallanguage-of-thoughtaccountof intentionalstatesandcapacities.However,some favöramixed-modelsapproachtocognition: somecognitivecapacitiesaresymbolic,some connectionist.Andsomeholdthatconnection- ismwillyieldanimplementationalarchitecture forasymboliccognitivearchitecture,onethat willhelpexplainhowasymboliccognitivearchi- tectureisrealizedinthenervoussystem. Contentexternalism.Manytodayholdthat Twin-EarththoughtexperimentsbyPutnamand TylerBurgeshowthatthecontentsofasubjecfs mentalstatesdonotsuperveneonintrinsic propertiesofthesubject:twoindividualscanbe exactlyalikeineveryintrinsicrespect,yetbein mentalstateswithdifferentcontents.(In responsetoTwin-Earththoughtexperiments, somephilosophershave,however,attemptedto characterizeanotionofnarrowcontent,akindof contentthatsupervenesonintrinsicproperties ofthinkers.)Content,externalistsclaim,de- pendsonextrinsic-contextualfactors.Ifexter- nalismiscorrect,thenapsychosemantictheory mustexaminetherelationbetweenmentalsym- bolsandtheextrinsic,contextualfactorsthat determinecontents.StephenStichhasargued thatpsychologyshouldeschewpsychosemantics andconcernitselfonlywiththesyntacticprop- ertiesofmentalsentences.Suchapsychology couldnotexplainintentionalcapacities.But Stichurgesthatcomputationalpsychologyalso eschewthatexplanatorygoal.If,however,psy- chologyistoexplainintentionalcapacities,a psychosemantictheoryisneeded.Dretske, Födor,RuthMillikan,andDavidPapineauhave eachindependentlyattemptedtoprovide,in physicalisticallyrespectableterms,foundations foranaturalizedexternalisttheoryofthecon- tentofmentalsentencesorinternalphysical states.Perhapstheleadingproblemforthesethe- oriesofcontentistoexplainhowthephysical andfunctionalfactsaboutastatedeterminea uniquecontentforit.Appealingtoworkby QuineandbyKripke,somephilosophersargue thatsuchfactswillnotdetermineuniquecon- tents. Bothcausalandepistemicconcernshavebeen raisedaboutexternalisttheoriesofcontent.Such theoriesinvitethequestionwhethertheprop- ertyofhavingacertaincontentisevercausally relevant.Ifcontentisacontextualpropertyofa statethathasit,canstateshaveeffectsinvirtue oftheirhavingacertaincontent?Thisisan importantissuebecauseintentionalstatesfigure inexplanationsnotonlyinvirtueoftheirinten- tionalmode(whethertheyarebeliefs,ordesires, etc.)butalsoinvirtueoftheircontents.Consider aneverydaybelief-desireexplanation.Thefact thatthesubjecfsbeliefwasthattherewasmilk intherefrigeratorandthefactthatthesubjecfs desirewasformilkarebothessentialtothebelief anddesireexplainingwhythesubjectwentto therefrigerator.Dretske,whomaintainsthat contentdependsonacausal-historicalcontext, hasattemptedtoexplainhowthepropertyof havingacertaincontentcanbecausallyrelevant eventhoughthepossessionoftheproperty dependsoncausal-historicalfactors.Andvarious otherphilosophershaveattemptedtoexplain howthecausalrelevanceofcontentcanbe squaredwiththefactthatitfailstosuperveneon intrinsicpropertiesofthesubject.Afurthercon- troversialquestioniswhetherexternalismis consistentwithourhavingprivilegedaccessto whatwearethinking. Consciousness.Consciousstatessuchaspain states,visualexperiences,andsoon,aresuch thatitis"like"somethingforthesubjectofthe statetobeinthem.Suchstateshaveaqualita- tiveaspect,aphenomenologicalcharacter.The what-it-is-likeaspectsofexperiencesarecalled qualia.Qualiaposeaseriousdifficultyforphysi- calism.Broadarguedthatonecanknowallthe physicalpropertiesofachemicalandhowit causallyinteractswithotherphysicalphenom- enaandyetnotknowwhatitisliketosmellit. Heconcludedthatthesmellofthechemicalis 693 philosophyoforganism philosophyofpsychology notitselfaphysicalproperty,butratheranirre- ducibleemergentproperty.FrankJacksonhas recentlydefendedaversionoftheargument, whichhasbeendubbedtheknowledgeargu- ment.Jacksonarguesthatasuper-scientist, Mary,whoknowsallthephysicalandfunctional factsaboutcolorvision,light,andmatter,buthas neverexperiencedrednesssinceshehasspent herentirelifeinablackandwhiteroom,would notknowwhatitisliketovisuallyexperience red.Heconcludesthatthephysicalandfunc- tional(topic-neutral)factsdonotentailallthe facts,andthusmaterialismisfalse.Inresponse, LawrenceNemirow,DavidLewis,andothers havearguedthatknowingwhatitisliketobein acertainconsciousstateis,inpart,amatterof know-how(e.g.,tobeabletoimagineoneselfin thestate)ratherthanfactualknowledge,and thatthefailureofknowledgeofthephysicaland functionalfactstoyieldsuchknow-howdoesnot implythefalsityofmaterialism. Functionalismseemsunabletosolvetheprob- lemofqualiasincequaliaseemnottobefunc- tionallydefinable.Inthe1970s,FödorandNed Blockarguedthattwostatescanhavethesame causalrole,therebyrealizingthesamefunctional state,yetthequaliaassociatedwitheachcanbe inverted.Thisiscalledtheproblemofinverted qualia.Thecolorspectrum,e.g.,mightbe invertedfortwoindividuals(apossibilityraised byLocke),despitetheirbeinginthesamefunc- tionalstates.Theyfurtherarguedthattwostates mightrealizethesamefunctionalstate,yetthe onemighthavequaliaassociatedwithitandthe othernot.Thisiscalledtheproblemofabsent qualia.SydneyShoemakerhasarguedthatthe possibilityofabsentqualiacanberuledouton functionalistgrounds.However,hehasalso refinedtheinvertedqualiascenarioandfurther articulatedtheproblemitposesforfunctional- ism.Whetherfunctionalismorphysicalismcan avoidtheproblemsofabsentandinvertedqualia remainsanopenquestion. ThomasNagelclaimsthatconsciousstatesare subjective:tofullyunderstandthem,onemust understandwhatitisliketobeinthem,butone candothatonlybytakinguptheexperiential pointofviewofasubjectinthem.Physicalstates, incontrast,areobjective.Physicalscienceat- temptstocharacterizetheworldinabstraction fromtheexperientialpointofviewofanysub- ject.AccordingtoNagel,whetherphenomenal mentalstatesreducetophysicalstatesturnson whethersubjectivestatesreducetoobjective states;and,atpresent,heclaims,wehaveno understandingofhowtheycould.Nagelhassug- gestedthatconsciousnessmaybeexplainable onlybyappealtoasyetundiscoveredbasicnon- mental,non-physicalproperties-"proto-mental properties"-theideabeingthatexperiential pointsofviewmightbeconstitutedbyproto- mentalpropertiestogetherwithphysicalproper- ties.Hethusclaimsthatpanphysicismisworthyof seriousconsideration.FrankJackson,JamesVan Cleve,andDavidChalmershavearguedthat consciouspropertiesareemergent,i.e.,funda- mental,irreduciblemacro-properties;and Chalmerssympathizeswithabrandofpan- physicism.ColinMcGinnclaimsthatwhilecon- sciouspropertiesarelikelyreductivelyexplain- ablebybrainproperties,ourmindsseemcon- ceptuallyclosedtotheexplainingproperties:we areunabletoconceptualizethem,justasacatis unabletoconceptualizeasquareroot.Dennett attemptstoexplainconsciousnessinsuperve- nientbehavioristterms.DavidRosenthalargues thatconsciousnessisaspecialcaseofintention- ality-morespecifically,thatconsciousstatesare juststateswecancomeinacertaindirectwayto believewearein.Dretske,WilliamLycan,and MichaelTyearguethatconsciouspropertiesare intentionalpropertiesandphysicalisticallyre- ducible.PatriciaChurchlandarguesthatcon- sciousphenomenaarereducibletoneurological phenomena.BrianLoarcontendsthatqualiaare identicalwitheitherfunctionalorneurological statesofthebrain;andChristopherHillargues specificallythatqualiaareidenticalwithneuro- logicalstates.LoarandHillattempttoexplain awaytheappearanceofcontingencyofpsy- chophysicalidentityclaims,butinawaydiffer- entfromthewayKripkeattemptstoexplainthe appearanceofcontingencyof'WaterisH20', sincetheyconcedethatthatmodeofexplanation isunavailable.Theyappealtodifferencesinthe conceptualrolesofneurologicalandfunctional conceptsbycontrastwithphenomenalconcepts. Theyarguethatwhilesuchconceptsarediffer- ent,theyanswertothesameproperties.The natureofconsciousnessthusremainsamatterof dispute. Seealsoactiontheory,cognitivesci- ence,CONNECTIONISM,FOLKPSYCHOLOGY, INTENTIONALITY,MEANING,PHILOSOPHYOF LANGUAGE,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE,PHYSI- CALISM.B.P.M. philosophyoforganism.Seewhitehead. philosophyofpsychology,thephilosophical studyofpsychology.Psychologybegantosepa- ratefromphilosophywiththeworkofthenine- 694 philosophyofpsychology philosophyofpsychology teenth-centuryGermanexperimentalists,espe- ciallyFechner(1801-87),Helmholtz(1821- 94),andWundt(1832-1920).Inthefirsthalfof thetwentiethcentury,theseparationwascom- pletedinthiscountryinsofarasseparatepsy- chologydepartmentsweresetupinmost universities,psychologistsestablishedtheirown journalsandprofessionalassociations,andex- perimentalmethodswerewidelyemployed,al- thoughnotineveryareaofpsychology(thefirst experimentalstudyoftheeffectivenessofapsy- chologicaltherapydidnotoccuruntil1963). Despitethisachievementofautonomy,however, issueshaveremainedaboutthenatureofthe connections,ifany,thatshouldcontinue betweenpsychologyandphilosophy. Oneradicalview,thatvirtuallyallsuchcon- nectionsshouldbesevered,wasdefendedbythe behavioristJohnWatsoninhisseminal1913 paper"PsychologyastheBehavioristViewsIt." Watsoncriticizespsychologists,eventheexperi- mentalists,forrelyingonintrospectivemethods andformakingconsciousnessthesubjectmatter oftheirdiscipline.Herecommendsthatpsychol- ogybeapurelyobjectiveexperimentalbranchof naturalscience,thatitstheoreticalgoalbetopre- dictandcontrolbehavior,andthatitdiscardall referencetoconsciousness.Inmakingbehavior thesolesubjectofpsychologicalinquiry,we avoidtakingsideson"thosetime-honoredrelics ofphilosophicalspeculation,"namelycompeting theoriesaboutthemind-bodyproblem,suchas interactionismandparallelism.Inalåterwork, publishedin1925,Watsonclaimedthatthesuc- cessofbehaviorismthreatenedtheveryexis- tenceofphilosophy:"Withthebehavioristic pointofviewnowbecomingdominant,itishärd tofindaplaceforwhathasbeencalledphiloso- phy.Philosophyispassing-hasallbutpassed, andunlessnewissuesarisewhichwillgivea foundationforanewphilosophy,theworldhas seenitslastgreatphilosopher." Onenewissuewasthecredibilityofbehavior- ism.Watsongavenoargumentforhisviewthat predictionandcontrolofbehaviorshouldbethe onlytheoreticalgoalsofpsychology.Ifthe attempttoexplainbehaviorisalsolegitimate,as someanti-behavioristsargue,thenitwould seemtobeanempiricalquestionwhetherthat goalcanbemetwithoutappealingtomentalistic causes.Watsonandhissuccessors,suchasB.F. Skinner,citednocredibleempiricalevidence thatitcould,butinsteadreliedprimarilyon philosophicalargumentsforbanningpostulation ofmentalisticcauses.Asaconsequence,behav- ioristsvirtuallyguaranteedthatphilosophersof psychologywouldhaveatleastoneadditional taskbeyondwrestlingwithtraditionalmind- bodyissues:theanalysisandcriticismofbehav- iorismitself. Althoughbehaviorismandthemind-body problemwereneverthesolesubjectsofphiloso- phyofpsychology,amuchrichersetoftopics developedafter1950whentheso-calledcogni- tiverevolutionoccurredinAmericanpsychol- ogy.Thesetopicsincludeinnateknowledgeand theacquisitionoftransformationalgrammars, intentionality,thenatureofmentalrepresenta- tion,functionalism,mentalimagery,thelan- guageofthought,and,morerecently, connectionism.Suchtopicsareofinterestto manycognitivepsychologistsandthoseinother disciplines,suchaslinguisticsandartificialintel- ligence,whocontributedtotheemergingdisci- plineknownascognitivescience.Thus,afterthe declineofvariousformsofbehaviorismandthe consequentriseofcognitivism,manyphiloso- phersofpsychologycollaboratedmoreclosely withpsychologists.Thisincreasedcooperation wasprobablyduenotonlytoabroadeningofthe issues,butalsotoamethodologicalchangein philosophy.Intheperiodroughlybetween1945 and1975,conceptualanalysisdominatedboth AmericanandEnglishphilosophyofpsychology andthecloselyrelateddiscipline,thephilosophy ofmind.Manyphilosopherstooktheposition thatphilosophywasessentiallyanaprioridisci- pline.Thesephilosophersrarelycitedtheempir- icalstudiesofpsychologists.Inrecentdecades, however,philosophyofpsychologyhasbecome moreempirical,atleastinthesensethatmore attentionisbeingpaidtothedetailsoftheempir- icalstudiesofpsychologists.Theresultismore interchangesbetweenphilosophersandpsychol- ogists. Althoughinterestincognitivepsychologyap- pearstopredominateinrecentAmericanphilos- ophyofpsychology,thenewemphasison empiricalstudiesisalsoreflectedinphilosophic workontopicsnotdirectlyrelatedtocognitive psychology.Forexample,philosophersofpsy- chologyhavewrittenbooksinrecentyearson theclinicalfoundationsofpsychoanalysis,the foundationsofbehaviortherapyandbehavior modification,andself-deception.Theemphasis onempiricaldatahasbeentakenonestepfur- therbynaturalists,whoarguethatinepistemol- ogy,atleast,andperhapsinallareasofphi- losophy,philosophicalquestionsshouldeither bereplacedbyquestionsfromempiricalpsy- chologyorbeansweredbyappealtoempirical studiesinpsychologyandrelateddisciplines.Itis 695 philosophyofreligion philosophyofreligion stilltooearlytopredictthefruitfulnessofthe naturalistapproach,butthisnewtrendmight wellhavepleasedWatson.Takentoanextreme, naturalismwouldmakephilosophydependent onpsychologyinsteadofthereverseandthus wouldfurtherenhancetheautonomyofpsy- chologythatWatsondesired. Seealsobehaviorism,cognitivescience, NATURALISM,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND.E.Er. philosophyofreligion,thesubfieldofphilosophy devotedtothestudyofreligiousphenomena. Althoughreligionsaretypicallycomplexsystems oftheoryandpractice,includingbothmythsand rituals,philosopherstendtoconcentrateoneval- uatingreligioustruthclaims.Inthemajortheis- tictraditions,Judaism,Christianity,andIslam, themostimportantoftheseclaimsconcemthe existence,nature,andactivitiesofGod.Suchtra- ditionscommonlyunderstandGodtobesome- thinglikeapersonwhoisdisembodied,etemal, free,all-powerful,all-knowing,thecreatorand sustaineroftheuniverse,andtheproperobject ofhumanobedienceandworship.Oneimpor- tantquestioniswhetherthisconceptionofthe objectofhumanreligiousactivityiscoherent; anotheriswhethersuchabeingactuallyexists. Philosophersofreligionhavesoughtrational answerstobothquestions. Themajortheistictraditionsdrawadistinction betweenreligioustruthsthatcanbediscovered andevenknownbyunaidedhumanreasonand thosetowhichhumanshaveaccessonlythrough aspecialdivinedisclosureorrevelation.Accord- ingtoAquinas,e.g.,theexistenceofGodand somethingsaboutthedivinenaturecanbe provedbyunaidedhumanreason,butsuchdis- tinctivelyChristiandoctrinesastheTrinityand Incarnationcannotbethusprovedandare knowntohumansonlybecauseGodhas revealedthem.Theistsdisagreeabouthowsuch divinedisclosuresoccur;themaincandidatesfor vehiclesofrevelationincludereligiousexperi- ence,theteachingsofaninspiredreligious leader,thesacredscripturesofareligiouscom- munity,andthetraditionsofaparticularchurch. ThereligiousdoctrinesChristiantraditionstake tobethecontentofrevelationareoften describedasmattersoffaith.Tobesure,suchtra- ditionstypicallyaffirmthatfaithgoesbeyond meredoctrinalbelieftoincludeanattitudeof profoundtrustinGod.Onmostaccounts,how- ever,faithinvolvesdoctrinalbelief,andsothere isacontrastwithinthereligiousdomainitself betweenfaithandreason.Onewaytospellout thecontrast-thoughnottheonlyway-isto imaginethatthecontentofrevelationisdivided intotwoparts.Ontheonehand,therearethose doctrines,ifany,thatcanbeknownbyhuman reasonbutarealsopartofrevelation;theexis- tenceofGodissuchadoctrineifitcanbeproved byhumanreasonalone.Suchdoctrinesmightbe acceptedbysomepeopleonthebasisofrational argument,whileothers,wholackrationalproof, acceptthemontheauthorityofrevelation.On theotherhand,therearethosedoctrinesthat cannotbeknownbyhumanreasonandfor whichtheauthorityofrevelationisthesole basis.Theyareobjectsoffaithratherthanreason andareoftendescribedasmysteriesoffaith.The- istsdisagreeabouthowsuchexclusiveobjectsof faitharerelatedtoreason.Oneprominentview isthat,althoughtheygobeyondreason,theyare inharmonywithit;anotheristhattheyarecon- trarytoreason.Thosewhourgethatsuchdoc- trinesshouldbeaccepteddespitethefactthat, orevenpreciselybecause,theyarecontraryto reasonareknownasfideists;thefamousslogan credoquiaabsurdum(Tbelievebecauseitis absurd')capturestheflavorofextremefideism. ManyscholarsregardKierkegaardasafideist onaccountofhisemphasisontheparadoxical natureoftheChristiandoctrinethatJesusof NazarethisGodincarnate. Modernphilosophersofreligionhave,forthe mostpart,confinedtheirattentiontotopics treatablewithoutpresupposingthetruthofany particulartradition'sclaimsaboutrevelationand havelefttheexplorationofmysteriesoffaithto thetheologiansofvarioustraditions.Agreatdeal ofphilosophicalworkclarifyingtheconceptof Godhasbeenpromptedbypuzzlesthatsuggest someincoherenceinthetraditionalconcept. Onekindofpuzzleconcemsthecoherenceof individualclaimsaboutthenatureofGod.Con- siderthetraditionalaffirmationthatGodisall- powerful(omnipotent).Reflectiononthisdoc- trineraisesafamousquestion:CanGodmakea stonesoheavythatevenGodcannotliftit?No matterhowthisisanswered,itseemsthatthere isatleastonethingthatevenGodcannotdo,i.e., makesuchastoneorliftsuchastone,andsoit appearsthatevenGodcannotbeall-powerful. Suchpuzzlesstimulateattemptsbyphilosophers toanalyzetheconceptofomnipotenceinaway thatspecifiesmorepreciselythescopeofthe powerscoherentlyattributabletoanomnipotent being.Totheextentthatsuchattemptssucceed, theyfosteradeeperunderstandingofthecon- ceptofGodand,ifGodexists,ofthedivine nature.Anothersortofpuzzleconcernsthecon- sistencyofattributingtwoormorepropertiesto 696 philosophyofreligion philosophyofreligion God.ConsidertheclaimthatGodisboth immutableandomniscient.Animmutablebeing isonethatcannotundergointernalchange,and anomniscientbeingknowsalltruths,and believesnofalsehoods.IfGodisomniscient,it seemsthatGodmustfirstknowandhence believethatitisnowTuesdayandnotbelieve thatitisnowWednesdayandlåterknowand hencebelievethatitisnowWednesdayandnot believethatitisnowTuesday.Ifso,God'sbeliefs change,andsincechangeofbeliefisaninternal change,Godisnotimmutable.Soitappearsthat GodisnotimmutableifGodisomniscient.Ares- olutionofthispuzzlewouldfurthercontributeto enrichingthephilosophicalunderstandingofthe conceptofGod. Itis,ofcourse,onethingtoelaborateacoher- entconceptofGod;itisquiteanothertoknow, apartfromrevelation,thatsuchabeingactually exists.AproofoftheexistenceofGodwould yieldsuchknowledge,anditisthetaskofnatural theologytoevaluateargumentsthatpurporttobe suchproofs.Asopposedtorevealedtheology,nat- uraltheologyrestrictstheassumptionsfitto serveaspremisesinitsargumentstothingsnat- urallyknowablebyhumans,i.e.,knowable withoutspecialrevelationfromsupernatural sources.Manypeoplehavehopedthatsuchnat- uralreligiousknowledgecouldbeuniversally communicatedandwouldjustifyaformofreli- giouspracticethatwouldappealtoallhuman- kindbecauseofitsrationality.Suchareligion wouldbeanaturalreligion.Thehistoryofnat- uraltheologyhasproducedabewilderingvariety ofargumentsfortheexistenceofGod.Thefour maintypesarethese:ontologicalarguments, cosmologicalarguments,teleologicalarguments, andmoralarguments. Theearliestandmostfamousversionofthe ontologicalargumentwassetforthbyAnselmof Canterburyinchapter2ofhisProslogion.Itisa böldattempttodeducetheexistenceofGod fromtheconceptofGod:weunderstandGodto beaperfectbeing,somethingthanwhichnötn- inggreatercanbeconceived.Becausewehave thisconcept,Godatleastexistsinourmindsas anobjectoftheunderstanding.EitherGodexists inthemindalone,orGodexistsbothinthe mindandasanextramentalreality.ButifGod existedinthemindalone,thenwecouldcon- ceiveofabeinggreaterthanthatthanwhich nothinggreatercanbeconceived,namely,one thatalsoexistedinextramentalreality.Sincethe conceptofabeinggreaterthanthatthanwhich nothinggreatercanbeconceivedisincoherent, Godcannotexistinthemindalone.HenceGod existsnotonlyinthemindbutalsoinextra- mentalreality. Themostcelebratedcriticismofthisformof theargumentwasKanfs,whoclaimedthatexis- tenceisnotarealpredicate.ForKant,areal predicatecontributestodeterminingthecontent ofaconceptandsoservesasapartofitsdefini- tion.Buttosaythatsomethingfallingundera conceptexistsdoesnotaddtothecontentofa concept;thereis,Kantsaid,nodifferenceincon- ceptualcontentbetweenahundredrealdollars andahundredimaginarydollars.Hence whetherornotthereexistssomethingthatcor- respondstoaconceptcannotbesettledbydefi- nition.TheexistenceofGodcannotbededuced fromtheconceptofaperfectbeingbecauseexis- tenceisnotcontainedintheconceptorthedef- initionofaperfectbeing. Contemporaryphilosophicaldiscussionhas focusedonaslightlydifferentversionofthe ontologicalargument.Inchapter3ofProslogion Anselmsuggestedthatsomethingthanwhich nothinggreatercanbeconceivedcannotbecon- ceivednottoexistandsoexistsnecessarily.Fol- lowingthislead,suchphilosophersasCharles Hartshorne,NormanMalcolm,andAlvinPlan- tingahavecontendedthatGodcannotbeacon- tingentbeingwhoexistsinsomepossibleworlds butnotinothers.Theexistenceofaperfectbeing iseithernecessary,inwhichcaseGodexistsin everypossibleworld,orimpossible,inwhich caseGodexistsinnopossibleworlds.Onthis view,ifitissomuchaspossiblethataperfect beingexists,Godexistsineverypossibleworld andhenceintheactualworld.Thecrucial premiseinthisformoftheargumentisthe assumptionthattheexistenceofaperfectbeing ispossible;itisnotobviouslytrueandcouldbe rejectedwithoutirrationality.Forthisreason, Plantingaconcedesthattheargumentdoesnot proveorestablishitsconclusion,butmaintains thatitdoesmakeitrationaltoaccepttheexis- tenceofGod. Thekeypremisesofvariouscosmologicalargu- mentsarestatementsofobviousfactsofageneral sortabouttheworld.Thus,theargumenttoa firstcausebeginswiththeobservationthatthere arenowthingsundergoingchangeandthings causingchange.Ifsomethingisacauseofsuch changeonlyifitisitselfcausedtochangeby somethingelse,thenthereisaninfmitelylong chainofcausesofchange.But,itisalleged,there cannotbeacausalchainofinfinitelength.There- förethereissomethingthatcauseschange,but isnotcausedtochangebyanythingelse,i.e.,a firstcause.Manycriticsofthisformoftheargu- 697 philosophyofreligion philosophyofreligion mentdenyitsassumptionthattherecannotbe aninfinitecausalregressorchainofcauses.This argumentalsofailstoshowthatthereisonlyone firstcauseanddoesnotprovethatafirstcause musthavesuchdivineattributesasomniscience, omnipotence,andperfectgoodness. Aversionofthecosmologicalargumentthat hasattractedmoreattentionfromcontemporary philosophersistheargumentfromcontingency tonecessity.Itstartswiththeobservationthat therearecontingentbeings-beingsthatcould havefailedtoexist.Sincecontingentbeingsdo notexistoflogicalnecessity,acontingentbeing mustbecausedtoexistbysomeotherbeing,for otherwisetherewouldbenoexplanationofwhy itexistsratherthannotdoingso.Eitherthe causalchainofcontingentbeingshasafirst member,acontingentbeingnotcausedby anothercontingentbeing,oritisinfinitelylong. If,ontheonehand,thechainhasafirstmem- ber,thenanecessarybeingexistsandcausesit. Afterall,beingcontingent,thefirstmember musthaveacause,butitscausecannotbe anothercontingentbeing.Henceitscausehasto benon-contingent,i.e.,abeingthatcouldnot failtoexistandsoisnecessary.If,ontheother hand,thechainisinfinitelylong,thenaneces- sarybeingexistsandcausesthechainasawhole. Thisisbecausethechainasawhole,beingitself contingent,requiresacausethatmustbenon- contingentsinceitisnotpartofthechain.In eithercase,iftherearecontingentbeings,anec- essarybeingexists.So,sincecontingentbeings doexist,thereisanecessarybeingthatcauses theirexistence.Criticsofthisargumentattackits assumptionthattheremustbeanexplanation fortheexistenceofeverycontingentbeing. Rejectingtheprinciplethatthereisasufficient reasonfortheexistenceofeachcontingent thing,theyarguethattheexistenceofatleast somecontingentbeingsisaninexplicablebrute fact.Andeveniftheprincipleofsufficientreason istrue,itstruthisnotobviousandsoitwould notbeirrationaltodenyit.Accordingly,William Rowe(b.1931)concludesthatthisversionofthe cosmologicalargumentdoesnotprovetheexis- tenceofGod,butheleavesopenthequestionof whetheritshowsthattheisticbeliefisreason- able. Thestartingpointofteleologicalargumentsisthe phenomenonofgoal-directednessinnature. Aquinas,e.g.,beginswiththeclaimthatwesee thatthingswhichlackintelligenceactforanend soastoachievethebestresult.Modernscience hasdiscreditedthisuniversalmetaphysicaltele- ology,butmanybiologicalsystemsdoseemto displayremarkableadaptationsofmeanstoends. Thus,asWilliamPaley(1743-1805)insisted,the eyeisadaptedtoseeinganditspartscooperatein complexwaystoproducesight.Thissuggestsan analogybetweensuchbiologicalsystemsand humanartifacts,whichareknowntobeproducts ofintelligentdesign.Spelledoutinmechanical terms,theanalogygroundstheclaimthatthe worldasawholeislikeavästmachinecomposed ofmanysmallermachines.Machinesarecon- trivedbyintelligenthumandesigners.Sincelike effectshavelikecauses,theworldasawholeand manyofitspartsarethereforeprobablyproducts ofdesignbyanintelligenceresemblingthe humanbutgreaterinproportiontothemagni- tudeofitseffects.Becausethisformoftheargu- mentrestsonananalogy,itisknownasthe analogkalargumentfortheexistenceofGod;itis alsoknownasthedesignargumentsinceitcon- cludestheexistenceofanintelligentdesignerof theworld. Humesubjectedthedesignargumenttosus- tainedcriticisminhisDialoguesConcerningNat- uralReligion.If,asmostscholarssuppose,the characterPhilospeaksforHume,Humedoesnot actuallyrejecttheargument.Hedoes,however, thinkthatitwarrantsonlytheveryweakcon- clusionthatthecauseorcausesoforderinthe universeprobablybearsomeremoteanalogyto humanintelligence.Asthiswayofputtingit indicates,theargumentdoesnotruleoutpoly- theism;perhapsdifferentminordeitiesdesigned lionsandtigers.Moreover,theanalogywith humanartificerssuggeststhatthedesigneror designersoftheuniversedidnotcreateitfrom nothingbutmerelyimposedorderonalready existingmatter.Andonaccountofthemixture ofgoodandevilintheuniverse,theargument doesnotshowthatthedesignerordesignersare morallyadmirableenoughtodeserveobedience orworship.SincethetimeofHume,thedesign argumenthasbeenfurtherunderminedbythe emergenceofDarwinianexplanationsofbiolog- icaladaptationsintermsofnaturalselectionthat giveexplanationsofsuchadaptationsintermsof intelligentdesignstiffcompetition. SomemoralargumentsfortheexistenceofGod conformtothepatternofinferencetothebestexpla- nation.Ithasbeenarguedthatthehypothesis thatmoralitydependsuponthewillofGodpro- videsthebestexplanationoftheobjectivityof moralobligations.Kanfsmoralargument, whichisprobablythebest-knownspecimenof thistype,takesadifferenttack.Accordingto Kant,thecompletegoodconsistsofperfect virtuerewardedwithperfecthappiness,and 698 philosophyofreligion philosophyofreligion virtuedeservestoberewardedwithproportional happinessbecauseitmakesoneworthytobe happy.Ifmoralityistocommandtheallegiance ofreason,thecompletegoodmustbearealpos- sibility,andsopracticalreasonisentitledtopos- tillatethattheconditionsnecessarytoguarantee itspossibilityobtain.Asfarasanyonecantell, natureanditslawsdonotfurnishsuchaguar- antee;inthisworld,apparently,thevirtuous oftensufferwhiletheviciousflourish.Andeven iftheoperationofnaturallawsweretoproduce happinessinproportiontovirtue,thiswouldbe merelycoincidental,andhencefinitemoral agentswouldnothavebeenmadehappyjust becausetheyhadbytheirvirtuemadethem- selvesworthyofhappiness.Sopracticalreasonis justifiedinpostulatingasupernaturalagentwith sufficientgoodness,knowledge,andpowerto ensurethatfiniteagentsreceivethehappiness theydeserveasarewardfortheirvirtue,though theoreticalreasoncanknownothingofsucha being.Criticsofthisargumenthavedeniedthat wemustpostulateasystematicconnection betweenvirtueandhappinessinordertohave goodreasonstobemoral.Indeed,makingsuch anassumptionmightactuallytemptonetocul- tivatevirtueforthesakeofsecuringhappiness ratherthanforitsownsake. Itseemsthereforethatnoneoftheseargu- mentsbyitselfconclusivelyprovestheexistence ofGod.However,someofthemmightcontribute toacumulativecasefortheexistenceofGod. AccordingtoRichardSwinburne,cosmological, teleological,andmoralargumentsindividually increasetheprobabilityofGod'sexistenceeven thoughnoneofthemmakesitmoreprobable thannot.Butwhenotherevidencesuchasthat derivingfromprovidentialoccurrencesandreli- giousexperiencesisaddedtothebalance,Swin- burneconcludesthattheismbecomesmore probablethanitsnegation.Whetherornotheis right,itdoesappeartobeentirelycorrectto judgetherationalityoftheisticbeliefinthelight ofourtotalevidence. Butthereisacasetobemadeagainsttheism too.Philosophersofreligionareinterestedin argumentsagainsttheexistenceofGod,andfair- nessdoesseemtorequireadmittingthatour totalevidencecontainsmuchthatbearsnega- tivelyontherationalityofbeliefinGod.The problemofevilisgenerallyregardedasthe strongestobjectiontotheism.Twokindsofevil canbedistinguished.Moralevilinheresinthe wickedactionsofmoralagentsandthebadcon- sequencestheyproduce.Anexampleistorturing theinnocent.Whenevilactionsareconsidered theologicallyasoffensesagainstGod,theyare regardedassins.Naturalevilsarebadconse- quencesthatapparentlyderiveentirelyfromthe operationsofimpersonalnaturalforces,e.g.the humanandanimalsufferingproducedbynat- uralcatastrophessuchasearthquakesandepi- demics.Bothkindsofevilraisethequestionof whatreasonsanomniscient,omnipotent,and perfectlygoodbeingcouldhaveforpermittingor allowingtheirexistence.Theodicyistheenter- priseoftryingtoanswerthisquestionand therebytojustifythewaysofGodtohumans. Itis,ofcourse,possibletodenythepresuppo- sitionsofthequestion.Somethinkershaveheld thatevilisunreal;othershavemaintainedthat thedeityislimitedandsolacksthepoweror knowledgetopreventtheevilsthatoccur.Ifone acceptsthepresuppositionsofthequestion,the mostpromisingstrategyfortheodicyseemstobe toclaimthateachevilGodpermitsisnecessary forsomegreatergoodortoavoidsomealterna- tivetoitthatisatleastasbadifnotworse.The strongestformofthisdoctrineistheclaimmade byLeibnizthatthisisthebestofallpossible worlds.Itisunlikelythathumans,withtheir cognitivelimitations,couldeverunderstandall thedetailsofthegreatergoodsforwhichevilsare necessary,assumingthatsuchgoodsexist;how- ever,wecanunderstandhowsomeevilscon- tributetoachievinggoods.Accordingtothe soul-makingtheodicyofJohnHick(b.1922), whichisrootedinatraditiongoingbacktoIre- naeus,admirablehumanqualitiessuchascom- passioncouldnotexistexceptasresponsesto suffering,andsoevilplaysanecessarypartinthe formationofmoralcharacter.Butthislineof thoughtdoesnotseemtoprovideacomplete theodicybecausemuchanimalsufferingoccurs unnoticedbyhumansandchildabuseoften destroysratherthanstrengthensthemoralchar- acterofitsvictims. Recentphilosophicaldiscussionhasoften focusedontheclaimthattheexistenceofan omniscient,omnipotent,andperfectlygood beingislogicallyinconsistentwiththeexistence ofevilorofacertainquantityofevil.Thisisthe logicalproblemofevil,andthemostsuccessful responsetoithasbeenthefreewilldefense.Unlike atheodicy,thisdefensedoesnotspeculateabout God'sreasonsforpermittingevilbutmerely arguesthatGod'sexistenceisconsistentwiththe existenceofevil.Itskeyideaisthatmoralgood cannotexistapartfromlibertarianfreeactions thatarenotcausallydetermined.IfGodaimsto producemoralgood,Godmustcreatefreecrea- turesuponwhosecooperationhemustdepend, 699 philosophyofscience philosophyofscience andsodivineomnipotenceislimitedbythefree- domGodconfersoncreatures.Sincesuchcrea- turesarealsofreetodoevil,itispossiblethatGod couldnothavecreatedaworldcontainingmoral goodbutnomoralevil.Plantingaextendsthe defensefrommoraltonaturalevilbysuggesting thatitisalsopossiblethatallnaturalevilisdue tothefreeactionsofnon-humanpersonssuch asSatanandhiscohorts.PlantingaandSwin- burnehavealsoaddressedtheprobabilisticprob- lemofevil,whichistheclaimthattheexistence ofevildisconfirmsorrendersimprobablethe hypothesisthatGodexists.Bothofthemargue fortheconclusionthatthisisnotthecase. Finally,itisworthmentioningthreeothertop- icsonwhichcontemporaryphilosophersofreli- gionhaveworkedtogoodeffect.Important studiesofthemeaninganduseofreligiouslan- guagewerestimulatedbythechallengeoflogi- calpositivism'sclaimthattheologicallanguageis cognitivelymeaningless.DefensesofsuchChristian doctrinesastheTrinity,Incarnation,andAtone- mentagainstvariousphilosophicalobjections haverecentlybeenofferedbypeoplecommitted toelaboratinganexplicitlyChristianphilosophy. Andagrowingappreciationofreligiousplural- ismhasbothsharpenedinterestinquestions abouttheculturalrelativityofreligiousrational- ityandbeguntoencourageprogresstowarda comparativephilosophyofreligions.Suchwork helpstomakephilosophyofreligionalivelyand diversefieldofinquiry. Seealsoaquinas,divineattributes, DIVINEFOREKNOWLEDGE,FREEWILLPROB- LEM,MYSTICISM,PARADOXESOFOMNIPO- TENCE,THEODICY,THEOLOGICALNATURAL- ISM.P.L.Q. philosophyofscience,thebranchofphilosophy thatiscenteredonacriticalexaminationofthe sciences:theirmethodsandtheirresults.One branchofthephilosophyofscience,methodology, iscloselyrelatedtothetheoryofknowledge.It exploresthemethodsbywhichsciencearrivesat itspositedtruthsconcerningtheworldandcrit- icallyexploresallegedrationalesforthesemeth- ods.Issuesconcerningthesenseinwhich theoriesareacceptedinscience,thenatureofthe confirmationrelationbetweenevidenceand hypothesis,thedegreetowhichscientificclaims canbefalsifiedbyobservationaldata,andthe like,aretheconcernofmethodology.Other branchesofthephilosophyofsciencearecon- cernedwiththemeaningandcontentofthe positedscientificresultsandarecloselyrelatedto metaphysicsandthephilosophyoflanguage. Typicalproblemsexaminedarethenatureofsci- entificlaws,thecognitivecontentofscientific theoriesreferringtounobservables,andthe structureofscientificexplanations.Finally,phi- losophyofscienceexploresspecificfoundational questionsarisingoutofthespecificresultsofthe sciences.Typicalquestionsexploredmightbe metaphysicalpresuppositionsofspace-timethe- ories,theroleofprobabilityinstatisticalphysics, theinterpretationofmeasurementinquantum theory,thestructureofexplanationsinevolu- tionarybiology,andthelike. Conceptsofthecredibilityofhypotheses. Somecrucialconceptsthatarisewhenissuesof thecredibilityofscientifichypothesesarein questionarethefollowing: Inductivismistheviewthathypothesescan receiveevidentialsupportfromtheirpredictive successwithrespecttoparticularcasesfalling underthem. Ifonetakestheprincipleofinductiveinfer- encetobethatthefuturewillbelikethepast, oneissubjecttotheskepticalobjectionthatthis ruleisemptyofcontent,andevenself-contra- dictory,ifanykindof"similarity"ofcasesisper- mitted.Torestorecontentandconsistencytothe rule,andforothermethodologicalpurposesas well,itisfrequentlyallegedthatonlynatural kinds,adelimitedsetof"genuine"properties, shouldbeallowedintheformulationofscientific hypotheses. Theviewthattheoriesarefirstarrivedatas creativehypothesesofthescientisfsimagination andonlythenconfronted,forjustificatorypur- poses,withtheobservationalpredictions deducedfromthem,iscalledthehypothetico- dedudivemodelofscience.Thismodeliscon- trastedwiththeviewthattheverydiscoveryof hypothesesissomehow"generated"outofaccu- mulatedobservationaldata. Theviewthathypothesesareconfirmedtothe degreethattheyprovidethe"bestexplanatory account"ofthedataisoftencalledabdudionand sometimescalledinferencetothebestexplanation. Theallegedrelationthatevidencebearsto hypothesis,warrantingitstruthbutnot,gener- ally,guaranteeingthattruth,iscalledconfirma- tion.Methodologicalaccountssuchasin- ductivismcountenancesuchevidentialwarrant, frequentlyspeakingofevidenceasmakinga hypothesisprobablebutnotestablishingitwith certainty. Probabilityintheconfirmationalcontextissup- posedtobearelationshipholdingbetween propositionsthatisquantitativeandisdescribed 700 philosophyofscience philosophyofscience bytheformåltheoryofprobability.Itissupposed tomeasurethe"degreeofsupport"thatone propositiongivestoanother,e.g.thedegreeof supportevidentialstatementsgivetoahypothe- sisallegedlysupportedbythem. Scientificmethodologistsoftenclaimthatsci- enceischaracterizedbyconvergence.Thisisthe claimthatscientifictheoriesintheirhistorical orderareconvergingtoanultimate,final,and idealtheory.Sometimesthisfinaltheoryissaid tobetruebecauseitcorrespondstothe"real world,"asinrealistaccountsofconvergence.In pragmatistversionsthisultimatetheoryisthe definingstandardoftruth. Itissometimesallegedthatonegroundfor choosingthemostplausibletheory,överand aboveconformityofthetheorywiththeobser- vationaldata,isthesimplicityofthetheory.Many versionsofthisthesisexist,someemphasizing formålelementsofthetheoryandothers,e.g., emphasizingpaucityofontologicalcommitment bythetheoryasthemeasureofsimplicity. Itissometimesallegedthatinchoosingwhich theorytobelieve,thescientificcommunityopts fortheoriescompatiblewiththedatathatmake minimalchangesinscientificbeliefnecessary fromthosedemandedbypreviouslyheldtheory. Thebelieverinmethodologicalconservatismmay alsotrytodefendsuchepistemicconservatismas normativelyrational. Anexperimentthatcandecisivelyshowasci- entifichypothesistobefalseiscalledacrucial experimentforthehypothesis.Itisathesisof manyphilosophersthatforhypothesesthat functionintheoriesandcanonlyconfrontobser- vationaldatawhenconjoinedwithothertheo- reticalhypotheses,noabsolutelydecisivecrucial experimentcanexist. Conceptsofthestructureofhypotheses.Here aresomeoftheessentialconceptsencountered whenitisthestructureofscientifichypotheses thatisbeingexplored: Initsexplanatoryaccountoftheworld,sci- encepositsnovelentitiesandproperties.Fre- quentlytheseareallegedtobenotaccessibleto directobservation.Atheoryisasetofhypotheses positingsuchentitiesandproperties.Some philosophersofsciencedividethelogicalconse- quencesofatheoryintothosereferringonlyto observablethingsandfeaturesandthoserefer- ringtotheunobservablesaswell.Variousre- ductionist,eliminationist,andinstrumentalist approachestotheoryagreethatthefullcognitive contentofatheoryisexhaustedbyitsobserva- tionalconsequencesreportedbyitsobservation sentences,aclaimdeniedbythosewhoespouse realistaccountsoftheories. Theviewthatthepartsofatheorythatdonot directlyreläteobservationalconsequencesought nottobetakenasgenuinelyreferentialatall, but,rather,asa"merelinguisticinstrument" allowingonetoderiveobservationalresultsfrom observationallyspecifiableposits,iscalledinstru- mentalism.Fromthispointofviewtermsputa- tivelyreferringtounobservablesfailtohave genuinereferenceandindividualnon-observa- tionalsentencescontainingsuchtermsarenot individuallygenuinelytrueorfalse. Verificationismisthegeneralnameforthedoc- trinethat,inonewayoranother,thesemantic contentofanassertionisexhaustedbythecon- ditionsthatcountaswarrantingtheacceptance orrejectionoftheassertion.Therearemanyver- sionsofverificationistdoctrinesthattrytodojus- ticebothtotheempiricistclaimthatthecontent ofanassertionisitstotalityofempiricalconse- quencesandalsotoawidevarietyofanti-reduc- tionistintuitionsaboutmeaning. Thedoctrinethattheoreticalsentencesmust bestrictlytranslatableintosentencesexpressed solelyinobservationaltermsinorderthatthe theoreticalassertionshavegenuinecognitive contentissometimescalledoperationalism.The "operation"bywhichamagnitudeisdetermined tohaveaspecifiedvalue,characterizedobserva- tionally,istakentogivetheverymeaningof attributingthatmagnitudetoanobject. Thedoctrinethatthemeaningsoftermsin theoriesarefixedbytherolethetermsplayin thetheoryasawholeisoftencalledsemantic holism.Accordingtothesemanticholist,defini- tionsoftheoreticaltermsbyappealtoobserva- tionaltermscannotbegiven,butallofthe theoreticaltermshavetheirmeaninggiven"asa group"bythestructureofthetheoryasawhole. Arelateddoctrineinconfirmationtheoryisthat confirmationaccruestowholetheories,andnot totheirindividualassertionsoneatatime.This isconfirmationalholism. Toseeanotherconceptionofcognitivecon- tent,conjoinallthesentencesofatheory together.Thenreplaceeachtheoreticaltermin thesentencesoobtainedwithapredicatevari- ableandexistentiallyquantifyöverallthepred- icatevariablessointroduced.ThisistheRamsey sentencefora(finitelyaxiomatized)theory.This sentencehasthesamelogicalconsequences framableintheobservationalvocabularyalone asdidtheoriginaltheory.Itisoftenclaimedthat theRamseysentenceforatheoryexhauststhe cognitivecontentofthetheory.TheRamseysen- 701 philosophyofscience philosophyofscience tenceissupposedto"define"themeaningofthe theoreticaltermsoftheoriginaltheoryaswellas haveempiricalconsequences;yetbyasserting theexistenceofthetheoreticalproperties,itis sometimesallegedtoremainarealistconstrual ofthetheory.Thelatterclaimismadedoubtful, however,bytheexistenceof"merelyrepresen- tational"interpretationsoftheRamseysentence. Theoriesareoftensaidtobesorelatedthatone theoryisreducibletoanother.Thestudyofthe relationtheoriesbeartooneanotherinthiscon- textissaidtobethestudyofintertheoreticre- duction.Suchreductiveclaimscanhavephil- osophicalorigins,asintheallegedreductionof materialobjectstosense-dataorofspatiotempo- ralrelationstocausalrelations,ortheycanbe scientificdiscoveries,asinthereductionofthe theoryoflightwavestothetheoryofelectro- magneticradiation.Numerous''models"ofthe reductiverelationexist,appropriatefordistinct kindsandcasesofreduction. Thetermscientificrealismhasmanyandvaried uses.Amongotherthingsthathavebeen assertedbythosewhodescribethemselvesassci- entificrealistsaretheclaimsthat"mature"sci- entifictheoriestypicallyrefertorealfeaturesof theworld,thatthehistoryofpastfalsificationsof acceptedscientifictheoriesdoesnotprovide goodreasonforpersistentskepticismastothe truthclaimsofcontemporarytheories,andthat thetermsoftheoriesthatputativelyreferto unobservablesoughttobetakenattheirrefer- entialfacevalueandnotreinterpretedinsome instrumentalisticmanner. Interna!realismdeniesirrealistclaimsfounded onthepastfalsificationofacceptedtheories. Internalrealistsare,however,skepticalof"meta- physical"claimsof"correspondenceoftruethe- oriestotherealworld"orofanynotionoftruth thatcanbeconstruedinradicallynon-epistemic terms.Whiletheoriesmayconvergetosome ultimate"true"theory,thenotionoftruthhere mustbeunderstoodinsomeversionofaPeircian ideaoftruthas"ultimatewarrantedassertabil- ity." Theclaimthatanytheorythatmakesrefer- encetopositedunobservablefeaturesofthe worldinitsexplanatoryapparatuswillalways encounterrivaltheoriesincompatiblewiththe originaltheorybutequallycompatiblewithall possibleobservationaldatathatmightbetaken asconfirmatoryoftheoriginaltheoryistheclaim oftheunderdeterm.ina.tionthesis. Ageneralizationtakentohave"lawlikeforce" iscalledalawofnature.Somesuggestedcriteria forgeneralizationshavinglawlikeforcearethe abilityofthegeneralizationtobackupthetruth ofclaimsexpressedascounterfactualconditions; theabilityofthegeneralizationtobeconfirmed inductivelyonthebasisofevidencethatisonly apropersubsetofalltheparticularinstances fallingunderthegenerality;andthegeneraliza- tionhavinganappropriateplaceinthesimple, systematichierarchyofgeneralizationsimpor- tantforfundamentalscientifictheoriesofthe world. Theapplicationofascientificlawtoagiven actualsituationisusuallyhedgedwiththepro- visothatforthelaw'spredictionstohold,"all other,unspecified,featuresofthesituationare normal."Suchaqualifyingclauseiscalleda ceterisparibusclause.Such"everythingelsebeing normal"claimscannotusuallybe"filledout," revealingimportantproblemsconcerningthe "opentexture"ofscientificclaims. Theclaimthatthefullspecificationofthestate oftheworldatonetimeissufficient,alongwith thelawsofnature,tofixthefullstateofthe worldatanyothertime,istheclaimofdetermin- ism.Thisisnottobeconfusedwithclaimsoftotal predictability,sinceevenifdeterminismwere truethefullstateoftheworldatatimemightbe, inprinciple,unavailableforknowledge. Conceptsofthefoundationsofphysicaltheo- ries.Here,finally,areafewconceptsthatarecru- cialindiscussingthefoundationsofphysical theories,inparticulartheoriesofspaceandtime andquantumtheory: Thedoctrinethatspaceandtimemustbe thoughtofasafamilyofspatialandtemporal relationsholdingamongthematerialcon- stituentsoftheuniverseiscalledrelationism. Relationistsdenythat"spaceitself"shouldbe consideredanadditionalconstituentofthe worldöverandabovetheworld'smaterialcon- tents.Thedoctrinethat"spaceitself"mustbe positedasanadditionalconstituentoftheworld överandaboveordinarymaterialthingsofthe worldissubstantivalism. Mach'sprincipleisthedemandthatallphysical phenomena,includingtheexistenceofinertial forcesusedbyNewtontoargueforasubstanti- valistposition,beexplainableinpurelyrelation- istterms.MachspeculatedthatNewton's explanationfortheforcesintermsofaccelera- tionwithrespectto"spaceitself"couldbe replacedwithanexplanationresortingtothe accelerationofthetestobjectwithrespecttothe remainingmatteroftheuniverse(the"fixed stars"). Inquantumtheorytheclaimthatcertain 702 philosophyofscience philosophyofscience "conjugate"quantities,suchaspositionand momentum,cannotbesimultaneously"deter- mined"toarbitrarydegreesofaccuracyisthe uncertaintyprinciple.Theissueofwhethersucha lackofsimultaneousexact"determination"is merelyalimitationonourknowledgeofthesys- temoris,instead,alimitationonthesystem's havingsimultaneousexactvaluesoftheconju- gatequantities,isafundamentaloneintheinter- pretationofquantummechanics. BelVstheoremisamathematicalresultaimedat showingthattheexplanationofthestatistical correlationsthatholdbetweencausallynon- interactivesystemscannotalwaysrelyonthe positingthatwhenthesystemsdidcausally interactinthepastindependentvalueswere fixedforsomefeatureofeachofthetwosystems thatdeterminedtheirfutureobservational behavior.Theexistenceofsuch"localhidden variables"wouldcontradictthecorrelational predictionsofquantummechanics.Theresult showsthatquantummechanicshasapro- foundly"non-local"nature. Canquantumprobabilitiesandcorrelationsbe obtainedasaveragesövervariablesatsome deeperlevelthanthosespecifyingthequantum stateofasystem?Ifsuchquantitiesexisttheyare calledhiddenvariables.Manydifferenttypesof hiddenvariableshavebeenproposed:determin- istic,stochastic,local,non-local,etc.Anumber ofproofsexisttotheeffectthatpositingcertain typesofhiddenvariableswouldforceprobabilis- ticresultsatthequantumlevelthatcontradict thepredictionsofquantumtheory. ComplementaritywasthetermusedbyNiels Bohrtodescribewhathetooktobeafunda- mentalstructureoftheworldrevealedbyquan- tumtheory.Sometimesitisusedtoindicatethe factthatmagnitudesoccurinconjugatepairs subjecttotheuncertaintyrelations.Sometimes itisusedmorebroadlytodescribesuchaspects astheabilitytoencompasssomephenomenain awavepictureoftheworldandotherphenom- enainaparticlepicture,butimplyingthatnoone picturewilldojusticetoalltheexperimental results. Theorthodoxformalizationofquantumthe- orypositstwodistinctwaysinwhichthequan- tumstatecanevolve.Whenthesystemis "unobserved,"thestateevolvesaccordingtothe deterministicSchrödingerequation.When "measured,"however,thesystemsuffersadis- continuous"collapseofthewavepacket"intoa newquantumstatedeterminedbytheoutcome ofthemeasurementprocess.Understanding howtoreconcilethemeasurementprocesswith thelawsofdynamicevolutionofthesystemis themeasurementproblem. Conservationandsymmetry.Anumberof importantphysicalprinciplesstipulatethatsome physicalquantityisconserved,i.e.thatthequan- tityofitremainsinvariantövertime.Earlycon- servationprincipleswerethoseofmatter(mäss),of energyandofmomentum.Thesebecameassim- ilatedtogetherintherelativisticprincipleofthe conservationofmomentum-energy.Othercon- servationlaws(suchastheconservationof baryonnumber)aroseinthetheoryofelemen- taryparticles.Asymmetryinphysicaltheory expressedtheinvarianceofsomestructuralfea- tureoftheworldundersometransformation. Examplesaretranslationandrotationinvariance inspaceandtheinvarianceundertransforma- tionfromoneuniformlymovingreferenceframe toanother.Suchsymmetriesexpressthefactthat systemsrelatedbysymmetrytransformations behavealikeintheirphysicalevolution.Some symmetriesareconnectedwithspace-time,such asthosenotedabove,whereasothers(suchas thesymmetryofelectromagnetismunderso- calledgaugetransformations)arenot.Avery importantresultofthemathematicianEmma Noethershowsthateachconservationlawis derivablefromtheexistenceofanassociated underlyingsymmetry. Chaostheoryandchaoticsystems.Inthehis- toryofthescientificstudyofdeterministicsys- tems,theparadigmofexplanationhasbeenthe predictionofthefuturestatesofasystemfroma specificationofitsinitialstate.Inorderforsuch apredictiontobeuseful,however,nearbyinitial statesmustleadtofuturestatesthatarecloseto oneanother.Thisisnowknowntoholdonlyin exceptionalcases.Ingeneraldeterministicsys- temsarechaoticsystems,i.e.,eveninitialstates veryclosetooneanotherwillleadinshortinter- valsoftimetofuturestatesthatdivergequickly fromoneanother. Chaostheoryhasbeendevelopedtoprovidea widerangeofconceptsusefulfordescribingthe structureofthedynamicsofsuchchaoticsys- tems.Thetheorystudiesthefeaturesofasystem thatwilldetermineifitsevolutionischaoticor non-chaoticandprovidesthenecessarydescrip- tivecategoriesforcharacterizingtypesofchaotic motion. Randomness.Theintuitivedistinctionbe- tweenasequencethatisrandomandonethat isorderlyplaysaroleinthefoundationsofprob- abilitytheoryandinthescientificstudyof 703 philosophyofthesocialsciences philosophyofthesocialsciences dynamicalsystems.Butwhatisarandom sequence?Subjectivistdefinitionsofrandomness focusontheinabilityofanagenttodetermine, onthebasisofhisknowledge,thefutureoccur- rencesinthesequence.Objectivistdefinitionsof randomnessseektocharacterizeitwithoutref- erencetotheknowledgeofanyagent.Some approachestodefiningobjectiverandomnessare thosethatrequireprobabilitytobethesamein theoriginalsequenceandinsubsequences "mechanically"selectablefromit,andthosethat defineasequenceasrandomifitpassesevery "effectivelyconstructible"statisticaltestforran- domness.Anotherimportantattempttocharac- terizeobjectiverandomnesscomparesthelength ofasequencetothelengthofacomputerpro- gramusedtogeneratethesequence.Thebasic ideaisthatasequenceisrandomifthecomputer programsneededtogeneratethesequenceareas longasthesequenceitself. Seealsoconfirmation,duhem,expla- NATION,HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVEMETHOD, LAWLIKEGENERALIZATION,PHILOSOPHYOF THESOCIALSCIENCES,SCIENTIFICREALISM, THEORETICALTERM.L.S. philosophyofthesocialsciences,thestudyofthe logicandmethodsofthesocialsciences.Central questionsinclude:Whatarethecriteriaofagood socialexplanation?How(ifatall)arethesocial sciencesdistinctfromthenaturalsciences?Is thereadistinctivemethodforsocialresearch? Throughwhatempiricalproceduresaresocial scienceassertionstobeevaluated?Arethere irreduciblesociallaws?Aretherecausalrelations amongsocialphenomena?Dosocialfactsand regularitiesrequiresomeformofreductionto factsaboutindividuals?Whatistheroleofthe- oryinsocialexplanation?Thephilosophyof socialscienceaimstoprovideaninterpretation ofthesocialsciencesthatanswerstheseques- tions. Thephilosophyofsocialscience,likethatof naturalscience,hasbothadescriptiveandapre- scriptiveside.Ontheonehand,thefieldisabout thesocialsciences-theexplanations,methods, empiricalarguments,theories,hypotheses,etc, thatactuallyoccurinthesocialscienceliterature. Thismeansthatthephilosopherneedsextensive knowledgeofseveralareasofsocialscience researchinordertobeabletoformulatean analysisofthesocialsciencesthatcorresponds appropriatelytoscientists'practice.Ontheother hand,thefieldisepistemic:itisconcernedwith theideathatscientifictheoriesandhypotheses areputforwardastrueorprobable,andarejus- tifiedonrationalgrounds(empiricalandtheoret- ical).Thephilosopheraimstoprovideacritical evaluationofexistingsocialsciencemethodsand practicesinsofarasthesemethodsarefoundto belesstruth-enhancingthantheymightbe. Thesetwoaspectsofthephilosophicalenterprise suggestthatphilosophyofsocialscienceshould beconstruedasarationalreconstructionofexist- ingsocialsciencepractice-areconstruction guidedbyexistingpracticebutextendingbeyond thatpracticebyidentifyingfaultyassumptions, formsofreasoning,andexplanatoryframe- works. Philosophershavedisagreedövertherelation betweenthesocialandnaturalsciences.One positionisnaturalism,accordingtowhichthe methodsofthesocialsciencesshouldcorrespond closelytothoseofthenaturalsciences.Thisposi- tioniscloselyrelatedtophysicalism,thedoctrine thatallhigher-levelphenomenaandregulari- ties-includingsocialphenomena-areulti- matelyreducibletophysicalentitiesandthelaws thatgovernthem.Ontheothersideistheview thatthesocialsciencesareinherentlydistinct fromthenaturalsciences.Thisperspectiveholds thatsocialphenomenaaremetaphysicallydis- tinguishablefromnaturalphenomenabecause theyareintentional-theydependonthemean- ingfulactionsofindividuals.Onthisview,nat- uralphenomenaadmitofcausalexplanation, whereassocialphenomenarequireintentional explanation.Theanti-naturalistpositionalso maintainsthatthereisacorrespondingdiffer- encebetweenthemethodsappropriatetonat- uralandsocialscience.AdvocatesoftheVerstehen methodholdthatthereisamethodofintuitive interpretationofhumanactionthatisradically distinctfrommethodsofinquiryinthenatural sciences. Oneimportantschoolwithinthephilosophy ofsocialsciencetakesitsorigininthisfactofthe meaningfulnessofhumanaction.Interpretive sociologymaintainsthatthegoalofsocialin- quiryistoprovideinterpretationsofhumancon- ductwithinthecontextofculturallyspecific meaningfularrangements.Thisapproachdraws ananalogybetweenliterarytextsandsocialphe- nomena:botharecomplexsystemsofmeaning- fulelements,andthegoaloftheinterpreteristo provideaninterpretationoftheelementsthat makessenseofthem.Inthisrespectsocialsci- enceinvolvesahermeneuticinquiry:itrequires thattheinterpretershouldteaseoutthemean- ingsunderlyingaparticularcomplexofsocial behavior,muchasaliterarycriticpiecestogether aninterpretationofthemeaningofacomplex 704 philosophyofthesocialsciences philosophyofthesocialsciences literarytext.Anexampleofthisapproachis Weber'streatmentoftherelationbetweencapi- talismandtheProtestantethic.Weberattempts toidentifytheelementsofwesternEuropean culturethatshapedhumanactioninthisenvi- ronmentinsuchawayastoproducecapitalism. Onthisaccount,bothCalvinismandcapitalism arehistoricallyspecificcomplexesofvaluesand meanings,andwecanbetterunderstandthe emergenceofcapitalismbyseeinghowitcorre- spondstothemeaningfulstructuresofCalvin- ism. Interpretivesociologistsoftentakethemean- ingfulnessofsocialphenomenatoimplythat socialphenomenadonotadmitofcausalexpla- nation.However,itispossibletoaccepttheidea thatsocialphenomenaderivefromthepurpo- siveactionsofindividualswithoutrelinquishing thegoalofprovidingcausalexplanationsof socialphenomena.Foritisnecessarytodistin- guishbetweenthegeneralideaofacausalrela- tionbetweentwoeventsorconditionsandthe morespecificideaof''causaldetermination throughstrictlawsofnature."Itistruethatsocial phenomenararelyderivefromstrictlawsof nature;warsdonotresultfromantecedentpolit- icaltensionsinthewaythatearthquakesresult fromantecedentconditionsinplatetectonics. However,sincenon-deterministiccausalrela- tionscanderivefromthechoicesofindividual persons,itisevidentthatsocialphenomena admitofcausalexplanation,andinfactmuch socialexplanationdependsonassertingcausal relationsbetweensocialeventsandprocesses- e.g.,theclaimthattheadministrativecompe- tenceofthestateisacrucialcausalfactorin determiningthesuccessorfailureofarevolu- tionarymovement.Acentralgoalofcausal explanationistodiscovertheconditionsexisting priortotheeventthat,giventhelaw-governed regularitiesamongphenomenaofthissort,were sufficienttoproducethisevent.TosaythatCisa causeofEistoassertthattheoccurrenceofC,in thecontextofafieldofsocialprocessesand mechanismsF,broughtaboutE(orincreasedthe likelihoodoftheoccurrenceofE).Centralto causalargumentsinthesocialsciencesistheidea ofacausalmechanism-aseriesofeventsor actionsleadingfromcausetoeffect.Supposeitis heldthattheextensionofatrolleylinefromthe centralcitytotheperipherycausedthedeterio- rationofpublicschoolsinthecentralcity.In ordertomakeoutsuchaclaimitisnecessaryto providesomeaccountofthesocialandpolitical mechanismsthatjointheantecedentcondition totheconsequent. Animportantvarietyofcausalexplanationin socialscienceismaterialistexplanation.This typeofexplanationattemptstoexplainasocial featureintermsoffeaturesofthematerialenvi- ronmentinthecontextofwhichthesocialphe- nomenonoccurs.Featuresoftheenvironment thatoftenappearinmaterialistexplanations includetopographyandclimate;thusitissome- timesmaintainedthatbanditrythrivesinremote regionsbecausetheruggedterrainmakesitmore difficultforthestatetorepressbandits.Butmate- rialistexplanationsmayalsorefertothematerial needsofsociety-e.g.,theneedtoproducefood andotherconsumptiongoodstosupportthe population.ThusMarxholdsthatitisthedevel- opmentofthe"productiveforces"(technology) thatdrivesthedevelopmentofpropertyrelations andpoliticalsystems.Ineachcasethematerial- istexplanationmustrefertothefactofhuman agency-thefactthathumanbeingsarecapable ofmakingdeliberativechoicesonthebasisof theirwantsandbeliefs-inordertocarryoutthe explanation;inthebanditryexample,theexpla- nationdependsonthefactthatbanditsarepru- dentenoughtorealizethattheirprospectsfor survivalarebetterintheperipherythaninthe core.Somaterialistexplanationstooacceptthe pointthatsocialphenomenadependonthepur- posiveactionsofindividuals. Acentralissueinthephilosophyofsocialsci- enceinvolvestherelationbetweensocialregu- laritiesandfactsaboutindividuals.Methodological individualismisthepositionthatassertsthepri- macyoffactsaboutindividualsöverfactsabout socialentities.Thisdoctrinetakesthreeforms:a claimaboutsocialentities,aclaimaboutsocial concepts,andaclaimaboutsocialregularities. Thefirstversionmaintainsthatsocialentitiesare reducibletoensemblesofindividuals-asan insurancecompanymightbereducedtothe ensembleofemployees,supervisors,managers, andownerswhoseactionsconstitutethecom- pany.Likewise,itissometimesheldthatsocial conceptsmustbereducibletoconceptsinvolving onlyindividuals-e.g.,theconceptofasocial classmightbedefinedintermsofconceptsper- tainingonlytoindividualsandtheirbehavior. Finally,itissometimesheldthatsocialregulari- tiesmustbederivablefromregularitiesofindi- vidualbehavior.Thereareseveralpositions opposedtomethodologicalindividualism.Atthe extremethereismethodologicalholism—thedoc- trinethatsocialentities,facts,andlawsare autonomousandirreducible;forexample,that socialstructuressuchasthestatehavedynamic propertiesindependentofthebeliefsandpur- 705 PhilotheMegarian physicalism posesoftheparticularpersonswhooccupyposi- tionswithinthestructure.Athirdpositioninter- mediatebetweenthesetwoholdsthatevery socialexplanationrequiresmicrofoundations- anaccountofthecircumstancesattheindivid- uallevelthatledindividualstobehaveinsuch waysastobringabouttheobservedsocialregu- larities.Ifweobservethatanindustrialstrikeis successfulöveranextendedperiodoftime,itis notsufficienttoexplainthiscircumstanceby referringtothecommoninterestthatmembers oftheunionhaveinwinningtheirdemands. Rather,weneedinformationaboutthecircum- stancesoftheindividualunionmemberthat inducehimorhertocontributetothispublic good.Themicrofoundationsdictumdoesnot require,however,thatsocialexplanationsbe couchedinnon-socialconcepts;instead,thecir- cumstancesofindividualagentsmaybecharac- terizedinsocialterms. Centraltomosttheoriesofexplanationisthe ideathatexplanationdependsongenerallaws governingthephenomenainquestion.Thusthe discoveryofthelawsofelectrodynamicspermit- tedtheexplanationofavarietyofelectromag- neticphenomena.Butsocialphenomenaderive fromtheactionsofpurposivemenandwomen; sowhatkindsofregularitiesareavailableonthe basisofwhichtoprovidesocialexplanations?A fruitfulresearchframeworkinthesocialsciences istheideathatmenandwomenarerational,so itispossibletoexplaintheirbehaviorastheout- comeofadeliberationaboutmeansofachieving theirindividualends.Thisfactintumgivesrise toasetofregularitiesaboutindividualbehavior thatmaybeusedasagroundforsocialexplana- tion.Wemayexplainsomecomplexsocialphe- nomenonastheaggregateresultoftheactionsof alargenumberofindividualagentswitha hypothesizedsetofgoalswithinastructured environmentofchoice. Socialscientistshaveoftenbeeninclinedto offerfunctionalexplanationsofsocialphenomena. Afunctionalexplanationofasocialfeatureisone thatexplainsthepresenceandpersistenceofthe featureintermsofthebeneficialconsequences thefeaturehasfortheongoingworkingofthe socialsystemasawhole.Itmightbeheld,e.g., thatsportsclubsinworking-classBritainexist becausetheygiveworking-classpeopleawayof expendingenergythatwouldotherwisegointo strugglesagainstanexploitativesystem,thus underminingsocialstabilitySportsclubsare explained,then,intermsoftheircontributionto socialstability.Thistypeofexplanationisbased onananalogybetweenbiologyandsociology. Biologistsexplainspeciestraitsintermsoftheir contributiontoreproductivefitness,andsociolo- gistssometimesexplainsocialtraitsintermsof theircontributionto''social"fitness.However, theanalogyismisleading,becausethereisagen- eralmechanismestablishingfunctionalityinthe biologicalrealmthatisnotpresentinthesocial realm.Thisisthemechanismofnaturalselec- tion,throughwhichaspeciesarrivesatasetof traitsthatarelocallyoptimal.Thereisnoanalo- gousprocessatworkinthesocialrealm,how- ever;soitisgroundlesstosupposethatsocial traitsexistbecauseoftheirbeneficialconse- quencesforthegoodofsocietyasawhole(or importantsubsystemswithinsociety).Sofunc- tionalexplanationsofsocialphenomenamustbe buttressedbyspecificaccountsofthecausal processesthatunderliethepostulatedfunctional relationships. Seealsocausation,decisiontheory, EXPLANATION,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE,VER- STEHEN.D.E.L. PhilotheMegarian.Seemegarians. phrasemarker.Seeambiguity. phrasestructure.Seeparsing. phrastic.Seeprescriptivism. phronesis.Seearistotle. physicalism,inthewidestsenseoftheterm, materialismappliedtothequestionofthenature ofmind.Soconstrued,physicalismisthethe- sis-callitontologicalphysicalism-thatwhat- everexistsoroccursisultimatelyconstitutedout ofphysicalentities.Butsometimes'physicalism' isusedtorefertothethesisthatwhateverexists oroccurscanbecompletelydescribedinthe vocabularyofphysics.Suchaviewgoeswith eitherreductionismoreliminativismaboutthe mental.Herereductionismistheviewthatpsy- chologicalexplanations,includingexplanations intermsof"folk-psychological"conceptssuchas thoseofbeliefanddesire,arereducibletoexpla- nationsformulableinaphysicalvocabulary, whichintumwouldimplythatentitiesreferred toinpsychologicalexplanationscanbefully describedinphysicalterms;andelminativismis theviewthatnothingcorrespondstotheterms inpsychologicalexplanations,andthattheonly correctexplanationsareinphysicalterms. Theterm'physicalism'appearstohaveorigi- natedintheViennaCircle,andthereductionist 706 physicalrealization P> versioninitiallyfavoredtherewasaversionof behaviorism:psychologicalstatementswere heldtobetranslatableintobehavioralstate- ments,mainlyhypotheticalconditionals, expressibleinaphysicalvocabulary.Thepsy- chophysicalidentitytheoryheldbyHerbert Feigl,Smart,andothers,sometimescalledtype physicalism,isreductionistinasomewhatdif- ferentsense.Thisholdsthatmentalstatesand eventsareidenticalwithneurophysiological statesandevents.Whileitdeniesthattherecan beanalytic,meaning-preservingtranslationsof mentalstatementsintophysicalisticones,it holdsthatbymeansofsynthetic"bridgelaws," identifyingmentaltypeswithphysicalones, mentalstatementscaninprinciplebetranslated intophysicalisticoneswithwhichtheyareat leastnomologicallyequivalent(ifthetermsin thebridgelawsarerigiddesignators,theequiv- alencewillbenecessary).Thepossibilityofsuch atranslationistypicallydeniedbyfunctionalist accountsofmind,onthegroundsthatthesame mentalstatemayhaveindefinitelymanydiffer- entphysicalrealizations,andsometimesonthe groundsthatitislogicallypossible,evenifit neverhappens,thatmentalstatesshouldbe realizednon-physically. Inhisclassicpaper"The'mental'andthe 'physical'"(1958),Feigldistinguishestwosenses of'physical':'physicalj'and'physicaL/.'Physi- cal/ispracticallysynonymouswith'scientific', applyingtowhateveris"anessentialpartofthe coherentandadequatedescriptiveandexplana- toryaccountofthespatiotemporalworld." 'PhysicaL/refersto"thetypeofconceptsand lawswhichsufficeinprinciplefortheexplana- tionandpredictionofinorganicprocesses."(It wouldseemthatifCartesiandualismweretrue, supposingthatpossible,thenonceanintegrated scienceoftheinteractionofimmaterialsoulsand materialbodieshadbeendeveloped,conceptsfor describingtheformerwouldcountasphysical.) Construedasanontologicaldoctrine,physical- ismsaysthatwhateverexistsoroccursisentirely constitutedoutofthoseentitiesthatconstitute inorganicthingsandprocesses.Construedasa reductionistorelminativistthesisaboutdescrip- tionandexplanation,itistheclaimthatavocab- ularyadequatefordescribingandexplaining inorganicthingsandprocessesisadequatefor describingandexplainingwhateverexists. Whilethesecondofthesethesesseemsto implythefirst,thefirstdoesnotimplythesec- ond.Itcanbequestionedwhetherthenotionof a"full"descriptionofwhatexistsmakessense. Andmanyontologicalphysicalists(materialists) holdthatareductiontoexplanationscouchedin theterminologyofphysicsisimpossible,notonly inthecaseofpsychologicalexplanationsbutalso inthecaseofexplanationscouchedintheter- minologyofsuchspecialsciencesasbiology. Theirobjectiontosuchreductionisnotmerely thatapurelyphysicaldescriptionof(e.g.)bio- logicalorpsychologicalphenomenawouldbe unwieldy;itisthatsuchdescriptionsnecessarily missimportantlawsandgeneralizations,ones thatcanonlybeformulatedintermsofbiologi- cal,psychological,etc,concepts. Ifontologicalphysicalists(materialists)arenot committedtothereducibilityofpsychologyto physics,neitheraretheycommittedtoanysort ofidentitytheoryclaimingthatentitiespicked outbymentalorpsychologicaldescriptionsare identicaltoentitiesfullycharacterizablebyphys- icaldescriptions.Asalreadynoted,materialists whoarefunctionalistsdenythattherearetype- typeidentitiesbetweenmentalentitiesand physicalones.Andsomedenythatmaterialists areevencommittedtotoken-tokenidentities, claimingthatanypsychologicaleventcouldhave hadadifferentphysicalcompositionandsoisnot identicaltoanyeventindividuatedintermsofa purelyphysicaltaxonomy. Seealsonaturalism,philosophyof MIND,REDUCTION,UNITYOFSCIENCE. S.Sho. physicalrealization.Seereduction. physician-assistedsuicide.Seebioethics. physis,Greektermfornature,primarilyusedto refertothenatureoressenceofalivingthing (Aristotle,MetaphysicsV.4).Physisisdefinedby AristotleinPhysicsII.1asasourceofmovement andrestthatbelongstosomethinginvirtueof itself,andidentifiedbyhimprimarilywiththe form,ratherthanthematter,ofthething.The termisalsousedtorefertothenaturalworldas awhole.Physisisoftencontrastedwithtechne, art;inethicsitisalsocontrastedwithnomos, convention,e.g.byCalliclesinPlato'sGorgias (482eff.),whodistinguishesnaturalfromcon- ventionaljustice.Seealsoaristotle,plato, TECHNE.W.J.P. pi,Chinesetermmeaning'screen','shelter',or 'cover'.PiisHstinTzu'smetaphorforanobscu- rationorblindnessofmind.Inthisconditionthe mindisobstructedinitsproperfunctioning,e.g., thinking,remembering,imagining,andjudging. Inshort,apiisanythingthatobstructsthemind's 707 Piaget,Jean Plantinga,Alvin cognitivetask.Whenthemindisinthestateof pi,reasonis,sotospeak,notoperatingproperly. Theoppositeofpiisclarityofmind,aprecondi- tionforthepursuitofknowledge.A.S.C. Piaget,Jean(1896-1980),Swisspsychologist andepistemologistwhoprofoundlyinfluenced questions,theories,andmethodsinthestudyof cognitivedevelopment.Thephilosophicalinter- pretationandimplicationsofhiswork,however, remaincontroversial.Piagetregardedhimselfas engagedingeneticepistemology,thestudyof whatknowledgeisthroughanempiricalinvesti- gationofhowourepistemicrelationstoobjects areimproved.Piagethypothesizedthatourepis- temicrelationsareconstructedthroughthepro- gressiveorganizationofincreasinglycomplex behavioralinteractionswithphysicalobjects. Thecognitivesystemoftheadultisneither learned,intheSkinneriansense,norgenetically preprogrammed.Rather,itresultsfromtheorga- nizationofspecificinteractionswhosecharacter isshapedbothbythefeaturesoftheobjects interactedwith(aprocesscalledaccommodatiori) andbythecurrentcognitivesystemofthechild (aprocesscalledassimilation).Thetendency towardequilibriumresultsinachangeinthe natureoftheinteractionaswellasinthecogni- tivesystem.Ofparticularimportanceforthefield ofcognitivedevelopmentwerePiagefsdetailed descriptionsandcategorizationsofchangesin theorganizationofthecognitivesystemfrom birththroughadolescence.Thatworkfocusedon changesinthechild'sunderstandingofsuch thingsasspace,time,cause,number,length, weight,andmorality.Amonghismajorworks areTheChild'sConceptionofNumber(1941),Biol- ogyandKnowledge(1967),GeneticEpistemology (1970),andPsychologyandEpistemology(1970). Seealsoepistemology.R.A.Sa. PicodellaMirandola,Giovanni(1463-94),Ital- ianphilosopherwho,in1486,wroteaseriesof 900theseswhichhehopedtodisputepubliclyin Rome.Thirteenofthesewerecriticizedbya papalcommission.WhenPicodefendedhimself inhisApology,thepopecondemnedall900the- ses.PicofledtoFrance,butwasbrieflyimpris- onedtherein1488.Onhisrelease,heretumed toFlorenceanddevotedhimselftoprivatestudy. HehopedtowriteaConcordofPlatoandAristotle, buttheonlyparthewasabletocompletewasOn BeingandtheOne(1492),inwhichheuses AquinasandChristianitytoreconcilePlato'sand Aristotle'sviewsaboutGod'sbeingandunity. Heisoftendescribedasasyncretist,butinfact hemadeitclearthatthetruthofChristianityhas priorityöverthepriscatheologiaorancientwis- domfoundinthehermeticcorpusandthe cabala.Thoughhewasinterestedinmagicand astrology,headoptsaguardedattitudetoward theminhisHeptaplus(1489),whichcontainsa mysticalinterpretationofGenesis;andinhis DisputationsAgainstAstrology,publishedposthu- mously,herejectsthemboth.Thetreatiseis largelytechnical,andthequestionofhuman freedomissetasideasnotdirectlyrelevant.This factcastssomedoubtonthepopulärthesisthat Pico'sphilosophywasacelebrationofman'sfree- domanddignity.Greatweighthasbeenplaced onPico'smostfamouswork,OntheDignityofMan (1486).Thisisashortorationintendedasan introductiontothedisputationofhis900theses, andthetitlewasinventedafterhisdeath.Pico hasbeeninterpretedassayingthatmanisset apartfromtherestofcreation,andiscompletely freetoformhisownnature.Infact,asthe Heptaplusshows,Picosawmanasamicrocosm containingelementsoftheangelic,celestial,and elementalworlds.Manisthusfirmlywithinthe hierarchyofnature,andisabondandlink betweentheworlds.Intheoration,theemphasis onfreedomisamoralone:manisfreetochoose betweengoodandevil.E.J.A. picturetheoryofmeaning.Seemeaning,wittgen- STEIN. pien,ChineseMohisttechnicaltermfordisputa- tion,definedas'contendingöverconverse claims'.Itinvolvesdiscriminationbetweenwhat doesanddoesnot"ätthefacts."InHsiinTzu,pien asdiscriminationpertainsespeciallytotheability todistinguishmentalstates(suchasanger,grief, love,hate,anddesires)aswellasproperobjects ofdifferentsenses.Pienissignificantlyusedinthe contextofjustificationasaphaseinethicalargu- mentation.Amongotherthings,pienasjustifica- tionpertainstoprojectionofthesignificanceof comparablepastethicalexperiencestopresent "härdcases"ofhumanlife.A.S.C. pienche.Seeschoolofnames. Pierred'AilIy.Seedailly. pinealgland.Seedescartes,philosophyofmind. pistis.Seedividedline. Plantinga,Alvin(b.1932),oneofthemostimpor- tanttwentieth-centuryAmericanphilosophers 708 Plato Plato ofreligion.Hisideashavedeterminedthedirec- tionofdebateinmanyaspectsofthediscipline. Hehasalsocontributedsubstantiallytoanalytic epistemologyandthemetaphysicsofmodality. PlantingaiscurrentlydirectoroftheCenterfor PhilosophyofReligionandJohn0'BrienProfes- sorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNotre Dame. Plantinga'sphilosophyofreligionhascentered ontheepistemologyofreligiousbelief.HisGod andOtherMinds(1967)introducedadefinmg claimofhiscareer-thatbeliefinGodmaybe rationalevenifitisnotsupportedbysuccessful argumentsfromnaturaltheology.Thisclaimwas fullydevelopedinaseriesofartidespublishedin the1980s,inwhichhearguedforthepositionhe calls"ReformedEpistemology."Borrowingfrom theworkoftheologianssuchasCalvin,Bavinck, andBarth,Plantingareasonedthattheisticbelief is"properlybasic,"justifiednotbyotherbeliefs butbyimmediateexperience.Thispositionwas mostthoroughlytreatedinhisartide"Reason andBeliefinGod"(PlantingaandWolterstorff, eds.,FaithandRationality,1983). InearlyworkPlantingaassumedaninternal- istviewofepistemicjustification.Låterhemoved toextemalism,arguingthatbasictheisticbelief wouldcountasknowledgeiftrueandappropri- atelyproduced.Hedevelopedthisapproachin "JustificationandTheism"(FaithandPhilosophy, 1987).Theseideasledtothedevelopmentofa full-scaleexternalistepistemologicaltheory,first presentedinhis1989GiffordLecturesandlåter publishedinthetwo-volumesetWarrant:The CurrentDebateandWarrantandProperFunction (1993).Thistheoryhasbecomethefocalpointof muchcontemporarydebateinanalyticepiste- mology. Plantingaisalsoaleadingtheoristinthemeta- physicsofmodality.TheNatureofNecessity(1974) developedapossibleworldssemanticsthathas becomestandardintheliterature.Hisanalysisof possibleworldsasmaximallyconsistentstatesof affairsoffersarealistcompromisebetweennom- inalistandextremereificationistconceptions.In thelasttwochapters,Plantingabringshismodal metaphysicstobearontwoclassicaltopicsinthe philosophyofreligion.Hepresentedwhatmany considerthedefinitiveversionofthefreewill defenseagainsttheargumentfromevilanda modalversionoftheontologicalargumentthat mayhaveproducedmoreresponsethananyver- sionsinceAnselm'soriginaloffering. Seealsoepistemology,evidentialism, PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION,POSSIBLEWORLDS. J.F.S. Plato(427-347b.c),preeminentGreekphil- osopherwhosechiefcontributionconsistsinhis conceptionoftheobservableworldasanimper- fectimageofarealmofunobservableand unchanging"Forms,"andhisconceptionofthe bestlifeasonecenteredontheloveofthese divineobjects. Lifeandinfluences.BorninAthenstoapoliti- callypowerfulandaristocraticfamily,Platocame undertheinfluenceofSocratesduringhisyouth andsetasidehisambitionsforapoliticalcareer afterSocrateswasexecutedforimpiety.Histrav- elsinsouthernItalyandSicilybroughthiminto closercontactwiththefollowersofPythagoras, whoseresearchinmathematicsplayedanimpor- tantroleinhisintellectualdevelopment.Hewas alsoacquaintedwithCratylus,afollowerof Heraclitus,andwasinfluencedbytheirdoctrine thattheworldisinconstantflux.Hewrotein oppositiontotherelativismofProtagorasandthe purelymaterialisticmodeofexplanationadopted byDemocritus.Attheurgingofadevotedfol- lower,Dion,hebecameinvolvedinthepoliticsof Syracuse,thewealthiestcityoftheGreekworld, buthiseffortstomoldtheideasofitstyrant, DionysiusII,wereunmitigatedfailures.These painfuleventsaredescribedinPlato'sLetters (Epistles),thelongestandmostimportantof whichistheSeventhLetter,andalthoughthe authenticityoftheLettersisamatterofcontro- versy,thereislittledoubtthattheauthorwas wellacquaintedwithPlato'slife.Afterreturning fromhisfirstvisittoSicilyin387,Platoestab- lishedtheAcademy,afraternalassociation devotedtoresearchandteaching,andnamed afterthesacredsiteontheoutskirtsofAthens whereitwaslocated.Asacenterforpolitical training,itrivaledtheschoolofIsocrates,which concentratedentirelyonrhetoric.Thebest- knownstudentoftheAcademywasAristotle, whojoinedattheageofseventeen(whenPlato wassixty)andremainedfortwentyyears. Chronologyoftheworks.Plato'sworks,many ofwhichtaketheformofdialoguesbetween Socratesandseveralotherspeakers,werecom- posedöveraperiodofaboutfiftyyears,andthis hasledscholarstoseeksomepatternofphilo- sophicaldevelopmentinthem.Increasingly sophisticatedstylometrictestshavebeendevised tocalculatethelinguisticsimilaritiesamongthe dialogues.AncientsourcesindicatethattheLaws wasPlato'slastwork,andthereisnowconsen- susthatmanyaffinitiesexistbetweenthestyleof thisworkandseveralothers,whichcanthere- 709 Plato Plato förealsobesafelyregardedaslateworks;these includetheSophist,Statesman,andPhilebus(per- hapswritteninthatorder).Stylometrictestsalso supportaroughdivisionofPlato'sotherworks intoearlyandmiddleperiods.Forexample,the Apology,Charmides,Crito,Euthyphro,HippiasMinor, lon,Laches,andProtagoras(listedalphabetically) arewidelythoughttobeearly;whilethePhaedo, Symposium,Republic,andPhaedrus(perhapswrit- teninthatorder)areagreedtobelongtohismid- dleperiod.Butinsomecasesitisdifficultor impossibletotellwhichoftwoworksbelonging tothesamegeneralperiodprecededtheother; thisisespeciallytrueoftheearlydialogues.The mostcontroversialchronologicalquestioncon- cernstheTimaeus:stylometrictestsoftenplaceit withthelåterdialogues,thoughsomescholars thinkthatitsphilosophicaldoctrinesaredis- cardedinthelåterdialogues,andtheytherefore assignittoPlato'smiddleperiod.Theunderlying issueiswhetherheabandonedsomeofthemain doctrinesofthismiddleperiod. Earlyandmiddledialogues.Theearlydialogues typicallyportrayanencounterbetweenSocrates andaninterlocutorwhocomplacentlyassumes thatheunderstandsacommonevaluativecon- ceptlikecourage,piety,orbeauty.Forexample, Euthyphro,inthedialoguethatbearshisname, deniesthatthereisanyimpietyinprosecutinghis father,butrepeatedquestioningbySocrates showsthathecannotsaywhatsinglethingall piousactshaveincommonbyvirtueofwhich theyarerightlycalledpious.Socratesprofessesto havenoanswertothese"WhatisX?"questions, andthisfitswellwiththeclaimhemakesinthe Apologythathispeculiarlyhumanformofwisdom consistsinrealizinghowlittleheknows.Inthese earlydialogues,Socratesseeksbutfailstofinda philosophicallydefensibletheorythatwould groundouruseofnormativeterms. TheMenoissimilartotheseearlydialogues-it askswhatvirtueis,andfailstofindan answer-butitgoesbeyondthemandmarksa transitioninPlato'sthinking.Itraisesforthefirst timeaquestionaboutmethodology:ifonedoes nothaveknowledge,howisitpossibletoacquire itsimplybyraisingthequestionsSocratesposes intheearlydialogues?Toshowthatitispossible, Platodemonstratesthatevenaslaveignorantof geometrycanbegintolearnthesubjectthrough questioning.Thedialoguethenproposesan explanationofourabilitytolearninthisway:the soulacquiredknowledgebeforeitenteredthe body,andwhenwelearnwearereallyrecollect- ingwhatweonceknewandforgot.Thisböld speculationaboutthesoulandourabilityto learncontrastswiththenoncommittalposition SocratestakesintheApology,whereheisunde- cidedwhetherthedeadloseallconsciousnessor continuetheiractivitiesinHades.Theconfidence inimmortalityevidentintheMenoisbolsteredby argumentsgiveninthePhaedo,Republic,and Phaedrus.Inthesedialogues,Platousesmeta- physicalconsiderationsaboutthenatureofthe soulanditsabilitytolearntosupportaconcep- tionofwhatthegoodhumanlifeis.Whereasthe Socratesoftheearlydialoguesfocusesalmost exclusivelyonethicalquestionsandispes- simisticabouttheextenttowhichwecananswer them,Plato,beginningwiththeMenoandcon- tinuingthroughouttherestofhiscareer,confi- dentlyassertsthatwecananswerSocratic questionsifwepursueethicalandmetaphysical inquiriestogether. TheForms.ThePhaedoisthefirstdialoguein whichPlatodecisivelypositstheexistenceofthe abstractobjectsthatheoftencalled"Forms"or "Ideas."(Thelattertermshouldbeusedwith caution,sincetheseobjectsarenotcreationsofa mind,butexistindependentlyofthought;the singularGreektermsPlatooftenusestoname theseabstractobjectsareeidosandidea.)These Formsareetemal,changeless,andincorporeal; sincetheyareimperceptible,wecancometo haveknowledgeofthemonlythroughthought. Platoinsiststhatitwouldbeanerrortoidentify twoequalstickswithwhatEqualityitselfis,or beautifulbodieswithwhatBeautyitselfis;after all,hesays,wemightmistakenlytaketwoequal stickstobeunequal,butwewouldneversuffer fromthedelusionthatEqualityitselfisunequal. TheunchangingandincorporealFormisthesort ofobjectthatispresupposedbySocraticinquiry; whateverypiousacthasincommonwithevery otheristhatitbearsacertainrelationship-called "participation"-tooneandthesamething,the FormofPiety.Inthissense,whatmakesapious actpiousandapairofequalsticksequalarethe FormsPietyandEquality.Whenwecallsticks equaloractspious,weareimplicitlyappealingto astandardofequalityorpiety,justassomeone appealstoastandardwhenshesaysthata paintedportraitofsomeoneisaman.Ofcourse, thepigmentonthecanvasisnotaman;rather,it isproperlycalledamanbecauseitbearsacertain relationshiptoaverydifferentsortofobject.In preciselythisway,PlatoclaimsthattheFormsare whatmanyofourwordsreferto,eventhough theyareradicallydifferentsortsofobjectsfrom theonesrevealedtothesenses. 710 Plato Plato Love.ForPlatotheFormsarenotmerelyan unusualitemtobeaddedtoourlistofexisting objects.Rather,theyareasourceofmoraland religiousinspiration,andtheirdiscoveryisthere- foreadecisiveturningpointinone'slife.This processisdescribedbyafictionalpriestessnamed DiotimaintheSymposium,adialoguecontaining aseriesofspeechesinpraiseofloveandcon- cludingwitharemarkabledescriptionofthepas- sionateresponseSocratesinspiredinAlcibiades, hismostnotoriousadmirer.AccordingtoDio- tima^account,thosewhoareinlovearesearch- ingforsomethingtheydonotyetunderstand; whethertheyrealizeitornot,theyseektheeter- nalpossessionofthegood,andtheycanobtain itonlythroughproductiveactivityofsomesort. Physicalloveperpetuatesthespeciesand achievesalowerformofimmortality,butamore beautifulkindofoffspringisproducedbythose whogovemcitiesandshapethemoralcharac- teristicsoffuturegenerations.Bestofallisthe kindoflovethateventuallyattachésitselftothe FormofBeauty,sincethisisthemostbeautiful ofallobjectsandprovidesthegreatesthappiness tothelover.OnedevelopsaloveforthisFormby ascendingthroughvariousstagesofemotional attachmentandunderstanding.Beginningwith anattractiontothebeautyofoneperson'sbody, onegraduallydevelopsanappreciationforthe beautypresentinallotherbeautifulbodies;then one'srecognitionofthebeautyinpeople'ssouls takesonincreasingstrength,andleadstoa deeperattachmenttothebeautyofcustoms, laws,andsystemsofknowledge;andthisprocess ofemotionalgrowthanddeepeninginsight eventuallyculminatesinthediscoveryofthe eternalandchangelessbeautyofBeautyitself. Plato'stheoryoferoticpassiondoesnot endorse"Platoniclove,"ifthatphrasedesignates apurelyspiritualrelationshipcompletelydevoid ofphysicalattractionorexpression.Whathe insistsonisthatdesiresforphysicalcontactbe restrainedsothattheydonotsubvertthegreater goodthatcanbeaccomplishedinhumanrela- tionships.Hissexualorientation(likethatof manyofhisAtheniancontemporaries)isclearly homosexual,andhevaluesthemoralgrowth thatcanoccurwhenonemanisphysically attractedtoanother,butinBookIoftheLawshe condemnsgenitalactivitywhenitishomosex- ual,onthegroundthatsuchactivityshould serveapurelyprocreativepurpose. Plato'sthoughtsaboutlovearefurtherdevel- opedinthePhaedrus.Thelover'slongingforand physicalattractiontoanothermakehimdisre- gardthenormsofcommonplaceanddispassion- atehumanrelationships:loveoftherightsortis thereforeoneoffourkindsofdivinemadness. Thisfourfoldclassificatoryschemeisthenusedas amodelofpropermethodology.Startingwith thePhaedrus,classification-whatPlatocallsthe "collectionanddivisionofkinds"-becomesthe principalmethodtobeusedbyphilosophers,and thisapproachismostfullyemployedinsuchlate worksastheSophist,Statesman,andPhilebus.Pre- sumablyitcontributedtoAristotle'sinterestin categoriesandbiologicalclassification. TheRepublic.Themoralandmetaphysical theorycenteredontheFormsismostfullydevel- opedintheRepublic,adialoguethattriesto determinewhetheritisinone'sownbestinter- eststobeajustperson.Itiscommonlyassumed thatinjusticepaysifonecangetawaywithit, andthatjustbehaviormerelyservestheinterests ofothers.Platoattemptstoshowthatonthecon- traryjustice,properlyunderstood,issogreata goodthatitisworthanysacrifice.Tosupportthis astonishingthesis,heportraysanidealpolitical community:therewewillseejusticewritlarge, andsowewillbebetterabletolindjusticeinthe individualsoul.Anidealcity,heargues,must makeradicalinnovations.Itshouldberuledby speciallytrainedphilosophers,sincetheirunder- standingoftheFormoftheGoodwillgivethem greaterinsightintoeverydayaffairs.Theiredu- cationiscomparedtothatofaprisonerwho, havingoncegazeduponnothingbutshadowsin theartificiallightofacave,isreleasedfrom bondage,leavesthecave,eventuallylearnsto seethesun,andistherebyequippedtoreturnto thecaveandseetheimagesthereforwhatthey are.Everythingintherulers'livesisdesignedto promotetheirallegiancetothecommunity:they areforbiddenprivatepossessions,theirsexual livesareregulatedbyeugenicconsiderations, andtheyarenottoknowwhotheirchildrenare. Positionsofpoliticalpowerareopentowomen, sincethephysicaldifferencesbetweenthemand mendonotinallcasesdeprivethemoftheintel- lectualormoralcapacitiesneededforpolitical office.Theworksofpoetsaretobecarefullyreg- ulated,forthefalsemoralnotionsofthetradi- tionalpoetshavehadapowerfulanddeleterious impactonthegeneralpublic.Philosophical reflectionistoreplacepopulärpoetryastheforce thatguidesmoraleducation. Whatmakesthiscityideallyjust,accordingto Plato,isthededicationofeachofitscomponents toonetaskforwhichitisnaturallysuitedand speciallytrained.Therulersareideallyequipped 711 Plato Plato torule;thesoldiersarebestabletoenforcetheir commands;andtheeconomicclass,composedof farmers,craftsmen,builders,andsoon,arecon- tenttodotheirworkandtoleavethetasksof makingandenforcingthelawstoothers. Accordinglywhatmakesthesoulofahuman beingjustisthesameprinciple:eachofitscom- ponentsmustproperlyperformitsowntask.The partofusthatiscapableofunderstandingand reasoningisthepartthatmustrule;theassertive partthatmakesuscapableofangerandcompet- itivespiritmustgiveourunderstandingtheforce itneeds;andourappetitesforfoodandsexmust betrainedsothattheyseekonlythoseobjects thatreasonapproves.Itisnotenoughtoeducate someone'sreason,forunlesstheemotionsand appetitesareproperlytrainedtheywillover- powerit.Justindividualsarethosewhohave fullyintegratedtheseelementsofthesoul.They donotunthinkinglyfollowalistofrules;rather, theirjusttreatmentofothersflowsfromtheir ownbalancedpsychologicalcondition.Andthe paradigmofajustpersonisaphilosopher,for reasonruleswhenitbecomespassionately attachedtothemostintelligibleobjectsthereare: theForms.Itemergesthatjusticepaysbecause attachmenttothesesupremelyvaluableobjects ispartofwhattruejusticeofthesoulis.The worthofourlivesdependsontheworthofthe objectstowhichwedevoteourselves.Thosewho thinkthatinjusticepaysassumethatwealth, domination,orthepleasuresofphysicalappetite aresupremelyvaluable;theirmistakeliesin theirlimitedconceptionofwhatsortsofobjects areworthloving. Latedialogues.TheRepublicdoesnotcontain Plato'slastthoughtsonmoralormetaphysical matters.Forexample,althoughhecontinuesto holdinhisfinalwork,theLaws,thatthefamily andprivatewealthshouldideallybeabolished, hedescribesingreatdetailasecond-bestcommu- nitythatretainstheseandmanyotherinstitu- tionsofordinarypoliticallife.Thesovereigntyof lawinsuchastateisstressedcontinually;politi- calofficesaretobefilledbyelectionsandlots,and magistratesaresubjecttocarefulscrutinyand prosecution.Powerisdividedamongseveral councilsandoffices,andphilosophicaltrainingis notaprerequisiteforpoliticalparticipation.This second-beststateisstillworldsapartfromamod- ernliberaldemocracy-poeticworksandmany featuresofprivatelifearecarefullyregulated, andatheismispunishedwithdeath-butitis remarkablethatPlato,afterhavingmadenocon- cessionstopopulärparticipationintheRepublic, devotedsomuchenergytofindingaproperplace foritinhisfinalwork. Plato'sthoughtsaboutmetaphysicsalsocon- tinuedtoevolve,andperhapsthemostserious problemininterpretinghisworkasawholeis theproblemofgraspingthedirectionofthese furtherdevelopments.Onenotoriousobstacleto understandinghislåtermetaphysicsispresented bytheParmenides,forherewefindanunan- sweredseriesofcriticismsofthetheoryofForms. Forexample,itissaidthatifthereisreasonto positoneFormofLargeness(toselectanarbi- traryexample)thenthereisanequallygoodrea- sontopositanunlimitednumberofFormsofthis type.The"first"FormofLargenessmustexist becauseaccordingtoPlatowheneveranumber ofthingsarelarge,thereisaFormofLargeness thatmakesthemlarge;butnow,theargument continues,ifweconsiderthisFormtogetherwith theotherlargethings,weshouldrecognizestill anotherForm,whichmakesthelargethingsand Largenessitselflarge.Theargumentcanbepur- suedindefinitely,butitseemsabsurdthatthere shouldbeanunlimitednumberofFormsofthis onetype.(Inantiquitytheargumentwasnamed theThirdMan,becauseitclaimsthatinaddition toasecondtypeofobjectcalled"man"-the FormofMan-thereisevenathird.) WhatisPlato'sresponsetothisandotherob- jectionstohistheory?HesaysintheParmenides thatwemustcontinuetoaffirmtheexistenceof suchobjects,forlanguageandthoughtrequire them;butinsteadofrespondingdirectlytothe criticisms,heembarksonaprolongedexamina- tionoftheconceptofunity,reachingapparently conflictingconclusionsaboutit.Whetherthese contradictionsaremerelyapparentandwhether thistreatmentofunitycontainsaresponsetothe earliercritiqueoftheFormsaredifficultmatters ofinterpretation.Butinanycaseitisclearthat Platocontinuestoupholdtheexistenceofun- changingrealities;therealdifficultyiswhether andhowhemodifieshisearlierviewsabout them. IntheTimaeus,thereseemtobenomodifica- tionsatall-afactthathasledsomescholarsto believe,inspiteofsomestylometricevidenceto thecontrary,thatthisworkwaswrittenbefore PlatocomposedthecritiqueoftheFormsinthe Parmenides.Thisdialoguepresentsanaccountof howadivinebutnotomnipotentcraftsman transformedthedisorderlymaterialsoftheuni- verseintoaharmoniouscosmosbylookingto theunchangingFormsasparadigmsandcreat- ing,tothebestofhislimitedabilities,constantly fluctuatingimagesofthoseparadigms.Thecre- 712 Plato,commentarieson Plekhanov,GeorgyValentinovich atedcosmosisviewedasasinglelivingorganism governedbyitsowndivinelyintelligentsoul; timeitselfcameintoexistencewiththecosmos, beinganimageofthetimelessnatureofthe Forms;space,however,isnotcreatedbythe divinecraftsmanbutisthecharacterlessrecepta- cleinwhichallchangetakesplace.Thebasic ingredientsoftheuniversearenotearth,air,fire, andwater,assomethinkersheld;rather,these elementsarecomposedofplanes,whicharein turnmadeoutofelementarytriangulärshapes. TheTimaeusisanattempttoshowthatalthough manyothertypesofobjectsbesidestheForms mustbeinvokedinordertounderstandthe orderlynatureofthechanginguniverse-souls, triangles,space-thebestscientificexplanations willportraythephysicalworldasapurposeful andverygoodapproximationtoaperfectpattern inherentintheseunchangingandeternal objects. ButFormsdonotplayasimportantarolein thePhilebus,alatedialoguethatcontainsPlato's fullestanswertothequestion,Whatisthegood? Hearguesthatneitherpleasurenotintelligence canbyitselfbeidentifiedwiththegood,sinceno onewouldbesatisfiedwithalifethatcontained justoneofthesebuttotallylackedtheother. Instead,goodnessisidentifiedwithproportion, beauty,andtruth;andintelligenceisrankeda superiorgoodtopleasurebecauseofitsgreater kinshiptothesethree.Here,asinthemiddledia- logues,Platoinsiststhataproperunderstanding ofgoodnessrequiresametaphysicalgrounding. Toevaluatetheroleofpleasureinhumanlife,we needamethodologythatappliestoallother areasofunderstanding.Morespecifically,we mustrecognizethateverythingcanbeplacedin oneoffourcategories:thelimited,theunlimited, themixtureofthesetwo,andtheintelligentcre- ationofthismixture.WhereFormsaretobe locatedinthisschemeisunclear.Althoughmeta- physicsisinvokedtoanswerpracticalquestions, asintheRepublic,itisnotpreciselythesame metaphysicsasbefore. ThoughwenaturallythinkofPlatoprimarily asawriterofphilosophicalworks,heregardsthe writtenwordasinferiortospökeninterchangeas aninstrumentforleamingandteaching.The drawbacksinherentinwrittencompositionare mostfullysetforthinthePhaedrus.Thereisno doubtthatintheAcademyheparticipatedfully inphilosophicaldebate,andonatleastoneocca- sionhelecturedtoageneralaudience.Weare toldbyAristoxenus,apupilofAristotle,that manyinPlato'saudiencewerebaffledanddisap- pointedbyalectureinwhichhemaintainedthat Goodisone.Wecansafelyassumethatincon- versationPlatoputforwardimportantphilo- sophicalideasthatnonethelessdidnotfindtheir wayintohiswritings.AristotlerefersinPhysics IV.2tooneofPlato'sdoctrinesasunwritten,and theenigmaticpositionsheascribestoPlatoin Metaphysics1.6-thattheFormsaretobe explainedintermsofnumber,whichareinturn generatedfromtheOneandthedyadofgreat andsmall-seemtohavebeenexpoundedsolely indiscussion.Somescholarshaveputgreat weightonthestatementintheSeventhLetter thatthemostfundamentalphilosophicalmatters mustremainunwritten,and,usinglåtertesti- monyaboutPlato'sunwrittendoctrines,they readthedialoguesassignsofamoreprofound buthiddentruth.TheauthenticityoftheSev- enthLetterisadisputedquestion,however.In anycase,sinceAristotlehimselftreatsthemid- dleandlatedialoguesasundissemblingaccounts ofPlato'sphilosophy,weareonfirmgroundin adoptingthesameapproach. Seealsoaristotle,commentarieson PLATO,NEOPLATONISM,SOCRATES.Pv.Kr. Plato,commentarieson.Seecommentarieson PLATO. Platonicform.Seeform,plato. pleasure.Seeepicureanism,hedonism. pleasure,katastematic.Seeepicureanism. pleasure,kinetic.Seeepicureanism. pleasureprinciple.SeeFREUD. Plekhanov,GeorgyValentinovich(1856-1918),a leadingtheoreticianoftheRussianrevolutionary movementandthefatherofRussianMarxism. ExiledfromhisnativeRussiaformostofhisadult life,in1883hefoundedinSwitzerlandthefirst RussianMarxistassociation-theEmancipation ofLabor,aforerunneroftheRussianSocial DemocraticWorkers'party.Inphilosophyhe soughttosystematizeanddisseminatetheout- lookofMarxandEngels,forwhichhepopular- izedthename'dialecticalmaterialism'.Forthe mostpartanorthodoxMarxistinhisunder- standingofhistory,Plekhanovarguedthathis- toricaldevelopmentscannotbedivertedor acceleratedatwill;hebelievedthatRussiawas notreadyforaproletarianrevolutioninthefirst decadesofthetwentiethcentury,andconse- quentlyheopposedtheBolshevikfactioninthe 713 plenitude,principleof pluralism split(1903)oftheSocialDemocraticparty.Atthe sametimehewasnotasimplisticeconomic determinist:heacceptedtheroleofgeographical, psychological,andothernon-economicfactors inhistoricalchange.Inepistemology,Plekhanov agreedwithKantthatwecannotknowthingsin themselves,buthearguedthatoursensations maybeconceivedas"hieroglyphs,"correspond- ingpointbypointtotheelementsofrealitywith- outresemblingthem.Inethics,too,Plekhanov soughttosupplementMarxwithKant,temper- ingtheclassanalysisofmoralitywiththeview thatthereareuniversallybindingethicalprinci- ples,suchastheprinciplethathumanbeings shouldbetreatedasendsratherthanmeans. BecauseintheseandotherrespectsPlekhanov's versionofMarxismconflictedwithLenin's,his philosophywasscornfullyrejectedbydoctri- naireMarxist-LeninistsduringtheStalinera. Seealsorussianphilosophy.J.P.Sc. plenitude,principleof.Seeprincipleofpleni- tude. pleoneteticIogic.Seepluralitivelogic. Plotinus(a.d.204-70),Greco-RomanNeopla- tonistphilosopher.BorninEgypt,thoughdoubt- lessofGreekancestry,hestudiedPlatonic philosophyinAlexandriawithAmmoniusSac- cas(232-43);then,afterabriefadventureon thestaffoftheEmperorGordianIIIonanunsuc- cessfulexpeditionagainstthePersians,hecame toRomein244andcontinuedteachingphiloso- phythereuntilhisdeath.Heenjoyedthesupport ofmanyprominentpeople,includingeventhe EmperorGallienusandhiswife.Hischiefpupils wereAmeliusandPorphyry,thelatterofwhom collectedandeditedhisphilosophicalessays,the Enneads(socalledbecausearrangedbyPorphyry insixgroupsofnine).Thefirstthreegroupscon- cernthephysicalworldandourrelationtoit,the fourthconcernsSoul,thefifthIntelligence,and thesixththeOne.Porphyry'sarrangementis generallyfollowedtoday,thoughachronological sequenceoftractates,whichhealsoprovidesin hisintroductoryLifeofPlotinus,isperhapsprefer- able.Themostimportanttreatisesare1.1;1.2;1.6; II.4;II.8;III.2-3;III.6;III.7;IV.3-4;V.l;V.3; VI.4-5;VI.7;VI.8;VI.9;andthegroupIII.8,V.8, V.5,andII.9(asingletreatise,splitupbyPor- phyry,thatisawide-rangingaccountofPloti- nus^philosophicalposition,culminatinginan attackongnosticism). Plotinussawhimselfasafaithfulexponentof Plato(seeespeciallyEnneadsV.l),butheisfar morethanthat.Platonismhaddevelopedcon- siderablyinthefivecenturiesthatseparatePlato fromPlotinus,takingonmuchfrombothAris- totelianismandStoicism,andPlotinusistheheir tothisprocess.Healsoaddsmuchhimself. Seealsoemanationism,neoplatonism. J.M.D. pluralism,aphilosophicalperspectiveonthe worldthatemphasizesdiversityratherthan homogeneity,multiplicityratherthanunity,dif- ferenceratherthansameness.Thephilosophical consequencesofpluralismwereaddressedby Greekantiquityinitspreoccupationwiththe problemoftheoneandthemany.Thepropo- nentsofpluralism,representedprincipallyby Empedocles,Anaxagoras,andtheAtomists (LeucippusandDemocritus),maintainedthat realitywasmadeupofamultiplicityofentities. Adherencetothisdoctrinesettheminopposi- tiontothemonismoftheEleaticSchool(Par- menides),whichtaughtthatrealitywasan impermeableunityandanunbrokensolidarity. Itwasthusthatpluralismcametobedefinedas aphilosophicalalternativetomonism. InthedevelopmentofOccidentalthought, pluralismcametobecontrastednotonlywith monismbutalsowithdualism,thephilosophical doctrinethattherearetwo,andonlytwo,kinds ofexistents.Descartes,withhisdoctrineoftwo distinctsubstances-extendednon-thinking substanceversusnon-extendedthinkingsub- stance-iscommonlyregardedashavingpro- videdtheclearestexampleofphilosophical dualism.Pluralismthusneedstobeunderstood asmarkingoutphilosophicalalternativestoboth monismanddualism. Pluralismasametaphysicaldoctrinerequires thatwedistinguishsubstantivalfromattributive pluralism.Substantivalpluralismviewstheworld ascontainingamultiplicityofsubstancesthat remainirreducibletoeachother.Attributiveplu- ralismfindsthemultiplicityofkindsnotamong thefurnitureofsubstancesthatmakeupthe worldbutratheramongadiversityofattributes anddistinguishingproperties.However,plural- ismcametobedefinednotonlyasametaphysi- caldoctrinebutalsoasaregulativeprincipleof explanationthatcallsupondifferingexplanatory principlesandconceptualschemestoaccountfor themanifoldeventsofnatureandthevarieties ofhumanexperience. Recentphilosophicalthoughthaswitnesseda resurgenceofinterestinpluralism.Thiswasevi- dentinthedevelopmentofAmericanpragma- tism,wherepluralismreceivedpiquantex- 714 pluralitivelogic PM pressioninJames'sAPluralisticUniverse(1909). Morerecentlypluralismwasgivenavoiceinthe thoughtofthelåterWittgenstein,withitsheavy accentonthepluralityoflanguagegamesdis- playedinourordinarydiscourse.Also,inthe currentdevelopmentsofphilosophicalpostmod- ernism(Jean-FrancoisLyotard),onefindsan explicitpluralisticorientation.Heretheempha- sisfallsonthemultiplicityofsignifiers,phrase regimens,genresofdiscourse,andnarrational strategies.Theallegedunitiesandtotalitiesof thought,discourse,andactionaresubvertedin theinterestsofreclaimingthediversifiedand heterogeneousworldofhumanexperience. Pluralismincontemporarythoughtinitiatesa moveintoapostmetaphysicalage.Itislesscon- cernedwithtraditionalmetaphysicalandepiste- mologicalissues,seekinganswerstoquestions aboutthenatureandkindsofsubstancesand attributes;anditismoreattunedtothediversity ofsocialpracticesandthemultiplerolesoflan- guage,discourse,andnarrativeinthepanoplyof humanaffairs. Seealsodewey,postmodern,pragma- tism,SPECULATIVEPHILOSOPHY.C.O.S. pluralitivelogic,alsocalledpleoneteticlogic,the logicof'many','mosf,'few',andsimilarterms (including'fouroutoffive','över45percent'and soon).Consider (1)'AlmostallFareG' (2)'AlmostallFarenotG' (3)'MostFareG' (4)'MostFarenotG' (5)'ManyFareG' (6)'ManyFarenotG' (1)i.e.,'FewFarenotG'and(6)arecontra- dictory,asare(2)and(5)and(3)and(4).(1)and (2)cannotbetruetogether(i.e.,theyarecon- traries),norcan(3)and(4),while(5)and(6) cannotbefalsetogether(i.e.,theyaresubcon- traries).Moreover,(1)entails(3)whichentails (5),and(2)entails(4)whichentails(6).Thus (l)-(6)formageneralized"squareofopposi- tion"(fittinginsidethestandardone). Sometimes(3)issaidtobetrueifmorethan halftheF'sareG,butthismakes'most'unnec- essarilyprecise,for'most'doesnotliterallymean 'morethanhalf.Althoughmanypluralitive termsarevague,theirinterrelationsarelogically precise.Again,onemightdefine'many'as'There areatleastn',forsomefixedn,atleastrelative tocontext.Butthisnotonlyerodesthevague- ness,italsofailstoworkforarbitrarilylargeand infinitedomains. 'Few','most',and'many'arebinaryquanti- fiers,atypeofgeneralizedquantifier.Aunary quantifier,suchasthestandardquantifiers 'some'and'all',connotesasecond-levelprop- erty,e.g.,'SomethingisF'means'Fhasan instance',and'AllF'sareG'means'FandnotG hasnoinstance'.Ageneralizedquantifiercon- notesasecond-levelrelation.'MostF'sareG' connotesabinaryrelationbetweeni7andG,one thatcannotbereducedtoanypropertyofa truth-functionalcompoundofFandG.Infact, noneofthestandardpluralitivetermscanbe definedinfirst-orderlogic. Seealsoformållogic,squareofoppo- sition,VAGUENESS.S.L.R. pluralityofcauses,asusedbyJ.S.Mill,more thanonecauseofasingleeffect;i.e.,tokensof differenteventtypescausingdifferenttokensof thesameeventtype.Pluralityofcausesisdistinct fromoverdeterminationofaneventbymore thanoneactualorpotentialtokencause.For example,ananimal'sdeathhasapluralityof causes:itmaydieofstarvation,ofbleeding,ofa blowtothehead,andsoon.Millthoughtthese caseswereimportantbecausehesawthatthe existenceofapluralityofcausescreatesprob- lemsforhisfourmethodsfordetermining causes.Mill'smethodofagreementisspecifically vulnerabletotheproblem:themethodfailsto revealthecauseofaneventwhentheeventhas morethanonetypeofcause,becausethe methodpresumesthatcausesarenecessaryfor theireffects. Actually,pluralityofcausesisacommonplace factabouttheworldbecauseveryfewcausesare necessaryfortheireffects.Unlesstheback- groundconditionsarespecifiedingreatdetail,or theidentityoftheeffecttypeisdefinedverynar- rowly,almostallcasesinvolveapluralityof causes.Forexample,flippingthelightswitchisa necessarycauseofthelighfsgoingon,onlyif oneassumesthattherewillbenoshortcircuit acrosstheswitch,thatthewiringwillremainas itis,andsoon,orifoneassumesthatby'the lighfsgoingon'onemeansthelighfsgoingon inthenormalway. Seealsocausation;mill,j.s.;mill's methods;type-tokendistinction.B.E. PlutarchofAthens.Seeneoplatonism. PlutarchofChaeronea.Seeacademy,middlepla- TONISM. PM.SeeAPPENDIXOFspecialsymbols. 715 pneuma Poincaré,JulesHenri pneuma.Seestoicism. Po-hutung("WhiteTigerHallConsultations"), animportantChineseConfucianworkofthe låterHandynasty,resultingfromdiscussionsat theimperialpalaceina.d.79ontheclassicsand theircommentaries.Dividedintoforty-three headings,thetextsumsupthedominantteach- ingsofConfucianismbyaffirmingtheabsolute positionofthemonarch,acosmologyandmoral psychologybasedontheyin-yangtheory,anda comprehensivesocialandpoliticalphilosophy. Whileemphasizingbenevolentgovernment,it legitimizestherightoftherulertouseforceto quelldisorder.Asystemof"threebondsandsix relationships"definesthehierarchicalstructure ofsociety.Humannature,identifiedwiththe yangcosmicforce,mustbecultivated,whilefeel- ings(yin)aretobecontrolledespeciallybyritu- alsandeducation.TheConfucianorthodoxy affirmedalsomarksanendtothedebate betweentheOldTextschoolandtheNewText schoolthatdividedearlierHanscholars.Seealso confucianism;yin,yang.A.K.L.C. poiésis(Greek,'production'),behavioraimedat anextemalend.InAristotle,poiesisisopposedto praxis(action).Itischaracteristicofcrafts-e.g. building,theendofwhichishouses.Itisthusa kinesis(process).ForAristotle,exercisingthe virtues,sinceitmustbeundertakenforitsown sake,cannotbepoiesis.Theknowledgeinvolved invirtueisthereforenotthesameasthat involvedincrafts.R.C. Poincaré,JulesHenri(1854-1912),French mathematicianandinfluentialphilosopherof science.BornintoaprominentfamilyinNancy, heshowedextraordinarytalentinmathematics fromanearlyage.HestudiedattheÉcoledes Minesandworkedasaminingengineerwhile completinghisdoctorateinmathematics(1879). In1881,hewasappointedprofessorattheUni- versityofParis,wherehelecturedonmathe- matics,physics,andastronomyuntilhisdeath. Hisoriginalcontributionstothetheoryofdiffer- entialequations,algebraictopology,andnumber theorymadehimtheleadingmathematicianof hisday.Hepublishedalmostfivehundredtech- nicalpapersaswellasthreewidelyreadbooks onthephilosophyofscience:ScienceandHypoth- esis(1902),TheValueofScience(1905),andScience andMethod(1908). Poincaré'sphilosophyofsciencewasshaped byhisapproachtomathematics.Geometricax- iomsareneithersyntheticapriorinorempirical; theyaremoreproperlyunderstoodasdefinitions. Thus,whenonesetofaxiomsispreferredöver anotherforuseinphysics,thechoiceisamatter of"convention";itisgovernedbycriteriaofsim- plicityandeconomyofexpressionratherthanby whichgeometryis"correct."ThoughEuclidean geometryisusedtodescribethemotionsofbod- iesinspace,itmakesnosensetoaskwhether physicalspace"really"isEuclidean.Discoveryin mathematicsresemblesdiscoveryinthephysical sciences,butwhereastheformerisaconstruc- tionofthehumanmind,thelatterhastobefit- tedtoanorderofnaturethatisultimately independentofmind. Scienceprovidesaneconomicandfruitful wayofexpressingtherelationshipsbetween classesofsensations,enablingreliablepredic- tionstobemade.Thesesensationsreflectthe worldthatcausesthem;the(limited)objectivity ofsciencederivesfromthisfact,butsciencedoes notpurporttodeterminethenatureofthat underlyingworld.Conventions,choicesthatare notdeterminablebyrule,enterintothephysi- calsciencesatalllevels.Suchprinciplesasthat oftheconservationofenergymayappeartobe empirical,butareinfactpostulatesthatscien- tistshavechosentotreatasimplicitdefinitions. Thedecisionbetweenalternativehypotheses alsoinvolvesanelementofconvention:the choiceofaparticularcurvetorepresentafinite setofdatapoints,e.g.,requiresajudgmentasto whichissimpler. Twokindsofhypotheses,inparticular,mustbe distinguished.Inductivegeneralizationsfrom observation("realgeneralizations")arehypo- theticalinthelimitedsensethattheyarealways capableoffurtherprecision.Thentherearethe- ories("indifferenthypotheses")thatpostulate underlyingentitiesorstructures.Theseentities mayseemexplanatory,butstrictlyspeakingare nomorethandevicesusefulincalculation.For atomictheorytoexplain,atomswouldhaveto exist.Butthiscannotbeestablishedintheonly waypermissibleforascientificclaim,i.e.directly byexperiment.Shortlybeforehedied,Poincaré finallyallowedthatPerrin'sexperimentalverifi- cationofEinstein'spredictionsregardingBrown- ianmotion,plushiscarefulmarshalingoftwelve otherdistinctexperimentalmethodsofcalculat- ingAvogadro'snumber,constitutedtheequiva- lentofanexperimentalproofoftheexistenceof atoms:"Onecansaythatweseethembecause wecancountthem....Theatomofthechemist isnowareality." Seealsoconventionalism,philosophy OFMATHEMATICS.E.M. 716 polarity Polishlogic polarity,therelationbetweendistinctphenom- ena,terms,orconceptssuchthateachinextrica- blyrequires,thoughitisopposedto,theother, asintherelationbetweenthenorthandsouth polesofamagnet.Inapplicationtotermsorcon- cepts,polarityentailsthatthemeaningofone involvesthemeaningoftheother.Thisisconcep- tualpolarity.Termsareexistentiallypolarprovided aninstanceofonecannotexistunlessthere existsaninstanceoftheother.Thesecondsense impliesthefirst.Supplyanddemandandgoodand evilareinstancesofconceptualpolarity.North andsouthandbuyingandsellingareinstancesof existentialpolarity.Somepolarconceptsare opposites,suchastruthandfalsity.Somearecor- relative,suchasquestionandanswer:ananswer isalwaysananswertoaquestion;aquestioncalls forananswer,butaquestioncanbeananswer, andananswercanbeaquestion.Theconceptis notrestrictedtopairsandcanbeextendedto generatemutualinterdependence,multipolar- ity.Seealsomeaning,philosophyoflan- GUAGE.M.G.S. Polishlogic,logicasresearched,elucidated,and taughtinPoland,1919-39.Betweenthetwo warscolleaguesJanLukasiewicz,Tadeusz Kotarbiriki,andStanislawLesniewski,assisted bystudents-become-collaboratorssuchasAlfred Tarski,JerzySlupecki,StanislawJaskowski,and BoleslawSobociriski,togetherwithmathemati- ciansinWarsawandphilosophicalcolleagues elsewhere,likeKasimirAjdukiewiczandTadeusz Czezowski,madeWarsawaninternationally knowncenterofresearchinlogic,metalogic, semantics,andfoundationsofmathematics.The Warsaw"school"alsodominatedPolishphiloso- phy,andmadePolandthecountrythatintro- ducedmodernlogiceveninsecondaryschools. Allthreefounderstooktheirdoctoratesin LvovunderKasimirTwardowski(1866-1938), mentorofleadingthinkersofindependent Polandbetweenthewars.ArrivingfromVienna totakethechairofphilosophyattwenty-nine, Twardowskihadtochoosebetweenconcentrat- ingonhisownresearchandorganizingthestudy ofphilosophyinPoland.Dedicatinghislifepri- marilytothecommunitytask,hebecamethe founderofmodernPolishphilosophy. Twardowski'sinformaldistinctionbetween distributiveandcollectiveconceptionsinflu- encedclassificationofphilosophyandthesci- ences,andanticipatedLesniewski'sformål axiomatizationsinontologyandmereology, respectively.Anothercommoninheritance importantinPolishlogicwasTwardowski'sstress ontheprocess-productambiguity.Heapplied thisdistinctiontodisambiguate'meaning'and refinehisteacherBrentano'saccountofmental actsasmeaningful("intentional")events,bydif- ferentiating(1)whatismeantor"intended"by theact,itsobjectivenoemaornoematic"inten- tionalobject,"from(2)itscorrespondingnoetic meaningorsubjective"content,"thecorrelated characteristicorstructurebywhichit"intends" its"object"or"objective"-i.e.,meansthat:such- and-such(isso). Twardowski'steaching-especiallythiscareful analysisof"contents"and"objects"ofmental acts-contributedtoMeinong'stheoryofob- jects,andlinkedit,Husserl'sphenomenology, andAntonMarty's"philosophicalgrammar" withthe"descriptivepsychology"oftheircom- monteacher,theAristotelianandScholastic empiricistBrentano,andthuswithsourcesofthe analyticmovementsinViennaandCambridge. Twardowski'slecturesonthephilosophicallogic ofcontentandjudgmentpreparedtheground forscientificsemantics;hisreferencestoBoolean algebraopenedthedoortomathematicallogic; andhisphenomenologicalideaofageneralthe- oryofobjectspointedtowardLesniewski'sontol- ogy.Twardowski'smaieuticcharacter,integrity, groundinginphilosophicaltraditions,andardu- oustraining(lecturesbeganatsixa.m.),together withhisrealistdefenseoftheclassicalAris- toteliancorrespondencetheoryoftruthagainst "irrationalism,"dogmatism,skepticism,andpsy- chologism,influencedhismanypupils,who becameleadersofPolishthoughtindiverse fields.Butmoreinfluentialthananydoctrine washisrigoristidealofphilosophyasastrictsci- entificdisciplineofcriticismandlogicalanalysis, precisedefinition,andconceptualclarification. Hiswasaschoolnotofdoctrinebutofmethod. Maintainingthiscommonmethodologicalin- heritanceintheirdivergentways,andencour- agedtolearnmoremathematicallogicthan Twardowskihimselfknew,hisstudentsinlogic wereearlyinfluencedbyFrege'sandHusserl's critiqueofpsychologisminlogic,Husserl'slogi- calinvestigations,andthelogicalreconstruction ofclassicalmathematicsbyFrege,Schröder, Whitehead,andRussell. AslecturerinLvovfrom1908untilhis appointmenttoWarsawin1915,Lukasiewicz introducedmathematicallogicintoPoland.To Lesniewski,newlyarrivedfromstudiesinGer- manyasanenthusiastforMarty'sphilosophyof language,Lukasiewicz'sinfluential1910Critique ofAristotle'sprincipleofcontradictionwasa "revelation"in1911.Amongotherthingsit 717 Polishnotation politicalphilosophy revealedparadoxeslikeRussell's,whichpreoc- cupiedhimforthenextelevenyearsas,logically refutingTwardowski'sPlatonisttheoryofab- straction,heworkedouthisownsolutionsand, influencedalsobyLeonChwistek,outgrewthe influenceofHansCorneliusandLeonPetrazycki, anddevelopedhisown"constructivelynominal- ist"foundations. In1919KotarbisskiandLesniewskijoined LukasiewiczinWarsaw,wheretheyattracted studentslikeTarski,Sobociriski,andSlupeckiin thefirstgeneration,andAndrzejMostowskiand CzeslawLejewskiinthenext.Whenthewar came,thesurvivorswerescatteredandthemeta- logiciansMorchajWajsberg,MoritzPresburger, andAdolfLindenbaumwerekilledor"disap- peared"bytheGestapo.Lukasiewiczconcen- tratedincreasinglyonhistoryoflogic(especially inreconstructingthelogicofAristotleandthe Stoics)anddeductiveproblemsconcerningsyllo- gisticandpropositionallogic.Hisideaoflogical probabilityanddevelopmentofthree-ormany- valuedandmodalcalculireflectedhisindeter- ministsympathiesinprewarexchangeswith KotarbiriskiandLesniewskionthestatusof truths(etemal,sempiternal,orboth?),especially asconcernsfuturecontingencies.Lesniewski concentratedondevelopinghislogicalsystems. Heleftelaborationofmanyofhisseminalmeta- logicalandsemanticinsightstoTarski,who, despiteadivergentinclinationtosimplifymeta- mathematicaldeductionsbyexpedientpostula- tion,sharedwithLesniewski,Lukasiewicz,and Ajdukiewicztheconvictionthatonlyformalized languagescanbemadelogicallyconsistentsub- jectsandinstrumentsofrigorousscientificinves- tigation.KotarbiriskidrewonLesniewski'slogic ofpredicationtodefendhis"reism"(asonepossi- bleapplicationofLesniewski'sontology),tofacil- itatehis"concretist"programfortranslating abstractionsintomoreconcreteterms,andto rationalizehis"imitationist"accountofmental actsordispositions.InheritingTwardowski'srole asculturalleaderandeducator,Kotarbiriskipop- ularizedthelogicalachievementsofhiscol- leaguesin(e.g.)hissubstantial1929treatiseon thetheoryofknowledge,formållogic,andscien- tificmethodology;thisworkbecamerequired readingforseriousstudentsand,togetherwith thelucidtextbooksbyLukasiewiczand Ajdukiewicz,raisedthelevelofphilosophicaldis- cussioninPoland.Jaskowskipublishedasystem of"naturaldeduction"bythesuppositional methodpracticedbyLesniewskisince1916. AjdukiewiczbasedhissyntaxonLesniewski's logicalgrammar,andbyhissearchingcritiques influencedKotarbiriski's"reist"and''concretist" formulations. ClosestinPolandtothelogicalpositivistsofthe ViennaCircle,Ajdukiewiczbroughtnewsophis- ticationtothephilosophyoflanguageandofsci- encebyhisexaminationoftheroleofconven- tionsandmeaningpostulatesinscientifictheory andlanguage,distinguishingaxiomatic,deduc- tive,andempiricalrulesofmeaning.Hisevolv- ingandrefinedconventionalistanalysesof theories,languages,"worldperspectives,"syn- onymy,translation,andanalyticity,andhis philosophicalclarificationbyparaphraseantici- patedviewsofCarnap,Feigl,andQuine.Butthe Polishthinkers,beyondtheircommonmethod- ologicalinheritanceandgeneraladherenceto extensionallogic,subscribedtolittlecommon doctrine,andintheirexchangeswiththeVienna positivistsremained"toosober"(saidLukasie- wicz)tojoininsweepingantimetaphysicalman- ifestos.LikeTwardowski,theywerecriticsof traditionalformulations,whosoughtnottopro- scribebuttoreformmetaphysics,byreformulat- ingissuesclearlyenoughtoadvanceunder- standing.Indeed,exceptforChwistek,themath- ematicianJanSlezyriski,andthehistoriansI.M. Bocheriski,Z.A.Jordan,andJanSalamucha,in additiontothephenomenologistRomanIngar- den,thekeyfiguresinPolishlogicwereallphilo- sophicaldescendantsofTwardowski. Seealsokotarbiiiski,leSniewski, LUKASIEWICZ.E.C.L. Polishnotation.Seelogicalnotation. politicalobligation.Seepoliticalphilosophy. politicalphilosophy,thestudyofthenatureand justificationofcoerciveinstitutions.Coercive institutionsrangeinsizefromthefamilytothe nation-stateandworldorganizationslikethe UnitedNations.Theyareinstitutionsthatatleast sometimesemployforceorthethreatofforceto controlthebehavioroftheirmembers.Justifying suchcoerciveinstitutionsrequiresshowingthat theauthoritieswithinthemhavearighttobe obeyedandthattheirmembershaveacorre- spondingobligationtoobeythem,i.e.,thatthese institutionshavelegitimatepoliticalauthority övertheirmembers. Classicalpoliticalphilosophers,likePlatoand Aristotle,wereprimarilyinterestedinproviding ajustificationforcity-stateslikeAthensor Sparta.Buthistorically,aslargercoerciveinsti- 718 politicalphilosophy politicalphilosophy tutionsbecamepossibleanddesirable,political philosopherssoughttojustifythem.Afterthe seventeenthcentury,mostpoliticalphilosophers focusedonprovidingajustificationfornation- stateswhoseclaimtolegitimateauthorityis restrictedbybothgeographyandnationality.But fromtimetotime,andmorefrequentlyinthe nineteenthandtwentiethcenturies,somepolit- icalphilosophershavesoughttoprovideajusti- ficationforvariousformsofworldgovernment withevenmoreextensivepowersthanthose presentlyexercisedbytheUnitedNations.And quiterecentlyfeministpoliticalphilosophers haveraisedimportantchallengestotheauthor- ityofthefamilyasitispresentlyconstituted. Anarchism(fromGreekanarchos,'nogovern- ment')rejectsthiscentraltaskofpoliticalphilos- ophy.Itmaintainsthatnocoerciveinstitutions arejustified.Proudhon,thefirstself-described anarchist,believedthatcoerciveinstitutions shouldbereplacedbysocialandeconomicorga- nizationsbasedonvoluntarycontractualagree- ment,andheadvocatedpeacefulchangetoward anarchism.Others,notablyBlanquiandBa- kunin,advocatedtheuseofviolencetodestroy thepowerofcoerciveinstitutions.Anarchism inspiredtheanarcho-syndicalistmovement, MakhnoandhisfollowersduringtheRussian CivilWar,theSpanishanarchistsduringthe SpanishCivilWar,andtheanarchistgauchistes duringthe1968"MayEvents"inFrance. Mostpoliticalphilosophers,however,have soughttojustifycoerciveinstitutions;theyhave simplydisagreedöverwhatsortofcoerciveinsti- tutionsarejustified.Liberalism,whichderives fromtheworkofLocke,istheviewthatcoercive institutionsarejustifiedwhentheypromotelib- erty.ForLocke,libertyrequiresaconstitutional monarchywithparliamentarygovernment. Övertime,however,theidealoflibertybecame subjecttoatleasttwointerpretations.Theview thatseemsclosesttoLocke'sisclassicalliberalism, whichisnowmorefrequentlycalled(political) libertarianism.Thisformofliberalisminterprets constraintsonlibertyaspositiveacts(i.e.,actsof commission)thatpreventpeoplefromdoing whattheyotherwisecoulddo.Accordingtothis view,failingtohelppeopleinneeddoesnot restricttheirliberty.Libertariansmaintainthat whenlibertyissointerpretedonlyaminimalor night-watchmanstatethatproteetsagainstforce, theft,andfraudcanbejustified.Incontrast,in welfareliberalism,aformofliberalismthatderives fromtheworkofT.H.Green,constraintsonlib- ertyareinterpretedtoinclude,inaddition,neg- ativeacts(i.e.,actsofomission)thatprevent peoplefromdoingwhattheyotherwisecoulddo. Accordingtothisview,failingtohelppeoplein needdoesrestricttheirliberty.Welfareliberals maintainthatwhenlibertyisinterpretedinthis fashion,coerciveinstitutionsofawelfarestate requiringaguaranteedsocialminimumand equalopportunityarejustified.Whilenoone deniesthatwhenlibertyisgivenawelfareliberal interpretationsomeformofwelfarestateis required,thereisconsiderabledebateöver whetheraminimalstateisrequiredwhenliberty isgivenalibertarianinterpretation.Atissueis whetherthelibertyofthepoorisconstrained whentheyarepreventedfromtakingfromthe surpluspossessionsoftherichwhattheyneed forsurvival.Ifsuchpreventiondoesconstrain thelibertyofthepoor,itcouldbearguedthat theirlibertyshouldhavepriorityövertheliberty oftherichnottobeinterferedwithwhenusing theirsurpluspossessionsforluxurypurposes.In thisway,itcouldbeshownthatevenwhenthe idealoflibertyisgivenalibertarianinterpreta- tion,awelfarestate,ratherthanaminimalstate, isjustified. Bothlibertarianismandwelfareliberalismare committedtoindividualism.Thisviewtakesthe rightsofindividualstobebasicandjustifiesthe actionsofcoerciveinstitutionsaspromoting thoserights.Communitarianism,whichderives fromthewritingsofHegel,rejectsindividualism. Itmaintainsthatrightsofindividualsarenot basicandthatthecollectivecanhaverightsthat areindependentofandevenopposedtowhat liberalsclaimaretherightsofindividuals. Accordingtocommunitarians,individualsare constitutedbytheinstitutionsandpracticesof whichtheyareapart,andtheirrightsandobliga- tionsderivefromthosesameinstitutionsand practices.Fascismisanextremeformofcommu- nitarianismthatadvocatesanauthoritarianstate withlimitedrightsforindividuals.InitsNational Socialism(Nazi)variety,fascismwasalsoanti- Semiticandmilitarist. Incontrasttoliberalismandcommunitarian- ism,socialismtakesequalitytobethebasicideal andjustifiescoerciveinstitutionsinsofarasthey promoteequality.Incapitalistsocietieswhere themeansofproduetionareownedandcon- trolledbyarelativelysmallnumberofpeople andusedprimarilyfortheirbenefit,socialists favörtakingcontrolofthemeansofproduetion andredirectingtheirusetothegeneralwelfare. AccordingtoMarx,theprincipleofdistribution forasocialistsocietyis:fromeachaccordingto 719 politicaltheory politicaltheory ability,toeachaccordingtoneeds.Socialistsdis- agreeamongthemselves,however,överwho shouldcontrolthemeansofproductionina socialistsociety.Intheversionofsocialism favoredbyLenin,thosewhocontrolthemeans ofproductionaretobeaneliteseeminglydiffer- ingonlyintheirendsfromthecapitalistelite theyreplaced.Inotherformsofsocialism,the meansofproductionaretobecontrolleddemo- cratically.Inadvancedcapitalistsocieties, nationaldefense,policeandfireprotection, incomeredistribution,andenvironmentalpro- tectionarealreadyunderdemocraticcontrol. Democracyor"governmentbythepeople"is thoughttoapplyintheseareas,andtorequire someformofrepresentation.Socialistssimply proposetoextendthedomainofdemocraticcon- troltoincludecontrolofthemeansofproduc- tion,onthegroundthattheverysame argumentsthatsupportdemocraticcontrolin theserecognizedareasalsosupportdemocratic controlofthemeansofproduction.Inaddition, accordingtoMarx,socialismwilltransformitself intocommunismwhenmostoftheworkthat peopleperforminsocietybecomesitsown reward,makingdifferentialmonetaryreward generallyunnecessary.Thendistributioninsoci- etycanproceedaccordingtotheprinciple,from eachaccordingtoability,toeachaccordingto needs. Itsohappensthatalloftheabovepolitical viewshavebeeninterpretedinwaysthatdeny thatwomenhavethesamebasicrightsasmen. Bycontrast,feminism,almostbydefinition,isthe politicalviewthatwomenandmenhavethe samebasicrights.Inrecentyears,mostpolitical philosophershavecometoendorseequalbasic rightsforwomenandmen,butrarelydothey addressquestionsthatfeministsconsiderofthe utmostimportance,e.g.,howresponsibilities anddutiesaretobeassignedinfamilystructures. Eachofthesepoliticalviewsmustbeevaluated bothinternallyandexternallybycomparison withtheotherviews.Oncethisisdone,their practicalrecommendationsmaynotbesodiffer- ent.Forexample,ifwelfareliberalsrecognize thatthebasicrightsoftheirviewextendto distantpeoplesandfuturegenerations,theymay endupendorsingthesamedegreeofequality socialistsdefend. Whatevertheirpracticalrequirements,each ofthesepoliticalviewsjustifiescivildisobedi- ence,evenrevolution,whencertainofthose requirementshavenotbeenmet.Civildisobedi- enceisanillegalactionundertakentodraw attentiontoafailurebytherelevantauthorities tomeetbasicmoralrequirements,e.g.,the refusalofRosaParkstogiveupherseatinabus toawhitemaninaccordwiththelocalordi- nanceinMontgomery,Alabama,in1955.Civil disobedienceisjustifiedwhenillegalactionof thissortisthebestwaytogettherelevant authoritiestobringthelawintobettercorre- spondencewithbasicmoralrequirements.By contrast,revolutionaryactionisjustifiedwhenit istheonlywaytocorrectaradicalfailureofthe relevantauthoritiestomeetbasicmoralrequire- ments.Whenrevolutionaryactionisjustified, peoplenolongerhaveapoliticalobligationto obeytherelevantauthorities;thatis,theyareno longermorallyrequiredtoobeythem,although theymaystillcontinuetodoso,e.g.outofhabit orfear. Recentcontemporarypoliticalphilosophyhas focusedonthecommunitarian-liberaldebate. Indefenseofthecommunitarianview,Alasdair Maclntyrehasarguedthatvirtuallyallformsof liberalismattempttoseparaterulesdefiningright actionfromconceptionsofthehumangood.On thisaccount,hecontends,theseformsofliberal- ismmustfailbecausetherulesdefiningright actioncannotbeadequatelygroundedapart fromaconceptionofthegood.Respondingto thistypeofcriticism,someliberalshaveopenly concededthattheirviewisnotgroundedinde- pendentlyofsomeconceptionofthegood. Rawls,e.g.,hasrecentlymadeclearthathislib- eralismrequiresaconceptionofthepolitical good,althoughnotacomprehensiveconception ofthegood.Itwouldseem,therefore,thatthe debatebetweencommunitariansandliberals mustturnonacomparativeevaluationoftheir competingconceptionsofthegood.Unfortu- nately,contemporarycommunitarianshavenot yetbeenveryforthcomingaboutwhatparticular conceptionofthegoodtheirviewrequires. Seealsoethics,justice,liberalism, POLITICALTHEORY,SOCIALPHILOSOPHY. J.P.St. politicaltheory,reflectionconcerningtheempir- ical,normative,andconceptualdimensionsof politicallife.Therearenotopicsthatallpolitical theoristsdooroughttoaddress,norequiredpro- cedures,nodoctrinesacknowledgedtobe authoritative.Themeaningof'politicaltheory' residesinitsfluctuatinguses,notinanyessen- tialproperty.Itisneverthelesspossibletoiden- tifyconcertedtendenciesamongthosewhohave practicedthisactivityövertwenty-fivecenturies. Sinceapproximatelytheseventeenthcentury, aprimaryquestionhasbeenhowbesttojustify 720 polyadic Pomponazzi,Pietro thepoliticalruleofsomepeopleöverothers.This questionsubordinatedtheissuethathad directedandorganizedmostpreviouspolitical theory,namely,whatconstitutesthebestformof politicalregime.Assumingpoliticalassociation tobeadivinelyordainedornaturallynecessary featureofthehumanestate,earlierthinkershad askedwhatmodeofpoliticalassociationcon- tributesmosttorealizingthegoodforhuman- kind.Signalingthevariablebutintimaterela- tionshipbetweenpoliticaltheoryandpolitical practice,thechangeinquestionreflectedand helpedtoconsolidateacceptanceofthepostulate ofnaturalhumanequality,thedenialofdivinely ornaturallygivenauthorityofsomehuman beingsöverothers.Onlyasmallminorityofpost- seventeenth-centurythinkershaveentertained thepossibilityperhapssuggestedbythispostu- late,thatnoformofrulecanbejustified,butthe shiftinquestionalteredthepoliticaltheory agenda.Issuesconcerningconsent,individual libertiesandrights,variousformsofequalityas integraltojustice,democraticandothercontrols ontheauthorityandpowerofgovernment- noneofwhichwereamongthefirstconcernsof ancientormedievalpoliticalthinkers-movedto thecenterofpoliticaltheory. Recurrenttendenciesandtensionsinpolitical theorymayalsobediscernedalongdimensions thatcross-cuthistoricaldivisions.Initsmostcel- ebratedrepresentations,politicaltheoryisinte- graltophilosophy.Systematicthinkerssuchas PlatoandAristotle,AugustineandAquinas, HobbesandHegel,presenttheirpolitical thoughtsassupportingandsupportedbytheir ethicsandtheology,metaphysicsandepistemol- ogy.Politicalargumentationmustsatisfythe samecriteriaoflogic,truth,andjustificationas anyother;apoliticaldoctrinemustbegrounded inthenatureofreality.Otherpoliticaltheorists alignthemselveswithempiricalsciencerather thanphilosophy.Oftenfocusingonquestionsof power,theyaimtogiveaccurateaccountsand factuallygroundedassessmentsofgovemment andpoliticsinparticulartimesandplaces.Books IV-VIofAristotle'sPoliticsinauguratethiscon- ceptionofpoliticaltheory;itisrepresentedby Montesquieu,Marx,andmuchofutilitarianism, anditisthenumericallypredominantformof academicpoliticaltheorizinginthetwentieth century.Yetothers,e.g.,Socrates,Machiavelli, Rousseau,andtwentieth-centurythinkerssuch asRawls,mixthepreviouslymentionedmodes butunderstandthemselvesasprimarilypursuing thepracticalobjectiveofimprovingtheirown politicalsocieties. Seealsopoliticalphilosophy,social PHILOSOPHY.R.E.F. polyadic.Seedegree. Polyaenus.Seeepicureanism. polysemy.Seeambiguity. polysyllogism,aseriesofsyllogismsconnectedby thefactthattheconclusionofonesyllogism becomesapremiseofanother.Thesyllogism whoseconclusionisusedasapremiseinanother syllogismwithinthechainiscalledtheprosyllo- gism;thesyllogismiswhichtheconclusionof anothersyllogismwithinthechainisusedasa premiseiscalledtheepisyllogism.Toillustrate, takethestandardformofthesimplestpolysyllo- gism: (a) (1)EveryBisA (2)EveryCisB (3).'.EveryCisA (P) (4)EveryCisA (5)EveryDisC (6)/.EveryDisA. Thefirstmember(a)ofthispolysyllogismisthe prosyllogism,sinceitsconclusion,(3),occursas apremise,(4),inthesecondargument.Thissec- ondmember,(P),istheepisyllogism,sinceit employsasoneofitspremises(4)theconclusion (3)ofthefirstsyllogism.Itshouldbenotedthat theterms'prosyllogism'and'episyllogism'are correlativeterms.Moreover,apolysyllogism mayhavemorethantwomembers.Seealso SYLLOGISM.I.BO. Pomponazzi,Pietro(1462-1525),Italianphi- losopher,anAristotelianwhotaughtattheuni- versitiesofPaduaandBologna.InDeincan- tationibus("OnIncantations,"1556),heregards theworldasasystemofnaturalcausesthatcan explainapparentlymiraculousphenomena. Humanbeingsaresubjecttothenaturalorderof theworld,yetdivinepredestinationandhuman freedomarecompatible(Defato,"OnFäte," 1567).Furthermore,hedistinguishesbetween whatisprovedbynaturalreasonandwhatis acceptedbyfaith,andclaimsthat,sincethereare argumentsforandagainsttheimmortalityofthe humanindividualsoul,thisbeliefistobe acceptedsolelyonthebasisoffaith(Deimmor- talitateanimae,"OntheImmortalityoftheSoul," 721 ponsasinorum Porphyry 1516).Hedefendedhisviewofimmortalityin theApologia(1518)andintheDefensorium (1519).Thesethreeworkswerereprintedas Tradatusacutissimi(1525). Pomponazzi'sworkwasinfluentialuntilthe seventeenthcentury,whenAristotelianism ceasedtobethemainphilosophytaughtatthe universities.Theeighteenth-centuryfreethink- ersshowednewinterestinhisdistinctionbe- tweennaturalreasonandfaith.P.Gar. ponsasinorum(Latin,'asses'bridge'),amethod- ologicaldevicebaseduponAristotle'sdescription ofthewaysinwhichonefindsasuitablemiddle termtodemonstratecategoricalpropositions. Thus,toprovetheuniversalaffirmative,one shouldconsiderthecharactersthatentailthe predicatePandthecharactersentailedbythe subjectS.Ifwefindinthetwogroupsofcharac- tersacommonmember,wecanuseitasamid- dleterminthesyllogisticproofof(say)'AllSare P'.Take'Allmenaremortal'asthecontemplated conclusion.Wefindthat'organism'isamongthe charactersentailingthepredicate'mortal'andis alsofoundinthegroupofcharactersentailedby thesubject'men',andthusitmaybeusedina syllogisticproofof'Allmenaremortal'.Toprove negativepropositionswemust,inaddition,con- sidercharactersincompatiblewiththepredicate, orincompatiblewiththesubject.Finally,proofs ofparticularpropositionsrequireconsidering charactersthatentailthesubject.Seealsosyl- logism.I.Bo. Popper,KarlRaimund(1902-94),Austrian-born Britishphilosopherbestknownforcontributions tophilosophyofscienceandtosocialandpoliti- calphilosophy.EducatedattheUniversityof Vienna(Ph.D.,1928),hetaughtphilosophyin NewZealandforadecadebeforebecominga readerandthenprofessorinlogicandscientific methodattheLondonSchoolofEconomics (1946-69).Hewasknightedin1965,electeda fellowoftheRoyalSocietyin1976,and appointedCompanionofHonourin1982(see hisautobiography,UnendedQuest,1976). Inoppositiontologicalpositivism'sverifiabil- itycriterionofcognitivesignificance,Popperpro- posesthatsciencebecharacterizedbyitsmethod: thecriterionofdemarcationofempiricalscience frompseudo-scienceandmetaphysicsisfalsifda- bility(LogikderForschung,1934,translatedasThe LogicofScientificDiscovery,1959).Accordingtofal- sificationism,sciencegrows,andmayeven approachthetruth,notbyamassingsupporting evidence,butthroughanunendingcycleof problems,tentativesolutions-unjustifiablecon- jectures-anderrorelimination;i.e.,thevigorous testingofdeductiveconsequencesandtherefu- tationofconjecturesthatfail(Conjecturesand Refutations,1963).Sinceconjecturesarenotin- ferencesandrefutationsarenotinductive,there isnoinductiveinferenceorinductivelogic.More generally,criticismisinstalledasthehallmarkof rationality,andthetraditionaljustificationist insistenceonproof,conclusiveorinconclusive, onconfirmation,andonpositiveargument,is repudiated. PopperbringstothecentralproblemsofKanfs philosophyanuncompromisingrealismand objectivism,thetoolsofmodernlogic,andaDar- winianperspectiveonknowledge,therebysolv- ingHume'sproblemofinductionwithoutlapsing intoirrationalism(ObjectiveKnowledge,1972).He madecontributionsofpermanentimportance alsototheaxiomatizationofprobabilitytheory (TheLogicofScientificDiscovery,1959);toitsinter- pretation,especiallythepropensityinterpreta- tion(PostscripttoTheLogicofScientificDiscovery,3 vols.1982-83);andtomanyotherproblems (TheSelfandItsBrain,withJohnC.Eccles,1977). Popper'ssocialphilosophy,likehisepistemol- ogy,isanti-authoritarian.Sinceitisahistoricist errortosupposethatwecanpredictthefuture ofmankind(ThePovertyofHistoricism,1957),the primetaskofsocialinstitutionsinanopensoci- ety-onethatencouragescriticismandallows rulerstobereplacedwithoutviolence-mustbe notlarge-scaleutopianplanningbutthemini- mization,throughpiecemealreform,ofavoid- ablesuffering.Thiswayalonepermitsproper assessmentofsuccessorfailure,andthusof learningfromexperience(TheOpenSocietyandIts Enemies,1945). Seealsoconfirmation,darwinism,his- toricism,LOGICALPOSITIVISM,PHILOSOPHY OFSCIENCE,PROBABILITY,PROBLEMOFIN- DUCTION,RATIONALITY.D.W.M. Porphyry(c.232-c.304),GreekNeoplatonist philosopher,secondtoPlotinusininfluence.He wasborninTyre,andisthussometimescalled PorphyrythePhoenician.Asayoungmanhe wenttoAthens,whereheabsorbedthePlato- nismofCassiusLonginus,whohadinturnbeen influencedbyAmmoniusSaccasinAlexandria. PorphyrywenttoRomein263,wherehe becameadiscipleofPlotinus,whohadalsobeen influencedbyAmmonius.Porphyrylivedin Romeuntil269,when,urgedbyPlotinusto 722 Port-RoyalLogic positivefreedom travelasacureforseveredepression,hetraveled toSicily.Heremainedthereforseveralyears beforereturningtoRometotakeöverPlotinus's school.HeapparentlydiedinRome. Porphyryisnotnotedfororiginalthought.He seemstohavededicatedhimselftoexplicating Aristotle'slogicanddefendingPlotinus'sversion ofNeoplatonism.DuringhisyearsinSicily,Por- phyrywrotehistwomostfamousworks,the lengthyAgainsttheChristians,ofwhichonlyfrag- mentssurvive,andtheIsagoge,or"Tntroduction." TheIsagoge,whichpurportstogiveanelemen- taryexpositionoftheconceptsnecessaryto understandAristotle'sCategories,wastranslated intoLatinbyBoethiusandroutinelypublished intheMiddleAgeswithLatineditionsofAris- totle'sOrganon,orlogicaltreatises.Itsinclusion inthatformatarguablyprecipitatedthediscus- sionoftheso-calledproblemofuniversalsinthe twelfthcentury.DuringhislåteryearsinRome, PorphyrycollectedPlotinus'swritings,editing andorganizingthemintoaschemeofhis own-notPlotinus's-design,sixgroupsofnine treatises,thuscalledtheEnneads.Porphyrypref- acedhiseditionwithaninformativebiography ofPlotinus,writtenshortlybeforePorphyry's owndeath. Seealsoneoplatonism,plotinus,tree OFPORPHYRY.W.E.M. Port-RoyalLogic,originallyentitledLalogique,ou Uartdepenser,atreatiseonlogic,language,and methodcomposedbyAntoineArnauldand PierreNicole(1625-95),possiblywiththehelp ofPascal,allofwhomweresolitairesassociated withtheconventatPort-Royal-des-Champs,the spiritualandintellectualcenterofFrench Jansenism.Originallywrittenasaninstruction manualforthesonoftheDucdeLuynes,the Logicwassoonexpandedandpublished(thefirst editionappearedin1662,butitwasconstantly beingmodified,augmented,andrewrittenbyits authors;by1685sixeditionsinFrenchhad appeared). Theworkdevelopsthelinguistictheoriespre- sentedbyArnauldandClaudeLancelotinthe Grammairegénéraleetraisonnée(1660),and reflectsthepedagogicalprinciplesembodiedin thecurriculumofthe"littleschools"runbyPort- Royal.ItscontentisalsopermeatedbytheCarte- sianismtowhichArnauldwasdevoted.The LogiksinfluencegrewbeyondJansenistcircles, anditsoonbecameinseventeenth-century Franceastandardmanualforrigorousthinking. Eventually,itwasadoptedasatextbookin Frenchschools.Theauthorsdeclaretheirgoalto betomakethoughtmorepreciseforbetterdis- tinguishingtruthfromerror-philosophicaland theological-andtodevelopsoundjudgment. Theyareespeciallyconcernedtodispeltheerrors andconfusionsoftheScholastics.Logicis"the artofdirectingreasontoaknowledgeofthings fortheinstructionofourselvesandothers."This artconsistsinreflectingonthemind'sfourprin- cipaloperations:conceiving,judging,reasoning, andordering.Accordingly,theLogicisdivided intofoursections:onideasandconception,on judgments,onreasoning,andonmethod.S.N. Posidonius.Seeacademy,commentarieson PLATO,STOICISM. positionalqualities.Seequalities. positiveandnegativefreedom,respectively,the areawithinwhichtheindividualisself-deter- miningandtheareawithinwhichtheindividual isleftfreefrominterferencebyothers.More specifically,oneisfreeinthepositivesensetothe extentthatonehascontrolöverone'slife,or rulesoneself.Inthissensethetermisveryclose tothatof'autonomy'.Theforcesthatcanprevent thisself-determinationareusuallythoughtofas internal,asdesiresorpassions.Thisconceptionof freedomcanbesaidtohaveoriginatedwith Plato,accordingtowhomapersonisfreewhen thepartsofthesoularerightlyrelatedtoeach other,i.e.therationalpartofthesoulrulesthe otherparts.Otheradvocatesofpositivefreedom includeSpinoza,Rousseau,Kant,andHegel. Oneisfreeinthenegativesenseifoneisnot preventedfromdoingsomethingbyanotherper- son.Oneispreventedfromdoingsomethingif anotherpersonmakesitimpossibleforonetodo somethingorusescoerciontopreventonefrom doingsomething.Hencepersonsarefreeinthe negativesenseiftheyarenotmadeunfreeinthe negativesense.Theterm'negativeliberty'was coinedbyBenthamtomeantheabsenceofcoer- cion.Advocatesofnegativefreedominclude Hobbes,Locke,andHume. Seealsofreewillproblem,kant,polit- ICALPHILOSOPHY.G.D. positiveduty.Seeduty. positivefeedback.Seecybernetics. positivefreedom.Seepositiveandnegativefree- dom. 723 positivemorality possibleworlds positivemorality.Seejurisprudence. positivism,legal.Seejurisprudence,legalposi- tivism. positivism,logical.Seecomte,logicalpositivism. possibilia.Seenecessity,possibleworlds. possibilist.Seeepistemiclogic. possibility.Seenecessity. possibility,epistemic.Seeepistemiclogic. possibleworlds,alternativeworldsintermsof whichonemaythinkofpossibility.Theideaof thinkingaboutpossibilityintermsofsuchworlds hasplayedanimportantpart,bothinLeibnizian philosophicaltheologyandinthedevelopment ofmodallogicandphilosophicalreflectionabout itinrecentdecades.Butthereareimportantdif- ferencesintheformstheideahastaken,andthe usestowhichithasbeenput,inthetwocon- texts. Leibnizuseditinhisaccountofcreation.Inhis viewGod'smindnecessarilyandetemallycon- tainstheideasofinfinitelymanyworldsthatGod couldhavecreated,andGodhaschosenthebest oftheseandmadeitactual,thuscreatingit. (SimilarviewsarefoundinthethoughtofLeib- niz^contemporary,Malebranche.)Thepossible worldsarethusthecompletealternativesamong whichGodchose.Theyarepossibleatleastinthe sensethattheyarelogicallyconsistent;whether somethingmoreisrequiredinorderforthemto becoherentasworldsisadifficultquestionin Leibnizinterpretation.Theyarecompleteinthat theyarepossibletotalitiesofcreatures;each includesawhole(possible)universe,initswhole spatialextentanditswholetemporalhistory(if itisspatiallyandtemporallyordered).Thetem- poralcompletenessdeservesemphasis.If"the worldoftomorrow"is"abetterworld"than"the worldoftoday,"itwillstillbepartofthesame "possibleworld"(theactualone);fortheactual "world,"intherelevantsense,includeswhat- everactuallyhashappenedorwillhappen throughoutalltime.Thecompletenessextends toeverydetail,sothatamilligram'sdifferencein theweightofthesmallestbirdwouldmakeadif- ferentpossibleworld.Thecompletenessofpos- sibleworldsmaybelimitedinoneway,however. Leibnizspeaksofworldsasaggregatesoffinite things.AsalternativesforGod'screation,they maywellnotbethoughtofasincludingGod,or atanyråte,noteveryfactaboutGod.Forthisand otherreasonsitisnotclearthatinLeibniz's thoughtthepossiblecanbeidentifiedwithwhat istrueinsomepossibleworld,orthenecessary withwhatistrueinallpossibleworlds. Thatidentificationisregularlyassumed,how- ever,intherecentdevelopmentofwhathas becomeknownaspossibleworldssemanticsfor modallogic(thelogicofpossibilityandnecessity, andofotherconceptions,e.g.thosepertainingto timeandtomorality,thathaveturnedouttobe formallyanalogous).Thebasicideahereisthat suchnotionsasthoseofvalidity,soundness,and completenesscanbedefinedformodallogicin termsofmodelsconstructedfromsetsofalter- native"worlds."Sincethelate1950smany importantresultshavebeenobtainedbythis method,whosebest-knownexponentisSaul Kripke.Someofthemostinterestingproofs dependontheideaofarelationofaccessibility betweenworldsintheset.Intuitively,oneworld isaccessiblefromanotherifandonlyifthefor- merispossiblein(orfromthepointofviewof) thelatter.Differentsystemsofmodallogicare appropriatedependingonthepropertiesofthis relation(e.g.,onwhetheritisorisnotreflexive and/ortransitiveand/orsymmetrical). Thepurelyformålresultsofthesemethodsare wellestablished.Theapplicationofpossible worldssemanticstoconceptionsoccurringin metaphysicallyricherdiscourseismorecontro- versial,however.Someofthecontroversyis relatedtodebatesöverthemetaphysicalreality ofvarioussortsofpossibilityandnecessity.Par- ticularlycontroversial,andalsoafocusofmuch interest,havebeenattemptstounderstand modalclaimsdere,aboutparticularindividualsas such(e.g.,thatIcouldnothavebeenamusical performance),intermsoftheidentityandnon- identityofindividualsindifferentpossible worlds. Similarly,thereisdebateövertheapplicability ofarelatedtreatmentofsubjunctivecondition- als,developedbyRobertStalnakerandDavid Lewis,thoughitisclearthatityieldsinterest- ingformålresults.Whatisrequired,onthis approach,forthetruthofTfitwerethecasethat A,thenitwouldbethecasethatB',isthat, amongthosepossibleworldsinwhichAistrue, someworldinwhichBistruebemoresimilar,in therelevantrespects,totheactualworldthan anyworldinwhichBisfalse. Oneofthemostcontroversialtopicsisthe natureofpossibleworldsthemselves.Mathe- maticallogiciansneednotbeconcernedwith this;awidevarietyofsetsofobjects,realorfic- 724 possibleworldssemantics postmodern titious,canbeviewedashavingtheproperties requiredofsetsof"worlds"fortheirpurposes. Butifmetaphysicallyrobustissuesofmodality (e.g.,whethertherearemorepossiblecolors thanweeversee)aretobeunderstoodinterms ofpossibleworlds,thequestionofthenatureof theworldsmustbetakenseriously.Some philosopherswoulddenyanyseriousmetaphys- icalroletothenotionofpossibleworlds.Atthe otherextreme,DavidLewishasdefendedaview ofpossibleworldsasconcretetotalities,thingsof thesamesortasthewholeactualuniverse,made upofentitieslikeplanets,persons,andsoforth. Onhisview,theactualityoftheactualworld consistsonlyinitsbeingthisone,theonethatwe arein;apartfromitsrelationtousorourlin- guisticacts,theactualisnotmetaphysicallydis- tinguishedfromthemerelypossible.Many philosophersfindthisresultcounterintuitive, andtheinfinityofconcretepossibleworldsan extravagantontology;butLewisarguesthathis viewmakespossibleattractivereductionsof modality(bothlogicalandcausal),andofsuch notionsasthatofaproposition,tomoreconcrete notions.Otherphilosophersarepreparedtosay therearenon-actualpossibleworlds,butthat theyareentitiesofaquitedifferentsortfromthe actualconcreteuniverse-setsofpropositions, perhaps,orsomeothertypeof"abstract"object. Leibnizhimselfheldaviewofthiskind,thinking ofpossibleworldsashavingtheirbeingonlyin God'smind,asintentionalobjectsofGod's thought. Seealsocounterfactuals,kripke SEMANTICS,MODALLOGIC.R.M.A. possibleworldssemantics.Seekripkesemantics, POSSIBLEWORLDS. postcardparadox.Seesemanticparadoxes. Post-complete.Seecompleteness. posthoc,ergopropterhoc.SeeiNFORMALfallacy. postmodern,oforrelatingtoacomplexsetof reactionstomodernphilosophyanditspresup- positions,asopposedtothekindofagreement onsubstantivedoctrinesorphilosophicalques- tionsthatoftencharacterizesaphilosophical movement.Althoughthereislittleagreement onpreciselywhatthepresuppositionsofmodern philosophyare,anddisagreementonwhich philosophersexemplifythesepresuppositions, postmodernphilosophytypicallyopposesfoun- dationalism,essentialism,andrealism.ForRorty, e.g.,thepresuppositionstobesetasidearefoun- dationalistassumptionssharedbytheleading sixteenth-,seventeenth-,andeighteenth-cen- turyphilosophers.ForNietzsche,Heidegger, Foucault,andDerrida,thecontestedpresupposi- tionstobesetasideareasoldasmetaphysics itself,andareperhapsbestexemplifiedbyPlato. Postmodernphilosophyhasevenbeencharac- terized,byLyotard,asprecedingmodernphiloso- phy,inthesensethatthepresuppositionsof philosophicalmodernismemergeoutofadispo- sitionwhoseantecedent,unarticulatedbeliefs arealreadypostmodern. Postmodernphilosophyisthereforeusefully regardedasacomplexdusterconceptthat includesthefollowingelements:ananti-(or post-)epistemologicalstandpoint;anti-essential- ism;anti-realism;anti-foundationalism;opposi- tiontotranscendentalargumentsandtrans- cendentalstandpoints;rejectionofthepictureof knowledgeasaccuraterepresentation;rejection oftruthascorrespondencetoreality;rejectionof theveryideaofcanonicaldescriptions;rejection offinalvocabularies,i.e.,rejectionofprinciples, distinctions,anddescriptionsthatarethoughtto beunconditionallybindingforalltimes,persons, andplaces;andasuspicionofgrandnarratives, metanarrativesofthesortperhapsbestillustrated bydialecticalmaterialism. Inadditiontothesethingspostmodernphilos- ophyis"against,"italsoopposescharacterizing thismenuofoppositionsasrelativism,skepti- cism,ornihilism,anditrejectsas"themeta- physicsofpresence"thetraditional,putatively impossibledreamofacomplete,unique,and closedexplanatorysystem,anexplanatorysys- temtypicallyfueledbybinaryoppositions.On thepositiveside,oneoftenfindsthefollowing themes:itscritiqueofthenotionoftheneutral- ityandsovereigntyofreason-includinginsis- tenceonitspervasivelygendered,historical,and ethnocentriccharacter;itsconceptionofthe socialconstructionofword-worldmappings;its tendencytoembracehistoricism;itscritiqueof theultimatestatusofacontrastbetweenepiste- mology,ontheonehand,andthesociologyof knowledge,ontheotherhand;itsdissolutionof thenotionoftheautonomous,rationalsubject; itsinsistenceontheartifactualstatusofdivisions oflaborinknowledgeacquisitionandproduc- tion;anditsambivalenceabouttheEnlighten- mentanditsideology. Manyoftheseelementsorelectiveaffinities werealreadysurfacinginthegrowingopposition tothespectatortheoryofknowledge,inEuropé andintheEnglish-speakingworld,longbefore 725 post-structuralism potency theterm'postmodem'becameacommonplace. InAnglophonephilosophythistooktheearly formofDewey's(andpragmatism's)opposition topositivism,earlyKuhn'sredescriptionofsci- entificpractice,andWittgenstein'sinsistenceon thelanguage-gamecharacterofrepresentation; critiquesof"themythofthegiven"fromSellars toDavidsonandQuine;theemergenceofepis- temologynaturalized;andtheputativedescrip- tion-dependentcharacterofdata,tetheredtothe theorydependenceofdescriptions(inKuhn, Sellars,Quine,andArthurFine-perhapsinall constructivistsinthephilosophyofscience). InEuropé,manyoftheseelectiveaffinitiessur- facedexplicitlyinandwereidentifiedwithpost- structuralism,althoughtracesareclearlyevident inHeidegger's(andlåterinDerrida's)attackson Husserl'sresidualCartesianism;therejectionof essentialdescriptions(Wesensanschauungen)in Husserl'ssense;Saussure'sandstructuralism's attackontheautonomyandcoherenceofatran- scendentalsignifiedstandingöveragainstaself- transparentsubject;Derrida'sdeconstructingthe metaphysicsofpresence;Foucaulfsredescrip- tionsofepistemes;theconvergencebetween French-andEnglish-speakingsocialconstruc- tivists;attacksonthelanguageofenablingcon- ditionsasreflectedinworriesaboutthepurchase ofnecessaryandsufficientconditionstalkon bothsidesoftheAtlantic;andLyotard'smany interventions,particularlythoseagainstgrand narratives. Manyoftheseelectiveaffinitiesthatcharac- terizepostmodernphilosophycanalsobeseenin thevirtuallyuniversalchallengestomoralphi- losophyasithasbeenunderstoodtraditionallyin theWest,notonlyinGermanandFrenchphi- losophy,butinthereevaluationof"themorality ofprinciples"intheworkofMaclntyre,Wil- liams,Nussbaum,JohnMcDowell,andothers. Theforceofpostmoderncritiquescanperhaps bestbeseeninsomeofthechallengesoffeminist theory,asintheworkofJudithButlerand HéléneCixous,andgendertheorygenerally.For itisingendertheorythattheconceptionof"rea- son"itselfasithasfunctionedintheshared philosophicaltraditionisredescribedasacon- ceptionthat,itisoftenargued,is(en)gendered, patriarchal,homophobic,anddeeplyoptional. Theterm'postmodern'islessclearinphiloso- phy,itsapplicationmoreuncertainanddivided thaninsomeotherfields,e.g.,postmodernarchi- tecture.Inarchitecturetheconceptisrelatively clear.Itdisplacesmodernisminassignableways, emergesasanoppositionalforceagainstarchi- tecturalmodernism,arejectionoftheworkand traditioninauguratedbyWalterGropius,Henri LeCorbusier,andMiesvanderRohe,especially theInternationalStyle.Inpostmodernarchitec- ture,themodernistprincipleofabstraction,of geometricpurityandsimplicity,isdisplacedby multivocityandpluralism,byrenewedinterest inbuildingsassignsandsignifiers,interestin theirreferentialpotentialandresources.The modernisfsaspirationtobuildingsthataretime- lessinanimportantsenseisitselfreadbypost- modernistsasaniconographythatprivilegesthe bravenewworldofscienceandtechnology,an aspirationthatglorifiesuncriticallytheindustrial revolutionofwhichitisitselfaquintessential expression.Thisaspirationtotimelessnessisdis- placedinpostmodernarchitecturebyadirect andself-consciousopennesstoandengagement withhistory.Itisthisrelativespecificityofthe conceptpostmodernarchitecturethatenabled CharlesJenckstowritethat"ModemArchitec- turediedinSt.LouisMissourionJuly15,1972 at3:32p.m."Unfortunately,noremotelysimilar sentencecanbewrittenaboutpostmodemphi- losophy. Seealsoanti-realism,deconstruction, FOUCAULT,FOUNDATIONALISM,LYOTARD, RORTY,SOCIALCONSTRUCTIVISM,STRUC- TURALISM.B.M. post-structuralism.SeeContinentalphilosophy, LYOTARD,STRUCTURALISM. potency,forAristotle,akindofcapacitythatisa correlativeofaction.Werequirenoinstruction tograspthedifferencebetween'XcandoY'and 'XisdoingY',thelattermeaningthatthedeed isactuallybeingdone.Thatanagenthasa potencytodosomethingisnotapureprediction somuchasageneralizationfrompastperfor- manceofindividualorkind.Aristotleusesthe exampleofabuilder,meaningsomeoneableto build,andthenconfrontstheMegaricobjection thatthebuildercanbecalledabuilderonly whenheactuallybuilds.Clearlyonewhois doingsomethingcandoit,butAristotleinsists thatthenappingcarpenterhasthepotencyto hammerandsaw.Apotencybasedonan acquiredskilllikecarpentryderivesfromthe potencysharedbythosewhoacquireandthose whodonotacquiretheskill.Anunskilled workercanbesaidtobeabuilder"inpotency," notinthesensethathehastheskillandcan employit,butinthesensethathecanacquire theskill.Inbothacquisitionandemployment, 'potency'referstotheactual-eithertheactual acquisitionoftheskilloritsactualuse.These 726 potentiality,first practicalattitude correlativesemergedfromAristotle'sanalysisof changeandbecoming.Thatwhich,fromnot havingtheskill,comestohaveitissaidtobe"in potency"tothatskill.Fromnothavingacertain shape,woodcomestohaveacertainshape.In theshapedwood,apotencyisactualized. Potencymustnotbeidentifiedwiththeun- shaped,withwhatAristotlecallsprivation. PrivationisthenegationofPinasubjectcapa- bleofP.Parmenides'identificationofprivation andpotencyaccordingtoAristotle,ledhimto denychange.Howcannot-PbecomeP?Itisthe subjectofnot-Ptowhichthechangeisattrib- utedandwhichsurvivesthechangethatisin potencytoX.Seealsoaristotle.R.M. potentiality,first.Seearistotle. potentiality,second.Seearistotle. poursoi.Seesartre. povertyofthestimulus,apsychologicalphenom- enonexhibitedwhenbehaviorisstimulus- unbound,andhencetheimmediatestimulus characterizedinstraightforwardphysicalterms doesnotcompletelycontrolbehavior.Human beingssortstimuliinvariouswaysandhöstsof influencesseemtoaffectwhen,why,andhow werespond-ourbackgroundbeliefs,facility withlanguage,hypothesesaboutstimuli,etc. Supposeapersonvisitingamuseumnoticesa paintingshehasneverbeforeseen.Pondering theunfamiliarpainting,shesays,"anambitious visualsynthesisofthemusicofMahlerandthe poetryofKeats."Ifstimulus(painting)controls response,thenherutteranceisaproductofear- lierresponsestosimilarstimuli.Givenpovertyof thestimulus,nosuchcontrolisexertedbythe stimulus(thepainting).Ofcourse,someinflu- enceofresponsemustbeconcededtothepaint- ing,forwithoutittherewouldbenoutterance. However,theutterancemaywelloutstripthe visitor'sconditioningandlearninghistory.Per- hapsshehadneverbeforetalkedofpaintingin termsofmusicandpoetry.ThelinguistNoam Chomskymadepovertyofthestimuluscentral tohiscriticismofB.F.Skinner'sVerbalBehavior (1957).Chomskyarguedthatthereisnopre- dicting,andcertainlynocriticalstimuluscontrol of,muchhumanbehavior.G.A.G. power,adisposition;anabilityorcapacityto yieldsomeoutcome.Onetradition(which includesLocke)distinguishesactiveandpassive powers.Aknifehastheactivepowertoslicean äpple,whichhasthepassivepowertobesliced bytheknife.Thedistinctionseemslargelygram- matical,however.Powersactinconcert:the powerofagrainofsalttodissolveinwaterand thewater'spowertodissolvethesaltarerecip- rocalandtheirmanifestationsmutual. Powersordispositionsaresometimesthought toberelationalpropertiesofobjects,properties possessedonlyinvirtueofobjectsstandingin appropriaterelationstootherobjects.However, ifwedistinguish,aswemust,betweenapower anditsmanifestation,andifweallowthatan objectcouldpossessapowerthatitnevermani- fested(agrainofsaltremainssolubleevenifit neverdissolves),itwouldseemthatanobject couldpossessapowerevenifappropriaterecip- rocalpartnersforitsmanifestationwerealto- gethernon-existent.Thisappearstohavebeen Locke'sview(AnEssayconcerningHumanUnder- standing,1690)of"secondaryqualities"(colors, sounds,andthelike),whichheregardedaspow- ersofobjectstoproducecertainsortsofsensory experienceinobservers. Philosopherswhotakepowersseriouslydis- agreeöverwhetherpowersareintrinsic,"built into"properties(thisview,defendedbyC.B. Martin,seemstohavebeenLocke's),orwhether theconnectionbetweenpropertiesandthepow- erstheybestowiscontingent,dependentper- hapsuponcontingentlawsofnature(aposition endorsedbyArmstrong).Isthesolubilityofsalt acharacteristicbuiltintothesalt,orisita"sec- ond-order"propertypossessedbythesaltin virtueof(i)thesalfspossessionofsome"first- order"propertyand(ii)thelawsofnature? Reductiveanalysesofpowers,thoughinfluen- tial,havenotfaredwell.Supposeagrainofsalt issolubleinwater.Doesthismeanthatifthesalt wereplacedinwater,itwoulddissolve?No. Imaginethatwerethesaltplacedinwater,a technicianwouldintervene,imposinganelec- tromagneticfield,therebypreventingthesalt fromdissolving.Attemptstoexclude"blocking" conditions-byappending"otherthingsequal" clausesperhaps-facechargesofcircularity:in nailingdownwhatotherthingsmustbeequal wefindourselvesappealingtopowers.Powers evidentlyarefundamentalfeaturesofourworld. Seealsodisposition,qualities,rela- tion,SUPERVENIENCE.J.F.H. powerset.Seesettheory. practicalargument.Seepracticalreasoning. practicalattitude.Seepracticalreasoning. 727 practicalfreedom practicalreasoning practicalfreedom.Seefreewillproblem. practicaljudgment.Seeakrasia. practicallogic.Seeinformallogic. practicalmodality.Seefreewillproblem. practicalrationality.Seerationality. practicalreason,thecapacityforargumentor demonstrativeinference,consideredinitsappli- cationtothetaskofprescribingorselecting behavior.Somephilosophicalconcernsinthis areapertaintotheactualthoughtprocessesby whichplansofactionareformulatedandcarried outinpracticalsituations.Asecondmajorissue iswhatrole,ifany,practicalreasonplaysin determiningnormsofconduct.Herethereare twofundamentalpositions. InstrumentalismistypifiedbyHume'sclaimthat reasonis,andoughtonlytobe,theslaveofthe passions.Accordingtoinstrumentalism,reason byitselfisincapableofinfluencingaction directly.Itmaydosoindirectly,bydisclosing factsthatarousemotivationalimpulses.Andit fulfillsanindispensablefunctionindiscerning means-endrelationsbywhichourobjectives maybeattained.Butnoneofthoseobjectivesis setbyreason.Allaresetbythepassions-the desiderativeandaversiveimpulsesarousedinus bywhatourcognitivefacultiesapprehend.It doesnotfollowfromthisalonethatethicalmoti- vationreducestomeredesireandaversion, basedonthepleasureandpaindifferentcourses ofactionmightafford.Theremightyetbea specificallyethicalpassion,oritmightbethat independentlybasedmoralinjunctionshavein themselvesaspecialcapacitytoprovokeordi- narydesireandaversion.Nevertheless,instru- mentalismisoftenassociatedwiththeviewthat pleasureandpain,happinessandunhappiness, arethesoleobjectsofvalueanddisvalue,and hencetheonlypossiblemotivatorsofconduct. Hence,itisclaimed,moralinjunctionsmustbe groundedinthesemotives,andpracticalreason isofinterestonlyassubordinatedtoinclination. Thealternativetoinstrumentalismistheview championedbyKant,thatpracticalreasonisan autonomoussourceofnormativeprinciples,capa- bleofmotivatingbehaviorindependentlyof ordinarydesireandaversion.Onthisviewitis thepassionsthatlackintrinsicmoralimport,and thefunctionofpracticalreasonistolimittheir motivationalrolebyformulatingnormative principlesbindingforallrationalagentsand foundedintheoperationofpracticalreason itself.Theoriesofthiskindusuallyviewmoral principlesasgroundedinconsistency,andan impartialrespectfortheautonomyofallrational agents.Tobemorallyacceptable,principlesof conductmustbeuniversalizable,sothatallratio- nalagentscouldbehaveinthesamewaywith- outtheirconducteitherdestroyingitselforbeing inconsistentlymotivated. Thereareadvantagesanddisadvantagesto eachoftheseviews.Instrumentalismoffersa simpleraccountofboththefunctionofpractical reasonandthesourcesofhumanmotivation. Butitintroducesastrongsubjectiveelementby givingprimacytodesire,therebyposingaprob- lemofhowmoralprinciplescanbeuniversally binding.TheKantianapproachoffersmore promisehere,sinceitmakesuniversalizability essentialtoanytypeofbehaviorbeingmoral. Butitismorecomplex,andtheclaimthatthe deliverancesofpracticalreasoncarryintrinsic motivationalforceisopentochallenge. Seealsoinstrumentalism,kant,moti- vationalINTERNALISM,PRACTICALREA- SONING,RATIONALITY.H.J.M. practicalreasoning,theinferentialprocessby whichconsiderationsfororagainstenvisioned coursesofactionarebroughttobearonthefor- mationandexecutionofintention.Thecontent ofapieceofpracticalreasoningisapracticalargu- ment.Practicalargumentscanbecomplex,but theyareoftensummarizedinsyllogisticform. Importantissuesconcerningpracticalreasoning includehowitrelätestotheoreticalreasoning, whetheritisacausalprocess,andhowitcanbe evaluated. Theoriesofpracticalreasoningtendtodivide intotwobasiccategories.Ononesortofview,the intrinsicfeaturesofpracticalreasoningexhibit littleornodifferencefromthoseoftheoretical reasoning.Whatmakespracticalreasoningprac- ticalisitssubjectmatterandmotivation.Hence thefollowingcouldbeabonafidepracticalsyllo- gism: Exercisewouldbegoodforme. Joggingisexercise. Therefore,joggingwouldbegoodforme. Thisargumenthaspracticalsubjectmatter,and ifmadewithaviewtowardintentionformation itwouldbepracticalinmotivationalso.Butit consistsentirelyofpropositions,whichare appropriatecontentsforbelief-states.Inprinci- 728 practicalsyllogism praedicamenta ple,therefore,anagentcouldacceptitsconclu- sionwithoutintendingorevendesiringtojog. Intentionformationrequiresafurtherstep.But ifthecontentofanintentioncannotbeapropo- sition,thatstepcouldnotcountinitselfasprac- ticalreasoningunlesssuchreasoningcanemploy thecontentsofstrictlypracticalmentalstates. Hencemanyphilosopherscallforpracticalsyllo- gismssuchas: WouldthatIexercise. Joggingisexercise. Therefore,Ishallgojogging. Herethefirstpremiseisoptativeandunderstood torepresentthecontentofadesire,andthecon- clusionisthecontentofadecisionoractofinten- tionformation.Thesecontentsarenottrueor false,andsoarenotpropositions. Theoriesthatrestrictthecontentsofpractical reasoningtopropositionshavetheadvantage thattheyallowsuchreasoningtobeevaluatedin termsoffamiliarlogicalprinciples.Thosethat permittheinclusionofoptativecontententaila needformorecomplexmodesofevaluation. However,theybringmoreoftheprocessof intentionformationundertheaegisofreason; also,theycanbeextendedtocovertheexecu- tionofintentions,intermsofsyllogismsthatter- minateinvolition.Bothaccountsmustdealwith casesofself-deception,inwhichtheconsidera- tionsanagentcitestojustifyadecisionarenot thosefromwhichitsprang,andcasesofakrasia, wheretheagentviewsonecourseofactionas superior,yetcarriesoutanother. Becausementalcontentisalwaysabstract,it cannotinitselfbeanomiccauseofbehavior.But thestatesandeventstowhichitbelongs- desires,beliefs,etc.-cancountascauses,and aresotreatedindeterministicexplanationsof action.Opponentsofdeterminismrejectthis step,andseektoexplainactionsolelythrough theteleologicalorjustifyingforcecarriedby mentalcontent. Practicalsyllogismsoftensummarizevery complexthoughtprocesses,inwhichmultiple optionsareconsidered,eachwithitsownposi- tiveandnegativeaspects.Somephilosophers holdthatwhensuccessfullyconcluded,this processissuesinajudgmentofwhataction wouldbebestallthingsconsidered-i.e.,inlight ofallrelevantconsiderations.Practicalreasoning canbeevaluatedinnumerousways.Somecon- cernthereasoningprocessitself:whetheritis timelyanddulyconsiderstherelevantalterna- tives,aswellaswhetheritiswellstructuredlog- ically.Otherconcernshavetodowiththeprod- uctsofpracticalreasoning.Decisionsmaybe deemedirrationaliftheyresultinincompatible intentions,orconflictwiththeagenfsbeliefs regardingwhatispossible.Theymayalsobecrit- icizediftheyconflictwiththeagenfsbestinter- ests.Finally,anagenfsintentionscanfailto accordwithstandardsofmorality.Therelation- shipamongthesewaysofevaluatingintentions isimportanttothefoundationsofethics. Seealsoactiontheory,akrasia,intu- ition,PRACTITION,REASONSFORACTION, VOLITION.H.J.M. practicalsyllogism.Seepracticalreasoning. practicalwisdom.Seearistotle. practition,Castafieda'stermforthecharacteris- ticcontentofpracticalthinking.Eachpractition representsanactionassomethingtobedone, say,asintended,commanded,recommended, etc,andnotasanaccomplishmentorprediction. Thus,unlikepropositions,practitionsarenot truth-valued,buttheycanbecomponentsof validargumentsandsopossessvaluesakinto truth;e.g.,thecommand'James,extinguish yourcigar!'seemslegitimategiventhatJamesis smokingacigarinacrowdedbus.Acknowledg- ingpractitionsisdirectlyrelevanttomanyother fields.Seealsoactiontheory,castaneda, DEONTICLOGIC,FREEWILLPROBLEM,PRACTI- CALREASONING.T.K. praedicabilia.Seepredicables. praedicamenta(singular:praedicamentum),in medievalphilosophy,thetenAristoteliancate- gories:substance,quantity,quality,relation, where,when,position(i.e.,orientation-e.g., "upright"),having,action,andpassivity.These werethetenmostgeneralofallgenera.Allof themexceptsubstancewereregardedasacci- dental.Itwasdisputedwhetherthistenfoldclas- sificationwasintendedasalinguisticdivision amongcategorematictermsorasanontological divisionamongextralinguisticrealities.Some authorsheldthatthedivisionwasprimarilylin- guistic,andthatextralinguisticrealitieswere dividedaccordingtosomebutnotallthe praedicamenta.Mostauthorsheldthateverything inanywayrealbelongedtoonepraedicamentum oranother,althoughsomemadeanexception forGod.Butauthorswhobelievedincomplexesig- nificabileusuallyregardedthemasnotbelonging 729 pragmaticambiguity pragmatism toanypraedicamentum.Seealsoaristotle, COMPLEXESIGNIFICABILE,GENUSGENERALIS- SIMUM.P.V.S. pragmaticambiguity.Seeambiguity. pragmaticcontradiction,acontradictionthatis generatedbypragmaticratherthanlogicalimpli- cation.AlogicallyimpliesBifitisimpossiblefor BtobefalseifAistrue,whereasApragmatically impliesBifinmost(butnotnecessarilyall)con- texts,saying'A'canreasonablybetakenasindi- catingthatBistrue.Thus,ifIsay,"It'sraining/' whatIsaydoesnotlogicallyimplythatIbelieve thatitisraining,sinceitispossibleforittobe rainingwithoutmybelievingitis.Nordoesmy sayingthatitisraininglogicallyimplythatI believethatitis,sinceitispossibleformetosay thiswithoutbelievingit.Butmysayingthisdoes pragmaticallyimplythatIbelievethatitisrain- ing,sincenormallymysayingthiscanreason- ablybetakentoindicatethatIbelieveit. Accordingly,ifIweretosay,"It'srainingbutI don'tbelievethatit'sraining,"theresultwould beapragmaticcontradiction.Thefirstpart("It's raining")doesnotlogicallyimplythenegationof thesecondpart("Idon'tbelievethatit'srain- ing")butmysayingthefirstpartdoespragmati- callyimplythenegationofthesecondpart.See alsoIMPLICATURE,PRESUPPOSITION.R.Fo. pragmaticmaxim.Seepeirce. pragmatics.Seephilosophyoflanguage,speech ACTTHEORY,THEORYOFSIGNS. pragmatictheoryoftruth.Seepragmatism,truth. pragmatism,aphilosophythatstressestherela- tionoftheorytopraxisandtakesthecontinuity ofexperienceandnatureasrevealedthroughthe outcomeofdirectedactionasthestartingpoint forreflection.Experienceistheongoingtransac- tionoforganismandenvironment,i.e.,both subjectandobjectareconstitutedintheprocess. Whenintelligentlyordered,initialconditionsare deliberatelytransformedaccordingtoends-in- view,i.e.,intentionally,intoasubsequentstate ofaffairsthoughttobemoredesirable.Knowl- edgeisthereforeguidedbyinterestsorvalues. Sincetherealityofobjectscannotbeknown priortoexperience,truthclaimscanbejustified onlyasthefulfillmentofconditionsthatare experimentallydetermined,i.e.,theoutcomeof inquiry. Asaphilosophicmovement,pragmatismwas firstformulatedbyPeirceintheearly1870sin theMetaphysicalClubinCambridge,Massachu- setts;itwasannouncedasadistinctiveposition inJames's1898addresstothePhilosophical UnionattheUniversityofCalifomiaatBerkeley, andfurtherelaboratedaccordingtotheChicago School,especiallybyDewey,Mead,andJane Addams(1860-1935).Emphasisonthereci- procityoftheoryandpraxis,knowledgeand action,factsandvalues,followsfromitspost- Darwinianunderstandingofhumanexperience, includingcognition,asadevelopmental,histor- icallycontingent,process.C.I.Lewis'spragmatic aprioriandQuine'srejectionoftheanalytic- syntheticdistinctiondeveloptheseinsightsfur- ther. Knowledgeisinstrumental-atoolfororga- nizingexperiencesatisfactorily.Conceptsare habitsofbelieforrulesofaction.Truthcannotbe determinedsolelybyepistemologicalcriteria becausetheadequacyofthesecriteriacannotbe determinedapartfromthegoalssoughtandval- uesinstantiated.Values,whichariseinhistori- callyspecificculturalsituations,areintelligently appropriatedonlytotheextentthattheysatis- factorilyresolveproblemsandarejudgedworth retaining.Accordingtopragmatictheoriesof truth,truthsarebeliefsthatareconfirmedinthe courseofexperienceandarethereforefallible, subjecttofurtherrevision.TruebeliefsforPeirce representrealobjectsassuccessivelyconfirmed untiltheyconvergeonafinaldetermination;for James,leadingsthatareworthwhile;andaccord- ingtoDewey'stheoryofinquiry,thetransfor- mationofanindeterminatesituationintoa determinateonethatleadstowarrantedasser- tions. Pragmaticethicsisnaturalistic,pluralistic, developmental,andexperimental.Itreflectson themotivationsinfluencingethicalsystems, examinestheindividualdevelopmentalprocess whereinanindividual'svaluesaregraduallydis- tinguishedfromthoseofsociety,situatesmoral judgmentswithinproblematicsituationsirre- duciblyindividualandsocial,andproposesas ultimatecriteriafordecisionmakingthevalue forlifeasgrowth,determinedbyallthose affectedbytheactualorprojectedoutcomes. Theoriginalinterdisciplinarydevelopmentof pragmatismcontinuesinitsinfluenceonthe humanities.OliverWendellHolmes,Jr.,member oftheMetaphysicalClub,låterjusticeoftheU.S. SupremeCourt,developedapragmatictheoryof law.Peirce'sPrincipleofPragmatism,bywhich meaningresidesinconceivablepracticaleffects, andhistriadictheoryofsignsdevelopedintothe 730 pragmatism,ethical Praxisschool fieldofsemiotics.James'sPrinciplesofPsychology (1890)notonlyestablishedexperimentalpsy- chologyinNorthAmerica,butshiftedphilo- sophicalattentionawayfromabstractanalysesof rationalitytothecontinuityofthebiologicaland themental.Thereflexaretheorywasrecon- struetedintoaninteractiveloopofperception, feeling,thinking,andbehavior,andjoinedwith theselectiveinterestofconsciousnesstobecome thebasisofradicalempiricism.Mead'stheoryof theemergenceofselfandmindinsocialactsand Dewey'sanalysesoftheindividualandsociety influencedthehumansciences.Dewey'stheory ofeducationascommunity-oriented,basedon thepsychologicaldevelopmentalstagesof growth,anddirectedtowardfullparticipationin ademocraticsociety,wasthephilosophicalbasis ofprogressiveeducation. Seealsocontextualism,dewey,james, NATURALISM,PEIRCE.C.H.S. pragmatism,ethical.Seemoralepistemology. praxis(fromGreekprasso,'doing','acting'),in Aristotle,thesphereofthoughtandactionthat comprisestheethicalandpoliticallifeofman, contrastedwiththetheoreticaldesignsoflogic andepistemology(theoria).Itwasthusthat 'praxis'acquireditsgeneraldefinitionof'prac- tice'throughacontrastivecomparisonwith'the- ory'. ThroughoutthehistoryofWesternphilosophy theconceptofpraxisfoundaplaceinavariety ofphilosophicalvocabularies.Marxandtheneo- Marxistslinkedtheconceptwithaproduetion paradigmintheinterestsofhistoricalexplana- tion.Withinsuchaschemeofthingstheactivi- tiesconstitutingtherelationsofproduetionand exchangeareseenasthedominantfeaturesof thesocioeconomichistoryofhumankind.Signi- ficationsof'praxis'arealsodiscernibleintheroot meaningofpragma(deed,affair),whichin- formedthedevelopmentofAmericanpragma- tism.Inmorerecenttimesthenotionofpraxis hasplayedaprominentroleintheformationof theschoolofcriticaltheory,inwhichtheperfor- mativesofpraxisareseentobemoredirectly associatedwiththeentwinedphenomenaofdis- course,communication,andsocialpractices. Thecentralphilosophicalissuesaddressedin thecurrentliteratureonpraxishavetodowith thetheory-practicerelationshipandtheprob- lemsassociatedwithavalue-freescience.The generalthrustisthatofunderminingorsubvert- ingthetraditionalbifurcationoftheoryandprac- ticeviaarecognitionofpraxis-orienteden- deavorsthatantedateboththeoryconstruetion andtheconstrualofpracticeasamereapplica- tionoftheory.Boththeprojectof"puretheory," whichmakesclaimsforavalue-neutralstand- point,andthepurelyinstrumentalistunder- standingofpractice,asitselfshornofdis- cernmentandinsight,arejettisoned.Theconse- quentphilosophicaltaskbecomesthatofunder- standinghumanthoughtandactionagainstthe backdropoftheeverydaycommunicativeen- deavors,habits,andskills,andsocialpractices thatmakeupourinheritanceintheworld. Seealsocriticaltheory,marx,marx- ism,c.o.s. Praxisschool,aschoolofphilosophyoriginating inZagrebandBelgradewhich,from1964to 1974,publishedtheinternationaleditionofthe leadingpostwarMarxistjournalPraxis.During thesameperiod,itorganizedtheKorculaSum- merSchool,whichattractedscholarsfrom aroundtheWesternworld.Inareducedformthe schoolcontinueseachspringwiththeSocialPhi- losophyCourseinDubrovnik,Croatia.The foundersofpraxisphilosophyincludeGajo Petrovic(Zagreb),MilanKangrga(Zagreb),and MihailoMarkovic(Belgrade).Anotherwell- knownmemberofthegroupisSvetozarSto- janovic(Belgrade),andasecond-generation leaderisGvozdenFlego(Zagreb). ThePraxisschoolemphasizedthewritingsof theyoungMarxwhilesubjectingdogmatic Marxismtooneofitsstrongestcriticisms.Distin- guishingbetweenMarx'sandEngels'swritings andemphasizingalienationandadynamiccon- ceptofthehumanbeing,itcontributedtoa greaterunderstandingoftheinterrelationship betweentheindividualandsociety.Throughits insistenceonMarx'scallfora"ruthlesscritique," theschoolstressedopeninquiryandfreedomof speechinbothEastandWest. Quitepossiblythemostimportantandoriginal philosopherofthegroup,andcertainlyCroatia's leadingtwentieth-centuryphilosopher,was GajoPetrovic(1927-93).Hecalledfor(1) understandingphilosophyasaradicalcritiqueof allexistingthings,and(2)understandinghuman beingsasbeingsofpraxisandcreativity.This låterledtoaviewofhumanbeingsasrevolu- tionarybynature.Atpresentheisprobablybest rememberedforhisMarxintheMid-TwentiethCen- turyandPhilosophieundRevolution.MilanKan- grga(b.1923)alsoemphasizeshumancreativity whileinsistingthatoneshouldunderstand humanbeingsasproducerswhohumanize nature.Anethicalproblematicofhumanitycan 731 preanalytic preexistence berealizedthroughavarietyofdisciplinesthat includeaesthetics,philosophicalanthropolgy, theoryofknowledge,ontologyandsocial thought.MihailoMarkovic(b.1923),amember oftheBelgradeEight,isbestknownforhisthe- oryofmeaning,whichleadshimtoatheoryof socialisthumanism.Hismostwidelyreadwork intheWestisFromAffluencetoPraxis:Philosophy andSocialCriticism. Seealsomarxism,praxis.J.Bi.&H.P. preanalytic,consideredbutnaive;commonsen- sical;nottaintedbypriorexplicittheorizing;said ofjudgmentsand,derivatively,ofbeliefsorintu- itionsunderlyingsuchjudgments.Preanalytic judgmentsareoftenusedtotestphilosophical theses.Allthingsconsidered,weprefertheories thataccordwithpreanalyticjudgmentstothose thatdonot,althoughmosttheoristsexhibita willingnesstorevisepreanalyticassessmentsin lightofsubsequentinquiry.Thus,apreanalytic judgmentmightbethoughttoconstituteastart- ingpointforthephilosophicalconsiderationofa giventopic.Isjusticegivingeverymanhisdue? Itmayseemso,preanalytically.Attentiontocon- creteexamples,however,mayleadustoadif- ferentview.Itisdoubtful,eveninsuchcases, thatwealtogetherabandonpreanalyticjudg- ments.Rather,weendeavortoreconcileappar- entlycompetingjudgments,makingadjustments inawaythatoptimizesoverallcoherence.See alsoPRETHEORETICAL,REFLECTIVEEQUILIB- RIUM.J.F.H. precisingdefinition.Seedefinition. precognition.Seeparapsychology. preconscious.SeeFREUD. pre-Critical.Seekant. predestination.Seefreewillproblem. predicables,alsopraedicabilia,sometimescalled thequinquevoces(fivewords),inmedievalphi- losophy,genus,species,difference,proprium,and accident,thefivemainwaysgeneralpredicates canbepredicated.ThelistcomesfromPor- phyry'sIsagoge.Itwasdebatedwhetheritapplies tolinguisticpredicatesonlyoralsotoextralin- guisticuniversals. Thingsthathaveaccidentscanexistwithout them;otherpredicablesbelongnecessarilyto whateverhasthem.(TheAristotelian/Porphyr- iannotionof"inseparableaccident"blursthis picture.)Genusandspeciesarenaturalkinds; otherpredicablesarenot.Anaturalkindthatis notanarrowestnaturalkindisagenus;onethat isnotabroadestnaturalkindisaspecies.(Some generaarealsospecies.)Apropriumisnota species,butiscoextensivewithone.Adifference belongsnecessarilytowhateverhasit,butis neitheranaturalkindnorcoextensivewith one. Seealsoaccident,definition,praedica- MENTA,PROPRIUM.P.V.S. predicate.Seegrammar,logicalsubject. predicate,projectible.Seegrueparadox. predicatecalculus.Seeformållogic. predicatehierarchy.Seehierarchy. predicatelogic.Seeformållogic. predication.Seequalities. predication,'is'of.Seeis. predicativeproperty.Seetypetheory. prediction.Seephilosophyofscience. predictionparadox.Seeparadox. preemptivecause.Seecausation. preestablishedharmony.Seeleibniz,philosophy ofmind. preexistence,existenceoftheindividualsoulor psychepriortoitscurrentembodiment,when thesoulorpsycheistakentobeseparableand capableofexistingindependentlyfromits embodiment.Thecurrentembodimentisthen oftendescribedasareincarnationofthesoul. Plato'sSocratesreferstosuchadoctrineseveral timesinthedialogues,notablyinthemythofEr inBookXoftheRepublic.Thedoctrineisdistin- guishedfromtwootherteachingsaboutthesoul: creationism,whichholdsthattheindividual humansoulisdirectlycreatedbyGod,andtra- ducianism,whichheldthatjustasbodybegets bodyinbiologicalgeneration,sothesoulofthe newhumanbeingisbegottenbytheparental soul.InHinduism,thecycleofreincarnations representstheperiodofestrangementandtrial forthesoulorÄtmanbeforeitachievesrelease (moksha).F.J.C. 732 prefaceparadox pre-Socratics prefaceparadox.Seesemanticparadoxes. preference.Seedecisiontheory. preferencelogics.Seedecisiontheory. preferencesatisfactionutilitarianism.Seehare. prehension.Seewhitehead. premise.Seeargument. premise,major.Seesyllogism. premise,minor.Seesyllogism. prenexnormalform.Seenormalform. prescriptivedefinition.Seedefinition. prescriptivemeaning.Seemeaning. prescriptivism,thetheorythatevaluativejudg- mentsnecessarilyhaveprescriptivemeaning. Associatedwithnoncognitivismandmoralanti- realism,prescriptivismholdsthatmorallan- guageissuchthat,ifyousaythatyouthinkone oughttodoacertainkindofact,andyetyouare notcommittedtodoingthatkindofactintherel- evantcircumstances,thenyoueitherspöke insincerelyorareusingtheword'ought'inaless thanfull-bloodedsense.Prescriptivismowesits staturetoHare.Oneofhisinnovationsisthedis- tinctionbetween"secondarilyevaluative"and "primarilyevaluative"words.Theprescriptive meaningofsecondarilyevaluativewords,such as'soft-hearted'or'chaste',mayvarysignifi- cantlywhiletheirdescriptivemeaningsstayrel- ativelyconstant.Harearguesthereverseforthe primarilyevaluativewords'good','bad','right', 'wrong','ought',and'must'.Forexample,some peopleassignto'wrong'thedescriptivemeaning 'forbiddenbyGod',othersassignitthedescrip- tivemeaning'causessocialconflict',andothers giveitdifferentdescriptivemeanings;butsince alluse'wrong'withthesameprescriptivemean- ing,theyareusingthesameconcept. Inparttoshowhowmoraljudgmentscanbe prescriptiveandyethavethesamelogicalrela- tionsasindicativesentences,Haredistinguished betweenphrasticsandneustics.Thephrastic,or content,canbethesameinindicativeandpre- scriptivesentences;e.g.,'Sam'sleaving'isthe phrasticnotonlyoftheindicative'Samwill leave'butalsooftheprescription'Samoughtto leave'.Hare'sLanguageofMorals(1952)specified thattheneusticindicatesmood,i.e.,whetherthe sentenceisindicative,imperative,interrogative, etc.However,inanartideinMind(1989)andin SortingOutEthics(1997),heused'neustic'to refertothesignofsubscription,and'tropic'to refertothesignofmood. Prescriptivityisespeciallyimportantifmoral judgmentsareuniversalizable.Forthenwecan employgoldenrule-stylemoralreasoning. Seealsoemotivism,ethics,hare,uni- VERSALIZABILITY.B.W.H. present-aimtheory.Seeparfit. pre-Socratics,theearlyGreekphilosopherswho werenotinfluencedbySocrates.(Generallythey livedbeforeSocrates,butsomearecontempo- rarywithhimorevenyounger.)Theclassifica- tion(thoughnottheterm)goesbacktoAristotle, whosawSocrates'humanismandemphasison ethicalissuesasawatershedinthehistoryofphi- losophy.Aristotlerightlynotedthatphilosophers priortoSocrateshadstressednaturalphilosophy andcosmologyratherthanethics.Hecredited themwithdiscoveringmaterialprinciplesand movingcausesofnaturalevents,buthecriticized themforfailingtostressstructuralelementsof things(formålcauses)andvaluesorpurposes (finalcauses). Unfortunately,nowritingofanypre-Socratic survivesinmorethanafragmentaryform,and evidenceoftheirviewsisthusoftenindirect, basedonreportsorcriticismsoflåterwriters.In ordertoreconstructpre-Socraticthought,schol- arshavesoughttocollecttestimoniesofancient sourcesandtoidentifyquotationsfromthepre- Socraticsinthosesources.Asmodernresearch hasrevealedflawsintheinterpretationsof ancientwitnesses,ithasbecomeaprincipleof exegesistobasereconstructionsoftheirviewson theactualwordsofthepre-Socraticsthemselves whereverpossible.Becauseofthefragmentary andderivativenatureofourevidence,evenbasic principlesofaphilosopher'ssystemsometimes remaincontroversial;nevertheless,wecansay thatthankstomodernmethodsofhistoriogra- phy,therearemanypointsweunderstandbet- terthanancientwitnesseswhoareoursec- ondarysources. OurbestancientsecondarysourceisAristotle, wholivedsoonafterthepre-Socraticsandhad accesstomostoftheirwritings.Heinterpretshis predecessorsfromthestandpointofhisownthe- ory;butanyhistorianmustinterpretphiloso- phersinlightofsometheoreticalbackground. SincewehaveextensivewritingsofAristotle,we 733 pre-Socratics pre-Socratics understandhissystemandcanfilterouthisown prejudices.HiscolleagueTheophrastuswasthe firstprofessionalhistorianofphilosophy.Adopt- ingAristotle'sgeneralframework,hesystemati- callydiscussedpre-Socratictheories.Unfortun- atelyhisworkitselfislöst,butmanyfragments andsummariesofpartsofitremain.Indeed,vir- tuallyallancientwitnesseswritingafter Theophrastusdependonhimfortheirgeneral understandingoftheearlyphilosophers,some- timesbywayofdigestsofhiswork.Whenbiog- raphybecameanimportantgenreinlåter antiquity,biographerscollectedfacts,anecdotes, slanders,chronologies(oftenbasedoncrudea prioriassumptions),listsofbooktitles,andsuc- cessionsofschooldirectors,whichprovide potentiallyvaluableinformation. Byreconstructingancienttheories,wecan tracethebroadoutlinesofpre-Socraticdevelop- mentwithsomeconfidence.Thefirstphiloso- phersweretheMilesians,philosophersof MiletusontheIoniancoastofAsiaMinor,who inthesixthcenturyb.c.brokeawayfrom mythologicalmodesofexplanationbyaccount- ingforallphenomena,evenapparentprodigies ofnature,bymeansofsimplephysicalhypothe- ses.AristotlesawtheMilesiansasmaterial monists,positingaphysicalsubstrate-ofwater, ortheapeiron,orair;buttheirmaterialsource wasprobablynotacontinuingsubstancethat underliesallchangesasAristotlethought,but ratheranoriginalstuffthatwastransformedinto differentstuffs. PythagorasmigratedfromIoniatosouthern Italy,foundingaschoolofPythagoreanswho believedthatsoulstransmigratedandthatnum- berwasthebasisofallreality.Because Pythagorasandhisearlyfollowersdidnotpub- lishanything,itisdifficulttotracetheirdevelop- mentandinfluenceindetail.BackinIonia, HeraclituscriticizedMilesianprinciplesbecause hesawthatifsubstanceschangedintoone another,theprocessoftransformationwasmore importantthanthesubstancesthatappearedin thecycleofchanges.Hethuschosetheunstable substancefireashismaterialprincipleand stressedtheunityofopposites.Parmenidesand theEleaticSchoolcriticizedthenotionofnot- beingthattheoriesofphysicaltransformations seemedtopresuppose.Onecannotevencon- ceiveofortalkofnot-being;henceanyconcep- tionthatpresupposesnot-beingmustberuled out.Butthebasicnotionsofcoming-to-be,differ- entiation,andindeedchangeingeneralpresup- posenot-being,andthusmustberejected. Eleaticanalysisleadstothefurtherconclusion, implicitinParmenides,explicitinMelissus,that thereisonlyonesubstance,what-is.Sincethis substancedoesnotcomeintobeingorchangein anyway,nordoesithaveanyinternaldifferenti- ations,theworldisjustasinglechangeless, homogeneousindividual. Parmenides'argumentseemstoundermine thefoundationsofnaturalphilosophy.AfterPar- menidesphilosopherswhowishedtocontinue naturalphilosophyfeltcompelledtograntthat coming-to-beandintemaldifferentiationofa givensubstancewereimpossible.Butinorderto accommodatenaturalprocesses,theypositeda pluralityofunchanging,homogeneousele- ments-thefourelementsofEmpedocles,the elementalstuffsofAnaxagoras,theatomsof Democritus-thatbyarrangementandre- arrangementcouldproducethecosmosandthe thingsinit.Thereisnorealcoming-to-beand perishingintheworldsincetheultimatesub- stancesareeverlasting;butsomelimitedkindof changesuchaschemicalcombinationormixture orlocomotioncouldaccountforchangingphe- nomenaintheworldofexperience.Thusthe "pluralists"incorporatedEleaticprinciplesinto theirsystemswhilerejectingthemoreradical implicationsoftheEleaticcritique. Pre-Socraticphilosophersdevelopedmore complexsystemsasaresponsetotheoretical criticisms.Theyfocusedoncosmologyandnat- uralphilosophyingeneral,championingreason andnatureagainstmythologicaltraditions.Yet thepre-Socraticshavebeencriticizedbothfor beingtoonarrowlyscientificininterestandfor notbeingscientific(experimental)enough. Whilethereissomejusticeinbothcriticisms, theirinterestsshowedbreadthaswellasnar- rowness,andtheyatleastmadesignificantcon- ceptualprogressinprovidingaframeworkfor scientificandphilosophicalideas.Whilethey neverdevelopedsophisticatedtheoriesofethics, logic,epistemology,ormetaphysics,norin- ventedexperimentalmethodsofconfirmation, theydidintroducetheconceptsthatultimately becamefundamentalinmoderntheoriesofcos- mic,biological,andculturalevolution,aswellas inatomism,genetics,andsocialcontracttheory. BecausetheSocraticrevolutionturnedphiloso- phyindifferentdirections,thepre-Socraticline diedout.Butthefirstphilosopherssupplied muchinspirationforthesophisticatedfourth- centurysystemsofPlatoandAristotleaswellas thebasicprinciplesofthegreatHellenistic schools,Epicureanism,Stoicism,andSkep- ticism. Seealsoeleaticschool,ionianphilos- 734 presupposition Price,Richard OPHY,MILESIANS,PARMENIDES,PYTHAGO- RAS.D.W.G. presupposition,(1)arelationbetweensentences orstatements,relatedtobutdistinctfromentail- mentandassertion;(2)whataspeakertakesto beunderstoodinmakinganassertion.Thefirst notionissemantic,thesecondpragmatic. ThesemanticnotionwasintroducedbyStraw- soninhisattackonRussell'stheoryofdescrip- tions,andperhapsanticipatedbyFrege. Strawsonarguedthat'ThepresentkingofFrance isbald'doesnotentail'Thereisapresentkingof France'asRusseliheld,butinsteadpresupposes it.Semanticpresuppositioncanbedefinedthus: asentenceorstatementSpresupposesasentence orstatementS'providedSentailsS'andthe negationofSalsoentailsS'.S'isaconditionof thetruthorfalsityofS.Thus,since'Thereisa presentkingofFrance'isfalse,'Thepresentking ofFranceisbald'isarguedtobeneithertruenor false.Soconstrued,presuppositionisdefinedin termsof,butisdistinctfrom,entailment.Itisalso distinctfromassertion,sinceitisviewedasa preconditionofthetruthorfalsityofwhatis asserted. Thepragmaticconceptiondoesnotappealto truthconditions,butinsteadcontrastswhata speakerpresupposesandwhatthatspeaker assertsinmakinganutterance.Thus,someone whoutters'ThepresentkingofFranceisbald' presupposes-believesandbelievesthatthe audiencebelieves-thatthereisapresentkingof France,andassertsthatthiskingisbald.Socon- ceived,presuppositionsarebeliefsthatthe speakertakesforgranted;ifthesebeliefsare false,theutterancewillbeinappropriateinsome way,butitdoesnotfollowthatthesentence utteredlacksatruth-value.Thesetwonotionsof presuppositionarelogicallyindependent.Onthe semanticcharacterization,presuppositionisa relationbetweensentencesorstatementsrequir- ingthattherebetruth-valuegaps.Ontheprag- maticcharacterization,itisspeakersratherthan sentencesorstatementsthathavepresupposi- tions;notruth-valuegapsarerequired.Many philosophersandlinguistshavearguedfortreat- ingwhathavebeentakentobecasesofseman- ticpresupposition,includingtheonediscussed above,aspragmaticphenomena.Somehave deniedthatsemanticpresuppositionsexist.If not,intuitionsaboutpresuppositiondonotsup- porttheclaimsthatnaturallanguageshave truth-valuegapsandthatweneedathree-val- uedlogictorepresentthesemanticsofnatural languageadequately. Presuppositionisalsodistinctfromimplica- ture.Ifsomeonereportsthathehasjusttornhis coatandyousay,"There'satailorshoparound thecomer,"youconversationallyimplicatethat theshopisopen.Thisisnotasemanticpresup- positionbecauseifitisfalsethattheshopisopen, thereisnoinclinationtosaythatyourassertion wasneithertruenorfalse.Itisnotapragmatic presuppositionbecauseitisnotsomethingyou believethehearerbelieves. Seealsoimplication,implicature, MANY-VALUEDLOGIC.R.B. pretheoretical,independentoftheory.Morespe- cifically,apropositionispretheoretical,according tosomephilosophers,ifandonlyifitdoesnot dependforitsplausibilityorimplausibilityon theoreticalconsiderationsorconsiderationsof theoreticalanalysis.Theterm'preanalytic'is oftenusedsynonymouslywith'pretheoretical', buttheformerismoreproperlypairedwith analysisratherthanwiththeory.Somephiloso- pherscharacterizepretheoreticalpropositionsas "intuitively"plausibleorimplausible.Such propositions,theyhold,canregulatephilosophi- caltheorizingasfollows:ingeneral,anadequate philosophicaltheoryshouldnotconflictwith intuitivelyplausiblepropositions(byimplying intuitivelyimplausiblepropositions),andshould implyintuitivelyplausiblepropositions.Some philosophersgrantthattheoreticalconsidera- tionscanoverride"intuitions"-inthesenseof intuitivelyplausiblepropositions-whenoverall theoreticalcoherence(orreflectiveequilibrium) istherebyenhanced.Seealsoanalyticphi- LOSOPHY,INTUITION,METAPHILOSOPHY, ORDINARYLANGUAGEPHILOSOPHY,PREANA- LYTIC,REFLECTIVEEQUILIBRIUM.P.K.M. Price,Richard(1723-91),WelshDissenting minister,actuary,andmoralphilosopher.His mainwork,AReviewofthePrincipalQuestionin Morals(1758),isadefenseofrationalismin ethics.Hearguedthattheunderstandingimme- diatelyperceivessimple,objective,moralquali- tiesofactions.Theresultingintuitiveknowledge ofmoraltruthsisaccompaniedbyfeelingsof approvalanddisapprovalresponsibleformoral motivation.Healsowroteinfluentialpaperson lifeexpectancy,publicfinance,andannuities; communicatedtotheRoyalSocietythepaperby hisdeceasedfriendThomasBayescontaining Bayes'stheorem;anddefendedtheAmerican andFrenchrevolutions.Burke'sReflectionsonthe RevolutioninFranceisaresponsetooneofPrice's sermons.J.W.A. 735 Prichard,H(arold)A(rthur) primemover Prichard,H(arold)A(rthur)(1871-1947),Eng- lishphilosopherandfounderoftheOxford schoolofintuitionism.AnOxfordfellowand professor,hepublishedKantsTheoryojKnowledge (1909)andnumerousessays,collectedinMoral Obligation(1949,1968)andinKnowledgeandPer- ception(1950).Prichardwasarealistinhisthe- oryofknowledge,followingCookWilson.He heldthatthroughdirectperceptioninconcrete casesweobtainknowledgeofuniversalsandof necessaryconnectionsbetweenthem,andhe elaboratedatheoryaboutourknowledgeof materialobjects.In"DoesMoralPhilosophyRest onaMistake?"(1912)hearguedpowerfullythat itiswrongtothinkthatageneraltheoryofobli- gationispossible.Nosingleprinciplecaptures thevariousreasonswhyobligatoryactsareoblig- atory.Onlybydirectperceptioninparticular casescanweseewhatweoughttodo.Withthis essayPrichardfoundedtheOxfordschoolof intuitionism,carriedonby,amongothers,Ross. Seealsoethics,ross.J.B.S. Priestley,Joseph(1733-1804),Britishexperi- mentalchemist,theologian,andphilosopher.In 1774hepreparedoxygenbyheatingmercuric oxide.Althoughhecontinuedtofavörthephlo- gistonhypothesis,hisworkdidmuchtodiscredit thatidea.Hediscoveredmanygases,including ammonia,sulfurdioxide,carbonmonoxide,and hydrochloricacid.Whilestudyingthelayerof carbondioxideöverabrewingvat,heconceived theideaofdissolvingitunderpressure.The resulting"sodawater"wasfamousthroughout Europé. HisEssayonGovernment(1768)influenced Jefferson'sideasintheAmericanDeclarationof Independence.Theessayalsocontributedtothe utilitarianismofBentham,supplyingthephrase "thegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber." PriestleymodifiedtheassociationismofLocke, Hume,andHartley,holdingthatasharpdistinc- tionmustbedrawnbetweentheresultsofassoci- ationinformingnaturalpropensitiesandits effectsonthedevelopmentofmoralideas.Onthe basisofthisdistinction,heargued,againstHume, thatdifferencesinindividualmoralsentiments areresultsofeducation,throughtheassociation ofideas,aviewanticipatedbyHelvétius.Priestley servedasministertoanti-Establishmentcongre- gations.Hisunpopularstressonindividualfree- domresultedinhismovetoPennsylvania,where hespenthislastyears.R.E.B. primafacieduty.Seeduty,ross. primafacieevidence.Seeevidence. primafaciejustification.Seejustification. primafacieright.Seerights. primarilyvaluativeword.Seeprescriptivism. primaryprocess.SeeFREUD. primaryqualities.Seequalities. primaryrule.Seehart. primarysubstance.Seearistotle. primematter.Seehylomorphism. primemover,theoriginalsourceandcauseof motion(change)intheuniverse-anideathat wasdevelopedbyAristotleandbecameimpor- tantinJudaic,Christian,andIslamicthought aboutGod.AccordingtoAristotle,something thatisinmotion(aprocessofchange)ismoving fromastateofpotentialitytoastateofactuality. Forexample,waterthatisbeingheatedispoten- tiallyhotandintheprocessofbecomingactually hot.Ifacauseofchangemustitselfactuallybein thestatethatitisbringingabout,thennothing canproducemotioninitself;whateverisin motionisbeingmovedbyanother.Forotherwise somethingwouldbebothpotentiallyandactu- allyinthesamestate.Thus,thewaterthatis potentiallyhotcanbecomehotonlybybeing changedbysomethingelse(thefire)thatisactu- allyhot.Theprimemover,theoriginalcauseof motion,mustitself,therefore,notbeinmotion; itisanunmovedmover. AquinasandothertheologiansviewedGodas theprimemover,theultimatecauseofall motion.Indeed,forthesetheologianstheargu- menttoestablishtheexistenceofafirstmover, itselfunmoved,wasaprincipalargumentusedin theireffortstoprovetheexistenceofGodonthe basisofreason.Manymodernthinkersquestion theargumentforafirstmoveronthegroundthat itdoesnotseemtobelogicallyimpossiblethat themotionofonethingbecausedbyasecond thingwhosemotionintumiscausedbyathird thing,andsoonwithoutend.Defendersofthe argumentclaimthatitpresupposesadistinction betweentwodifferentcausalseries,onetempo- ralandonesimultaneous,andarguethatthe objectionsucceedsonlyagainstatemporal causalseries. 736 primitivesymbol principleofdoubleeffect Seealsoagentcausation,aquinas, ARISTOTLE.W.L.R. primitivesymbol.Seelogisticsystem. principiumindividuationis,thecause(orbasis)of individualityinindividuals;whatmakessome- thingindividualasopposedtouniversal,e.g., whatmakesthecatMininaindividualandthus differentfromtheuniversal,cat.Questions regardingtheprincipleofindividuationwere firstraisedexplicitlyintheearlyMiddleAges. Classicalauthorslargelyignoredindividuation; theirontologicalfocuswasontheproblemof universals.Thekeytextsthatoriginatedthedis- cussionoftheprincipleofindividuationare foundinBoethius.BetweenBoethiusandf150, individuationwasalwaysdiscussedinthecon- textofmorepressingissues,particularlythe problemofuniversals.After1150,individuation slowlyemergedasafocusofattention,sothatby theendofthethirteenthcenturyithadbecome anindependentsubjectofdiscussion,especially inAquinasandDunsScotus. Mostearlymodernphilosophersconceived theproblemofindividuationepistemically ratherthanmetaphysically;theyfocusedonthe discernibilityofindividualsratherthanthecause ofindividuation(Descartes).Withfewexcep- tions(KarlPopper),thetwentiethcenturyhas followedthisepistemicapproach(P.F.Straw- son). Seealsoindividuation,metaphysics. J.J.E.G. principleofbivalence,theprinciplethatany(sig- nificant)statementiseithertrueorfalse.Itis oftenconfusedwiththeprincipleofexcluded middle.Letting'Tp'ståndfor'pistrue'and"T~ p'for'pisfalse'andotherwiseusingstandard logicalnotation,bivalenceis'TpVT~p'and excludedmiddleis'T(pV~p)'.Thattheyaredif- ferentprinciplesisshownbythefactthatin probabilitytheory,where'Tp'canbeexpressed asTr(p)=1',bivalence'(Pr(p)=1)V(Pr(~p) =1)'isnottrueforallvaluesofp-e.g.itisnot truewhere'p'ståndsfor'givenafairtossofafair die,theresultwillbeasix'(astatementwitha probabilityof'As,where~phasaprobabilityof 5As)-butexcludedmiddle'Pr(pV~p)=1'istrue foralldefinitevaluesofp,includingtheproba- bilitycasejustgiven.Ifweallowthatsome(sig- nificant)statementshavenotruth-valueor probabilityanddistinguishexternalnegation 'Tp'frominternalnegation'T~p',wecandistin- guishbivalenceandexcludedmiddlefromthe principleofnon-contradiction,namely,'~(Tp• T~p)',whichisequivalentto'~TpV~T~p'. Standardtruth-functionallogicseesnodiffer- encebetween'p'and'Tp',or'~Tp'and'T~p', andthusisunabletodistinguishthethreeprin- ciples.Somephilosophersoflogicdenythereis suchadifference.Seealsomany-valued LOGIC,PHILOSOPHYOFLOGIC,VAGUENESS. R.P. principleofcharity.Seemeaning. principleofcomprehension.Seesettheory. principleofconcretion.Seewhitehead. principleofconservation.Seephilosophyofsci- ENCE. principleofcontradiction,alsocalledprincipleof non-contradiction,theprinciplethatastatement anditsnegationcannotbothbetrue.Itcanbe distinguishedfromtheprincipleofbivalence, andgivencertaincontroversialassumptions, fromtheprincipleofexcludedmiddle;butin truth-functionallogicallthreeareregardedas equivalent.Outsideofformållogictheprinciple of(non-)contradictionisbestexpressedasAris- totleexpressesit:"Nothingcanbothbeandnot beatthesametimeinthesamerespect."See alsoLAWSOFTHOUGHT,PRINCIPLEOFBIVA- LENCE.R.P. principleofdeterminism.Seemill'smethods. principleofdominance.Seene WCOMBSPARADOX. principleofdoubleeffect,theviewthatthereis amorallyrelevantdifferencebetweenthosecon- sequencesofouractionsweintendandthosewe donotintendbutdostillforesee.Accordingto theprinciple,ifincreasedliteracymeansahigher suicideråte,thosewhoworkforeducationare notguiltyofdrivingpeopletokillthemselves.A physicianmaygiveapatientpainkillersforesee- ingthattheywillshortenhislife,eventhough theuseofoutrightpoisonsisforbiddenandthe physiciandoesnotintendtoshortenthepatienfs life.Anarmyattackingalegitimatemilitarytar- getmayacceptasinevitable,withoutintending tobringabout,thedeathsofanumberofcivil- ians. Traditionalmoraltheologiansaffirmedthe existenceofexceptionlessprohibitionssuchas 737 principleofexcludedmiddle principleofinsufficientreason thatagainsttakinganinnocenthumanlife, whileusingtheprincipleofdoubleeffectto resolvehärdcasesandavoidmoralblindalleys. Theyheldthatonemayproduceaforbidden effect,provided(1)one'sactionalsohadagood effect,(2)onedidnotseekthebadeffectasan endorasameans,(3)onedidnotproducethe goodeffectthroughthebadeffect,and(4)the goodeffectwasimportantenoughtooutweigh thebadone. SomecontemporaryphilosophersandRoman Catholictheologiansholdthatamodifiedversion oftheprincipleofdoubleeffectisthesolejusti- ficationofdeadlydeeds,evenwhentheperson killedisnotinnocent.Theydröpanyrestriction onthecausalsequence,sothat(e.g.)itislegiti- matetocutofftheheadofanunbornchildto savethemother'slife.Buttheyopposecapital punishmentonthegroundthatthosewhoinflict itrequirethedeathoftheconvictaspartoftheir plan.Theyalsoplaydownthefourthrequire- ment,onthegroundthattheweighingofincom- mensurablegoodsitrequiresisimpossible. Consequentialistsdenytheprincipleofdouble effect,asdothoseforwhomthecrucialdistinc- tionisbetweenwhatwecausebyouractionsand whatjusthappens.Inthemostplausibleview, theprincipledoesnotpresupposeexceptionless moralprohibitions,onlysomethingstronger thanprimafacieduties.Itiseasiertojustifyan obliqueevasionofamoralrequirementthana directviolation,evenifdirectviolationsare sometimespermissible.Sounderstood,theprin- cipleisaguidetoprudenceratherthanasubsti- tuteforit. Seealsoethics,euthanasia,intention, JUSTWARTHEORY.P.E.D. principleofexcludedmiddle,theprinciplethat thedisjunctionofany(significant)statement withitsnegationisalwaystrue;e.g.,'Either thereisatreeöver500feettalloritisnotthe casethatthereissuchatree'.Theprincipleis oftenconfusedwiththeprincipleofbivalence. Seealsoprincipleofbivalence.R.P. principleofgenericconsistency.Seeuniversaliz- ABILITY. principleofindifference,aruleforassigninga probabilitytoaneventbasedon"parityofrea- sons."Accordingtotheprinciple,whenthe "weightofreasons"favoringoneeventisequal tothe"weightofreasons"favoringanother,the twoeventsshouldbeassignedthesameproba- bility.Whentherearenmutuallyexclusiveand collectivelyexhaustiveevents,andthereisno reasontofavöroneöveranother,thenwe shouldbe"indifferent"andtheneventsshould eachbeassignedprobabilitylin(theeventsare equiprobable),accordingtotheprinciple.This principleisusuallyassociatedwiththenames Bernoulli(ArsConjectandi,1713)andLaplace (Théorieanalytiquedesprobabilités,1812),andwas socalledbyJ.M.Keynes(ATreatiseonProbabil- ity,1921).Theprinciplegivesprobabilitybotha subjective("degreeofbelief")andalogical("par- tiallogicalentailment")interpretation.One rationalefortheprinciplesaysthatinignorance, whennoreasonsfavöroneeventöveranother, weshouldassignequalprobabilities.Ithasbeen counteredthatanyassignmentofprobabilitiesat allisaclaimtosomeknowledge.Also,several seeminglynaturalapplicationsoftheprinciple, involvingnon-linearlyrelatedvariables,have ledtosomemathematicalcontradictions,known asBertrand'sparadox,andpointedoutby Keynes.Seealsobertrand'sparadox, EQUIPROBABLE,KEYNES,LAPLACE,PROBA- BILITY.E.Ee. principleofinsufficientreason,theprinciplethat ifthereisnosufficientreason(orexplanation) forsomething'sbeing(thecase),thenitwillnot be(thecase).Sincetheriseofmodernprobabil- itytheory,manyhaveidentifiedtheprincipleof insufficientreasonwiththeprincipleofindiffer- ence(aruleforassigningaprobabilitytoan eventbasedon"parityofreasons").Thetwo principlesarecloselyrelated,butitisilluminat- inghistoricallyandlogicallytoviewtheprinci- pleofinsufficientreasonasthegeneralprinciple statedabove(whichisrelatedtotheprinciple ofsufficientreason)andtoviewtheprincipleof indifferenceasaspecialcaseoftheprincipleof insufficientreasonapplyingtoprobabilities.As Machnoted,theprincipleofinsufficientreason, thusconceived,wasusedbyArchimedesto arguethataleverwithequalweightsatequal distancesfromacentralfulcrumwouldnot move,sinceifthereisnosufficientreasonwhyit shouldmoveonewayortheother,itwouldnot moveonewayortheother.Philosophersfrom AnaximandertoLeibnizusedthesameprinciple toargueforvariousmetaphysicaltheses. Theprincipleofindifferencecanbeseentobe aspecialcaseofthisprincipleofinsufficientrea- sonapplyingtoprobabilities,ifonereadsthe principleofindifferenceasfollows:whenthere areNmutuallyexclusiveandexhaustiveevents andthereisnosufficientreasontobelievethat anyoneofthemismoreprobablethananyother, 738 principleoflimitedvariety principleofverifiability thennooneofthemismoreprobablethanany other(theyareequiprobable).Theideaof"par- ityofreasons"associatedwiththeprincipfeof indifferenceis,insuchmanner,reiatedtothe ideathatthereisnosufficientreasonforfavor- ingoneoutcomeöveranother.Thisissignificant becausetheprincipleofinsufficientreasonislog- icallyequivalenttothemorefamiliarprincipleof sufficientreason(ifsomethingis[thecase],then thereisasufficientreasonforitsbeing[the case])-whichmeansthattheprincipleofindif- ferenceisalogicalconsequenceoftheprinciple ofsufficientreason.Ifthisisso,wecanunder- standwhysomanywereinclinedtobelievethe principleofindifferencewasanaprioritruth aboutprobabilities,sinceitwasanapplicationto probabilitiesofthatmostfundamentalofall allegedaprioriprinciplesofreasoning,theprin- cipleofsufficientreason.Norshoulditsurprise usthattheallegedaprioritruthoftheprinciple ofindifferencewasascontroversialinprobabil- itytheoryaswastheallegedaprioritruthofthe principleofsufficientreasoninphilosophygen- erally. Seealsoprinciplesofindifference, PROBABILITY.R.H.K. principleoflimitedvariety.Seemill'smethods. principleoflogicalform.Seelogicalform. principleofmaximizingexpectedutility.Seenew- comb'sparadox. principleofnon-contradiction.Seeprincipleof CONTRADICTION. principleofparsimony.Seeockham'srazor. principleofperfection.Seeleibniz. principleofplenitude,theprinciplethatevery genuinepossibilityisrealizedoractualized.This principleofthe"fullnessofbeing"wasnamedby A.O.Lovejoy,whoshowedthatitwascom- monlyassumedthroughoutthehistoryofWest- ernscienceandphilosophy,fromPlatoto Plotinus(whoassociateditwithinexhaustible divineproductivity),throughAugustineand othermedievalphilosophers,tothemodern rationalists(SpinozaandLeibniz)andthe Enlightenment.Lovejoyconnectedplenitudeto thegreatchainofbeing,theideathattheuni- verseisahierarchyofbeingsinwhicheverypos- sibleformisactualized.Intheeighteenth century,theprinciplewas"temporalized":every possibleformofcreaturewouldberealized-not necessarilyatalltimes-butatsomestage"inthe fullnessoftime."Aclueaboutthesignificanceof plenitudeliesinitsconnectiontotheprincipleof sufficientreason(everythinghasasufficientrea- son[causeorexplanation]forbeingornot being).Plenitudesaysthatifthereisnosufficient reasonforsomething'snotbeing(i.e.,ifitisgen- uinelypossible),thenitexists-whichislogically equivalenttothenegativeversionofsufficient reason:ifsomethingdoesnotexist,thenthereis asufficientreasonforitsnotbeing.R.H.K. principleofproportionality.Seecajetan. principleofself-determination.Seeself-determi- NATION. principleofsubsidiarity.Seesubsidiarity. principleofsufficientreason.Seeleibniz,principle ofinsufficientreason. principleoftheanomalismofthemental.Seephi- losophyOFMLND. principleoftheconservationofmatter.Seephi- losophyOFSCIENCE. principleofuncertainty.Seephilosophyofsci- ence,QUANTUMMECHANICS. principleofuniversality.Seeuniversalizability. principleofuniversalizability.Seeuniversaliz- ability. principleofunlimitedcomprehension.Seeset THEORY. principleofutility.Seeutilitarianism. principleofverifiability,aclaimaboutwhat meaningfulnessis:atitssimplest,asentenceis meaningfulprovidedthereisamethodforveri- fyingit.Therefore,ifasentencehasnosuch method,i.e.,ifitdoesnothaveassociatedwithit awayoftellingwhetheritisconclusivelytrueor conclusivelyfalse,thenitismeaningless.The purposeforwhichthisverificationistprinciple wasoriginallyintroducedwastodemarcatesen- tencesthatare"apttomakeasignificantstate- mentoffact"from"nonsensical"or"pseudo-" sentences.Itispartoftheemotivetheoryofcon- tent,e.g.,thatmoraldiscourseisnot(literally, cognitively)meaningful,andtherefore,notfac- 739 priority,conceptual prisoner'sdilemma tual.And,withtheverifiabilityprinciple,the centralEuropeanlogicalpositivistsofthe1920s hopedtostrip"metaphysicaldiscourse"ofits pretensionsoffactuality.Forthem,whether thereisarealityexternaltothemind,asthereal- istsclaim,orwhetherallrealityismadeupof "ideas"or"appearances,"asidealistsclaim,isa "meaninglesspseudo-problem." Theverifiabilityprincipleprovedimpossibleto frameinaformthatdidnotadmitallmetaphys- icalsentencesasmeaningful.(Further,itcasts doubtonitsownstatus.Howwasittobeveri- fied?)So,e.g.,inthefirsteditionofLanguage, TruthandLogic,Ayerproposedthatasentenceis verifiable,andconsequentlymeaningful,ifsome observationsentencecanbededucedfromitin conjunctionwithcertainotherpremises,with- outbeingdeduciblefromthoseotherpremises alone.Itfollowsthatanymetaphysicalsentence Mismeaningfulsince'ifM,thenO'alwaysisan appropriatepremise,whereisanobservation sentence.Intheprefacetothesecondedition, Ayerofferedamoresophisticatedaccount:Mis directlyverifiableprovideditisanobservation sentenceoritentails,inconjunctionwithcertain observationsentences,someobservationsen- tencethatdoesnotfollowfromthemalone.And Misindirectlyverifiableprovideditentails,in conjunctionwithcertainotherpremises,some directlyverifiablesentencethatdoesnotfollow fromthoseotherpremisesaloneandtheseaddi- tionalpremisesareeitheranalyticordirectlyver- ifiable(orareindependentlyindirectlyver- ifiable).Thenewverifiabilityprincipleisthen thatallandonlysentencesdirectlyorindirectly verifiableare"literallymeaningful."Unfortu- nately,Ayer'semendationadmitseverynon- analyticsentence.LetMbeanymetaphysical sentenceandland2anypairofobservation sentenceslogicallyindependentofeachother. ConsidersentenceA:'eitheror(not-Mand not-02)'.Conjoinedwith2,AentailsOl.But2 alonedoesnotentailOrSoAisdirectlyverifi- able.Therefore,sinceMconjoinedwithAentails Oj,whichisnotentailedbyAalone,Misindi- rectlyverifiable.Variousrepairshavebeen attempted;nonehassucceeded. Seealsologicalpositivism,meaning, VERIFICATIONISM,VIENNACIRCLE.E.L. priority,conceptual.Seedependence. priorprobability.Seebayes'stheorem. priscatheologica.Seeficino. prisoner'sdilemma,aproblemingametheory, andmorebroadlythetheoryofrationalchoice, thattakesitsnamefromafamiliarsortofplea- bargainingsituation:Twoprisoners(Robinand Carol)areinterrogatedseparatelyandoffered thesamedeal:Ifoneofthemconfesses("de- fects")andtheotherdoesnot,thedefectorwill begivenimmunityfromprosecutionandthe otherwillgetastiffprisonsentence.Ifbothcon- fess,bothwillgetmoderateprisonterms.Ifboth remainsilent(cooperatewitheachother),both willgetlightprisontermsforalesseroffense. Therearethusfourpossibleoutcomes: (1)Robinconfessesandgetsimmunity,while Carolissilentandgetsastiffsentence. (2)Botharesilentandgetlightsentences. (3)Bothconfessandgetmoderatesentences. (4)Robinissilentandgetsastiffsentence, whileCarolconfessesandgetsimmunity. AssumethatforRobin,(1)wouldbethebest outcome,followedby(2),(3),and(4),inthat order.AssumethatforCarol,thebestoutcomeis (4),followedby(2),(3),and(1).Eachprisoner thenreasonsasfollows:"Myconfederatewill eitherconfessorremainsilent.Ifsheconfesses, Imustdolikewise,inordertoavoidthe'sucker's payoff'(immunityforher,astiffsentencefor me).Ifsheremainssilent,thenImustconfessin ordertogetimmunity-thebestoutcomeforme. Thus,nomatterwhatmyconfederatedoes,I mustconfess."Underthoseconditions,bothwill confess,effectivelypreventingeachotherfrom achievinganythingbetterthantheoptionthey bothrankasonlythird-best,eventhoughthey agreethatoption(2)issecond-best. Thisillustrativestory(attributedtoA.W. Tucker)mustnotbeallowedtoobscurethefact thatmanysortsofsocialinteractionshavethe samestructure.Ingeneral,wheneveranytwo partiesmustmakesimultaneousorindependent choicesöverarangeofoptionsthathastheordi- nalpayoffstructuredescribedinthepleabar- gainingstory,theyareinaprisoner'sdilemma. Diplomats,negotiators,buyers,andsellersregu- larlyfindthemselvesinsuchsituations.Theyare callediteratedprisoner'sdilemmasifthesame partiesrepeatedlyfacethesamechoiceswith eachother. Moreover,thereareanalogousproblemsof cooperationandconflictatthelevelofmany- personinteractions:so-calledw-personpris- onersdiemmasorfreeriderproblems.The provisionofpublicgoodsprovidesanexample. Supposethereisapublicgood,suchascleanair, 740 privacy,epistemic privation nationaldefense,orpublicradio,whichweall want.Supposethatiscanbeprovidedonlyby collectiveaction,atsomecosttoeachofthecon- tributors,butthatwedonothavetohaveacon- tributionfromeveryoneinordertogetit. Assumethatweallpreferhavingthegoodtonot havingit,andthatthebestoutcomeforeachof uswouldbetohaveitwithoutcosttoourselves. Soeachofusreasonsasfollows:"Otherpeople willeithercontributeenoughtoproducethe goodbythemselves,ortheywillnot.Iftheydo, thenIcanhaveitcost-free(thebestoptionfor me)andthusIshouldnotcontribute.Butifoth- ersdonotcontributeenoughtoproducethe goodbythemselves,andiftheprobabilityisvery lowthatmycostlycontributionwouldmakethe differencebetweensuccessandfailure,once againIshouldnotcontribute."Obviously,ifwe allreasoninthisway,wewillnotgetthepublic goodwewant.Suchproblemsofcollective actionhavebeennoticedbyphilosopherssince Plato.Theircurrentnomenclature,rigorous game-theoreticformulation,empiricalstudy, andsystematicphilosophicaldevelopment, however,hasoccurredsince1950. Seealsogametheory,socialchoice THEORY.L.C.B. privacy,epistemic.Seeepistemicprivacy. privatelanguageargument,anargumentde- signedtoshowthattherecannotbealanguage thatonlyonepersoncanspeak-alanguagethat isessentiallyprivate,thatnooneelsecaninprin- cipleunderstand.Inadditiontoitsintrinsicinter- est,theprivatelanguageargumentisrelevantto discussionsoflinguisticrulesandlinguistic meaning,behaviorism,solipsism,andphenome- nalism.Theargumentiscloselyassociatedwith Wittgenstein'sPhilosophicalInvestigations(1958). Theexactstructureoftheargumentiscontro- versial;thisaccountshouldberegardedasa standardone,butnotbeyonddispute. Theargumentbeginswiththesuppositionthat apersonassignssignstosensations,wherethese aretakentobeprivatetothepersonwhohas them,andattemptstoshowthatthissupposition cannotbesustainedbecausenostandardsforthe correctorincorrectapplicationofthesamesign toarecurrenceofthesamesensationarepossi- ble.ThusWittgensteinsupposesthatheunder- takestokeepadiaryabouttherecurrenceofa certainsensation;heassociatesitwiththesign 'S',andmarks'S'onacalendareverydayhehas thatsensation.Wittgensteinfindsthenatureof theassociationofthesignandsensationobscure, onthegroundthat'S'cannotbegivenanordi- narydefinition(thiswouldmakeitsmeaning publiclyaccessible)orevenanostensivedefini- tion.Hefurtherarguesthatthereisnodifference betweencorrectandincorrectentriesof'S'on subsequentdays.Theinitialsensationwith whichthesign'S'wasassociatedisnolonger present,andsoitcannotbecomparedwitha subsequentsensationtakentobeofthesame kind.Hecouldatbestclaimtorememberthe natureoftheinitialsensation,andjudgethatit isofthesamekindastoday's.Butsincethemem- orycannotconfirmitsownaccuracy,thereisno possibletestofwhetherherememberstheinitial associationofsignandsensationrighttoday. Consequentlythereisnocriterionforthecorrect reapplicationofthesign'S'.Thuswecannot makesenseofthenotionofcorrectlyreapplying 'S',andcannotmakesenseofthenotionofapri- vatelanguage. Theargumentdescribedappearstoquestion onlytheclaimthatonecouldhavetermsforpri- vatementaloccurrences,andmaynotseemto impugnabroadernotionofaprivatelanguage whoseexpressionsarenotrestrictedtosignsfor sensations.AdvocatesofWittgenstein'sargu- mentwouldgeneralizeitandclaimthatthefocus onsensationssimplyhighlightstheabsenceofa distinctionbetweencorrectandincorrectreap- plicationsofwords.Alanguagewithtermsfor publiclyaccessibleobjectswould,ifprivatetoits user,stillbeclaimedtolackcriteriaforthecorrect reapplicationofsuchterms.Thisbroadernotion ofaprivatelanguagewouldthusbearguedtobe equallyincoherent. Seealsophilosophyoflanguage,prob- lemOFOTHERMINDS,WITTGENSTEIN.R.B. privation,alackofsomethingthatitisnaturalor goodtopossess.Thetermiscloselyassociated withtheideathatevilisitselfonlyalackofgood, privatiobord.Intraditionaltheisticreligions everythingotherthanGodiscreatedbyGodout ofnothing,creationexnihilo.Since,beingper- fect,Godwouldcreateonlywhatisgood,the entireoriginalcreationandeverycreaturefrom themostcomplextothesimplestarecreated entirelygood.Theoriginalcreationcontainsno evilwhatever.Whatthenisevilandhowdoesit entertheworld?Theideathatevilisaprivation ofgooddoesnotmean,e.g.,thatarockhassome degreeofevilbecauseitlackssuchgoodqualities asconsciousnessandcourage.Athinghassome degreeofevilonlyifitlackssomegoodthatis 741 privilegedaccess privilegedaccess properforthatthingtopossess.Intheoriginal creationeachcreatedthingpossessedthegoods propertothesortofthingitwas.Accordingto Augustine,evilenterstheworldwhencreatures withfreewillabandonthegoodabovethem- selvesforsomelower,inferiorgood.Human bemgs,e.g.,becomeeviltotheextentthatthey freelyturnfromthehighestgood(God)totheir ownprivategoods,becomingproud,selfish,and wicked,thusdeservingthefurtherevilsofpain andpunishment.Oneoftheproblemsforthis explanationoftheoriginofevilistoaccountfor whyanentirelygoodcreaturewoulduseitsfree- domtoturnfromthehighestgoodtoalesser good.Seealsophilosophyofreligion. W.L.R. privilegedaccess,specialfirst-personawareness ofthecontentsofone'sownmind.Since Descartes,manyphilosophershaveheldthat personsareawareoftheoccurrentstatesoftheir ownmindsinawaydistinctfromboththeir modeofawarenessofphysicalobjectsand theirmodeofawarenessofthementalstatesof others. Cartesiansviewsuchapprehensionasprivi- legedinseveralways.First,itisheldtobeimme- diate,bothcausallyandepistemically.While knowledgeofphysicalobjectsandtheirproper- tiesisacquiredviaspatiallyintermediatecauses, knowledgeofone'sownmentalstatesinvolves nosuchcausalchains.Andwhilebeliefsabout physicalpropertiesarejustifiedbyappealtoways objectsappearinsenseexperience,beliefsabout thepropertiesofone'sownmentalstatesarenot justifiedbyappealtopropertiesofadifferentsort. IjustifymybeliefthatthepaperonwhichIwrite iswhitebypointingoutthatitappearswhitein apparentlynormallight.Bycontrast,mybelief thatwhiteappearsinmyvisualexperience seemstobeself-justifying. Second,Cartesiansholdthatfirst-personap- prehensionofoccurrentmentalcontentsisepis- temicallyprivilegedinbeingabsolutelycertain. Absolutecertaintyincludesinfallibility,incorri- gibility,andindubitability.Thatajudgmentis infalliblemeansthatitcannotbemistaken;its beingbelievedentailsitsbeingtrue(eventhough judgmentsregardingoccurrentmentalcontents arenotnecessarytruths).Thatitisincorrigible meansthatitcannotbeoverriddenorcorrected byothersorbythesubjecthimselfatalåtertime. Thatitisindubitablemeansthatasubjectcan neverhavegroundsfordoubtingit.Philosophers sometimesclaimalsothatasubjectisomniscient withregardtoherownoccurrentmentalstates: ifapropertyappearswithinherexperience,then sheknowsthis. Subjects'privilegedaccesstotheimmediate contentsoftheirownmindscanbeheldtobe necessaryorcontingent.Regardingcorrigibility, forexample,proponentsofthestrongerview holdthatfirst-personreportsofoccurrentmen- talstatescouldneverbeoverriddenbyconflict- ingevidence,suchasconflictingreadingsofbrain statespresumedtobecorrelatedwiththemen- talstatesinquestion.Theypointoutthatknowl- edgeofsuchcorrelationswoulditselfdependon first-personreportsofmentalstates.Ifareading ofmybrainindicatesthatIaminpain,andIsin- cerelyclaimnottobe,thenthelawlinkingbrain statesofthattypewithpainsmustbemistaken. Proponentsoftheweakerviewholdthat,while personsarecurrentlythebestauthoritiesasto theoccurrentcontentsoftheirownminds,evi- dencesuchasconflictingreadingsofbrainstates couldeventuallyoverridesuchauthority,despite thedependenceoftheevidenceonearlierfirst- personreports. Weakerviewsonprivilegedaccessmayalso denyinfallibilityonmoregeneralgrounds.In judginganything,includinganoccurrentmental state,tohaveaparticularpropertyP,itseems thatImustrememberwhichpropertyPis,and memoryappearstobealwaysfallible.Evenif suchjudgmentsarealwaysfallible,however, theymaybemoreimmediatelyjustifiedthan othersortsofjudgments.Hencetheremaystill beprivilegedaccess,butofaweakersort. Inthetwentiethcentury,Ryleattackedthe ideaofprivilegedaccessbyanalyzingintrospec- tion,awarenessofwhatoneisthinkingordoing, intermsofbehavioraldispositions,e.g.disposi- tionstogivememoryreportsofone'smental stateswhenaskedtodoso.Butwhilebehavior- istorfunctionalanalysesofsomestatesofmind maybeplausible,forinstanceanalysesofcogni- tivestatessuchasbeliefs,accountsintheseterms ofoccurrentstatessuchassensationsorimages arefarlessplausible.Amoreinfluentialattackon strongerversionsofprivilegedaccesswas mountedbyWilfridSellars.Accordingtohim, wemustbetrainedtoreportnon-inferentially onpropertiesofoursenseexperiencebyfirst learningtorespondwithwholesystemsofcon- ceptstopublic,physicalobjects.BeforeIcan learntoreportaredsenseimpression,Imust learnthesystemofcolorconceptsandthelogi- calrelationsamongthembylearningtorespond tocoloredobjects.Hence,knowledgeofmyown mentalstatescannotbethefirmbasisfrom whichIprogresstootherknowledge. 742 proattitude probability Evenifthisorderofconceptacquisitionis determinednecessarily,itstillmaybethatper- sons'accesstotheirownmentalstatesisprivi- legedinsomeofthewaysindicated,oncethe requisiteconceptshavebeenacquired.Beliefs aboutone'sownoccurrentstatesofmindmay stillbemoreimmediatelyjustifiedthanbeliefs aboutphysicalproperties,forexample. Seealsocertainty,foundationalism, IMMEDIACY,PERCEPTION.A.H.G. proattitude,afavorabledispositiontowardan objectorstateofaffairs.Althoughsomephiloso- phersequateproattitudeswithdesires,the expressionismoreoftenintendedtocovera widerangeofconativestatesofmindincluding wants,feelings,wishes,values,andprinciples. Myregardingacertaincourseofactionopento measmorallyrequiredandmyregardingitasa sourceofselfishsatisfactionequallyqualifyas proattitudestowardtheobjectofthataction.It iswidelyheldthatintentionalaction,or,more generally,actingforreasons,isnecessarilybased, inpart,ononeormoreproattitudes.IfIgoto thestoreinordertobuysometurnips,then,in additiontomyregardingmystore-goingascon- ducivetotumipbuying,Imusthavesomepro attitudetowardturnipbuying.Seealsoaction THEORY,PRACTICALREASONING.J.F.H. probabilism.Seemedina. probabilisticautomaton.Seecomputertheory, SELF-REPRODUCINGAUTOMATON. probabilisticcausation.Seecausation. probabilisticdisposition.Seedisposition. probabilisticindependence.Seeprobability. probabilisticlaw.Seecausallaw. probability,anumericalvaluethatcanattachto itemsofvariouskinds(e.g.,propositions,events, andkindsofevents)thatisameasureofthe degreetowhichtheymayorshouldbe expected-orthedegreetowhichtheyhave "theirowndisposition,"i.e.,independentlyof ourpsychologicalexpectations-tobetrue,to occur,ortobeexemplified(dependingonthe kindofitemthevalueattachésto).Thereare bothmultipleinterpretationsofprobabilityand twomainkindsoftheoriesofprobability: abstractformålcalculiandinterpretationsofthe calculi.Anabstractformålcalculusaxiomatically characterizesformålpropertiesofprobability functions,wheretheargumentsofthefunction areoftenthoughtofassets,oraselementsofa Booleanalgebra.Inapplication,thenatureofthe argumentsofaprobabilityfunction,aswellas themeaningofprobability,aregivenbyinter- pretationsofprobability. ThemostfamousaxiomatizationisKol- mogorov's(FoundationsoftheTheoryofProbability, 1933).Thethreeaxiomsforprobabilityfunc- tionsPrare:(1)Pr(X)>forallX;(2)Pr(X)= 1if^t"isnecessary(e.g.,atautologyifaproposi- tion,anecessaryeventifanevent,anda"uni- versalset"ifaset);and(3)Pr(XVY)=Pr(X)+ Pr(Y)(where'Vcanmean,e.g.,logicaldisjunc- tion,orset-theoreticalunion)ifXandYare mutuallyexclusive(X&Yisacontradictionif theyarepropositions,theycan'tbothhappenif theyareevents,andtheirset-theoreticalinter- sectionisemptyiftheyaresets).Axiom(3)is calledfiniteadditivity,whichissometimesgen- eralizedtocountableadditivity,involvinginfi- nitedisjunctionsofpropositions,orinfinite unionsofsets.Conditionalprobability,Pr(XIY) (theprobabilityofX"given"or"conditionalon" y),isdefinedasthequotientPr(X&Y)IPr(Y).An itemXissaidtobepositivelyornegativelystatisti- cally(orprobabilistically)correlatedwithanitemY accordingtowhetherPr(XIY)isgreaterthanor lessthanPr(XI~Y)(where~Y\sthenegationof apropositionY,orthenon-occurrenceofan eventY,ortheset-theoreticalcomplementofa setY);inthecaseofequality,Xissaidtobesta- tistically(orprobabilistically)independentofY.All threeoftheseprobabilisticrelationsaresymmet- ric,andsometimestheterm'probabilisticrele- vance'isusedinsteadof'correlation'.Fromthe axioms,familiartheoremscanbeproved:e.g., (4)Pr(~X)=1-Pr(X);(5)Pr(XVY)=Pr(X)+ Pr(Y)-Pr(X&Y)(forallXand7);and(6)(asim- pleversionofBayes'stheorem)Pr(XIY)= Pr(YlX)Pr(X)IPr(Y).Thus,anabstractformålcal- culusofprobabilityallowsforcalculationofthe probabilitiesofsomeitemsfromtheprobabilities ofothers. Themaininterpretationsofprobabilityin- cludetheclassical,relativefrequency,propensity,log- ical,andsubjectiveinterpretations.Accordingto theclassicalinterpretation,theprobabilityofan event,e.g.ofheadsonacointoss,isequaltothe ratioofthenumberof"equipossibilities"(or equiprobableevents)favorabletotheeventin questiontothetotalnumberofrelevant equipossibilities.Ontherelativefrequencyinter- pretation,developedbyVenn(TheLogicofChance, 1866)andReichenbach(TheTheoryofProbability, 743 probability probability 1935),probabilityattachéstosetsofevents withina"referenceclass."WhereWistherefer- enceclass,andnisthenumberofeventsinW, andmisthenumberofeventsin(orofkind)X, withinW,thentheprobabilityofX,relativetoW, ismin.Forvariousconceptualandtechnicalrea- sons,thiskindof"actualfiniterelativefre- quency"interpretationhasbeenrefinedinto variousinfiniteandhypotheticalinfiniterelative frequencyaccounts,whereprobabilityisdefined intermsoflimitsofseriesofrelativefrequencies infinite(nested)populationsofincreasingsizes, sometimesinvolvinghypotheticalinfiniteexten- sionsofanactualpopulation.Thereasonsfor thesedevelopmentsinvolve,e.g.:theartificial restriction,forfinitepopulations,ofprobabilities tovaluesoftheformUn,wherenisthesizeof thereferenceclass;thepossibilityof"merecoin- cidence"intheactualworld,wherethesemay notreflectthetruephysicaldispositionsinvolved intherelevantevents;andthefactthatproba- bilityisoftenthoughttoattachtopossibilities involvingsingleevents,whileprobabilitieson therelativefrequencyaccountattachtosetsof events(thisisthe"problemofthesinglecase," alsocalledthe"problemofthereferenceclass"). Theseproblemsalsohaveinspired"propensity" accountsofprobability,accordingtowhichprob- abilityisamoreorlessprimitiveideathatmea- suresthephysicalpropensityordispositionofa givenkindofphysicalsituationtoyieldanout- comeofagiventype,ortoyielda"long-run"rel- ativefrequencyofanoutcomeofagiventype. AtheoremofprobabilityprovedbyJacob Bernoulli(ArsConjectandi,1713)andsometimes calledBernoulli'stheoremortheweaklawoflarge numbers,andalsoknownasthefirstlimittheo- rem,isimportantforappreciatingthefrequency interpretation.Thetheoremstates,roughly,that inthelongrun,frequencysettlesdowntoprob- ability.Forexample,supposetheprobabilityofa certaincoin'slandingheadsonanygiventossis 0.5,andletebeanynumbergreaterthan0.Then thetheoremimpliesthatasthenumberoftosses growswithoutbound,theprobabilityap- proaches1thatthefrequencyofheadswillbe withineof0.5.Moregenerally,letpbetheprob- abilityofanoutcomeOonatrialofanexperi- ment,andassumethatthisprobabilityremains constantastheexperimentisrepeated.Aftern trials,therewillbeafrequency,/,oftrialsyield- ingoutcomeO.Thetheoremsaysthatforany numbersdandegreaterthan0,thereisannsuch thattheprobability(P)thatIp—f\1-d).Bernoullialsoshowedhowto calculatesuchnforgivenvaluesofd,e,andp.It isimportanttonoticethatthetheoremconcerns probabilities,andnotcertainty,foralong-runfre- quency.Noticealsotheassumptionthatthe probabilitypofOremainsconstantastheexper- imentisrepeated,sothattheoutcomesontrials areprobabilisticallyindependentofearlierout- comes. Thekindsofinterpretationsofprobabilityjust describedaresometimescalled"objective"or "statistical"or"empirical"sincethevalueofa probability,ontheseaccounts,dependsonwhat actuallyhappens,oronwhatactualgivenphys- icalsituationsaredisposedtoproduce-as opposedtodependingonlyonlogicalrelations betweentherelevantevents(orpropositions),or onwhatweshouldrationallyexpecttohappen orwhatweshouldrationallybelieve.Incontrast totheseaccounts,therearethe"logical"andthe "subjective"interpretationsofprobability.Car- nap("TheTwoConceptsofProbability,"Philoso- phyandPhenomenologicalResearch,1945)has markedthiskindofdistinctionbycallingthesec- ondconceptprobabilitylandthefirstprobability•. Accordingtothelogicalinterpretation,associ- atedwithCarnap(seealsoLogicalFoundationsof Probability,1950;andContinuumofInductiveMeth- ods,1952),theprobabilityofapropositionX givenapropositionYisthe"degreetowhichY logicallyentailsX."Carnapdevelopedaninge- niousandelaboratesetofsystemsoflogicalprob- ability,including,e.g.,separatesystemsde- pendingonthedegreetowhichonehappensto be,logicallyandrationally,sensitivetonew informationinthereevaluationofprobabilities. Thereis,ofcourse,aconnectionbetweenthe ideasoflogicalprobability,rationality,belief,and beliefrevision.Itisnaturaltoexplicatethe"log- ical-probabilistic"ideaoftheprobabilityofX givenFasthedegreetowhicharationalperson wouldbelieveXhavingcometolearnY(taking accountofbackgroundknowledge).Here,the ideaofbeliefsuggestsasubjective(sometimes calledepistemicorpartialbeliefordegreeofbelief) interpretationofprobability;andtheideaof probabilityrevisionsuggeststheconceptofinduc- fr'o»:boththelogicalandthesubjectiveinterpre- tationsofprobabilityhavebeencalled"inductive probability"-aformålapparatustocharacterize rationallearningfromexperience. Thesubjectiveinterpretationofprobability, accordingtowhichtheprobabilityofaproposi- tionisameasureofone'sdegreeofbeliefinit, wasdevelopedby,e.g.,Ramsey("Truthand Probability,"inhisFoundationsofMathematicsand OtherEssays,1926);Definetti("Foresight:ItsLog- icalLaws,ItsSubjectiveSources,"1937,trans- 744 probability,prior problemofinduction latedbyH.Kyburg,Jr.,inH.E.Smokler,Studies inSubjectiveProbability,1964);andSavage(The FoundationsofStatistics,1954).Ofcourse,subjec- tiveprobabilityvariesfrompersontoperson. Also,inorderforthistobeaninterpretationof probability,sothattherelevantaxiomsaresatis- fied,notallpersonscancount-onlyrational,or "coherent"personsshouldcount.Sometheorists havedrawnaconnectionbetweenrationality andprobabilisticdegreesofbeliefintermsofdis- positionstosetcoherentbettingodds(thosethat donotallowa"Dutchbook"-anarrangement thatforcestheagenttolosecomewhatmay), whileothershavedescribedtheconnectionin moregeneraldecision-theoreticterms. Seealsobayes'stheorem,carnap,dutch BOOK,INDUCTION,PROPENSITY,REICHEN- bach.E.Ee. probability,prior.Seebayes'stheorem. probabilityfunction.Seebayesianrationality. problematicjudgment.Seekant. problematicmodality.Seemodality. problemofevil.Seephilosophyofreligion. problemofinduction.FirststatedbyHume,this problemconcernsthelogicalbasisofinferences fromobservedmattersoffacttounobserved mattersoffact.Althoughdiscussionoften focusesuponpredictionsoffutureevents(e.g.,a solareclipse),thequestionappliesalsotoinfer- encestopastfacts(e.g.,theextinctionof dinosaurs)andtopresentoccurrencesbeyond therangeofdirectobservation(e.g.,themotions ofplanetsduringdaylighthours).Longbefore HumetheancientSkepticshadrecognizedthat suchinferencescannotbemadewithcertainty; theyrealizedtherecanbenodemonstrative (deductive)inference,say,fromthepastand presenttothefuture.Hume,however,poseda moreprofounddifficulty:Arewejustifiedinplac- inganydegreeofconfidenceintheconclusions ofsuchinferences?Hisquestioniswhetherthere isanytypeofnon-demonstrativeorinductive inferenceinwhichwecanbejustifiedinplacing anyconfidenceatall. AccordingtoHume,ourinferencesfromthe observedtotheunobservedarebasedonregu- laritiesfoundinnature.Webelieve,e.g.,thatthe earth,sun,andmoonmoveinregularpatterns (accordingtoNewtonianmechanics),andon thatbasisastronomerspredictsolarandlunar eclipses.Humenotes,however,thatallofour evidenceforsuchuniformitiesconsistsofpast andpresentexperience;inapplyingtheseuni- formitiestothefuturebehaviorofthesebodies wearemakinganinferencefromtheobserved totheunobserved.Thispointholdsingeneral. Wheneverwemakeinferencesfromthe observedtotheunobservedwerelyontheuni- formityofnature.Thebasisforourbeliefthat natureisreasonablyuniformisourexperienceof suchuniformityinthepast.Ifweinferthat naturewillcontinuetobeuniforminthefuture, wearemakinganinferencefromtheobserved totheunobserved-preciselythekindofinfer- enceforwhichweareseekingajustification.We arethuscaughtupinacircularargument. Since,asHumeemphasized,muchofourrea- soningfromtheobservedtotheunobservedis basedoncausalrelations,heanalyzedcausality toascertainwhetheritcouldfurnishanecessary connectionbetweendistincteventsthatcould serveasabasisforsuchinferences.Hisconclu- sionwasnegative.Wecannotestablishanysuch connectionapriori,foritisimpossibletodeduce thenatureofaneffectfromitscause-e.g.,we cannotdeducefromtheappearanceoffalling snowthatitwillcauseasensationofcoldrather thanheat.Likewise,wecannotdeducethe natureofacausefromitseffect-e.g.,lookingat adiamond,wecannotdeducethatitwaspro- ducedbygreatheatandpressure.Allsuch knowledgeisbasedonpastexperience.Ifwe inferthatfuturesnowwillfeelcoldorthatfuture diamondswillbeproducedbygreatheatand pressure,weareagainmakinginferencesfrom theobservedtotheunobserved. Furthermore,ifwecarefullyobservecasesin whichwebelieveacause-effectrelationholds, wecannotperceiveanynecessaryconnection betweencauseandeffect,oranypowerinthe causethatbringsabouttheeffect.Weobserve onlythataneventofonetype(e.g.,drinking water)occurspriortoandcontiguouslywithan eventofanothertype(quenchingthirst).More- over,wenoticethateventsofthetwotypeshave exhibitedaconstantconjunction;i.e.,whenever aneventofthefirsttypehasoccurredinthepast ithasbeenfollowedbyoneofthesecondtype. Wecannotdiscoveranynecessaryconnectionor causalpoweraposteriori;wecanonlyestablish priority,contiguity,andconstantconjunctionup tothepresent.Ifweinferthatthisconstantcon- junctionwillpersistinfuturecases,wearemak- inganotherinferencefromobservedto unobservedcases.Tousecausalityasabasisfor justifyinginferencefromtheobservedtothe 745 problemofotherminds problemofotherminds unobservedwouldagaininvovleacircularargu- ment. Humeconcludesskepticallythattherecanbe norationalorlogicaljustificationofinferences fromtheobservedtotheunobserved-i.e., inductiveornon-demonstrativeinference.Such inferencesarebasedoncustomandhabit. Naturehasendoweduswithaproclivityto extrapolatefrompastcasestofuturecasesofa similarkind.Havingobservedthateventsofone typehavebeenregularlyfollowedbyeventsof anothertype,weexperience,uponencountering acaseofthefirsttype,apsychologicalexpecta- tionthatoneofthesecondtypewillfollow.Such anexpectationdoesnotconstitutearationaljus- tification. AlthoughHumeposedhisproblemintermsof homelyexamples,theissuesheraisesgotothe heartofeventhemostsophisticatedempirical sciences,foralloftheminvolveinferencefrom observedphenomenatounobservedfacts.Al- thoughcomplextheoriesareoftenemployed, Hume'sproblemstillapplies.Itsforceisbyno meansconfinedtoinductionbysimpleenumer- ation. Philosophershaverespondedtotheproblem ofinductioninmanydifferentways.Kantin- vokedsyntheticaprioriprinciples.Manytwen- tieth-centuryphilosophershavetreateditasa pseudo-problem,basedonlinguisticconfusion, thatrequiresdissolutionratherthansolution. Carnapmaintainedthatinductiveintuitionis indispensable.Reichenbachofferedapragmatic vindication.Goodmanhasrecommendedreplac- ingHume's"oldriddle"withanewriddleof inductionthathehasposed.Popper,taking Hume'sskepticalargumentsasconclusive,advo- catesdeductivism.Hearguesthatinductionis unjustifiableanddispensable.Noneofthemany suggestionsiswidelyacceptedascorrect. Seealsocausation,grueparadox, HUME,SKEPTICISM,UNIFORMITYOFNATURE. w.c.s. problemofotherminds,thequestionofwhat rationalbasisapersoncanhaveforthebeliefthat otherpersonsaresimilarlyconsciousandhave minds.Everyperson,byvirtueofbeingcon- scious,isawareofherownstateofconsciousness andthusknowsshehasamind;butthemental statesofothersarenotsimilarlyapparenttoher. Aninfluentialattempttosolvethisproblem wasmadebyphilosophicalbehaviorists.Accord- ingtoRyleinTheConceptofMind(1949),amind isnotaghostinthephysicalmachinebut (roughlyspeaking)anaggregateofdispositions tobehaveintelligentlyandtorespondovertlyto sensorystimulation.Sincethebehaviordistinc- tiveofthesementalisticdispositionsisreadily observableinotherhumanbeings,theso-called problemofothermindsiseasilysolved:itarose frommereconfusionabouttheconceptofmind. Ryle'sopponentsweregenerallywillingtocon- cedethatsuchdispositionsprovideproofthat anotherpersonhasa"mind"orisasentient being,buttheywerenotwillingtoadmitthat thosedispositionsprovideproofthatotherpeo- pleactuallyhavefeelings,thoughts,andsensory experiences.Theirconvictionsonthislastmat- tergeneratedarevisedversionoftheother- mindsproblem;itmightbecalledtheproblemof other-personexperiences. Earlyeffortstosolvetheproblemofother mindscanbeviewedasattemptstosolvethe problemofother-personexperiences.According toJ.S.Mill'sExaminationofSirWilliamHamilton's Philosophy(1865),onecandefendone'sconvic- tionthatothershavefeelingsandothersubjec- tiveexperiencesbyemployinganargument fromanalogy.Todevelopthatanalogyonefirst attendstohowone'sownexperiencesarerelated toovertorpubliclyobservablephenomena.One mightobservethatonefeelspainwhenpricked byapinandthatonerespondstothepainby wincingandsaying"ouch."Thenextstepisto attendtothebehaviorandcircumstancesofoth- ers.Sinceotherpeoplearephysicallyverysimi- lartooneself,itisreasonabletoconcludethatif theyareprickedbyapinandrespondbywinc- ingandsaying"ouch,"theytoohavefeltpain. Analogousinferencesinvolvingothersortsof mentalstatesandothersortsofbehaviorandcir- cumstancesaddstrongsupport,Millsaid,to one'sbeliefinother-personexperiences. Althoughargumentsfromanalogyaregener- allyconcededtoproviderationallyacceptable evidenceforunobservedphenomena,theana- logicalargumentforother-personexperiences wasvigorouslyattackedinthe1960sbyphiloso- phersinfluencedbyWittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations(1953).Theircentralcontention wasthatanyoneemployingtheargumentmust assumethat,solelyfromherowncase,she knowswhatfeelingsandthoughtsare.This assumptionwasrefuted,theythought,by Wittgenstein'sprivatelanguageargument, whichprovedthatwelearnwhatfeelingsand thoughtsareonlyintheprocessoflearninga publiclyunderstandablelanguagecontainingan appropriatepsychologicalvocabulary.Tounder- standthislattervocabulary,thesecriticssaid,one mustbeabletouseitsingredientwordscorrectly 746 problemofthecriterion problemofthespeckledhen inrelationtoothersaswellastooneself;andthis canbeascertainedonlybecausewordslike'pain' and'depression'areassociatedwithbehavioral criteria.Whensuchcriteriaaresatisfiedbythe behaviorofothers,oneknowsthatthewordsare correctlyappliedtothemandthatoneisjustified inbelievingthattheyhavetheexperiencesin question.Thesupposedproblemofother-person experiencesisthus"dissolved"byajustappreci- ationofthepreconditionsforcoherentthought aboutpsychologicalstates. Wittgenstein'sclaimthat,tobeconceivable, "aninnerprocessståndsinneedofexternalcri- teria,"löstitsholdonphilosophersduringthe 1970s.Animportantconsiderationwasthis:ifa feelingofpainisagenuinerealitydifferentfrom thebehaviorthattypicallyaccompaniesit,then so-calledpainbehaviorcannotbeshowntopro- videadequateevidenceforthepresenceofpain byapurelylinguisticargument;someempirical inductiveevidenceisneeded.Since,contraryto Wittgenstein,oneknowswhatthefeelingofpain islikeonlybyhavingthatfeeling,one'sbelief thatotherpeopleoccasionallyhavefeelingsthat aresignificantlylikethepainonefeelsoneself apparentlymustbesupportedbyanargumentin whichanalogyplaysacentralrole.Noother strategyseemspossible. Seealsobehaviorism,philosophyof MIND,PRIVATELANGUAGEARGUMENT,WITT- GENSTEIN.B.A. problemofthecriterion,aproblemofepistemol- ogy,arisingintheattemptbothtoformulatethe criteriaandtodeterminetheextentofknowledge. Skepticalandnon-skepticalphilosophersdis- agreeastowhat,orhowmuch,weknow.Dowe haveknowledgeoftheexternalworld,other minds,thepast,andthefuture?Anyanswer dependsonwhatthecorrectcriteriaofknowl- edgeare.Theproblemisgeneratedbytheseem- ingplausibilityofthefollowingtwopropositions: (1)Inordertorecognizeinstances,andthusto determinetheextent,ofknowledge,we mustknowthecriteriaforit. (2)Inordertoknowthecriteriaforknowledge (i.e.,todistinguishbetweencorrectand incorrectcriteria),wemustalreadybeable torecognizeitsinstances. AccordingtoanargumentofancientGreek Skepticism,wecanknowneithertheextentnor thecriteriaofknowledgebecause(1)and(2)are bothtrue.Thereare,however,threefurtherpos- sibilities.First,itmightbethat(2)istruebut(1) false:wecanrecognizeinstancesofknowledge evenifwedonotknowthecriteriaofknowl- edge.Second,itmightbethat(1)istruebut(2) false:wecanidentifythecriteriaofknowledge withoutpriorrecognitionofitsinstances. Finally,itmightbethatboth(1)and(2)arefalse. Wecanknowtheextentofknowledgewithout knowingcriteria,andviceversa.Chisholm,who hasdevotedparticularattentiontothisproblem, callsthefirstoftheseoptionsparticularism,and thesecondmethodism.Hume,askepticaboutthe extentofempiricalknowledge,wasamethodist. ReidandMoorewereparticularists;theyre- jectedHume'sskepticismonthegroundthatit turnsobviouscasesofknowledgeintocasesof ignorance.Chisholmadvocatesparticularism becausehebelievesthat,unlessoneknowsto beginwithwhatoughttocountasaninstanceof knowledge,anychoiceofacriterionisun- groundedandthusarbitrary.Methodiststurn thisargumentaround:theyrejectasdogmatic anyidentificationofinstancesofknowledgenot basedonacriterion.Seealsoskepticism. M.St. problemofthesinglecase.Seeprobability, PROPENSITY. problemofthespeckledhen,aproblempro- poundedbyRyleasanobjectiontoAyer'sanaly- sisofperceptionintermsofsense-data.Itis impliedbythisanalysisthat,ifIseeaspeckled hen(inagoodlightandsoon),Idosobymeans ofapprehendingaspeckledsense-datum.The analysisimpliesfurtherthatthesense-datum actuallyhasjustthenumberofspecklesthatI seemtoseeasIlookatthehen,andthatitis immediatelyevidenttomejusthowmany specklesthisis.Thus,ifIseemtoseemanyspeck- lesasIlookatthehen,thesense-datumIappre- hendmustactuallycontainmanyspeckles,and itmustbeimmediatelyevidenttomehowmany itdoescontain.Nowsupposeitseemstomethat Iseemorethan100speckles.ThenthedatumI amapprehendingmustcontainmorethan100 speckles.Perhapsitcontains132ofthem.The analysiswouldthenimply,absurdly,thatitmust beimmediatelyevidenttomethatthenumber ofspecklesisexactly132.Onewaytoavoidthis implicationwouldbetodenythatasense-datum ofminecouldcontainexactly132speckles-or anyotherlarge,determinatenumberof them-preciselyonthegroundthatitcould neverseemtomethatIwasseeingexactlythat manyspeckles.Apossibledrawbackofthis approachisthatitinvolvescommittingoneselfto theclaim,whichsomephilosophershavefound 747 proceduralism productiontheory self-contradictory,thatasense-datummaycon- tainmanyspecklesevenifthereisnolargenum- bernsuchthatitcontainsnspeckles.Seealso PERCEPTION,VAGUENESS.R.Ke. proceduralism.Seejurisprudence. processphilosophy.Seewhitehead. process-productambiguity,anambiguitythat occurswhenanouncanrefereithertoaprocess (oractivity)ortotheproductofthatprocess(or activity).E.g.,'Thedefinitionwasdifficult'could meaneitherthattheactivityofdefiningwasa difficultonetoperform,orthatthedefiniens(the formofwordsproposedasequivalenttotheterm beingdefined)thatthedefinerproducedwasdif- ficulttounderstand.Again,'Thewritingab- sorbedherattention'leavesitunclearwhetherit wastheactivityofwritingoraproductofthat activitythatshefoundengrossing.Philosophi- callysignificanttermsthatmightbeheldto exhibitprocess-productambiguityinclude: 'analysis','explanation','inference','thought'. P.Mac. processtheology,anytheologystronglyinflu- encedbythetheisticmetaphysicsofWhitehead orHartshorne;moregenerally,anytheologythat takesprocessorchangeasbasiccharacteristicsof allactualbeings,includingGod.Thoseversions mostinfluencedbyWhiteheadandHartshorne shareacoreofconvictionsthatconstitutethe mostdistinctivethesesofprocesstheology:God isconstantlygrowing,thoughcertainabstract featuresofGod(e.g.,beingloving)remaincon- stant;Godisrelatedtoeveryotheractualbeing andisaffectedbywhathappenstoit;every actualbeinghassomeself-determination,and God'spowerisreconceivedasthepowertolure (attempttopersuade)eachactualbeingtobe whatGodwishesittobe.Thesethesesrepresent significantdifferencesfromideasofGodcom- moninthetraditionofWesterntheism,accord- ingtowhichGodisunchanging,isnotreally relatedtocreaturesbecauseGodisnotaffected bywhathappenstothem,andhasthepowerto dowhateveritislogicallypossibleforGodtodo (omnipotence).Processtheologiansalsodisagree withtheideathatGodknowsthefutureinallits details,holdingthatGodknowsonlythose detailsofthefuturethatarecausallynecessitated bypastevents.Theyclaimtheseareonlycertain abstractfeaturesofasmallclassofeventsinthe nearfutureandofanevensmallerclassinthe moredistantfuture.Becauseoftheirunder- standingofdivinepowerandtheiraffirmationof creaturelyself-determination,theyclaimthat theyprovideamoreadequatetheodicy.Their criticsclaimthattheirideaofGod'spower,ifcor- rect,wouldrenderGodunworthyofworship; somealsomakethisclaimabouttheirideaof God'sknowledge,preferringamoretraditional ideaofomniscience. AlthoughWhiteheadandHartshornewere bothphilosophersratherthantheologians, processtheologyhasbeenmoreinfluential amongtheologians.Itisamajorcurrentincon- temporaryAmericanProtestanttheologyand hasattractedtheattentionofsomeRoman Catholictheologiansaswell.Italsohasinflu- encedsomebiblicalscholarswhoareattempting todevelopadistinctiveprocesshermeneutics. Seealsophilosophyofreligion,white- head.J.A.K. Proclus.Seecommentariesonplato,hellenistic PHILOSOPHY,NEOPLATONISM. Prodicus.Seesophists. productiontheory,theeconomictheorydealing withtheconversionoffactorsofproductioninto consumergoods.Incapitalistictheoriesthat assumeidealmärkets,firmsproducegoodsfrom threekindsoffactors:capital,labor,andraw materials.Productionissubjecttotheconstraint thatprofit(thedifferencebetweenrevenuesand costs)bemaximized.Thefirmistherebyfaced withthefollowingdecisions:howmuchtopro- duce,whatpricetochargefortheproduct,what proportionstocombinethethreekindsoffactors in,andwhatpricetopayforthefactors.Inmär- ketsclosetoperfectcompetition,thefirmwill havelittlecontrolöverpricessothedecision problemtendstoreducetotheamountsoffac- torstouse.Therangeoffeasiblefactorcombi- nationsdependsonthetechnologiesavailableto firms.Interestingcomplicationsariseifnotall firmshaveaccesstothesametechnologies,or ifnotallfirmsmakeaccurateresponsescon- cerningtechnologicalchanges.Also,ifthescale ofproductionaffectsthefeasibletechnologies, thefirms'decisionprocessmustbesubtle.In eachofthesecases,imperfectcompetitionwill result. Marxianeconomiststhinkthattheconcepts usedinthiskindofproductiontheoryhavea normativecomponent.Inreality,alargefirm's capitaltendstobeownedbyarathersmall,priv- ilegedclassofnon-laborersandlaboristreated asacommoditylikeanyotherfactor.Thismight 748 productivereason proofbyrecursion leadtotheperceptionthatprofitresultsprimar- ilyfromcapitaland,therefore,belongstoits owners.Marxianscontendthatlaborispri- marilyresponsibleforprofitand,consequently, thatlaborisentitledtomorethanthemärket wage. Seealsoperfectcompetition,philoso- PHYOFECONOMICS.A.N. productivereason.Seetheoreticalreason. professionalethics,atermdesignatingoneor moreof(1)thejustifiedmoralvaluesthatshould governtheworkofprofessionals;(2)themoral valuesthatactuallydoguidegroupsofprofes- sionals,whetherthosevaluesareidentifiedas(a) principlesincodesofethicspromulgatedbypro- fessionalsocietiesor(b)actualbeliefsandcon- ductofprofessionals;and(3)thestudyof professionalethicsintheprecedingsenses,either (i)normative(philosophical)inquiriesintothe valuesdesirableforprofessionalstoembrace,or (ii)descriptive(scientific)studiesoftheactual beliefsandconductofgroupsofprofessionals. Professionalvaluesincludeprinciplesofobliga- tionandrights,aswellasvirtuesandpersonal moralidealssuchasthosemanifestedinthelives ofJaneAddams,AlbertSchweitzer,andThur- goodMarshall. Professionsaredefinedbyadvancedexpertise, socialorganizations,society-grantedmonopolies överservices,andespeciallybysharedcommit- mentstopromoteadistinctivepublicgoodsuch ashealth(medicine),justice(law),orlearning (education).Thesesharedcommitmentsimply specialdutiestomakeservicesavailable,main- tainconfidentiality,secureinformedconsentfor services,andbeloyaltoclients,employers,and otherswithwhomonehasfiduciaryrelation- ships.Boththeoreticalandpracticalissuessur- roundtheseduties.Thecentraltheoreticalissue istounderstandhowthejustifiedmoralvalues governingprofessionalsarelinkedtowiderval- ues,suchashumanrights.Mostpracticaldilem- masconcernhowtobalanceconflictingduties. Forexample,whatshouldattorneysdowhen confidentialityrequireskeepinginformation secretthatmightsavethelifeofaninnocent thirdparty?Otherpracticalissuesareproblems ofvaguenessanduncertaintysurroundinghow toapplydutiesinparticularcontexts.Forexam- ple,doesrespectforpatients'autonomyforbid, permit,orrequireaphysiciantoassistatermi- nallyillpatientdesiringsuicide?Equallyimpor- tantishowtoresolveconflictsofinterestin whichself-seekingplacesmoralvaluesatrisk. Seealsoappliedethics,bioethics. M.W.M. programminglanguage.Seecomputertheory. programs,modallogicof.Seedynamiclogic. projectiblepredicate.Seegrueparadox. projection.Seeheidegger. projectivism.Seemoralpsychology. prolepsis.Seeepicureanism,hellenisticphiloso- PHY. proof.Seeprooftheory. proof,finitary.Seehilbert'sprogram. proof,indirect.Seereductioadabsurdum. proofbyrecursion,alsocalledproofbymathe- maticalinduction,amethodforconclusively demonstratingthetruthofuniversalproposi- tionsaboutthenaturalnumbers.Thesystemof (natural)numbersisconstruedasaninfinite sequenceofelementsbeginningwiththenum- ber1andsuchthateachsubsequentelementis the(immediate)successoroftheprecedingele- ment.The(immediate)successorofanumberis thesumofthatnumberwith1.Inordertoapply thismethodtoshowthateverynumberhasa certainchosenpropertyitisnecessarytodemon- stratetwosubsidiarypropositionsoftencalled respectivelythebasisstepandtheinductivestep. Thebasisstepisthatthenumber1hasthecho- senproperty;theinductivestepisthatthesucces- sorofanynumberhavingthechosenpropertyis alsoanumberhavingthechosenproperty(in otherwords,foreverynumbern,ifnhasthe chosenpropertythenthesuccessorofnalsohas thechosenproperty).Theinductivestepisitself auniversalpropositionthatmayhavebeen provedbyrecursion. Themostcommonlyusedexampleofatheo- remprovedbyrecursionistheremarkablefact, knownbeforethetimeofPlato,thatthesumof thefirstnoddnumbersisthesquareofn.This proposition,mentionedprominentlybyLeibniz asrequiringandhavingdemonstrativeproof,is expressedinuniversalformasfollows:forevery numbern,thesumofthefirstnoddnumbersis w2.1=l2,(1+3)=22,(1+3+5)=32,and soon. Rigorousformulationofaproofbyrecursion 749 proof-theoreticreflectionprinciples prooftheory oftenusesasapremisethepropositioncalled, sincethetimeofDeMorgan,theprincipleof mathematicalinduction:everypropertybelong- ingtoiandbelongingtothesuccessorofevery numbertowhichitbelongsisapropertythat belongswithoutexceptiontoeverynumber. Peano(i858-1932)tooktheprincipleofmath- ematicalinductionasanaxiominhis1889 axiomatizationofarithmetic(orthetheoryof naturalnumbers).Thefirstacceptableformma- tionofthisprincipleisattributedtoPascal. Seealsodemorgan,omega,philosophy OFMATHEMATICS.J.Cor. proof-theoreticreflectionprinciples.Seereflec- tionPRINCIPLES. prooftheory,abranchofmathematicallogic foundedbyDavidHilbertinthe1920stopursue HilberfsProgram.Thefoundationalproblems underlyingthatprogramhadbeenformulated aroundtheturnofthecentury,e.g.,inHilberfs famousaddresstotheInternationalCongressof MathematiciansinParis(1900).Theywere closelyconnectedwithinvestigationsonthe foundationsofanalysiscarriedoutbyCantorand Dedekind;buttheywerealsorelatedtotheir conflictwithKroneckeronthenatureofmathe- maticsandtothedifficultiesofacompletely unrestrictednotionofsetormultiplicity.Atthat time,thecentralissueforHilbertwastheconsis- tencyofsetsinCantor'ssense.Hesuggestedthat theexistenceofconsistentsets(multiplicities), e.g.,thatofrealnumbers,couldbesecuredby provingtheconsistencyofasuitable,character- izingaxiomaticsystem;buttherewereonlythe vaguestindicationsonhowtodothat.Inaradi- caldeparturefromstandardpracticeandhisear- lierhints,Hilbertproposedfouryearslåtera novelwayofattackingtheconsistencyproblem fortheoriesinUberdieGrundlagenderLogikund derArithmetik(1904).Thisapproachwould require,first,astrictformalizationoflogic togetherwithmathematics,thenconsideration ofthefinitesyntacticconfigurationsconstituting thejointformalismasmathematicalobjects,and showingbymathematicalargumentsthatcon- tradictoryformulascannotbederived. ThoughHilbertlecturedonissuesconcerning thefoundationsofmathematicsduringthesub- sequentyears,thetechnicaldevelopmentand philosophicalclarificationofprooftheoryandits aimsbeganonlyaround1920.Thatinvolved, firstofall,adetaileddescriptionoflogicalcalculi andthecarefuldevelopmentofpartsofmathe- maticsinsuitablesystems.Arecordoftheformer isfoundinHilbertandAckermann,Grundziige dertheoretischenLogik(1928);andofthelatterin SupplementIVofHilbertandBernays,Grundla- genderMathematikII(1939).Thispresupposes thecleardistinctionbetweenmetamathematics andmathematicsintroducedbyHilbert.Forthe purposesoftheconsistencyprogrammetamath- ematicswasnowtakentobeaveryweakpartof arithmetic,so-calledfinitistmathematics,be- lievedtocorrespondtothepartofmathematics thatwasacceptedbyconstructivistslikeKro- neckerandBrouwer.Additionalmetamathe- maticalissuesconcernedthecompletenessand decidabilityoftheories.Thecrucialtechnicaltool forthepursuitoftheconsistencyproblemwas Hilberfse-calculus. Themetamathematicalproblemsattractedthe collaborationofyoungandquitebrilliantmath- ematicians(withphilosophicalinterests);among themwerePaulBernays,WilhelmAckermann, JohnvonNeumann,JacquesHerbrand,Gerhard Gentzen,andKurtSchutte.Theresultsobtained inthe1920sweredisappointingwhenmeasured againstthehopesandambitions:Ackermann, vonNeumann,andHerbrandestablishedessen- tiallytheconsistencyofarithmeticwithavery restrictedprincipleofinduction.Thatlimitsof finitistconsiderationsforconsistencyproofshad beenreachedbecameclearin1931through Gödel'sincompletenesstheorems.Also,special casesofthedecisionproblemforpredicatelogic (HilberfsEntscheidungsproblem)hadbeensolved; itsgeneralsolvabilitywasmaderatherimplausi- blebysomeofGödel'sresultsinhis1931paper. Theactualproofofunsolvabilityhadtowait until1936foraconceptualclarificationof 'mechanicalprocedure'or'algorithm';thatwas achievedthroughtheworkofChurchand Turing. Thefurtherdevelopmentofprooftheoryis roughlycharacterizedbytwocomplementary tendencies:(1)theextensionofthemetamathe- maticalframerelativetowhich"constructive" consistencyproofscanbeobtained,and(2)the refinedformalizationofpartsofmathematicsin theoriesmuchweakerthansettheoryoreven fullsecond-orderarithmetic.Theformerten- dencystartedwiththeworkofGödeland Gentzenin1933establishingtheconsistencyof fullclassicalarithmeticrelativetointuitionistic arithmetic;itledinthe1970sand1980stocon- sistencyproofsofstrongsubsystemsofsecond- orderarithmeticrelativetointuitionistictheories ofconstructiveordinals.Thelattertendency reachesbacktoWeyl'sbookDasKontinuum (1918)andculminatedinthe1970sbyshowing 750 propensity property thattheclassicalresultsofmathematicalanaly- siscanbeformallyobtainedinconservative extensionsoffirst-orderarithmetic.Forthe metamathematicalworkGentzen'sintroduction ofsequentcalculiandtheuseoftransfinite inductionalongconstructiveordinalsturnedout tobeveryimportant,aswellasGödel'sprimitive recursivefunctionalsoffinitetype.Themethods andresultsofprooftheoryareplaying,notsur- prisingly,asignificantroleincomputerscience. Workinprooftheoryhasbeenmotivatedby issuesinthefoundationsofmathematics,with theexplicitgoalofachievingepistemological reductionsofstrongtheoriesformathematical practice(likesettheoryorsecond-orderarith- metic)toweak,philosophicallydistinguished theories(likeprimitiverecursivearithmetic).As theformalizationofmathematicsinstrongthe- oriesiscrucialforthemetamathematical approach,andastheprogrammaticgoalcanbe seenasawayofcircumventingthephilosophi- calissuessurroundingstrongtheories,e.g.,the natureofinfinitesetsinthecaseofsettheory Hilberfsphilosophicalpositionisoftenequated withformalism-inthesenseofFregeinhisUber dieGrundlagenderGeometrie(1903-06)andalso ofBrouwer'sinauguraladdressIntuitionismand Formalism(1912).Thoughsuchaviewisnot completelyunsupportedbysomeofHilberfs polemicalremarksduringthe1920s,onbalance, hisphilosophicalviewsdevelopedintoasophis- ticatedinstrumentalism,ifthatlabelistaken inErnestNagel'sjudicioussense(TheStructure ofScience,1961).Hilberfsisaninstrumentalism emphasizingthecontentualmotivationofmath- ematicaltheories;thatisclearlyexpressedinthe firstchapterofHilbertandBernays'sGrundlagen derMathematikI(1934).Asustainedphilosophi- calanalysisofproof-theoreticresearchinthe contextofbroaderissuesinthephilosophyof mathematicswasprovidedbyBernays;hispen- etratingessaysstretchöverfivedecadesandhave beencollectedinAbhandlungenzurPhilosophieder Mathematik(1976). Seealsoconsistency,formalization, GÖDEL'SINCOMPLETENESSTHEOREMS,HIL- BERT'SPROGRAM,METAMATHEMATICS.W.S. propensity,anirregularornon-necessitating causaldispositionofanobjectorsystemtopro- ducesomeresultoreffect.Propensitiesareusu- allyconceivedasessentiallyprobabilisticin nature.Adiemaybesaidtohaveapropensityof "strength"ormagnitudeVetoturnupa3if thrownfromadicebox,ofstrengthlhtoturnup, say,a3or4,etc.Butpropensitytalkisarguably appropriateonlywhendeterminismfails. Strengthisoftentakentovaryfromto1. Popperregardedthepropensitynotionasa newphysicalormetaphysicalhypothesis,akinto thatofforces.LikePeirce,hedeployedittointer- pretprobabilityclaimsaboutsinglecases:e.g., theprobabilityofthisradiumatom'sdecayingin 1,600yearsis'Ii.Onrelativefrequencyinterpre- tations,probabilityclaimsareaboutpropertiesof largeclassessuchasrelativefrequenciesofout- comesinthem,ratherthanaboutsinglecases. Butsingle-caseclaimsappeartobecommonin quantumtheory.Popperadvocatedapropensity interpretationofquantumtheory.Propensities alsofeatureintheoriesofindeterministicor probabilisticcausation. Competingtheoriesaboutpropensitiesat- tributethemvariouslytocomplexsystemssuch aschanceorexperimentalset-upsorarrange- ments(acoinandtossingdevice),toentities withinsuchset-ups(thecoinitself),andtopar- ticulartrialsofsuchset-ups.Long-runtheories construepropensitiesasdispositionstogiverise tocertainrelativefrequenciesof,orprobability distributionsöver,outcomesinlongrunsoftri- als,whicharesometimessaidto"manifest"or "display"thepropensities.Hereapropensity's strengthisidenticaltosomesuchfrequency.By contrast,single-casetheoriesconstruepropensi- tiesasdispositionsofsingulartrialstobring aboutparticularoutcomes.Theirexistence,not theirstrength,isdisplayedbysuchanoutcome. Herefrequenciesprovideevidenceabout propensitystrength.Butthetwocanalwaysdif- fer;theyconvergewithalimitingprobabilityof 1inanappropriatelongrun. Seealsocausation,determinism,dispo- sition,PEIRCE,PROBABILITY,QUANTUM MECHANICS.D.S. properdass.Seeclass. properlybasicrelief.Seeevidentialism,plån- tinga. propernames,causaltheoryof.Seecausaltheory OFPROPERNAMES. propersensibles.Seearistotle. propersymbol.Seesyncategoremata. propertiesofterms,doctrineof.Seesherwood. property,roughly,anattribute,characteristic, feature,trait,oraspect. 751 property property Intensionality.Therearetwosalientwaysof talkingaboutproperties.First,aspredicablesor instantiables.Forexample,thepropertyredis predicableofredobjects;theyareinstancesofit. Propertiesaresaidtobeintensionalentitiesinthe sensethatdistinctpropertiescanbetrulypredi- catedof(i.e.,haveasinstances)exactlythesame things:thepropertyofbeingacreaturewitha kidney#thepropertyofbeingacreaturewitha heart,thoughthesetwosetshavethesame members.Propertiesthusdifferfromsets(col- lections,classes);forthelattersatisfyaprinciple ofextensionality:theyareidenticaliftheyhave thesameelements.Thesecondsalientwayof talkingaboutpropertiesisbymeansofproperty abstractssuchas'thepropertyofbeingF'.Such linguisticexpressionsaresaidtobeintensionalin thefollowingsemantical(vs.ontological)sense: 'thepropertyofbeingF'and'thepropertyof beingG'candenotedifferentpropertieseven thoughthepredicates'F'and'G'aretrueof exactlythesamethings.Thestandardexplana- tion(Frege,Russell,Carnap,etal.)isthat'the propertyofbeingF'denotesthepropertythat thepredicate'F'expresses.Sincepredicates'F' and'G'canbetrueofthesamethingswithout beingsynonyms,thepropertyabstracts'beingF' and'beingG'candenotedifferentproperties. Identitycriteria.Somephilosophersbelieve thatpropertiesareidenticaliftheynecessarily havethesameinstances.Otherphilosophers holdthatthiscriterionofidentityholdsonlyfor aspecialsubclassofproperties-thosethatare purelyqualitative-andthatthepropertiesfor whichthiscriteriondoesnotholdareall"com- plex"(e.g.,relational,disjunctive,conditional,or negativeproperties).Onthistheory,complex propertiesareidenticaliftheyhavethesame formandtheirpurelyqualitativeconstituents areidentical. Ontologicalstatus.Becausepropertiesarea kindofuniversal,eachofthestandardviewson theontologicalstatusofuniversalshasbeen appliedtopropertiesasaspecialcase.Nominal- ism:onlyparticulars(andperhapscollectionsof particulars)exist;therefore,eitherpropertiesdo notexistortheyarereducible(followingCarnap etal.)tocollectionsofparticulars(includingper- hapsparticularsthatarenotactualbutonlypos- sible).Conceptualism:propertiesexistbutare dependentonthemind.Realism:propertiesexist independentlyofthemind.Realismhastwo mainversions.Inrebusrealism:apropertyexists onlyifithasinstances.Anteremrealism:aprop- ertycanexistevenifithasnoinstances.For example,thepropertyofbeingamanweighing övertonhasnoinstances;however,itisplausi- bletoholdthatthispropertydoesexist.Afterall, thispropertyseemstobewhatisexpressedby thepredicate'isamanweighingöveraton'. Essenceandaccident.Thepropertiesthata givenentityhasdivideintotwodisjointclasses: thosethatareessentialtotheentityandthose thatareaccidentaltoit.Apropertyisessential toanentityif,necessarily,theentitycannotexist withoutbeinganinstanceoftheproperty.A propertyisaccidentaltoanindividualifitispos- siblefortheindividualtoexistwithoutbeingan instanceoftheproperty.Beinganumberisan essentialpropertyofnine;beingthenumberof theplanetsisanaccidentalpropertyofnine. Somephilosophersbelievethatallpropertiesare eitheressentialbynatureoraccidentalby nature.Apropertyisessentialbynatureifitcan beanessentialpropertyofsomeentityand,nec- essarily,itisanessentialpropertyofeachentity thatisaninstanceofit.Thepropertyofbeing self-identicalisthusessentialbynature.How- ever,itiscontroversialwhethereveryproperty thatisessentialtosomethingmustbeessential bynature.Thefollowingisacandidatecoun- terexample.Ifthisautomobilebackfiresloudly onagivenoccasion,loudnesswouldseemtobe anessentialpropertyoftheassociatedbång. Thatparticularbångcouldnotexistwithout beingloud.Iftheautomobilehadbackfired softly,thatparticularbångwouldnothave existed;analtogetherdistinctbång-asoft bång-wouldhaveexisted.Bycontrast,ifaman isloud,loudnessisonlyanaccidentalproperty ofhim;hecouldexistwithoutbeingloud. Loudnessthusappearstobeacounterexample: althoughitisanessentialpropertyofcertain particulars,itisnotessentialbynature.Itmight bereplied(echoingAristotle)thataloudbång andaloudmaninstantiateloudnessindifferent waysand,moregenerally,thatpropertiescanbe predicated(instantiated)indifferentways.Ifso, thenoneshouldbespecificaboutwhichkindof predication(instantiation)isintendedinthe definitionof'essentialbynature'and'acciden- talbynature'.Whenthisisdone,thecoun- terexamplesmightwelldisappear.Ifthereare indeeddifferentwaysofbeingpredicated (instantiated),mostoftheforegoingremarks aboutintensionality,identitycriteria,andthe ontologicalstatusofpropertiesshouldberefined accordingly. Seealsoessentialism,intensionality, RELATION.G.B. 752 property,accidental proposition property,accidental.Seerelation. property,Cambridge.SeeCambridgechange. property,consequential.Seesupervenience. property,extrinsic.Seerelation. property,hereditary.Seerelation. property,impredicative.Seetypetheory. property,intrinsic.Seerelation. property,non-predicative.Seetypetheory. property,phenomenal.Seequalia. property,predicative.Seetypetheory. proportionality,principleof.Seecajetan. proposition,anabstractobjectsaidtobethatto whichapersonisrelatedbyabelief,desire,or otherpsychologicalattitude,typicallyexpressed inlanguagecontainingapsychologicalverb ('think','deny','doubt',etc.)followedbyathat- clause.Thepsychologicalstatesinquestionare calledpropositionalattitudes.WhenIbelieve thatsnowiswhiteIståndintherelationof believingtothepropositionthatsnowiswhite. WhenIhopethattheprotonswillnotdecay, hoperelätesmetothepropositionthatthepro- tonswillnotdecay.Apropositioncanbeacom- monobjectforvariousattitudesofvarious agents:thattheprotonswillnotdecaycanbethe objectofmybelief,myhope,andyourfear. Asentenceexpressinganattitudeisalsotaken toexpresstheassociatedproposition.Because 'Theprotonswillnotdecay'identifiesmyhope, itidentifiesthepropositiontowhichmyhope relätesme.Thusthepropositioncanbethe sharedmeaningofthissentenceandallitssyn- onyms,inEnglishorelsewhere(e.g.,'dieProto- nenwerdennichtzerfallen'). This,insum,isthetraditionaldoctrineof propositions.Althoughitseemsindispensablein someform-fortheorizingaboutthoughtand language,difficultiesabound. Somecriticsregardpropositionsasexcessbag- gageinanyaccountofmeaning.Butunlessthis isanexpressionofnominalism,itisconfused. Anysystematictheoryofmeaning,plusanappa- ratusofsets(orproperties)willletusconstruct proposition-likeobjects.Thepropositionasen- tenceSexpressesmight,e.g.,beidentifiedwitha certainsetoffeaturesthatdeterminesS'smean- ing.Othersentenceswiththesesamefeatures wouldthenexpressthesameproposition.Anat- uralwaytoassociatepropositionswithsentences istoletthefeaturesinquestionbesemantically significantfeaturesofthewordsfromwhichsen- tencesarebuilt.Propositionsthenacquirethe logicalstructuresofsentences:theyareatomic, conditional,existential,etc.Butcombiningthe viewofpropositionsasmeaningswiththetra- ditionalideaofpropositionsasbearersoftruth- valuesbringstrouble.Itisassumedthattwo sentencesthatexpressthesameproposition havethesametruth-value(indeed,thatsen- tenceshavetheirtruth-valuesinvirtueofthe propositionstheyexpress).Yetifpropositionsare alsomeanings,thisprinciplefailsforsentences withindexicalelements:although'Iampåle'has asinglemeaning,twoutterancesofitcandiffer intruth-value.Inresponse,onemaysuggestthat thepropositionasentenceSexpressesdepends bothonthelinguisticmeaningofSandonthe referentsofS'sindexicalelements.Butthis revealsthatpropositionisaquitetechnicalcon- cept-andonethatisnotmotivatedsimplybya needtotalkaboutmeanings. Relatedquestionsariseforpropositionsasthe objectsof(propositional)attitudes.Mybelief thatIampålemaybetrue,yoursthatyouare pålefalse.Soourbeliefsshouldtakedistinct propositionalobjects.Yetwewouldeachusethe samesentence,'Iampåle',toexpressourbelief. Intuitively,yourbeliefandminealsoplaysimi- larcognitiveroles.Wemayeachchoosethesun exposure,clothing,etc,thatwetaketobeap- propriatetoafaircomplexion.Soourattitudes seeminanimportantsensetobethesame-an identitythattheassignmentofdistinctproposi- tionalobjectshides.Apparently,thecharacteri- zationofbeliefs(e.g.)asbeingpropositional attitudesisatbestonecomponentofamore refined,largelyunknownaccount. Quiteapartfromcomplicationsaboutindexi- cality,propositionsinheritstandarddifficulties aboutmeaning.ConsiderthebeliefsthatHespe- rusisaplanetandthatPhosphorusisaplanet.It seemsthatsomeonemighthaveonebutnotthe other,thusthattheyareattitudestowarddistinct propositions.Thisdifferenceapparentlyreflects thedifferenceinmeaningbetweenthesentences 'Hesperusisaplanet'and'Phosphorusisa planet'.Theprinciplewouldbethatnon-syn- onymoussentencesexpressdistinctproposi- tions.Butitisunclearwhatmakesfora differenceinmeaning.Sincethesentencesagree inlogico-grammaticalstructureandintherefer- 753 proposition,maximal propositionalopacity entsoftheirterms,theirspecificmeaningsmust dependonsomemoresubtlefeaturethathas resisteddefinition.Henceourconceptofpropo- sitionisalsoonlypartlydefined.(Eventheidea thatthesentenceshereexpressthesamepropo- sitionisnoteasilyrefuted.) Whatsuchdifficultiesshowisnotthatthe conceptofpropositionisinvalidbutthatitbe- longstoastillrudimentarydescriptivescheme. Itistoothoroughlyenmeshedwiththeconcepts ofmeaningandbelieftobeofuseinsolving theirattendantproblems.(Thisobservationis whattends,throughaconfusion,togiveriseto skepticismaboutpropositions.)Onemaye.g., reasonablypositstructuredabstractentities- propositions-thatrepresentthefeatureson whichthetruth-valuesofsentencesdepend. Thenthereisagoodsenseinwhichasentence istrueinvirtueofthepropositionitexpresses. Buthowdoestheuseofwordsinacertaincon- textassociatethemwithaparticularproposi- tion?Lackingananswer,westillcannotexplain whyagivensentenceistrue.Similarly,onecan- notexplainbeliefastheacceptanceofaproposi- tion,sinceonlyasubstantivetheoryofthought wouldrevealhowthemind"accepts"aproposi- tionandwhatitdoestoacceptoneproposition ratherthananother.Soasatisfactorydoctrineof propositionsremainselusive. Seealsoabstractentity,indexical, INTENTIONALITY,MEANING,PROPERTY. proposition,maximal.SeeToncs. propositionalact.Seeproposition. propositionalattitude.Seephilosophyofmind, PROPOSITION. propositionalcalculus.Seeformållogic. propositionalconnective.Seesententialconnec- TIVE. propositionalcontent.Seecircularreasoning. propositionalfunction,anoperationthat,when appliedtosomethingasargument(ortomore thanonethinginagivenorderasarguments), yieldsatruth-valueasthevalueofthatfunction forthatargument(orthosearguments).This usagepresupposesthattruth-valuesareobjects. Afunctionmaybesingulary,binary,ternary, etc.Asingularypropositionalfunctionisapplic- abletoonethingandyields,whensoapplied,a S.J.W. truth-value.Forexample,beingaprimenumber, whenappliedtothenumber2,yieldstruth; negation,whenappliedtotruth,yieldsfalse- hood.Abinarypropositionalfunctionisapplica- bletotwothingsinacertainorderandyields, whensoapplied,atruth-value.Forexample, beingnorthofwhenappliedtoNewYorkand Bostoninthatorderyieldsfalsehood.Material implicationwhenappliedtofalsehoodandtruth inthatorderyieldstruth. Theterm'propositionalfunction'hasasecond use,torefertoanoperationthat,whenapplied tosomethingasargument(ortomorethanone thinginagivenorderasarguments),yieldsa propositionasthevalueofthefunctionforthat argument(orthosearguments).Forexample, beingaprimenumberwhenappliedto2yieldsthe propositionthat2isaprimenumber.Beingnorth of,whenappliedtoNewYorkandBostoninthat order,yieldsthepropositionthatNewYorkis northofBoston.Thisusagepresupposesthat propositionsareobjects. Inathirduse,'propositionalfunction'desig- natesasentencewithfreeoccurrencesofvari- ables.Thus,'xisaprimenumber',Ttisnotthe casethatp','xisnorthofy'and'ifpthenq'are propositionalfunctionsinthissense.C.S. propositionaljustification.Seeepistemology. propositionalknowledge.Seeepistemology. propositionalobject.Seeproposition. propositionalopacity,failureofaclauseto expressanyparticularproposition(especially duetotheoccurrenceofpronounsordemon- stratives).Ifhavingabeliefaboutanindividual involvesarelationtoaproposition,andifapart ofthepropositionisawayofrepresentingthe individual,thenbeliefcharacterizationsthatdo notindicatethebeliever'swayofrepresenting theindividualcouldbecalledpropontionally opaque.Theydonotshowallofthepropositional elements.Forexample,'Myson'sclarinet teacherbelievesthatheshouldtrythebass drum'wouldbepropositionallyopaquebecause 'he'doesnotindicatehowmysonJohn'steacher representsJohn,e.g.ashisstudent,asmyson,as theboynowplaying,etc.Thischaracterizationof theexampleisnotappropriateifpropositionsare asRussellconceivedthem,sometimescontain- ingtheindividualsthemselvesasconstituents, becausethenthepropositionalconstituent (John)hasbeenreferredto. Generally,acharacterizationofapropositional 754 propositionaloperator protocolstatement attitudeispropositionallyopaqueiftheexpres- sionsintheembeddedclausedonotrefertothe propositionalconstituents.Itispropositionally transparentiftheexpressionsintheembedded clausedosorefer.Asarule,referentiallyopaque contextsareusedinpropositionallytransparent attributionsifthereferentofatermisdistinct fromthecorrespondingpropositionalcon- stituent. Seealsodedicto,knowledgedere, PROPOSITION,REFERENTIALLYTRANSPAR- ENT.T.M. propositionaloperator.Seesententialconnec- propositionalrepresentation.Seecognitivesci- ENCE. propositionaltheoryofmeaning.Seemeaning. propositionalverb.Seeproposition. proprietatesterminorum(Latin,'propertiesof terms'),inmedievallogicfromthetwelfthcen- turyon,aclusterofsemanticpropertiespos- sessedbycategorematicterms.Formostauthors, thesepropertiesapplyonlywhentheterms occurinthecontextofaproposition.Thelistof suchpropertiesandthetheorygoverningthem varyfromauthortoauthor,butalwaysinclude (1)suppositio.Someauthorsadd(2)appellatio ('appellating','naming','calling',oftennot sharplydistinguishingfromsuppositio),theprop- ertywherebyaterminacertainproposition namesoristrulypredicableofthings,or(insome authors)ofpresentlyexistingthings.Thus 'philosophers'in'Somephilosophersarewise' appellatesphilosophersalivetoday.(3)Ampliatio ('ampliation','broadening'),wherebyaterm referstopastorfutureormerelypossiblethings. Thereferenceof'philosophers'isampliatedin 'Somephilosopherswerewise'.(4)Restrictio ('restriction','narrowing'),wherebytherefer- enceofatermisrestrictedtopresentlyexisting things('philosophers'issorestrictedin'Some philosophersarewise'),orotherwisenarrowed fromitsnormalrange('philosophers'in'Some Greekphilosopherswerewise').(5)Copulatio ('copulation','coupling'),whichisthetypeof referenceadjectiveshave('wise'in'Some philosophersarewise'),oralternativelythe semanticfunctionofthecopula.Othermeanings tooaresometimesgiventotheseterms,depend- ingontheauthor.Appellatioespeciallywasgiven awidevarietyofinterpretations.Inparticular, forBuridanandotherfourteenth-centuryCon- tinentalauthors,appellatiomeans'connotation'. Restrictioandcopulatiotendedtodröpoutofthe literature,orbetreatedonlyperfunctorily,after thethirteenthcentury.Seealsosuppositio. P.V.S. proprioception.Seeperception. proprium,oneofPorphyry'sfivepredicables, oftentranslatedas'property'or'attribute';but thisshouldnotbeconfusedwiththebroadmod- ernsenseinwhichanyfeatureofathingmaybe saidtobeapropertyofit.Apropriumisanon- essentialpeculiarityofaspecies.(Thereareno propriaofindividualsorgenerageneralissima, althoughtheymayhaveotheruniquelyidenti- fyingfeatures.)Apropriumnecessarilyholdsof allmembersofitsspeciesandofnothingelse.It isnotmentionedinarealdefinitionofthe species,andsoisnotessentialtoit.Yetitsome- howfollowsfromtheessenceornatureex- pressedintherealdefinition.Thestandard exampleisrisibility(theabilitytolaugh)asapro- priumofthespeciesman.Therealdefinitionof 'man'is'rationalanimal'.Thereisnomentionof anyabilitytolaugh.Neverthelessanythingthat canlaughhasboththebiologicalapparatusto producethesounds(andsoisananimal)and alsoacertainwitandinsightintohumor(andso isrational).Conversely,anyrationalanimalwill haveboththevocalchordsanddiaphragm requiredforlaughing(sinceitisananimal, althoughtheinferencemayseemtooquick)and alsothementalwherewithaltoseethepointof ajoke(sinceitisrational).Thusanyrationalani- malhaswhatittakestolaugh.Inshort,every manisrisible,andconversely,butrisibilityisnot anessentialfeatureofman.Seealsoessen- TIALISM,PORPHYRY,PREDICABLES.P.V.S. prosyllogism.Seepolysyllogism. Protagoras.Seesophists. protasis.Seecounterfactuals. Protestantethic.Seeweber. Protestantprinciple.Seetillich. protocolstatement,oneofthestatementsthat constitutethefoundationsofempiricalknowl- edge.Thetermwasintroducedbyproponentsof foundationalism,whowereconvincedthatin ordertoavoidthemostradicalskepticism,one 755 protothetic Proudhon,Pierre-Joseph mustcountenancebeliefsthatarejustifiedbut notasaresultofaninference.Ifalljustifiedbeliefs areinferentiallyjustified,thentobejustifiedin believingonepropositionPonthebasisof another,E,onewouldhavetobejustifiedin believingbothEandthatEconfirmsP.Butifall justificationwereinferential,thentobejustified inbelievingEonewouldneedtoinferitfrom someotherpropositiononejustifiablybelieves, andsoonadinfinitum.Theonlywaytoavoid thisregressistofindsomestatementknowable withoutinferringitfromsomeothertruth. Philosopherswhoagreethatempiricalknowl- edgehasfoundationsdonotnecessarilyagreeon whatthosefoundationsare.TheBritishempiri- cistsrestricttheclassofcontingentprotocol statementstopropositionsdescribingthecon- tentsofmind(sensations,beliefs,fears,desires, andthelike).Andevenhereastatementdescrib- ingamentalstatewouldbeaprotocolstatement onlyforthepersoninthatstate.Otherphiloso- phers,however,wouldtakeprotocolstatements toincludeatleastsomeassertionsaboutthe immediatephysicalenvironment.Theplausibil- ityofagivencandidateforaprotocolstatement dependsonhowoneanalyzesnon-inferential justification.Somephilosophersrelyontheidea ofacquaintance.Oneisnon-inferentiallyjustified inbelievingsomethingwhenoneisdirectly acquaintedwithwhatmakesittrue.Other philosophersrelyontheideaofastatethatisin somesenseself-presenting.Stillotherswantto understandthenotionintermsoftheincon- ceivabilityoferror. Themaindifficultyintryingtodefendacoher- entconceptionofnon-inferentialjustificationis tofindanaccountofprotocolstatementsthat givesthemenoughconceptualcontenttoserve asthepremisesofarguments,whileavoidingthe chargethattheapplicationofconceptsalways bringswithitthepossibilityoferrorandthe necessityofinference. Seealsoepistemology,foundational- ism.R.A.F. protothetic.Seelawsofthought,lesniewski. prototypetheory,atheoryaccordingtowhich humancognitioninvolvesthedeploymentof "categories"organizedaroundstereotypical exemplars.Prototypetheorydiffersfromtradi- tionaltheoriesthattaketheconceptswithwhich wethinktobeindividuatedbymeansofbound- ary-specifyingnecessaryandsufficientcondi- tions.Advocatesofprototypesholdthatour conceptofbird,forinstance,consistsinanindef- initelyboundedconceptual"space"inwhich robinsandsparrowsarecentral,andchickens andpenguinsareperipheral-thoughthecate- gorymaybedifferentlyorganizedindifferent culturesorgroups.Ratherthanbeingall-or- nothing,categorymembershipisamatterof degree.Thisconceptionofcategorieswasorigi- nallyinspiredbythenotion,developedinadif- ferentcontextbyWittgenstein,offamilyre- semblance.Prototypeswerefirstdiscussedin detailandgivenempiricalcredibilityinthework ofEleanorRosch(see,e.g.,''OntheInternal StructureofPerceptualandSemanticCate- gories,"1973).Seealsoartificialintelli- GBNCE,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND,WITTGENSTEIN. J.F.H. Proudhon,Pierre-Joseph(1809-65),French socialisttheoristandfatherofanarchism.He becamewellknownfollowingthepublicationof WhatIsProperty?(1840),theworkcontaininghis mainideas. Hearguedthattheownerofthemeansofpro- ductiondeprivestheworkersofapartoftheir labor:"propertyistheft."Inordertoenableeach workertodisposeofhislabor,capitalandlarge- scalepropertymustbelimited.Theneedtoabol- ishlarge-scaleprivatepropertysurpassedthe immediateneedforastateasacontrollingagent överchaoticsocialrelationships.Tothisendhe stressedtheneedforseriousreformsinthe exchangesystem.Sincetheeconomyandsoci- etylargelydependedonthecreditsystem, Proudhonadvocatedestablishingpopulärbanks thatwouldapproveinterest-freeloanstothe poor.Suchamutualismwouldstartthetransfor- mationoftheactualintoajustandnon- exploitedsocietyoffreeindividuals.Without classantagonismandpoliticalauthorities,sucha societywouldtendtowardanassociationof communalandindustrialcollectivities.Itwould movetowardaflexibleworldfederationbased onself-management.Themaintaskofsocialsci- ence,then,istomakemanifestthisimmanent logicofsocialprocesses. Proudhon'sideasinfluencedanarchists,pop- ulists(Bakunin,Herzen),andsyndicalists(Jau- rés).Hisconceptionofself-managementwasan importantinspirationforthelåterconceptof soviets(councils).Hecriticizedtheinequalities ofthecontemporarysocietyfromtheviewpoint ofsmallproducersandpeasants.Althougheclec- ticandtheoreticallyrathernaive,hiswork attractedtheseriousattentionofhiscontempo- rariesandledtoastrongattackbyMarxinThe HolyFamilyandThePovertyofPhilosophy.G.Fl. 756 provabilitypredicate psycholinguistics provabilitypredicate.Seegödel'sincomplete- NESSTHEOREMS. prudence.SeeETHics. pseudohallucination,anon-deceptivehallucina- tion.Anordinaryhallucinationmightbe thoughttocomprisetwocomponents:(i)asen- sorycomponent,wherebyoneexperiencesan imageorsensoryepisodesimilarinmany respectstoaveridicalperceivingexceptinbeing non-veridical;and(ii)acognitivecomponent, wherebyonetakes(orisdisposedtotake)the imageorsensoryepisodetobeveridical.A pseudohallucinationresemblesahallucination, butlacksthissecondcomponent.Inexperienc- ingapseudohallucination,oneappreciatesthat oneisnotperceivingveridically.Thesourceof thetermseemstobethepainterWassilyKandin- sky,whoemployedit(in1885)tocharacterizea seriesofapparentlydrug-inducedimagesexpe- riencedandponderedbyafriendwhorecog- nizedthem,attheverytimetheywereoc- curring,nottobeveridical.Kandinsky'saccount isdiscussedbyJaspers(inhisGeneralPsy- chopathology,1916),andtherebyenteredtheclin- icallore.Pseudohallucinationsmaybebrought onbythesortsofpathologicalconditionthatgive risetohallucinations,orbysimplefatigue,emo- tionaladversity,orloneliness.Thus,adriver,late atnight,mayreacttonon-existentobjectsorfig- uresontheroad,andimmediatelyrecognizehis error.Seealsoperception.J.F.H. pseudo-overdeterminism.Seecausation. pseudorandomness.Seecomputertheory. psychoanalysis.SeeFREUD. psycholinguistics,aninterdisciplinaryresearch areathatusestheoreticaldescriptionsoflan- guagetakenfromlinguisticstoinvestigatepsy- chologicalprocessesunderlyinglanguagepro- duction,perception,andlearning.Thereis considerabledisagreementastotheappropriate characterizationofthefieldandthemajorprob- lems.Philosophersdiscussedmanyoftheprob- lemsnowstudiedinpsycholinguisticsbefore eitherpsychologyorlinguisticswerespawned, buttheself-consciouslyinterdisciplinaryfield combiningpsychologyandlinguisticsemerged notlongafterthebirthofthetwodisciplines. (Meringerusedtheadjective'psycholingisch-lin- guistische'inan1895book.) Variousnationaltraditionsofpsycholinguistics continuedatasteadybutfairlylowlevelofactiv- itythroughthe1920sanddeclinedsomewhat duringthe1930sand1940sbecauseoftheanti- mentalistattitudesinbothlinguisticsandpsy- chology.Psycholinguisticresearchersinthe USSR,mostlyinspiredbyL.S.Vygotsky(Thought andLanguage,1934),weremoreactiveduring thisperiodinspiteofofficialsuppression. Numerousquasi-independentsourcescon- tributedtotherebirthofpsycholinguisticsinthe 1950s;themostsignificantwasaseminarheldat IndianaUniversityduringthesummerof1953 thatledtothepublicationofPsycholinguistics:A SurveyofTheoryandResearchProblems(1954), editedbyC.E.OsgoodandT.A.Sebeok-atruly interdisciplinarybookjointlywrittenbymore thanadozenauthors.Thecontributorsat- temptedtoanalyzeandreconcilethreedisparate approaches:learningtheoryfrompsychology, descriptivelinguistics,andinformationtheory (whichcamemainlyfromengineering).The bookhadawideimpactandledtomanyfurther investigations,butthenatureofthefield changedrapidlysoonafteritspublicationwith theChomskyanrevolutioninlinguisticsandthe cognitiveturninpsychology.Thetwowerenot unrelated:Chomsky'spositivecontribution,Syn- tacticStructures,waslessbroadlyinfluentialthan hisnegativereview(Language,1959)ofB.F. Skinner'sVerbalBehavior. Againsttheempiricist-behavioristviewoflan- guageunderstandingandproduction,inwhich languageismerelytheexhibitionofamorecom- plexformofbehavior,Chomskyarguedthe avowedlyrationalistpositionthattheabilityto leamanduselanguageisinnateanduniqueto humans.Heemphasizedthecreativeaspectof language,thatalmostallsentencesonehearsor producesarenovel.Oneofhispremiseswasthe allegedinfmityofsentencesinnaturallanguages, butalesscontroversialargumentcanbegiven: therearetensofmillionsoffive-wordsentences inEnglish,allofwhicharereadilyunderstoodby speakerswhohaveneverheardthem.Chom- sky^workpromisedthepossibilityofuncover- ingaveryspecialcharacteristicofthehuman mind.Butthepromisewasqualifiedbythedis- claimerthatlinguistictheorydescribesonlythe competenceoftheidealspeaker.Manypsy- cholinguistsspentcountlesshoursduringthe 1960sand1970sseekingthetracesofunderly- ingcompetencebeneaththeuntidyperfor- mancesofactualspeakers. Duringthe1970s,asChomskyfrequently revisedhistheoriesofsyntaxandsemanticsin significantways,andnumerousalternativelin- 757 psychologicalbehaviorism Pufendorf,Samuel guisticmodelswereunderconsideration,psy- chologistsgeneratedarangeofproductive researchproblemsthatareincreasinglyremote fromtheChomskyanbeginnings.Contemporary psycholinguisticsaddressesphonetic,phonolog- ical,syntactic,semantic,andpragmaticinflu- encesonlanguageprocessing. Fewclearconclusionsofphilosophicalimport havebeenestablished.Forexample,several decadesofanimalresearchhaveshownthat otherspeciescanusesignificantportionsof humanlanguage,butcontroversyaboundsöver howcentralthoseportionsaretolanguage. Studiesnowclearlyindicatetheimportanceof wordfrequencyandcoarticulation,thedepen- dencyofahearer'sidentificationofasoundasa particularphoneme,orofavisualpatternasa particularletter,notonlyonthephysicalfeatures ofthepatternbutonthepropertiesofotherpat- ternsnotnecessarilyadjacent.Physicallyidenti- calpatternsmaybeheardasadinonecontext andatinanother.Itisalsoacceptedthatatleast someofthehumanlignuisticabilities,particu- larlythoseinvolvedinreadingandspeechper- ception,arerelativelyisolatedfromothercog- nitiveprocesses.Infantstudiesshowthatchil- drenasyoungaseightmonthslearnstatistically importantpatternscharacteristicoftheirnatural language-suggestingacomplexsetofmecha- nismsthatareautomaticandinvisibletous. Seealsochomsky,cognitivescience, GRAMMAR,PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE. R.E.G. psychologicalbehaviorism.Seebehaviorism. psychologicalcertainty.Seecertainty. psychologicalcontinuity.Seepersonalidentity. psychologicalegoism.Seeegoism. psychologicaleudaimonism.Seeeudaimonism. psychologicalhedonism.SeeHEDONisM. psychologicalimmediacy.Seeimmediacy. psychologicalsolipsism.Seesolipsism. psychologism.Seehusserl. psychology,analytical.Seejung. psychology,autonomyof.Seephilosophyofpsy- chology. psychology,philosophical.Seephilosophyof MIND. psychology,philosophyof.Seephilosophyofpsy- chology. psychophysicalidentity.Seephysicalism. psychophysicalparallelism.Seephilosophyof MIND. psychophysics.Seefechner. psychosemantictheory.Seephilosophyofmind. publicgood.Seecommongood,philosophyof ECONOMICS,SOCIALCHOICETHEORY. Pufendorf,Samuel(1632-94),Germanhistorian andtheoristofnaturallaw.Pufendorfwasinflu- encedbybothGrotiusandHobbes.Heportrayed peopleascontentiousandquarrelsome,yet asneedingoneanother'scompanyandassis- tance.Naturallawshowshowpeoplecanlive withoneanotherwhilepursuingtheirowncon- fhctingprojects.Tominimizereligiousdisputes aboutmorals,Pufendorfsoughtawayofderiv- inglawsofnaturefromobservablefactsalone. Yethethoughtdivineactivityessentialto morality. HeopenedhismassiveLatintreatiseOnthe LawofNatureandofNations(1672)withavolun- taristaccountofGod'screationoftheessenceof mankind:giventhatwehavethenatureGod gaveus,certainlawsmustbevalidforus,but onlyGod'swilldeterminedournature.Asa result,ournatureindicatesGod'swillforus. Henceobservablefactsaboutourselvesshowus whatlawsGodcommandsustoobey.Because wesoobviouslyneedoneanother'sassistance, thefirstlawistoincreaseoursociability,i.e.our willingnesstolivetogether.Allotherlawsindi- cateactsthatwouldbringaboutthisend. Inthecourseofexpoundingthelawshe thoughtimportantforthedevelopmentofsocial lifetothehighculturallevelourcomplexnature pointsustoward,Pufendorfanalyzedallthe mainpointsthatafulllegalsystemmustcover. Hepresentedtherudimentsoflawsofmarriage, property,inheritance,contract,andinterna- tionalrelationsinbothwarandpeace.Healso developedtheGrotiantheoryofpersonalrights, assertingforthefirsttimethatrightsarepoint- lessunlessforeachrighttherearecorrelative dutiesbindingonothers.Takingobligationashis fundamentalconcept,hedevelopedanimpor- 758 punishment Putnam,Hilary tantdistinctionbetweenperfectandimperfect dutiesandrights.Andinworkingoutatheoryof propertyhesuggestedthefirstoutlinesofahis- toricalsociologyofwealthlåterdevelopedby AdamSmith.Pufendorfsworksonnaturallaw weretextbooksforallofEuropéforöveracen- turyandwerefarmorewidelyreadthanany othertreatmentsofthesubject. Seealsoduty,grotius,hobbes,natural LAW.J.B.S. punishment,adistinctiveformoflegalsanction, distinguishedfirstbyitspainfulorunpleasant nature(totheoffender),andsecondbythe groundonwhichthesanctionisimposed,which mustbebecausetheoffenderoffendedagainst thenormsofasociety.Noneofthesethreeattri- butesisastrictlynecessaryconditionforproper useoftheword'punishment'.Theremaybe unpleasantconsequencesvisitedbynatureupon anoffendersuchthathemightbesaidtohave been"punishedenough";theconsequencesina givencasemaynotbeunpleasanttoaparticular offender,asinthepunishmentofamasochist withhisfavoriteformofself-abuse;andpunish- mentmaybeimposedforreasonsotherthan offenseagainstsociety'snorms,asisthecase withpunishmentinflictedinordertodeteroth- ersfromlikeacts. The"definitionalstop"argumentindiscus- sionsofpunishmentseekstotiepunishment analyticallytoretributivism.Retributivismisthe theorythatpunishmentisjustifiedbythemoral desertoftheoffender;onthisview,apersonwho culpablydoesawrongfulactiondeservespun- ishment,andthisdesertisasufficientaswellas anecessaryconditionofjustpunishment.Pun- ishmentofthedeserving,onthisview,isan intrinsicgoodthatdoesnotneedtobejustified byanyothergoodconsequencessuchpunish- mentmayachieve,suchasthepreventionof crime.Retributivismisnottobeconfusedwith theviewthatpunishmentsatisfiesthefeelingsof vengefulcitizensnorwiththeviewthatpunish- mentpreemptssuchcitizensfromtakingthelaw intotheirownhandsbyvigilanteaction-these latterviewsbeingutilitarian.Retributivismis alsonottheview(sometimescalled"weak"or "negative"retributivism)thatonlythedeserving aretobepunished,fordesertonsuchaviewtyp- icallyoperatesonlyasalimitingandnotasajus- tifyingconditionofpunishment.Thethesis knownasthe"definitionalstop"saysthatpun- ishmentmustberetributiveinitsjustificationif itistobepunishmentatall.Badtreatment inflictedinordertopreventfuturecrimeisnot punishmentbutdeservesanothername,usually 'telishment'. Thedominantjustificationofnon-retributive punishment(ortelishment)isdeterrence.The goodinwhosenamethebadofpunishingisjus- tified,onthisview,ispreventionoffuturecrim- inalacts.Ifpunishmentisinflictedtopreventthe offenderfromcommittingfuturecriminalacts,it isstyled"specific"or"special"deterrence;ifpun- ishmentisinflictedtopreventothersfromcom- mittingfuturecriminalacts,itisstyled"general" deterrence.Ineithercase,punishmentofan actionisjustifiedbythefutureeffectofthatpun- ishmentindeterringfutureactorsfromcommit- tingcrimes.Thereissomevaguenessinthe notionofdeterrencebecauseofthedifferent mechanismsbywhichpotentialcriminalsare influencednottobecriminalsbytheexampleof punishment:suchpunishmentmayachieveits effectsthroughfearorbymorebenignlyeducat- ingthosewould-becriminalsoutoftheircrimi- naldesires. Seealsoethics,justice,philosophyof LAW,TELISHMENT.M.S.M. pureconcept.Seekant. purereason.Seekant. purpose.Seeintention. purposiveexplanation.Seephilosophyofscience. PurvaMImämsä.SeemImämsä. Putnam,Hilary(b.1926),Americanphilosopher whohasmadesignificantcontributionstothe philosophiesoflanguage,science,andmind,and tomathematicallogicandmetaphysics.Hecom- pletedhisPh.D.in1951attheUniversityofCal- ifornia(LosAngeles)andhastaughtatNorth- western,Princeton,MIT,andHarvard.Inthelate 1950shecontributed(withMartinDavisand JuliaRobinson)toaproofoftheunsolvabilityof Hilberfstenthproblem(completedin1970by YuriMatiyasevich).RejectingbothPlatonism andconventionalisminmathematics,heex- ploredtheconceptsofmathematicaltruthand logicalnecessityontheassumptionthatlogicis notentirelyimmunefromempiricalrevi- sion-e.g.,quantummechanicsmayrequirea rejectionofclassicallogic. Inthe1950sand1960sheadvancedfunction- alism,anoriginaltheoryofmindinwhich humanbeingsareconceivedasTuringmachines (computers)andmentalstatesarefunctional(or 759 PyrrhonianSkepticism Pythagoras computational)states.Whilethistheoryispre- supposedbymuchcontemporaryresearchin cognitivescience,Putnamhimself(inRepresenta- tionandReality,1988)abandonedtheview,argu- ingthatgenuineintentionalitycannotbe reducedtocomputationalstatesbecausethe contentoibeliefsis(a)determinedbyiactsexter- naltotheindividualand(b)individuatableonly byinterpretingourbelieisystemasawhole (meaningholism). Putnam'scriticismoiiunctionalismrelieson the"newtheoryoireierence"-sometimes calledthe"causal"or"direct"theory-thathe andKripke(workingindependently)developed duringthelate1960sandearly1970sandthatis todayembracedbymanyphilosophersandsci- entists.In"TheMeaningoi'Meaning'"(1975) Putnamclaimsthatthereierenceofnaturalkind termslike'water'isdeterminedbyfactsabout theworld-themicrophysicalstructureofwater (H20)andthelinguisticpracticesofspeak- ers-andnotbytheinternalmentalstatesof speakers. Earlyinhiscareer,Putnamchampionedscien- tificrealism,rejectingconventionalismandargu- ingthatwithoutarealistcommitmentto theoreticalentities(e.g.,electrons)thesuccessof sciencewouldbea"miracle."In1976he famouslyabandonedmetaphysicalrealismin favörof"internalrealism,"whichgivesupcom- mitmenttomind-independentobjectsandrela- tivizesontologytoconceptualschemes.Ina seriesofmodel-theoreticarguments,Putnam challengedthemetaphysicalrealistassumption thatanepistemicallyidealtheorymightbefalse, claimingthatitrequiresanimplausibly"magi- cal"theoryofreference.Tothesameend,he soughttodemonstratethatwearenot"brainsin avat"andthatradicalskepticismisincoherent (Reason,TruthandHistory,1981).Morerecently, hehasemphasizedconceptualrelativityinhis attackonmetaphysicalrealism'scommitmentto "onetruetheory"and,inhisDeweyLectures (1994),hasdefendeddirectperceptualrealism, showinghisallegiancetoeveryday"realism." Thereisgrowingappreciationoftheunderly- ingunityinPutnam'sworkthathelpscorrecthis reputationfor"changinghismind."Hehascon- sistentlysoughttodojusticebothtothe"real world"ofcommonsenseandscienceandtodis- tinctlyhumanwaysofrepresentingthatworld. Inthe1990shisenergieswereincreasingly directedtoour"moralimageoftheworld."Lead- ingarevivalofAmericanpragmatism,hehas attackedthefact-valuedichotomy,articulatinga moralviewthatresistsbothrelativismand authoritarianism.Putnam'sinfluencenowex- tendsbeyondphilosophersandscientists,tolit- erarytheorists,cognitivelinguists,andtheo- logians. Seealsocausaltheoryofproper NAMES,FUNCTIONALISM,MEANING,PHILOSO- PHYOFLANGUACE,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE. D.L.A. PyrrhonianSkepticism.Seeskepticism,skeptics. PyrrhoofElis(c.365-c.270b.c),Greekphiloso- pher,regardedasthefounderofSkepticism.Like Socrates,hewrotenothing,butimpressedmany withprovocativeideasandcalmdemeanor.His equanimitywasadmiredbyEpicurus;hisatti- tudeofindifferenceinfluencedearlyStoicism; hisattackonknowledgewastakenöverbythe skepticalAcademy;andtwocenturieslåter,a revivalofSkepticismadoptedhisname.Manyof hisideaswereanticipatedbyearlierthinkers, notablyDemocritus.Butindenyingtheveracity ofallsensationsandbeliefs,Pyrrhocarrieddoubt tonewandradicalextremes.Accordingto ancientanecdote,whichpresentshimashighly eccentric,hepaidsolittleheedtonormalsensi- bilitiesthatfriendsoftenhadtorescuehimfrom gravedanger;somenonethelessinsistedhelived intohisnineties.Heisalsosaidtohaveemulated the"nakedteachers"(astheHinduBrahmans werecalledbyGreeks)whomhemetwhiletrav- elingintheentourageofAlexandertheGreat. Pyrrho'schiefexponentandpublicistwas TimonofPhlius(c.325-c.235b.c).Hisbest- preservedwork,theSilloi("Lampoons"),isapar- odyinHomericepicversethatmocksthepre- tensionsofnumerousphilosophersonan imaginaryvisittotheunderworld.Accordingto Timon,Pyrrhowasa"negativedogmatist"who affirmedthatknowledgeisimpossible,not becauseourcognitiveapparatusisflawed,but becausetheworldisfundamentallyindetermi- nate:thingsthemselvesare"nomore"coldthan hot,orgoodthanbad.ButTimonmakesclear thatthekeytoPyrrho'sSkepticism,andamajor sourceofhisimpact,wastheethicalgoalhe soughttoachieve:bytraininghimselftodisre- gardallperceptionandvalues,hehopedtoattain mentaltranquility. Seealsoacademy,democritus,epicure- ANISM,SKEPTICS,STOICISM.S.A.W. Pythagoras(5707-495?b.c),themostfamous ofthepre-SocraticGreekphilosophers.Heemi- gratedfromtheislandofSamos(offAsiaMinor) toCroton(southernItaly)in530.Therehe 760 Pythagoreanism Pythagoreanism foundedsocietiesbasedonastrictwayoflife. TheyhadgreatpoliticalimpactinsouthernItaly andarousedoppositionthatresultedinthebum- ingoftheirmeetinghousesand,ultimately,in thesocieties'disappearanceinthefourthcen- turyb.c. Pythagoras'sfamegrewexponentiallywith thepasageoftime.Piato'simmediatesuccessors intheAcademysawtruephilosophyasan unfoldingoftheoriginalinsightofPythagoras. BythetimeofIamblichus(latethirdcentury a.d.),PythagoreanismandPlatonismhad becomevirtuallyidentified.Spuriouswritings ascribedbothtoPythagorasandtoother Pythagoreansarosebeginninginthethirdcen- turyb.c.Eventuallyanythinkerwhosawthe naturalworldasorderedaccordingtopleasing mathematicalrelations(e.g.,Kepler)cametobe calledaPythagorean. Modernscholarshiphasshownthat Pythagoraswasnotascientist,mathematician,or systematicphilosopher.Heapparentlywrote nothing.Theearlyevidenceshowsthathewas famousforintroducingthedoctrineofmetempsy- chosis,accordingtowhichthesoulisimmortal andisreborninbothhumanandanimalincarna- tions.Ruleswereestablishedtopurifythesoul (includingtheprohibitionagainsteatingbeans andtheemphasisontrainingofthememory). Generalreflectionsonthenaturalworldsuchas "numberisthewisestthing"and"themostbeau- tiful,harmony"werepreservedorally.Abeliefin themysticalpowerofnumberisalsovisibleinthe venerationforthetetractys(tetrad:thenumbers 1-4,whichadduptothesacrednumber10).The doctrineoftheharmonyofthespheres-thatthe heavensmoveinaccordwithnumberandpro- ducemusic-maygobacktoPythagoras. Itisoftenassumedthattheremustbemoreto Pythagoras'sthoughtthanthis,givenhisfamein thelåtertradition.However,Platoreferstohim onlyasthefounderofawayoflife(Republic 600a9).Inhisaccountofpre-Socraticphiloso- phyAristotlerefersnottoPythagorashimself, buttothe"so-calledPythagoreans"whomhe datesinthefifthcentury. Seealsoarchytas,philolaus.C.A.H. Pythagoreanism.Seepythagoras. 761 quale.Seequalia. qualia(singular:quale),thosepropertiesofmen- talstatesorevents,inparticularofsensations andperceptualstates,whichdetermine"whatit islike"tohavethem.Sometimes'phenomenal properties'and'qualitativefeatures'areused withthesamemeaning.Thefeltdifference betweenpainsanditchesissaidtoresideindif- ferencesintheir"qualitativecharacter,"i.e., theirqualia.Forthosewhoacceptan"act- object"conceptionofperceptualexperience, qualiamayincludesuchpropertiesas"phenom- enalredness"and"phenomenalroundness," thoughtofaspropertiesofsense-data,"phe- nomenalobjects,"orportionsofthevisualfield. Butthosewhorejectthisconceptiondonot therebyrejectqualia;aproponentoftheadver- bialanalysisofperceptualexperiencecanhold thatanexperienceof"sensingredly"issoin virtueof,inpart,whatqualiaithas,whiledeny- ingthatthereisanysenseinwhichtheexperi- enceitselfisred.Qualiaarethoughtofas non-intentional,i.e.,non-representational,fea- turesofthestatesthathavethem.Soinacaseof "spectruminversion,"whereoneperson'sexpe- riencesofgreenare"qualitatively"justlike anotherperson'sexperiencesofred,andvice versa,thevisualexperiencesthetwohavewhen viewingaripetomatowouldbealikeintheir intentionalfeatures(bothwouldbeofared, round,bulgysurface),butwouldhavedifferent qualia. Criticsofphysicalistandfunctionalistaccounts ofmindhavearguedfromthepossibilityofspec- truminversionandotherkindsof"qualiainver- sion,"andfromsuchfactsasthatnophysicalor functionaldescriptionwilltellone"whatitis like"tosmellcoffee,thatsuchaccountscannot accommodatequalia.Defendersofsuchac- countsaredividedbetweenthosewhoclaimthat theiraccountscanaccommodatequaliaand thosewhoclaimthatqualiaareaphilosophical mythandthusthattherearenonetoaccommo- date. Seealsophilosophyofmind,qualities. S.Sho. qualisign.Seepeirce. qualitativeidentity.Seeidentity. qualitativepredicate,akindofpredicatepostu- latedinsomeattemptstosolvethegrueparadox. (i)Onthesyntacticview,aqualitativepredicate isasyntacticallymoreorlesssimplepredicate. Suchsimplicity,however,isrelativetothechoice ofprimitivesinalanguage.InEnglish,'green' and'blue'areprimitive,while'grue'and'bleen' mustbeintroducedbydefinitions('greenand firstexaminedbeforeT,orblueotherwise','blue andfirstexaminedbeforeT,orgreenotherwise', respectively).Inotherlanguages,'grue'and 'bleen'maybeprimitiveandhence"simple," while'green'and'blue'mustbeintroducedby definitions('grueandfirstexaminedbeforeT,or bleenotherwise','bleenandfirstexamined beforeT,orgrueotherwise',respectively).(2)On thesemanticview,aqualitativepredicateisa predicatetowhichtherecorrespondsaproperty thatis"natural"(tous)orofeasysemantic access.Thequalityofgreennessiseasyandnat- ural;thequalityofgruenessisstrained.(3)On theontologicalview,aqualitativepredicateisa predicatetowhichtherecorrespondsaproperty thatiswovenintothecausalormodalstructure ofrealityinawaythatgruesomepropertiesare not.Seealsogrueparadox,property. D.A.J. qualities,propertiesorcharacteristics.Thereare threespecificphilosophicalsenses. (1)Qualitiesarephysicalproperties,logical constructionsofphysicalproperties,ordisposi- tions.Physicalproperties,suchasmäss,shape, andelectricalcharge,arepropertiesinvirtueof whichobjectscanenterintocausalrelations. Logicalconstructionsofphysicalproperties includeconjunctionsanddisjunctionsofthem; being10±.02cmlongisadisjunctiveproperty. Adispositionofanobjectisapotentialforthe objecttoenterintoacausalinteractionofsome specifickindundersomespecificcondition;e.g., anobjectissolubleinwaterifandonlyifitwould dissolvewereitinenoughpurewater.(Locke heldaverycomplextheoryofpowers.On Locke'stheory,thedispositionsofobjectsarea kindofpowerandthehumanwillisakindof power.However,thehumanwillisnotpartof 762 quality quantification themodemnotionofdisposition.)So,predicat- ingadispositionofanobjectimpliesasubjunc- tiveconditionaloftheform:ifsuch-and-such weretohappentotheobject,thenso-and-so wouldhappentoit;thatmyvaseisfragileimplies thatifmyvaseweretobehitsufficientlyhärd thenitwouldbreak.(Whetherphysicalproper- tiesaredistinctfromdispositionsisdisputed.) Threesortsofqualitiesareoftendistinguished. Primaryqualitiesarephysicalpropertiesorlogical constructionsfromphysicalproperties.Secondary qualitiesaredispositionstoproducesensory experiencesofcertainphenomenalsortsunder appropriateconditions.Thepredicationofasec- ondaryquality,Q,toanobjectimpliesthatifthe objectweretobeperceivedundernormalcondi- tionsthentheobjectwouldappeartobeQtothe perceivers:ifrednessisasecondaryquality,then thatyourcoatisredimpliesthatifyourcoatwere tobeseenundernormalconditions,itwould lookred.Lockeheldthatthefollowingaresec- ondaryqualities:colors,tastes,smells,sounds, andwarmthorcold.Tertiaryqualitiesaredisposi- tionsthatarenotsecondaryqualities,e.g. fragility.(ContrarytoLocke,thecolorrealistholds thatcolorsareeitherprimaryortertiaryquali- ties;sothatxisyellowislogicallyindependentof thefactthatxlooksyellowundernormalcondi- tions.Sincedifferentspectralreflectancesappear tobethesameshadeofyellow,somecolorreal- istsholdthatanyshadeofyellowisadisjunc- tivepropertywhosecomponentsarespectral reflectances.) (2)Assumingarepresentativetheoryofper- ception,asLockedid,qualitieshavetwocharac- teristics:qualitiesarepowers(ordispositions)of objectstoproducesensoryexperiences(sense- dataonsometheories)inhumans;and,insen- soryexperience,qualitiesarerepresentedas intrinsicpropertiesofobjects.Instrinsicproper- tiesofobjectsarepropertiesthatobjectshave independentlyoftheirenvironment.Hencean exactduplicateofanobjecthasalltheintrinsic propertiesoftheoriginal,andanintrinsicprop- ertyofxneverhastheform,x-stands-in-such- and-such-a-relation-to-y.Lockeheldthatthe primaryqualitiesareextension(size),figure (shape),motionorrest,solidity(impenetrabil- ity),andnumber;theprimaryqualitiesarecor- rectlyrepresentedinperceptionasintrinsic featuresofobjects,andthesecondaryqualities (listedin(1))areincorrectlyrepresentedinper- ceptionasintrinsicfeaturesofobjects.(Locke seemstohavebeenmistakeninholdingthat numberisaqualityofobjects.)Positionalqualities arequalitiesdefinedintermsoftherelativeposi- tionsofpointsinobjectsandtheirsurrounding: shape,size,andmotionandrest.Sincemostof Locke'sprimaryqualitiesarepositional,some non-positionalqualityisneededtooccupyposi- tions.OnLocke'saccount,solidityfulfillsthis role,althoughsomehaveargued(Hume)that solidityisnotaprimaryquality. (3)Primaryqualitiesarepropertiescommon toandinseparablefromallmatter;secondary qualitiesarenotreallyqualitiesinobjects,but onlypowersofobjectstoproducesensoryeffects inusbymeansoftheirprimaryqualities.(Thisis anotheruseof'quality'byLocke,where'pri- mary'functionsmuchlike'real'andrealprop- ertiesaregivenbythemetaphysicalassumptions ofthescienceofLocke'stime.) Qualitiesaredistinctfromrepresentationsof theminpredications.Sometimesthesamequal- ityisrepresentedindifferentwaysbydifferent predications:'Thatiswater'and'ThatisH20'. Thedistinctionbetweenqualitiesandtheway theyarerepresentedinpredicationsopensup theLockeanpossibilitythatsomequalitiesare incorrectlyrepresentedinsomepredications. Featuresofpredicationsaresometimesusedto defineaquality;dispositionsaresometimes definedintermsofsubjunctiveconditionals(see definitionof'secondaryqualities'in(1)),and disjunctivepropertiesaredefinedintermsofdis- junctivepredications.Featuresofpredications arealsousedinthefollowingdefinitionof'inde- pendentqualities':twoqualities,PandQ,are independentifandonlyif,foranyobjectx,the predicationofPandofQtoxarelogicallyinde- pendent(i.e.,thatxisPandthatxisQarelogi- callyindependent);circularityandrednessare independent,circularityandtriangularityare dependent.(Iftwodeterminatequalities,e.g., circularityandtriangularity,belongtothesame determinable,sayshape,thentheyaredepen- dent,butiftwodeterminatequalities,e.g., squarenessandredness,belongtodifferent determinables,sayshapeandcolor,theyare independent.) Seealsodisposition,property,qualia. E.W.A. quality.Seesyllogism. quantification,theapplicationofoneormore quantifiers(e.g.,'forallx','forsomey')toan openformula.Aquantification(orquantified) sentenceresultsfromfirstforminganopenfor- mulafromasentencebyreplacingexpressions belongingtoacertainclassofexpressionsinthe sentencesbyvariables(whosesubstituendsare 763 quantificationalshiftfallacy quantifyingin theexpressionsofthatclass)andthenprefixing theformulawithquantifiersusingthosevari- ables.Forexample,from'BillhatesMary'we form'xhatesy',towhichweprefixthequanti- fiers'forallx'and'forsomey',gettingthequan- tificationsentence'forallx,forsomey,xhatesy' ('Everyonehatessomeone'). Inreferentialquantificationonlytermsofrefer- encemaybereplacedbyvariables.Thereplace- abletermsofreferencearethesubstituendsof thevariables.Thevaluesofthevariablesareall thoseobjectstowhichreferencecouldbemade byatermofreferenceofthetypethatthevari- ablesmayreplace.Thusthepreviousexample 'forallx,forsomey,xhatesy'isareferential quantification.Termsstandingforpeople('Bill', 'Mary',e.g.)arethesubstituendsofthevariables 'x'and'y'.Andpeoplearethevaluesofthevari- ables. Insubstitutionalquantificationanytypeofterm maybereplacedbyvariables.Avariablereplac- ingatermhasasitssubstituendsalltermsofthe typeofthereplacedterm.Forexample,from'Bill marriedMary'wemayform'BillRMary',to whichweprefixthequantifier'forsomeR',get- tingthesubstitutionalquantification'forsomeR, BillRMary'.Thisisnotareferentialquantifica- tion,sincethesubstituendsof'R'arebinary predicates(suchas'marries'),whicharenot termsofreference. Referentialquantificationisaspeciesofobjec- tualquantification.Thetruthconditionsof quantificationsentencesobjectuallyconstrued areunderstoodintermsofthevaluesofthevari- ableboundbythequantifier.Thus,'forallv,i))v' istrueprovided'§Vistrueforallvaluesofthe variableV;'forsomev,i/Vistrueprovided'i/V istrueforsomevalueofthevariable'V.The truthorfalsityofasubstitutionalquantification tumsinsteadonthetruthorfalsityofthesen- tencesthatresultfromthequantifiedformulaby replacingvariablesbytheirsubstituends.For example,'forsomeR,BillRMary'istruepro- videdsomesentenceoftheform'BillRMary'is true. Inclassicallogictheuniversalquantifier'for all'isdefinableintermsofnegationandtheexis- tentialquantifier'forsome':'forallx'isshortfor 'notforsomexnot'.Theexistentialquantifieris similarlydefinableintermsofnegationandthe universalquantifier.Inintuitionisticlogic,this doesnothold.Bothquantifiersareregardedas primitive. Seealsoformållogic,philosophyof logic.C.S. quantificationalshiftfallacy.Seeformålfallacy. quantificationtheory,elementary.Seeformål LOGIC. quantifier.Seeformållogic,pluralitivelogic. quantifierelimination.Seeuniversalinstantia- noN. quantifiershiftfallacy.Seeformålfallacy. quantifyingin,useofaquantifieroutsideofan opaqueconstructiontoattempttobindavari- ablewithinit,aprocedurewhoselegitimacywas firstquestionedbyQuine.Anopaqueconstruc- tionisonethatresistssubstitutivityofidentity. Amongothers,theconstructionsofquotation, theverbsofpropositionalattitude,andthelogi- calmodalitiescangiverisetoopacity.Forexam- ple,thepositionof'six'in: (1)'six'containsexactlythreeletters isopaque,sincethesubstitutionfor'six'byits codesignate'immediatesuccessoroffive'renders atruthintoafalsehood: (1')'theimmediatesuccessoroffive'contains exactlythreeletters. Similarly,thepositionof'theearth'in: (2)Tombelievesthattheearthishabitable isopaque,ifthesubstitutionof'theearth'byits codesignate'thethirdplanetfromthesun'ren- dersasentencethatTomwouldaffirmintoone thathewoulddeny: (2')Tombelievesthatthethirdplanetfrom thesunishabitable. Finally,thepositionof'9'(andof'7')in: (3)Necessarily(9>7) isopaque,sincethesubstitutionof'thenumber ofmajorplanets'foritscodesignate'9'rendersa truthintoafalsehood: (3')Necessarily(thenumberofmajorplanets >7). Quinearguesthatsincethepositionswithin opaqueconstructionsresistsubstitutivityof identity,theycannotmeaningfullybequantified. Accordingly,thefollowingthreequantifiedsen- tencesaremeaningless: (1")(Ex)('x'>7), (2")(Ex)(Tombelievesthatxishabitable), 764 quantity quantummechanics (3")(Ex)necessarily(x>7). (1"),(2"),and(3")aremeaningless,sincethesec- ondoccurrenceof'x'ineachofthemdoesnot functionasavariableintheordinary(non- essentialist)quantificationalway.Thesecond occurrenceof'x'in(1")functionsasanamethat namesthetwenty-fourthletterofthealphabet. Thesecondoccurrencesof'x'in(2")andin(3") donotfunctionasvariables,sincetheydonot allowallcodesignativetermsassubstituends withoutchangeoftruth-value.Thus,theymay takeobjectsasvaluesbutonlyobjectsdesignated incertainways,e.g.,intermsoftheirintensional oressentialproperties.So,shortofacquiescingin anintensionalistoressentialistmetaphysics, Quineargues,wecannotingeneralquantifyinto opaquecontexts. Seealsointensionality,meaning,sub- STITUTIVITYSALVAVERITATE.R.F.G. quantity.Seemagnitude,syllogism. quantumlogic,thelogicofwhichthemodelsare certainnon-Booleanalgebrasderivedfromthe mathematicalrepresentationofquantum mechanicalsystems.(Themodelsofclassical logicare,formally,Booleanalgebras.)Thisisthe centralnotionofquantumlogicintheliterature, althoughthetermcoversavarietyofmodallog- ics,dialogics,andoperationallogicsproposedto elucidatethestructureofquantummechanics anditsrelationtoclassicalmechanics.The dynamicalquantitiesofaclassicalmechanical system(position,momentum,energy,etc.)form acommutativealgebra,andthedynamicalprop- ertiesofthesystem(e.g.,thepropertythatthe positionliesinaspecifiedrange,ortheproperty thatthemomentumisgreaterthanzero,etc.) formaBooleanalgebra.Thetransitionfrom classicaltoquantummechanicsinvolvesthe transitionfromacommutativealgebraof dynamicalquantitiestoanoncommutativealge- braofso-calledobservables.Onewayofunder- standingtheconceptualrevolutionfrom classicaltoquantummechanicsisintermsofa shiftfromtheclassofBooleanalgebrastoaclass ofnon-Booleanalgebrasastheappropriaterela- tionalstructuresforthedynamicalpropertiesof mechanicalsystems,hencefromaBooleanclas- sicallogictoanon-Booleanquantumlogicasthe logicapplicabletothefundamentalphysical processesofouruniverse.Thisconceptionof quantumlogicwasdevelopedformallyinaclas- sic1936paperbyG.BirkhoffandJ.vonNeu- mann(althoughvonNeumannfirstproposed theideain1927). Thefeaturesthatdistinguishquantumlogic fromclassicallogicvarywiththeformulation.In theBirkhoff-vonNeumannlogic,thedistribu- tivelawofclassicallogicfails,butthisisbyno meansafeatureofallversionsofquantumlogic. ItfollowsfromGleason'stheorem(1957)that thenon-Booleanmodelsdonotadmittwo-val- uedhomomorphismsinthegeneralcase,i.e., thereisnopartitionofthedynamicalproperties ofaquantummechanicalsystemintothosepos- sessedbythesystemandthosenotpossessedby thesystemthatpreservesalgebraicstructure, andequivalentlynoassignmentofvaluestothe observablesofthesystemthatpreservesalge- braicstructure.Thisresultwasprovedindepen- dentlyforfinitesetsofobservablesbyS.Kochen andE.P.Specker(1967).Itfollowsthattheprob- abilitiesspecifiedbytheBorninterpretationof thestatefunctionofaquantummechanicalsys- temfortheresultsofmeasurementsofobserv- ablescannotbederivedfromaprobability distributionöverthedifferentpossiblesetsof dynamicalpropertiesofthesystem,orthediffer- entpossiblesetsofvaluesassignabletothe observables(ofwhichonesetispresumedtobe actual),determinedbyhiddenvariablesinaddi- tiontothestatefunction,ifthesesetsofproper- tiesorvaluesarerequiredtopreservealgebraic structure.WhileBell'stheorem(1964)excludes hiddenvariablessatisfyingacertainlocalitycon- dition,theKochen-Speckertheoremrelätesthe non-Booleanityofquantumlogictotheimpos- sibilityofhiddenvariableextensionsofquantum mechanics,inwhichvalueassignmentstothe observablessatisfyconstraintsimposedbythe algebraicstructureoftheobservables. Seealsobooleanalgebra,philosophy OFSCIENCE,QUANTUMMECHANICS.J.Bub quantummechanics,alsocalledquantumtheory, thesciencegoverningobjectsofatomicandsub- atomicdimensions.Developedindependentlyby WernerHeisenberg(asmatrixmechanics,1925) andErwinSchrödinger(aswavemechanics, 1926),quantummechanicsbreakswithclassical treatmentsofthemotionsandinteractionsof bodiesbyintroducingprobabilityandactsof measurementinseeminglyirreducibleways.In thewidelyusedSchrödingerversion,quantum mechanicsassociateswitheachphysicalsystem atime-dependentfunction,calledthestatefunc- tion(alternatively,thestatevectororTfunc- tion).Theevolutionofthesystemisrepresented 765 quantummechanics quantummechanics bythetemporaltransformationofthestatefunc- tioninaccordwithamasterequation,knownas theSchrödingerequation.Alsoassociatedwitha systemare"observables":(inprinciple)measur- ablequantities,suchasposition,momentum, andenergy,includingsomewithnogoodclassi- calanalogue,suchasspin.AccordingtotheBorn interpretation(1926),thestatefunctionis understoodinstrumentally:itenablesonetocal- culate,foranypossiblevalueofanobservable, theprobabilitythatameasurementofthat observablewouldfindthatparticularvalue. Theformålpropertiesofobservablesandstate functionsimplythatcertainpairsofobservables (suchaslinearmomentuminagivendirection, andpositioninthesamedirection)areincom- patibleinthesensethatnostatefunctionassigns probability1tothesimultaneousdetermination ofexactvaluesforbothobservables.Thisisa qualitativestatementoftheHeisenberguncer- taintyprinciple(alternatively,theindeterminacy principle,orjusttheuncertaintyprinciple). Quantitatively,thatprincipleplacesaprecise limitontheaccuracywithwhichonemay simultaneouslymeasureapairofincompatible observables.Thereisnocorrespondinglimit, however,ontheaccuracywithwhichasingle observable(say,positionalone,ormomentum alone)maybemeasured.Theuncertaintyprin- cipleissometimesunderstoodintermsofcom- plementarity,ageneralperspectiveproposedby NielsBohraccordingtowhichtheconnection betweenquantumphenomenaandobservation forcesourclassicalconceptstosplitintomutu- allyexclusivepackages,bothofwhichare requiredforacompleteunderstandingbutonly oneofwhichisapplicableunderanyparticular experimentalconditions.Sometakethistoimply anontologyinwhichquantumobjectsdonot actuallypossesssimultaneousvaluesforincom- patibleobservables;e.g.,donothavesimultane- ouspositionandmomentum.Otherswould hold,e.g.,thatmeasuringthepositionofan objectcausesanuncontrollablechangeinits momentum,inaccordwiththelimitsonsimul- taneousaccuracybuiltintotheuncertaintyprin- ciple.Thesewaysoftreatingtheprinciplearenot uncontroversial. Philosophicalinterestarisesinpartfrom wherethequantumtheorybreakswithclassical physics:namely,fromtheapparentbreakdown ofdeterminism(orcausality)thatseemstoresult fromtheirreduciblystatisticalnatureofthethe- ory,andfromtheapparentbreakdownof observer-independenceorrealismthatseemsto resultfromthefundamentalroleofmeasure- mentinthetheory.Bothfeaturesrelätetothe interpretationofthestatefunctionasproviding onlyasummaryoftheprobabilitiesforvarious measurementoutcomes.Einstein,inparticular, criticizedthetheoryonthesegrounds,andin 1935suggestedastrikingthoughtexperimentto showthat,assumingnoaction-at-a-distance, onewouldhavetoconsiderthestatefunctionas anincompletedescriptionoftherealphysical stateforanindividualsystem,andtherefore quantummechanicsasmerelyaprovisionalthe- ory.Einstein'sexampleinvolvedapairofsys- temsthatinteractbrieflyandthenseparate,but insuchawaythattheoutcomesofvariousmea- surementsperformedoneachsystem,sepa- rately,showanuncannycorrelation.In1951the physicistDavidBohmsimplifiedEinstein's example,andlåter(1957)indicatedthatitmay berealizableexperimentally.ThephysicistJohn S.Bellthenformulatedalocalityassumption (1964),similartoEinstein's,thatconstrainsfac- torswhichmightbeusedindescribingthestate ofanindividualsystem,so-calledhiddenvari- ables.LocalityrequiresthatintheEinstein- Bohmexperimenthiddenvariablesnotallowthe measurementperformedononesysteminacor- relatedpairimmediatelytoinfluencetheout- comeobtainedinmeasuringtheother,spatially separatedsystem.Belldemonstratedthatlocal- ity(inconjunctionwithotherassumptionsabout hiddenvariables)restrictstheprobabilitiesfor measurementoutcomesaccordingtoasystemof inequalitiesknownastheBellinequalities,and thattheprobabilitiesofcertainquantumsystems violatetheseinequalities.ThisisBell'stheorem. SubsequentlyseveralexperimentsoftheEin- stein-Bohmtypehavebeenperformedtotestthe Bellinequalities.Althoughtheresultshavenot beenunivocal,theconsensusisthattheexperi- mentaldatasupportthequantumtheoryand violatetheinequalities.Currentresearchistry- ingtoevaluatetheimplicationsoftheseresults, includingtheextenttowhichtheyruleoutlocal hiddenvariables.(SeeJ.CushingandE. McMullin,eds.,PhilosophicalConsequencesof QuantumTheory,1989.) Thedescriptiveincompletenesswithwhich Einsteinchargedthetheorysuggestsotherprob- lems.Aparticularlydramaticonearoseincorre- spondencebetweenSchrödingerandEinstein; namely,the"gruesome"Schrödingercatpara- dox.Hereacatisconfinedinaclosedchamber containingaradioactiveatomwithafifty-fifty chanceofdecayinginthenexthour.Iftheatom decaysittriggersarelaythatcausesahammerto fallandsmashaglassvialholdingaquantityof 766 quasi-indicator Quine,W(illard)V(an)O(rman) prussicacidsufficienttokillthecat.Accordingto theSchrödingerequation,afteranhourthestate functionfortheentireatom+relay+hammer +glassvial+catsystemissuchthatifwe observethecattheprobabilityforfindingitalive (dead)is50percent.However,thisevolvedstate functionisoneforwhichthereisnodefinite result;accordingtoit,thecatisneitheralivenor dead.Howthendoesanydefinitefactofthemat- terarise,andwhen?Istheactofobservation itselfinstrumentalinbringingaboutthe observedresult,doesthatresultcomeaboutby virtueofsomespecialrandomprocess,oristhere someotheraccountcompatiblewithdefinite resultsofmeasurements?Thisistheso-called quantummeasurementproblemandittooisan activeareaofresearch. Seealsodeterminism,einstein,field THEORY,PHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE,RELATIV- ITY.A.F. quasi-indicator,Castaneda'stermforanexpres- sionusedtoascribeindexicalreferencetoa speakerorthinker.IfJohnsays"Iamhungry"it isincorrecttoreportwhathesaidwith'John claimsthatIamhungry',sinceT,beingan indexical,expressesspeaker'sreference,not John's.However,'JohnclaimsthatJohnishun- gry'failstorepresenttheindexicalelementofhis assertion.Instead,weuse'Johnclaimsthathe himselfishungry',where'hehimself'isaquasi- indicatordepictingJohn'sreferencetohimself quaself.Becauseofitssubjectiveandperspecti- valcharacter,wecannotgrasptheexactcontent ofanother'sindexicalreference,yetquasi-index- icalrepresentationsarepossiblesincewecon- fronttheworldthroughgenericallythesame indexicalmodesofpresentation.Ifthesemodesare irreducible,thenquasi-indicatorsareindispens- ablefordescribingthethoughtsandexperiences ofothers.Assuch,theyarenotequivalenttoor replaceablebyanyantecedentsoccurringout- sidethescopeofpsychologicalverbstowhich theyaresubordinated.Seealsocastaneda, GUISETHEORY,INDEXICAL,SCOPE.T.K. quasi-quotes.Seecorners. quaternioterminorum.Seesyllogism. quiddity.Seeavicenna,essentialism. Quine,W(illard)V(an)O(rman)(b.1908),Amer- icanphilosopherandlogician,renownedforhis rejectionoftheanalytic-syntheticdistinction andforhisadvocacyofextensionalism,natural- ism,physicalism,empiricism,andholism.Quine tookhisdoctorateinphilosophyatHarvardin 1932.Afterfouryearsofpostdoctoralfellow- ships,hewasappointedtothephilosophyfaculty atHarvardin1936.Thereheremaineduntilhe retiredfromteachingin1978. DuringsixdecadesQuinepublishedscoresof journalartidesandmorethantwentybooks.His writingstouchanumberofareas,including logic,philosophyoflogic,settheory,philosophy oflanguage,philosophyofmind,philosophyof science,metaphysics,epistemology,andethics. Amonghismostinfluentialartidesandbooksare "NewFoundationsforMathematicalLogic" (1936),"TwoDogmasofEmpiricism"(1951), "EpistemologyNaturalized"(1969),andWord andObject(1960).In"NewFoundations"he developsasettheorythatavoidsRussell'spara- doxwithoutrelyingonRussell'stheoryoftypes. Rather,followingErnstZermelo,Quinedröps thepresumptionthateverymembershipcondi- tiondeterminesaset.Thesystemof"NewFoun- dations"continuestobewidelydiscussedby mathematicians. "TwoDogmas"setsouttorepudiatewhathe seesastwodogmasoflogicalempiricism.The firstistheso-calledanalytic-syntheticdistinc- tion;thesecondisaweakformofreductionism totheeffectthateachsyntheticstatementhas associatedwithitauniquesetofconfirming experiencesandauniquesetofinfirmingexpe- riences.Againstthefirstdogma,Quineargues thatnoneofthethen-currentattemptstochar- acterizeanalyticity(e.g.,"astatementisanalytic ifandonlyifitistruesolelyinvirtueofitsmean- ing")dosowithsufficientclarity,andthatany similarcharacterizationislikewisedoomedto fail.Againsttheseconddogma,Quineargues thatamoreaccurateaccountoftherelation betweenthestatementsofatheoryandexperi- enceisholisticratherthanreductionistic,thatis, onlyasacorporatebodydothestatementsofa theoryfacethetribunalofexperience.Quine concludesthattheeffectsofrejectingthesetwo dogmasofempiricismare(1)ablurringofthe supposedboundarybetweenspeculativemeta- physicsandnaturalscienceand(2)ashifttoward pragmatism. In"EpistemologyNaturalized"Quineargues infavörofnaturalizingepistemology:old-time epistemology(firstphilosophy)hasfailedinits attempttogroundscienceonsomethingfirmer thanscienceandshould,therefore,bereplaced byascientificaccountofhowweacquireour overalltheoryoftheworldandwhyitworksso well. 767 qumquevoces quinquevoces InWordandObject,Quine'smostfamousbook, hearguesinfavörof(1)naturalizingepistemol- ogy,(2)physicalismasagainstphenomenalism andmind-bodydualism,and(3)extensionality asagainstintensionality.Healso(4)developsa behavioristicconceptionofsentence-meaning, (5)theorizesaboutlanguagelearning,(6)spec- ulatesontheontogenesisofreference,(7) explainsvariousformsofambiguityandvague- ness,(8)recommendsmeasuresforregimenting languagesoastoeliminateambiguityand vaguenessaswellastomakeatheory'slogicand onticcommitmentsperspicuous("tobeistobe thevalueofaboundvariable"),(9)argues againstquantifiedmodallogicandtheessential- ismitpresupposes,(10)arguesforPlatonicreal- isminmathematics,(11)arguesforscientific realismandagainstinstrumentalism,(12)devel- opsaviewofphilosophicalanalysisasexplica- tion,(13)arguesagainstanalyticityandfor holism,(14)arguesagainstcountenancing propositions,and(15)arguesthatthemeanings oftheoreticalsentencesareindeterminateand thatthereferenceoftermsisinscrutable.Quine's subsequentwritingshavelargelybeendevoted tosummingup,clarifying,andexpandingon themesfoundinWordandObject. Seealsoanalytic-syntheticdistinc- TION,EMPIRICISM,EXTENSIONALISM,HOL- ISM,NATURALISM,NATURALISTICEPISTE- MOLOGY,PHYSICALISM.R.F.G. quinquevoces.Seepredicables. 768 Rabad.Seeibndaud. racetrackparadox.Seezenosparadoxes. racism,hostility,contempt,condescension,or prejudice,onthebasisofsocialpracticesofracial classification,andthewiderphenomenaof social,economic,andpoliticalmistreatmentthat oftenaccompanysuchclassification.Themost salientinstancesofracismincludetheNaziide- ologyofthe"Aryanmasterrace,"American chattelslavery,SouthAfricanapartheidinthe latetwentiethcentury,andthe"JimCrow"laws andtraditionsofsegregationthatsubjugated AfricandescendantsintheSouthernUnited StatesduringthecenturyaftertheAmerican CivilWar. Socialtheoristsdisputewhether,initsessence, racismisabelieforanideologyofracialinferior- ity,asystemofsocialoppressiononthebasisof race,aformofdiscourse,discriminatoryconduct, oranattitudeofcontemptorheartlessness(and itsexpressioninindividualorcollectivebehav- ior).Thecaseforanyoftheseastheessenceof racismhasitsdrawbacks,andaproponentmust showhowtheotherscanalsocometoberacistin virtueofthatessence.Somedenythatracismhas anynatureoressence,insistingitisnothingmore thanchanginghistoricalrealities.However,these thinkersmustexplainwhatmakeseachreality aninstanceofracism.Theoristsdifferöverwho andwhatcanberacistandunderwhatcircum- stances,somerestrictingracismtothepowerful, othersfindingitalsoinsomereactionsbythe oppressed.Here,theformeroweanexplanation ofwhypowerisnecessaryforracism,whatsort (economicorpolitical?generalorcontextual?), andinwhomorwhat(racistindividuals?their racialgroups?).Althoughvirtuallyeveryone thinksracismobjectionable,peopledisagreeöver whetheritscentraldefectiscognitive(irration- ality,prejudice),economic/prudential(ineffi- ciency),ormoral(unnecessarysuffering,un- equaltreatment).Finally,racism'sconnection withtheambiguousandcontroversialconceptof raceitselfiscomplex.Plainly,racismpresupposes thelegitimacyofracialclassifications,andper- hapsthemetaphysicalrealityofraces.Never- theless,someholdthatracismisalsopriortorace, withracialclassificationsinventedchieflyto explainandhelpjustifytheoppressionofsome peoplesbyothers. Thetermoriginatedtodesignatethepseudo- scientifictheoriesofracialessenceandinferior- itythataroseinEuropéinthenineteenth centuryandwereendorsedbyGermany'sThird Reich.Sincethecivilrightsmovementinthe UnitedStatesafterWorldWarII,thetermhas cometocoveramuchbroaderrangeofbeliefs, attitudes,institutions,andpractices.Todayone hearschargesofunconscious,covert,institu- tional,paternalistic,benign,anti-racist,liberal, andevenreverseracism.Racismiswidely regardedasinvolvingignorance,irrationality, unreasonableness,injustice,andotherintellec- tualandmoralvices,tosuchanextentthattoday virtuallynooneiswillingtoaccepttheclassifi- cationofoneself,one'sbeliefs,andsoon,as racist,exceptincontextsofself-reproach.Asa result,classifyinganythingasracist,beyondthe mostegregiouscases,isaseriouschargeandis oftenhotlydisputed. Seealsojustice,politicalphilosophy, SOCIALPHILOSOPHY.J.L.A.G. radicaltranslation.Seeindeterminacyoftrans- LATION. Rämänuja(10177-1137?),Indianphilosopher whofoundedtheVisistadvaitatradition.Histhe- isticsystemprovidesthetheoreticalbasisfor BhaktidevotionalHinduism.Hismostimportant writingsaretheSribhåsya(acommentaryonthe Brahma-SutrasofBadarayanathatpresentsan interpretationcompetitivetoSharikara's),the Gitä-Bhäsya(acommentaryontheBhagavad Gita),andtheVedärthasamgraha(acommentary ontheUpanishads).Herejectsnaturaltheology, offersapowerfulcriticismofAdvaitaVedanta, andpresentsasystematicarticulationofdevo- tionaltheism.Seealsovisistadvaita VEDANTA.K.E.Y. ramifiedtypetheory.Seetypetheory. Ramistmovement.Seeramus. Ramsey,FrankPlumpton(1903-30),influential 769 Ramsey-eliminability Ramus,Petrus Britishphilosopheroflogicandmathematics.His primaryinterestswereinlogicandphilosophy, butdecadesafterhisuntimelydeathtwoofhis publicationssparkednewbranchesofeconom- ics,andinpuremathematicshiscombinatorial theoremsgaveriseto"Ramseytheory"(Economic Journal1927,1928;Proc.LondonMath.Soc, 1928).DuringhislifetimeRamsey'sphilosophi- calreputationoutsideCambridgewasbased largelyonhisarchitecturalreparationofWhite- headandRussell'sPrincipiaMathematica, strengtheningitsclaimtoreducemathematicsto thenewlogicformulatedinVolume1-areduc- tionroundedoutbyWittgenstein'sassessmentof logicaltruthsastautologous.Ramseyclarified thislogicistpictureofmathematicsbyradically simplifyingRussell'sramifiedtheoryoftypes, eliminatingtheneedfortheunarguableaxiom ofreducibility(Proc.LondonMath.Soc,1925).His philosophicalworkwaspublishedmostlyafter hisdeath.Thecanon,establishedbyRichard Braithwaite(TheFoundationsofMathematics 1931),remainsgenerallyintactinD.H.Mellor's edition(PhilosophicalPapers,1990).Furtherwrit- ingsofvaryingimportanceappearinhisNoteson Philosophy,ProbabilityandMathematics(M.C. Galavotti,ed.,1991)andOnTruth(Nicholas RescherandUlrichMajer,eds.,1991). AsanundergraduateRamseyobservedthat theredundancyaccountoftruth"enablesusto ruleoutatoncesometheoriesoftruthsuchas that'tobetrue'means'towork'or'tocohere' sinceclearly'pworks'and'pcoheres'arenot equivalentto'p'."Låter,inthecanonical"Truth andProbability"(1926),hereaddressedto knowledgeandbeliefthemainquestionsordi- narilyassociatedwithtruth,analyzingprobabil- ityasamodeofjudgmentintheframeworkofa theoryofchoiceunderuncertainty.Reinvented andacknowledgedbyL.J.Savage(Foundationsof Statistics,1954),thisformsthetheoreticalbasisof thecurrentlydominant"Bayesian"viewofratio- naldecisionmaking.Ramseycuthisphilosoph- icalteethonWittgenstein'sTractatusLogico- Philosophicus.Histranslationappearedin1922;a longcriticalnoticeofthework(1923)washis firstsubstantialphilosophicalpublication.His låterroleinWittgenstein'srejectionoftheTrac- tatusisacknowledgedintheforewordtoPhilo- sophicalInvestigations(1953). Theposthumouscanonhasbeenagoldmine. Anexample:"Propositions"(1929),readingthe theoreticalterms(T,U,etc.)ofanaxiomatized scientifictheoryasvariables,seesthetheory's contentasconveyedbya"Ramseysentence" sayingthatforsomeT,U,etc,thetheory's axiomsaretrue,asentenceinwhichallextralog- icaltermsareobservational.Anotherexample: "GeneralPropositionsandCausality"(1929),of- feringinafootnotethe"Ramseytest"forac- ceptabilityofconditionals,i.e.,addtheif-clause toyourambientbeliefs(minimallymodifiedto maketheenlargedsetself-consistent),and accepttheconditionalifthethen-clausefollows. Seealsobayesianrationality,proba- bility,TRUTH.R.J. Ramsey-eliminability.Seebeth'sdefinabilitythe- OREM. Ramseysentence.Seephilosophyofmind,phi- losophyOFSCIENCE. Ramseytest.Seeramsey. Ramus,Petrus,inFrench,PierredeLaRamée (1515-72),Frenchphilosopherwhoquestioned theauthorityofAristotleandinfluencedthe methodsandteachingoflogicthroughthesev- enteenthcentury.In1543hepublishedhis DialecticaeinstitutioneslibriXV,andin1555 reworkeditasDialectique-thefirstphilosophical workinFrench.HewasappointedbyFrancoisI asthefirstRegiusProfessoroftheUniversityof Paris,wherehetaughtuntilhewaskilledinthe St.Bartholomew'sDayMassacrein1572. Ramusdoubtedthatwecanapodictically intuitthemajorpremisesrequiredforAristotle's rationalsyllogism.TurninginsteadtoPlato, Ramusproposedthata"Socratizing"oflogic wouldproduceamoreworkableandfruitful result.AshadAgricolaandSturm,hereworked therhetoricalandliberalartstraditions'concepts of"invention,judgment,andpractice,"placing "method"inthecenterofjudgment.Proceeding inthesestages,wecan"read"nature's"argu- ments,"becausetheyaremodeledonnatural reasoning,whichintumcanemulatetherea- soningbywhichGodcreates.Oftenhisresults weredepictedgraphicallyintables(asinchapter IXofHobbes'sLeviathan).Whencarefullydone theywouldshowbothwhatisknownandwhere gapsrequirefurtherinvestigation;theprocess frominventiontojudgmentiscontinuous. Ramus'sworkssawsome750editionsinone century,fosteringthe"Ramist"movementin emergingProtestantuniversitiesandtheAmeri- cancolonies.HeinfluencedBacon,Hobbes,Mil- ton,Methodism,CambridgePlatonism,and AlstedinEuropé,andHookerandCongrega- tionalisminPuritanAmerica.Inconsistencies makehimlessthanamajorfigureinthehistory 770 randomness rationalism oflogic,buthismanyworksandtheirrapidpop- ularityledtophilosophicalandeducational effortstobringtheworldoflearningtothe"plain man"byusingthevernacular,andbymore closelycorrelatingtherigorofphilosophywith thememorableandpersuasivepowersof rhetoric;hesawthisgoalasSocratic.C.Wa. randomness.Seephilosophyofscience. range.Seerelation. Rashdall,Hastings(1858-1924),Englishhisto- rian,theologian,andpersonalidealist.While acknowledgingthatBerkeleyneededtobecor- rectedbyKant,RashdalldefendedBerkeley's thesisthatobjectsonlyexistforminds.Fromthis heconcludedthatthereisadivinemindthat guaranteestheexistenceofnatureandtheobjec- tivityofmorality.Inhismostimportantphilo- sophicalwork,TheTheoryofGoodandEvil(1907), Rashdallarguedthatactionsarerightorwrong accordingtowhethertheyproducewell-being, inwhichpleasureaswellasavirtuousdisposi- tionareconstituents.Rashdallcoinedthename 'idealutilitarianism'forthisview.Seealsoutil- ITARIANISM.J.W.A. rationalchoicetheory.Seedecisiontheory. rationalism,thepositionthatreasonhasprece- denceöverotherwaysofacquiringknowledge, or,morestrongly,thatitistheuniquepathto knowledge.Itismostoftenencounteredasa viewinepistemology,whereitistraditionally contrastedwithempiricism,theviewthatthe sensesareprimarywithrespecttoknowledge.(It isimportantheretodistinguishempiricismwith respecttoknowledgefromempiricismwith respecttoideasorconcepts;whereastheformer isopposedtorationalism,thelatterisopposedto thedoctrineofinnateideas.)Thetermisalso encounteredinthephilosophyofreligion,where itmaydesignatethosewhoopposetheviewthat revelationiscentraltoreligiousknowledge;and inethics,whereitmaydesignatethosewho opposetheviewthatethicalprinciplesare groundedinorderivefromemotion,empathy, orsomeothernon-rationalfoundation. Theterm'rationalism'doesnotgenerallydes- ignateasingleprecisephilosophicalposition; thereareseveralwaysinwhichreasoncanhave precedence,andseveralaccountsofknowledge towhichitmaybeopposed.Furthermore,the veryterm'reason'isnotaltogetherclear.Often itdesignatesafacultyofthesoul,distinctfrom sensation,imagination,andmemory,whichis thegroundofaprioriknowledge.Butthereare otherconceptionsofreason,suchasthenar- rowerconceptioninwhichPascalopposesrea- sonto"knowledgeoftheheart"(Pensées,section 110),orthecomputationalconceptionofreason HobbesadvancesinLeviathan1.5. Thetermmightthusbeappliedtoanumberof philosophicalpositionsfromtheancientsdown tothepresent.Amongtheancients,'rationalism' and'empiricism'especiallydenotetwoschoolsof medicine,theformerrelyingprimarilyonathe- oreticalknowledgeofthehiddenworkingsofthe humanbody,thelatterrelyingondirectclinical experience.Thetermmightalsobeusedtochar- acterizetheviewsofPlatoandlåterNeoplaton- ists,whoarguedthatwehavepureintellectual accesstotheFormsandgeneralprinciplesthat governreality,andrejectedsensoryknowledge oftheimperfectrealizationofthoseFormsinthe materialworld. Inrecentphilosophicalwriting,theterm 'rationalism'ismostcloselyassociatedwiththe positionsofagroupofseventeenth-century philosophers,Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz,and sometimesMalebranche.Thesethinkersare oftenreferredtocollectivelyastheContinental rationalists,andaregenerallyopposedtotheso- calledBritishempiricists,Locke,Berkeley,and Hume.Alloftheformersharetheviewthatwe haveanon-empiricalandrationalaccesstothe truthaboutthewaytheworldis,andallprivi- legereasonöverknowledgederivedfromthe senses.Thesephilosophersarealsoattractedto mathematicsasamodelforknowledgeingen- eral.Butthesecommonviewsaredevelopedin quitedifferentways. Descartesclaimstotakehisinspirationfrom mathematics-notmathematicsascommonly understood,buttheanalysisoftheancients. AccordingtoDescartes,westartfromfirstprin- ciplesknowndirectlybyreason(thecogitoergo sumoftheMeditations),whathecallsintuitionin hisRulesfortheDirectionoftheMind;allother knowledgeisdeducedfromthere.Acentralaim ofhisMeditationsistoshowthatthisfacultyof reasonistrustworthy.Thesenses,ontheother hand,aregenerallydeceptive,leadingustomis- takesensoryqualitiesforrealqualitiesof extendedbodies,andleadingustothefalsephi- losophyofAristotleandtoScholasticism. Descartesdoesnotrejectthesensesaltogether;in MeditationVIhearguesthatthesensesaremost oftencorrectincircumstancesconcerningthe preservationoflife.Perhapsparadoxically, experimentisimportanttoDescartes'sscientific 771 rationalism,Continental rationality work.However,hisprimaryinterestisinthethe- oreticalaccountofthephenomenaexperiment reveals,andwhilehispositionisunclear,hemay haveconsideredexperimentasanauxiliaryto intuitionanddeduction,orasasecond-best methodthatcanbeusedwithproblemstoocom- plexforpurereason.Malebranche,following Descartes,takessimilarviewsinhisSearchafter Truth,thoughunlikeDescartes,heemphasizes originalsinasthecauseofourtendencytotrust thesenses. Spinoza'smodelforknowledgeisEuclidean geometry,asrealizedinthegeometricalformof theEthics.Spinozaexplicitlyarguesthatwecan- nothaveadequateideasoftheworldthrough sensation(EthicsII,propositions16-31).Inthe Ethicshedoesseearoleforthesensesinwhathe callsknowledgeofthefirstandknowledgeof thesecondkinds,andintheearlierEmendationof theIntellect,hesuggeststhatthesensesmaybe auxiliaryaidstogenuineknowledge.Butthe sensesareimperfectandfarlessvaluable,accord- ingtoSpinoza,thanintuition,i.e.,knowledgeof thethirdkind,fromwhichsensoryexperienceis excluded.Spinoza'srationalismisimplicitina centralpropositionoftheEthics,inaccordance withwhich"theorderandconnectionofideasis thesameastheorderandconnectionofthings" (EthicsII,proposition7),allowingonetoinfer causalconnectionsbetweenbodiesandstatesof thematerialworlddirectlyfromthelogicalcon- nectionsbetweenideas. Leibniz,too,emphasizesreasonöverthe sensesinanumberofways.Inhisyouthhe believedthatitwouldbepossibletocalculate thetruth-valueofeverysentencebyconstruct- ingalogicallanguagewhosestructuremirrors thestructureofrelationsbetweenconceptsin theworld.Thisviewisreflectedinhismature thoughtinthedoctrinethatineverytruth,the conceptofthepredicateiscontainedinthecon- ceptofthesubject,sothatifonecouldtakethe God's-eyeview(which,heconcedes,wecan- not),onecoulddeterminethetruthorfalsityof anypropositionwithoutappealtoexperience (DiscourseonMetaphysics,section8).Leibnizalso arguesthatalltruthsarebasedontwobasic principles,thelawofnon-contradiction(for necessarytruths),andtheprincipleofsufficient reason(forcontingenttruths)(Monadology,sec- tion31),bothofwhichcanbeknownapriori. Andso,atleastinprinciple,thetruth-valuesof allpropositionscanbedeterminedapriori.This reflectshispracticeinphysics,wherehederives anumberoflawsofmotionfromtheprinciple oftheequalityofcauseandeffect,whichcanbe knownapriorionthebasisoftheprincipleof sufficientreason.But,atthesametime,referring totheempiricalschoolofancientmedicine, Leibnizconcedesthat"weareallmereEmpirics inthreefourthsofouractions"(Monadology,sec- tion28). Eachoftheso-calledContinentalrationalists does,inhisownway,privilegereasonöverthe senses.Butthecommondesignation'Continen- talrationalism'aroseonlymuchlåter,probably inthenineteenthcentury.Fortheircontempo- raries,moreimpressedwiththeirdifferences thantheircommondoctrines,theContinental rationalistsdidnotformasinglehomogeneous schoolofthought. Seealsoapriori,empiricism,intuition. D.Garb. rationalism,Continental.Seerationalism. rationalism,moral.Seemoralsensetheory. rationality.Initsprimarysense,rationalityisa normativeconceptthatphilosophershavegen- erallytriedtocharacterizeinsuchawaythat,for anyaction,belief,ordesire,ifitisrationalwe oughttochooseit.Nosuchpositivecharacteri- zationhasachievedanythingclosetouniversal assentbecause,often,severalcompetingactions, beliefs,ordesirescountasrational.Equating whatisrationalwithwhatisrationallyrequired eliminatesthecategoryofwhatisrationally allowed.Irrationalityseemstobethemorefun- damentalnormativecategory;foralthoughthere areconflictingsubstantiveaccountsofirrational- ity,allagreethattosayofanaction,belief,or desirethatitisirrationalistoclaimthatitshould alwaysbeavoided. Rationalityisalsoadescriptiveconceptthat referstothoseintellectualcapacities,usually involvingtheabilitytouselanguage,thatdistin- guishpersonsfromplantsandmostotherani- mals.Thereissomedisputeaboutwhethersome non-humananimals,e.g.,dolphinsandchim- panzees,arerationalinthissense. Theoreticalrationalityappliestobeliefs.Anirra- tionalbeliefisonethatobviouslyconflictswith whatoneshouldknow.Thischaracterizationof anirrationalbeliefisidenticalwiththepsychi- atriccharacterizationofadelusion.Itisaperson- relativeconcept,becausewhatobviouslycon- flictswithwhatshouldbeknownbyoneperson neednotobviouslyconflictwithwhatshouldbe knownbyanother.Onthisaccount,anybelief thatisnotirrationalcountsasrational.Many positivecharacterizationsofrationalbeliefshave 772 rationality,epistemic rationalpsychology beenproposed,e.g.,(1)beliefsthatareeither self-evidentorderivedfromself-evidentbeliefs byareliableprocedureand(2)beliefsthatare consistentwiththeoverwhelmingmajorityof one'sbeliefs;butallofthesepositivecharacteri- zationshaveencounteredseriousobjections. Practicalrationalityappliestoactions.Forsome philosophersitisidenticaltoinstrumentalratio- nality.Onthisview,commonlycalledinstrumen- talism,actingrationallysimplymeansactingina waythatismaximallyefficientinachievingone's goals.However,mostphilosophersrealizethat achievingonegoalmayconflictwithachieving another,andthereforerequirethatarational actionbeonethatbestachievesone'sgoalsonly whenthesegoalsareconsideredasforminga system.Othershaveaddedthatallofthesegoals mustbeonesthatwouldbechosengivencom- pleteknowledgeandunderstandingofwhatit wouldbeliketoachievethesegoals.Onthelat- teraccountofrationalaction,thesystemofgoals ischosenbyallpersonsforthemselves,andapart fromconsistencythereisnoexternalstandpoint fromwhichtoevaluaterationallyanysuchsys- tem.Thus,forapersonwithacertainsystemof goalsitwillbeirrationaltoactmorally.Another accountofrationalactionisnotatallperson-rel- ative.Onthisaccount,toactrationallyistoact onuniversalizableprinciples,sothatwhatisa reasonforonepersonmustbeareasonfor everyone.Onepointofsuchanaccountisto makeitrationallyrequiredtoactmorally,thus makingallimmoralactionirrational. However,iftocallanactionirrationalisto claimthateveryonewouldholdthatitisalways tobeavoided,thenitisneitherirrationaltoact immorallyinordertobenefitoneselforone's friends,norirrationaltoactmorallyevenwhen thatgoesagainstone'ssystemofgoals.Onlya negativecharacterizationofwhatisrationalas whatisnotirrational,whichmakesitrationally permissibletoacteithermorallyorinaccordance withone'sownsystemofgoals,aslongasthese goalsmeetsomeminimalobjectivestandard, seemslikelytobeadequate. Seealsoepistemology,ethics,practi- calREASONING,THEORETICALREASON. B.Ge. rationality,epistemic.Seeirrationality. rationality,instrumental.Seerationality. rationality,practical.Seerationality. rationality,theoretical.Seerationality. rationalization,(1)anapparentexplanationofa person'sactionorattitudebyappealtoreasons thatwouldjustifyorexculpatethepersonfor it-if,contrarytofact,thosereasonswereto explainit;(2)anexplanationorinterpretation madefromarationalperspective.Insense(1), rationalizationsarepseMiio-explanations,often motivatedbyadesiretoexhibitanitemina favorablelight.Suchrationalizationssometimes involveself-deception.Dependingonone'sview ofjustification,arationalizationmightjustifyan action-byadducingexcellentreasonsforits performance-eveniftheagent,nothaving actedforthosereasons,deservesnocreditforso acting.Insense(2)(asensepopularizedinphi- losophybyDonaldDavidson),rationalizationsof intentionalactionsaregenuineexplanationsin termsofagents'reasons.Inthissense,wepro- videarationalizationfor-or"rationalize"- RoberfsshoppingatZed'sbyidentifyingtherea- son(s)forwhichhedoesso:e.g.,hewantstobuy anexcellentkitchenknifeandbelievesthatZed's sellsthebestcutleryintown.(Also,thereasons forwhichanagentactsmaythemselvesbesaid torationalizetheaction.)Beliefs,desires,and intentionsmaybesimilarlyrationalized.Ineach case,arationalizationexhibitstherationalized itemas,tosomedegree,rationalfromthestand- pointofthepersontowhomitisattributed.See alsoRATIONALITY,REASONSFORACTION, SELF-DECEPTION.A.R.M. rationalnumber.Seemathematicalanalysis. rationalpsychology,theaprioristudyofthe mind.Thiswasalargecomponentofeighteenth- andnineteenth-centurypsychology,andwas contrastedbyitsexponentswithempiricalpsy- chology,whichisrootedincontingentexperi- ence.Theterm'rationalpsychology'mayalso designateamind,orformofmind,havingthe propertyofrationality.Currentphilosophyof mindincludesmuchdiscussionofrationalpsy- chologies,butthenotionisapparentlyambigu- ous.Ononehand,thereisrationalityasin- telligibility.Thisisaminimalcoherence,sayof desiresorinferences,thatamindmustpossessto beamind.Forinstance,DonaldDavidson,many functionalists,andsomedecisiontheorists believethereareprinciplesofrationalityofthis sortthatconstraintheappropriateattributionof beliefsanddesirestoaperson,sothatamind mustmeetsuchconstraintsifitistohavebeliefs anddesires.Onanotherpole,thereisrationality asjustification.Forsomeone'spsychologyto havethispropertyisforthatpsychologytobeas 773 rationalreconstruction Rawls,John reasonrequiresittobe,sayforthatperson's inferencesanddesirestobesupportedbyproper reasonsgiventheirproperweight,andhenceto bejustified.Rationalityasjustificationisanor- mativeproperty,whichitwouldseemsome mindslack.Butdespitetheapparentdifferences betweenthesetwosortsofrationality,some importantworkinphilosophyofmindimplies eitherthatthesetwosensesinfactcollapse,orat leastthatthereareinterveningandsignificant senses,sothatthingsatleastalotlikenormative principlesconstrainwhatourpsychologiesare. Seealsophilosophyofmind.J.R.M. rationalreconstruction,alsocalledlogicalrecon- struction,translationofadiscourseofacertain conceptualtypeintoadiscourseofanothercon- ceptualtypewiththeaimofmakingitpossible tosayeverything(oreverythingimportant)that isexpressibleintheformermoreclearly(orper- spicuously)inthelatter.Thebest-knownexam- pleisoneinCarnap'sDerLogischeAufbauderWelt. Carnapattemptedtotranslatediscoursecon- cerningphysicalobjects(e.g.,'Thereisaround browntable')intodiscourseconcerningimmedi- ateobjectsofsenseexperience('Colorpatchesof such-and-suchchromaticcharacteristicsand shapeappearinsuch-and-suchaway').Hewas motivatedbytheempiricistdoctrinethatimme- diatesenseexperienceisconceptuallypriorto everythingelse,includingournotionofaphys- icalobject.Inadditiontotalkofimmediatesense experience,Carnapreliedonlogicandsetthe- ory.Sincetheiruseisdifficulttoreconcilewith strictempiricism,histranslationwouldnothave fullyvindicatedempiricismevenifithadsuc- ceeded.Seealsodefinition,logicalposi- TIVISM,PHENOMENALISM.TY. ratiorecta.Seeindirectdiscourse. ratioscale.Seemagnitude. rävensparadox.Seeconfirmation. Rawls,John(b.1921),Americanphilosopher widelyrecognizedasoneoftheleadingpolitical philosophersofthetwentiethcentury.HisAThe- oryofJustice(1971)isoneoftheprimarytextsin politicalphilosophy.PoliticalLiberalism(1993) revisesRawls'stheorytomakehisconceptionof justicecompatiblewithliberalpluralism,but leavesthecoreofhisconceptionintact. Drawingontheliberalanddemocraticsocial contracttraditionsofLocke,Rousseau,andKant, Rawlsarguesthatthemostreasonableprinciples ofjusticearethoseeveryonewouldacceptand agreetofromafairposition.Sincetheseprinci- plesdeterminethejusticeofsociety'spolitical constitution,economy,andpropertyrules(its "basicstructure"),Rawlstakesafairagreement situationtobeonewhereeveryoneisimpartially situatedasequals.Inthisso-calledoriginalposi- tioneveryoneisequallysituatedbyahypothet- ical"veilofignorance."Thisveilrequiresin- dividualstosetasidetheirknowledgeoftheir particulardifferences,includingknowledgeof theirtalents,wealth,socialposition,religious andphilosophicalviews,andparticularconcep- tionsofvalue. Rawlsarguesthatinthehypotheticaloriginal positioneveryonewouldrejectutilitarianism, perfectionism,andintuitionistviews.Instead theywouldunanimouslyacceptjusticeasfair- ness.Thisconceptionofjusticeconsistsmainlyof twoprinciples.Thefirstprinciplesaysthatcer- tainlibertiesarebasicandaretobeequallypro- videdtoall:libertyofconscience,freedomof thought,freedomofassociation,equalpolitical liberties,freedomandintegrityoftheperson, andthelibertiesthatmaintaintheruleoflaw. Thesearebasicliberties,becausetheyareneces- sarytoexerciseone's"moralpowers."Thetwo moralpowersare,first,thecapacitytoberatio- nal,tohavearationalconceptionofone'sgood; andsecond,thecapacityforasenseofjustice,to understand,apply,andactfromrequirementsof justice.Thesepowersconstituteessentialinter- estsoffreeandequalmoralpersonssincethey enableeachpersontobeafreeandresponsible agenttakingpartinsocialcooperation. Rawls'ssecondprincipleofjustice,thediffer- enceprinciple,regulatespermissibledifferences inrights,powers,andprivileges.Itdefinesthe limitsofinequalitiesinwealth,income,powers, andpositionsthatmayexistinajustsociety.It says,first,thatsocialpositionsaretobeopento alltocompeteforontermsoffairequalityof opportunity.Second,inequalitiesinwealth, income,andsocialpowersandpositionsareper- missibleonlyiftheymaximallybenefittheleast advantagedclassinsociety. Thedifferenceprincipleimpliesthatajusteco- nomicsystemdistributesincomeandwealthso astomaketheclassofleastadvantagedpersons betteroffthantheywouldbeunderanyalterna- tiveeconomicsystem.Thisprincipleistobecon- sistentwiththe"priority"ofthefirstprinciple, whichrequiresthatequalbasiclibertiescannot betradedforotherbenefits.Theleastadvan- 774 Ray,John reality taged'srighttovote,forexample,cannotbelim- itedforthesakeofimprovingtheirrelativeeco- nomicposition.Instead,abasiclibertycanbe limitedonlyforthesakeofmaintainingother basicliberties. Rawlscontendsthat,takingthetwoprinciples ofjusticetogether,ajustsocietymaximizesthe worthtotheleastadvantagedofthebasicliber- tiessharedbyall(Theory,p.205).Thepriorityof basiclibertyimpliesaliberalegalitariansocietyin whicheachpersonisensuredadequateresources toeffectivelyexerciseherbasiclibertiesand becomeindependentandself-governing.Ajust societyisthengovernedbyaliberal-democratic constitutionthatprotectsthebasiclibertiesand providescitizenswithequallyeffectiverightsto participateinelectoralprocessesandinfluence legislation.Economicallyajustsocietyincorpo- ratesamodifiedmärketsystemthatextensively distributesincomeandwealth-eithera"prop- erty-owningdemocracy"withwidespreadown- ershipofmeansofproduction,orliberal socialism. Seealsocontractarianism,justice, KANT,LIBERALISM,RIGHTS,UTILITARIANISM. S.Fr. Ray,John(1627-1705),Englishnaturalistwhose workonthestructureandhabitsofplantsand animalsledtoimportantconclusionsonthe methodologyofclassificationandgaveastrong impetustothedesignargumentinnaturalthe- ology.Inanearlypaperhearguedthatthedeter- miningcharacteristicsofaspeciesarethose transmittedbyseed,sincecolor,scent,size,etc, varywithclimateandnutriment.Parallelsfrom theanimalkingdomsuggestedthecorrectbasis forclassificationwouldbestructural.Butwe havenoknowledgeofrealessences.Ourexperi- enceofnatureisofacontinuum,andforpracti- calpurposeskinshipsarebestidentifiedbya pluralityofcriteria.Hismaturetheoryissetout inDissertatioBrevis(1696)andMethodusEmendata (1703).TheWisdomofGodManifestedintheWorks oftheCreation(1691andthreerevisions)wasa best-sellingcompendiumofRay'sownscientific leamingandwasimitatedandquarriedbymany låterexponentsofthedesignargument.Philo- sophically,hereliedonothers,fromCiceroto Cudworth,andwassupersededbyPaley. M.A.St. RäzT,al.SeeAL-RäzI. reactiveattitude.Seestrawson. realassent.Seenewman. realdefinition.Seedefinition. realdistinction.Seefundamentumdivisionis. realessence.Seeessentialism. realism,direct.Seedirectrealism. realism,interna).Seephilosophyofscience. realism,metaphysical.Seearmstrong,metaphys- ICALREALISM. realism,modal.Seelewis,david. realism,moral.Seemoralrealism. realism,naive.Seeperception. realism,perceptual.Seeperception. realism,scientific.Seephilosophyofscience;sel- lars,wilfrid. realism,Scotistic.Seedunsscotus. realismanferem.Seeproperty. realisminrebus.Seeproperty. reality,instandardphilosophicalusage,how thingsactuallyare,incontrastwiththeirmere appearance.Appearancehastodowithhow thingsseemtoaparticularperceiverorgroupof perceivers.Realityissometimessaidtobetwo- way-independentofappearance.Thismeans thatappearancedoesnotdeterminereality. First,nomatterhowmuchagreementthereis, basedonappearance,aboutthenatureofreal- ity,itisalwaysconceivablethatrealitydiffers fromappearance.Secondly,appearancesarein nowayrequiredforreality:realitycanoutstrip therangeofallinvestigationsthatweareina positiontomake.Itmaybethatrealityalways bringswithitthepossibilityofappearances,in thecounterfactualsensethatiftherewere observerssuitablysituated,thenifconditions werenotconducivetoerror,theywouldhave experiencesofsuch-and-suchakind.Butthe truthofsuchacounterfactualseemstobe groundedinthefactsofreality.Phenomenalism holds,tothecontrary,thatthefactsofrealitycan beexplainedbysuchcounterfactuals,butphe- 775 realityprinciple reasonsforaction nomenalistshavefailedtoproduceadequate non-circularanalyses. Theconceptofrealityonwhichitistwo-way- independentofexperienceissometimescalled objectivereality.However,Descartesusedthis phrasedifferentlytoeffectacontrastwithformål oractualreality.Heheldthattheremustbeat leastasmuchrealityintheefficientandtotal causeofaneffectasintheeffectitself,andapplied thisprincipleasfollows:'Theremustbeatleastas muchactualorformålrealityintheefficientand totalcauseofanideaasobjectiverealityinthe ideaitself."Theobjectiverealityofanideaseems tohavetodowithitshavingrepresentational content,whileactualorformålrealityhastodo withexistenceindependentofthemind.Thus thequotedprinciplerelätesfeaturesofthecause ofanideatotherepresentationalcontentofthe idea.Descartes'smainintendedapplications weretoGodandmaterialobjects. Seealsodescartes.G.Fo. realityprinciple.SeeFREUD. realizability,multiple.Seefunctionalism. realization.Seephilosophyofmind. realization,physical.Seereduction. realmathematics.Seehilbert'sprogram. realnumber.Seemathematicalanalysis. realproposition.Seehilbert'sprogram. reason.Seepracticalreason,theoreticalrea- son. reason,all-things-considered.Seereasonsfor action. reason,evidential.Seeepistemology. reason,exciting.Seehutcheson. reason,explaining.Seereasonsforaction. reason,justifying.Seehutcheson. reason,normative.Seereasonsforaction. reason,objective.Seereasonsforaction. reason,overriding.Seereasonsforaction. reason,practical.Seekant,practicalreason. reason,principleofsufficient.Seeleibniz. reason,productive.Seetheoreticalreason. reason,pure.Seekant. reason,subjective.Seereasonsforaction. reason,theoretical.Seetheoreticalreason. reasoning.Seecircularreasoning,kant,practi- calREASONING. reasoning,circular.Seecircularreasoning. reasoning,demonstrative.Seeinference. reasonsexternalism.Seeexternalism. reasonsforaction,considerationsthatcallforor justifyaction.Theymaybesubjectiveorobjec- tive.Asubjectivereasonisaconsiderationanagent understandstosupportacourseofaction, whetherornotitactuallydoes.Anobjectiverea- sonisonethatdoessupportacourseofaction, regardlessofwhethertheagentrealizesit.What arecitedasreasonsmaybematterseitheroffact orofvalue,butwhenfactsarecitedvaluesare alsorelevant.Thusthefactthatcigarettesmoke containsnicotineisareasonfornotsmoking onlybecausenicotinehasundesirableeffects. Themostimportantevaluativereasonsarenor- mativereasons-i.e.,considerationshaving(e.g.) ethicalforce.Factsbecomeobligatingreasons when,inconjunctionwithnormativeconsider- ations,theygiverisetoanobligation.Thusin viewoftheobligationtohelptheneedy,thefact thatothersarehungryisanobligatingreasonto seetheyarefed. Reasonsforactionenterpracticalthinkingas thecontentsofbeliefs,desires,andothermental states.Butnotallthereasonsonehasneedmoti- vatethecorrespondingbehavior.ThusImayrec- ognizeanobligationtopaytaxes,yetdosoonly forfearofpunishment.Ifso,thenonlymyfear isanexplainingreasonformyaction.Anoverrid- ingreasonisonethattakesprecedenceöverall others.Itisoftenclaimedthatmoralreasons overrideallothersobjectively,andshoulddoso subjectivelyaswell.Finally,onemayspeakofan all-things-consideredreason-onethatafterdue considerationistakenasfinallydeterminativeof whatshallbedone. 776 reasonsforbelief redintegration Seealsopracticalreason,reasonsfor BELIEF.H.J.M. reasonsforbelief,roughly,basesofbelief.The word'beliefiscommonlyusedtodesignateboth aparticularsortofpsychologicalstate,astateof believing,andaparticularintentionalcontentor propositionbelieved.Reasonsforbeliefexhibit ananalogousduality.Aproposition,p,mightbe saidtoprovideanormativereasontobelievea proposition,q,forinstance,whenpbearssome appropriatewarrantingrelationtoq.Andp mightaffordaperfectlygoodreasontobelieveq, eventhoughnoone,asamatteroffact,believes eitherporq.Incontrast,pisareasonthatIhave forbelievingq,ifIbelievepandpcountsasarea- son(inthesenseabove)tobelieveq.Undoubt- edly,Ihavereasontobelievecountlessprop- ositionsthatIshallnever,asithappens,cometo believe.Suppose,however,thatpisareasonfor whichIbelieveq.Inthatcase,Imustbelieveboth pandq,andpmustbeareasontobelieveq-or, atanyråte,Imustregarditassuch.Itmaybe thatImust,inaddition,believeqatleastinpart becauseIbelievep. Reasonsinthesesensesareinevitablyepis- temic;theyturnonconsiderationsofevidence, truth-conduciveness,andthelike.Butnotall reasonsforbeliefareofthissort.Anexplanatory reason,areasonwhyIbelievep,maysimplybean explanationformyhavingorcomingtohave thisbelief.PerhapsIbelievepbecauseIwas brainwashed,orstruckonthehead,orbecause Ihavestrongnon-epistemicmotivesforthis belief.(Imight,ofcourse,holdthebeliefonthe basisofunexceptionableepistemicgrounds. Whenthisisso,mybelievingpmaybothwar- rantandexplainmybelievingq.)Reflectionsof thissortcanleadtoquestionsconcerningthe overallor"all-things-considered"reasonable- nessofagivenbelief.Somephilosophers(e.g., Clifford)arguethatabelief'sreasonableness dependsexclusivelyonitsepistemicstanding: mybelievingpisreasonableformeprovideditis epistemicallyreasonableforme;wherebeliefis concerned,epistemicreasonsareoverriding.Oth- ers,sidingwithJames,havefocusedontherole ofbeliefinourpsychologicaleconomy,arguing thatthereasonablenessofmyholdingagiven beliefcanbeaffectedbyavarietyofnon-epis- temicconsiderations.SupposeIhavesomeevi- dencethatpisfalse,butthatIståndtobenefitin asignificantwayfromcomingtobelievep.Ifthat isso,andifthepracticaladvantagesofmyhold- ingpconsiderablyoutweighthepracticaldisad- vantages,itmightseemobviousthatmyholding pisreasonableformeinsomeall-embracing sense. Seealsopascal,reasonsforaction. J.F.H. reasonsinternalism.Seeexternalism. rebirth,wheelof.Seebuddhism,samsära. recognition,ruleof.Seejurisprudence. recollection.Seeplato,survival. reconstruction.Seerationalreconstruction. reconstruction,logical.Seerationalreconstruc- tion. reconstruction,rational.Seerationalrecon- struction. RectificationofNames.Seeche NGMING. recurrence,eternal.Seeeternalreturn. recursion,definitionby.Seedefinition. recursion,proofby.Seeproofbyrecursion. recursivefunctiontheory,arelativelyrecentarea ofmathematicsthattakesasitspointofdepar- turethestudyofanextremelylimitedclassof arithmeticfunctionscalledtherecursivefunc- tions.Strictlyspeaking,recursivefunctionthe- oryisabranchofhigherarithmetic(number theory,orthetheoryofnaturalnumbers)whose universeofdiscourseisrestrictedtothenon- negativeintegers:0,1,2,etc.However,thetech- niquesandresultsofthenewerareadonot resemblethosetraditionallyassociatedwith numbertheory.Theclassofrecursivefunctions isdefinedinawaythatmakesevidentthatevery recursivefunctioncanbecomputedorcalcu- lated.Thehypothesisthateverycalculablefunc- tionisrecursive,whichisknownasChurch's thesis,isoftentakenasakindofaxiominrecur- sivefunctiontheory.Thistheoryhasplayedan importantroleinmodernphilosophyofmathe- matics,especiallywhenepistemologicalissues arestudied.Seealsochurch'sthesis,com- PUTABILITY,PHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICS, PROOFBYRECURSION.J.Cor. redintegration,apsychologicalprocess,similarto 777 reducibility,axiomof reduction orinvolvingclassicalconditioning,inwhichone featureofasituationcausesapersontorecall, visualize,orrecomposeanentireoriginalsitua- tion.Onopeningapackofcigarettes,aperson mayvisualizetheentireprocess,includingstrik- ingthematch,lightingthecigarette,andpuffing. Redintegrationisusedasatechniqueinbehav- iortherapy,e.g.whensomeonetryingtorefrain fromsmokingisexposedtounpleasantodörs andvividpicturesoflungscakedwithcancer, andthenpermittedtosmoke.Iftheunpleasant- nessoftheodörsandvisualizationoutweighsthe reinforcementofsmoking,thepersonmayresist smoking. Philosophically,redintegrationisofinterestfor tworeasons.First,theprocessmaybecriticalin prudence.Bybringinglong-rangeconsequences ofbehaviorintofocusinpresentdeliberation, redintegrationmayhelptoprotectlong-range interests.Second,redintegrationoffersarolefor visualimagesinproducingbehavior.Imagesfig- ureinparadigmaticcasesofredintegration.In recollectingpicturesofcancerouslungs,theper- sonmayrefrainfromsmoking. Seealsocognitivepsychotherapy,con- DITIONING.G.A.G. reducibility,axiomof.Seetypetheory. reduct,Craig.Seecraig'sinterpolationtheo- rem. reductioadabsurdum.(1)Theprinciples(AD~ A)D~Aand(~ADA)DA.(2)Theargument forms'IfAthenBandnot-B;therefore,not-A' and'Ifnot-AthenBandnot-5;therefore,A'and argumentsoftheseforms.Reasoningviasuch argumentsisknownasthemethodofindirectproof. (3)Therulesofinferencethatpermit(i)infer- ringnot-AhavingderivedacontradictionfromA and(ii)inferringAhavingderivedacontradic- tionfromnot-A.Bothrulesholdinclassicallogic andcometothesamethinginanylogicwiththe lawofdoublenegation.Inintuitionistlogic, however,(i)holdsbut(ii)doesnot.Seealso DOUBLENEGATION,MATHEMATICALINTU- ITIONISM.G.RS. reduction,thereplacementofoneexpressionby asecondexpressionthatdiffersfromthefirstin primafaciereference.So-calledreductionshave beenmeantinthesenseofuniformlyapplicable explicitdefinitions,contextualdefinitions,or replacementssuitableonlyinalimitedrangeof contexts.Thus,authorshavespökenofreductive conceptualanalyses,especiallyintheearlydays ofanalyticphilosophy.Inparticular,inthesense- datumtheory(talkof)physicalobjectswassup- posedtobereducedto(talkof)sense-databy explicitdefinitionsorotherformsofconceptual analysis. Logicalpositiviststalkedofthereductionof theoreticalvocabularytoanobservational vocabulary,firstbyexplicitdefinitions,andlåter byotherdevices,suchasCarnap'sreductionsen- tences.Theseappealedtoatestconditionpredi- cate,T(e.g.,'isplacedinwater'),andadisplay predicate,D(e.g.,'dissolves'),tointroduceadis- positionalorother"non-observational"term,S (e.g.,'iswater-soluble'):(V*)[TxD(DxDSx]), with'D'representingthematerialconditional. Negativereductionsentencesfornon-occur- renceofStooktheform(Vx)[NTxD(NDxD~ Sx)].ForcoincidingpredicatepairsTandTDand ~DandNDCamapreferredtobilateralreduc- tionsentences:(Vx)[TxD(Dx=Sx)].Likeso manyotherattemptedreductions,reduction sentencesdidnotachievereplacementofthe "reduced"term,S,sincetheydonotfixapplica- tionofSwhenthetestcondition,T,failstoapply. Inthephilosophyofmathematics,logicism claimedthatallofmathematicscouldbereduced tologic,i.e.,allmathematicaltermscouldbe definedwiththevocabularyoflogicandallthe- oremsofmathematicscouldbederivedfromthe lawsoflogicsupplementedbythesedefinitions. Russell'sPrincipiaMathematicacarriedoutmuch ofsuchaprogramwithareductivebaseofsome- thingmuchmorelikewhatwenowcallsetthe- oryratherthanlogic,strictlyconceived.Many nowacceptthereducibilityofmathematicstoset theory,butonlyinasenseinwhichreductions arenotunique.Forexample,thenaturalnum- berscanequallywellbemodeledasclassesof equinumeroussetsorasvonNeumannordinals. Thisnon-uniquenesscreatesseriousdifficulties, withsuggestionsthatset-theoreticreductions canthrowlightonwhatnumbersandother mathematicalobjects"reallyare." Incontrast,wetakescientifictheoriestotellus, unequivocally,thatwaterisH2andthattem- peratureismeantranslationalkineticenergy. Accountsoftheoryreductioninscienceattempt toanalyzethecircumstanceinwhicha"reducing theory"appearstotellusthecompositionof objectsorpropertiesdescribedbya"reducedthe- ory."Thesimplestaccountsfollowthegeneral patternofreduction:oneprovides"identity statements"or"bridgelaws,"withatleastthe formofexplicitdefinitions,foralltermsinthe 778 reduction reduction reducedtheorynotalreadyappearinginthe reducingtheory;andthenonearguesthatthe reducedtheorycanbededucedfromthereduc- ingtheoryaugmentedbythedefinitions.For example,thelawsofthermodynamicsaresaidto bededuciblefromthoseofstatisticaimechanics, togetherwithstatementssuchas'temperatureis meantranslationalkineticenergy'and'pressure ismeanmomentumtransfer'. Howshouldtheidentitystatementsorbridge lawsbeunderstood?Ittakesempiricalinvestiga- tiontoconfirmstatementssuchasthattempera- tureismeantranslationalkineticenergy. Consequently,somehaveargued,suchstate- mentsatbestconstitutecontingentcorrelations ratherthanstrictidentities.Ontheotherhand, iftherelevanttermsandtheirextensionsarenot mediatedbyanalyticdefinitions,theidentity statementsmaybeanalogizedtoidentities involvingtwonames,suchas'CiceroisTully', whereittakesempiricalinvestigationtoestablish thatthetwonameshappentohavethesameref- erent. Onecangeneralizetheideaoftheoryreduc- tioninavarietyofways.Onemayrequirethe bridgelawstosufficeforthedeductionofthe reducedfromthereducingtheorywithout requiringthatthebridgelawstaketheformof explicitidentitystatementsorbiconditionalcor- relations.Someauthorshavealsofocusedonthe faetthatinpracticeareducingtheoryT2corrects orrefinesthereducedtheoryT1#sothatitis reallyonlyacorrectionorrefinement,Tr*,that isdeduciblefromT2andthebridgelaws.Some haveconsequentlyappliedtheterm'reduction' toanypairoftheorieswherethesecondcorrects andextendsthefirstinwaysthatexplainboth whythefirsttheorywasasaccurateasitwasand whyitmadetheerrorsthatitdid.Inthis extendedsense,relativityissaidtoreduceNew- tonianmechanics. Dothesocialsciences,especiallypsychology, inprinciplereducetophysics?Thisprospect wouldsupporttheso-calledidentitytheory(of mindandbody),inparticularresolvingimpor- tantproblemsinthephilosophyofmind,suchas themind-bodyproblemandtheproblemof otherminds.Many(thoughbynomeansall)are nowskepticalabouttheprospectsforidentifying mentalproperties,andthepropertiesofother specialsciences,withcomplexphysicalproper- ties.Toillustratewithanexamplefromeconom- ics(adaptedfromFödor),intherightcir- cumstancesjustaboutanyphysicalobjectcould countasapieceofmoney.Thusprospectsseem dimforfindingaclosedandfinitestatementof theform'beingapieceofmoneyis...',with onlypredicatesfromphysicsappearingonthe right(thoughsomewouldwanttoadmitinfinite definitionsinprovidingreduetions).Similarly, onesuspectsthatattributes,suchaspain,areat bestfunctionalpropertieswithindefinitelymany possiblephysicalrealizations.Believingthat reduetionsbyfinitelystabledefinitionsarethus outofreach,manyauthorshavetriedtoexpress theviewthatmentalpropertiesarestillsome- howphysicalbysayingthattheynonetheless superveneonthephysicalpropertiesofthe organismsthathavethem. Infact,thesesamedifficultiesthataffectmen- talpropertiesaffecttheparadigmcaseoftem- perature,andprobablyallputativeexamplesof theoreticalreduction.Temperatureismean translationaltemperatureonlyingases,andonly idealizedonesatthat.Inothersubstances,quite differentphysicalmechanismsrealizetempera- ture.Temperatureismoreaccuratelydescribed asafunctionalproperty,havingtodowiththe mechanismofheattransferbetweenbodies, where,inprinciple,therequiredmechanism couldbephysicallyrealizedinindefinitelymany ways. Inmostandquitepossiblyallcasesofputative theoryreductionbystrictidentities,wehave insteadarelationofphysicalrealization,constitu- tion,orinstantiation,nicelyillustratedbythe propertyofbeingacalculator(exampletaken fromCummins).Thepropertyofbeingacalcu- latorcanbephysicallyrealizedbyanabacus,by deviceswithgearsandlevers,byoneswithvac- uumtubesorsiliconchips,and,intherightcir- cumstances,byindefinitelymanyotherphysical arrangements.Perhapsmanywhohaveused 'reduction',particularlyinthesciences,have intendedtheterminthissenseofphysicalreal- izationratherthanoneofstrictidentity. Letusrestrictattentiontopropertiesthat reduceinthesenseofhavingaphysicalrealiza- tion,asinthecasesofbeingacalculator,having acertaintemperature,andbeingapieceof money.Whetherornotanobjectcountsashav- ingpropertiessuchasthesewilldepend,notonly onthephysicalpropertiesofthatobject,buton variouscircumstancesofthecontext.Intensions ofrelevantlanguageusersconstituteaplausible candidateforrelevantcircumstances.Inatleast manycases,dependenceoncontextarisesbe- causethepropertyconstitutesafunctionalprop- erty,wheretherelevantfunctionalsystem (calculationalpractices,heattransfer,monetary 779 reduction,phenomenological referentiallytransparent systems)aremuchlargerthantheproperty- bearingobjectinquestion.Theseexamplesraise thequestionofwhethermanyandperhapsall mentalpropertiesdependineliminablyonrela- tionstothingsoutsidetheorganismsthathave thementalproperties. Seealsoexplanation,philosophyof SCIENCE,SUPERVENIENCE,UNITYOFSCIENCE. P.Te. reduction,phenomenological.Seehusserl. reductionbase.Seereduction. reductionism.Seereduction. reductionism,explanatory.Seemethodological HOLISM. reductionsentence,foragivenpredicateQ3of space-timepointsinafirst-orderlanguage,any universalsentenceSoftheform:(x)[QYxD (Q2xZ>Q3x)],providedthatthepredicatesQ; andQ2areconsistentlyapplicabletothesame space-timepoints.IfS[hastheformgivenabove andS2isoftheform(x)[Q4xZ)(Q5Z)~QJ] andeitherSlisareductionsentenceforQ3orS2 isareductionsentencefor~Q3,thepair{5j,S2) isareductionpairforQ3.IfQ=Q4andQ7=~ Q5,theconjunctionofSandS2isequivalentto abilateralreductionsentenceforQ3oftheform (x)[Q,D(Q3=Q2)]. TheseconceptswereintroducedbyCarnapin "TestabilityandMeaning,"PhilosophyofScience (1936-37),tomodifytheverifiabilitycriterionof meaningtoaconfirmabilityconditionwhere termscanbeintroducedintomeaningfulscien- tificdiscoursebychainsofreductionpairsrather thanbydefinitions.Theincentiveforthismodi- ficationseemstohavebeentoaccommodatethe useofdispositionpredicatesinscientificdis- course.Carnapproposedexplicatingadisposi- tionpredicateQ3bybilateralreductionsentences forQ3.Animportantbutcontroversialfeatureof Carnap'sapproachisthatitavoidsappealtonon- extensionalconditionalsinexplicatingdisposi- tionpredicates. Seealsocarnap,reduction,verifica- TIONISM.I.L. reductivenaturalism.Seenaturalism. redundancytheoryoftruth.Seetruth. reference.Seemeaning,philosophyoflan- guage,THEORYOFDESCRIPTIONS. reference,causal-historicaltheoryof.Seephiloso- phyOFLANGUAGE. reference,descriptiontheoryof.Seephilosophyof LANGUAGE. reference,direct.Seecausaltheoryofproper names. reference,historicaltheoryof.Seephilosophyof LANGUAGE. reference,inscrutabilityof.Seeindeterminacyof translation. reference,newtheoryof.Seeputnam. referenceclass.Seeprobability. referential.Seereferentiallytransparent. referentiallytransparent.Anoccurrenceofasin- gulartermtinasentence'...t...'isreferentially transparent(orpurelyreferential)ifandonlyif thetruth-valueof'...t...'dependsonwhether thereferentoftsatisfiestheopensentence'... x...';thesatisfactionof...x...'bythereferent oftwouldguaranteethetruthof'...t...',and failureofthisindividualtosatisfy'...x wouldguaranteethat'...t...'wasnottrue. 'Bostonisacity'istrueifandonlyifthereferent of'Boston'satisfiestheopensentence'xisacity', sotheoccurrenceof'Boston'isreferentially transparent.Butin'Theexpression"Boston"has sixletters',thelengthofthewordwithinthe quotes,notthefeaturesofthecityBoston,deter- minesthetruth-valueofthesentence,sothe occurrenceisnotreferentiallytransparent. AccordingtoaFregeantheoryofmeaning,the referenceofanycomplexexpression(thatisa meaningfulunit)isafunctionofthereferentsof itsparts.Withinthiscontext,anoccurrenceofa referentialtermfinameaningfulexpression'... t...'isreferentiallytransparent(orpurelyrefer- ential)ifandonlyiftcontributesitsreferentto thereferenceof'...t...'.Theexpression'the areaaroundBoston'referstotheparticulararea itdoesbecauseofthereferentof'Boston'(and thereferenceorextensionofthefunction expressedby'theareaaroundx'). Anoccurrenceofareferentialtermiina meaningfulexpression'...t...'isreferentially opaqueifandonlyifitisnotreferentiallytrans- parent.Thus,ifthasareferentiallyopaque occurrenceinasentence'...t...',thenthe truth-valueof'...t...'dependsonsomething 780 referentialoccurrence reflectionprinciples otherthanwhetherthereferentoftsatisfies'... x...'. Althoughthesedefinitionsapplytooccur- rencesofreferentialterms,theterms'referen- tiallyopaque'and'referentiallytransparent'are usedprimarilytoclassifylinguisticcontextsfor termsasreferentiallyopaquecontexts.Iftoccurs purelyreferentiallyinSbutnotinC(S),thenC ()isareferentiallyopaquecontext.Butwemust qualifythis:C()isareferentiallyopaquecon- textforthatoccurrenceoftinS.Itwouldnotfol- low(withoutfurtherargument)thatC()isa referentiallyopaquecontextforotheroccur- rencesoftermsinsentencesthatcouldbeplaced intoC(). Contextsofquotation,propositionalattitude, andmodalityhavebeenwidelynotedfortheir potentialtoproducereferentialopacity.Con- sider: (1)Johnbelievesthatthenumberofplanetsis lessthaneight. (2)Johnbelievesthatnineislessthaneight. If(1)istruebut(2)isnot,theneither'thenum- berofplanets'or'nine'hasanoccurrencethatis notpurelyreferential,becausethesentences woulddifferintruth-valueeventhoughthe expressionsareco-referential.Butwithinthe sentences: (3)Thenumberofplanetsislessthaneight. (4)Nineislessthaneight. theexpressionsappeartohavepurelyreferential occurrence.In(3)and(4),thetruth-valueofthe sentenceasawholedependsonwhetherthe referentof'Thenumberofplanets'and'Nine' satisfies'xislessthaneight'.Becausetheoccur- rencesin(3)and(4)arepurelyreferentialbut thosein(1)and(2)arenot,thecontext'John believesthat()'isareferentiallyopaquecontext fortherelevantoccurrenceofatleastoneofthe twosingularterms.Somearguethattheoccur- renceof'nine'in(2)ispurelyreferentialbecause thetruth-valueofthesentenceasawhole dependsonwhetherthereferent,nine,satisfies theopensentence'Johnbelievesthatxisless thaneight'.Sayingsorequiresthatwemake senseoftheconceptofsatisfactionforsuchsen- tences(beliefsentencesandothers)andthatwe showthattheconceptofsatisfactionappliesin thiswayinthecaseathand(sentence(2)).There iscontroversyaboutwhetherthesethingscanbe done.In(1),ontheotherhand,thetruth-value isnotdeterminedbywhethernine(thereferent of'thenumberofplanets')satisfiestheopensen- tence,sothatoccurrenceisnotpurelyreferen- tial. Modalcontextsraisesimilarquestions. (5)Necessarily,nineisodd. (6)Necessarily,thenumberofplanetsisodd. If(5)istruebut(6)isnot,thenatleastoneofthe expressionsdoesnothaveapurelyreferential occurrence,eventhoughbothappeartobe purelyreferentialinthenon-modalsentence thatappearsinthecontext'Necessarily,'. Thusthecontextisreferentiallyopaqueforthe occurrenceofatleastoneoftheseterms. Onanalternativeapproach,genuinelysingu- lartermsalwaysoccurreferentially,and'the numberofplanets'isnotagenuinelysingular term.Russell'stheoryofdefinitedescriptions, e.g.,providesanalternativesemanticanalysisfor sentencesinvolvingdefinitedescriptions.This wouldenableustosaythatevensimplesen- tenceslike(3)and(4)differconsiderablyinsyn- tacticandsemanticstructure,sothatthe similaritythatsuggeststheproblem,theseem- inglysimilaroccurrencesofco-referentialterms, ismerelyapparent. Seealsodedicto,quantifyingin,sub- STITUTIVITYSALVAVERITATE.TM. referentialoccurrence.See QUANTIFYINGIN. referentialopacity.Seereferentiallytranspar- ent. referentialquantification.Seequantification. referentialtheoryofmeaning.Seemeaning,phi- LOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE. reflectionprinciples,twovarietiesofinternal statementsrelatedtocorrectnessinformål axiomaticsystems. (1)Proof-theoreticreflectionprinciplesareformu- latedforeffectivelypresentedsystemsSthatcon- tainamodicumofelementarynumbertheory sufficienttoarithmetizetheirownsyntactic notions,asdonebyKurtGödelinhis1931work onincompleteness.LetProvs(x)expressthatxis theGödelnumberofastatementprovableinS, andletnbethenumberofA,foranystatement AofS.Theweakestreflectionprincipleconsid- eredforSisthecollectionRfn(S)ofallstatements oftheformProvs(nA)—»A,whichexpressthatifA isprovablefromSthenA(istrue).Theproposi- tionConsexpressingtheconsistencyofSisacon- sequenceofRfn(S)(obtainedbytakingAtobea disprovablestatement).Thus,byGödel'ssecond 781 reflectiveequilibrium regressionanalysis incompletenesstheorem,Rfn(S)isstrongerthan SifSisconsistent.Reflectionprinciplesareused intheconstructionofordinallogicsasasystem- aticmeansofovercomingincompleteness. (2)Set-theoreticreflectionprinciplesareformu- latedforsystemsSofaxiomaticsettheory,such asZF(Zermelo-Fraenkel).Inthesimplestform theyexpressthatanypropertyAinthelanguage ofSthatholdsoftheuniverseof''all"sets, alreadyholdsofaportionofthatuniversecoex- tensivewithsomesetx.ThistakestheformA—> (3x)AbRa.Inasymmetricalrela- tion,theorderofthetermsisreversible. Examples:aisasiblingofb;aandbhavea commondivisor.Alsosymmetricalisthe nullrelation,underwhichnoobjectis relätedtoanything. (3)transitive(orexhibittransitivity):foralla,b, andc,(aRb&bRc)—»aRc.Transitiverela- tionscarryacrossamiddleterm.Examples: aislessthanb;aisanancestorofb.Thus, ifaislessthanbandbislessthanc,aisless thanc:lessthanhascarriedacrossthemid- dleterm,b. (4)antisymmetrical:forallaandb,(aRb&bRa) —>a=b. (5)trichotomous,connected,ortotal(tricliotomy): forallaandb,aRbVbRaVa=b. (6)asymmetrical:aRb&bRaholdsfornoaand b. (7)functional:foralla,b,andc,(aRb&aRc)—> b=c.Inafunctionalrelation(whichmay alsobecalledafunction),eachfirstterm uniquelydeterminesasecondterm. Risnon-reflexiveifitisnotreflexive,i.e.,ifthe condition(1)failsforatleastoneobjecta.Ris non-symmetricif(2)failsforatleastonepairof objects(a,b).Analogouslyfornon-transitive.Ris irreflexive(aliorelative)if(1)holdsfornoobject aandintransitiveif(3)holdsfornoobjectsa,b, andc.Thusunderstandsisnon-reflexivesince somethingsdonotunderstandthemselves,but notirreflexive,sincesomethingsdo;lovesisnon- symmetricbutnotasymmetrical;andbeinga cousino/isnon-transitivebutnotintransitive,as beingmotherofis. (l)-(3)defineanequivalencerelation(e.g.,the identityrelationamongnumbersortherelation ofbeingthesameageasamongpeople).Aclass ofobjectsbearinganequivalencerelationRto eachotherisanequivalenceclassunderR.(1),(3), and(4)defineapartialorder;(3),(5),and(6)a linearorder.Similarpropertiesdefineother importantclassifications,suchaslatticeand Booleanalgebra.TheconverseofarelationRis thesetofallpairs(b,a)suchthataRb;thecom- 788 relationalism relationalvalue plementofRisthesetofallpairs(a,b)suchthat -aRb(i.e.aRbdoesnothold). Amorecomplexexamplewillshowthepower ofarelationalvocabulary.TheancestralofRisthe setofall(a,b)suchthateitheraRborthereare finitelymanycyc2,c,...,csuchthataRc7and c,Rcandc^Rc-,and...andcRb.Freeeintro- 1223ne> ducedtheancestralinhistheoryofnumber:the naturalnumbersareexactlythoseobjectsbear- ingtheancestralofthesuccessor-ofrelationto zero.Equivalently,theyaretheintersectionofall setsthatcontainzeroandareclosedunderthe successorrelation.(Thisisformalizableinsec- ond-orderlogic.)Frege'sideahasmanyapplica- tions.E.g.,assumeasetU,relationRonU,and propertyF.AnelementaofUishereditarilyF (withrespecttoR)ifaisFandanyobjectbwhich bearstheancestralofRtoaisalsoF.HenceFis heresaidtobeahereditaryproperty,andtheset aishereditarilyfinite(withrespecttothemem- bershiprelation)ifaisfinite,itsmembersare,as arethemembersofitsmembers,etc.Thehered- itarilyfinitesets(orthesetshereditarilyofcardi- nality(A—>A), andtocontraction-freelogics,whichaddition- allyrejectcontraction,inoneformreading(A—> (A->B))->(A->B).Rminuscontraction(RW) differsfromlinearlogic,muchstudiedrecentlyin computerscience,onlybyacceptingthedistri- butionof'Er'över'v',whichthelatterrejects. Likelinearlogic,relevancelogiccontainsboth truth-functionalandnon-truth-functionalcon- nectives.Unlikelinearlogic,however,R,E,and Tareundecidable(unusualamongpropositional logics).Thisresultwasobtainedonlyin1984.In theearly1970s,relevancelogicsweregivenpos- sible-worldssemanticsbyseveralauthorswork- ingindependently.Theyalsohaveaxiomatic, naturaldeduction,andsequent(orconsecution) formulations.Onetechnicalresultthathas attractedattentionhasbeenthedemonstration that,althoughrelevancelogicsrejectDS,theyall acceptAckermann'sndeGamma:thatifAVBand iAaretheses,soisB.Arecentresultoccasioning muchsurprisewasthatrelevantarithmetic(con- sistingofPeano'spostulatesonthebaseofquan- tifiedR)doesnotadmitGamma. Seealsoimplication,modallogic. S.L.R. relevantalternative.Seecontextualism. reliabilism,atypeoftheoryinepistemologythat holdsthatwhatqualifiesabeliefasknowledgeor asepistemicallyjustifiedisitsreliablelinkageto thetruth.DavidArmstrongmotivatesreliabilism withananalogybetweenathermometerthat reliablyindicatesthetemperatureandabelief thatreliablyindicatesthetruth.Abeliefqualifies asknowledge,hesays,ifthereisalawlikecon- nectioninnaturethatguaranteesthatthebelief istrue.Acousinofthenomicsufficiencyaccount isthecounterfactualapproach,proposedby Dretske,Goldman,andNozick.Atypicalformu- lationofthisapproachsaysthatabeliefqualifies 792 religion,natural rerumnatura asknowledgeifthebeliefistrueandthecognizer hasreasonsforbelievingitthatwouldnotobtain unlessitweretrue.Forexample,someone knowsthatthetelephoneisringingifhebelieves this,itistrue,andhehasaspecificauditoryexpe- riencethatwouldnotoccurunlessthetelephone wereringing.Inaslightlydifferentformulation, someoneknowsapropositionifhebelievesit,it istrue,andifitwerenottruehewouldnot believeit.Intheexample,ifthetelephonewere notringing,hewouldnotbelievethatitis, becausehewouldnothavethesameauditory experience.Theseaccountsareguidedbythe ideathattoknowapropositionitisnotsufficient thatthebeliefbe"accidentally"true.Rather,the belief,oritsmodeofacquisition,must"track," "hookupwith,"or"indicate"thetruth. Unlikeknowledge,justifiedbeliefneednot guaranteeorbe"hookedup"withthetruth,for ajustifiedbeliefneednotitselfbetrue.Nonethe- less,reliabilistsinsistthattheconceptofjustified beliefalsohasaconnectionwithtruthacquisi- tion.AccordingtoGoldman'sreliableprocess account,abeliefsjustificationalstatusdepends onthepsychologicalprocessesthatproduceor sustainit.Justifiedbeliefsareproducedbyappro- priatepsychologicalprocesses,unjustifiedbeliefs byinappropriateprocesses.Forexample,beliefs producedorpreservedbyperception,memory, introspection,and"good"reasoningarejustified, whereasbeliefsproducedbyhunch,wishful thinking,or"bad"reasoningareunjustified. Whyarethefirstgroupofprocessesappropriate andthesecondinappropriate?Thedifference appearstolieintheirreliability.Amongthe beliefsproducedbyperception,introspection,or "good"reasoning,ahighproportionaretrue;but onlyalowproportionofbeliefsproducedby hunch,wishfulthinking,or"bad"reasoningare true.Thus,whatqualifiesabeliefasjustifiedisits beingtheoutcomeofasequenceofreliable belief-formingprocesses. Reliabilismisaspeciesofepistemologicalex- ternalism,becauseitmakesknowledgeorjusti- ficationdependonfactorssuchastruth connectionsortruthratiosthatareoutsidethe cognizer'smindandnotnecessarilyaccessibleto him.Yetreliabilismtypicallyemphasizesinternal factorsaswell,e.g.,thecognitiveprocesses responsibleforabelief.Processreliabilismisa formofnaturalisticepistemologybecauseitcen- tersoncognitiveoperationsandtherebypåves thewayforcognitivepsychologytoplayarolein epistemology. Seealsoepistemology,naturalistic EPISTEMOLOGY,PERCEPTION.A.I.G. religion,natural.Seenaturalreligion,philoso- PHYOFRELIGION. religion,philosophyof.Seenaturalreligion,phi- LOSOPHYOFRELIGION. reminiscence.SeepLATo. Renouvier,Charles(1815-1903),French philosopherinfluencedbyKantandComte,the latterbeingoneofhisteachers.Renouvier rejectedmanyoftheviewsofboththesephiloso- phers,however,chartinghisowncourse.He emphasizedtheirreduciblepluralityandindivid- ualityofallthingsagainstthecontemporaryten- denciestowardabsoluteidealism.Human individualityheassociatedwithindeterminism andfreedom.Totheextentthatagentsareunde- terminedbyotherthingsandself-determining, theyareuniqueindividuals.Indeterminismalso extendstothephysicalworldandtoknowledge. Herejectedabsolutecertitude,butdefendedthe universalityofthelawsoflogicandmathemat- ics.Inpoliticsandreligion,heemphasizedindi- vidualfreedomandfreedomofconscience.His emphasisonplurality,indeterminism,freedom, novelty,andprocessinfluencedJamesand, throughJames,Americanpragmatism.Seealso FREEWILLPROBLEM.R.H.K. replacement,axiomof.Seesettheory. representation,mental.Seecognitivescience. representationalism.Seerorty. representationalscheme.Seegödel'sincomplete- nesstheorems. representationaltheoryofart.Seemimesis. representationaltheoryofmemory.Seememory. representationtheorem.Seemagnitude. representativerealism.Seeperception. repression.SeeFREUD. republicanism,classical.Seeclassicalrepubli- CANISM. rerumnatura(Latin,'thenatureofthings'), metaphysics.Thephrasecanalsobeusedmore narrowlytomeanthenatureofphysicalreality, andoftenitpresupposesanaturalisticviewofall 793 rescogitans resultantattribute reality.Lucretius'sepicpoemDererumnaturais anEpicureanphysics,designedtounderpinthe Epicureanmorality.A.RM. rescogitans.Seedescartes. resextensa.Seedescartes. residues,methodof.Seemill'smethods. respondentconditioning.Seebehaviorism. responsevariable.Seeregressionanalysis. responsibility,aconditionthatrelätesanagentto actionsof,andconsequencesconnectedto,that agent,andisalwaysnecessaryandsometimes sufficientfortheappropriatenessofcertainkinds ofappraisalsofthatagent.Responsibilityhasno singledefinition,butisseveralcloselyconnected specificconcepts. Roleresponsibility.Agentsareidentifiedby socialrolesthattheyoccupy,sayparentorpro- fessor.Typicallydutiesareassociatedwithsuch roles-tocarefortheneedsoftheirchildren,to attendclassesandpublishresearchpapers.A personinasocialroleis"responsiblefor"theex- ecutionofthoseduties.Onewhocarriesoutsuch dutiesis"aresponsibleperson"or"isbehaving responsibly." Causalresponsibility.Events,includingbutnot limitedtohumanactions,causeotherevents. Thecauseis"responsible"fortheeffect.Causal responsibilitydoesnotimplyconsciousness; objectsandnaturalphenomenamayhavecausal responsibility. Liabilityresponsibility.Practicesofpraiseand blameincludeconstraintsonthementalstance thatanagentmusthavetowardanactionora consequenceofaction,inorderforpraiseor blametobeappropriate.Tomeetsuchconstraints istomeetafundamentalnecessaryconditionfor liabilityforpraiseorblame-hencetheexpres- sion'liabilityresponsibility'.Theseconstraints includesuchfactorsasintention,knowledge, recklessnesstowardconsequences,absenceof mistake,accident,inevitabilityofchoice.An agentwiththecapabilityforliabilityresponsibil- itymaylackitonsomeoccasion-whenmis- taken,forexample. Capacityresponsibility.Practicesofpraiseand blameassumealevelofintellectualandemo- tionalcapability.Theseverelymentallydisad- vantagedortheveryyoung,forexample,donot havethecapacitytomeettheconditionsforlia- bilityresponsibility.Theyarenot"responsible"in thattheylackcapacityresponsibility. Bothmoralityandlawembodyandrespect thesedistinctions,thoughlawinstitutionalizes andformalizesthem.Finalor"bottom-line"as- signmentofresponsibilityequivalenttoindeed deservingpraiseorblamestandardlyrequires eachofthelatterthreespecifickindsofrespon- sibility.Thefirstkindsuppliessomenormative standardsforpraiseorblame. Seealsocausation,diminishedcapac- ity,FREEWILL,HART,INTENTION,MENSREA. R.A.Sh. responsibility,diminished.Seediminishedcapac- ity. restrictedquantification.Seeformållogic. restrictio.Seeproprietatesterminorum. resultance,arelationaccordingtowhichone property(theresultantproperty,sometimes calledtheconsequentialproperty)ispossessed bysomeobjectoreventinvirtueof(andhence asaresultof)thatobjectoreventpossessing someotherpropertyorsetofproperties.Theidea isthatpropertiesofthingscanbeorderedinto connectedlevels,somebeingmorebasicthan andgivingrisetoothers,thelatterresultingfrom theformer.Forinstance,afigurepossessesthe propertyofbeingatriangleinvirtueofitspos- sessingacollectionofproperties,includingbeing aplanefigure,havingthreesides,andsoon;the formerresultingfromthelatter.Anobjectisbrit- tle(hasthepropertyofbeingbrittle)invirtueof havingacertainmolecularstructure. Itisoftenclaimedthatmoralpropertieslike rightnessandgoodnessareresultantproperties: anactionisrightinvirtueofitspossessingother properties.Theseexamplesmakeitclearthatthe natureofthenecessaryconnectionholding betweenaresultantpropertyandthosebase propertiesthatgrounditmaydifferfromcaseto case.Inthegeometricalexample,theverycon- ceptofbeingatrianglegroundstheresultance relationinquestion,andwhilebrittlenessis nomologicallyrelatedtothebasepropertiesfrom whichitresults,inthemoralcase,theresultance relationisarguablyneitherconceptualnor causal. Seealsoconstitution,naturalism, SUPERVENIENCE.M.C.T. resultantattribute.Seesupervenience. 794 retributivejustice Ricoeur,Paul retributivejustice.Seejustice,punishment. retributivism.Seepunishment. retrocausation.Seecausation. return,eternal.Seeeternalreturn. revelation.Seephilosophyofreligion. revisionarymetaphysics.Seemetaphysics. Rhazes.Seeal-räzI. RichardKilvington.Seekilvington. RichardRufus,alsocalledRichardofCornwall(d. c.1260),Englishphilosopher-theologianwho wrotesomeoftheearliestcommentariesonAris- totleintheLatinWest.Hiscommentarieswere notcursorysummaries;theyincludedsustained philosophicaldiscussions.Richardwasamaster ofartsatParis,wherehestudiedwithAlexander ofHales;hewasalsodeeplyinfluencedbyRobert Grosseteste.HeleftParisandjoinedtheFrancis- canorderin1238;hewasordainedinEngland. In1256,hebecameregentmasteroftheFran- ciscanstudiumatOxford;accordingtoRoger Bacon,hewasthemostinfluentialphilosophical theologianatOxfordinthesecondhalfofthe thirteenthcentury. InadditiontohisAristotlecommentaries, RichardwrotetwocommentariesonPeterLom- bard'sSentences(c.1250,c.1254).Inthefirstof theseheborrowedfreelyfromRobertGros- seteste,AlexanderofHales,andRichardFish- acre;thesecondcommentarywasacriticalcon- densationofthelecturesofhisyoungercontem- porary,St.Bonaventure,presentedinParis. RichardRufuswasthefirstmedievalproponent ofthetheoryofimpetus;hisviewsonprojectile motionwerecitedbyFranciscusMeyronnes.He alsoadvocatedotherargumentsfirstpresented byJohannesPhiloponus.Againsttheeternityof theworld,heargued:(1)pasttimeisnecessarily finite,sinceithasbeentraversed,and(2)the worldisnoteternal,sinceiftheworldhadno beginning,nomoretimewouldtranspirebefore tomorrowthanbeforetoday.Healsoarguedthat iftheworldhadnotbeencreatedexnihilo,the firstcausewouldbemutable.RobertGrosseteste citedoneofRichard'sargumentsagainstthe eternityoftheworldinhisnotesonAristotle's Physics. Intheology,Richarddeniedthevalidityof Anselm'sontologicalargument,but,anticipating DunsScotus,hearguedthattheexistenceofan independentbeingcouldbeinferredfromits possibility.LikeDunsScotus,heemploysthefor- maldistinctionasanexplanatorytool;inpre- sentinghisownviews,DunsScotuscited Richard'sdefinitionoftheformåldistinction. Richardstatedhisphilosophicalviewsbriefly, evencryptically;hisLatinprosestyleissome- timeseccentric,characterizedbyinterjectionsin whichheaddressesquestionstoGod,himself, andhisreaders.Hewashesitantaboutthevalue ofsystematictheologyforthetheologian,defer- ringtobiblicalexpositionastheprimaryforum fortheologicaldiscussion.Insystematictheol- ogy,heemphasizedAristotelianphilosophyand logic.Hewasawell-knownlogician;someschol- arsbelieveheisthefamouslogicianknownas theMagisterAbstractionum.Thoughhebor- rowedfreelyfromhiscontemporaries,hewasa profoundlyoriginalphilosopher. SeealsoAlexanderofhales,bonaven- ture,GROSSETESTE,PETERLOMBARD.R.W. Richard'sparadox.Seesemanticparadoxes. Rickert,Heinrich.Seeneo-kantianism. Ricoeur,Paul(b.1913),Frenchhermeneuticist andphenomenologistwhohasbeenaprofessor atseveralFrenchuniversitiesaswellastheUni- versityofNaples,YaleUniversity,andtheUni- versityofChicago.Hehasreceivedmajorprizes fromFrance,Germany,andItaly.Heisthe authoroftwenty-somevolumestranslatedina varietyoflanguages.Amonghisbest-known booksareFreedomandNature:TheVoluntaryand theInvoluntary;FreudandPhilosophy:AnEssayof Interpretation;TheConflictofInterpretations:Essayin Hermeneutics;TheRoleoftheMetaphor:Multi-Disci- plinaryStudiesoftheCreationofMeaninginLan- guage,TimeandNarrative;andOneselfasAnother. HisearlystudieswiththeFrenchexistentialist Marcelresultedinabook-lengthstudyofMar- cel'sworkandlåteraseriesofpublisheddia- logueswithhim. Ricoeur'sphilosophicalenterpriseiscolored byacontinuingtensionbetweenfaithandrea- son.Hislong-standingcommitmentstoboththe significanceoftheindividualandtheChristian faitharereflectedinhishermeneuticalvoyage, hiscommitmenttotheEspritmovement,and hisinterestinthewritingsofEmmanuel Mounier.Thislatterpointisalsoseeninhis claimoftheinseparabilityofactionanddis- 795 Riemann,G.F.B. rights courseinourquestformeaning.Inourcom- prehensionofbothhistoryandfictiononemust turntothetexttounderstanditsplotasguide- lineifwearetocomprehendexperienceofany reflectivesort.Intheendtherearenometa- physicalorepistemologicalgroundsbywhich meaningcanbeverified,andyetournatureis suchthatpossibilitymustbepresentbeforeus. Ricoeurattemptshisexplanationthrougha hermeneuticphenomenology.Theveryher- meneuticsofexistencethatfollowsisitselflim- itedbyreason'squestioningofexperienceand itsattemptstotranscendthelimitthroughthe languageofsymbolsandmetaphors.Freedom andmeaningcometoberealizedintheactual- izationofanethicsthatarisesoutoftheveryact ofexistingandthustranscendsthemerenatural voluntarydistinctionofaformålethic.Itisclear fromhislåterworkthatherejectsanyformof foundationalismincludingphenomenologyas wellasnihilismandeasyskepticism.Througha sortofinterdependentdialecticthatgoesbeyond themoremechanicalmodelsofHegelianismor Marxism,theselfunderstandsitselfandis understoodbytheotherintermsofitssuffering anditsmoralactions. Seealsohegel,hermeneutics,husserl, MARCEL,PHENOMENOLOGY.J.Bi. Riemann,G.F.B.Seenon-euclideangeometry. right,absolute.Seerights. right,primafacie.Seerights. rightaction.Seeethics. rightness,objective.Seeobjectiverightness. rightness,subjective.Seeobjectiverightness. rightofnature.Seehobbes. rights,advantageouspositionsconferredon somepossessorbylaw,morals,rules,orother norms.Thereisnoagreementonthesensein whichrightsareadvantages.Willtheorieshold thatrightsfavörthewillofthepossessoröverthe conflictingwillofsomeotherparty;interesttheo- riesmaintainthatrightsservetoprotectorpro- motetheinterestsoftheright-holder.Hohfeld identifiedfourlegaladvantages:liberties,claims, powers,andimmunities. TheconceptofarightaroseinRoman jurisprudenceandwasextendedtoethicsvia naturallawtheory.Justaspositivelaw,thelaw positedbyhumanlawmakers,conferslegal rights,sothenaturallawconfersnaturalrights. Rightsareclassifiedbytheirspecificsourcesin differentsortsofrules.Legalrightsareadvanta- geouspositionsunderthelawofasociety.Other speciesofinstitutionalrightsareconferredbythe rulesofprivateorganizations,ofthemoralcode ofasociety,orevenofsomegame.Thosewho identifynaturallawwiththemorallawoften identifynaturalrightswithmoralrights,but somelimitnaturalrightstoourmostfundamen- talrightsandcontrastthemwithordinarymoral rights.Othersdenythatmoralrightsarenatural becausetheybelievethattheyareconferredby themoresorpositivemoralityofone'ssociety. Onealwayspossessesanyspecificrightby virtueofpossessingsomestatus.Thus,rightsare alsoclassifiedbystatus.Civilrightsarethoseone possessesasacitizen;humanrightsarepossessed byvirtueofbeinghuman.Presumablywomen's rights,children'srights,patients'rights,andthe rightsofblacksassuchareanalogous. Humanrightsplayverymuchthesamerolein ethicsonceplayedbynaturalrights.Thisispartly becauseontologicaldoubtsabouttheexistence ofGodunderminetheacceptanceofanynatural lawtakentoconsistindivinecommands,and epistemologicaldoubtsaboutself-evidentmoral truthsleadmanytorejectanynaturallawcon- ceivedofasthedictatesofreason.Althoughthe Thomisticviewthatnaturalrightsaregrounded onthenatureofmanisoftenadvocated,most moralphilosophersrejectitsteleologicalconcep- tionofhumannaturedefinedbyessential humanpurposes.Itseemssimplertoappeal insteadtofundamentalrightsthatmustbeuni- versalamonghumanbeingsbecausetheyare possessedmerelybyvirtueofone'sstatusasa humanbeing.Humanrightsarestillthoughtof asnaturalintheverybroadsenseofexisting independentlyofanyhumanactionorinstitu- tion.Thisexplainshowtheycanbeusedasan independentstandardintermsofwhichtocriti- cizethelawsandpoliciesofgovernmentsand otherorganizations.Sincehumanrightsareclas- sifiedbystatusratherthansource,thereis anotherspeciesofhumanrightsthatareinstitu- tionalratherthannatural.Thesearethehuman rightsthathavebeenincorporatedintolegalsys- temsbyinternationalagreementssuchasthe EuropeanConventiononHumanRights. Itissometimessaidthatwhilenaturalrights wereconceivedaspurelynegativerights,suchas therightnottobearbitrarilyimprisoned,human rightsareconceivedmorebroadlytoinclude positivesocialandeconomicrights,suchasthe 796 rights,Hohfeldian Rorty,Richard righttosocialsecurityortoanadequatestandard ofliving.Butthisissurelynottruebydefinition. TraditionalnaturallawtheoristssuchasGrotius andLockespökeofnaturalrightsaspowersand associatedthemwithliberties,ratherthanwith claimsagainstinterference.Andwhilemodern declarationsofhumanrightstypicallyinclude socialandeconomicrights,theyassumethat thesearerightsinthesamesensethattraditional politicalrightsare. Rightsareoftenclassifiedbytheirformålprop- erties.Forexample,therightnottobebattered isanegativerightbecauseitimposesanegative dutynottobatter,whilethecreditor'srighttobe repaidisapositiverightbecauseitimposesapos- itivedutytorepay.Therighttoberepaidisalso apassiverightbecauseitscontentisproperlyfor- mulatedinthepassivevoice,whiletherightto defendoneselfisanactiverightbecauseitscon- tentisbeststatedintheactivevoice.Again,a rightinremisarightthatholdsagainstallsecond parties;arightinpersonamisarightthatholds againstoneorafewothers.Thisisnotquite Harfsdistinctionbetweengeneralandspecial rights,rightsofeveryoneagainsteveryone,such astherighttofreespeech,andrightsarisingfrom specialrelations,suchasthatbetweencreditor anddebtororhusbandandwife. Rightsareconceptuallycontrastedwithduties becauserightsareadvantageswhiledutiesare disadvantages.Still,manyjuristsandphiloso- phershaveheldthatrightsanddutiesarelogical correlatives.Thisdoesseemtobetrueofclaim rights;thus,thecreditor'srighttoberepaid impliesthedebtor'sdutytorepayandviceversa. Butthelogicalcorrelativeofalibertyright,such asone'srighttoparkinfrontofone'shouse,is theabsenceofanydutyforonenottodoso.This contrastisindicatedbyD.D.Raphael'sdistinc- tionbetweenrightsofrecipienceandrightsof action. Sometimestosaythatonehasarighttodo somethingistosaymerelythatitisnotwrong foronetoactinthisway.Thishasbeencalledthe weaksenseof'aright'.Moreoftentoassertthat onehasarighttodosomethingdoesnotimply thatexercisingthisrightisright.Thus,Imight havearighttorefusetodoafavörforafriend eventhoughitwouldbewrongformetodoso. Finally,manyphilosophersdistinguishbe- tweenabsoluteandprimafacierights.An absoluterightalwaysholds,i.e.,disadvantages somesecondparty,withinitsscope;aprimafacie rightisonethatholdsunlessthegroundofthe rightisoutweighedbysomestrongercontrary reason. Seealsoduty,hohfeld,naturallaw, PHILOSOPHYOFLAW,POLITICALPHILOSOPHY. C.We. rights,Hohfeldian.Seehohfeld. rights,imperfect.Seegrotius. rights,legal.Seerights. rights,natural.Seerights. rights,perfect.Seerights. rigiddesignator.Seemeaning. rigorism,theviewthatmoralityconsistsinthat singlesetofsimpleorunqualifiedmoralrules, discoverablebyreason,whichappliestoall humanbeingsatalltimes.Itisoftensaidthat Kanfsdoctrineofthecategoricalimperativeis rigoristic.Twomainobjectionstorigorismare(1) somemoralrulesdonotapplyuniversally-e.g., Tromisesshouldbekept'appliesonlywhere thereisaninstitutionofpromising;and(2)some rulesthatcouldbeuniversallykeptareabsurd- e.g.,thateveryoneshouldståndononelegwhile thesunrises.RecentinterpretersofKantdefend himagainsttheseobjectionsbyarguing,e.g., thatthe"rules"hehadinmindaregeneral guidelinesforlivingwell,whichareinfactuni- versalandpracticallyrelevant,orthathewasnot arigoristatall,seeingmoralworthasissuingpri- marilyfromtheagenfscharacterratherthan adherencetorules.R.C. rigorousduty.Seeduty. ringofCyges,aringthatgivesitswearerinvisi- bility,discussedinPlato'sRepublic(II,359b- 360d).Glaucontellsthestoryofamanwhodis- coveredtheringandusedittousurpthethrone todefendtheclaimthatthosewhobehavejustly dosoonlybecausetheylackthepowertoact unjustly.Iftheycouldavoidpayingthepenalty ofinjustice,Glauconargues,everyonewouldbe unjust.Seealsoplato,socrates.W.J.P. robot.Seecomputertheory. roleresponsibility.Seeresponsibility. Rorty,Richard(b.1931),Americanphilosopher, notableforthebreadthofhisphilosophicaland culturalinterests.HewaseducatedattheUni- versityofChicagoandYaleandhastaughtat 797 RoscelindeCompiégne Rosenzweig,Franz Wellesley,Princeton,theUniversityofVirginia, andStanford.Hisearlyworkwasprimarilyin standardareasofanalyticphilosophysuchasthe philosophyofmind,where,forexample,he developedanimportantdefenseofeiiminative materialism.In1979,however,hepublishedP/n'- losophyandtheMirrorofNature,whichwasboth hailedanddenouncedasafundamentalcritique ofanalyticphilosophy.Boththepraiseandthe abusewereoftenbasedonmisconceptions,but thereisnodoubtthatRortyquestionedfunda- mentalpresuppositionsofmanyAnglo-Ameri- canphilosophersandshowedaffinitiesfor Continentalalternativestoanalyticphilosophy. Atroot,however,Rorty'spositionisneither analytic(exceptinitsstylisticclarity)norConti- nental(exceptinitsculturalbreadth).Hisview is,rather,pragmatic,acontemporaryincarna- tionofthedistinctivelyAmericanphilosophizing ofJames,Peirce,andDewey.OnRorty'sreading, pragmatisminvolvesarejectionoftherepresen- tationalismthathasdominatedmodernphiloso- phyfromDescartesthroughlogicalpositivism. Accordingtorepresentationalism,wehavedirect accessonlytoideasthatrepresenttheworld,not totheworlditself.Philosophyhastheprivileged roleofdeterminingthecriteriaforjudgingthat ourrepresentationsareadequatetoreality. AmainthrustofPhilosophyandtheMirrorof Natureistodiscreditrepresentationalism,firstby showinghowithasfunctionedasanunjustified presuppositioninclassicalmodernphilosophers suchasDescartes,Locke,andKant,andsecond byshowinghowanalyticphilosopherssuchas WilfridSellarsandQuinehaverevealedtheinco- herenceofrepresentationalistassumptionsin contemporaryepistemology.Since,onRorty's view,representationalismdefinestheepistemo- logicalprojectofmodemphilosophy,itsfailure requiresthatweabandonthisprojectand,with it,traditionalpretensionstoaprivilegedcogni- tiveroleforphilosophy.Rortyseesnopointin seekinganon-representationalistbasisforthe justificationorthetruthofourknowledge claims.Itisenoughtoacceptasjustifiedbeliefs thoseonwhichourepistemiccommunityagrees andtouse'true'asanhonorifictermforbeliefs thatweseeas"justifiedtothehilt." Rortycharacterizeshispositivepositionas "liberalironism."Hisliberalismisofastandard sort,takingasitsbasicvaluethefreedomofall individuals:first,theirfreedomfromsuffering, butthenalsofreedomtoformtheirliveswith whatevervaluestheyfindmostcompelling. Rortydistinguishesthe"publicsphere"inwhich weallsharetheliberalcommitmenttouniversal freedomfromthe"privatespheres"inwhichwe allworkoutourownspecificconceptionofthe good.Hisironismreflectshisrealizationthat thereisnogroundingforpublicorprivatevalues otherthanourdeep(butcontingent)commit- menttothemandhisappreciationofthemulti- tudeofprivatevaluesthathedoesnothimself happentoshare.Rortyhasemphasizedthe importanceofliteratureandliterarycriti- cism-asopposedtotraditionalphilosophy-for providingthecitizensofaliberalsocietywith appropriatesensitivitiestotheneedsandvalues ofothers. Seealsoanalyticphilosophy;Conti- nentalphilosophy;pragmatism;quine; sellars,wilfrid.g.g. RoscelindeCompiégne(c.l050-c.l125),French philosopherandlogicianwhobecameembroiled intheologicalcontroversywhenheappliedhis logicalteachingstothedoctrineoftheTrinity. Sincealmostnothingsurvivesofhiswritten work,wemustrelyonhostileaccountsofhis viewsbyAnselmofCanterburyandPeter Abelard,bothofwhomopenlyopposedhisposi- tions. PerhapsthemostnotoriousviewRoscelinis saidtohaveheldisthatuniversalsaremerelythe puffsofairproducedwhenawordispro- nounced.Onthispointheopposedviewscur- rentamongmanytheologiansthatauniversal hasanexistenceindependentoflanguage,and somehowiswhatmanydifferentparticularsare. Roscelin'saversiontoanyproposalthatdifferent thingscanbesomeonethingisprobablywhat ledhiminhisthinkingaboutthethreepersons ofGodtoapositionthatsoundedsuspiciously liketheheresyoftritheism.Roscelinalsoevi- dentlyheldthatthequalitiesofthingsarenot entitiesdistinctfromthesubjectsthatpossess them.ThisindicatesthatRoscelinprobably deniedthattermsintheAristoteliancategories otherthansubstancesignifiedanythingdistinct fromsubstances. Abelard,theforemostlogicianofthetwelfth century,studiedunderRoscelinaround1095 andwasundoubtedlyinfluencedbyhimonthe questionofuniversals.Roscelin'sviewthatuni- versalsarelinguisticentitiesremainedanimpor- tantoptioninmedievalthought.Otherwisehis positionsdonotappeartohavehadmuchcur- rencyintheensuingdecades. Seealsoabstractentity,metaphysics. M.M.T. Rosenzweig,Franz(1886-1929),Germanphi- 798 Rosmini-Serbati,Antonio Ross,W(illiam)D(avid) losopherandJewishtheologianknownasoneof thefoundersofreligiousexistentialism.Hisearly relationtoJudaismwastenuous,andatone pointhecameclosetoconvertingtoChristian- ity.Areligiousexperienceinasynagoguemade himchangehismindandreturntoJudaism.His chiefphilosophicworksareatwo-volumestudy, HegelandtheState(1920),andhismasterpiece, TheStårofRedemption(1921). Rosenzweig'sexperienceinWorldWarI causedhimtorejectabsoluteidealismonthe groundthatitcannotaccountfortheprivacyand finalityofdeath.Insteadoflookingforaunify- ingprinciplebehindexistence,Rosenzweigstarts withthreeindependentrealities"given"inexpe- rience:God,theself,andtheworld.Callinghis method"radicalempiricism,"heexplainshow God,theself,andtheworldareconnectedby threeprimaryrelations:creation,revelation,and redemption.Inrevelation,Goddoesnotcom- municateverbalstatementsbutmerelyapres- encethatcallsforloveanddevotionfrom worshipers. Seealsoexistentialism,jewishphiloso- phy.K.See. Rosmini-Serbati,Antonio(1797-1855),Italian philosopher,Catholicpriest,counselortoPope PiusIX,andsupporterofthesupremacyofthe churchövercivilgovernment(Neo-Guelphism). Rosminihadtwomajorconcerns:theobjectivity ofhumanknowledgeandthesynthesisofphilo- sophicalthoughtwithinthetraditionofCatholic thought.InhisNuovosaggiosulVoriginedelleidee ("NewEssayontheOriginofIdeas,"1830),he identifiestheuniversalaprioriintuitivecompo- nentofallhumanknowledgewiththeideaof beingthatgivesusthenotionofapossibleor idealbeing.Everythingintheworldisknownby intellectualperception,whichisthesynthesisof sensationandtheideaofbeing.Exceptforthe ideaofbeing,whichisdirectlygivenbyGod,all ideasderivefromabstraction.Theobjectivityof humanknowledgerestsonitsuniversaloriginin theideaofbeing.Theharmonybetweenphilos- ophyandreligioncomesfromthefactthatall humanknowledgeistheresultofdivinerevela- tion.Rosmini'sthoughtwasinfluencedby AugustineandAquinas,andstimulatedbythe attempttofindasolutiontothecontrasting needsofrationalismandempiricism.P.Gar. Ross,W(illiam)D(avid)(1877-1971),British Aristotelianscholarandmoralphilosopher.Born inEdinburghandeducatedattheUniversityof EdinburghandatBalliolCollege,Oxford,he becameafellowofMertonCollege,thenafel- low,tutor,andeventuallyprovostatOrielCol- lege.Hewasvice-chancellorofOxfordUniver- sity(1941-44)andpresidentoftheBritish Academy(1936-40).Hewasknightedin1938 inviewofnationalservice. Rosswasadistinguishedclassicalscholar:he editedtheOxfordtranslationsofAristotle (1908-31)andtranslatedtheMetaphysicsandthe Ethicshimself.HisAristotle(1923)isajudicious expositionofAristotle'sworkasawhole.Kanfs EthicalTheory(1954)isacommentaryonKanfs TheGroundworkofEthics. Hismajorcontributiontophilosophywasin ethics:TheRightandtheGood(1930)andEonnda- tionsofEthics(1939).Theviewheexpressedthere wascontroversialinEnglish-speakingcountries fortenyearsorso.Heheldthat'right'and'good' areempiricallyindefinabletermsthatname objectivepropertiesthepresenceofwhichis knownintuitivelybypersonswhoaremature andeducated.Wefirstcognizetheminparticu- larinstances,thenarriveatgeneralprinciples involvingthemby"intuitiveinduction."(He thoughteveryethicaltheorymustadmitatleast oneintuition.)Theknowledgeofmoralprinci- plesisthusratherlikeknowledgeoftheprinci- plesofgeometry.'Right'('dutiful')appliesto acts,inthesenseofwhatanagentbringsabout (andthereisnodutytoactfromagoodmotive, andarightactcanhaveabadmotive);'morally good'appliesprimarilytothedesiresthatbring aboutaction.Hecastigatedutilitarianismas absorbingalldutiesintoenhancingthewell- beingofeveryoneaffected,whereasinfactwe havestrongspecialobligationstokeeppromises, makereparationforinjuries,repayservices done,distributehappinessinaccordwithmerit, benefitindividualsgenerally(andheconcedes thisisaweightymatter)andourselves(onlyin respectofknowledgeandvirtue),andnotinjure others(normallyastrongerobligationthanthat tobenefit).Thatwehavethese"primafacie" dutiesisself-evident,buttheyareonlyprima facieinthesensethattheyareactualdutiesonly ifthereisnostrongerconflictingprimafacie duty;andwhenprimafaciedutiesconflict,what oneoughttodoiswhatsatisfiesallofthem best-althoughwhichthisisisamatterofjudg- ment,notself-evidence.(Heconceded,however, incontrasttohisgeneralcritiqueofutilitarian- ism,thatpublicsupportoftheseprimafacieprin- cipleswiththeirintuitivestrengthcanbe justifiedonutilitariangrounds.)Tomeetvarious counterexamplesRossintroducedcomplica- tions,suchasthatapromiseisnotbindingifdis- 799 Rousseau,Jean-Jacques Rousseau,Jean-Jacques chargeofitwillnotbenefitthepromisee(pro- vidingthiswasanimplicitunderstanding),and itislessbindingifmadelongagoorinacasual manner. Onlyfourstatesofaffairsaregoodinthem- selves:desiretodoone'sduty(virtue),knowl- edge,pleasure,andthedistributionofhappiness inaccordancewithdesert.Ofthese,virtueis morevaluablethananyamountofknowledgeor pleasure.InFoundationsofEthicsheheldthat virtueandpleasurearenotgoodinthesame sense:virtueis"admirable"butpleasureonlya "worthyobjectofsatisfaction"(so'good'does notnamejustoneproperty). Seealsoduty,ethics,moralepistemol- OGY,SELF-EVIDENCE.R.B.B. Rousseau,Jean-Jacques(1712-78),Swiss-born Frenchphilosopher,essayist,novelist,andmusi- cian,bestknownforhistheoriesonsocialfree- domandsocietalrights,education,andreligion. BorninGeneva,hewaslargelyself-educated andmovedtoFranceasateenager.Throughout muchofhislifehemovedbetweenParisandthe provinceswithseveraltripsabroad(includinga ScottishstaywithHume)andareturnvisitto Geneva,wherehereconvertedtoProtestantism fromhisearlierconversiontoCatholicism.Fora timehewasafriendofDiderotandother philosophesandwasaskedtocontributeartides onmusicfortheEncyclopedia. Rousseau'sworkcanbeseenfromatleast threeperspectives.Associalcontracttheorist,he attemptstoconstructahypotheticalstateof naturetoexplainthecurrenthumansituation. Thisevolvesaformofphilosophicalanthropol- ogythatgivesusbothatheoryofhumannature andaseriesofpragmaticclaimsconcerningsocial organization.Asasocialcommentator,hespeaks ofbothpracticalandidealformsofeducation andsocialorganization.Asamoralist,hecontin- uallyattemptstounitetheindividualandthecit- izenthroughsomeformofuniversalpolitical actionorconsent. InDiscourseontheOriginandFoundationof InequalityAmongMankind(1755),Rousseaupre- sentsuswithanalmostidyllicviewofhuman- ity.Innaturehumansarefirstseenaslittlemore thananimalsexceptfortheirspecialspecies sympathy.Låter,throughanexplanationofthe developmentofreasonandlanguage,heisable tosuggesthowhumans,whileretainingthis sympathy,can,bydistancingthemselvesfrom nature,understandtheirindividualselves.This leadstonaturalcommunityandtheclosestthing towhatRousseauconsidershumanity'sperfect moment.Privatepropertyquicklyfollowsonthe divisionoflabor,andhumansfindthemselves alienatedfromeachotherbytheclassdivisions engenderedbyprivateproperty.Thusman,who wasborninfreedom,nowfindshimselfin chains.TheSocialContractorPrinciplesofPolitical Right(1762)hasamoreambitiousgoal.Withan accountofthepracticalroleofthelegislatorand theintroductionoftheconceptofthegeneral will,Rousseauattemptstogiveusafoundation forgoodgovernmentbypresentingasolutionto theconflictsbetweentheparticularandtheuni- versal,theindividualandthecitizen,andthe actualandthemoral.Individuals,freelyagree- ingtoasocialpactandgivinguptheirrightsto thecommunity,areassuredofthelibertiesand equalityofpoliticalcitizenshipfoundinthecon- tract.Itisonlythroughbeingacitizenthat theindividualcanfullyrealizehisfreedom andexercisehismoralrightsandduties.While theindividualisnaturallygood,hemust alwaysguardagainstbeingdominatedordomi- nating. Rousseaufindsasolutiontotheproblemsof individualfreedomsandinterestsinasuperior formofmoral/politicalactionthathecallsthe generalwill.Theindividualascitizensubstitutes "Imust"for"Iwill,"whichisalsoan"Ishall" whenitexpressesassenttothegeneralwill.The generalwillisauniversalforceorstatementand thusismorenoblethananyparticularwill.In willinghisowninterest,thecitizenisatthesame timewillingwhatiscommunallygood.Thepar- ticularandtheuniversalareunited.Theindivid- ualhumanparticipantrealizeshimselfinrealiz- ingthegoodofall. AsapracticalpoliticalcommentatorRousseau knewthattheuniversalandtheparticulardonot alwayscoincide.Forthisheintroducedtheidea ofthelegislator,whichallowstheindividualciti- zentorealizehisfulfillmentassocialbeingandto exercisehisindividualrightsthroughuniversal consent.Inmomentsofdifferencebetweenthe majoritywillandthegeneralwillthelegislator willinstillthecorrectmoral/politicalunder- standing.Thiswillberepresentedinthelaws. Whilesovereigntyrestswiththecitizens, Rousseaudoesnotrequirethatpoliticalactionbe direct.Althoughallgovernmentshouldbe democratic,variousformsofgovernmentfrom representativedemocracy(preferableinsmall societies)tostrongmonarchies(preferablein largenation-states)maybeacceptable.Toshore uptheunityandstabilityofindividualsocieties, Rousseausuggestsasortofcivicreligiontowhich allcitizenssubscribeandinwhichallmembers 800 Royce,Josiah Russell,Bertrand(ArthurWilliam) participate.Hisearlierwritingsoneducationand hislåterpracticaltreatisesonthegovernmentsof PolandandCorsicareflectrelatedconcemswith naturalandmoraldevelopmentandwithhistor- icalandgeographicalconsiderations. Seealsosocialcontract.J.Bi. Royce,Josiah(1855-1916),Americanphiloso- pherbestknownforhispragmaticidealism,his ethicsofloyalty,andhistheoryofcommunity. EducatedatBerkeley,atJohnsHopkins,andin Germany,hetaughtphilosophyatHarvardfrom 1882. Royceheldthataconceptoftheabsoluteor eternalwasneededtoaccountfortruth,ultimate meaning,andrealityinthefaceofveryrealevil inhumanexperience.Seekingtoreconcileindi- vidualswiththeAbsolute,hepostulated,inThe WorldandtheIndividual(1899,1901),Absolute WillandThoughtasanexpressionofthecon- creteanddifferentiatedindividualityofthe world. Roycesawtheindividualselfasbothmoral andsinful,developingthroughsocialinterac- tion,communityexperience,andcommunal andself-interpretation.Selfisconstitutedbya lifeplan,byloyaltytoanultimategoal.Yetself- limitationandegoism,twohumansins,work againstachievementofindividualgoals,perhaps renderinglifeasenselessfailure.Theselfneeds savingandthisisthemessageofreligion,argues Royce(TheReligionsAspectsofPhilosophy,1885; TheSourcesofReligionsInsight,1912). ForRoyce,theinstrumentofsalvationisthe community.InThePhilosophyofLoyalty(1908), hedevelopsanethicsofloyaltytoloyalty,i.e., theextensionofloyaltythroughoutthehuman community.InTheProblemofChristianity(1913), Roycepresentsadoctrineofcommunitythat overcomestheindividualism-collectivismdi- lemmaandallowsagenuineblendingofindi- vidualandsocialwill. Communityisbuiltthroughinterpretation,a mediativeprocessthatreconcilestwoideas, goals,andpersons,bringingcommonmeaning andunderstanding.Interpretationinvolves respectforselvesasdynamosofideasandpur- poses,thewilltointerpret,dissatisfactionwith partialmeaningsandnarrownessofview,reci- procity,andmutuality.Inthiswork,the Absoluteisa"CommunityofInterpretationand Hope,"inwhichthereisanendlesslyaccumu- latingseriesofinterpretationsandsignificant deeds.Anindividualcontributionthusisnotlöst butbecomesanindispensableelementinthe divinelife. AmongRoyce'sinfluentialstudentswereC.I. Lewis,WilliamEmestHocking,NorbertWiener, Santayana,andT.S.Eliot.J.A.K.K. Rufus,Richard.Seerichardrufus. rule,primary.Seehart. rule,secondary.Seehart. ruleofaddition.Seedisjunctionintroduction. ruleofconjunction.Seeconjunctionintroduc- tion. ruleofdetachment.Seelotteryparadox. ruleofdoublenegation.Seedoublenegation. ruleofinference.Seelogisticsystem. ruleoflaw,thelargelyformålorprocedural propertiesofawell-orderedlegalsystem.Com- monly,thesepropertiesarethoughttoinclude:a prohibitionofarbitrarypower(thelawgiveris alsosubjecttothelaws);lawsthataregeneral, prospective,clear,andconsistent(capableof guidingconduct);andtribunals(courts)thatare reasonablyaccessibleandfairlystructuredto hearanddeterminelegalclaims.Contemporary discussionsoftheruleoflawfocusontwomajor questions:(1)towhatextentisconformitytothe ruleoflawessentialtotheveryideaofalegalsys- tem;and(2)whatistheconnectionbetweenthe ruleoflawandthesubstantivemoralvalueofa legalsystem?Seealsophilosophyoflaw, POLITICALPHILOSOPHY.RS. ruleofrecognition.Seehart,jurisprudence. ruleofsimplification.Seeconjunctionelimina- TION. ruleoftotalevidence.Seeinduction. ruleutilitarianism.Seeutilitarianism. RulingArgument.Seemegarians. Russell,Bertrand(ArthurWilliam)(1872-1970), Britishphilosopher,logician,socialreformer, andmanofletters,oneofthefoundersofana- lyticphilosophy.Bornintoanaristocraticpoliti- calfamily,Russellalwaysdividedhisinterests betweenpoliticsandphilosophy.Orphanedat four,hewasbroughtupbyhisgrandmother, 801 Russell,Bertrand(ArthurWilliam) Russell,Bertrand(ArthurWilliam) whoeducatedhimathomewiththehelpof tutors.HestudiedmathematicsatCambridge fromi890to1893,whenheturnedtophiloso- phy. AthomehehadabsorbedJ.S.Milfsliberal- ism,butnothisempiricism.AtCambridgehe cameundertheinfluenceofneo-Hegelianism, especiallytheidealismofMcTaggart,Ward(his tutor),andBradley.Hisearliestlogicalviews wereinfluencedmostbyBradley,especially Bradley'srejectionofpsychologism.But,like WardandMcTaggart,herejectedBradley'smeta- physicalmonisminfavörofpluralism(or monadism).Evenasanidealist,heheldthatsci- entificknowledgewasthebestavailableandthat philosophyshouldbebuiltaroundit.Through manysubsequentchanges,thisbeliefaboutsci- ence,hispluralism,andhisanti-psychologism remainedconstant. In1895,heconceivedtheideaofanidealist encyclopediaofthesciencestobedevelopedby theuseoftranscendentalargumentstoestablish theconditionsunderwhichthespecialsciences arepossible.Russell'sfirstphilosophicalbook,An EssayontheFoiindationsofGeometry(1897),was partofthisproject,aswereother(mostlyunfin- ishedandunpublished)piecesonphysicsand arithmeticwrittenatthistime(seehisCollected Papers,vols.1-2).Russellclaimed,incontrastto Kant,tousetranscendentalargumentsina purelylogicalwaycompatiblewithhisanti-psy- chologism.Inthiscase,however,itshouldbe bothpossibleandpreferabletoreplacethemby purelydeductivearguments.Anotherproblem aroseinconnectionwithasymmetricalrelations, whichledtocontradictionsiftreatedasinternal relations,butwhichwereessentialforanytreat- mentofmathematics.Russellresolvedboth problemsin1898byabandoningidealism (includinginternalrelationsandhisKantian methodology).Hecalledthistheonerealrevo- lutioninhisphilosophy.WithhisCambridge contemporaryMoore,headoptedanextreme Platonicrealism,fullystatedinThePrinciplesof Mathematics(1903)thoughanticipatedinACrit- icalExpositionofthePhilosophyofLeibniz(1900). Russell'sworkonthescienceswasbythen concentratedonpuremathematics,butthenew philosophyyieldedlittleprogressuntil,in1900, hediscoveredPeano'ssymboliclogic,which offeredhopethatpuremathematicscouldbe treatedwithoutKantianintuitionsortranscen- dentalarguments.OnthisbasisRussellpro- poundedlogicism,theclaimthatthewholeof puremathematicscouldbederiveddeductively fromlogicalprinciples,apositionhecameto independentlyofFrege,whoheldasimilarbut morerestrictedviewbutwhoseworkRusselldis- coveredonlylåter.Logicismwasannouncedin ThePrinciplesofMathematics;itsdevelopment occupiedRussell,incollaborationwithWhite- head,forthenexttenyears.Theirresultswere publishedinPrincipiaMathematica(1910-13,3 vols.),inwhichdetailedderivationsweregiven forCantor'ssettheory,finiteandtransfinite arithmetic,andelementarypartsofmeasurethe- ory.AsademonstrationofRussell'slogicism, Principiadependsuponmuchpriorarithmetiza- tionofmathematics,e.g.ofanalysis,whichisnot explicitlytreated.Evenwiththeseallowances muchisstillleftout:e.g.,abstractalgebraand statistics.Russell'sunpublishedpapers(Papers, vols.4-5),however,containlogicalinnovations notincludedinPrincipia,e.g.,anticipationsof Church'slambda-calculus. OnRussell'sextremerealism,everythingthat canbereferredtoisatermthathasbeing(though notnecessarilyexistence).Thecombinationof termsbymeansofarelationresultsinacomplex term,whichisaproposition.Termsareneither linguisticnorpsychological.Thefirsttaskofphi- losophyisthetheoreticalanalysisofpropositions intotheirconstituents.Thepropositionsoflogic areuniqueinthattheyremaintruewhenanyof theirterms(apartfromlogicalconstants)are replacedbyanyotherterms. In1901Russelldiscoveredthatthisposition fellpreytoself-referentialparadoxes.Forexam- ple,ifthecombinationofanynumberoftermsis anewterm,thecombinationofalltermsisa termdistinctfromanyterm.Themostfamous suchparadoxiscalledRussell'sparadox.Russell's solutionwasthetheoryoftypes,whichbanned self-referencebystratifyingtermsandexpres- sionsintocomplexhierarchiesofdisjointsub- classes.Theexpression'allterms',e.g.,isthen meaninglessunlessrestrictedtotermsofspeci- fiedtype(s),andthecombinationoftermsofa giventypeisatermofdifferenttype.Asimple versionofthetheoryappearedinPrinciplesof Mathematics(appendixA),butdidnoteliminate alltheparadoxes.Russelldevelopedamoreelab- orateversionthatdid,in"MathematicalLogicas BasedontheTheoryofTypes"(1908)andin Principia.From1903to1908Russellsoughtto preservehisearlieraccountoflogicbyfinding otherwaystoavoidtheparadoxes-includinga well-developedsubstitutionaltheoryofclasses andrelations(posthumouslypublishedinEssays inAnalysis,1974,andPapers,vol.5).Othercosts oftypetheoryforRussell'slogicismincludedthe vastlyincreasedcomplexityoftheresultingsys- 802 Russell,Bertrand(ArthurWilliam) Russell,Bertrand(ArthurWilliam) ternandtheadmissionoftheproblematicaxiom ofreducibility. TwootherdifficultieswithRusselfsextreme realismhadimportantconsequences:(1)'Imet Quine'and'Imetaman'aredifferentproposi- tions,evenwhenQuineisthemanImet.Inthe Prinäples,thefirstpropositioncontainsaman, whilethesecondcontainsadenotingconceptthat denotestheman.Denotingconceptsarelike Fregeansenses;theyaremeaningsandhave denotations.Whenoneoccursinaproposition thepropositionisnotabouttheconceptbutits denotation.Thistheoryrequiresthattherebe somewayinwhichadenotingconcept,rather thanitsdenotation,canbedenoted.Aftermuch effort,Russellconcludedin"OnDenoting" (1905)thatthiswasimpossibleandeliminated denotingconceptsasintermediariesbetween denotingphrasesandtheirdenotationsby meansofhistheoryofdescriptions.Usingfirst- orderpredicatelogic,Russellshowed(inabroad, thoughnotcomprehensiverangeofcases)how denotingphrasescouldbeeliminatedinfavörof predicatesandquantifiedvariables,forwhich logicallypropernamescouldbesubstituted.(These werenamesofobjectsofacquaintance-repre- sentedinordinarylanguageby'this'and'that'. Mostnames,hethought,weredisguiseddefinite descriptions.)Similartechniqueswereapplied elsewheretootherkindsofexpression(e.g.class names)resultinginthemoregeneraltheoryof incompletesymbols.Oneimportantconsequence ofthiswasthattheontologicalcommitmentsof atheorycouldbereducedbyreformulatingthe theorytoremoveexpressionsthatapparently denotedproblematicentities.(2)Thetheoryof incompletesymbolsalsohelpedsolveextreme realism'sepistemicproblems,namelyhowto accountforknowledgeoftermsthatdonotexist, andforthedistinctionbetweentrueandfalse propositions.First,thetheoryexplainedhow knowledgeofawiderangeofitemscouldbe achievedbyknowledgebyacquaintanceofa muchnarrowerrange.Second,propositional expressionsweretreatedasincompletesymbols andeliminatedinfavöroftheirconstituentsand apropositionalattitudebyRussell'smultiple relationtheoryofjudgment. TheseinnovationsmarkedtheendofRussell's extremerealism,thoughheremainedaPlatonist inthatheincludeduniversalsamongtheobjects ofacquaintance.Russellreferredtoallhis philosophyafter1898aslogicalatomism,indicat- ingtherebythatcertaincategoriesofitemswere takenasbasicanditemsinothercategories wereconstructedfromthembyrigorouslogical means.Itdependsthereforeuponreduc- tion,whichbecameakeyconceptinearlyana- lyticphilosophy.Logicalatomismchangedas Russell'slogicdevelopedandasmorephilo- sophicalconsequencesweredrawnfromits application,butthelabelisnowmostoften appliedtothemodifiedrealismRussellheldfrom 1905to1919.LogicwascentraltoRussell'sphi- losophyfrom1900onward,andmuchofhis fertilityandimportanceasaphilosophercame fromhisapplicationofthenewlogictoold problems. In1910RussellbecamealectureratCam- bridge.Therehisintereststurnedtoepistemol- ogy.Inwritingapopulärbook,Problemsof Philosophy(1912),hefirstcametoappreciatethe workoftheBritishempiricists,especiallyHume andBerkeley.Heheldthatempiricalknowledge isbasedondirectacquaintancewithsense-data, andthatmatteritself,ofwhichwehaveonly knowledgebydescription,ispostulatedasthe bestexplanationofsense-data.Hesoonbecame dissatisfiedwiththisideaandproposedinstead thatmatterbelogicallyconstructedoutofsense- dataandunsensedsensibilia,therebyobviating dubiousinferencestomaterialobjectsasthe causesofsensations.Thisproposalwasinspired bythesuccessfulconstructionsofmathematical conceptsinPrincipia.Heplannedalargework, "TheoryofKnowledge,"whichwastousethe multiplerelationtheorytoextendhisaccount fromacquaintancetobeliefandinference (Popers,vol.7).However,theprojectwasaban- donedasincompleteinthefaceofWittgenstein's attacksonthemultiplerelationtheory,andRus- sellpublishedonlythoseportionsdealingwith acquaintance.Theconstructionofmatter,how- ever,wentahead,atleastinoutline,inOur KnowledgeoftheExternatWorld(1914),though theonlydetailedconstructionswereundertaken låterbyCarnap.OnRussell'saccount,material objectsarethoseseriesofsensibiliathatobeythe lawsofphysics.Sensibiliaofwhichamindis aware(sense-data)providetheexperientialbasis forthatmind'sknowledgeofthephysicalworld. Thistheoryissimilar,thoughnotidentical,to phenomenalism.Russellsawthetheoryasan applicationofOckham'srazor,bywhichpostu- latedentitieswerereplacedbylogicalconstruc- tions.Hedevotedmuchtimetounderstanding modernphysics,includingrelativityandquan- tumtheory,andinTheAnalysisofMatter(1927) heincorporatedthefundamentalideasofthose theoriesintohisconstructionofthephysical world.Inthisbookheabandonedsensibiliaas fundamentalconstituentsoftheworldinfavör 803 Russell,Bertrand(ArthurWilliam) Russell,Bertrand(ArthurWilliam) ofevents,whichwere"neutral"becauseintrin- sicallyneitherphysicalnormental. In1916RussellwasdismissedfromCambridge onpoliticalgroundsandfromthattimeonhad toearnhislivingbywritingandpubliclecturing. Hispopulärlectures,"ThePhilosophyofLogical Atomism"(1918),werearesultofthis.These lecturesformaninterimwork,lookingbackon thelogicalachievementsof1905-10and emphasizingtheirimportanceforphilosophy, whiletakingstockoftheproblemsraisedby Wittgenstein'scriticismsofthemultiplerelation theory.In1919Russell'sphilosophyofmind underwentsubstantialchanges,partlyin responsetothosecriticisms.Thechanges appearedin"OnPropositions:WhatTheyAre andHowTheyMean"(1919)andTheAnalysisof Mind(1921),wheretheinfluenceofcontempo- rarytrendsinpsychology,especiallybehavior- ism,isevident.Russellgaveuptheviewthat mindsareamongthefundamentalconstituents oftheworld,andadoptedneutralmonism, alreadyadvocatedbyMach,James,andthe AmericanNewRealists.OnRussell'sneutral monism,amindisconstitutedbyasetofevents relatedbysubjectivetemporalrelations(simul- taneity,successiveness)andbycertainspecial ("mnemic")causallaws.Inthiswayhewasable toexplaintheapparentfactthat"Hume'sinabil- itytoperceivehimselfwasnotpeculiar."Inplace ofthemultiplerelationtheoryRussellidentified thecontentsofbeliefswithimages("image- propositions")andwords("word-propositions"), understoodascertainsortsofevents,andana- lyzedtruth(quacorrespondence)intermsof resemblanceandcausalrelations. From1938to1944RusselllivedintheUnited States,wherehewroteAnInquiryintoMeaning andTruth(1940)andhispopulärAHistoryof WesternPhilosophy(1945).Hisphilosophical attentionturnedfrommetaphysicstoepistemol- ogyandhecontinuedtoworkinthisfieldafter hereturnedin1944toCambridge,wherehe completedhislastmajorphilosophicalwork, HumanKnowledge:ItsScopeandLimits(1948).The frameworkofRussell'searlyepistemologycon- sistedofananalysisofknowledgeintermsof justifiedtruebelief(thoughithasbeensuggested thatheunintentionallyanticipatedEdmund Gettier'sobjectiontothisanalysis),andan analysisofepistemicjustificationthatcombined fallibilismwithaweakempiricismandwitha foundationalismthatmaderoomforcoherence. ThisframeworkwasretainedinAnInquiryand HumanKnowledge,butthereweretwosortsof changesthatattenuatedthefoundationalistand empiricistelementsandaccentuatedthefalli- bilistelement.First,thescopeofhumanknowl- edgewasreduced.Russellhadalreadyreplaced hisearlierMooreanconsequentialismaboutval- ueswithsubjectivism.(Contrast"TheElements ofEthics,"1910,with,e.g.,ReligionandScience, 1935,orHumanSocietyinEthicsandPolitics, 1954.)Consequently,whathadbeenconstrued asself-evidentjudgmentsofintrinsicvaluecame toberegardedasnon-cognitiveexpressionsof desire.Inaddition,Russellnowreversedhisear- lierbeliefthatdeductiveinferencecanyieldnew knowledge.Second,thedegreeofjustification attainableinhumanknowledgewasreducedat alllevels.Regardingthefoundationofpercep- tualbeliefs,Russellcametoadmitthatthe object-knowledge("acquaintancewithasense- datum"wasreplacedby"noticingaperceptive occurrence"inAnInquiry)thatprovidesthe non-inferentialjustificationforaperceptual beliefisburiedunderlayersof"interpretation" andunconsciousinferenceineventheearliest stagesofperceptualprocesses.Regardingthe superstructureofinferentiallyjustifiedbeliefs, RussellconcludedinHumanKnowledgethat unrestrictedinductionisnotgenerallytruth- preserving(anticipatingGoodman's"newriddle ofinduction").Considerationoftheworkof ReichenbachandKeynesonprobabilityledhim totheconclusionthatcertain"postulates"are needed"toprovidetheantecedentprobabilities requiredtojustifyinductions,"andthattheonly possiblejustificationforbelievingthesepostu- lateslies,notintheirself-evidence,butinthe resultantincreaseintheoverallcoherenceof one'stotalbeliefsystem.Intheend,Russell's desireforcertaintywentunsatisfied,ashefelt himselfforcedtotheconclusionthat"allhuman knowledgeisuncertain,inexact,andpartial.To thisdoctrinewehavenotfoundanylimitation whatever." Russell'sstrictlyphilosophicalwritingsof1919 andlåterhavegenerallybeenlessinfluential thanhisearlierwritings.Hisinfluencewas eclipsedbythatoflogicalpositivismandordi- narylanguagephilosophy.Heapprovedofthe logicalpositivists'respectforlogicandscience, thoughhedisagreedwiththeirmetaphysical agnosticism.Buthisdislikeofordinarylanguage philosophywasvisceral.InMyPhilosophical Development(1959),heaccuseditspractitioners ofabandoningtheattempttounderstandthe world,"thatgraveandimportanttaskwhich philosophythroughouttheageshashitherto pursued." Seealsofrege,logicalconstruction, 804 RusselTsparadox Russianphilosophy LOGICISM,PERCEPTION,SET-THEORETIC PARADOXES,SETTHEORY,THEORYOF DESCRIPTIONS,TYPETHEORY,WHITEHEAD. N.G.8-D.B.M. RusselTsparadox.Seeset-theoreticparadoxes. Russiannihilism,aformofnihilism,aphenome- nonmainlyofRussiainthe1860s,which,in contrasttothegeneralculturalnihilismthat Nietzschelåtercriticized(inthe1880s)asa "dead-end"devaluingofallvalues,wasfuture- orientedand"instrumental/'exaltingpossibility överactuality.Russiannihilistsurgedthe"anni- hilation"-figurativeandliteral-ofthepastand present,i.e.,ofrealizedsocialandculturalvalues andofsuchvaluesinprocessofrealization,inthe nameofthefuture,i.e.,forthesakeofsocialand culturalvaluesyettoberealized.Bakunin,as earlyas1842,hadstatedthebasicnihilisttheme: "thenegationofwhatexists...forthebenefitof thefuturewhichdoesnotyetexist."Thebest- knownliteraryexemplarofnihilisminRussiais thecharacterBazarovinTurgenev'snovel FathersandSons(1862).Itsmostarticulate spokesmanwasDmitriPisarev(1840-68),who sharedBazarov'sculturalanti-Romanticism, philosophicalanti-idealism,andunquestioned trustinthepowerofnaturalsciencetosolve socialandmoralproblems.Pisarevproclaimed, "Itispreciselyinthe[spread-eagled,laboratory] frogthatthesalvation...oftheRussianpeople istobefound."Andheformulatedwhatmay serveasthemanifestoofRussiannihilism: "Whatcanbebrokenshouldbebroken;what willståndtheblowisfittolive;whatbreaksinto smithereensisrubbish;inanycase,strikeright andleft,itwillnotandcannotdoanyharm."See alsoRUSSIANPHILOSOPHY.G.L.K. Russianphilosophy,thephilosophyproducedby Russianthinkers,bothinRussiaandinthecoun- triestowhichtheyemigrated,fromthemid- eighteenthcenturytothepresent.Therewas noRenaissanceinRussia,butintheearlyeigh- teenthcenturyPetertheGreat,inopeninga "windowtotheWest,"openedRussiaupto Westernphilosophicalinfluences.Thebegin- ningsofRussianspeculationdatefromthat period,inthedialogues,fables,andpoemsofthe anti-EnlightenmentthinkerGregorySkovoroda (1722-94)andinthesocialträets,metaphysical treatises,andpoemsoftheEnlightenment thinkerAlexanderRadishchev(1749-1802). Untilthelastquarterofthenineteenthcen- turythemostoriginalandforcefulRussian thinkersstoodoutsidetheacademy.Sincethen, bothinRussiaandinWesternexile,anumberof themostimportantRussianphilosophers- includingBerdyaevandLevShestov(1866- 1938)-havebeenuniversityprofessors.The nineteenth-centurythinkers,thoughuniversity- educated,lackedadvanceddegrees.Theonly universityprofessoramongthem,PeterLavrov (1823-1900),taughtmathematicsandscience ratherthanphilosophy(duringthe1850s).Ifwe compareRussianphilosophytoGermanphilos- ophyofthisperiod,withitsgalaxyofuniversity professors-Wolff,Kant,Fichte,Schelling, Hegel,Dilthey-thecontrastissharp.However, ifwecompareRussianphilosophytoEnglishor Frenchphilosophy,thecontrastfades.Nopro- fessorsofphilosophyappearinthelinefrom FrancisBaconthroughHobbes,Locke,Berkeley, Hume,Bentham,andJ.S.Mill,toSpencer.And inFranceMontaigne,Descartes,Pascal,Rous- seau,andComtewereallnon-professors. Truetotheirnon-professional,even"ama- teur"status,Russianphilosophersuntilthelate nineteenthcenturypaidlittleattentiontothe moretechnicaldisciplines:logic,epistemology, philosophyoflanguage,andphilosophyofsci- ence.Theyfocusedinsteadonphilosophical anthropology,ethics,socialandpoliticalphilos- ophy,philosophyofhistory,andphilosophyof religion. InRussia,morethaninanyotherWesterncul- turaltradition,speculation,fiction,andpoetry havebeenlinked.Ontheonehand,majornov- elistssuchasTolstoyandDostoevsky,andmajor poetssuchasPasternakandBrodsky,have engagedinwide-rangingphilosophicalreflec- tion.Ontheotherhand,philosopherssuchas Skovoroda,AlexeiKhomyakov(1804-60),and VladimirSolovyov(1853-1900)weregifted poets,whilethinkerssuchasHerzen,Konstan- tinLeontyev(1831-91),andtheanti-Leninist MarxistAlexanderBogdanov(1873-1928) madetheirliterarymarkwithnovels,shortsto- ries,andmemoirs.SuchRussianthinkersas VasilyRozanov(1856-1919)andShestov, althoughtheywrotenobelleslettres,werecele- bratedinliterarycirclesfortheirsparklingessay- isticandaphoristicstyles. Certainpreoccupationsofnineteenth-century Russianthinkers-especiallyPyotrChaadaev (1794-1856)duringthe1820sand1830s,the SlavophilesandWesternizersduringthe1840s and1850s,andthePopulistsduringthe1860s and1870s-mightappeartobedistinctivebutin factwerenot.Thecontroversialquestionsof Russia'srelationtoWesternEuropéandof 805 Ryle,Gilbert Ryle,Gilbert Russia's"specialpath"tomodernityhavetheir counterpartsinthereflectionsofthinkersin Spain("SpainandEuropé"),Germany(the Sonderweg-atermofwhichtheRussianosobyi put'isatranslation),andPoland("thePolish Question"). ThecontentofRussianphilosophymaybe characterizedingeneraltermsastendingtoward utopianism,maximalism,moralism,andsoteri- ology.Totakethelastpointfirst:Hegelianismwas receivedinRussiainthe1830snotonlyasanall- embracingphilosophicalsystembutalsoasa vehicleofsecularsalvation.Inthe1860s Darwinismwassimilarlyreceived,aswas Marxisminthe1890s.Utopianismappearsatthe historicalandsociopoliticallevelintwoof Solovyov'scharacteristicdoctrines:hisearly "freetheocracy,"inwhichthespiritualauthority oftheRomanpopewastobeunitedwiththesec- ularauthorityoftheRussiantsar;andhislåter ecumenicalprojectofreunitingtheEastern (RussianOrthodox)andWestern(Roman Catholic)churchesinasingle"universal[vselen- skaia]church"thatwouldalsoincorporatethe "Protestantprinciple"offreephilosophicaland theologicalinquiry.Maximalismappearsatthe individualandreligiouslevelinShestov'sclaim thatGod,forwhomalone"allthingsarepossi- ble,"cancausewhathashappenednottohave happenedand,inparticular,canrestoreirrecov- erablehumanloss,suchasthatassociatedwith disease,deformity,madness,anddeath.Maxi- malismandmoralismareunitedatthecosmic and"scientific-technological"levelinNikolai Fyodorov's(1829-1903)insistenceontheover- ridingmoralobligationofallmen("thesons")to jointhecommoncauseofrestoringlifeto"the fathers,"thosewhogavethemliferatherthan,as sanctionedbythe"theoryofprogress,"pushing them,figurativelyifnotliterally,intothegrave. Certaindoctrinalemphasesandassumptions linkRussianthinkersfromwidelyseparated pointsonthepoliticalandideologicalspectrum: (1)Russianphilosopherswerenearlyunani- mousindismissingthenotoriousCartesian- Humean"problemofotherminds"asanon- problem.Theirconvictionsabouthumancom- munityandconciliarity(sobornosf),whether religiousorsecular,weretoopowerfultopermit Russianthinkerstoraiseseriousdoubtsasto whethertheirmoaningandbleedingneighbor was"really"inpain. (2)MostRussianthinkers-theWesternizers wereapartialexception-viewedkeyWestern philosophicalpositionsandformulations,from theSocratic"knowthyself"totheCartesiancog- ito,asoverlyindividualisticandoverlyintellec- tualistic,asfailingtotakeintoaccountthewhole- nessofthehumanperson. (3)Bothsuchanti-MarxistsasHerzen(with his"philosophyoftheact")andFyodorov(with his"projective"commontask)andtheearly RussianMarxistswereinagreementaboutthe unacceptabilityofthe"Western"dichotomy betweenthoughtandaction.Butwhenthey stressedtheunityoftheoryandpractice,akey questionremained:Whoistoshapethisunity? Andwhatisitsform?ThethreadbareMarxist- Leninist"philosophy"oftheStalinyearspaidlip servicetothefreedominvolvedinforgingsucha unity.Stalininfactimposedcrushingrestraints uponboththoughtandaction. Since1982,worksbyandaboutthepreviously abusedorneglectedreligiousandspeculative thinkersofRussia'spasthavebeenwidelyrepub- lishedandeagerlydiscussed.ThisappliestoFyo- dorov,Solovyov,Leontyev,Rozanov,Berdyaev, Shestov,andtheHusserlianShpet,among others. Seealsobakunin,berdyaev,herzen, LENIN,PLEKHANOV,RUSSIANNIHILISM,SO- LOVYOV.G.L.K. Ryle,Gilbert(1900-76),Englishanalyticphi- losopherknownespeciallyforhiscontributions tothephilosophyofmindandhisattackson Cartesianism. Hisbest-knownworkisthemasterpieceThe Conceptof'Mind(1949),anattackonwhathecalls "Cartesiandualism"andadefenseofatypeof logicalbehaviorism.Thisdualismhedubs"the dogmaoftheGhostintheMachine,"the Machinebeingthebody,whichisphysicaland publiclyobservable,andtheGhostbeingthe mindconceivedasaprivateorsecretarenain whichepisodesofsenseperception,conscious- ness,andinnerperceptiontakeplace.Aperson, then,isacombinationofsuchamindandabody, withthemindoperatingthebodythroughexer- cisesofwillcalled"volitions."Ryle'sattackon thisdoctrineisbothsharplyfocusedandmulti- farious.Hefindsthatitrestsonacategorymis- take,namely,assimilatingstatementsabout mentalprocessestothesamecategoryasstate- mentsaboutphysicalprocesses.Thisisamistake inthelogicofmentalstatementsandmentalcon- ceptsandleadstothemistakenmetaphysicalthe- orythatapersoniscomposedoftwoseparateand distinct(thoughsomehowrelated)entities,a mindandabody.Itistruethatstatementsabout thephysicalarestatementsaboutthingsand theirchanges.Butstatementsaboutthemental 806 Ryle,Gilbert Ryle,Gilbert arenot,andinparticulararenotaboutathing called"themind."Thesetwotypesofstatements donotbelongtothesamecategory.Toshowthis, Ryledeploysavarietyofarguments,including argumentsallegingtheimpossibilityofcausal relationsbetweenmindandbodyandarguments allegingviciousinfiniteregresses.Todevelophis positiveviewonthenatureofmind,Rylestudies theuses(andhencethelogic)ofmentalterms andfindsthatmentalstatementstellusthatthe personperformsobservableactionsincertain waysandhasadispositiontoperformother observableactionsinspecifiablecircumstances. Forexample,todosomethingintelligentlyisto dosomethingphysicalinacertainwayandto adjustone'sbehaviortothecircumstances,not, asthedogmaoftheGhostintheMachinewould haveit,toperformtwoactions,oneofwhichisa mentalactionofthinkingthateventuallycauses aseparatephysicalaction.Rylebuttressesthis positionwithmanyacuteandsubtleanalysesof theusesofmentalterms. MuchofRyle'sotherworkconcernsphilo- sophicalmethodology,sustainingthethesis (whichisthebackboneofTheConceptofMind) thatphilosophicalproblemsanddoctrinesoften arisefromconceptualconfusion,i.e.,frommis- takesaboutthelogicoflanguage.Important writingsinthisveinincludetheinfluentialarti- de"SystematicallyMisleadingExpressions"and thebookDilemmas(1954).Rylewasalsointer- estedinGreekphilosophythroughouthislife, andhislastmajorwork,Plato'sProgress,putsfor- wardnovelhypothesesaboutchangesinPlato's views,theroleoftheAcademy,thepurposesand usesofPlato'sdialogues,andPlato'srelations withtherulersofSyracuse. Seealsobehaviorism,category,phi- losophyOFMIND,WITTGENSTEIN.J.W.M. 807 S5.Seemodallogic. SaadiahGaon(882-942),Jewishexegete,phi- losopher,liturgist,grammarian,andlexicogra- pher.BomintheFayyuminEgypt,Saadiah wrotehisfirstHebrewdictionarybyagetwenty. HeremovedtoTiberias,probablyfleeingthe backlashofhispolemicagainsttheKaraite(bib- licist,anti-Talmudic)sect.Therehemasteredthe inductivetechniquesofsemanticanalysispio- neeredbyMuslimMu'tazilitesindefendingtheir rationalisticmonotheismandvoluntaristic theodicy.Helearnedphilologicallyfromthe Masoretesandliturgicalpoets,andphilosophi- callyfromtheMu'tazilite-influencedJewish metaphysicianDåtidal-MuqammisofRaqqain Iraq,andIsaacIsraeliofQayrawaninTunisia,a Neoplatonizingphysician,withwhomtheyoung philosopherattemptedacorrespondence.But hissenseofsystem,evidencedinhispioneering chronology,prayerbook,andschemeoftropes, andnurturedbyArabicversionsofPlato(but seeminglynotmuchAristotle),allowedhimto outgrowandoutshinehismentors.Hecameto prominencebysuccessfullydefendingthetradi- tionalHebrewcalendar,usingastronomical, mathematical,andrabbinicarguments.Calledto Baghdad,hebecameGaon(Hebrew,'Eminence') orheadoftheancientTalmudicacademyof Pumpedita,thennearlydefunct.Hiscommen- tariesonrabbinicpropertylawandhislettersto JewishcommunitiesasfarawayasSpainrefur- bishedtheauthorityoftheacademy,butacon- troversywiththeExilarch,secularheadof MesopotamianJewry,ledtohisdepositionand sixyearsinlimbo,deprivedofhisjudicial authority.Hedelvedintoscientificcosmology, translatedmanybiblicalbooksintoArabicwith philosophiccommentariesandthematicintro- ductions,andaround933completedTheBookof CriticallyChosenBeliefsandConvictions,thefirst Jewishphilosophicalsumma.Unusualamong medievalworksforalengthyepistemological introduction,itstenArabictreatisesdefendand definecreation,monotheism,humanobligation andvirtue,theodicy,naturalretribution,resur- rection,immortalityandrecompense,IsraeTs redemption,andthegoodlife. Saadiaharguesthatnosinglegoodsufficesfor humanhappiness;eachinisolationisdestruc- tive.TheTorahpreparestheoptimalblendofthe appetitiveanderotic,procreative,civilizational, ascetic,political,intellectual,pious,andtranquil. Followingal-Rhäzi(d.925or932),Saadiah arguesthatsincedestructionalwaysovercomes organizationinthisworld,sufferingswillalways outweighpleasures;therefore(asinrabbinicand Mu'tazilitetheodicy)Godmustbeassumedto rightthebalancesinthehereafter.Indeed,jus- ticeistheobjectofcreation-notsimplythatthe righteousberewardedbutthatallshouldearn theirdeservedrequital:theverylightthatis sownfortherighteousisthefirethattorments thewicked.Butifrequitalandevenrecompense mustbeearned,thislifeismuchmorethanan anteroom.Authenticitybecomesavalueinitself: theinnocentarenottolddirectlythattheirsuf- feringsareatrial,ortheirtestingwouldbe invalid.Onlybyenduringtheirsufferingswith- outinterferencecantheydemonstratethequal- itiesthatmakethemworthyofthehighest reward.MovinglyreconciledwiththeExilarch, SaadiahendedhislifeasGaon.Hisvoluntarism, naturalism,andrationalismlaidphilosophical foundationsforMaimonides,andhisinductive exegesisbecameacornerstoneofcriticalher- meneutics. Seealsojewishphilosophy.L.E.G. sage.Seesheng. SaintPetersburgparadox,apuzzleaboutgam- blingthatmotivatedthedistinctionbetween expectedreturnandexpectedutility.Daniel BemoullipublisheditinaSt.Petersburgjournal in1738.Itconcernsagamblelikethis:itpays$2 ifheadsappearsonthefirsttossofacoin,$4if headsdoesnotappearuntilthesecondtoss,$8 ifheadsdoesnotappearuntilthethirdtoss,and soon.Theexpectedretumfromthegambleis (Vz)2+(V4)4+(7s)8+or1+1+1+ i.e.,itisinfinite.Butnoonewouldpaymuchfor thegamble.Soitseemsthatexpectedreturns donotgovernrationalpreferences.Bernoulli arguedthatexpectedUtilitiesgovemrationalpref- erences.Healsoheldthattheutilityofwealthis proportionaltothelogoftheamountofwealth. Givenhisassumptions,thegamblehasfinite 808 Saint-Simon samatha expectedutility,andshouldnotbepreferredto largesumsofmoney.However,atwentieth-cen- turyversionoftheparadox,attributedtoKarl Menger,reconstructsthegamble,puttingutility payoffsinplaceofmonetarypayoffs,sothatthe newgamblehasinfiniteexpectedutility.Since noonewouldtrademuchutilityforthenew gamble,italsoseemsthatexpectedUtilitiesdo notgovernrationalpreferences.Theresolution oftheparadoxisunderdebate.Seealsodeci- SIONTHEORY,EMPIRICALDECISIONTHEORY. P.We. Saint-Simon,Comtede,titleofClaude-Henride Rouvroy(1760-1825),Frenchsocialreformer. Anaristocratbybirth,heinitiallyjoinedthe ranksoftheenlightenedandliberalbourgeoisie. HisNewtonianLetterstoanInhabitantofGeneva (1803)andIntroductiontoScientificWorksofthe NineteenthCentury(1808)championedCon- dorcefsvisionofscientificandtechnological progress.WithAugusteComte,hesharedapos- itivisticphilosophyofhistory:thetriumphofsci- enceövermetaphysics.Writteninwartime,The ReorganizationofEuropeanSociety(1814)urged thecreationofaEuropeanparliamentarysystem tosecurepeaceandunity.Havingmovedfrom scientismtopacifism,Saint-Simonmovedfur- thertoindustrialism. In1817,undertheinfluenceoftwotheocratic thinkers,deMaistreandBonald,Saint-Simon turnedawayfromclassicaleconomicliberalism andrepudiatedlaissez-fairecapitalism.TheIndus- triellSystem(1820)draftstheprogramforahier- archicalstate,atechnocraticsociety,anda plannedeconomy.Theindustrialsocietyofthe futureisbasedontheprinciplesofproduetivity andcooperationandledbyarationalandeffi- cientclass,theindustrialists(artists,scientists, andtechnicians).Hearguedthattheassociation ofpositivismwithunselfishness,oftechniquesof rationalproduetionwithsocialsolidarityand interdependency,wouldremedytheplightofthe poor.Industrialismprefiguressocialism,and socialismpåvesthewayfortheruleofthelawof love,theeschatologicalageofTheNewChristian- ity(1825).Thisutopiantreatise,whichreveals Saint-Simon'saltemativetoreactionaryCatholi- cismandProtestantindividualism,becamethe BibleoftheSaint-Simonians,asectarianschool ofutopiansocialists.J.-L.S. Sakti,inHinduthought,force,power,orenergy, personifiedasthedivineconsortofthegodSiva. Saktiisviewedasthefeminineactivedivine aspect(ascontrastedwiththemasculinepas- sivedivineaspect),whichaffectsthecreation, maintenance,anddissolutionoftheuniverse, andpossessesintelligence,will,knowledge,and actionasmodes.K.E.Y. Saktism.Seesakti. salvaveritate.Seesubstitutivitysalvaveri- TATE. sämädhi,Sanskrittermmeaning'concentration', 'absorption','superconsciousstate','alteredstate ofconsciousness'.InIndia'sphilosophicaltradi- tionthistermwasmadefamousbyitsuseinthe YogasystemofPatanjali(secondcenturyb.c). Inthissystemthegoalwastoattaintheselfs freedom,sothattheself,conceivedaspurecon- sciousnessinitstruenature,wouldnotbelim- itedbythematerialmodesofexistence.Itwas believedthatthroughaseriesofyogictechniques theselfisfreedfromitskarmicfettersandliber- atedtoitsoriginalstateofself-luminouscon- sciousness,knownassamädhi.TheIndian philosophicalsystemshadraisedanddebated manyepistemologicalandmetaphysicalques- tionsregardingthenatureofconsciousness,the conceptofmind,andtheideaoftheself.They alsowonderedwhetherayogiwhohasattained samädhiiswithintheconfinesoftheconven- tionalmoralrealm.ThisissueissimilartoNie- tzsche'sideaofthetransvaluationofvalues.See alsoNIETZSCHE.D.K.C. samanantara-pratyaya,inBuddhism,acausal termmeaning'immediatelyantecedent(anan- tara)andsimilar(sama)condition'.Accordingto Buddhistcausaltheory,everyexistentisacon- tinuumofmomentaryeventsofvariouskinds. Thesemomentaryeventsmaybecausallycon- nectedtooneanotherinavarietyofways;one oftheseisdenotedbythetermsamanantara- pratyaya.Thiskindofcausalconnectionrequires thateverymomentaryeventhave,asanecessary conditionforitsexistence,animmediatelypre- cedingeventofthesamekind.So,e.g.,among thenecessaryconditionsfortheoccurrenceofa momentofsensationinsomecontinuummust betheoccurrenceofanimmediatelypreceding momentofsensationinthatsamecontinuum. P.J.G. samatha,inBuddhism,tranquillityorcalm.The termisusedtodescribebothonekindofmedi- tationalpracticeandthestatesofconsciousness producedbyit.Toeultivatetranquillityorcalm- nessistoreducethemind'slevelofaffectand, 809 Samhita sanction finally,toproduceastateofconsciousnessin whichemotionisaltogetherabsent.Thiscondi- tionistakentohavesalvificsignificancebecause emotionaldisturbanceofallkindsisthoughtto hinderclearperceptionandunderstandingofthe waythingsare;reductionofaffectthereforeaids accuratecognition.Thetechniquesdesignedto fosterthisreductionareessentiallyconcentra- tive.Seealsojhäna,vipassanä.P.J.G. Samhita.Seevedas. Sarhkara.Seeshankara. samsära(Sanskrit,'goingaround'),inHindu thought,theceaselessroundsofrebirththatcon- stitutethehumanpredicament.Samsäraspeaks oftherelentlesscycleofcomingandgoingin transmigrationofthesoulfrombodytobodyin thisandotherworlds.Itisthemanifestationof karma,forone'sdeedsbearfruitioninthetim- ing,status,form,andnatureofthephenomenal personinfuturelives.Ordinaryindividualshave littleprospectofreleaseandinsomesystemsthe relationshipamongkarma,rebirth,andsamsära isahighlymechanicalcosmiclawofdebtand creditwhichaffirmsthathumandeedsproduce theirownrewardorpunishment.Fortheiststhe Deityistheultimatecontrollerofsamsäraand canbreakthecycle,adjustit,or,bythegod's kindnessorgrace,saveonefromfuturebirths regardlessofone'sactions.Seealsoavåtar. R.N.Mi. Sanches,Francisco(c.1551-1623),Portuguese- bornphilosopherandphysician.Raisedinsouth- ernFrance,hetookhismedicaldegreeatthe UniversityofMontpellier.Afteradecadeofmed- icalpracticehewasprofessorofphilosophyat theUniversityofToulouseandlåterprofessorof medicinethere. Hismostimportantwork,Quodnihilscitur(That NothingIsKnown,1581),isaclassicofskeptical argumentation.Writtenatthesametimethathis cousin,Montaigne,wrotethe"Apologyfor RaimundSebond,"itdevastatinglycriticizedthe Aristoteliantheoryofknowledge.Hebeganby declaringthathedidnotevenknowifheknew nothing.ThenheexaminedtheAristotelianview thatscienceconsistsofcertainknowledgegained bydemonstrationsfromtruedefinitions.Firstof all,wedonotpossesssuchdefinitions,sinceall ourdefinitionsarejustarbitrarynamesofthings. TheAristoteliantheoryofdemonstrationisuse- less,sinceinsyllogisticreasoningtheconclusion hastobepartoftheevidenceforthepremises. E.g.,howcanoneknowthatallmenaremortal unlessoneknowsthatSocratesismortal?Also, anythingcanbeprovenbysyllogisticreasoningif onechoosestherightpremises.Thisdoesnot producerealknowledge.Furtherwecannot knowanythingthroughitscauses,sinceone wouldhavetoknowthecausesofthecauses,and thecausesofthese,adinfinitum. SanchesalsoattackedthePlatonictheoryof knowledge,sincemathematicalknowledgeis aboutidealratherthanrealobjects.Mathemat- icsisonlyhypothetical.Itsrelevancetoexperi- enceisnotknown.Truesciencewouldconsistof perfectknowledgeofathing.Eachparticular wouldbeunderstoodinandbyitself.Such knowledgecanbeattainedonlybyGod.Wecan- notstudyobjectsonebyone,sincetheyareall interrelatedandinterconnected.Ourfaculties arealsonotreliableenough.Hencegenuine knowledgecannotbeattainedbyhumans.What wecando,using"scientificmethod"(atermfirst usedbySanches),isgathercarefulempirical informationandmakecautiousjudgmentsabout it.Hisviewswerewellknownintheseventeenth century,andmayhaveinspiredthe"mitigated skepticism"ofGassendiandothers. Seealsoskepticism.R.H.P. sanction,anythingwhosefunctionistopenalize orreward.Itisusefultodistinguishbetween socialsanctions,legalsanctions,internalsanc- tions,andreligioussanctions.Socialsanctions areextralegalpressuresexertedupontheagent byothers.Forexample,othersmightdistrustus, ostracizeus,orevenphysicallyattackus,if webehaveincertainways.Legalsanctions includecorporalpunishment,imprisonment, fines,withdrawalofthelegalrightstorunabusi- nessortoleavethearea,andotherpenalties. Internalsanctionsmayincludenotonlyguilt feelingsbutalsothesympatheticpleasuresof helpingothersorthegratifiedconscienceof doingright.Divinesanctions,ifthereareany,are rewardsorpunishmentsgiventousbyagod whilewearealiveorafterwedie. Thereareimportantphilosophicalquestions concemingsanctions.Shouldlawbedefinedas therulesthebreakingofwhichelicitspunish- mentbythestate?Couldtherebeamoralduty tobehaveinagivenwayiftherewerenosocial sanctionsconcerningsuchbehavior?Ifnot,then aconventionalistaccountofmoraldutyseems unavoidable.And,towhatextentdoesthecom- binedeffectofexternalandinternalsanctions makerationalegoism(orprudenceorself-inter- est)coincidewithmorality?B.W.H. 810 Sankära Santayana,George Sahkara.Seeshankara. Sankhya-Yoga,asystemofHinduthoughtthat positstwosortsofreality,immaterial(purusha) andmaterial(prakrti).Prakrti,aphysicalstuff composedofwhatislightweightandfine- grained(sattva),whatisheavyandcoarse (tamas),andwhatisactive(rajas),isinsome sensethesourceofmatter,force,space,and time.Sankhyaphysicaltheoryexplainsthecom- plexbyreferencetothepropertiesofitscompo- nents. Thephysicaluniverseeverlastinglyoscillates betweenstatesinwhichthethreeelementsexist unmixedandstatesinwhichtheymingle;when theymingle,theycomposephysicalbodiessome ofwhichincarnatebitsofpurusha.Whenthe basicelementsmingle,transmigrationoccurs. Purshaisinherentlypassive,andmentalproper- tiesbelongonlytothecompositeofprakrtiand purusha,leadingcriticstoaskwhat,whenthe physicalelementsareseparated,individuates onemindfromanother.Theansweristhatone bitofpurushahasonetransmigratoryhistoryand anotherbithasanotherhistory.Critics(e.g., Nyäya-Vaishesikaphilosophers)werenotsatis- fiedwiththisanswer,whichallowednointrinsic distinctionsbetweenbitsofnon-incamate purusha.ThedialecticofcriticismledtoAdvaita Vedanta(forwhichallpurushadistinctionsare illusory)andothervarietiesofVedanta(Dvaita andVisistadvaita)forwhichmindshaveinher- ent,notmerelyembodied,consciousness. Sankhyaclaimsthattherecanbenoemergent properties(propertiesnotsomehowareshuffling ofpriorproperties),sotheeffectmustinsome sensepreexistinthecause. Seealsohinduism.K.E.Y. Santayana,George(1863-1952),Spanish- Americanphilosopherandwriter.BorninSpain, hearrivedintheUnitedStatesasachild, receivedhiseducationatHarvard,androseto professorofphilosophythere.Hefirstcameto prominenceforhisview,developedinTheSense ofBeauty(1896),thatbeautyisobjectifiedplea- sure.HisTheLifeofReason(5vols.,1905),acele- bratedexpressionofhisnaturalisticvision,traces humancreativityinordinarylife,society,art, religion,andscience.Hedeniedthathisphiloso- phyeverchanged,butthematureexpressionof histhought,inSkepticismandAnimalFaith(1923) andTheRealmsofBeing(4vols.,1927-40),is deliberatelyontologicalandlacksthephenome- nologicalemphasisoftheearlierwork. Humanbeings,accordingtoSantayana,are animalsinamaterialworldcontingenttothe core.Reflectionmusttakeasitsprimarydatum humanactionaimedateatingandfleeing.The philosophyofanimalfaithconsistsofdisentan- glingthebeliefstacitinsuchactionsandyieldsa realismconcerningboththeobjectsofimmedi- ateconsciousnessandtheobjectsofbelief. Knowledgeistruebeliefrenderedinsymbolic terms.Assymbolism,itconstitutesthehaunt- inglybeautifulworldsofthesenses,poetry,and religion;asknowledge,itguidesandistestedby successfulaction. SantayanahadbeentaughtbyWilliamJames, andhisinsistenceontheprimacyofactionsug- gestsaclosesimilaritytotheviewsofDewey.He is,nevertheless,notapragmatistinanyordinary sense:heviewsnatureasthefullyformedarena ofhumanactivityandexperienceasaflowofiso- lated,privatesentienceinthisalienworld.His deepestsympathyiswithAristotle,thoughhe agreeswithPlatoaboutthemind-independent existenceofFormsandwithSchopenhauer aboutthedimnessofhumanprospects. Hismaturefour-realmontologyturnsonthe distinctionbetweenessenceandmatter.Essences areformsofdefiniteness.Theyareinfinitein numberandencompasseverythingpossible. Theireternitymakesthemcausallyinefficacious: aspossibilities,theycannotaccomplishtheir ownactualization.Matter,asurdandformless force,generatesthephysicaluniversebyselect- ingessencesforembodiment.Truthistherealm ofbeingcreatedbytheintersectionofmatterand form:itistheeternalrecordofessencesthathave been,arebeing,andwillbegivenactualityinthe historyoftheworld.Spiritorconsciousnesscan- notbereducedtothemotionsofthephysical organismthatgiverisetoit.Itisconstitutedbya sequenceofactsorintuitionswhoseobjectsare essencesbutwhosetime-spänning,synthetic naturerendersthemimpotent. Organicselectivityisthesourceofvalues. Accordingly,thegoodofeachorganismisafunc- tionofitsnature.Santayanasimplyacceptsthe factthatsomeofthesegoodsareincommensu- rableandthetragicrealitythattheymaybe incompatible,aswell.Underfavorablecircum- stances,alifeofreasonorofmaximalharmo- nizedsatisfactionsispossibleforawhile.The finestachievementofhumanbeings,however,is thespirituallifeinwhichweovercomeanimal partialityandthusallvaluationinordertoenjoy theintuitionofetemalessences.Santayana identifiessuchspiritualitywiththebestthatreli- gionandsoundphilosophycanoffer.Itdoesnot helpusescapefinitudeanddeath,butenablesus 811 Sapir-Whorfhypothesis Sartre,Jean-Paul inthisshortlifetotranscendcareandtointuit theeternal. Santayana'sexquisitevisionhasgainedhim manyadmirersbutfewfollowers.Hissystemisa self-consistentandsophisticatedsynthesisofele- ments,suchasmaterialismandPlatonism,that havehithertobeenthoughtimpossibletorecon- cile.Hismasterfulwritingmakeshisbooks instructiveandpleasurable,evenifmanyofhis characteristicviewsengenderresistanceamong philosophers.J.La. Sapir-Whorfhypothesis,broadly,theclaimthat one'sperception,thought,andbehaviorare influencedbyone'slanguage.Thehypothesis wasnamedafterBenjaminLeeWhorf(1897- 1941)andhisteacherEdwardSapir(1884- 1939).Wemaydiscerndifferentversionsofthis claimbydistinguishingdegreesoflinguistic influence,thehighestofwhichiscompleteand unalterabledeterminationofthefundamental structuresofperception,thought,andbehavior. Inthemostradicalform,thehypothesissaysthat one'srealityisconstructedbyone'slanguageand thatdifferentlystructuredlanguagesgiveriseto differentrealities,whichareincommensurable. Seealsolinguisticrelativity,philosophy OFLANGUAGE,SOCIALCONSTRUCTIVISM. T.Y. Sartre,Jean-Paul(1905-80),Frenchphilosopher andwriter,theleadingadvocateofexistentialism duringtheyearsfollowingWorldWarII.The heartofhisphilosophywasthepreciousnotion offreedomanditsconcomitantsenseofpersonal responsibility.Heinsisted,inaninterviewafew yearsbeforehisdeath,thatheneverceasedto believethat"intheendoneisalwaysresponsi- bleforwhatismadeofone,"onlyaslightrevi- sionofhisearlier,bölderslogan,"manmakes himself."Tobesure,asastudentofHegel,Marx, Husserl,andHeidegger-andbecauseofhisown physicalfrailtyandthetragediesofthe war-Sartrehadtobewellawareofthemany constraintsandobstaclestohumanfreedom,but asaCartesian,heneverdeviatedfromDes- cartes'sclassicalportraitofhumanconsciousness asfreeanddistinctfromthephysicaluniverseit inhabits.Oneisneverfreeofone's"situation," Sartretellsus,thoughoneisalwaysfreetodeny ("negate")thatsituationandtotrytochangeit. Tobehuman,tobeconscious,istobefreeto imagine,freetochoose,andresponsibleforone's lotinlife. Asastudent,SartrewasfascinatedbyHusserl's newphilosophicalmethod,phenomenology.His firstessaysweredirectresponsestoHusserland applicationsofthephenomenologicalmethod. HisessayonTheImaginationin1936established thegroundworkformuchofwhatwastofollow: thecelebrationofourremarkablefreedomto imaginetheworldotherthanitisand(following Kant)thewaythatthisabilityinformsallofour experience.InTheTranscendenceoftheEgo(1937) hereconsideredHusserl'scentralideaofa"phe- nomenologicalreduction"(theideaofexamin- ingtheessentialstructuresofconsciousnessas such)andargued(followingHeidegger)thatone cannotexamineconsciousnesswithoutatthe sametimerecognizingtherealityofactual objectsintheworld.Inotherwords,therecanbe nosuch"reduction."InhisnovelNausea(1938), Sartremadethispointinaprotractedexample: hisboredandoftennauseatednarratorconfronts agnarledchestnuttreeintheparkandrecog- nizeswithavisceralshockthatitspresenceis simplygivenandutterlyirreducible.InTheTran- scendenceoftheEgoSartrealsoreconsidersthe notionoftheself,whichHusserl(andsomany earlierphilosophers)hadidentifiedwithcon- sciousness.Buttheself,Sartreargues,isnot"in" consciousness,muchlessidenticaltoit.Theself isoutthere"intheworld,liketheselfof another."Inotherwords,theselfisanongoing projectintheworldwithotherpeople;itisnot simplyself-awarenessorself-consciousnessas such("Ithink,thereforeIam"). Thisseparationofselfandconsciousnessand therejectionoftheselfassimplyself-conscious- nessprovidetheframeworkforSartre'sgreatest philosophicaltreatise,Uétreetlenéant(Beingand Nothingness,1943).Itsstructureisunabashedly Cartesian,consciousness("being-for-itself"or poursoi)ontheoneside,theexistenceofmere things("being-in-itself"orensoi)ontheother. (ThephraseologycomesfromHegel.)ButSartre doesnotfallintotheCartesiantrapofdesignat- ingthesetwotypesofbeingasseparate"sub- stances."Instead,Sartredescribesconsciousness as"nothing'-"notathing"butanactivity,"a windblowingfromnowheretowardtheworld." Sartreoftenresortstovisceralmetaphorswhen developingthistheme(e.g.,"awormcoiledin theheartofbeing"),butmuchofwhatheis arguingisfamiliartophilosophicalreadersinthe moremetaphor-freeworkofKant,whoalso warnedagainstthefollies("paralogisms")of understandingconsciousnessasitselfa(possible) objectofconsciousnessratherthanastheactiv- ityofconstitutingtheobjectsofconsciousness. (Asthelensofacameracanneverseeitself-and inamirroronlyseesareflectionofitself-con- 812 sat/chit/ananda sat/chit/ananda sciousnesscanneverviewitselfasconsciousness andisonlyawareofitself-"foritself"-through itsexperienceofobjects.)Ontologically,one mightthinkof"nothingness"as"no-thing-ness," amuchlessoutrageoussuggestionthanthose thatwouldmakeitanoddsortofathing. Itisthroughthenothingnessofconsciousness anditsactivitiesthatnegationcomesintothe world,ourabilitytoimaginetheworldother thanitisandtheinescapablenecessityofimag- iningourselvesotherthanweseemtobe.And becauseconsciousnessisnothingness,itisnot subjecttotherulesofcausality.Centraltothe argumentofUétreetlenéantandSartre'sinsis- tenceontheprimacyofhumanfreedomishis insistencethatconsciousnesscannotbeunder- stoodincausalterms.Itisalwaysself-determin- ingand,assuch,"italwaysiswhatitisnot,and isnotwhatitis"-aplayfulparadoxthatrefers tothefactthatwearealwaysintheprocessof choosing. Consciousnessis"nothing,"buttheselfis alwaysonitswaytobeingsomething. Throughoutourlivesweaccumulateabodyof factsthataretrueofus-our"facticity"-but duringourlivesweremainfreetoenvisionnew possibilities,toreformourselvesandtoreinter- pretourfacticityinthelightofnewprojectsand ambitions-our"transcendence."Thisindeter- minacymeansthatwecanneverbeanything, andwhenwetrytoestablishourselvesassome- thingparticular-whetherasocialrole(police- man,waiter)oracertaincharacter(shy,in- tellectual,cowardly)-wearein"badfaith."Bad faithiserroneouslyviewingourselvesassome- thingfixedandsettled(Sartreutterlyrejects Freudandhistheoryoftheunconsciousdetermi- nationofourpersonalitiesandbehavior),butitis alsobadfaithtoviewoneselfasabeingofinfinite possibilitiesandignorethealwaysrestrictive factsandcircumstanceswithinwhichallchoices mustbemade.Ontheonehand,wearealways tryingtodefineourselves;ontheotherhandwe arealwaysfreetobreakawayfromwhatweare, andalwaysresponsibleforwhatwehavemadeof ourselves.Butthereisnoeasyresolutionor"bal- ance"betweenfacticityandfreedom,rathera kindofdialecticortension.Theresultisourfrus- trateddesiretobeGod,tobebothin-itselfand for-itself.Butthisisnotsomuchblasphemyasan expressionofdespair,aformofontologicalorigi- nalsin,theimpossibilityofbeingbothfreeand whatwewanttobe. LifeforSartreisyetmorecomplicated.There isathirdbasicontologicalcategory,onaparwith thebeing-in-itselfandbeing-for-itselfandnot derivativeofthem.Hecallsit"being-for-others." Tosaythatitisnotderivativeistoinsistthatour knowledgeofothersisnotinferred,e.g.bysome argumentbyanalogy,fromthebehaviorofoth- ers,andweourselvesarenotwhollyconstituted byourself-determinationsandthefactsabout us.Sartregivesusabrutalbutfamiliareveryday exampleofourexperienceofbeing-for-othersin whathecalls"thelook"(leregard).Someone catchesus"intheact"ofdoingsomethinghumil- iating,andwefindourselvesdefiningourselves (probablyalsoresistingthatdefinition)intheir terms.InhisSaintGenet(1953),Sartredescribes suchaconversionoftheten-year-oldJeanGenet intoathief.So,too,wetendto"catch"one anotherinthejudgmentswemakeanddefine oneanotherintermsthatareoftenunflattering. Butthesejudgmentsbecomeanessentialand ineluctibleingredientinoursenseofourselves, andtheytooleadtoconflictsindeed,confhctsso basicandsofrustratingthatinhisplayHuisclos (NoExit,1943)Sartrehasoneofhischaracters utterthefamousline,"Hellisotherpeople." Inhislåterworks,notablyhisCritiqueofDialec- ticalReason(1958-59),Sartreturnedincreas- inglytopoliticsand,inparticular,towarda defenseofMarxismonexistentialistprinciples. Thisentailedrejectingmaterialistdeterminism, butitalsorequiredanewsenseofsolidarity(or whatSartrehadwistfullycalled,followingHei- degger,Mitseinor"beingwithothers").Thusin hislåterworkhestruggledtofindawayofover- comingtheconflictandinsularityortherather "bourgeois"consciousnesshehaddescribedin BeingandNothingness.Notsurprisingly(givenhis constantpoliticalactivities)hefounditinrevo- lutionaryengagement.Consonantwithhis rejectionofbourgeoisselfhood,Sartreturned downthe1964Nobelprizeforliterature. SeealsoContinentalphilosophy,exis- tentialism,MARXISM,PHENOMENOLOGY. R.C.So. sat/chit/änanda,alsosaccidänanda,threeSanskrit termscombinedtorefertotheHighestRealityas 'existence,intelligence,bliss'.Thelåterthinkers ofAdvaitaVedanta,suchasSharikara,usedthe termtodenotetheAbsolute,Brahman,astateof onenessofbeing,ofpureconsciousnessandof absolutevalueorfreedom.Thesearenottobe takenasattributesoraccidentsthatqualifyBrah- manbuttermsthatexpressitsessentialnatureas experiencedbyhumanbeings.Sat(being,exis- tence)isalsosatyam(truth),affirmingthatBrah- manisexperiencedasbeingitself,notabeing överagainstanother.Chitispureconsciousness, 813 satisfaction satisfice consciousnesswithoutobject,andänandaisthe experienceofunlimitedfreedomanduniversal potentialityaswellassatisfactionandthebliss thattranscendsbothallthatispleasurableinthe worldandreleasefromthebondageofsamsära. Hindutheistsunderstandsatlchitlänandaasthe qualitiesofthesupremegod.Seealsoadvaita, BRAHMAN,VEDANTA.R.N.Mi. satisfaction,anauxiliarysemanticnotionintro- ducedbyTarskiinordertogivearecursivedefi- nitionoftruthforlanguagescontaining quantifiers.Intuitively,thesatisfactionrelation holdsbetweenformulascontainingfreevari- ables(suchas'Building(x)&Tall(x)')andobjects orsequencesofobjects(suchastheEmpireState Building)ifandonlyiftheformula''holdsof"or "appliesto"theobjects.Thus,'Building(x)& Tall(x)',issatisfiedbyallandonlytallbuildings, and'~Tall(Xj)&Taller(Xj,x2)'issatisfiedbyany pairofobjectsinwhichthefirstobject(corre- spondingto'x')isnottall,butnonethelesstaller thanthesecond(correspondingto'x2'). Satisfactionisneededwhendefiningtruthfor languageswithsentencesbuiltfromformulas containingfreevariables,becausethenotionsof truthandfalsitydonotapplytothese"open"for- mulas.Thus,wecannotcharacterizethetruthof thesentences'3x(Building(x)&Tall(x))'('Some buildingistall')intermsofthetruthorfalsityof theopenformula'Building(x)&Tall(x)',since thelatterisneithertruenorfalse.Butnotethat thesentenceistrueifandonlyiftheformulais satisfiedbysomeobject.Sincewecangivea recursivedefinitionofthenotionofsatisfaction for(possiblyopen)formulas,thisenablesusto usethisauxiliarynotionindefiningtruth. Seealsosemanticparadoxes,tarski, TRUTH.J.Et. satisfactionconditions.Seesearle. satisfiable,havingacommonmodel,astructure inwhichallthesentencesinthesetaretrue;said ofasetofsentences.Inmodernlogic,satisfiabil- ityisthesemanticanalogueofthesyntactic, proof-theoreticnotionofconsistency,theun- provabilityofanyexplicitcontradiction.The completenesstheoremforfirst-orderlogic,that allvalidsentencesareprovable,canbeformu- latedintermsofsatisfiability:syntacticconsis- tencyimpliessatisfiability.Thistheoremdoesnot necessarilyholdforextensionsoffirst-order logic.Foranysoundproofsystemforsecond- orderlogictherewillbeanunsatisfiablesetof sentenceswithouttherebeingaformålderiva- tionofacontradictionfromtheset.Thisfollows fromGödel'sincompletenesstheorem.Oneof thecentralresultsofmodeltheoryforfirst-order logicconcernssatisfiability:thecompactnessthe- orem,duetoGödelin1936,saysthatifevery finitesubsetofasetofsentencesissatisfiablethe setitselfissatisfiable.Itfollowsimmediatelyfrom hiscompletenesstheoremforfirst-orderlogic, andgivesapowerfulmethodtoprovethecon- sistencyofasetofsentences.Seealsocom- pactnessTHEOREM,COMPLETENESS,GÖDEI_'S INCOMPLETENESSTHEOREMS,MODELTHEORY, PROOFTHEORY.Z.G.S. satisfice,tochooseordothegoodenoughrather thanthemostorthebest.'Satisfice',anobsolete variantof'satisfy',hasbeenadoptedbyecono- mistHerbertSimonandotherstodesignatenon- optimizingchoiceoraction.Accordingtosome economists,limitationsoftimeorinformation maymakeitimpossibleorinadvisableforan individual,firm,orstatebodytoattempttomax- imizepleasure,profits,märketshare,revenues, orsomeotherdesiredresult,andsatisficingwith respecttosuchresultsisthensaidtoberational, albeitlessthanideallyrational.Althoughmany orthodoxeconomiststhinkthatchoicecanand alwaysshouldbeconceivedinmaximizingor optimizingterms,satisficingmodelshavebeen proposedineconomics,evolutionarybiology, andphilosophy. Biologistshavesometimesconceivedevolu- tionarychangeaslargelyconsistingof"good enough"orsatisficingadaptationstoenviron- mentalpressuresratherthanasproceeding throughoptimaladjustmentstosuchpressures, butinphilosophy,themostfrequentrecentuse oftheideaofsatisficinghasbeeninethicsand rationalchoicetheory.Economiststypically regardsatisficingasacceptableonlywherethere areunwantedconstraintsondecisionmaking; butitisalsopossibletoseesatisficingasentirely acceptableinitself,andinthefieldofethics,it hasrecentlybeenarguedthattheremaybenötn- ingremissaboutmoralsatisficing,e.g.,givinga goodamounttocharity,butlessthanonecould give.Itispossibletoformulatesatisficingforms ofutilitarianismonwhichactionsaremorally right(even)iftheycontributemerelypositively and/orinsomelargeway,ratherthanmaxi- mally,tooverallnethumanhappiness.Ben- tham'soriginalformulationoftheprincipleof utilityandPopper'snegativeutilitarianismareboth examplesofsatisficingutilitarianisminthis sense-anditshouldbenotedthatsatisficing utilitarianismhastheputativeadvantageöver 814 saturated Saussure,Ferdinandde optimizingformsofallowingforsupererogatory degreesofmoralexcellence.Moreover,any moralviewthattreatsmoralsatisficingasper- missiblemakesroomformoralsupererogationin caseswhereoneoptimallygoesbeyondthe merelyacceptable.Butsincemoralsatisficingis lessthanoptimalmoralbehavior,butmaybe moremeritoriousthancertainbehaviorthat(in thesamecircumstances)wouldbemerelyper- missible,somemoralsatisficingmayactually countassupererogatory. Inrecentworkonrationalindividualchoice, somephilosophershavearguedthatsatisficing mayoftenbeacceptableinitself,ratherthan merelysecond-best.EvenSimonallowsthatan entrepreneurmaysimplyseekasatisfactory retumoninvestmentorshareofthemärket, ratherthanamaximumunderoneofthese headings.Butanumberofphilosophershave madethefurtherclaimthatwemaysometimes, withoutirrationality,turndownthereadily availablebetterinthelightofthegoodnessand sufficiencyofwhatwealreadyhaveorareenjoy- ing.Independentlyofthecostsoftakingasecond dessert,apersonmaybeentirelysatisfiedwith whatshehaseatenand,thoughwillingtoadmit shewouldenjoythatextradessert,turnitdown, saying''FmjustfineasIam."Whethersuch examplesreallyinvolveanacceptablerejection ofthe(momentarily)betterforthegoodenough hasbeendisputed.However,somephilosophers havegoneontosay,evenmorestrongly,thatsat- isficingcansometimesberationallyrequiredand optimizingrationallyunacceptable.Tokeepon seekingpleasurefromfoodorsexwithoutever beingthoroughlysatisfiedwithwhatonehas enjoyedcanseemcompulsiveandassuchless thanrational.Ifoneistrulyrationalaboutsuch goods,oneisn'tinsatiable:atsomepointonehas hadenoughanddoesn'twantmore,even thoughonecouldobtainfurtherpleasure. Theideathatsatisficingissometimesarequire- mentofpracticalreasonisreminiscentofAris- totle'sviewthatmoderationisinherently reasonable-ratherthanjustanecessarymeans tolåterenjoymentsandtheavoidanceoflåter painorillness,whichisthewaytheEpicureans conceivedmoderation.Butperhapsthegreatest advocateofsatisficingisPlato,whoarguesinthe Philebusthattheremustbemeasureorlimitto our(desirefor)pleasureinorderforpleasureto countasagoodthingforus.Insatiablytoseek andobtainpleasurefromagivensourceistogain nothinggoodfromit.Andaccordingtosucha view,satisficingmoderationisanecessarypre- conditionofhumangoodandflourishing,rather thanmerelybeingarationalrestraintonthe accumulationofindependentlyconceivedper- sonalgoodorwell-being. Seealsodecisiontheory,hedonism, RATIONALITY,UTILITARIANISM.M.A.Sl. saturated.Seefrege. Saussure,Ferdinandde(1857-1913),Swisslin- guistandfounderoftheschoolofstructurallin- guistics.Hisworkinlinguisticswasamajor influenceonthelåterdevelopmentofFrench structuralistphilosophy,aswellasstructural anthropology,structuralistliterarycriticism,and modernsemiology.Hepursuedstudiesinlin- guisticslargelyunderGeorgCurtiusattheUni- versityofLeipzig,alongwithsuchfuture J'unggrammatiker(neogrammarians)asLeskien andBrugmann.Followingthepublicationofhis importantMémoiresurlesystémeprimitifdesvoyelles dansleslanguesindo-européenes(1879),Saussure leftforParis,whereheassociatedhimselfwith theSociétéLinguistiqueandtaughtcomparative grammar.In1891,heretumedtoSwitzerlandto teachSanskrit,comparativegrammar,andgen- erallinguisticsattheUniversityofGeneva.His majorwork,theCourseinGeneralLinguistics (1916),wasassembledfromstudents'notesand hisoriginallectureoutlinesafterhisdeath. TheCourseinGeneralLinguisticsarguedagainst theprevalenthistoricalandcomparativephilo- logicalapproachestolanguagebyadvancing whatSaussuretermedascientificmodelforlin- guistics,oneborrowedinpartfromDurkheim. Suchamodelwouldtakethe"socialfact"oflan- guage(lalangue)asitsobject,anddistinguishthis fromthevarietyofindividualspeechevents(la parole),aswellasfromthecollectivityofspeech eventsandgrammaticalrulesthatformthegen- eralhistoricalbodyoflanguageassuch(lelon- gage).Thus,byseparatingouttheuniqueand accidentalelementsofpracticedspeech,Saus- suredistinguishedlanguage(lalangue)asthe objectivesetoflinguisticelementsandrulesthat, takenasasystem,governsthelanguageusespe- cifictoagivencommunity. Itwasthesystematiccoherencyandgeneral- ityoflanguage,soconceived,thatinclinedSaus- suretoapproachlinguisticsprincipallyinterms ofitsstaticorsynchronicdimension,ratherthan itshistoricalordiachronicdimension.ForSaus- sure,thesystemoflanguageisa"treasury"or "depository"ofsigns,andthebasicunitofthe linguisticsignisitselftwo-sided,havingbotha phonemiccomponent(''thesignifier")anda semanticcomponent("thesignified").Heterms 815 scalarimplicature Schelling,FriedrichWilhelmJoseph theformerthe"acoustical"or"sound"image- whichmay,inturn,berepresentedgraphically, inwriting-andthelatterthe"concept"or "meaning."Saussureconstruesthesignifiertobe arepresentationoflinguisticsoundsintheimag- inationormemory,i.e.,a"psychologicalphe- nomenon,"onethatcorrespondstoaspecifiable rangeofmaterialphoneticsounds.Itsdistinctive propertyconsistsinitsbeingreadilydifferenti- atedfromothersignifiersintheparticularlan- guage.Itisthefunctionofeachsignifier,asa distinctentity,toconveyaparticularmeaning- or"signified"concept-andthisisfixedpurelyby conventionalassociation. Whiletherelationbetweenthesignifierand signifiedresultsinwhatSaussuretermsthe''pos- itive"factofthesign,thesignultimatelyderives itslinguisticvalue(itsprecisedescriptivedeter- mination)fromitspositioninthesystemoflan- guageasawhole,i.e.,withintheparadigmatic andsyntagmaticrelationsthatstructurallyand functionallydifferentiateit.Signifiersarediffer- entiallyidentified;signifiersarearbitrarilyasso- ciatedwiththeirrespectivesignifiedconcepts; andsignsassumethedeterminationtheydoonly throughtheirconfigurationwithinthesystemof languageasawhole:thesefactsenabledSaus- suretoclaimthatlanguageislargelytobeunder- stoodasaclosedformålsystemofdifferences, andthatthestudyoflanguagewouldbeprinci- pallygovernedbyitsautonomousstructural determinations. Soconceived,linguisticswouldbebutapartof thestudyofsocialsignsystemsingeneral, namely,thebroaderscienceofwhatSaussure termedsemiology.Saussure'sinsightswouldbe takenupbythesubsequentGeneva,Prague,and Copenhagenschoolsoflinguisticsandbythe Russianformalists,andwouldbefurtherdevel- opedbythestructuralistsinFranceandelse- where,aswellasbyrecentsemiological approachestoliterarycriticism,socialanthropol- ogy,andpsychoanalysis. Seealsomeaning,philosophyoflan- guage,STRUCTURALISM,THEORYOFSIGNS. D.A1. scalarimplicature.Seeimplicature. scepticism.Seeskepticism. Schadenfreude.Seevalue. Scheler,Max(1874-1928),Germanphenome- nologist,socialphilosopher,andsociologistof knowledge.BorninMunich,hestudiedinJena; whenhereturnedtoMunichin1907hecamein contactwithphenomenology,especiallythe realistversionoftheearlyHusserlandhis MunichSchoolfollowers.Scheler'sfirstworks werephenomenologicalstudiesinethicsleading tohisultimatetheoryofvalue:hedescribedthe moralfeelingsofsympathyandresentmentand wroteacriticismofKantianformalismandratio- nalism,FormalisminEthicsandaNon-Formal EthicsofValue(1913).Duringthewar,hewasan ardentnationalistandwroteessaysinsupportof thewarthatwerealsophilosophicalcriticismsof modemculture,opposedto"Anglo-Saxon"nat- uralismandrationalcalculation.Althoughhe låterembracedabroadernotionofcommunity, suchcriticismsofmodernityremainedconstant themesofhiswritings.HisconversiontoCatholi- cismafterthewarledhimtoapplyphenomeno- logicaldescriptiontoreligiousphenomenaand feelings,andhelåterturnedtothemesofanthro- pologyandnaturalscience. ThecoreofScheler'sphenomenological methodishisconceptionoftheobjectivityof essences,which,thoughcontainedinexperi- ence,areaprioriandindependentofthe knower.ForScheler,valuesaresuchobjective, thoughnon-Platonic,essences.Theirobjectivity isintuitivelyaccessibleinimmediateexperience andfeelings,aswhenweexperiencebeautyin musicanddonotmerelyhearcertainsounds. Schelerdistinguishedbetweenvaluationsor valueperspectivesontheonehand,whichare historicallyrelativeandvariable,andvalueson theother,whichareindependentandinvariant. Therearefoursuchvalues,thehierarchicalorga- nizationofwhichcouldbebothimmediately intuitedandestablishedbyvariouspubliccrite- rialikedurationandindependence:pleasure, vitality,spirit,andreligion.Correspondingto thesevaluesarevariouspersonalitieswhoare notcreatorsofvaluebuttheirdiscoverers,his- toricaldisclosers,andexemplars:the"artistof consumption,"thehero,thegenius,andthe saint.Asimilarhierarchyofvaluesappliesto formsofsociety,thehighestofwhichisthe church,oraChristiancommunityofsolidarity andlove.Schelercriticizesthelevelingtenden- ciesofliberalismforviolatingthishierarchy, leadingtoformsofresentment,individualism, andnationalism,allofwhichrepresentthefalse orderingofvalues. Seealsohusserl,kant,naturalism, PHENOMENOLOGY.J.Bo. Schelling,FriedrichWilhelmJoseph(1775- 1854),Germanphilosopherwhosemetamor- 816 Schelling,FriedrichWilhelmJoseph Schelling,FriedrichWilhelmJoseph phosesencompasstheentirehistoryofGerman idealism.ASchwabian,Schellingfirststudiedat Tubingen,wherehebefriendedHölderlinand Hegel.TheyoungSchellingwasanenthusiastic exponentofFichte'sWissenschaftslehreand devotedseveralearlyessaystoitsexposition. Afterstudyingscienceandmathematicsat Leipzig,hejoinedFichteatJenain1798.Mean- while,insuchwritingsasPhilosophischeBriefe iiberDogmatismusundKritizismus("Philosophical LettersonDogmatismandCriticism,"1795), Schellingbetrayedgrowingdoubtsconcerning Fichte'sphilosophy(aboveall,itstreatmentof nature)andalivelyinterestinSpinoza.Hethen turnedtoconstructingasystematicNaturphiloso- phie(philosophyofnature)withinthecontextof whichnaturewouldbetreatedmoreholistically thanbyeitherNewtonianscienceortranscen- dentalidealism.Ofhismanypublicationsonthis topic,twoofthemoreimportantareIdeenzu einerPhilosophiederNatur('Tdeasconcerninga PhilosophyofNature,"1797)andVonderWelt- seele("OntheWorld-Soul,"1798). Whereastranscendentalidealismattemptsto deriveobjectiveexperiencefromaninitialactof freeself-positing,Schelling'sphilosophyof natureattemptstoderiveconsciousnessfrom objects.Beginningwith"pureobjectivity,"the Naturphilosophiepurportstoshowhownature undergoesaprocessofunconsciousself-devel- opment,culminatingintheconditionsforits ownself-representation.ThemethodofNatur- philosophieisfundamentallyapriori:itbegins withtheconceptoftheunityofnatureand accountsforitsdiversitybyinterpretingnatureas asystemofopposedforcesor"polarities,"which manifestthemselvesinevermorecomplexlev- elsoforganization(Potenzen). AtJena,Schellingcameintocontactwith Tieck,Novalis,andtheSchlegelbrothersand becameinterestedinart.Thisnewinterestisevi- dentinhisSystemdestranszendentalenIdealismus (1800),whichdescribesthepathfrompuresub- jectivity(self-consciousness)toobjectivity(the necessarypositingoftheNot-I,orofnature).The mostinnovativeandinfluentialportionofthis treatise,whichisotherwisecloselymodeledon Fichte'sWissenschaftslehre,isitsconclusion, whichpresentsartastheconcreteaccomplish- mentofthephilosophicaltask.Inaestheticexpe- riencetheidentitybetweenthesubjectiveand theobjective,theidealandthereal,becomesan objecttotheexperiencingIitself. ForSchelling,transcendentalidealismand Naturphilosophiearetwocomplementarysidesor subdivisionsofalarger,moreencompassingsys- tem,whichhedubbedtheSystemofIdentityor AbsoluteIdealismandexpoundedinaseriesof publications,includingtheDarstellungmeinesSys- temsderPhilosophie("PresentationofMySystem ofPhilosophy,"1801),Bruno(1802),andVor- lesungeniiberdieMethodedesakademischenStudi- ums("LecturesontheMethodofAcademic Study,"1803).Themostdistinctivefeatureof thissystemisthatitbeginswithabaldassertion oftheunityofthoughtandbeing,i.e.,withthe bareideaoftheself-identical"Absolute,"which isdescribedasthefirstpresuppositionofall knowledge.Sincetheidentitywithwhichthis systemcommencestranscendseveryconceiv- abledifference,itisalsodescribedasthe"point ofindifference."Fromthisundifferentiatedor "indifferent"startingpoint,Schellingproceedsto adescriptionofrealityasawhole,consideredas adifferentiatedsystemwithinwhichunityis maintainedbyvarioussyntheticrelationships, suchassubstanceandattribute,causeandeffect, attractionandrepulsion.Likehisphilosophyof nature,Schelling'sSystemofIdentityutilizesthe notionofvarioushierarchicallyrelatedPotenzen asitsbasicorganizingprinciple.Theobvious questionconcemsthepreciserelationship betweenthe"indifferent"Absoluteandthereal systemofdifferentiatedelements,aquestionthat maybesaidtohavesettheagendaforSchelling's subsequentphilosophizing. From1803to1841SchellingwasinBavaria, wherehecontinuedtoexpoundhisSystemof Identityandtoexplorethephilosophiesofart andnature.Themostdistinctivefeatureofhis thoughtduringthisperiod,however,wasanew interestinreligionandinthetheosophicalwrit- ingsofBoehme,whoseinfluenceisprominentin thePhilosophischeUntersuchungeniiberdasWesen dermenschlichenFreiheit("PhilosophicalInvesti- gationsconcerningtheNatureofHumanFree- dom,"1809),aworkofteninterpretedasan- ticipatingexistentialism.Healsoworkedona speculativeinterpretationofhumanhistory,Die Weltalter,whichremainedunpublished,andlec- turedregularlyonthehistoryofphilosophy. In1841SchellingmovedtoBerlin,wherehe lecturedonhisnewphilosophyofrevelationand mythology,whichhenowcharacterizedas"pos- itivephilosophy,"incontradistinctiontothe purely"negative"philosophyofKant,Fichte, andHegel.Somescholarshaveinterpretedthese posthumouslypublishedlecturesasrepresenting theculminationbothofSchelling'sownpro- tractedphilosophicaldevelopmentandofGer- manidealismasawhole. SeealsoFICHTE,HEGEL,kant.D.Br. 817 schema Schlegel,Friedrichvon schema.Seethema. schemata.Seekant. schematicform.Seelogicalform. scheme,alsoschema(plural:schemata),ameta- linguisticframeortemplateusedtospecifyan infinitesetofsentences,itsinstances,byfmite means,oftentakenwithasideconditiononhow itsblänksorplaceholdersaretobefilled.Thesen- tence'EitherAbearguesoritisnotthecasethat Abeargues'isaninstanceoftheexcludedmiddle schemeforEnglish:'Either...oritisnotthecase that...',wherethetwoblänksaretobefilled withoneandthesame(well-formeddeclarative) Englishsentence.Sincefirst-ordernumberthe- orycannotbefinitelyaxiomatized,themathe- maticalinductionschemeisusedtoeffectively specifyaninfinitesetofaxioms:Tfzeroissuch that...andthesuccessorofeverynumbersuch that...isalsosuchthat...,theneverynumber issuchthat...',wherethefourblänksaretobe filledwithoneandthesamearithmeticopen sentence,suchas'itprecedesitsownsuccessor' or'itisfinite'.Amongthebest-knownisTarski's schemeT:'...isatruesentenceifandonlyif...', wherethesecondblankisfilledwithasentence andthefirstblankbyanameofthesentence. Seealsoconvbntiont,logicalform, METALANGUAGE,OPENFORMULA,PHILOSO- PHYOFMATHEMATICS,TARSKI.J.Cor. Schiller,JohannChristophFriedrichvon(1759- 1805),Germanpoet,dramatist,andphilosopher. AlongwithhiscolleaguesReinholdandFichte, heparticipatedinsystematicallyrevisingKanfs transcendentalidealism.ThoughSchiller'sbest- knowntheoreticalcontributionsweretoaes- thetics,hisphilosophicalambitionsweremore general,andheproposedanovelsolutiontothe problemofthesystematicunity,notmerelyofthe criticalphilosophy,butofhumannature.His mostsubstantialphilosophicalwork,Briefeiiber dieäesthetischeErziehungdesMenschen("Letterson theAestheticEducationofMan,"1794/95), examinestherelationshipbetweennatural necessityandpracticalfreedomandaddresses twoproblemsraisedbyKant:Howcanacreature governedbynaturalnecessityanddesireever becomeawareofitsownfreedomandthuscapa- bleofautonomousmoralaction?Andhowcan thesetwosidesofhumannature-thenatural, sensuoussideandtherational,supersensuous one-bereconciled?Incontradistinctionbothto thosewhosubordinateprinciplestofeelings ("savages")andtothosewhoinsistthatone shouldstrivetosubordinatefeelingstoprinciples ("barbarians"),Schillerpositedanintermediary realmbetweenthesphereofnatureandthatof freedom,aswellasathirdbasichumandrive capableofmediatingbetweensensuousand rationalimpulses.Thisthirdimpulseisdubbed the"playimpulse,"andtheintermediarysphere towhichitpertainsisthatofartandbeauty.By cultivatingtheplayimpulse(i.e.,via"aesthetic education")oneisnotonlyfreedfrombondage tosensualityandgrantedafirstglimpseofone's practicalfreedom,butonealsobecomescapable ofreconcilingtherationalandsensuoussidesof one'sownnature.Thisideaofaconditionin whichoppositesaresimultaneouslycancelled andpreserved,aswellasthespecificprojectof reconcilingfreedomandnecessity,profoundly influencedsubsequentthinkerssuchasSchelling andHegelandcontributedtothedevelopmentof Germanidealism.Seealsofichte,idealism, KANT,NEO-KANTIANISM,SCHELLING.D.Br. Schlegel,Friedrichvon(1772-1829),German literarycriticandphilosopher,oneoftheprinci- palrepresentativesofGermanRomanticism.In OntheStudyofGreekPoetry(1795),Schlegellaid thefoundationsforthedistinctionofclassicaland Romanticliteratureandapronouncedcon- sciousnessofliterarymodernity.Togetherwith hisbrotherAugustWilhelm,heeditedthe Athenaeum(1798-1800),themaintheoretical organofGermanRomanticism,famousforits collectionoffragmentsasanewmeansofcritical communication.Schlegelistheoriginatorofthe Romantictheoryofirony,anon-dialecticalform ofphilosophizingandliterarywritingthattakes itsinspirationfromSocraticironyandcombines itwithFichte'sthoughtprocessofaffirmationand negation,"self-creation"and"self-annihilation." CloselyconnectedwihSchlegel'stheoryofirony ishistheoryoflanguageandunderstanding (hermeneutics).Criticalreflectiononlanguage promotesanironicawarenessofthe"necessity andimpossibilityofcompletecommunication" (CriticalFragments,No.108);criticalreflectionon understandingrevealstheamountofincompre- hensibility,of"positivenot-understanding" involvedineveryactofunderstanding(On Incomprehensibility,1800).Schlegel'swritings wereessentialfortheriseofhistoricalconscious- nessinGermanRomanticism.HisOnAncientand ModernLiterature(1812)isreputedtorepresent thefirstliteraryhistoryinamodernandbroadly comparativefashion.HisPhilosophyofHistory (1828),togetherwithhisPhilosophyofLife(1828) 818 Schleiermacher,Friedrich SchoolofNames andPhilosophyofLanguage(1829),confront Hegel'sphilosophyfromthepointofviewofa Christianandpersonalistictypeofphilosophiz- ing.SchlegelconvertedtoCatholicismin1808. Seealsofichte.E.Beh. Schleiermacher,Friedrich(1768-1834),German philosopher,a"criticalrealist"workingamong post-Kantianidealists.Inphilosophyandscience hepresupposedtranscendentalfeatures,noted inhisdialecticlectures,andadvocatedintegra- tivebuthistoricallycontingent,empiricalfunc- tions.Bothdevelop,but,contraHegel,not logically.Schleiermacherwasacreatorofmod- emgeneralhermeneutics;afatherofmodern theologicalandreligiousstudies;anadvocateof women'srights;thecofounder,withHumboldt, oftheUniversityatBerlin(1808-10),wherehe taughtuntil1834;andtheclassictranslatorof PlatointoGerman. Schleiermacherhashadanundeservedly minorplaceinhistoriesofphilosophy.Ap- pointedchieflytotheology,hepublishedless philosophy,thoughheregularlylectured,in tightlyargueddiscourse,inGreekphilosophy, historyofphilosophy,dialectic,hermeneutics andcriticism,philosophyofmind("psychol- ogy"),ethics,politics,aesthetics,andphilosophy ofeducation.Fromthe1980s,hiscollectedwrit- ingsandlargecorrespondencebegantoappear inaforty-volumecriticaleditionandinthe largerSchleiermacherStudiesandTranslations series.Brilliant,newlyavailablepiecesfromhis twentiesonfreedom,thehighestgood,andval- ues,previouslyknownonlyinfragmentsbut essentialforunderstandinghisviewsfully,were amongthefirsttoappear.Muchofhisoutlook wasformedbeforehebecameprominentinthe earlyRomanticcircle(1796-1806),distinguish- ablebyhismarkedlyreligious,consistentlylib- eralviews. Seealsohermeneutics.T.N.T. Schlick,Moritz.Seeviennacircle. Scholasticism,asetofscholarlyandinstructional techniquesdevelopedinWesternEuropean schoolsofthelatemedievalperiod,includingthe useofcommentaryanddisputedquestion. 'Scholasticism'isderivedfromLatinscholasticus, whichinthetwelfthcenturymeantthemaster ofaschool.TheScholasticmethodisusuallypre- sentedasbeginninginthelawschools-notably atBologna-andasbeingthentransportedinto theologyandphilosophybyaseriesofmasters includingAbelardandPeterLombard.Within thenewuniversitiesofthethirteenthcentury thestandardizationofthecurriculumandthe enormousprestigeofAristotle'swork(despite thesuspicionwithwhichitwasinitiallygreeted) contributedtotheentrenchmentofthemethod anditwasnotuntiltheeducationalreformsof thebeginningofthesixteenthcenturythatit ceasedtobedominant. Thereis,strictlyspeaking,nosuchthingas Scholasticism.Asthetermwasoriginallyusedit presupposedthatasinglephilosophywastaught intheuniversitiesoflatemedievalEuropé,but therewasnosuchphilosophy.Thephilosophical movementsworkingoutsidetheuniversitiesin thelatesixteenthandearlyseventeenthcen- turiesandthe"neo-Scholastics"ofthelatenine- teenthandearlytwentiethcenturiesallfound suchapresuppositionuseful,andtheirinfluence ledscholarstoassumeit.Atfirstthisgenerated effortstofindacommoncoreinthephilosophies taughtinthelatemedievalschools.More recentlyithasledtoeffortstofindmethodschar- acteristicoftheirteaching,andtoanextension ofthetermtotheschoolsoflateantiquityandof Byzantium. Bothamongtheopponentsoftheschoolsin theseventeenthcenturyandamongthe"neo- Scholastics,"'Scholasticism'wassupposedto designateadoctrinewhosecorewasthedoctrine ofsubstanceandaccidents.Asportrayedby DescartesandLocke,theScholasticsacceptedthe viewthatamongthecomponentsofathingwere asubstantialformandanumberofrealacciden- talforms,manyofwhichcorrespondedtoper- ceptiblepropertiesofthething-itscolor,shape, temperature.Theywerealsosupposedtohave acceptedasharpdistinctionbetweennaturaland unnaturalmotion. Seealsoneo-scholasticism.C.G.Norm. Scholasticmethod.Seescholasticism. SchoolofLaws.Seechineselegalism. SchoolofNames,alsocalled,inChinese,ming Ma,alooselyassociatedgroupofChinese philosophersoftheWarringStatesperiod(403- 221b.c),alsoknownaspienche(Dialecticiansor Sophists).ThemostfamouswereHuiShihand Kung-sunLungTzu.Thoughinterestedinthe relationbetweennamesandreality,theSophists addressedsuchissuesasrelativity,perspectivism, space,time,causality,essentialism,universalism, andparticularism.Perhapsmoreimportantthan theirsubjectmatter,however,wastheirmethod- ology.Astheirnamesuggests,theSophists 819 Schopenhauer,Arthur Schröder-Bernsteintheorem delightedinlanguagegamesandlogicalpuzzles. Theyusedlogicandrationalargumentnotonly asaweapontodefeattheirphilosophicaloppo- nentsbutasatooltosharpenrationalargumen- tationitself.Paradoxessuchas'IgotoYiieh todaybutarriveyesterday'and'Awhitehorseis notahorse'continuetostimulatephilosophical discussiontoday.YetfrustratedConfucian, Taoist,andLegalistcontemporarieschided Sophistsforwastingtheirtimeonabstractions andpuzzles,andforsuccumbingtointellectual- ismforitsownsake.AsConfucianismemerged tobecomethestateideologytheSchoolof NamesdisappearedsometimeintheearlyHan dynasty(206b.c.-a.d.220);havingbeenin importantmeasureco-optedbytheleading interpreterofConfucianismoftheperiod,Hsiin Tzu.Seealsochinesephilosophy,hsun TZU,KUNG-SUNLUNGTZU.R.P.P.&R.TA. Schopenhauer,Arthur(1788-1860),German philosopher.BorninDanzigandschooledin Germany,France,andEnglandduringawell- traveledchildhood,hebecameacquainted throughhisnovelistmotherwithGoethe, Schlegel,andthebrothersGrimm.Hestudied medicineattheUniversityofGöttingenandphi- losophyattheUniversityofBerlin;receivedthe doctoratefromtheUniversityofJenain1813; andlivedmuchofhisadultlifeinFrankfurt, wherehedied. Schopenhauer'sdissertation,OntheFourfold RootofthePrincipleofSufficientReason(1813),lays thegroundworkforallofhislåterphilosophical work.Theworldofrepresentation(equivalentto Kanfsphenomenalworld)isgovernedby"the principleofsufficientreason":"everypossible object...ståndsinanecessaryrelationtoother objects,ontheonehandasdetermined,onthe otherasdetermining"(TheWorldasWillandRep- resentation).Thus,eachobjectofconsciousness canbeexplainedintermsofitsrelationswith otherobjects. ThesystematicstatementofSchopenhauer's philosophyappearedinTheWorldasWilland Representation(1818).HisotherworksareOn VisionandColors(1815),"OntheWillinNature" (1836),conjoinedwith"OntheFoundationof Morality"inTheTwoFundamentalProblemsof Ethics(1841);thesecondeditionofTheWorldas WillandRepresentation,whichincludedasecond volumeofessays(1844);anenlargedand revisededitionofOntheFourfoldRootofthe PrincipleofSufficientReason(1847);andParerga andParalipomena,aseriesofessays(1851).These areallconsistentwiththeprincipalstatement ofhisthoughtinTheWorldasWillandRepre- sentation. ThecentralpostulateofSchopenhauer'ssys- temisthatthefundamentalrealityiswill,which heequateswiththeKantianthing-in-itself. UnlikeKant,Schopenhauercontendsthatone canimmediatelyknowthething-in-itself throughtheexperienceofaninner,volitional realitywithinone'sownbody.Everyphenome- non,accordingtoSchopenhauer,hasacompa- rableinnerreality.Consequently,theterm'will' canextendtotheinnernatureofallthings. Moreover,becausenumberpertainsexclusively tothephenomenalworld,thewill,asthing-in- itself,isone.Nevertheless,differenttypesof thingsmanifestthewilltodifferentdegrees. Schopenhaueraccountsforthesedifferencesby invokingPlato'sIdeas(orForms).TheIdeasare theuniversalprototypesforthevariouskindsof objectsinthephenomenalworld.Takencollec- tively,theIdeasconstituteahierarchy.Weusu- allyoverlookthemineverydayexperience, focusinginsteadonparticularsandtheirpracti- calrelationshipstous.However,duringaesthetic experience,werecognizetheuniversalIdea withintheparticular;simultaneously,asaes- theticbeholders,webecome"theuniversalsub- jectofknowledge." Aestheticexperiencealsoquietsthewill withinus.Thecompletesilencingofthewillis, forSchopenhauer,theidealforhumanbeings, thoughitisrarelyattained.Becausewillisthe fundamentalmetaphysicalprinciple,ourlives aredominatedbywilling-and,consequently, filledwithstruggle,conflict,anddissatisfaction. InspiredbyBuddhism,Schopenhauercontends thatalloflifeissuffering,whichonlyanendto desirecanpermanentlyeliminate(asopposedto therespiteofaestheticexperience).Thisis achievedonlybythesaint,whorejectsdesirein aninneracttermed"denialofthewilltolive." Thesaintfullygraspsthatthesamewillmoti- vatesallphenomenaand,recognizingthatnötn- ingisgainedthroughstruggleandcompetition, achieves"resignation."Suchapersonachieves theethicalidealofallreligions-compassion towardallbeings,resultingfromtheinsightthat allare,fundamentally,one. Seealsokant,plato.K.M.H. Schröder-Bernsteintheorem,thetheoremthat mutuallydominantsetsareequinumerous.Aset AissaidtobedominatedbyasetBifandonlyif eachelementofAcanbemappedtoaunique elementofBinsuchawaythatnotwoelements ofAaremappedtothesameelementofB(pos- 820 Schrödinger,Erwin scientificrealism siblywithsomeelementsofBleftöver).Intu- itively,ifAisdominatedbyB,thenBhasatleast asmanymembersasA.Giventhisintuition,one wouldexpectthatifAisdominatedbyBandB isdominatedbyA,thenAandBareequinumer- ous(i.e.,AcanbemappedtoBasdescribed abovewithnoelementsofBleftöver).Thisisthe Schröder-Bernsteintheorem.Statedintermsof cardinalnumbers,thetheoremsaysthatifk(x)),oneinstanceforeachformulathatdoes notcontainPfree.Thescheme"asserts"that everyformuladeterminestheextensionofa property.Ifthelanguagehasvariablesranging överfunctions,theremayalsobeaversionofthe axiomofchoke:VR(\/x3yRxy—>■IfMxRxfx).Instan- dardsemanticsforsecond-orderlogic,amodelof agivenlanguageisthesameasamodelforthe correspondingfirst-orderlanguage.Therelation variablesrangeövereveryrelationöverthe domain-of-discourse,thefunctionvariables rangeövereveryfunctionfromthedomainto thedomain,etc.Innon-standard,orHenkin semantics,eachmodelconsistsofadomain-of- discourseandaspecifiedcollectionofrelations, functions,etc,onthedomain.Thelattermay notincludeeveryrelationorfunction.Thespec- ifiedcollectionsaretherangeofthesecond-order variablesinthemodelinquestion.Ineffect, Henkinsemanticsregardssecond-orderlan- guagesasmulti-sorted,first-orderlanguages. Seealsoformållogic,formålseman- tics,PHILOSOPHYOFLOGIC.S.Sha. secondpotentiality.Seearistotle. secondThomism.Seethomism. secundumquid,inacertainrespect,orwitha qualification.Fålladescanarisefromconfusing whatistrueonlysecundumquidwithwhatistrue simpliciter('withoutqualification','absolutely', 'onthewhole'),orconversely.Thusastrawberry isredsimpliciter(onthewhole).Butitisblack, notred,withrespecttoitsseeds,secundumquid. Byignoringthedistinction,onemightmistak- enlyinferthatthestrawberryisbothredandnot red.Again,acertainthiefisagoodcook,secun- dumquid;butitdoesnotfollowthatheisgood simpliciter(withoutqualification).Aristotlewas thefirsttorecognizethefallacysecundumquidet simpliciterexplicitly,inhisSophisticalRefutations. Onthebasisofsomeexceptionallyenigmatic remarksinthesamework,theliarparadoxwas oftenregardedintheMiddleAgesasaninstance ofthisfallacy.Seealsoparadox.P.V.S. securitystrategy.Seemaximinstrategy. seeing,epistemic.Seedretske. 824 seeing,non-epistemic self-determination seeing,non-epistemic.Seedretske. selection.Seephilosophyofbiology. self,bundletheoryof.Seebundletheory. self-consciousness.Seededicto,knowledgeby ACQUAINTANCE,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND. self-control.SeeAKRAsiA. self-deception,(1)purposefulactiontoavoid unpleasanttruthsandpainfultopics(aboutone- selfortheworld);(2)unintentionalprocessesof denial,avoidance,orbiasedperception;(3)men- talstatesresultingfromsuchactionorprocesses, suchasignorance,falsebelief,wishfulthinking, unjustifiedopinions,orlackofclearawareness. Thus,parentstendtoexaggeratethevirtuesof theirchildren;loversdisregardclearsignsof unreciprocatedaffection;overeatersrationalize awaytheneedtodiet;patientsdyingofcancer pretendtothemselvesthattheirhealthis improving. Insomecontexts'self-deception'isneutraland impliesnocriticism.Deceivingoneselfcaneven bedesirable,generatingavitalliethatpromotes happinessortheabilitytocopewithdifficulties. Inothercontexts'self-deception'hasnegative connotations,suggestingbadfaith,falsecon- sciousness,orwhatJosephButlercalled"inner hypocrisy"-therefusaltoacknowledgeour wrongdoing,characterflaws,oronerousrespon- sibilities.Existentialistphilosophers,likeKier- kegaard,Heidegger,andmostnotablySartre(Be- ingandNothingness,1943),denouncedself-de- ceptionasaninauthentic(dishonest,cowardly) refusaltoconfrontpainfulthoughsignificant truths,especiallyaboutfreedom,responsibility, anddeath.HerbertFingarette,however,argued thatself-deceptionismorallyambiguous-nei- therclearlyblameworthynorclearlyfault- less-becauseofhowiterodescapacitiesfor actingrationally(Self-Deception,1969). Theideaofintentionallydeceivingoneself seemsparadoxical.IndeceivingotherpeopleI usuallyknowatruththatguidesmeasIstatethe oppositefalsehood,intendingtherebytomislead themintobelievingthefalsehood.Fivedifficul- tiesseemtopreventmefromdoinganythinglike thattomyself. (1)Withinterpersonaldeception,oneperson knowssomethingthatanotherpersondoesnot. Yetself-deceiversknowthetruthallalong,and soitseemstheycannotuseittomakethemselves ignorant.Onesolutionisthatself-deception occursövertime,withtheinitialknowledge becominggraduallyeroded.Orperhapsself- deceiversonlysuspectratherthanknowthe truth,andthendisregardrelevantevidence. (2)Ifconsciousnessimpliesawarenessofone's ownconsciousacts,thenaconsciousintention todeceivemyselfwouldbeself-defeating,forI wouldremainconsciousofthetruthIwishto flee.Sartre'ssolutionwastoviewself-deception asspontaneousandnotexplicitlyreflectedupon. Freud'ssolutionwastoconceiveofself-decep- tionasunconsciousrepression. (3)Itseemsthatself-deceiversbelieveatruth thattheysimultaneouslygetthemselvesnotto believe,buthowisthatpossible?Perhapsthey keeponeoftwoconflictingbeliefsunconscious ornotfullyconscious. (4)Self-deceptionsuggestswillfullycreating beliefs,butthatseemsimpossiblesincebeliefs cannotvoluntarilybechosen.Perhapsbeliefs canbeindirectlymanipulatedbyselectively ignoringandattendingtoevidence. (5)Itseemsthatonepartofaperson(the deceiver)manipulatesanotherpart(thevictim), butsuchextremesplitssuggestmultipleperson- alitydisordersratherthanself-deception.Per- hapswearecomposedof"subselves"-relatively unifieddustersofelementsinthepersonality.Or perhapsatthispointweshouldjettisoninter- personaldeceptionasamodelforunderstanding self-deception. Seealsoakrasia,fheud,philosophyof MIND.M.W.M. self-determination,theautonomypossessedbya communitywhenitispoliticallyindependent;in astrictsense,territorialsovereignty.Within internationallaw,theprincipleofself-determina- tionappearstogranteverypeoplearighttobe self-determining,butthereiscontroversyöver itsinterpretation.Appliedtoestablishedstates, theprinciplecallsforrecognitionofstatesover- eigntyandnon-interventionininternalaffairs. Byprovidingfortheself-determinationofsub- ordinatecommunities,however,itcangenerate demandsforsecessionthatconflictwithexisting claimsofsovereignty.Also,whatnon-self-gov- eminggroupsqualifyasbeneficiaries?The nationalinterpretationoftheprincipletreatscul- turalornationalunitsastheproperclaimants, whereastheregionalinterpretationconfersthe rightofself-determinationuponthepopulations ofwell-definedregionsregardlessofculturalor nationalaffiliations.Thisdifferencereflectsthe rootsoftheprincipleinthedoctrinesofnational- ismandpopulärsovereignty,respectively,butcom- 825 self-evidence self-referentialincoherence plicatesitsapplication.Seealsopoliticalphi- losophy.T.K. self-evidence,thepropertyofbeingself-evident. Onlytruepropositions(ortruths)areself-evi- dent,thoughfalsepropositionscanappeartobe self-evident.Itiswidelyheldthatatruepropo- sitionisself-evidentifandonlyifonewouldbe justifiedinbelievingitifoneadequatelyunder- stoodit.Somewouldalsorequirethatself-evi- dentpropositionsareknownifbelievedonthe basisofsuchanunderstanding.Someself-evi- dentpropositionsareobvious,suchasthepropo- sitionthatallstagsaremale,butothersarenot, sinceitmaytakeconsiderablereflectionto achieveanadequateunderstandingofthem. Thatslaveryiswrongandthatthereisnoknowl- edgeoffalsehoodsareperhapsexamplesofthe latter.Notallobviouspropositionsareself-evi- dent,e.g.,itisobviousthatastonewillfallif dropped,butadequateunderstandingofthat claimdoesnotbyitselfjustifyoneinbelievingit. Anobviouspropositionisonethatimmediately seemstrueforanyonewhoadequatelyunder- standsit,butitsobviousnessmayrestonwell- knownandcommonlyacceptedempiricalfacts, notonunderstanding. Allanalyticpropositionsareself-evidentbut notallself-evidentpropositionsareanalytic.The propositionsthatifAisolderthanB,thenBis youngerthanA,andthatnoobjectcanbered andgreenallöveratthesametimeandinthe samerespects,arearguablyself-evidentbutnot analytic.Allself-evidentpropositionsareneces- sary,foronecouldnotbejustifiedinbelievinga contingentpropositionsimplyinvirtueofunder- standingit.However,notallnecessaryproposi- tionsareself-evident,e.g.,thatwaterisH2and thattemperatureisthemeasureofthemolecu- laractivityinsubstancesarenecessarybutnot self-evident.Apropositioncanappeartobeself- evidenteventhoughitisnot.Forinstance,the propositionthatallunmarriedadultmalesare bachelorswillappearself-evidenttomanyuntil theyconsiderthatthepopeissuchamale.A propositionmayappearself-evidenttosomebut nottoothers,eventhoughitmusteitherhaveor lackthepropertyofbeingself-evident.Self-evi- dentpropositionsareknowablenon-empirically, orapriori,butsomepropositionsknowablea prioriarenotself-evident,e.g.,certainconclu- sionsoflonganddifficultchainsofmathematical reasoning. Seealsoanalytic-syntheticdistinc- TION,APRIORI,KANT,NECESSITY,RATIONAL- ISM.B.R. self-interesttheory.Seeparfit. self-justification.Seeepistemology. self-love.Seebutler,egoism. self-organizingsystem.Seecomputertheory. self-presenting,inthephilosophyofMeinong, havingtheability-commontoallmental states-tobeimmediatelypresenttoour thought.InMeinong'sview,nomentalstatecan bepresentedtoourthoughtinanyother way-e.g.,indirectly,viaaLockean"ideaof reflection."Theonlywaytoapprehendamental stateistoexperienceor"livethrough"it.The experienceinvolvedintheapprehensionofan externalobjecthasthusadoublepresentational function:(1)viaits"content"itpresentsthe objecttoourthought;(2)asitsown"quasi-con- tent"itpresentsitselfimmediatelytoour thought.Inthecontemporaryera,Roderick Chisholmhasbasedhisaccountofempirical knowledgeinpartonarelatedconceptofthe self-presenting.(InChisholm'ssense-thedefin- itionofwhichweomithere-allself-presenting statesaremental,butnotconversely;for instance,beingdepressedbecauseofthedeathof one'sspousewouldnotbeself-presenting.)In Chisholm'sepistemology,self-presentingstates areasourceofcertaintyinthefollowingway:if i7isaself-presentingstate,thentobecertainthat oneisinstateFitissufficientthatoneis,and believesoneselftobeinstateF.Seealso BRENTANO,MEINONG,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND. R.Ke. self-reference,paradoxesof.Seerussell,type THEORY. self-referentialincoherence,aninternaldefectof anassertionortheory,whichitpossessespro- videdthat(a)itestablishessomerequirement thatmustbemetbyassertionsortheories,(b)it isitselfsubjecttothisrequirement,and(c)itfails tomeettherequirement.Themostfamous exampleislogicalpositivism'smeaningcriterion, whichrequiresthatallmeaningfulassertionsbe eithertautologicalorempiricallyverifiable,yetis itselfneither.Apossibleearlyexampleisfound inHume,whoseownwritingsmighthavebeen consignedtotheflameshadlibrariansfollowed hiscounseltodosowithvolumesthatcontain neither"abstractreasoningconcerningquantity ornumber"nor"experimentalreasoningcon- cerningmatteroffactandexistence."Bölddefi- 826 self-reproducingautomaton self-reproducingautomaton ancewasshownbyWittgenstein,who,realizing thatthepropositionsoftheTractatusdidnot"pic- ture"theworld,advisedthereaderto"throw awaytheladderafterhehasclimbedupit."An epistemologicalexampleisfurnishedbyany foundationalisttheorythatestablishescriteria forrationalacceptabilitythatthetheoryitself cannotmeet.Seealsohume,logicalposi- tivism.W.Has. self-reproducingautomaton,aformålmodelof self-reproductionofakindintroducedbyvon Neumann.Heworkedwithanintuitiverobot modelandthenwithawell-definedcellulär automatonmodel.Imagineaclassofrobotic automatamadeofrobotpartsandoperatingin anenvironmentofsuchparts.Therearecom- puterparts(switches,memoryelements,wires), input-outputparts(sensingelements,display elements),actionparts(graspingandmoving elements,joiningandcuttingelements),and straightbars(tomaintainstructureandto employinastoragetape).Therearealsoenergy sourcesthatenabletherobotstooperateand movearound.Thesefivecategoriesofpartsare sufficientfortheconstructionofrobotsthatcan makeobjectsofvariouskinds,includingother robots. Thesepartsalsoclearlysufficeformakinga robotversionofanyfiniteautomaton.Sensingand actingpartscanthenbeaddedtothisrobotso thatitcanmakeanindefinitelyexpandablestor- agetapefromstraightbars.(A"blanktape"con- sistsofbarsjoinedinsequence,andtherobot storesinformationonthistapebyattachingbars ornotatthejunctions.)Ifitsfiniteautomaton partcanexecuteprogramsandissufficiently powerful,sucharobotisauniversalcomputing robot(ef.auniversalTuringmachine). Auniversalcomputingrobotcanbeaug- mentedtoformauniversalconstruetingrobot- arobotthatcanconstruetanyrobot,givenits description.Letrbeanyrobotwithanindefi- nitelyexpandabletape,letF(r)bethedescription ofitsfinitepart,andletT(r)betheinformation onitstape.Nowtakeauniversalcomputing robotandaugmentitwithsensingandacting devicesandwithprogramssothatwhenF(r)fol- lowedbyT(r)iswrittenonitstape,thisaug- menteduniversalcomputerperformsasfollows. First,itreadsthedescriptionF(r),findsthe neededparts,andconstruetsthefinitepartofr. Second,itmakesablanktape,attachésittothe finitepartofr,andthencopiestheinformation T(r)fromitsowntapeontothenewtape.This augmentationofauniversalcomputingrobotis auniversalconstruetor.Forwhenitstartswiththe informationF(r),T(r)writtenonitstape,itwill construetacopyofrwithT(r)onitstape. Robotself-reproductionresultsfromapplying theuniversalconstruetortoitself.Modifythe universalconstruetorslightlysothatwhenonly adescriptionF(r)iswrittenonitstape,itcon- struetsthefinitepartofrandthenattachésatape withF(r)writtenonit.Callthisversionofthe universalconstruetorC.NowplaceC'sdescrip- tionF(C)onitsowntapeandstartitup.Cfirst readsthisdescriptionandconstruetsacopyof thefinitepartofitselfinanemptyregionofthe cellulärspace.Thenitaddsablanktapetothe newconstructionandcopiesF(Cu)ontoit.Hence CwithF(C)onitstapehasproducedanother copyofCwithF(C)onitstape.Thisisautoma- tonself-reproduction. Thisrobotmodelofself-reproductionisvery general.Todevelopthelogicofself-reproduction further,vonNeumannfirstextendedtheconcept ofafiniteautomatontothatofaninfinitecellu- lärautomatonconsistingofanarrayor"space"of cells,eachcellcontainingthesamefiniteautoma- ton.Hechoseaninfinitecheckerboardarrayfor modelingself-reproduction,andhespecifieda particulartwenty-nine-stateautomatonforeach square(cell).Eachautomatonisconnected directlytoitsfourcontiguousneighbors,and communicationbetweenneighborstakesoneor twotime-steps. Thetwenty-ninestatesofacellfallintothree categories.Thereisablankstatetorepresentthe passivityofanemptyarea.Therearetwelve statesforswitching,storage,andcommunica- tion,fromwhichanyfiniteautomatoncanbe construetedinasufficientlylargeregionofcells. Andtherearesixteenstatesforsimulatingthe activitiesofconstructionanddestruetion.Von Neumannchosethesetwenty-ninestatesinsuch awaythatanareaofnon-blankcellscouldcom- puteandgrow,i.e.,activateapathofcellsoutto ablankregionandconvertthecellsofthatregion intoacellulärautomaton.Aspecificcellulär automatonisembeddedinthisspacebythe selectionoftheinitialstatesofafiniteareaof cells,allothercellsbeingleftblank.Auniversal computerconsistsofasufficientlypowerfulfinite automatonwithatape.Thetapeisanindefi- nitelylongrowofcellsinwhichbitsarerepre- sentedbytwodifferentcellstates.Thefinite automatonaccessesthesecellsbymeansofacon- structionarmthatitextendsbackandforthin rowsofcellscontiguoustothetape.Whenacti- vated,thisfiniteautomatonwillexecutepro- gramsstoredonitstape. 827 Sellars,RoyWood Sellärs,Wilfrid Auniversalconstructorresultsfromaugmenting theuniversalcomputer(ef.therobotmodel). Anotherconstruetionarmisadded,together withafiniteautomatoncontrollertooperateit. Thecontrollersendssignalsintothearmto extenditouttoablankregionofthecellulär space,tomovearoundthatregion,andto changethestatesofcellsinthatregion.Afterthe universalconstructorhasconvertedtheregion intoacellulärautomaton,itdirectsthecon- struetionarmtoactivatethenewautomatonand thenwithdrawfromit.Cellulärautomatonself- reproduetionresultsfromapplyingtheuniversal constructortoitself,asintherobotmodel. Cellulärautomataarenowstudiedextensively byhumansworkinginteractivelywithcomput- ersasabstractmodelsofbothphysicaland organicsystems.(SeeArthurW.Burks,"Von Neumann'sSelf-ReproducingAutomata,"in PapersofJohnvonNeumannonComputersandCom- puterTheory,editedbyWilliamAsprayand ArthurBurks,1987.)Thestudyofartificiallifeis anoutgrowthofcomputersimulationsofcellu- lärautomataandrelatedautomata.Cellulär automataorganizationsaresometimesusedin highlyparallelcomputers. Seealsoartificialintelligence,artifi- cialLIFE,COMPUTERTHEORY,TURING MACHINE.A.W.B. Sellars,RoyWood.Seenewrealism. Sellars,Wilfrid(1912-89),Americanphiloso- pher,sonofRoyWoodSellars,andoneofthe greatsystematicphilosophersofthecentury.His mostinfluentialandrepresentativeworksare "EmpiricismandthePhilosophyofMind"(1956) and"PhilosophyandtheScientificImageof Man"(1960).TheSellarsiansystemmaybeout- linedasfollows. Themythofthegiven.Thesis(1):Classical empiricism(foundationalism)maintainsthat ourbeliefinthecommonsense,objectiveworld ofphysicalobjectsisultimatelyjustifiedonlyby thewaythatworldpresentsitselfinsenseexpe- rience.Thesis(2):Italsotypicallymaintainsthat senseexperience(a)isnotpartofthatworldand (b)isnotaformofconceptualcognitionlike thinkingorbelieving.Thesis(3):From(1)and (2a)classicalempiricismconcludesthatour knowledgeofthephysicalworldisinferredfrom senseexperience.Thesis(4):Sinceinferences deriveknowledgefromknowledge,senseexpe- rienceitselfmustbeaformofknowledge.The- ses(l)-(4)collectivelyarethedoctrineofthe given.Eachthesistakenindividuallyisplausible. However,Sellarsarguesthat(2b)and(4)are incompatibleif,ashethinks,knowledgeisakind ofconceptualcognition.Concludingthatthe doctrineofthegivenisfalse,hemaintainsthat classicalempiricismisamyth. Thepositivesystem.Fromananalysisofthe- oreticalexplanationinthephysicalsciences,Sel- larsconcludesthatpostulatingtheoretical entitiesisjustifiedonlyiftheoreticallaws- nomologicalgeneralizationsreferringtotheoret- icalentities-areneededtoexplainparticular observablephenomenaforwhichexplanationin termsofexceptionlessobservationlawsis unavailable.Whilerejectinganyclassicalempiri- cistinterpretationofobservation,Sellarsagrees thatsomeaccountofnon-inferentialknowledge isrequiredtomakesenseoftheoreticalexplana- tionthusconceived.Hethinksthatutterances madeindirectresponsetosensorystimuli (observationalreports)countasnon-inferential knowledgewhen(a)theypossessauthority,i.e., occurinconditionsensuringthattheyreliably indicatesomephysicalproperty(say,shape)in theenvironmentandareacceptedbythelin- guisticcommunityaspossessingthisquality;and (b)theuttererhasjustifiedbeliefthattheypos- sessthisauthority. Sellarsclaimsthatsomeperceptualconditions induceordinarypeopletomakeobservation reportsinconsistentwithestablishedexplana- toryprinciplesofthecommonsenseframework. Wethusmighttendtoreportspontaneouslythat anobjectisgreenseenindaylightandblueseen indoors,andyetthinkithasnotundergoneany processthatcouldchangeitscolor.Sellarsseesin suchconflictingtendenciesvestigesofaprimitive conceptualframeworkwhosetensionshave beenpartiallyresolvedbyintroducingthecon- ceptofsenseexperiences.Theseexperiences countastheoreticalentities,sincetheyarepos- tulatedtoaccountforobservationalphenomena forwhichnoexceptionlessobservationlaws exist.Thisexamplemayserveasaparadigmfor aprocessoftheoreticalexplanationoccurringin theframeworkofcommonsensebeliefsthatSel- larscallsthemanifestimage,aprocessthatitselfis amodelforhistheoryoftherationaldynamics ofconceptualchangeinboththemanifestimage andinscience-thescientificimage.Becausethe actualprocessofconceptualevolutioninHomo sapiensmaynotfitthispatternofrationaldynam- ics,Sellarstreatsthesedynamicsasoccurring withincertainhypotheticalidealhistories (myths)ofthewayinwhich,fromcertaincon- 828 semanticatomism semanticholism ceptuallyprimitivebeginnings,onemighthave cometopostulatetherequisitetheoretical explanations. Themanifestimage,liketheproto-theories fromwhichitarose,isitselfsubjecttovarious tensionsultimatelyresolvedinthescientific image.Becausethislatterimagecontainsameta- physicaltheoryofmaterialobjectsandpersons thatisinconsistentwiththatofitspredecessor framework,Sellarsregardsthemanifestimageas replacedbyitssuccessor.IntermsofthePeircean conceptionoftruththatSellarsendorses,thesci- entificimageistheonlytrueimage.Inthissense Sellarsisascientificrealist. Thereis,however,alsoanimportantsensein whichSellarsisnotascientificrealist:despitedis- creditingclassicalempiricism,hethinksthatthe intrinsicnatureofsenseexperiencegivestocon- ceptualizationmorethansimplysensorystimu- lusyetlessthanthecontentofknowledge claims.InspiredbyKant,Sellarstreatstheman- ifestimageasaKantianphenomenalworld,a worldthatexistsasacognitiveconstruction which,thoughlackingidealfactualtruth,is guidedinpartbyintrinsicfeaturesofsenseexpe- rience.Thisisnot(analytic)phenomenalism, whichSellarsrejects.Moreover,thespecial methodologicalroleforsenseexperiencehas effectsevenwithinthescientificimageitself. Theoriesofmind,perception,andsemantics. Mind:Inthemanifestimagethoughtsareprivate episodesendowedwithintentionality.Called innerspeech,theyaretheoreticalentitieswhose causalandintentionalpropertiesaremodeled, respectively,oninferentialandsemanticproper- tiesofovertspeech.Theyareintroducedwithin abehavioristproto-theory,theRyleanframe- work,toprovideatheoreticalexplanationfor behaviornormallyaccompaniedbylinguistically overtreasons. Perception:Inthemanifestimagesenseexperi- encesaresenseimpressions-statesofpersons modeledontwo-dimensional,coloredphysical replicasandintroducedinthetheoreticallan- guageoftheadverbialtheoryofperceptionto explainwhyitcanlookasifsomeperceptible qualityispresentwhenitisnot. Semantics:Themeaningofasimplepredicatep inalanguageListheroleplayedinLbypdefined intermsofthreesetsoflinguisticrules:language entryrules,intralinguisticrules,andlanguagedepar- turerules.Thisaccountalsosupportsanominal- isttreatmentofabstractentities.Identificationof aroleforatokenofpinLcanbeeffecteddemon- strativelyinthespeaker'slanguagebysaying thatpinLisamemberoftheclassofpredicates playingthesameroleasademonstratedpredi- cate.ThusaspeakerofEnglishmightsaythat 'rot'inGermanplaysthesemanticrole'red'has inEnglish. Sellarsseesscienceandmetaphysicsasauton- omousstrandsinasinglewebofphilosophical inquiry.Sellarsianismthuspresentsanimpor- tantalternativetotheviewthatwhatisfunda- mentallyrealisdeterminedbythelogical structureofscientificlanguagealone.Sellarsalso seesordinarylanguageasexpressingacommon- senseframeworkofbeliefsconstitutingakindof proto-theorywithitsownmethods,meta- physics,andtheoreticalentities.Thus,healso presentsanimportantalternativetotheview thatphilosophyconcernsnotwhatisultimately real,butwhatwordslike'real'ultimatelymean inordinarylanguage. Seealsoepistemology,metaphysical REALISM,ORDINARYLANGUAGEPHILOSOPHY. TV. semanticatomism.Seesemanticholism. semanticcompleteness.Seecompleteness. semanticcompositionality.Seemeaning. semanticconsequence.Seemodallogic. semanticconsistency.Seeconsistency. semanticholism,ametaphysicalthesisaboutthe natureofrepresentationonwhichthemeaning ofasymbolisrelativetotheentiresystemofrep- resentationscontainingit.Thus,alinguistic expressioncanhavemeaningonlyinthecontext ofalanguage;ahypothesiscanhavesignificance onlyinthecontextofatheory;aconceptcan haveintentionalityonlyinthecontextofthe beliefsystem.Holismaboutcontenthaspro- foundlyinfluencedvirtuallyeveryaspectofcon- temporarytheorizingaboutlanguageandmind, notonlyinphilosophy,butinlinguistics,literary theory,artificialintelligence,psychology,and cognitivescience.Contemporarysemantichol- istsincludeDavidson,Quine,GilbertHarman, HartryField,andSearle. Becausesemanticholismisametaphysicaland notasemanticthesis,twotheoristsmightagree aboutthesemanticfactsbutdisagreeabout semanticholism.So,e.g.,nothinginTarski's writingsdetermineswhetherthesemanticfacts expressedbythetheoremsofanabsolutetruth 829 semanticmolecularism semanticparadoxes theoryareholisticornot.YetDavidson,aseman- ticholist,arguedthatthecorrectformfora semantictheoryforanaturallanguageLisan absolutetruththeoryforL.Semantictheories, likeothertheories,neednotweartheirmeta- physicalcommitmentsontheirsleeves. Holismhassomestartlingconsequences.Con- siderthis.FranklinD.Roosevelt(whodiedwhen theUnitedStatesstillhadjustforty-eightstates) didnotbelievetherewerefiftystates,butIdo; semanticholismsaysthatwhat'state'meansin ourmouthsdependsonthetotalityofourbeliefs aboutstates,including,therefore,ourbeliefs abouthowmanystatesthereare.Itseemstofol- lowthatheandImustmeandifferentthingsby 'state';hence,ifhesays"Alaskaisnotastate" andIsay"Alaskaisastate"wearenotdisagree- ing.Thislineofargumentleadstosuchsurpris- ingdeclarationsasthatnaturallangaugesare not,ingeneral,intertranslatable(Quine,Saus- sure);thattheremaybenofactofthematter aboutthemeaningsoftexts(Putnam,Derrida); andthatscientifictheoriesthatdifferintheir basicpostulatesare"empiricallyincommensu- rable"(PaulFeyerabend,Kuhn). Forthosewhofindtheseconsequencesof semanticholismunpalatable,therearethree mutuallyexclusiveresponses:semanticatom- ism,semanticmolecularism,orsemantic nihilism. Semanticatomistsholdthatthemeaningof anyrepresentation(linguistic,mental,orother- wise)isnotdeterminedbythemeaningofany otherrepresentation.Historically,Anglo-Ameri- canphilosophersintheeighteenthandnine- teenthcenturiesthoughtthatanideaofanXwas aboutX'sinvirtueofthisidea'sphysicallyresem- blingX's.Resemblancetheoriesarenolonger thoughtviable,butanumberofcontemporary semanticatomistsstillbelievethatthebasic semanticrelationisbetweenaconceptandthe thingstowhichitapplies,andnotoneamong conceptsthemselves.Thesephilosophersinclude Dretske,DennisStampe,Födor,andRuthMil- likan. Semanticmolecularism,likesemanticholism, holdsthatthemeaningofarepresentationina languageLisdeterminedbyitsrelationshipsto themeaningsofotherexpressionsinL,but, unlikeholism,notbyitsrelationshipstoevery otherexpressioninL.Semanticmolecularistsare committedtotheview,contrarytoQuine,that foranyexpressioneinalanguageLthereisan in-principlewayofdistinguishingbetweenthose representationsinLthemeaningsofwhich determinethemeaningofeandthoserepresen- tationsinLthemeaningsofwhichdonotdeter- minethemeaningofe.Traditionally,thisin- principledelimitationissupportedbyan analytic/syntheticdistinction.Thoserepresenta- tionsinLthataremeaning-constitutingofeare analyticallyconnectedtoeandthosethatarenot meaning-constitutingaresyntheticallycon- nectedtoe.Meaningmolecularismseemstobe themostcommonpositionamongthosephiloso- pherswhorejectholism.Contemporarymean- ingmolecularistsincludeMichaelDevitt, Dummett,NedBlock,andJohnPerry. Semanticnihilismisperhapsthemostradical responsetotheconsequencesofholism.Itisthe viewthat,strictlyspeaking,therearenoseman- ticproperties.Strictlyspeaking,thereareno mentalstates;wordslackmeanings.Atleastfor scientificpurposes(andperhapsforotherpur- posesaswell)wemustabandonthenotionthat peoplearemoralorrationalagentsandthatthey actoutoftheirbeliefsanddesires.Semantic nihilistsincludeamongtheirranksPatriciaand PaulChurchland,StephenStich,Dennett,and, sometimes,Quine. Seealsoanalytic-syntheticdistinc- tion,MEANING,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND.E.L. semanticmolecularism.Seesemanticholism. semanticnihilism.Seesemanticholism. semanticparadoxes,acollectionofparadoxes involvingthesemanticnotionsoftruth,predica- tion,anddefmability.Theliarparadoxistheold- estandmostwidelyknownofthese,havingbeen formulatedbyEubulidesasanobjectiontoAris- totle'scorrespondencetheoryoftruth.Initssim- plestform,theliarparadoxariseswhenwetryto assessthetruthofasentenceorpropositionthat assertsitsownfalsity,e.g.: (A)Sentence(A)isnottrue. Itwouldseemthatsentence(A)cannotbetrue, sinceitcanbetrueonlyifwhatitsaysisthecase, i.e.,ifitisnottrue.Thussentence(A)isnottrue. Butthen,sincethisispreciselywhatitclaims,it wouldseemtobetrue. Severalalternativeformsoftheliarparadox havebeengiventheirownnames.Thepostcard paradox,alsoknownasaliarcycle,envisionsa postcardwithsentence(B)ononesideandsen- tence(C)ontheother: (B)Thesentenceontheothersideofthis cardistrue. 830 semanticparadoxes semanticparadoxes (C)Thesentenceontheothersideofthiscard isfalse. Here,noconsistentassignmentoftruth-values tothepairofsentencesispossible.Inthepreface paradox,itisimaginedthatabookbeginswith theclaimthatatleastonesentenceinthebook isfalse.Thisclaimisunproblematicallytrueif somelåtersentenceisfalse,butiftheremainder ofthebookcontainsonlytruths,theinitialsen- tenceappearstobetrueifandonlyiffalse.The prefaceparadoxisoneofmanyexamplesofcon- tingentliars,claimsthatcaneitherhavean unproblematictruth-valueorbeparadoxical, dependingonthetruth-valuesofvariousother claims(inthiscase,theremainingsentencesin thebook).Relatedtotheprefaceparadoxis Epimenedes'paradox:Epimenedes,himself fromCrete,issaidtohaveclaimedthatallCre- tansareliars.Thisclaimisparadoxicalifinter- pretedtomeanthatCretansalwayslie,orif interpretedtomeantheysometimeslieandifno otherclaimmadebyEpimenedeswasalie.On theformerinterpretation,thisisasimplevaria- tionoftheliarparadox;onthelatter,itisaform ofcontingentliar. OthersemanticparadoxesincludeBerry's paradox,Richard'sparadox,andGrelling'spara- dox.Thefirsttwoinvolvethenotionofdefin- abilityofnumbers.Berry'sparadoxbeginsby notingthatnames(ordescriptions)ofintegers consistoffinitesequencesofsyllables.Thusthe three-syllablesequence'twenty-five'names25, andtheseven-syllablesequence'thesumof threeandseven'namesten.Nowconsiderthe collectionofallsequencesof(English)syllables thatarelessthannineteensyllableslong.Of these,manyarenonsensical('bababa')andsome makesensebutdonotnameintegers('arti- choke'),butsomedo('thesumofthreeand seven').SincethereareonlyfinitelymanyEng- lishsyllables,thereareonlyfinitelymanyof thesesequences,andonlyfinitelymanyintegers namedbythem.Berry'sparadoxariseswhenwe considertheeighteen-syllablesequence'the smallestintegernotnameableinlessthannine- teensyllables'.Thisphraseappearstobeaper- fectlywell-defineddescriptionofaninteger.But ifthephrasenamesanintegern,thennisname- ableinlessthannineteensyllables,andhenceis notdescribedbythephrase. Richard'sparadoxconstructsasimilarlypara- doxicaldescriptionusingwhatisknownasa diagonalconstruction.Imaginealistofallfinite sequencesoflettersofthealphabet(plusspaces andpunctuation),orderedasinadictionary. PrunethislistsothatitcontainsonlyEnglishdef- initionsofrealnumbersbetweenand1.Then considerthedefinition:"Letrbetherealnumber betweenand1whosekthdecimalplaceis)if thekthdecimalplaceofthenumbernamedby thekthmemberofthislistis1,andotherwise'. Thisdescriptionseemstodefinearealnumber thatmustbedifferentfromanynumberdefined onthelist.Forexample,rcannotbedefinedby the237thmemberofthelist,becauserwilldif- ferfromthatnumberinatleastits237thdecimal place.Butifitindeeddefinesarealnumber betweenand1,thenthisdescriptionshould itselfbeonthelist.Yetclearly,itcannotdefinea numberdifferentfromthenumberdefinedby itself.Apparently,thedefinitiondefinesareal numberbetweenand1ifandonlyifitdoesnot appearonthelistofsuchdefinitions. Grelling'sparadox,alsoknownastheparadox ofheterologicality,involvestwopredicates definedasfollows.Saythatapredicateis"auto- logical"ifitappliestoitself.Thus'polysyllabic' and'short'areautological,since'polysyllabic'is polysyllabic,and'short'isshort.Incontrast,a predicateis"heterological"ifandonlyifitisnot autological.Thequestioniswhetherthepredi- cate'heterological'isheterological.Ifouranswer isyes,then'heterological'appliestoitself-and soisautological,notheterological.Butifour answerisno,thenitdoesnotapplytoitself-and soisheterological,onceagaincontradictingour answer. Thesemanticparadoxeshaveledtoimportant workinbothlogicandthephilosophyoflan- guage,mostnotablybyRussellandTarski.Rus- selldevelopedtheramifiedtheoryoftypesasa unifiedtreatmentofallthesemanticparadoxes. Russell'stheoryoftypesavoidstheparadoxesby introducingcomplexsyntacticconditionsonfor- mulasandonthedefinitionofnewpredicates.In theresultinglanguage,definitionslikethose usedinformulatingBerry'sandRichard'spara- doxesturaouttobeill-formed,sincetheyquan- tifyövercollectionsofexpressionsthatinclude themselves,violatingwhatRussellcalledthe viciouscircleprinciple.Thetheoryoftypesalso rulesout,onsyntacticgrounds,predicatesthat applytothemselves,ortolargerexpressionscon- tainingthoseverysamepredicates.Inthisway, theliarparadoxandGrelling'sparadoxcannotbe constructedwithinalanguageconformingtothe theoryoftypes. Tarski'sattentiontotheliarparadoxmadetwo fundamentalcontributionstologic:hisdevelop- mentofsemantictechniquesfordefiningthe truthpredicateforformalizedlanguagesandhis 831 semantics semiosis proofofTarski'stheorem.Tarskiansemantics avoidstheliarparadoxbystartingwithaformål language,callitL,inwhichnosemanticnotions areexpressible,andhenceinwhichtheliarpara- doxcannotbeformulated.Thenusinganother language,knownasthemetalanguage,Tarski appliesrecursivetechniquestodefinethepredi- catetrue-in-L,whichappliestoexactlythetrue sentencesoftheoriginallanguageL.Theliar paradoxdoesnotariseinthemetalanguage, becausethesentence (D)Sentence(D)isnottrue-in-L. is,ifexpressibleinthemetalanguage,simply true.(Itistruebecause(D)isnotasentenceof L,andsoafortiorinotatruesentenceofL.)A truthpredicateforthemetalanguagecanthenbe definedinyetanotherlanguage,themetameta- language,andsoforth,resultinginasequenceof consistenttruthpredicates. Tarski'stheoremusestheliarparadoxtoprove asignificantresultinlogic.Thetheoremstates thatthetruthpredicateforthefirst-orderlan- guageofarithmeticisnotdefinableinarithmetic. Thatis,ifwedeviseasystematicwayofrepre- sentingsentencesofarithmeticbynumbers, thenitisimpossibletodefineanarithmetical predicatethatappliestoallandonlythosenum- bersthatrepresenttruesentencesofarithmetic. Thetheoremisprovenbyshowingthatifsucha predicateweredefinable,wecouldconstructa sentenceofarithmeticthatistrueifandonlyif itisnottrue:anarithmeticalversionofsentence (A),theliarparadox. BothRussell'sandTarski'ssolutionstothe semanticparadoxeshaveleftmanyphilosophers dissatisfied,sincethesolutionsarebasicallypre- scriptionsforconstructinglanguagesinwhich theparadoxesdonotarise.Butthefactthatpara- doxescanbeavoidedinartificiallyconstructed languagesdoesnotitselfgiveasatisfyingexpla- nationofwhatisgoingwrongwhenthepara- doxesareencounteredinnaturallanguage,orin anartificiallanguageinwhichtheycanbefor- mulated.Mostrecentworkontheliarparadox, followingKripke's"OutlineofaTheoryofTruth" (1975),looksatlanguagesinwhichtheparadox canbeformulated,andtriestoprovideaconsis- tentaccountoftruththatpreservesasmuchas possibleoftheintuitivenotion. Seealsoset-theoreticparadoxes, TRUTH,TYPETHEORY.J.Et. semantics.Seeformålsemantics,philosophyof LANGUAGE. semantics,conceptualrole.Seemeaning,philoso- phyOFMIND. semantics,extensionalist.Seeextensionalism. semantics,Kripke.Seekripkesemantics. semantics,linguistic.Seephilosophyoflan- guage. semantics,non-standard.Seesecond-order LOGIC. semantics,outerdomain.Seefreelogic. semantics,possibleworlds.Seekripkesemantics, possibleworlds. semantics,situation.Seepossibleworlds. semantics,standard.Seesecond-orderlogic. semantics,supervaluation.Seefreelogic. semantics,Tarskian.Seeformålsemantics. semantics,truth-conditional.Seemeaning. semanticsolipsism.Seesolipsism. semantictableaux.Seephilosophyoflogic. semantictheoryoftruth.Seetruth. semantictruth.Seetruth. semi-order.Seeordering. semiosis(fromGreeksemeiösis,'observationof signs'),therelationofsignificationinvolvingthe threerelataofsign,object,andmind.Semioticis thescienceorstudyofsemiosis.Thesemioticof JohnofSaintThomasandofPeirceincludestwo distinctcomponents:therelationofsignification andtheclassificationofsigns.Therelationofsig- nificationisgenuinelytriadicandcannotbe reducedtothesumofitsthreesubordinate dyads:sign-object,sign-mind,object-mind.A signrepresentsanobjecttoamindjustasAgives agifttoB.Semiosisisnot,asitisoftentakento be,amerecompoundofasign-objectdyadand asign-minddyadbecausethesedyadslackthe essentialintentionalitythatunitesmindwith object;similarly,thegiftrelationinvolvesnot justAgivingandBreceivingbut,crucially,the intentionunitingAandB. 832 semiotic senses,special IntheScholasticlogicofJohnofSaintThomas, thesign-objectdyadisacategorialrelation (secundumesse),thatis,anessentialrelation, fallinginAristotle'scategoryofrelation,while thesign-minddyadisatranscendentalrelation (secundumdici),thatis,arelationonlyinanana- logicalsense,inamannerofspeaking;thusthe formålrationaleofsemiosisisconstitutedbythe sign-objectdyad.Bycontrast,inPeirce'slogic, thesign-objectdyadandthesign-minddyadare eachonlypotentialsemiosis:thus,thehiero- glyphsofancientEgyptweremerelypotential signsuntilthediscoveryoftheRosettaStone, justasaroad-markingwasamerelypotential signtothedriverwhooverlookedit. Classificationsofsignstypicallyfollowfrom thelogicofsemiosis.ThusJohnofSaintThomas dividessignsaccordingtotheirrelationstotheir objectsintonaturalsigns(smokeasasignoffire), customarysigns(napkinsonthetableasasign thatdinnerisimminent),andstipulatedsigns(as whenaneologismiscoined);healsodivides signsaccordingtotheirrelationstoamind.An instrumentalsignmustfirstbecognizedasan objectbeforeitcansignify(e.g.,awrittenword orasymptom);aformålsign,bycontrast,directs themindtoitsobjectwithouthavingfirstbeen cognized(e.g.,perceptsandconcepts).Formål signsarenotthatwhichwecognizebutthatby whichwecognize.Allinstrumentalsignspre- supposetheactionofformålsignsinthesemio- sisofcognition.Peircesimilarlyclassifiedsigns intothreetrichotomiesaccordingtotheirrela- tionswith(1)themselves,(2)theirobjects,and (3)theirinterpretants(usuallyminds);and CharlesMorris,whofollowedPeirceclosely, calledtherelationshipofsignstooneanotherthe syntacticaldimensionofsemiosis,therelation- shipofsignstotheirobjectsthesemantical dimensionofsemiosis,andtherelationshipof signstotheirinterpretersthepragmaticdimen- sionofsemiosis. Seealsojohnofsaintthomas,peirce, THEORYOFSIGNS.J.B.M. semiotic.Seetheoryofsigns. Seneca,LuciusAnnaeus.Seestoicism. sensa.Seeperception. sensationalism,thebeliefthatallmentalstates- particularlycognitivestates-arederived,by compositionorassociation,fromsensation.Itis oftenjoinedtotheviewthatsensationsprovide theonlyevidenceforourbeliefs,or(more rarely)totheviewthatstatementsaboutthe worldcanbereduced,withoutloss,tostate- mentsaboutsensation. Hobbeswasthefirstimportantsensationalist inmodemtimes."Thereisnoconceptionin man'smind,"hewrote,"whichhathnotatfirst, totally,orbyparts,beenbegottenuponthe organsofsense.Therestarederivedfromthat original."Butthebeliefgainedprominencein theeighteenthcentury,duelargelytotheinflu- enceofLocke.Lockehimselfwasnotasensa- tionalist,becausehetookthemind'sreflection onitsownoperationstobeanindependent sourceofideas.Buthisdistinctionbetweensim- pleandcomplexideaswasusedbyeighteenth- centurysensationalistssuchasCondillacand Hartleytoexplainhowconceptionsthatseem distantfromsensemightnonethelessbederived fromit.Andtoaccountfortheparticularwaysin whichsimpleideasareinfactcombined,Condil- lacandHartleyappealedtoaseconddevice describedbyLocke:theassociationofideas. "Elementary"sensations-thebuildingblocks ofourmentallife-wereheldbythesensation- aliststobenon-voluntary,independentofjudg- ment,freeofinterpretation,discreteoratomic, andinfalliblyknown.Nineteenth-centurysensa- tionaliststriedtoaccountforperceptioninterms ofsuchbuildingblocks;theystruggledparticu- larlywiththeperceptionofspaceandtime.Late nineteenth-centurycriticssuchasWardand Jamesadvancedpowerfulargumentsagainstthe reductionofperceptiontosensation.Perception, theyclaimed,involvesmorethanthepassive reception(orrecombinationandassociation)of discretepelletsofincorrigibleinformation.They urgedachangeinperspective-toafunctional- istviewpointmorecloselyalliedwithprevailing trendsinbiology-fromwhichsensationalism neverfullyrecovered. Seealsoempiricism,hobbes,perception. K.P.W. sense.Seemeaning. sense,direct.Seeobliquecontext. sense,indirect.Seeobliquecontext. sense-data.Seeperception. sense-datumtheory.Seephenomenalism. sensequalia.Seequalia. senses,special.Seefacultypsychology. 833 sensibilia sententialconnective sensibilia(singular:sensibile),asusedbyRusseli, thoseentitiesthatnooneis(atthemoment)per- ceptuallyawareof,butthatare,ineveryother respect,justliketheobjectsofperceptualaware- ness. Ifoneisadirectrealistandbelievesthatthe objectsoneisawareofinsenseperceptionare ordinaryphysicalobjects,thensensibiliaare,of course,justphysicalobjectsofwhichnooneis (atthemoment)aware.Assuming(withcom- monsense)thatordinaryobjectscontinueto existwhennooneisawareofthem,itfollows thatsensibiliaexist.If,however,onebelieves(as Russelldid)thatwhatoneisawareofinordi- narysenseperceptionissomekindofideainthe mind,aso-calledsense-datum,thensensibilia haveaproblematicstatus.Asensibilethenturns outtobeanunsensedsense-datum.Onsome (theusual)conceptionsofsense-data,thisislike anunfeltpain,sinceasense-datum'sexistence (notasasense-datum,butasanythingatall) dependsonour(someone's)perceptionofit.To exist(forsuchthings)istobeperceived(see Berkeley's"esseestpercipii").If,however,one extendsthenotionofsense-datum(asMoore wasinclinedtodo)towhateveritisofwhichone is(directly)awareinsenseperception,thensen- sibiliamayormaynotexist.Itdependson what-physicalobjectsorideasinthemind-we aredirectlyawareofinsenseperception(and,of course,ontheempiricalfactsaboutwhether objectscontinuetoexistwhentheyarenot beingperceived).Ifdirectrealistsareright, horsesandtrees,whenunobserved,aresensi- bilia.Soarethefrontsurfacesofhorsesandtrees (thingsMooreonceconsideredtobesense- data).Ifthedirectrealistsarewrong,andwhat weareperceptuallyawareofare"ideasinthe mind,"thenwhetherornotsensibiliaexist dependsonwhetherornotsuchideascanexist apartfromanymind. SeealsoPERCEPTION,RUSSELL.F.D. sensibleintuition.Seekant. sensibles,common.Seearistotle,sensuscom- munis. sensibles,proper.Seearistotle. sensibles,special.Seearistotle,facultypsy- CHOLOGY. sensorium,theseatandcauseofsensationinthe brainofhumansandotheranimals.Thetermis notpartofcontemporarypsychologicalparlance; itbelongstoprebehavioral,prescientificpsychol- ogy,especiallyoftheseventeenthandeigh- teenthcenturies.Onlycreaturespossessedofa sensoriumwerethoughtcapableofbodilyand perceptualsensations.Somethinkersbelieved thatthesensorium,whenexcited,alsoproduced muscularactivityandmotion.G.A.G. sensorn.Seeperception. sensuscommunis,acognitivefacultytowhich thefivesensesreport.Itwasfirstarguedforin Aristotle'sOntheSoulII.1-2,thoughtheterm 'commonsense'wasfirstintroducedinScholas- ticthought.Aristotlereferstopropertiessuchas magnitudethatareperceivedbymorethanone senseascommonsensibles.Torecognizecom- monsensibles,heclaims,wemustpossessasin- glecognitivepowertocomparesuchqualities, receivedfromthedifferentsenses,toone another.Augustinesaysthe"innersense"judges whetherthesensesareworkingproperly,and perceiveswhethertheanimalperceives(Delibero arbitrioII.3-5).Aquinas(InDeanimaII,13.370) heldthatitisalsobythecommonsensethatwe perceivewelive.Hesaysthecommonsenseuses theexternalsensestoknowsensibleforms, preparingthesensiblespeciesitreceivesforthe operationofthecognitivepower,whichrecog- nizestherealthingcausingthesensiblespecies. Seealsoaquinas,aristotle.J.Lo. sentence,basic.Seefoundationalism. sententialcalculus.Seeformållogic. sententialconnective,alsocalledsententialoper- ator,propositionalconnective,propositional operator,awordorphrase,suchas'and','or',or 'if...then',thatisusedtoconstructcompound sentencesfromatomic-i.e.,non-compound- sentences.Asententialconnectivecanbede- finedformallyasanexpressioncontaining blänks,suchthatwhentheblänksarereplaced withsentencestheresultisacompoundsen- tence.Thus,'ifthen'and' or'aresententialconnectives,sincewe canreplacetheblänkswithsentencestogetthe compoundsentences'Iftheskyisclearthenwe cangoswimming'and'Wecangoswimmingor wecanstayhome'. Classicallogicmakesuseoftruth-functional connectivesonly,forwhichthetruth-valueof thecompoundsentencecanbedetermined uniquelybythetruth-valueofthesentencesthat replacetheblänks.Thestandardtruth-functional 834 sententialoperator set-theoreticparadoxes connectivesare'and','or','not','if...then',and 'ifandonlyif.Therearemanynon-truth-func- tionalconnectivesaswell,suchas'itispossible that'and'because'. Seealsoformållogic,operator,truth TABLE.V.K. sententialoperator.Seesententialconnective. sentiment.Seesentimentalism. sentimentalism,thetheory,prominentinthe eighteenthcentury,thatepistemologicalor moralrelationsarederivedfromfeelings. Althoughsentimentalismandsensationalismare bothempiricistpositions,thelatterviewhasall knowledgebuiltupfromsensations,experiences impingingonthesenses.Sentimentalistsmay allowthatideasderivefromsensations,buthold thatsomerelationsbetweenthemarederived internally,thatis,fromsentimentsarising uponreflection.Moralsentimentalists,suchas Shaftesbury,Hutcheson,andHume,arguedthat thevirtueorviceofacharactertraitisestablished byapprovingordisapprovingsentiments. Hume,themostthoroughgoingsentimental- ist,alsoarguedthatallbeliefsabouttheworld dependonsentiments.Onhisanalysis,whenwe formabelief,werelyonthemind'scausallycon- nectingtwoexperiences,e.g.,fireandheat.But, henotes,suchcausalconnectionsdependonthe notionofnecessity-thatthetwoperceptions willalwaysbesoconjoined-andthereisnötn- ingintheperceptionsthemselvesthatsupplies thatnotion.Theideaofnecessaryconnectionis insteadderivedfromasentiment:ourfeelingof expectationoftheoneexperienceuponthe other.Likewise,ournotionsofsubstance(the unityofexperiencesinanobject)andofself(the unityofexperiencesinasubject)aresentiment- based.Butwhereasmoralsentimentsdonot purporttorepresenttheexternalworld,these metaphysicalnotionsofnecessity,substance, andselfare"fictions,"creationsoftheimagina- tionpurportingtorepresentsomethinginthe outsideworld. Seealsohume,hutcheson,moralsense THEORY,SENSATIONALISM,SHAFTESBURY. E.S.R. separation,axiomof.Seeaxiomofcomprehen- sion,settheory. separationoflawandmorals.Seehart. sequentcalculus.Seecut-eliminationtheorem. set.Seesettheory. set,singleton.Seesettheory. set,well-ordered.Seeset-theoreticparadoxes. set-theoreticparadoxes,acollectionofparadoxes thatrevealdifficultiesincertaincentralnotions ofsettheory.Thebest-knownoftheseareRus- sell'sparadox,Burali-Forti'sparadox,andCan- tor'sparadox. Russell'sparadox,discoveredin1901by BertrandRussell,isthesimplest(andsomost problematic)oftheset-theoreticparadoxes. Usingit,wecanderiveacontradictiondirectly fromCantor'sunrestrictedcomprehension schema.Thisschemaassertsthatforanyformula P(x)containingxasafreevariable,thereisaset [xIP(x)}whosemembersareexactlythose objectsthatsatisfyP(x).Toderivethecontradic- tion,takeP(x)tobetheformulaxGx,andletz betheset[x\x§!x]whoseexistenceisguaran- teedbythecomprehensionschema.Thuszisthe setwhosemembersareexactlythoseobjectsthat arenotmembersofthemselves.Wenowask whetherzis,itself,amemberofz.Iftheanswer isyes,thenwecanconcludethatzmustsatisfy thecriterionofmembershipinz,i.e.,zmustnot beamemberofz.Butiftheanswerisno,then sincezisnotamemberofitself,itsatisfiesthecri- terionformembershipinz,andsozisamember ofz. Allmodernaxiomatizationsofsettheoryavoid Russell'sparadoxbyrestrictingtheprinciples thatasserttheexistenceofsets.Thesimplest restrictionreplacesunrestrictedcomprehension withtheseparationschema.Separationasserts that,givenanysetAandformulaP(x),thereisa set[xGAIP(x)},whosemembersareexactly thosemembersofAthatsatisfyP(x).Ifwenow takeP(x)tobetheformulax$ix,thenseparation guaranteestheexistenceofasetzA={xGA\x (£x}.WecanthenuseRusseLVsreasoningto provetheresultthatzAcannotbeamemberof theoriginalsetA.(IfitwereamemberofA,then wecouldprovethatitisamemberofitselfifand onlyifitisnotamemberofitself.Henceitisnot amemberof^4.)Butthisresultisnotproblem- atic,andsotheparadoxisavoided. TheBurali-ForteparadoxandCantor'spara- doxaresometimesknownasparadoxesofsize, sincetheyshowthatsomecollectionsaretoo largetobeconsideredsets.TheBurali-Forte paradox,discoveredbyCesareBurali-Forte,is concernedwiththesetofallordinalnumbers.In Cantor'ssettheory,anordinalnumbercanbe 835 set-theoreticreflectionprinciples settheory assignedtoanywell-orderedset.(Asetiswell- orderedifeverysubsetofthesethasaleastele- ment.)ButCantor'ssettheoryalsoguarantees theexistenceofthesetofallordmals,againdue totheunrestrictedcomprehensionschema.This setofordinalsiswell-ordered,andsocanbe associatedwithanordinalnumber.Butitcanbe shownthattheassociatedordinalisgreaterthan anyordinalintheset,hencegreaterthanany ordinalnumber. Cantor'sparadoxinvolvesthecardinalityof thesetofallsets.Cardinalityisanothernotionof sizeusedinsettheory:asetAissaidtohave greatercardinalitythanasetBifandonlyifBcan bemappedone-to-oneontoasubsetofAbutA cannotbesomappedontoBoranyofitssubsets. OneofCantor'sfundamentalresultswasthatthe setofallsubsetsofasetA(knownasthepower setofA)hasgreatercardinalitythanthesetA. ApplyingthisresulttothesetVofallsets,wecan concludethatthepowersetofVhasgreatercar- dinalitythanV.Buteverysetinthepowersetof yisalsoinV(sinceVcontainsallsets),andsothe powersetofVcannothavegreatercardinality thanV.Wethushaveacontradiction. LikeRusselPsparadox,bothofthesepara- doxesresultfromtheunrestrictedcomprehen- sionschema,andareavoidedbyreplacingitwith weakerset-existenceprinciples.Variousprinci- plesstrongerthantheseparationschemaare neededtogetareasonablesettheory,andmany alternativeaxiomatizationshavebeenproposed. Butthelessonoftheseparadoxesisthatnoset- existenceprinciplecanentailtheexistenceofthe Russellset,thesetofallordinals,orthesetofall sets,onpainofcontradiction. Seealsosemanticparadoxes,setthe- ory.J.Et. set-theoreticreflectionprinciples.Seereflection PRINCIPLES. settheory,thestudyofcollections,rangingfrom familiarexampleslikeasetofencyclopediasora deckofcardstomathematicalexampleslikethe setofnaturalnumbersorthesetofpointsona lineorthesetoffunctionsfromasetAtoanother setB.Setscanbespecifiedintwobasicways:by alist(e.g.,(0,2,4,6,8})andastheextensionof aproperty(e.g.,{xIxisanevennaturalnumber lessthan10},wherethisisread'thesetofallx suchthatxisanevennaturalnumberlessthan 10').Themostfundamentalrelationinsetthe- oryismembership,asin'2isamemberoftheset ofevennaturalnumbers'(insymbols:2G[x\x isanevennaturalnumber}).Membershipis determinate,i.e.,anycandidateformembership inagivensetiseitherinthesetornotintheset, withnoroomforvaguenessorambiguity.Asefs identityiscompletelydeterminedbyitsmembers orelements(i.e.,setsareextensionalratherthan intensional).Thus[x\xishuman}isthesameset as[xIxisafeatherlessbipedjbecausetheyhave thesamemembers. Thesmallestsetpossibleistheemptyornullset, thesetwithnomembers.(Therecannotbemore thanoneemptyset,byextensionality.)Itcanbe specified,e.g.,as{x\x¥=x],butitismostoften symbolizedasor{}.AsetAiscalledasubsetof asetBandBasupersetofAifeverymemberof AisalsoamemberofB;insymbols,AQB.So, thesetofevennaturalnumbersisasubsetofthe setofallnaturalnumbers,andanysetisasuper- setoftheemptyset.TheunionoftwosetsAand Bisthesetwhosemembersarethemembersof AandthemembersofB-insymbols,AUB= {xIxGAorxGB]-sotheunionofthesetof evennaturalnumbersandthesetofoddnatural numbersisthesetofallnaturalnumbers.The intersectionoftwosetsAandBisthesetwhose membersarecommontobothAandB-insym- bols,AC\B={x\xE:Aandx£B)-sotheinter- sectionofthesetofevennaturalnumbersand thesetofprimenaturalnumbersisthesingleton set{2},whoseonlymemberisthenumber2. Twosetswhoseintersectionisemptyarecalled disjoint,e.g.,thesetofevennaturalnumbersand thesetofoddnaturalnumbers.Finally,thedif- fereticebetweenasetAandasetBistheset whosemembersaremembersofAbutnotmem- bersofB-insymbols,A-B={x\x(=Aandx .Allthat isessentialtoorderedpairsisthattwoofthem areequalonlywhentheirfirstentriesareequal andtheirsecondentriesareequal.Varioussets canbeusedtosimulatethisbehavior,butthe versionmostcommonlyusedistheKuratowski orderedpair:(a,b)isdefinedtobe{{a},{a,b}}.On thisdefinition,itcanindeedbeprovedthat (a,b)=(c,d)ifandonlyifa=candb=d. TheCartesianproductoftwosetsAandBistheset ofallorderedpairswhosefirstentryisinAand whosesecondentryisB-insymbols,AXB={x \x=(a,b)forsomeaGAandsomebGB}.This 836 settheory settheory sametechniquecanbeusedtoformordered triples-(a,b,c)=((a,b),c);orderedfour- tuples-(a,b,c,d)=((a,b,c),d);andbyexten- sion,orderedK-tuplesforallfiniten. Usingonlythesesimplebuildingblocks,(sub- stitutesfor)alltheobjectsofclassicalmathemat- icscanbeconstructedinsidesettheory.For example,arelationisdefinedasasetofordered pairs-sothesuccessorrelationamongnatural numbersbecomes{(0,1),(1,2),(2,3)...}-and afunctionisarelationcontainingnodistinct orderedpairsoftheform(a,b)and(a,c)-sothe successorrelationisafunction.Thenatural numbersthemselvescanbeidentifiedwithvari- oussequencesofsets,themostcommonof whicharefinitevonNeumannordinalnumbers: 0,{0},{0,{0},{01{01,10,{0}»(Onthisdef- inition,=0,1={0},2={0,{0}},etc,each numbernhasnmembers,thesuccessorofnisn U[n],andnDx). CrispinWrighthassuggestedthattheviewthat naturalnwnberisasortalconceptiscentralto Frege's(oranyother)number-theoreticplaton- ism.Theword'sortal'asatechnicalterminphi- losophyapparentlyfirstoccursinLocke'sEssay ConcemingHumanUnderstanding.Lockeargues thattheso-calledessenceofagenusorsort (unliketherealessenceofathing)ismerelythe abstractideathatthegeneralorsortalname ståndsfor.But'sortal'hasonlyoneoccurrence inLocke'sEssay.Itscurrencyincontemporary philosophicalidiomprobablyshouldbecredited toP.F.Strawson'sIndividuals.Thegeneralidea maybetracedatleasttothenotionofsecondsnb- stanceinAristotle'sCategories. Seealsoaristotle,causallaw,essen- TIALISM,PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE.S.T.K. Soto,Domingode(1494-1560),SpanishDo- minicantheologianandphilosopher.Bornin Segovia,hestudiedinAlcalådeHenaresand Paris,taughtatSegoviaandSalamanca,andwas namedofficialrepresentativeoftheHolyRoman EmpireattheCouncilofTrentbyCharlesV. AmongSoto'smanyworks,hiscommentarieson Aristotle'sPhysicsandOntheSoulståndout.He alsowroteabookonthenatureofgraceandan importanttreatiseonlaw. Sotowasoneoftheearlymembersofthe schoolofSpanishThomism,buthedidnot alwaysfollowAquinas.Herejectedthedoctrine oftherealdistinctionbetweenessenceandexis- tenceandadoptedDunsScotus'spositionthat theprimaryobjectofhumanunderstandingis indeterminatebeingingeneral.Apartfrom metaphysicsandtheology,Soto'sphilosophyof lawandpoliticaltheoryarehistoricallyimpor- tant.Hemaintained,contrarytohisteacher Vitoria,thatlaworiginatesintheunderstanding ratherthaninthewillofthelegislator.Healso distinguishednaturalfrompositivelaw:thelatter arisesfromthedecisionoflegislators,whereas theformerisbasedonnature.Sotowasafounder ofthegeneraltheoryofinternationallaw. Seealsoaquinas,philosophyoflaw. J.J.E.G. soul,alsocalledspirit,anentitysupposedtobe presentonlyinlivingthings,correspondingto theGreekpsycheandLatinanima.Sincethere seemstobenomaterialdifferencebetweenan organisminthelastmomentsofitslifeandthe organism'snewlydeadbody,manyphilosophers sincethetimeofPlatohaveclaimedthatthesoul isanimmaterialcomponentofanorganism. Becauseonlymaterialthingsareobservedtobe subjecttodissolution,Platotookthesoul's immaterialityasgroundsforitsimmortality.Nei- therPlatonorAristotlethoughtthatonlyper- sonshadsouls:Aristotleascribedsoulstoanimals andplantssincetheyallexhibitedsomeliving functions.UnlikePlato,Aristotledeniedthe transmigrationofsoulsfromonespeciesto anotherorfromonebodytoanotherafterdeath; hewasalsomoreskepticalaboutthesoul's capacityfordisembodiment-roughly,survival andfunctioningwithoutabody.Descartes arguedthatonlypersonshadsoulsandthatthe soul'simmaterialnaturemadefreedompossible evenifthehumanbodyissubjecttodeterminis- ticphysicallaws.Asthesubjectofthought, memory,emotion,desire,andaction,thesoul hasbeensupposedtobeanentitythatmakes self-consciousnesspossible,thatdifferentiates simultaneousexperiencesintoexperiences eitherofthesamepersonorofdifferentpersons, andthataccountsforpersonalidentityoraper- son^continuedidentitythroughtime.Dualists arguethatsoulandbodymustbedistinctin ordertoexplainconsciousnessandthepossibil- ityofimmortality.Materialistsarguethatcon- sciousnessisentirelytheresultofcomplex physicalprocesses.Seealsodescartes,per- sonalIDENTITY,PLATO,SURVIVAL.W.E.M. soundness,(1)(ofanargument)thepropertyof beingvalidandhavingalltruepremises;(2)(of alogic)thepropertyofbeingnottoostrongina certainrespect.AlogicLhasweaksoundnesspro- videdeverytheoremofLisvalid.AndLhas strongsoundnessifforeverysetVofsentences, everysentencededuciblefromFusingLisalog- icalconsequenceofT".Seealsocompleteness, LOGICALCONSEQUENCE,LOGICALFORM, VALID.G.F.S. soundness,strong.Seesoundness. soundness,weak.Seesoundness. sovereignty,divine.Seedivineattributes. space,anextendedmanifoldofseveraldimen- sions,wherethenumberofdimensionscorre- spondstothenumberofvariablemagnitudes 866 space,absolute spatiotemporalcontinuity neededtospecifyalocationinthemanifold;in particular,thethree-dimensionalmanifoldin whichphysicalobjectsaresituatedandwith respecttowhichtheirmutualpositionsanddis- tancesaredefined. AncientGreekatomismdefinedspaceasthe infinitevoidinwhichatomsmove;butwhether spaceisfiniteorinfinite,andwhethervoidspaces exist,haveremainedinquestion.Aristotlede- scribedtheuniverseasafiniteplenumand reducedspacetotheaggregateofallplacesof physicalthings.Hisviewwaspreeminentuntil RenaissanceNeoplatonism,theCopernicanrev- olution,andtherevivalofatomismreintroduced infinite,homogeneousspaceasafundamental cosmologicalassumption. Furthercontroversyconcernedwhetherthe spaceassumedbyearlymodernastronomy shouldbethoughtofasanindependentlyexist- ingthingorasanabstractionfromthespatial relationsofphysicalbodies.Interestintherela- tivityofmotionencouragedthelatterview,but Newtonpointedoutthatmechanicspresupposes absolutedistinctionsamongmotions,andhe concludedthatabsolutespacemustbepostu- latedalongwiththebasiclawsofmotion (Principia,1687).Leibnizarguedfortherela- tionalviewfromtheidentityofindiscernibles: thepartsofspaceareindistinguishablefromone anotherandthereforecannotbeindependently existingthings.Relativisticphysicshasdefused theoriginalcontroversybyrevealingbothspace andspatialrelationsasmerelyobserver-depen- dentmanifestationsofthestructureofspace- time. Meanwhile,Kantshiftedthemetaphysical controversytoepistemologicalgroundsbyclaim- ingthatspace,withitsEuclideanstructure,isnei- thera"thing-in-itself"norarelationofthings- in-themselves,buttheaprioriformofouterintu- ition.Hisviewwaschallengedbytheelaboration ofnon-Euclideangeometriesinthenineteenth century,byHelmholtz'sargumentsthatboth intuitiveandphysicalspaceareknownthrough empiricalinvestigation,andfinallybytheuseof non-Euclideangeometryinthetheoryofrelativ- ity.Preciselywhatgeometricalpresuppositions areinherentinhumanspatialperception,and whatmustbelearnedfromexperience,remain subjectsofpsychologicalinvestigation. Seealsorelativity,space-time,time. R.D. space,absolute.Seespace. space,life.Seelewin. space,mathematical.Seespace. space,phase.Seestate. space,state.Seestate. space-time,afour-dimensionalcontinuumcom- biningthethreedimensionsofspacewithtime inordertorepresentmotiongeometricallyEach pointisthelocationofanevent,allofwhich togetherrepresent"theworld"throughtime; pathsinthecontinuum(worldlines)represent thedynamicalhistoriesofmovingparticles,so thatstraightworldlinescorrespondtouniform motions;three-dimensionalsectionsofconstant timevalue("spacelikehypersurfaces"or"simul- taneityslices")representallofspaceatagiven time. TheideawasforeshadowedwhenKantrepre- sented"thephenomenalworld"asaplane definedbyspaceandtimeasperpendicularaxes (InauguralDissertation,1770),andwhenJoseph LouisLagrange(1736-1814)referredto mechanicsas"theanalyticgeometryoffour dimensions."Butclassicalmechanicsassumesa universalstandardofsimultaneity,andsoitcan treatspaceandtimeseparately.Theconceptof space-timewasexplicitlydevelopedonlywhen Einsteincriticizedabsolutesimultaneityand madethevelocityoflightauniversalconstant. ThemathematicianHermannMinkowski showedin1908thattheobserver-independent structureofspecialrelativitycouldberepre- sentedbyametricspaceoffourdimensions: observersinrelativemotionwoulddisagreeon intervalsoflengthandtime,butagreeonafour- dimensionalintervalcombiningspatialandtem- poralmeasurements.Minkowski'smodelthen madepossiblethegeneraltheoryofrelativity, whichdescribesgravityasacurvatureofspace- timeinthepresenceofmässandthepathsof fallingbodiesasthestraightestworldlinesin curvedspace-time. Seealsoeinstein,relativity,space, TIME.R.D. spatiotemporalcontinuity,apropertyofthe careers,orspace-timepaths,ofwell-behaved objects.Letaspace-timepathbeaseriesofpos- siblespatiotemporalpositions,eachrepresented (inaselectedcoordinatesystem)byanordered pairconsistingofatime(itstemporalcompo- nent)andavolumeofspace(itsspatialcompo- nent).Suchapathwillbespatiotemporally continuousprovideditissuchthat,relativeto anyinertialframeselectedascoordinatesystem, 867 speaker'smeaning speculativephilosophy (1)foreverysegmentoftheseries,thetemporal componentsofthemembersofthatsegment formacontinuoustemporalinterval;and(2)for anytwomembersandofthe seriesthatdifferintheirtemporalcomponents(ti andtj),ifViandVj(thespatialcomponents)dif- ferineithershape,size,orlocation,then betweenthesemembersoftheseriestherewill beamemberwhosespatialcomponentismore similartoViandVjintheserespectsthanthese aretoeachother. Thisnotionisofphilosophicalinterestpartly becauseofitsconnectionswiththenotionsof identityövertimeandcausality.Puttingaside suchqualificationsasquantumconsiderations mayrequire,materialobjects(atleastmacro- scopicobjectsoffamiliarkinds)apparentlycan- notundergodiscontinuouschangeofplace,and cannothavetemporalgapsintheirhistories,and thereforethepaththroughspace-timetracedby suchanobjectmustapparentlybespatiotempo- rallycontinuous.Morecontroversialistheclaim thatspatiotemporalcontinuity,togetherwith somecontinuitywithrespecttootherproperiies, issufficientaswellasnecessaryfortheidentity ofsuchobjects-e.g.,thatifaspatiotemporally continuouspathissuchthatthespatialcompo- nentofeachmemberoftheseriesisoccupiedby atableofacertaindescriptionatthetimethatis thetemporalcomponentofthatmember,then thereisasingletableofthatdescriptionthat tracesthatpath.Thosewhodenythisclaim sometimesmaintainthatitisfurtherrequiredfor theidentityofmaterialobjectsthattherebe causalandcounterfactualdependenceoflåter statesonearlierones(ceterisparibus,ifthetable hadbeendifferentyesterday,itwouldbecorre- spondinglydifferentnow).Sinceitappearsthat chainsofcausalitymusttracespatiotemporally continuouspaths,itmaybethatinsofarasspa- tiotemporalcontinuityisrequiredfortranstem- poralidentity,thisisbecauseitisrequiredfor transtemporalcausality. Seealsopersonalidentity,timeslice. S.Sho. speaker'smeaning.Seemeaning. specialrelativity.Seerelativity. specialsenses.Seearistotle,facultypsychol- specialsensibles.Seearistotle,facultypsychol- ogy. species.Seedefinition. species,intentional.Seeaquinas,aristotle. speciesism.Seemoralstatus. speciesproblem.Seephilosophyofbiology. speciouspresent,thesupposedtimebetween pastandfuture.ThetermwasfirstofferedbyE. R.ClayinTheAlternative:AStudyinPsychology (1882),andwascitedbyJamesinChapterXV ofhisPrinciplesofPsychology(1890).Claychal- lengestheassumptionthatthe"present"asa "datum"isgivenas"present"tousinourexpe- rience."Thepresenttowhichthedatumrefers isreallyapartofthepast-arecentpast- delusivelygivenasbenigntimethatinter- venesbetweenthepastandthefuture.Letitbe namedthespeciouspresent,andletthepastthat isgivenasbeingthepastbeknownastheobvi- ouspast." ForJames,thispositionissupportiveofhis contentionthatconsciousnessisastreamand canbedividedintopartsonlybyconceptual addition,i.e.,onlybyourascribingpast,present, andfuturetowhatis,inouractualexperience,a seamlessflow.Jamesholdsthatthe"practically cognizedpresentisnoknife-edgebutasaddle- back,"asortof"ducatum"whichweexperience asawhole,andonlyuponreflectiveattentiondo we"distinguishitsbeginningfromitsend." WhereasClayreferstothedatumofthepres- entas"delusive,"onemightrathersaythatitis perpetuallyelusive,foraswehaveourexperi- ence,now,itisalwaysbathedretrospectivelyand prospectively.Contrarytocommonwisdom,no singleexperienceeverishadbyourconscious- nessutterlyalone,singleandwithoutrelations, föreandaft. Seealsotime.J.J.M. speckledhen.Seeproblemofthespeckledhen. spectruminversion.Seequalia. speculativephilosophy,aformoftheorizingthat goesbeyondverifiableobservation;specifically,a philosophicalapproachinformedbytheimpulse toconstructagrandnarrativeofaworldview thatencompassesthewholeofreality.Specula- tivephilosophypurportstobindtogetherreflec- tionsontheexistenceandnatureofthecosmos, thepsyche,andGod.Itsetsforitsgoalaunify- ingmatrixandanoverarchingsystemwhere- 868 speculativereason Spencer,Herbert withtocomprehendtheconsideredjudgments ofcosmology,psychology,andtheology. Hegel'sabsoluteidealism,particularlyasde- velopedinhislåterthought,paradigmatically illustratestherequirementsforspeculativephi- losophizing.Hissystemofidealismoffereda visionoftheunityofthecategoriesofhuman thoughtastheycometorealizationinand throughtheiroppositiontoeachother.Specula- tivethoughttendstoplaceapremiumonuni- versality,totality,andunity;andittendsto marginalizetheconcreteparticularitiesofthe naturalandsocialworld.Initsaggressiveuseof thesystematicprinciple,gearedtoaunification ofhumanexperience,speculativephilosophy aspirestoacomprehensiveunderstandingand explanationofthestructuralinterrelationsofthe culturespheresofscience,morality,art,andreli- gion. Seealsohegel. c.o.s. speculativereason.Seepracticalreasoning. speechacttheory,thetheoryoflanguageuse, sometimescalledpragmatics,asopposedtothe theoryofmeaning,orsemantics.Basedonthe meaning-usedistinction,itcategorizessystem- aticallythesortsofthingsthatcanbedonewith wordsandexplicatesthewaysthesearedeter- mined,underdetermined,orundeterminedby themeaningsofthewordsused.Relyingfurther onthedistinctionbetweenspeakermeaningand linguisticmeaning,itaimstocharacterizethe natureofcommunicativeintentionsandhow theyareexpressedandrecognized. Speechactsareaspeciesofintentionalaction. Ingeneral,oneandthesameutterancemay compriseanumberofdistinctthoughrelated acts,eachcorrespondingtoadifferentintention onthepartofthespeaker.Beyondintendingto produceacertainsequenceofsoundsforminga sentenceinEnglish,apersonwhouttersthesen- tence'Thedoorisopen',e.g.,islikelytobe intendingtoperform,intheterminologyofJ.L. Austin(HowtoDoThingswithWords,1962),(1) thelocutionaryactofsaying(expressingthe proposition)thatacertaindoorisopen,(2)the illocutionaryactofmakingthestatement (expressingthebelief)thatitisopen,and(3)the perlocutionaryactofgettinghislistenertobelieve thatitisopen.Insodoing,hemaybeperform- ingtheindirectspeechactofrequesting(illocu- tionary)thelistenertoclosethedoorandof getting(perlocutionary)thehearertoclosethe door. Theprimaryfocusofspeechacttheoryison illocutionaryacts,whichmaybeclassifiedina varietyofways.Statements,predictions,and answersexemplifyconstatives;requests,com- mandsandpermissionsaredirectives;promises, offers,andbetsarecommissives;greetings,apolo- gies,andcongratulationsareacknowledgments. Theseareallcommunicativeillocutionaryacts, eachdistinguishedbythetypeofpsychological stateexpressedbythespeaker.Successfulcom- municationconsistsintheaudience'srecogni- tionofthespeaker'sintentiontobeexpressinga certainpsychologicalstatewithacertaincon- tent.Conventionalillocutionaryacts,ontheother hand,effectorofficiallyaffectinstitutionalstates ofaffairs.Examplesoftheformerareappointing, resigning,sentencing,andadjourning;examples ofthelatterareassessing,acquitting,certifying, andgrading.(SeeKentBachandRobertM.Har- nish,LinguisticCommunicationandSpeechActs, 1979.) Thetypeofactanutteranceexemplifiesdeter- minesitsillocutionaryforce.Intheexample'The doorisopen',theutterancehastheforceofboth astatementandarequest.Theillocutionaryforce potentialofasentenceistheforceorforceswith whichitcanbeusedliterally,e.g.,inthecaseof thesentence'Thedoorisopen',asastatement butnotasarequest.Thefelicityconditionsonan illocutionaryactpertainnotonlytoitscommu- nicativeorinstitutionalsuccessbutalsotoitssin- cerity,appropriateness,andeffectiveness. Anexplicitperformativeutteranceisanillocu- tionaryactperformedbyutteringanindicative sentenceinthesimplepresenttensewithaverb namingthetypeofactbeingperformed,e.g.,'I apologizeforeverythingIdid'and'Youare requestednottosmoke'.Theadverb'hereby' maybeusedbeforetheperformativeverb('apolo- gize'and'request'intheseexamples)toindicate thattheveryutterancebeingmadeisthevehi- cleoftheperformanceoftheillocutionaryactin question.Agoodtestfordistinguishingillocu- tionaryfromperlocutionaryactsistodetermine whetheraverbnamingtheactcanbeusedper- formatively.Austinexploitedthephenomenon ofperformativeutterancestoexposéthecom- monphilosophicalerrorofassumingthatthepri- maryuseoflanguageistomakestatements. Seealsoaustin,j.l.;philosophyoflan- guage.K.B. Spencer,Herbert(1820-1903),Englishphiloso- pher,socialreformer,andeditorofTheEconomist. Inepistemology,Spenceradoptedthenine- 869 Speusippus Spinoza,Baruch teenth-centurytrendtowardpositivism:the onlyreliableknowledgeoftheuniverseistobe foundinthesciences.Hisethicswereutilitarian, followingBenthamandJ.S.Mill:pleasureand painarethecriteriaofvalueassignsofhappiness orunhappinessintheindividual.HisSynthetic Philosophy,expoundedinbookswrittenöver manyyears,assumed(bothinbiologyandpsy- chology)theexistenceofLamarckianevolution: givenacharacteristicenvironment,everyanimal possessesadispositiontomakeitselfintowhatit will,failingmaladaptiveinterventions,eventu- allybecome.Thedispositionsgainexpressionas inheritedacquiredhabits.Spencercouldnot acceptthatspeciesoriginatebychancevariations andnaturalselectionalone:directadaptationto environmentalconstraintsismainlyresponsible forbiologicalchanges.Evolutionalsoincludes theprogressionofsocietiesinthedirectionofa dynamicalequilibriumofindividuals:thehu- manconditionisperfectiblebecausehumanfac- ultiesarecompletelyadaptedtolifeinsociety, implyingthatevilandimmoralitywilleventually disappear.Hisideasonevolutionpredatedpub- licationofthemajorworksofDarwin;A.R.Wal- lacewasinfluencedbyhiswritings.R.E.B. Speusippus.Seeacademy. Spinoza,Baruch(1632-77),Dutchmetaphysi- cian,epistemologist,psychologist,moralphi- losopher,politicaltheorist,andphilosopherof religion,generallyregardedasoneofthemost importantfiguresofseventeenth-centuryratio- nalism. Lifeandworks.BornandeducatedintheJew- ishcommunityofAmsterdam,heforsookhis givenname'Baruch'infavöroftheLatin'Bene- dicfattheageoftwenty-two.Between1652and 1656hestudiedthephilosophyofDescartesin theschoolofFrancisvandenEnden.Having developedunorthodoxviewsofthedivine nature(andhavingceasedtobefullyobservant ofJewishpractice),hewasexcommunicatedby theJewishcommunityin1656.Hespenthis entirelifeinHolland;afterleavingAmsterdamin 1660,heresidedsuccessivelyinRijnsburg,Voor- burg,andtheHague.Hesupportedhimselfat leastpartlythroughgrindinglenses,andhis knowledgeofopticsinvolvedhiminanareaof inquiryofgreatimportancetoseventeenth-cen- turyscience.Acquaintedwithsuchleadingintel- lectualfiguresasLeibniz,Huygens,andHenry Oldenberg,hedeclinedaprofessorshipatthe UniversityofHeidelbergpartlyonthegrounds thatitmightinterferewithhisintellectualfree- dom.Hisprematuredeathattheageofforty- fourwasduetoconsumption. TheonlyworkpublishedunderSpinoza's nameduringhislifetimewashisPrinciplesof Descartes'sPhilosophy(RenatiDesCartesPrincipio- rumPhilosophiae,ParsIetn,1663),anattemptto recastandpresentPartsIandIIofDescartes's PrinciplesofPhilosophyinthemannerthatSpi- nozacalledgeometricalorderorgeometricalmethod. ModeledontheElementsofEuclidandonwhat Descartescalledthemethodofsynthesis,Spi- noza^"geometricalorder"involvesaninitialset ofdefinitionsandaxioms,fromwhichvarious propositionsaredemonstrated,withnotesor scholiaattachedwherenecessary.Thiswork, whichestablishedhiscredentialsasanexpositor ofCartesianphilosophy,haditsoriginsinhis endeavortoteachDescartes'sPrinciplesofPhilos- ophytoaprivatestudent.Spinoza'sTheological- PoliticalTreatise(TractatusTheologico-Politicus)was publishedanonymouslyin1670.Afterhisdeath, hisclosecircleoffriendspublishedhisPosthu- mousWorks(OperaPostuma,1677),whichin- cludedhismasterpieces,Ethic,Demonstratedin GeometricalOrder(Ethica,OrdineGeometricoDe- monstrata).ThePosthumousWorksalsoincluded hisearlyunfinishedTreatiseontheEmendationof theIntellect(TractatusdeIntellectusEmendatione), hislåterunfinishedPoliticalTreatise(Tractatus Politicus),aHebrewGrammar,andCorrespondence. AnunpublishedearlyworkentitledShortTreatise onGod,Man,andHisWell-Being(KorteVorhan- delungvanGod,deMenschendeszelvsWelstand),in manywaysaforerunneroftheEthics,wasredis- covered(incopiedmanuscript)andpublishedin thenineteenthcentury.Spinoza'sauthorshipof twobriefscientifictreatises,OntheRainbowand OntheCalculationofChances,isstilldisputed. Metaphysics.Spinozaoftenusestheterm 'God,orNature'("Deus,siveNatura"),andthis identificationofGodwithNatureisattheheart ofhismetaphysics.Becauseofthisidentification, hisphilosophyisoftenregardedasaversionof pantheismand/ornaturalism.Butalthoughphi- losophybeginswithmetaphysicsforSpinoza,his metaphysicsisultimatelyintheserviceofhis ethics.BecausehisnaturalizedGodhasno desiresorpurposes,humanethicscannotprop- erlybederivedfromdivinecommand.Rather, Spinozisticethicsseekstodemonstrate,froman adequateunderstandingofthedivinenatureand itsexpressioninhumannature,thewayin whichhumanbeingscanmaximizetheiradvan- tage.Centraltothesuccessfulpursuitofthis 870 Spinoza,Baruch Spinoza,Baruch advantageisadequateknowledge,whichleads toincreasingcontrolofthepassionsandtocoop- erativeaction. Spinoza'sontology,likethatofDescartes,con- sistsofsubstances,theirattributes(which Descartescalledprincipalattributes),andtheir modes.IntheEthics,Spinozadefines'substance' aswhatis"initself,andisconceivedthrough itself";'attribute'asthatwhich"theintellectper- ceivesofasubstanceasconstitutingitsessence"; and'mode'as"theaffectionsofasubstance,or thatwhichisinanotherthroughwhichalsoitis conceived."WhileDescarteshadrecognizeda strictsenseinwhichonlyGodisasubstance,he alsorecognizedasecondsenseinwhichthereare twokindsofcreatedsubstances,eachwithits ownprincipalattribute:extendedsubstances, whoseonlyprincipalattributeisextension;and minds,whoseonlyprincipalattributeisthought. Spinoza,incontrast,consistentlymaintainsthat thereisonlyonesubstance.Hismetaphysicsis thusaformofsubstantialmonism.Thisonesub- stanceisGod,whichSpinozadefinesas"abeing absolutelyinfinite,i.e.,asubstanceconsistingof aninfinityofattributes,ofwhicheachexpresses anetemalandinfiniteessence."Thus,whereas Descarteslimitedeachcreatedsubstancetoone principalattribute,Spinozaclaimsthattheone substancehasinfiniteattributes,eachexpressing thedivinenaturewithoutlimitationinitsown way.Oftheseinfiniteattributes,however, humanscancomprehendonlytwo:extension andthought.Withineachattribute,themodesof Godareoftwokinds:infinitemodes,whichare pervasivefeaturesofeachattribute,suchasthe lawsofnature;andfinitemodes,whicharelocal andlimitedmodificationsofsubstance.Thereis aninfinitesequenceoffinitemodes. Descartesregardedahumanbeingasasub- stantialunionoftwodifferentsubstances,the thinkingsoulandtheextendedbody,incausal interactionwitheachother.Spinoza,incontrast, regardsahumanbeingasafinitemodeofGod, existingsimultaneouslyinGodasamodeof thoughtandasamodeofextension.Heholds thateverymodeofextensionisliterallyidentical withthemodeofthoughtthatisthe"ideaof" thatmodeofextension.Sincethehumanmind istheideaofthehumanbody,itfollowsthatthe humanmindandthehumanbodyareliterally thesamething,conceivedundertwodifferent attributes.Becausetheyareactuallyidentical, thereisnocausalinteractionbetweenthemind andthebody;butthereisacompleteparallelism betweenwhatoccursinthemindandwhat occursinthebody.Sinceeverymodeofexten- sionhasacorrespondingandidenticalmodeof thought(howeverrudimentarythatmightbe), Spinozaallowsthateverymodeofextensionis "animatedtosomedegree";hisviewisthusa formofpanpsychism. AnothercentralfeatureofSpinoza'smeta- physicsishisnecessitarianism,expressedinhis claimthat"thingscouldhavebeenproduced... innootherway,andinnootherorder"thanthat inwhichtheyhavebeenproduced.Hederives thisnecessitarianismfromhisdoctrinethatGod existsnecessarily(forwhichheoffersseveral arguments,includingaversionoftheontologi- calargument)andhisdoctrinethateverything thatcanfollowfromthedivinenaturemustnec- essarilydoso.Thus,althoughhedoesnotusethe term,heacceptsaverystrongversionofthe principleofsufficientreason.Attheoutsetof theEthics,hedefinesathingasfreewhenits actionsaredeterminedbyitsownnaturealone. OnlyGod-whoseactionsaredetermined entirelybythenecessityofhisownnature,and forwhomnothingisexternal-iscompletelyfree inthissense.Nevertheless,humanbeingscan achievearelätivefreedomtotheextentthatthey livethekindoflifedescribedinthelåterpartsof theEthics.Hence,Spinozaisacompatibilistcon- cerningtherelationbetweenfreedomanddeter- minism."Freedomofthewill"inanysensethat impliesalackofcausaldetermination,however, issimplyanillusionbasedonignoranceofthe truecausesofabeing'sactions.Therecognition thatalloccurrencesarecausallydetermined, Spinozaholds,hasapositiveconsolatorypower thataidsoneincontrollingthepassions. Epistemologyandpsychology.Likeother rationalists,Spinozadistinguishestworepresen- tationalfaculties:theimaginationandtheintel- lect.Theimaginationisafacultyofforming imagisticrepresentationsofthings,derivedulti- matelyfromthemechanismsofthesenses;the intellectisafacultyofformingadequate,non- imagisticconceptionsofthings.Healsodistin- guishesthree"kindsofknowledge."Thefirstor lowestkindhecallsopinionorimagination (opinio,imaginatio).Itincludes"randomorinde- terminateexperience"(experientiavaga)andalso "hearsay,orknowledgefrommeresigns";itthus dependsontheconfusedandmutilateddeliver- ancesofthesenses,andisinadequate.Thesec- ondkindofknowledgehecallsreason(ratio);it dependsoncommonnotions(i.e.,featuresof thingsthatare"commontoall,andequallyin thepartandinthewhole")oronadequate knowledgeoftheproperties(asopposedtothe 871 Spinoza,Baruch Spinoza,Baruch essences)ofthings.Thethirdkindofknowledge hecallsintuitiveknowledge(scientiaintuitiva);it proceedsfromadequateknowledgeofthe essenceorattributesofGodtoknowledgeofthe essenceofthings,andhenceproceedsinthe properorder,fromcausestoeffects.Boththesec- ondandthirdkindsofknowledgeareadequate. Thethirdkindispreferable,however,asinvolv- ingnotonlycertainknowledgethatsomethingis so,butalsoknowledgeofhowandwhyitisso. Becausethereisonlyonesubstance-God- theindividualthingsoftheworldarenotdistin- guishedfromoneanotherbyanydifferenceof substance.Rather,amongtheintemalqualita- tivemodificationsanddifferentiationsofeach divineattribute,therearepatternsthathavea tendencytoendure;theseconstituteindividual things.(Astheyoccurwithintheattributeof extension,Spinozacallsthesepatternsfixedpro- portionsofmotionandrest.)Althoughtheseindi- vidualthingsarethusmodesoftheone substance,ratherthansubstancesintheirown right,eachhasanatureoressencedescribablein termsofthething'sparticularpatternandits mechanismsforthepreservationofitsown being.Thistendencytowardself-preservation Spinozacallsconatus(sometimestranslatedas 'endeavor').Everyindividualthinghassome conatus.Anindividualthingacts,orisactive,to theextentthatwhatoccurscanbeexplainedor understoodthroughitsownnature(i.e.,itsself- preservatorymechanism)alone;itispassiveto theextentthatwhathappensmustbeexplained throughthenatureofotherforcesimpingingon it.Thus,everything,towhateverextentitcan, activelystrivestopersevereinitsexistence;and whateveraidsthisself-preservationconstitutes thatindividual'sadvantage. Spinoza'sspecificallyhumanpsychologyisan applicationofthismoregeneraldoctrineofcona- tus.Thatapplicationismadethroughappealto severalspecificcharacteristicsofhumanbeings: theyformimagisticrepresentationsofother individualsbymeansoftheirsenses;theyare sufficientlycomplextoundergoincreasesand decreasesintheircapacityforaction;andthey arecapableofengaginginreason.Thefunda- mentalconceptsofhispsychologyaredesire, whichisconatusitself,especiallyasoneiscon- sciousofitasdirectedtowardattainingapartic- ularobject;pleasure,whichisanincreasein capacityforaction;andpain,whichisadecrease incapacityforaction.Hedefinesotheremotions intermsofthesebasicemotions,astheyoccur inparticularcombinations,inparticularkindsof circumstances,withparticularkindsofcauses, and/orwithparticularkindsofobjects.Whena personistheadequatecauseofhisorherown emotions,theseemotionsareactiveemotions; otherwise,theyarepassions.Desireandplea- surecanbeeitheractiveemotionsorpassions, dependingonthecircumstances;pain,however, canonlybeapassion.Spinozadoesnotdenythe phenomenonofaltruism:one'sself-preserva- torymechanism,andhenceone'sdesire,can becomefocusedonawidevarietyofobjects, includingthewell-beingofalovedpersonor object-eventoone'sowndetriment.However, becausehereducesallhumanmotivation, includingaltruisticmotivation,topermutations oftheendeavortoseekone'sownadvantage,his theoryisarguablyaformofpsychologicalego- Ethics.Spinoza'sethicaltheorydoesnottake theformofasetofmoralcommands.Rather,he seekstodemonstrate,byconsideringhuman actionsandappetitesobjectively-"justasifit wereaQuestionoflines,planes,andbod- ies"-whereinaperson'strueadvantagelies. Readerswhogenuinelygraspthedemonstrated truthswill,heholds,ipsofactobemotivated,toat leastsomeextent,tolivetheirlivesaccordingly. Thus,Spinozisticethicsseekstoshowhowaper- sonactswhen"guidedbyreason";toactinthis wayisatthesametimetoactwithvirtue,or power.Allactionsthatresultfromunderstand- ing-i.e.,allvirtuousactions-maybeattributed tostrengthofcharacter(fortitudo).Suchvirtuous actionsmaybefurtherdividedintotwoclasses: thoseduetotenacity(animositas),or"theDesire bywhicheachonestrives,solelyfromthedictate ofreason,topreservehisbeing";andthosedue tonobility(generositas),or"theDesirebywhich eachonestrives,solelyfromthedictateofrea- son,toaidothermenandjointhemtohimin friendship."Thus,thevirtuouspersondoesnot merelypursueprivateadvantage,butseeksto cooperatewithothers;returnsloveforhatred; alwaysactshonestly,notdeceptively;andseeks tojoinhimselfwithothersinapoliticalstate. Nevertheless,theultimatereasonforaidingoth- ersandjoiningthemtooneselfinfriendshipis that"nothingismoreusefultomanthan man"-i.e.,becausedoingsoisconduciveto one'sownadvantage,andparticularlytoone's pursuitofknowledge,whichisagoodthatcan besharedwithoutloss.AlthoughSpinozaholds thatwegenerallyusetheterms'good'and'evil' simplytoreportsubjectiveappearances-sothat wecall"good"whateverwedesire,and"evil" whateverweseektoavoid-heproposesthatwe 872 Spinoza,Baruch Spinoza,Baruch define'good'philosophicallyas'whatwecer- tainlyknowtobeusefultous',and'evil'as'what wecertainlyknowpreventsusfrombeingmas- tersofsomegood'.SinceGodisperfectandhas noneeds,itfollowsthatnothingiseithergoodor evilforGod.Spinoza'sultimateappealtothe agenfsadvantagearguablyrendershisethical theoryaformofethicalegoism,eventhoughhe emphasizestheexistenceofcommonshareable goodsandthe(instrumental)ethicalimportance ofcooperationwithothers.However,itisnota formofhedonism;fordespitetheprominencehe givestopleasure,theultimateaimofhuman actionisahigherstateofperfectionorcapacity foraction,ofwhoseincreasingattainmentplea- sureisonlyanindicator. Ahumanbeingwhoseself-preservatory mechanismisdrivenordistortedbyexternal forcesissaidtobeinbondagetothepassions;in contrast,onewhosuccessfullypursuesonly whatistrulyadvantageous,inconsequenceof genuineunderstandingofwherethatadvantage properlylies,isfree.Accordingly,Spinozaalso expresseshisconceptionofavirtuouslifeguided byreasonintermsofanideal"freeman."Above all,thefreemanseeksunderstandingofhimself andofNature.Adequateknowledge,andpartic- ularlyknowledgeofthethirdkind,leadsto blessedness,topeaceofmind,andtotheintel- lectualloveofGod.Blessednessisnotareward forvirtue,however,butratheranintegralaspect ofthevirtuouslife.Thehumanmindisitselfa partoftheinfiniteintellectofGod,andadequate knowledgeisaneternalaspectofthatinfinite intellect.Hence,asonegainsknowledge,a greaterpartofone'sownmindcomestobeiden- tifiedwithsomethingthatiseternal,andone becomeslessdependenton-andlessdisturbed by-thelocalforcesofone'simmediateenviron- ment.Accordingly,thefreeman"thinksofnoth- inglessthanofdeath,andhiswisdomisa meditationonlife,notondeath."Moreover,just asone'sadequateknowledgeisliterallyaneter- nalpartoftheinfiniteintellectofGod,theresult- ingblessedness,peaceofmind,andintellectual loveareliterallyaspectsofwhatmightbecon- sideredGod'sowneternal"emotional"life. Althoughthisendowsthefreemanwithakind ofblessedimmortality,itisnotapersonal immortality,sincethesensationandmemory thatareessentialtopersonalindividualityare noteternal.Rather,thefreemanachievesdur- inghislifetimeanincreasingparticipationina bodyofadequateknowledgethathasitself alwaysbeeneternal,sothat,atdeath,alargepart ofthefreeman'smindhasbecomeidentified withtheeternal.Itisthusakindof"immortal- ity"inwhichonecanparticipatewhileonelives, notmerelywhenonedies. Politicsandphilosophicaltheology.Spinoza's politicaltheory,likethatofHobbes,treatsrights andpowerasequivalent.Citizensgiveuprights tothestateforthesakeoftheprotectionthatthe statecanprovide.Hobbes,however,regardsthis socialcontractasnearlyabsolute,oneinwhich citizensgiveupalloftheirrightsexcepttheright toresistdeath.Spinoza,incontrast,emphasizes thatcitizenscannotgiveuptherighttopursue theirownadvantageastheyseeit,initsfullgen- erality;andhencethatthepower,andright,of anyactualstateisalwayslimitedbythestate's practicalabilitytoenforceitsdictatessoastoalter thecitizens'continuingperceptionoftheirown advantage.Furthermore,hehasamoreexten- siveconceptionofthenatureofanindividual's ownadvantagethanHobbes,sinceforhimone's owntrueadvantageliesnotmerelyinfendingoff deathandpursuingpleasure,butinachieving theadequateknowledgethatbringsblessedness andallowsonetoparticipateinthatwhichis eternal.Inconsequence,Spinoza,unlikeHobbes, recommendsalimited,constitutionalstatethat encouragesfreedomofexpressionandreligious toleration.Suchastate-itselfakindofindivid- ual-bestpreservesitsownbeing,andprovides boththemoststableandthemostbeneficialform ofgovernmentforitscitizens. InhisTheological-PoliticalTreatise,Spinozaalso takesuppopulärreligion,theinterpretationof Scripture,andtheirbearingonthewell-beingof thestate.HecharacterizestheOldTestament prophetsasindividualswhosevividimagina- tionsproducedmessagesofpoliticalvalueforthe ancientHebrewstate.Usinganaturalisticout- lookandhistoricalhermeneuticmethodsthat anticipatethelåter"highercriticism"ofthe Bible,heseekstoshowthatScripturalwriters themselvesconsistentlytreatonlyjusticeand charityasessentialtosalvation,andhencethat dogmaticdoxasticrequirementsarenotjustified byScripture.Populärreligionshouldthuspro- poundonlythesetworequirements,whichit mayimaginativelyrepresent,tothemindsofthe many,astherequirementsforrewardsgranted byadivineLawgiver.Thefew,whoaremore philosophical,andwhothusrelyonintellect, willrecognizethatthenaturallawsofhuman psychologyrequirecharityandjusticeascondi- tionsofhappiness,andthatwhatthevulgärcon- strueasrewardsgrantedbypersonaldivine interventionareinfaetthenaturalconsequences ofavirtuouslife. 873 Spir,Afrikan splitbraineffects BecauseofhisidentificatonofGodwithNature andhistreatmentofpopulärreligion,Spinoza's contemporariesoftenregardedhisphilosophy asathinlydisguisedatheism.Paradoxically, however,nineteenth-centuryRomanticismem- bracedhimforhispantheism;Novalis,e.g., famouslycharacterizedhimas"theGod-intoxi- catedman."Infact,SpinozaascribestoNature mostofthecharacteristicsthatWesterntheolo- gianshaveascribedtoGod:SpinozisticNatureis infinite,eternal,necessarilyexisting,theobjectof anontologicalargument,thefirstcauseofall things,all-knowing,andthebeingwhosecon- templationproducesblessedness,intellectual love,andparticipationinakindofimmortality oreternallife.Spinoza'sclaimtoaffirmthe existenceofGodisthereforenomereevasion. However,heemphaticallydeniesthatGodis apersonoractsforpurposes;thatanythingis goodorevilfromthedivineperspective;or thatthereisapersonalimmortalityinvolving memory. Inadditiontohisinfluenceonthehistoryof biblicalcriticismandonliterature(includingnot onlyNovalisbutsuchwritersasWordsworth, Coleridge,Heine,Shelley,GeorgeEliot,George Sand,SomersetMaugham,JorgeLuisBorges, andBernardMalamud),Spinozahasaffectedthe philosophicaloutlooksofsuchdiversetwenti- eth-centurythinkersasFreudandEinstein.Con- temporaryphysicistshaveseeninhismonistic metaphysicsananticipationoftwentieth-cen- turyfieldmetaphysics.Moregenerally,heisa leadingintellectualforebearoftwentieth-cen- turydeterminismandnaturalism,andofthe mind-bodyidentitytheory. Seealsodescartes,leiesniz,rational- ism.D.Garr. Spir,Afrikan(1837-90),Germanphilosopher. HeservedintheCrimeanWarasaRussianoffi- cer.Anon-academic,hepublishedbooksinGer- manandFrench.HismajorworksareForschung nachderGewissheitinderErkenntnisderWirk- lichkeit(InquiryconcerningCertaintyintheKnowl- edgeofActuality,1869)andthetwo-volume DenkenundWirklichkeit:VersucheinerErneuerung derkritischenPhilosophie(ThoughtandActuality: AttemptataRevivalofCriticalPhilosophy,1873). ThoughtandActualitypresentsametaphysics basedontheradicalseparationoftheapparent worldandanabsolutereality.Allwecanknow aboutthe"unconditioned"isthatitmustcon- formwiththeprincipleofidentity.Whileretain- ingtheunknowablething-in-itselfofKant,Spir arguedfortheempiricalrealityoftime,whichis giventousinimmediateexperienceand dependsonourexperienceofasuccessionofdif- ferentialstates.Theaimofphilosophyistoreach fundamentalandimmediatecertainties.Ofthe worksincludedinhisGesammelteSchriften(1883- 84),onlyarelativelyminorstudy,Rightand Wrong,wastranslatedintoEnglish(in1954). ThereareanumberofreferencestoSpirinthe writingsofNietzsche,whichindicatethatsome ofNietzsche'scentralnotionswereinfluenced, bothpositivelyandnegatively,bySpir'sanalyses ofbecomingandtemporality,aswellasbyhis conceptoftheseparationoftheworldofappear- anceandthe"trueworld."G.J.S. spirit.Seesoul. spirit,Absolute.Seehegel. spissitude.Seemore,henry. splitbraineffects,awidearrayofbehavioral effectsconsequentupontheseveringofthecere- bralcommisures,andgenerallyinterpretedas indicatingasymmetryincerebralfunctions.The humanbrainhasconsiderableleft-rightfunc- tionaldifferentiation,orasymmetry,thataffects behavior.Themostobviousexampleishanded- ness.Bythe1860sBouillaud,Dax,andBroca hadobservedthattheeffectsofunilateraldam- ageindicatedthatthelefthemispherewaspref- erentiallyinvolvedinlanguage.Sincethe1960s, thiscommitmenttofunctionalasymmetryhas beenreinforcedbystudiesofpatientsinwhom communicationbetweenthehemisphereshas beensurgicallydisrupted. Splitbraineffectsdependonseveringthecere- bralcommisures,andespeciallythecorpuscal- losum,whichareneuralstructuresmediating communicationbetweenthecerebralhemi- spheres.Commisurotomieshavebeenper- formedsincethe1940stocontrolsevere epilepsy.Thisisintendedtoleavebothhemi- spheresintactandfunctioningindependently. Beginninginthe1960s,J.E.Bogen,M.S.Gaz- zaniga,andR.W.Sperryconductedanarrayof psychologicalteststoevaluatethedistinctive abilitiesofthedifferenthemispheres.Ascertain- ingthedegreeofcerebralasymmetrydependson acarefullycontrolledexperimentaldesignin whichaccessofthedisassociatedhemispheresto peripheralcuesislimited.Theresulthasbeena widearrayofstrikingresults.Forexample, patientsareunabletomatchanobjectsuchasa keyfeltinonehandwithasimilarobjectfeltin theother;patientsareunabletonameanobject 874 spontaneity,libertyof standardmodel heldinthelefthand,thoughtheycannamean objectheldintheright. Researchershaveconcludedthattheseresults confirmaclearlateralizationofspeech,writing, andcalculationinthelefthemisphere(forright- handedpatients),leavingtherighthemisphere largelyunabletorespondinspeechorwriting, andtypicallyunabletoperformevensimplecal- culations.Itisoftenconcludedthatthelefthemi- sphereisspecializedforverbalandanalytic modesofthinking,whiletherighthemisphereis specializedformorespatialandsyntheticmodes ofthinking.Theprecisecharacterandextentof thesedifferencesinnormalsubjectsarelessclear. R.C.R. spontaneity,libertyof.Seefreewillproblem, HUME. spreadlaw.Seerelevancelogic. squareofopposition,agraphicrepresentationof variouslogicalrelationsamongcategorical propositions.(Relationsamongmodalandeven amonghypotheticalpropositionshavealsobeen representedonthesquare.)Twopropositionsare saidtobeeachother's(1)contradictoriesifexactly oneofthemmustbetrueandexactlyonefalse; (2)contrariesiftheycouldnotbothbetrue althoughtheycouldbothbefalse;and(3)sub- contrariesifatleastoneofthemmustbetrue althoughbothofthemmaybetrue.Thereisa relationof(4)subaltemationofoneproposition, calledsubaltern,toanothercalledsuperaltern,if thetruthofthelatterimpliesthetruthofthefor- mer,butnotconversely. Applyingthesedefinitionstothefourtypesof categoricalpropositions,wefindthatSaPandSoP arecontradictories,andsoareSePandSiP.SaP andSeParecontraries.SiPandSoParesubcon- traries.SiPissubalterntoSaP,andSoPissubal- terntoSeP.Theserelationscanberepresented graphicallyinasquareofopposition: SaP contraries SeP subaltern & C0-SeP Subcontraries:SiPVSoP Subalterns:SaP->SiP,SeP->SoP Fortheserelationstohold,anunderlyingexis- tentialassumptionmustbesatisfied:theterms servingassubjectsofpropositionsmustbesatis- fied,notempty(e.g.,'man'issatisfiedand'elf empty).Onlythecontradictoryoppositionre- mainswithoutthatassumption.Moderninter- pretationsofcategoricalpropositionsexcludethe existentialassumption;thus,onlythecontradic- toryoppositionremainsinthesquare. Seealsosyllogism.I.Bo. squareofopposition,modal.Seecontingent. stadiumparadox.Seezeno'sparadoxes. Stagirite.Seearistotle. standardanalysis.Seemathematicalanalysis. standardinterpretation.Seeformålsemantics. standardmodel,atermthat,like'non-standard model',isusedwithregardtotheoriesthatsys- tematize(partof)ourknowledgeofsomemath- ematicalstructure,forinstancethestructureof naturalnumberswithaddition,multiplication, andthesuccessorfunction,orthestructureof realnumberswithordering,addition,andmul- tiplication.Modelsisomorphictothisintended mathematicalstructurearethe"standardmod- els"ofthetheory,whileanyother,non-isomor- phic,modelofthetheoryisa'non-standard' model.SincePeanoarithmeticisincomplete,it hasconsistentextensionsthathavenostandard model.Buttherearealsonon-standard,count- ablemodelsofcompletenumbertheory,theset ofalltruefirst-ordersentencesaboutnatural numbers,aswasfirstshownbySkolemin1934. Categoricaltheoriesdonothaveanon-stan- dardmodel.Itislessclearwhetherthereisa standardmodelofsettheory,althoughacount- ablemodelwouldcertainlycountasnon-stan- dard.TheSkolemparadoxisthatanyfirst-order formulationofsettheory,likeZF,duetoZermelo andFraenkel,hasacountablemodel,whileit seemstoasserttheexistenceofnon-countable sets.Manyotherimportantmathematicalstruc- turescannotbecharacterizedbyacategoricalset offirst-orderaxioms,andthusallownon-stan- dardmodels.TheAmericanphilosopherPutnam hasarguedthatthisfacthasimportantimplica- tionsforthedebateaboutrealisminthephilos- ophyoflanguage.Ifaxiomscannotcapturethe 875 standardsemantics statetable "intuitive"notionofaset,whatcould?Someof hisdetractorshavepointedoutthatwithinsec- ond-orderlogiccategoricalcharacterizationsare oftenpossible.ButPutnamhasobjectedthatthe intendedinterpretationofsecond-orderlogic itselfisnotfixedbytheuseoftheformalismof second-orderlogic,where"use"isdeterminedby therulesofinferenceforsecond-orderlogicwe knowabout.Moreover,categoricaltheoriesare sometimesuninformative. Seealsocategoricaltheory,gödel's INCOMPLETENESSTHEOREMS,SETTHEORY. Z.G.S. standardsemantics.Seesecond-orderlogic. state,thewayanobjectorsystembasicallyis;the fundamental,intrinsicpropertiesofanobjector system,andthebasisofitsotherproperties.An instantaneousstateisastateatagiventime.State variablesareconstituentsofastatewhosevalues mayvarywithtime.InclassicalorNewtonian mechanicstheinstantaneousstateofanM-parti- clesystemconsistsofthepositionsandmomenta (massesmultipliedbyvelocities)ofthenparti- clesatagiventime.Othermechanicalproperties arefunctionsofthoseinstates.Fundamentaland derivedpropertiesareoften,thoughpossibly misleadingly,calledobservables.Thesetofasys- tem^possiblestatescanberepresentedasan abstractphasespaceorstatespace,withdimen- sionsorcoordinatesfor(thecomponentsof) eachstatevariable. Inquantumtheory,statesdonotfixthepar- ticularvaluesofobservables,onlytheprobabili- tiesofobservablesassumingparticularvaluesin particularmeasurementsituations.Forposi- tivismorinstrumentalism,specifyingaquantum statedoesnothingmorethanprovideameans forcalculatingsuchprobabilities.Forrealism,it doesmore-e.g.,itreferstothebasisofaquan- tumsystem'sprobabilisticdispositionsor propensities.VectorsinHilbertspacesrepresent possiblestates,andHermitianoperatorsonvec- torsrepresentobservables. Seealsodisposition,instrumentalism, PROBABILITY,PROPENSITY,QUANTUMME- CHANICS,STATEOFAFFAIRS.D.S. state,liberaltheoryofthe.Seelocke,political PHILOSOPHY. state,political.Seepoliticalphilosophy. statedescription.Seecarnap. statefunction.Seequantummechanics. statement,basic.Seefoundationalism. statementform.Seelogicalform. stateofaffairs,apossibility,actuality,orimpossi- bilityofthekindexpressedbyanominalization ofadeclarativesentence.(Thedeclarativesen- tence'Thisdiecomesupsix'canbenominalized eitherthroughtheconstruction'thatthisdie comesupsix'orthroughthelikesof'thisdie's comingupsix'.Theresultingnominalizations mightbeinterpretedasnamingcorresponding propositionsorstatesofaffairs.) Statesofaffairscomeinseveralvarieties.Some arepossiblestatesofaffairs,orpossibilities.Con- siderthepossibilityofacertaindiecomingupsix whenrollednext.Thispossibilityisastateof affairs,asisits"complement"-thedie'snotcom- ingupsixwhenrollednext.Thereisinaddition thestateofaffairswhichconjoinsthatdie'scom- ingupsixwithitsnotcomingupsix.Andthis (contradictory)stateofaffairsisofcoursenota possibility,notapossiblestateofaffairs.More- over,foreveryactualstateofaffairsthereisa non-actualone,itscomplement. Foreverypropositionthereishenceastateof affairs:possibleorimpossible,actualornot. Indeedsomeconsiderpropositionstobestatesof affairs.Sometakefactstobeactualstatesof affairs,whileothersprefertodefinethemastrue propositions.Ifpropositionsarestatesofaffairs, thenfactsareofcoursebothactualstatesofaffairs andtruepropositions. Inaverybroadsense,eventsarejustpossible statesofaffairs;inanarrowersensetheyarecon- tingentstatesofaffairs;andinastillnarrower sensetheyarecontingentandparticularstatesof affairs,involvingjusttheexemplificationofann- adicpropertybyasequenceofindividualsof lengthn.Inayetnarrowersenseeventsareonly thoseparticularandcontingentstatesofaffairs thatentailchange.Abaseball'sremaininground throughoutacertainperioddoesnotcountasan eventinthisnarrowersensebutonlyasastateof thatbaseball,unliketheeventofitsbeinghitby acertainbat. Seealsocondition,proposition.E.S. stateofnature.Seehobbes,locke. statespace.Seestate. statetable.Seeturingmachine. 876 statevariable statisticallaw statevariable.Seestate. stateverb.Seeactionverb. statisticalexplanation,anexplanationexpressed inanexplanatoryargumentcontainingpremises andconclusionsmakingclaimsaboutstatistical probabilities.Theseargumentsincludededuc- tionsoflessgeneralfrommoregenerallawsand differfromothersuchexplanationsonlyinsofar asthecontentsofthelawsimplyclaimsabout statisticalprobability. Mostphilosophicaldiscussioninthelatterhalf ofthetwentiethcenturyhasfocusedonstatistical explanationofeventsratherthanlaws.Thistype ofargumentwasdiscussedbyEmestNagel(The StructureofScience,1961)undertherubric"proba- bilisticexplanation,"andbyHempel(Aspectsof ScientificExplanation,1965)as"inductivestatisti- cal"explanation.Theexplananscontainsastate- mentassertingthatagivensystemrespondsin oneofseveralwaysspecifiedbyasamplespace ofpossibleoutcomesonatrialorexperimentof sometype,andthatthestatisticalprobabilityofan event(representedbyasetofpointsinthesample space)onthegivenkindoftrialisalsogivenfor eachsuchevent.Thus,thestatementmightassert thatthestatisticalprobabilityisnear1oftherela- tivefrequencyrlnofheadsinntossesbeingclose tothestatisticalprobabilitypofheadsonasingle toss,wherethesamplespaceconsistsofthe2" possiblesequencesofheadsandtailsinntosses. NagelandHempelunderstoodsuchstatistical probabilitystatementstobecoveringlaws,sothat inductive-statisticalexplanationanddeductive- nomologicalexplanationofeventsaretwo speciesofcoveringlawexplanation. Theexplanansalsocontainsaclaimthatan experimentofthekindmentionedinthestatis- ticalassumptionhastakenplace(e.g.,thecoin hasbeentossedntimes).Theexplanandum assertsthataneventofsomekindhasoccurred (e.g.,thecoinhaslandedheadsapproximatelyr timesinthentosses). Inmanycases,thekindofexperimentcanbe describedequivalentlyasanw-foldrepetitionof someotherkindofexperiment(asathousand- foldrepetitionofthetossingofagivencoin)or astheimplementationofthekindoftrial(thou- sand-foldtossingofthecoin)onetime.Hence, statisticalexplanationofeventscanalwaysbe construedasderivingconclusionsabout"single cases"fromassumptionsaboutstatisticalproba- bilitiesevenwhentheconcernistoexplainmäss phenomena.Yet,manyauthorscontroversially contraststatisticalexplanationinquantum mechanics,whichisallegedtorequireasingle- casepropensityinterpretationofstatisticalprob- ability,withstatisticalexplanationinstatistical mechanics,genetics,andthesocialsciences, whichallegedlycallsforafrequencyinterpreta- tion. Thestructureoftheexplanatoryargumentof suchstatisticalexplanationhastheformofa directinferencefromassumptionsaboutstatisti- calprobabilitiesandthekindofexperimenttrial whichhastakenplacetotheoutcome.Onecon- troversialaspectofdirectinferenceistheprob- lemofthereferenceclass.Sincetheearly nineteenthcentury,statisticalprobabilityhas beenunderstoodtoberelativetothewaythe experimentortrialisdescribed.AuthorslikeJ. Venn,Peirce,R.A.Fisher,andReichenbach, amongmanyothers,havebeenconcernedwith howtodecideonwhichkindoftrialtobasea directinferencewhenthetrialunderinvestiga- tioniscorrectlydescribableinseveralwaysand thestatisticalprobabilitiesofpossibleoutcomes maydifferrelativetothedifferentsortsof descriptions.Themostcomprehensivediscus- sionofthisproblemofthereferenceclassis foundintheworkofH.E.Kyburg(e.g.,Proba- bilityandtheLogicofRationalBelief1961).Hempel acknowledgeditsimportanceasan"epistemic ambiguity"ininductivestatisticalexplanation. Controversyalsoarisesconcerninginductive acceptance.Maytheconclusionofanexplana- torydirectinferencebeajudgmentastothesub- jectiveprobabilitythattheoutcomeevent occurred?Mayajudgmentthattheoutcome eventoccurredisinductively"accepted"be made?Issomeothermodeofassessingtheclaim abouttheoutcomeappropriate?Hempel'sdis- cussionofthe"nonconjunctivenessofinductive- statistical"explanationderivesfromKyburg's earlieraccountofdirectinferencewherehigh probabilityisassumedtobesufficientforaccep- tance.Non-conjunctivenesshasbeenavoidedby abandoningthesufficiencyofhighprobability(I. Levi,GamblingwithTruth,1967)orbydenying thatdirectinferenceininductive-statistical explanationinvolvesinductiveacceptanceatall (R.C.Jeffrey,"StatisticalExplanationvs.Statis- ticalInference,"inEssaysinHonorofC.G.Hempel, 1969). Seealsocausation,explanation.I.L. statisticalindependence.Seeprobability. statisticallaw.Seecausallaw. 877 statisticalprobability Stirner,Max statisticalprobability.Seeprobability. Steiner,Rudolf(1861-1925),Austrianspiritual- istandfounderofanthroposophy.Trainedasa scientist,heeditedGoethe'sscientificwritings andpreparedthestandardeditionofhiscom- pleteworksfrom1889to1896.Steiner'smajor work,DiePhilosophiederFreiheit,waspublishedin 1894.HisFriedrichNietzsche:EinKämpfergegen seineZeit(1895)wastranslatedin1960byMar- garetdeRisasFriedrichNietzsche:FighterforFree- dom. Steinertaughtataworkingmen'scollegeand editedaliteraryjournal,MagazinfurLiteratur,in Berlin.In1901heembracedaspiritualismwhich emphasizedaformofknowledgethattran- scendedsensoryexperienceandwasattainedby the"higherself."Heheldthatmanhadprevi- ouslybeenattunedtospiritualprocessesby virtueofadreamlikestateofconsciousness,but wasdivertedfromthisconsciousnessbypreoc- cupationwithmaterialentities.Throughtrain- ing,individualscouldretrievetheirinnate capacitytoperceiveaspiritualrealm.Steiner's writingsonthisthemeareThePhilosophyofSpir- itualActivity(1894),OccultScience:AnOutline (1913),OntheRiddleofMan(1916),andOnthe RiddlesoftheSoul(1917).Hislastworkwashis autobiography(1924). Toadvancehisteachings,hefoundedthe AnthroposophicalSociety(1912)andaschoolof "spiritualscience"calledtheGoetheanumnear Basel,Switzerland.HisworkinspiredtheWal- dorfSchoolmovement,whichcomprisessome eightyschoolsforchildren.Theanthroposophy movementheestablishedremainsactivein EuropéandtheUnitedStates.G.J.S. Stephen,SirLeslie(1832-1904),Englishliterary critic,editor,intellectualhistorian,andphiloso- pher.HewasthefirstchiefeditorofthegreatDic- tionaryofNationalBiography,writinghundredsof theentrieshimself.Broughtupinanintensely religioushousehold,helösthisfaithandspent muchofhistimetryingtoconstructamoraland intellectualoutlooktoreplaceit.Hismainworks inintellectualhistory,thetwo-volumeHistoryof EnglishThoughtintheEighteenthCentury(1876) andthethree-volumeEnglishUtilitarians(1900), wereundertakenaspartofthisproject.Sowas hisonepurelyphilosophicalwork,theScienceof Ethics(1882),inwhichhetriedtodevelopan evolutionarytheoryofmorality.Stephenwas impatientofphilosophicaltechnicalities.Hence histreatiseonethicsdoesverylittletoresolvethe problems-someofthempointedouttohimby hisfriendHenrySidgwick-withevolutionary ethics,anddoesnotgetbeyondtheseveralother worksonthesubjectpublishedduringthis period.Hishistoriesofthoughtaresometimes superficial,andtheirfocusofinterestisnotours; buttheyarestillusefulbecauseoftheirscopeand themassivescholarshiptheyputtouse.Seealso DARWINISM.J.B.S. Stewart,Dugald.Seescottishcommonsensephi- losophy. Stillingfleet,Edward(1635-99),Englishdivine andcontroversialistwhofirstmadehisname withIrenicum(1659),usingnatural-lawdoc- trinestoopposereligioussectarianism.HisOri- ginesSacrae(1662),ostensiblyonthesuperiority oftheScripturalrecordöverotherformsof ancienthistory,wasforitsdayalearnedstudy inthemoralcertaintyofhistoricalevidence,the authorityoftestimony,andthecredibilityof miracles.Indrawingeclecticallyonphilosophy fromantiquitytotheCambridgePlatonists,he wasmuchinfluencedbytheCartesiantheoryof ideas,butlåterrepudiatedCartesianismforits mechanisttendency.Forthreedecadeshepam- phleteeredonbehalfofthemoralcertaintyof orthodoxProtestantbeliefagainstwhathecon- sideredthebeliefs"contrarytoreason"of RomanCatholicism.Thisledtocontroversywith Unitariananddeistwriterswhoarguedthat mysteriesliketheTrinitywereequallycontrary to"clearanddistinct"ideas.Hewasalarmedat theusemadeofLocke's"new,"i.e.non- Cartesian,wayofideasbyJohnTolandin ChristianitynotMysterious(1696),anddevotedhis lastyearstochallengingLocketoprovehis orthodoxy.Thedebatewaslargelyöverthecon- ceptsofsubstance,essence,andperson,andof faithandcertainty.Lockegavenoquarterinthe publiccontroversy,butinthefourtheditionof hisEssay(1700)hesilentlyamendedsomepas- sagesthathadprovokedStillingfleet.Seealso CAMBRIDGEPLATONISTS,DEISM,DESCARTES, LOCKE.M.A.St. stipulativedefinition.Seedefinition. Stirner,Max,pseudonymofKasperSchmidt (1805-56),Germanphilosopherwhoproposed atheoryofradicalindividualism.Bornin Bayreuth,hetaughtinGymnasiumsandlåterat aBerlinacademyforwomen.Hetranslatedwhat becameastandardGermanversionofSmith's WealthofNationsandcontributedartidestothe RhenischeZeitung.Hismostimportantworkwas 878 stochasticprocess Stoicism DerEinzigeundseinEigenthum(1845),translated byStevenT.ByingtonasTheEgoandHisOwn (1907).HissecondbookwasDieGeschichteder Reaktion(1852). StirnerwasinreactiontoHegelandwasfora timeassociatedwiththeleftHegelians.He stressedthepriorityofwillandinstinctöverrea- sonandproposedaradicalanarchicindividual- ism.Eachindividualisunique,andthein- dependentegoisthefundamentalvalueand reality.Stirnerattackedthestate,religiousideas, andabstractionssuchas"humanity"as"spec- tres"thataredeceptiveillusions,remnantsof erroneoushypostatizations.Hisdefenseofego- ismissuchthattheindividualisconsideredto havenoobligationsorduties,andespeciallynot tothestate.Encouraginganindividual"rebel- lion"againststatedominationandcontrol, Stirnerattractedafollowingamongnineteenth- andtwentieth-centuryanarchists.Thesolegoal oflifeisthecultivationof"uniqueness"or"own- ness."EngelsandMarxattackedhisideasat length(undertherubric"SaintMarx")inThe GermanIdeology.Insofarashistheoryofradical individualismoffersnoclearlystatedethical requirements,ithasbeencharacterizedasaform ofnihilisticegoism. Seealsohegel.G.J.S. stochasticprocess,aprocessthatevolves,astime goesby,accordingtoaprobabilisticprinciple ratherthanadeterministicprinciple.Such processesarealsocalledrandomprocesses,but 'stochastic'doesnotimplycompletedisorderli- ness.Theprincipleofevolutiongoverningasto- chasticorrandomprocessisprecise,though probabilistic,inform.Forexample,suppose someprocessunfoldsindiscretesuccessive stages.Andsupposethatgivenanyinitial sequenceofstages,S,S7,...,S,thereisapre- ciseprobabilitythatthenextstageSn+lwillbe stateS,apreciseprobabilitythatitwillbeS',and soonforallpossiblecontinuationsofthe sequenceofstates.Theseprobabilitiesarecalled transitionprobabilities.Anevolvingsequenceof thiskindiscalledadiscrete-timestochastic process,ordiscrete-timerandomprocess. Atheoreticallyimportantspecialcaseoccurs whentransitionprobabilitiesdependonlyonthe lateststageinthesequenceofstages.Whenan evolvingprocesshasthispropertyitiscalleda discrete-timeMarkovprocess.Asimpleexampleof adiscrete-timeMarkovprocessisthebehaviorof apersonwhokeepstakingeitherastepforward orastepbackaccordingtowhetheracoinfalls headsortails;theprobabilisticprincipleofmove- mentisalwaysappliedtotheperson'smost recentposition. Thesuccessivestagesofastochasticprocess neednotbediscrete.Iftheyarecontinuous,they constitutea"continuous-time"stochasticorran- domprocess. Themathematicaltheoryofstochastic processeshasmanyapplicationsinscienceand technology.Theevolutionofepidemics,the processofsoilerosion,andthespreadofcracks inmetalshaveallbeengivenplausiblemodelsas stochasticprocesses,tomentionjustafewareas ofresearch. Seealsodeterminism,probability,re- gressionANALYSIS.T.H. Stoicism,oneofthethreeleadingmovements constitutingHellenisticphilosophy.Itsfounder wasZenoofCitium(334-262b.c),whowas succeededasschoolheadbyCleanthes(331- 232).Butthethirdhead,Chrysippus(c.280- c.206),wasitsgreatestexponentandmostvolu- minouswriter.Thesethreearetheleadingrep- resentativesofEarlyStoicism.Noworkbyany earlyStoicsurvivesintact,exceptCleanthes' short"HymntoZeus."Otherwisewearedepen- dentondoxography,onisolatedquotations,and onsecondarysources,mostofthemhostile.Nev- ertheless,aremarkablycoherentaccountofthe systemcanbeassembled. TheStoicworldisanideallygoodorganism,all ofwhosepartsinteractforthebenefitofthe whole.Itisimbuedwithdivinereason(logos),its entiredevelopmentprovidentiallyordainedby fäteandrepeatedidenticallyfromoneworld phasetothenextinanever-endingcycle,each phaseendingwithaconflagration(ekpyrosis). Onlybodiesstrictly"exist"andcaninteract. Bodyisinfinitelydivisible,andcontainsnovoid. Atthelowestlevel,theworldisanalyzedintoan activeprinciple,god,andapassiveprinciple, matter,bothprobablycorporeal.Outoftheseare generated,atahigherlevel,thefourelements air,fire,earth,andwater,whoseowninteraction isanalogoustothatofgodandmatter:airand fire,severallyorconjointly,areanactiverational forcecalledbreath(Greekpneuma,Latinspiritus), whileearthandwaterconstitutethepassivesub- strateonwhichtheseact,totallyinterpenetrat- ingeachotherthankstothenon-particulate structureofbodyanditscapacitytobemixed "throughandthrough."Mostphysicalanalysisis conductedatthishigherlevel,andpneuma becomesakeyconceptinphysicsandbiology.A thing'squalitiesareconstitutedbyitspneuma, whichhastheadditionalroleofgivingitcohe- 879 Stoicism Stoicism sionandthusanessentialidentity.Ininanimate objectsthisunifyingpneumaiscalledahexis (state);inplantsitiscalledphysis(nature);and inanimals"soul."Evenqualitiesofsoul,e.g.jus- tice,areportionsofpneuma,andtheytooare thereforebodies:onlythuscouldtheyhavetheir evidentcausalefficacy.Fourincorporealsare admitted:place,void(whichsurroundsthe world),time,andlekta(seebelow);thesedonot strictly"exist"-theylackthecorporealpowerof interaction-butasitemswithsomeobjective standingintheworldtheyare,atleast,"some- things."Universals,identifiedwithPlato'sForms, aretreatedasconcepts(ennoemata),convenient fictionsthatdonoteveneamthestatusof "somethings." Stoicethicsisfoundedontheprinciplethat onlyvirtueisgood,onlyvicebad.Otherthings conventionallyassignedavalueare"indifferent" (adiaphora),althoughsome,e.g.,health,wealth, andhonor,arenaturally"preferred"(proegmena), whiletheiroppositesare"dispreferred" (apoproegmena).Eventhoughtheirpossessionis irrelevanttohappiness,frombirththeseindiffer- entsserveastheappropriatesubjectmatterof ourchoices,eachcorrectchoicebeinga"proper function"(kathekon)-notyetamorallygoodact, butasteptowardoureventualend(telos)of"liv- inginaccordancewithnature."Aswedevelop ourrationality,theappropriatechoicesbecome morecomplex,lessintuitive.Forexample,itmay sometimesbemoreinaccordancewithnature's plantosacrificeyourwealthorhealth,inwhich caseitbecomesyour"properfunction"todoso. Youhaveaspecificroletoplayintheworldplan, andmoralprogress(prokope)consistsinlearning it.Thisprogressinvolveswideningyournatural "affinity"(oikeiosis):aninitialconcemforyourself andyourpartsislåterextendedtothosecloseto you,andeventuallytoallmankind.Thatisthe Stoicroutetowardjustice.However,justiceand theothervirtuesareactuallyfoundonlyinthe sage,anidealizedperfectlyrationalpersontotally intunewiththedivinecosmicplan.TheStoics doubtedwhetheranysagesexisted,although therewasatendencytotreatatleastSocratesas havingbeenone.Thesageistotallygood,every- oneelsetotallybad,ontheparadoxicalStoic principlethatallsinsareequal.Thesage's actions,howeversimilarexternallytomere "properfunctions,"haveanentirelydistinct character:theyarerenamed'rightactions' (katorthomata).Actingpurelyfrom"rightrea- son,"heisdistinguishedbyhis"freedomfrom passion"(apatheia):morallywrongimpulses,or passions,areatrootintellectualerrorsofmistak- ingwhatisindifferentforgoodorbad,whereas thesage'sevaluationsarealwayscorrect.The sagealoneishappyandtrulyfree,livinginper- fectharmonywiththedivineplan.Allhuman livesarepredeterminedbytheprovidentially designed,all-embracingcausalnexusoffäte;yet beingtheprincipalcausesoftheiractions,the goodandthebadalikeareresponsibleforthem: determinismandmoralityarefullycompatible. Stoicepistemologydefendstheexistenceof cognitivecertaintyagainsttheattacksoftheNew Academy.Beliefisdescribedasassent(syn- katathesis)toanimpression(phantasia),i.e.tak- ingastruethepropositionalcontentofsome perceptualorreflectiveimpression.Certainty comesthroughthe"cognitiveimpression"(phan- tasiakataleptike),aself-certifyingperceptualrep- resentationofexternalfact,claimedtobecom- monplace.Outofsetsofsuchimpressionswe acquiregenericconceptions(prolepseis)and becomerational.Thehighestintellectualstate, knowledge(episteme),inwhichallcognitionsbe- comemutuallysupportingandhence"unshak- ablebyreason,"istheprerogativeofthewise. Everyoneelseisinastateofmereopinion(doxa) orofignorance.Nevertheless,thecognitiveim- pressionservesasa"criterionoftruth"forall.A furtherimportantcriterionisprolepseis,also calledcommonconceptionsandcommonno- tions(koinaiennoiai),oftenappealedtoinphilo- sophicalargument.Althoughofficiallydepen- dentonexperience,theyoftensoundmorelike innateintuitions,purportedlyindubitable. Stoiclogicispropositional,bycontrastwith Aristotle'slogicofterms.Thebasicunitisthe simpleproposition(axioma),theprimarybearer oftruthandfalsehood.Syllogisticalsoemploys complexpropositions-conditional,conjunc- tive,anddisjunctive-andrestsonfive"in- demonstrable"inferenceschemata(towhich otherscanbereducedwiththeaidoffourrules calledihemata).Alltheseitemsbelongtotheclass oflekta-"sayables"or"expressibles."Wordsare bodies(vibratingportionsofair),asareexternal objects,butpredicateslikethatexpressedby'... walks',andthemeaningsofwholesentences, e.g.,'Socrateswalks',areincorporeallekta.The structureandcontentofboththoughtsandsen- tencesareanalyzedbymappingthemontolekta, butthelektaarethemselvescausallyinert. Conventionally,asecondphaseoftheschool isdistinguishedasMiddleStoicism.Itdeveloped largelyatRhodesunderPanaetiusandPosido- nius,bothofwhominfluencedthepresentation ofStoicisminCicero'sinfluentialphilosophical treatises(mid-firstcenturyb.c).Panaetius 880 Stoicism,Middle Strawson,SirPeter (c.185-cl10)softenedsomeclassicalStoicposi- tions,hisethicsbeingmorepragmaticandless concernedwiththeidealizedsage.Posidonius (c.135-c.50)madeStoicismmoreopentoPla- tonicandAristotelianideas,revivingPlato's inclusionofirrationalcomponentsinthesoul. Athirdphase,RomanStoicism,istheonlyStoic erawhosewritingshavesurvivedinquantity.It isrepresentedespeciallybytheyoungerSeneca (a.d.c.1-65),Epictetus(a.d.c.55-c.135),and MarcusAurelius(a.d.121-80).Itcontinuedthe trendsetbyPanaetius,withastrongprimary focusonpracticalandpersonalethics.Many prominentRomanpoliticalfigureswereStoics. AfterthesecondcenturyA.D.Stoicismasasys- temfellfromprominence,butitsterminology andconceptshadbythenbecomeanineradica- blepartofancientthought.Throughthewritings ofCiceroandSeneca,itsimpactonthemoral andpoliticalthoughtoftheRenaissancewas immense. Seealsocicero,doxographers,hel- LENISTICPHILOSOPHY.D.N.S. Stoicism,Middle.Seestoicism. stoneparadox.Seeparadoxesofomnipotence. Stout,GeorgeFrederick(1860-1944),British psychologistandphilosopher.AstudentofWard, hewasinfluencedbyHerbartandespecially Brentano.HewaseditorofMind(1892-1920). HefoflowedWardinrejectingassociationismand sensationism,andproposinganalysisofmindas activityratherthanpassivity,consistingofactsof cognition,feeling,andconation.Stoutstressed attentionastheessentialfunctionofmind,and arguedforthegoal-directednessofallmental activityandbehavior,greatlyinfluencing McDougafTshormicpsychology.Hereinter- pretedtraditionalassociationistideastoempha- sizeprimacyofmentalactivity;e.g.,association bycontiguity-apassivemechanicalprocess imposedonmind-becameassociationbyconti- nuityofattentionalinterest.WithBrentano,he arguedthatmentalrepresentationinvolves "thoughtreference"toarealobjectknown throughtherepresentationthatisitselftheobject ofthought,likeLocke's"idea."Inphilosophyhe wasinfluencedbyMooreandRusseli.Hismajor worksareAnalyticPsychology(1896)andManual ofPsychology(1899).Seealsoassociationism, BRENTANO,SENSATIONALISM.T.H.L. St.Petersburgparadox.SeesaintPetersburg PARADOX. strategy.Seegametheory. Straton.Seeperipateticschool. StratoofLampsacus(c.335-c.267b.c),Greek philosopherandpolymathnicknamed"the Physicist"forhisinnovativeideasinnaturalsci- ence.HesucceededTheophrastusasheadofthe Lyceum.Earlierheservedasroyaltutorin Alexandria,wherehisstudentsincludedAris- tarchus,whodevisedthefirstheliocentricmodel. OfStrato'smanywritingsonlyfragmentsand summariessurvive.Theseshowhimcriticizing theabstractconceptualanalysisofearliertheo- ristsandpayingcloserattentiontoempiricalevi- dence.Amonghistargetswereatomistargu- mentsthatmotionisimpossibleunlessthereis void,andalsoAristotle'sthesisthatmatteris fullycontinuous.Stratoarguedthatnolarge voidoccursinnature,butthatmatterisnaturally porous,lacedwithtinypocketsofvoid.His investigationsofcompressionandsuctionwere influentialinancientphysiology.Indynamics,he proposedthatbodieshavenopropertyoflight- nessbutonlymoreorlessweight.Seealsohel- LENISTICPHILOSOPHY,LYCEUM.S.A.W. Strawson,SirPeter(b.1919),Britishphilosopher whohasmademajorcontributionstologic, metaphysics,andthestudyofKant.Hiscareer hasbeenatOxford,wherehewastheleading philosopherofhisgeneration. Hisfirstimportantwork,"OnReferring" (1950),arguesthatRussell'stheoryofdescrip- tionsfailstodealproperlywiththeroleof descriptionsas"referringexpressions"because Russellassumedthe"bogustrichotomy"that sentencesaretrue,false,ormeaningless:for Strawson,sentenceswithemptydescriptionsare meaningfulbut"neithertruenorfalse"because thegeneralpresuppositionsgoverningtheuseof referringexpressionsarenotfulfilled.Oneaspect ofthisargumentwasRussell'sallegedinsensitiv- itytotheordinaryuseofdefinitedescriptions. Thecontrastbetweentheabstractschemataof formållogicandthemanifoldrichnessofthe inferencesinherentinordinarylanguageisthe centralthemeofStrawson'sfirstbook,Introduc- tiontoLogicalTheory(1952). InIndividuals(1959)Strawsonreintroduced metaphysicsasarespectablephilosophicaldisci- plineafterdecadesofpositivistrhetoric.Buthis projectisonly"descriptive"metaphysics-eluci- dationofthebasicfeaturesofourownconcep- tualscheme-andhisargumentsarebasedon thephilosophyoflanguage:"basic"particulars 881 strictconditional structuralism arethosewhicharebasicobjectsofreference, anditisthespatiotemporalandsortalconditions fortheiridentificationandreidentificationby speakersthatconstitutethebasiccategories. Threeargumentsareespeciallyfamous:(1)even inapurelyauditoryworldobjectivereferenceon thebasisofexperiencerequiresatleastanana- iogueofspace;(2)becauseself-referencepre- supposesreferencetoothers,persons,conceived asbearersofbothphysicalandpsychological properties,areatypeofbasicparticular;and(3) "feature-placing"discourse,suchas'itissnow- ingherenow',is"theultimatepropositional level"throughwhichreferencetoparticulars entersdiscourse. Strawson'snextbook,TheBoundsofSense (i966),providesacriticalreadingofKanfsthe- oreticalphilosophy.Hisaimistoextricatewhat heseesastheprofoundtruthsconcerningthe presuppositionsofobjectiveexperienceand judgmentthatKanfstranscendentalarguments establishfromthemysteriousmetaphysicsof Kanfstranscendentalidealism.Strawson'scrit- icshaveargued,however,thattheresulting positionisunstable:transcendentalarguments cantellusonlywhatwemustsupposetobethe case.SoifKanfsidealism,whichrestrictssuch suppositionstothingsastheyappeartous,is abandoned,wecandrawconclusionsconcern- ingthewaytheworlditselfmustbeonlyifwe addtheverificationistthesisthatabilitytomake senseofsuchsuppositionsrequiresabilitytover- ifythem.Inhisnextbook,SkepticismandNatu- ralism:SomeVarieties(1985),Strawsonconceded this:transcendentalargumentsbelongwithin descriptivemetaphysicsandshouldnotbe regardedasattemptstoprovideanexternaljus- tificationofourconceptualscheme.Intruthno suchexternaljustificationiseitherpossibleor needed:instead-andhereStrawsoninvokes HumeratherthanKant-ourreasoningscome toanendinnaturalpropensitiesforbeliefthat arebeyondquestionbecausetheyalonemakeit possibletoraisequestions.Inafamousearlier paperStrawsonhadurgedmuchthesamepoint concerningthefreewilldebate:defendersofour ordinaryattitudesofreproachandgratitude shouldnotseektogroundtheminthe"panicky metaphysics"ofasupra-causalfreewill;instead theycanandneeddonomorethanpointtoour unshakablecommitmenttothese"reactive"atti- tudesthroughwhichwemanifestourattach- menttothatfundamentalcategoryofour conceptualscheme-persons. Seealsofreewillproblem,kant,ordi- naryLANGUAGEPHILOSOPHY,PARADIGM CASEARGUMENT,PRESUPPOSITION,RUSSELL, THEORYOFDESCRIPTIONS,TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT.T.R.B. strictconditional.Seecounterfactuals,implica- TION. strictduty.Seekant. strictidentity.Seeidentity. strictimplication.Seeimplication. strictpartialorder.Seeordering. strokenotation.Seeshefferstroke. strongsemanticcompleteness.Seecompleteness. strongsoundness.Seesoundness. strongsupervenience.Seesupervenience. structuralambiguity.Seeambiguity. structuralism,adistinctiveyetextremelywide rangeofproductiveresearchconductedinthe socialandhumansciencesfromthe1950s throughthe1970s,principallyinFrance.Itisdif- ficulttodescribestructuralismasamovement, becauseofthemethodologicalconstraintsexer- cisedbythevariousdisciplinesthatcametobe influencedbystructuralism-e.g.,anthropology, philosophy,literarytheory,psychoanalysis, politicaltheory,evenmathematics.Nonetheless, structuralismisgenerallyheldtoderiveitsorga- nizingprinciplesfromtheearlytwentieth-cen- turyworkofSaussure,thefounderofstructural linguistics.Arguingagainsttheprevailinghistori- cistandphilologicalapproachestolinguistics,he proposeda"scientific"modeloflanguage,one understoodasaclosedsystemofelementsand rulesthataccountfortheproductionandthe socialcommunicationofmeaning.Inspiredby Durkheinfsnotionofa"socialfacf-thatdo- mainofobjectivitywhereinthepsychologi- calandthesocialordersconverge-Saussure viewedlanguageastherepositoryofdiscursive signssharedbyagivenlinguisticcommunity.The particularsigniscomposedoftwoelements,a phonemicsignifier,ordistinctivesoundelement, andacorrespondingmeaning,orsignifiedele- ment.Thedefiningrelationbetweenthesign's soundandmeaningcomponentsisheldtobe arbitrary,i.e.,basedonconventionalassociation, andnotduetoanyfunctionofthespeakingsub- 882 structuralism structuralism jecfspersonalinclination,ortoanyexternalcon- siderationofreference.Whatlendsspecificityor identitytoeachparticularsignifierisitsdifferen- tialrelationtotheothersignifiersinthegreater set;hence,eachbasicunitoflanguageisitselfthe productofdifferencesbetweenotherelements withinthesystem.Thisprincipleofdifferential- andstructural-relationwasextendedby Troubetzkoytotheorderofphonemes,whereby adefiningsetofvocalicdifferencesunderliesthe constitutionofalllinguisticphonemes.Finally, forSaussure,theclosedsetofsignsisgovernedby asystemofgrammatical,phonemic,andsyntac- ticrules.Languagethusderivesitssignificance fromitsownautonomousorganization,andthis servestoguaranteeitscommunicativefunction. Sincelanguageistheforemostinstanceof socialsignsystemsingeneral,thestructural accountmightserveasanexemplarymodelfor understandingtheveryintelligibilityofsocial systemsassuch-hence,itsobviousrelevanceto thebroaderconcernsofthesocialandhuman sciences.ThisimplicationwasraisedbySaussure himself,inhisCourseonGeneralLinguistics(1916), butitwasadvanceddramaticallybytheFrench anthropologistClaudeLévi-Strauss-whois generallyacknowledgedtobethefounderof modernstructuralism-inhisextensiveanalyses intheareaofsocialanthropology,beginning withhisElementaryStructuresofKinship(1949). Lévi-Straussarguedthatsocietyisitselforga- nizedaccordingtooneformoranotherofsignif- icantcommunicationandexchange-whether thisbeofinformation,knowledge,ormyths,or evenofitsmembersthemselves.Theorganiza- tionofsocialphenomenacouldthusbeclarified throughadetailedelaborationoftheirsubtend- ingstructures,which,collectively,testifytoa deeperandall-inclusive,socialrationality.As withtheanalysisoflanguage,thesesocialstruc- tureswouldbedisclosed,notbydirectobserva- tion,butbyinferenceanddeductionfromthe observedempiricaldata.Furthermore,since thesestructuresaremodelsofspecificrelations, whichinturnexpressthedifferentialproperties ofthecomponentelementsunderinvestigation, thestructuralanalysisisbothreadilyformaliz- ableandsusceptibletoabroadvarietyofappli- cations.InBritain,e.g.,EdmundLeachpursued theseanalysesinthedomainofsocialanthro- pology;intheUnitedStates,Chomskyapplied insightsofstructuralismtolinguistictheoryand philosophyofmind;inItaly,Ecoconducted extensivestructuralistanalysesinthefieldsof socialandliterarysemiotics. Withitsacknowledgmentthatlanguageisa rule-governedsocialsystemofsigns,andthat effectivecommunicationdependsonthe resourcesavailabletothespeakerfromwithin thecodesoflanguageitself,thestructuralist approachtendstobelesspreoccupiedwiththe moretraditionalconsiderationsof"subjectivity" and"history"initstreatmentofmeaningfuldis- course.Inthepost-structuralismthatgrewoutof thisapproach,theFrenchphilosopherFoucault, e.g.,focusedonthegenerationofthe"subject" bythevariousepistemicdiscoursesofimitation andrepresentation,aswellasontheinstitutional rolesofknowledgeandpowerinproducingand conservingparticular"disciplines"inthenatural andsocialsciences.Thesedisciplines,Foucault suggested,inturngovernourtheoreticaland practicalnotionsofmadness,criminality,pun- ishment,sexuality,etc,notionsthatcollectively serveto"normalize"theindividualsubjectto theirdeterminations.Likewise,inthedomainof psychoanalysis,LacandrewontheworkofSaus- sureandLévi-StrausstoemphasizeFreud'scon- cernwithlanguageandtoarguethat,asasetof determiningcodes,languageservestostructure thesubjecfsveryunconscious.Problematically, however,itistheverydynamismoflanguage, includingmetaphor,metonymy,condensation, displacement,etc,thatintroducesthesocial symbolicintotheconstitutionofthesubject. Althusserappliedtheprinciplesofstructuralist methodologytohisanalysisofMarxism,espe- ciallytheroleplayedbycontradictioninunder- standinginfrastructuralandsuperstructural formation,i.e.,fortheconstitutionofthehistor- icaldialectic.HisaccountfollowedMarx'srejec- tionofFeuerbach,atoncedenyingtheroleof traditionalsubjectivityandhumanism,andpre- sentinga"scientific"analysisof"historicalmate- rialism,"onethatwouldbeanti-historicistin principlebutattentivetotheactualpoliticalstate ofaffairs.ForAlthusser,suchaphilosophical analysishelpedprovidean"objective"discern- menttothehistoricaltransformationofsocial reality. Therestraintthestructuralistsextended towardthetraditionalviewsofsubjectivityand historydramaticallycoloredtheirtreatmentboth oftheindividualswhoareagentsofmeaningful discourseandofthelinguisticallyarticulable objectfieldingeneral.Thisredirectionof researchinterests(particularlyinFrance,dueto theinfluentialworkofBarthesandMichelSerres inthefieldsofpoetics,culturalsemiotics,and communicationtheory)hasresultedinaseriesof originalanalysesandalsoprovokedlively debatesbetweentheadherentsofstructuralist 883 structuralism,mathematical Suårez,Francisco methodologyandthemoreconventionallyori- entedschoolsofthought(e.g.,phenomenology, existentialism,Marxism,andempiricistandpos- itivistphilosophiesofscience).Thesedebates servedasanagencytoopenupsubsequentdis- cussionsondeconstructionandpostmodernist theoryforthephilosophicalgenerationofthe 1980sandlåter. Thesepost-structuralistthinkerswereperhaps lessconcernedwiththeorganizationofsocial phenomenathanwiththeirinitialconstitution andsubsequentdynamics.Hence,theproblem- aticsofthesubjectandhistory-or,inbroader terms,temporalityitself-wereagainengaged. Thenewdiscussionswereabettedbyamorecrit- icalappraisaloflanguageandtendedtobeanti- Hegelianintheirrejectionofthetotalizing tendencyofsystematicmetaphysics.Heidegger's critiqueoftraditionalmetaphysicswasoneofthe majorinfluencesinthediscussionsfollowing structuralism,aswasthereexaminationofNie- tzsche'searlieraccountsof"genealogy,"hisanti- essentialism,andhisteachingofadynamic"will topower."Additionally,manypoststructuralist philosophersstressedtheFreudiannotionsofthe libidoandtheunconsciousasdeterminingfac- torsinunderstandingnotonlythesubject,but thedeeprhetoricalandaffectivecomponentsof languageuse.Anastonishingvarietyofphiloso- phersandcriticsengagedinthedebatesinitially framedbythestructuralistthinkersoftheperiod, andtheirextendedresponsesandcriticalreap- praisalsformedthevibrant,poststructuralist periodofFrenchintellectuallife.Suchfiguresas Ricoeur,EmmanuelLevinas,Kristeva,Maurice Blanchot,Derrida,GillesDeleuze,FelixGuattari, Lyotard,JeanBaudrillard,PhilippeLacoue- Labarthe,Jean-LucNancy,andIrigarayinaugu- ratedaseriesofcontemporaryreflectionsthat havebecomeinternationalinscope. SeealsoContinentalphilosophy, DECONSTRUCTION,FOUCAULT,HEIDEGGBR, LACAN,LYOTARD,POSTMODERN,SAUSSURE. D.A1. structuralism,mathematical.Seemathematical STRUCTURALISM. structure.Seegrammar,philosophyoflan- guage,TRANSFORMATIONRULE. structure,deep.Seegrammar,philosophyof LANGUAGE,TRANSFORMATIONRULE. structure,surface.Seegrammar,philosophyof LANGUAGE,TRANSFORMATIONRULE. structuredescription.Seecarnap. stuff.Seemetaphysics. SturtnundDräng.Seegoethe. Suårez,Francisco,alsoknownasDoctorEximius (1548-1617),SpanishJesuitphilosopherand theologian.BorninGranada,hestudiedatSala- mancaandtaughtthereandatRome,Coimbra, andotherleadinguniversities.Suårez'smost importantworksareDelegibus("OnLaw,"1612), DeDeounoettrino("OntheTrinity,"1606),De anima("OntheSoul,"1621),andthemonu- mentalDisputationesmetaphysicae("Metaphysical Disputations,"1597).TheDisputationeshasa uniqueplaceinphilosophy,beingthefirstsys- tematicandcomprehensiveworkofmetaphysics writtenintheWestthatisnotacommentaryon Aristotle'sMetaphysics.Dividedintofifty-fourdis- putations,itdiscusseseverymetaphysicalissue knownatthetime.Itsinfluencewasimmediate andlastingandcanbeseenintheworkof ScholasticsinbothEuropéandLatinAmerica, andofmodernphilosopherssuchasDescartes, Leibniz,Wolff,andSchopenhauer. Suårez'smaincontributionstophilosophyoc- curredinmetaphysics,epistemology,andthe philosophyoflaw.Inallthreeareashewasinflu- encedbyAristotleandAquinas,althoughhealso drewinspirationfromOckham,DunsScotus, andothers.Inmetaphysics,Suårezisknownfor hisviewsonthenatureofmetaphysics,being, andindividuation.Metaphysicsisthescienceof "beinginsofarasitisrealbeing"(ensinquantum ensreale),anditsproperobjectofstudyisthe objectconceptofbeing.Thisunderstandingof theobjectofmetaphysicsisoftenseenaspaving thewayforearlymodernmetaphysicaltheory,in whichtheobjectofmetaphysicsismental.For Suåreztheconceptofbeingisderivedbyanalogy fromthesimilarityexistingamongthings. ExistingrealityforSuåreziscomposedofindivid- uals:everythingthatexistsisindividual,includ- ingsubstancesandtheirproperties,accidents, principles,andcomponents.Heunderstands individualityasincommunicability,namely,the inabilityofindividualstobedividedintoentities ofthesamespecifickindasthemselves.Theprin- cipleofindividuationis"entity,"whichheidenti- fieswith"essenceasitexists."Thisprinciple appliesbothtosubstancesandtheirproperties, accidents,principles,andcomponents. Inepistemology,twoofSuårez'sviewsstånd out:thattheintellectknowstheindividual throughaproperandseparateconceptwithout 884 subaltern subject-objectdichotomy havingtotumtoreflection,apositionthatsup- portsanempiricistepistemologyinwhich,con- trarytoThomism,knowledgeoftheindividualis notmediatedthroughuniversals;and(2)his viewofmiddleknowledge(scientiamedia),the knowledgeGodhasofwhateveryfreecreature wouldfreelydoineverypossiblesituation.This notionwasusedbySuårezandMolinatoexplain howGodcancontrolhumanactionswithout violatingfreewill. Inphilosophyoflaw,Suårezwasaninnova- tivethinkerwhoseideasinfluencedGrotius.For himlawisfundamentallyanactofthewillrather thanaresultofanordinanceofreason,as Aquinasheld.Lawisdividedintoeternal,divine, natural,andhuman.Humanlawisbasedonnat- uralordivinelawandisnottheresultofhuman creation. Seealsoindividuation,metaphysics. J.J.E.G. subaltern.Seesquareofopposition. subcontrary.Seesquareofopposition. subdoxastic,pertainingtostatesofmindpostu- latedtoaccountfortheproductionandcharac- terofcertainapparentlynon-inferentialbeliefs. ThesewerefirstdiscussedbyStephenP.Stichin "BeliefsandSubdoxasticStates"(1978).Imay formthebeliefthatyouaredepressed,e.g.,on thebasisofsubtlecuesthatIamunabletoartic- ulate.Thepsychologicalmechanismresponsible forthisbeliefmightbethoughttoharborinfor- mationconcerningthesecuessubdoxastically. Althoughsubdoxasticstatesresemblebeliefsin certainrespects-theyincorporateintentional content,theyguidebehavior,theycanbestow justificationonbeliefs-theydifferfromfully- fledgeddoxasticstatesorbeliefsinatleasttwo respects.First,asnotedabove,subdoxasticstates maybelargelyinaccessibletointrospection;I maybeunabletodescribe,evenonreflection, thebasisofmybeliefthatyouaredepressed.Sec- ond,subdoxasticstatesseemcutoffinferentially fromanagenfscorpusofbeliefs;mysubdoxas- ticappreciationthatyourforeheadiscreased maycontributetomybelievingthatyouare depressed,but,unlikethebeliefthatyourfore- headiscreased,itneednot,inthepresenceof otherbeliefs,leadtofurtherbeliefsaboutyour visage.Seealsobelief.J.F.H. subject.Seegrammar,logicalsubject. subjectiveprobability.Seeprobability. subjectivereason.Seereasonsforaction. subjectiverightness.Seeobjectiverightness. subjectivism,anyphilosophicalviewthat attemptstounderstandinasubjectivemanner whatatfirstglancewouldseemtobeaclassof judgmentsthatareobjectivelyeithertrueor false-i.e.,trueorfalseindependentlyofwhat webelieve,want,orhope.Therearetwoways ofbeingasubjectivist.Inthefirstway,onecan saythatthejudgmentsinquestion,despitefirst appearances,arereallyjudgmentsaboutour ownattitudes,beliefs,emotions,etc.Inthesec- ondway,onecandenythatthejudgmentsare trueorfalseatall,arguinginsteadthattheyare disguisedcommandsorexpressionsofattitudes. Inethics,forexample,asubjectiveviewofthe secondsortisthatmoraljudgmentsaresimply expressionsofourpositiveandnegativeatti- tudes.Thisisemotivism.Prescriptivismisalsoa subjectiveviewofthesecondsort;itistheview thatmoraljudgmentsarereallycommands-to say"Xisgood"istosay,detailsaside,"DoX." Viewsthatmakemoralityultimatelyamatterof conventions(orwhatweormostpeopleagree to)canalsobeconstruedassubjectivetheories, albeitofthefirsttype.Subjectivismisnotlimited toethics,however.Accordingtoasubjective viewofepistemicrationality,thestandardsof rationalbeliefarethestandardsthattheindivid- ual(orperhapsmostmembersintheindividual's community)wouldapproveofinsofarasthey areinterestedinbelievingthosepropositions thataretrueandnotbelievingthosepropositions thatarefalse.Similarly,phenomenalistscanbe regardedasproposingasubjectiveaccountof materialobjectstatements,sinceaccordingto them,suchstatementsarebestunderstoodas complexstatementsaboutthecourseofour experiences.Seealsoemotivism,episte- mology,ETHICALOBJECTIVISM,IDEALOB- SERVER.R.FO. subjectivism,moral.Seeethics. subject-objectdichotomy,thedistinctionbe- tweenthinkersandwhattheythinkabout.The distinctionisnotexclusive,sincesubjectscan alsobeobjects,asinreflexiveself-conscious thought,whichtakesthesubjectasitsintended object.Thedichotomyalsoneednotbean exhaustivedistinctioninthestrongsensethat everythingiseitherasubjectoranobject,since inalogicallypossibleworldinwhichthereare nothinkers,theremayyetbemind-independent 885 subjunctiveconditional subsidiarity thingsthatareneithersubjectsnorobjects. Whethertherearenon-thinkingthingsthatare notobjectsofthoughtintheactualworld dependsonwhetherornotitissufficientinlogic tointendeveryindividualthingbysuch thoughtsandexpressionsas'Wecanthinkof everythingthatexists'.Thedichotomyisaninter- implicativedistinctionbetweenthinkersand whattheythinkabout,inwhicheachpresup- posestheother.Iftherearenosubjects,thennei- therarethereobjectsinthetruesense,and conversely. Asubject-objectdichotomyisacknowledged inmostWesternphilosophicaltraditions,but emphasizedespeciallyinContinentalphiloso- phy,beginningwithKant,andcarryingthrough idealistthoughtinFichte,Schelling,Hegel,and Schopenhauer.Itisalsoprominentinintention- alistphilosophy,intheempiricalpsychologyof Brentano,theobjecttheoryofMeinong,Ernst Mally(1879-1944),andTwardowski,andthe transcendentalphenomenologyofHusserl.Sub- ject-objectdichotomyisdeniedbycertainmys- ticisms,renouncedasthephilosophicalfictionof duality,ofwhichCartesianmind-bodydualism isaparticularinstance,andcriticizedbymystics asaconfusionthatpreventsmindfromrecog- nizingitsessentialonenesswiththeworld, therebycontributingtounnecessaryintellectual andmoraldilemmas. Seealsobrentano,Continentalphilos- ophy,HUSSERL,INTENTIONALITY,PHENOME- NOLOGY.D.J. subjunctiveconditional.Seecounterfactuals. sublation.Seehegel. sublime,afeelingbroughtaboutbyobjectsthat areinfinitelylargeorväst(suchastheheavens ortheocean)oroverwhelminglypowerful(such asaragingtorrent,hugemountains,or precipices).Theformer(inKanfsterminology) isthemathematicallysublimeandthelatterthe dynamicallysublime.Thoughtheexperienceof thesublimeistoanimportantextentunpleasant, itisalsoaccompaniedbyacertainpleasure:we enjoythefeelingofbeingoverwhelmed.On Kanfsview,thispleasureresultsfromanaware- nessthatwehavepowersofreasonthatarenot dependentonsensation,butthatlegislateöver sense.Thesublimethusdisplaysboththelimita- tionsofsenseexperience(andhenceourfeeling ofdispleasure)andthepowerofourownmind (andhencethefeelingofpleasure). Thesublimewasanespeciallyimportantcon- ceptintheaesthetictheoryoftheeighteenthand nineteenthcenturies.Reflectiononitwasstim- ulatedbytheappearanceofatranslationof Longinus'sPerihypsous(OntheSublime)in1674. The"postmodernsublime"hasinaddition emergedinlatetwentiethcenturythoughtasa basisforraisingquestionsaboutart.Whereas beautyisassociatedwiththatwhoseformcanbe apprehended,thesublimeisassociatedwiththe formless,thatwhichis"unpresentable"insensa- tion.Thus,itisconnectedwithcritiquesof"the aesthetic"-understoodasthatwhichissensu- ouslypresent-asawayofunderstandingwhat isimportantaboutart.Ithasalsobeengivena politicalreading,wherethesublimeconnects withresistancetorule,andbeautyconnectswith conservativeacceptanceofexistingformsor structuresofsociety. Seealsoaestheticproperty,aesthet- ics,beauty.S.L.F. subset.Seesettheory. subsidiarity,abasicprincipleofsocialorderand thecommongoodgoverningtherelations betweenthehigherandlowerassociationsina politicalcommunity.Positively,theprincipleof subsidiarityholdsthatthecommongood,i.e., theensembleofsocialresourcesandinstitutions thatfacilitatehumanself-realization,dependson fosteringthefree,creativeinitiativesofindivid- ualsandoftheirvoluntaryassociations;thus,the state,inadditiontoitsdirectroleinmaintaining publicgood(whichcomprisesjustice,public peace,andpublicmorality)alsohasanindirect roleinpromotingotheraspectsofthecommon goodbyrenderingassistance(subsidium)tothose individualsandassociationswhoseactivities facilitatecooperativehumanself-realizationin work,play,thearts,sciences,andreligion.Neg- atively,theprincipleofsubsidiarityholdsthat higher-level(i.e.,morecomprehensive)associa- tions-whiletheymustmonitor,regulate,and coordinate-oughtnottoabsorb,replace,or underminethefreeinitiativesandactivitiesof lower-levelassociationsandindividualsinsofar asthesearenotcontrarytothecommongood. Thispresumptionfavoringfreeindividualand socialinitiativehasbeendefendedonvarious grounds,suchastheinefficiencyofburdening thestatewithmyriadlocalconcerns,aswellas thecorrespondingefficiencyofunleashingthe free,creativepotentialofsubordinategroupsand individualswhobuildupthesharedeconomic, scientific,andartisticresourcesofsociety.Butthe deepergroundforthispresumptionistheview 886 subsistence substancecausation thathumanflourishingdependscruciallyon freedomforindividualself-directionandforthe self-governmentofvoluntaryassociationsand thathumanbeingsflourishbestthroughtheir ownpersonalandcooperativeinitiativesrather thanasthepassiveconsumersorbeneficiariesof theinitiativesofothers. Seealsocommongood,justice,liber- alism,POLITICALPHILOSOPHY.J.B.M. subsistence(translationofGermanBestand),in currentphilosophy,especiallyMeinong'ssys- tem,thekindofbeingthatbelongsto"ideal" objects(suchasmathematicalobjects,statesof affairs,andabstractionslikesimilarityanddif- ference).Bycontrast,thekindofbeingthat belongsto"real"(wirklich)objects,thingsofthe sortsinvestigatedbythesciencesotherthanpsy- chologyandpuremathematics,iscalledexistence (Existenz).Existenceandsubsistencetogether exhausttherealmofbeing(Sein).So,e.g.,the subsistentidealfigureswhosepropertiesare investigatedbygeometersdonotexist-theyare nowheretobefoundintherealworld-butitis nolesstrueofthemthattheyhavebeingthanit isofanexistentphysicalobject:therearesuch figures. Beingdoesnot,however,exhausttherealmof objectsorthings.Thepsychologicalphenome- nonofintentionalityshowsthatthereare(in somesenseof'thereare')objectsthatneither existnorsubsist.Everyintentionalstateis directedtowardanobject.Althoughonemay covettheHopeDiamondordesiretheunification ofEuropé,onemayalsocovetanon-existent materialobjectordesireanon-subsistentstateof affairs.Ifonecovetsanon-existentdiamond, thereis(insomesenseof'thereis')something thatonecovets-one'sstateofmindhasan object-andithascertainproperties:itis,e.g.,a diamond.Itmaythereforebesaidtoinhabitthe realmofSosein('beingthus'or'predication'or 'havingproperties'),whichisthecategorycom- prisingthetotalityofobjects.Objectsthatdonot haveanysortofbeing,eitherexistenceorsub- sistence,belongtonon-being(Nichtsein).Ingen- eral,thepropertiesofanobjectdonotdetermine whetherithasbeingornon-being.(Butthereare specialcases:theroundsquare,byitsvery nature,cannotsubsist.)Meinongthusmaintains thatobjecthoodisausserseiend,i.e.,independent ofbothexistenceandsubsistence. Seealsoabstractentity,meinong, METAPHYSICS.P.V.I. subspecieaeternitatis.Seespinoza. substance,asdefinedbyAristotleintheCate- gories,thatwhichisneitherpredicable ("sayable")ofanythingnorpresentinanything asanaspectorpropertyofit.Theexampleshe givesareanindividualmanandanindividual horse.Wecanpredicatebeingahorseofsome- thingbutnotahorse;norisahorseinsomething else.Healsoheldthatonlysubstancescan remainself-identicalthroughchange.Allother thingsareaccidentsofsubstancesandexistonly asaspects,properties,orrelationsofsubstances, orkindsofsubstances,whichAristotlecalledsec- ondarysubstances.Anexampleofanaccident wouldbethecolorofanindividualman,andan exampleofasecondarysubstancewouldbehis beingaman. ForLocke,asubstanceisthatpartofanindi- vidualthinginwhichitspropertiesinhere.Since wecanobserve,indeedknow,onlyathing's properties,itssubstanceisunknowable.Locke's senseisobviouslyrootedinAristotle'sbutthe lattercarriesnoskepticalimplications.Infact, Locke'ssenseiscloserinmeaningtowhatAris- totlecallsmatter,andwouldbebetterregarded asasynonymof'substratum',asindeeditisby Locke.Substancemayalsobeconceivedasthat whichiscapableofexistingindependentlyof anythingelse.ThissenseisalsorootedinAristot- le^,but,understoodquitestrictly,leadstoSpi- noza^viewthattherecanbeonlyonesubstance, namely,thetotalityofrealityorGod. Afourthsenseof'substance'isthecommon, ordinarysense,'whatathingismadeof.This senseisrelatedtoLocke's,butlacksthelatter's skepticalimplications.Italsocorrespondsto whatAristotlemeantbymatter,atleastproxi- matematter,e.g.,thebronzeofabronzestatue (Aristotleanalyzesindividualthingsascompos- itesofmatterandform).Thisnotionofmatter, orstuff,hasgreatphilosophicalimportance, becauseitexpressesanideacrucialtobothour ordinaryandourscientificunderstandingsofthe world.PhilosopherssuchasHumewhodenythe existenceofsubstancesholdthatindividual thingsaremerebundlesofproperties,namely, thepropertiesordinarilyattributedtothem,and usuallyholdthattheyareincapableofchange; theyareseriesofmomentaryevents,ratherthan thingsenduringthroughtime. Seealsobundletheory,property.P.Bu. substance,primary.Seearistotle. substance,secondary.Seearistotle. substancecausation.Seeagentcausation. 887 substance-function Sufism substance-function.Seet'i,yung. substantialform.Seefor M,HYLOMORPHISM. substantialism,theviewthattheprimary,most fundamentalentitiesaresubstances,everything elsebeingdependentforitsexistenceonthem, eitherasapropertyofthemorarelation betweenthem.Differentversionsoftheview wouldcorrespondtothedifferentsensesofthe word'substance'.Seealsosubstance.P.Bu. substantivalcausation.Seecausation. substantivalism.Seephilosophyofscience. substantivepluralism.Seepluralism. substitutabilitysalvaveritate.Seesubstitutivity SALVAVERITATE. substitutionalquantification.Seequantification. substitutivitysalvaveritate,aconditionmetby twoexpressionswhenoneissubstitutableforthe otheratacertainoccurrenceinasentenceand thetruth-value(truthorfalsity)ofthesentence isnecessarilyunchangedwhenthesubstitution ismade.Insuchacasethetwoexpressionsare saidtoexhibitsubstitutivityorsubstitutability salvaveritate(literally,'withtruthsaved')with respecttooneanotherinthatcontext.The expressionsarealsosaidtobeinterchangeableor intersubstitutablesalvaveritateinthatcontext. Whereitisobviousfromagivendiscussionthat itisthetruth-valuethatistobepreserved,itmay besaidthattheoneexpressionissubstitutable fortheotherorexhibitssubstitutabilitywith respecttotheotheratthatplace. Leibnizproposedtousetheuniversalinter- changeabilitysalvaveritateoftwotermsinevery "proposition"inwhichtheyoccurasanecessary andsufficientconditionforidentity-presum- ablyfortheidentityofthethingsdenotedbythe terms.Thereareapparentexceptionstothiscri- terion,asLeibnizhimselfnoted.Ifasentence occursinacontextgovernedbyapsychological verbsuchas'believe'or'desire',byanexpres- sionconveyingmodality(e.g.,'necessarily','pos- sibly'),orbycertaintemporalexpressions(such as'itwillsoonbethecasethat'),thentwoterms maydenotethesamethingbutnotbeinter- changeablewithinsuchasentence.Occurrences ofexpressionswithinquotationmarksorwhere theexpressionsarebothmentionedandused(ef. Quine'sexample,"Giorgionewasso-calledbe- causeofhissize")alsoexhibitfailureofsubstitu- tivity. Fregeurgedthatsuchfailuresaretobe explainedbythefactthatwithinsuchcontexts anexpressiondoesnothaveitsordinarydenota- tionbutdenotesinsteadeitheritsusualsenseor theexpressionitself. Seealsoquantifyingin,referentially TRANSPARENT.C.A.A. substrate.Seesubstance. substratum.Seeberkeley,substance. subsumptiontheoryofexplanation.Seecovering lawmodel. sufficientcondition.Seecondition. sufficientreason,principleof.Seeleibniz. Sufism(fromArabicsufi,'mystic'),Islamicmys- ticism.TheArabicwordistasawwitf.Thephilo- sophicallysignificantaspectsofSufismareits psychologyinitsearlyphaseanditsepistemol- ogyandontologyinitslåterphase. Theearlypracticesofasceticism,introspection, andmeditationonGodandthehereafteras depictedintheKoraneventuallydevelopedin classicalSufism(eighth-eleventhcenturies)into thespiritualjourneyofthemystic,thesuccessive stagesofwhichweredescribedwithasophisti- catedpsychologicalterminology.Sufisdifferenti- atedtwolevelsofspiritualattainment:thefirst wasthatof"stations"(maqämät)thatwere reachedthroughindividualeffort,abnegation, andspiritualexercises(e.g.,tawakkul,'selfless trustinGod',sabr,'patience',etc).Thecharac- teristictheyallsharedwasthattheSufi,through anactofthewillanddeliberatedeeds,sup- pressedhisindividualegoanditsconcomitant attachmenttoworldlythingsandemotionsin ordertobecomereceptivetothefollowinglevel of"states"(ahwäl),whichwerevouchsafedto himthroughGod'sgrace.Theseeulminatedin thegoalofthemysticalquest,thefinalstatesof bliss,whichwerevariouslyidentifiedbySufis, accordingtotheirproclivities,aslove(mahabba, låter'ishq),mysticalknowledge(ma'rifa),andthe totallossofegoconsciousnessandtheconcomi- tantabsorptionandsubsistenceinandthrough God(fana'andbaqä').Thelanguagedescribing thesestagesandstateswasallusiveandsymbol- icalratherthandescriptive. Sufism,whichwasviewedinitiallywithsuspi- cionbytheauthoritiesandtheorthodox,was 888 suicide,assisted sunyata integratedintomainstreambeliefintheeleventh century,primarilythroughtheworkofal-Gha- zäll(d.1111).Afteral-Ghazäll,thetheoretical andpracticalaspectsofSufism,whichhadprevi- ouslygonehandinhand,developedindifferent ways.Atthepopulärlevel,Sufipracticesand instructionwereinstitutionalizedinfraternities andordersthat,eversince,haveplayedavital roleinallIslamicsocieties,especiallyamongthe disenfranchised.Lifeintheordersrevolved aroundtheregimentedinitiationofthenovices totheSufipathbythemaster.Althoughtheo- reticalinstructionwasalsogiven,thegoalofthe mysticwasprimarilyachievedbyspiritualprac- tices,chieflytherepetitionofreligiousformulas (dhikr).Amongtheintellectuals,Sufismacquired aphilosophicalglossandterminology.Allthe currentsofearlierSufism,aswellaselementsof NeoplatonicemanationismdrawnfromArabic philosophy,wereintegratedintoacomplexand multifacetedsystemof"theosophy"inthemon- umentalworkofIbn'ArabI(d.1240).Thissystem restsonthepivotalconceptof"unityofbeing" (wahdatal-wujud),accordingtowhichGodisthe onlybeingandtheonlyreality,whiletheentire creationconstitutesaseriesofhisdynamicand continuousself-manifestations.Theindividual whocombinesinhimselfthetotalityofthese manifestationstobecometheprototypeofcre- ation,aswellasthemediumthroughwhichGod canbeknown,isthePerfectMan,identifiedwith theProphetMuhammad.Themystic'squest consistsofanexperiential(epistemological) retracingofthelevelsofmanifestationsbackto theiroriginandculminatesintheclosestpossi- bleapproximationtothelevelofthePerfect Man.Ibn'Arabfsmysticalthought,whichcom- pletelydominatedSufism,foundexpressionin låtertimesprimarilyinthepoetryofthevarious Islamiclanguages,whilecertainaspectsofit werereintroducedintoArabicphilosophyin Safavidtimes. Seealsoal-ghazälI,arabicphilosophy. D.Gu. suicide,assisted.Seebioethics. summumbonum(Latin,'highestgood'),thatin relationtowhichallotherthingshaveatmost instrumentalvalue(valueonlyinsofarasthey areproductiveofwhatisthehighestgood). Philosophicalconceptionsofthesummum bonumhaveforthemostpartbeenteleologicalin character.Thatis,theyhaveidentifiedthehigh- estgoodintermsofsomegoalorgoalsthat humanbeings,itissupposed,pursuebytheir verynature.Thesenaturalgoalsorendshave differedconsiderably.Forthetheist,thisendis God;fortherationalist,itistherationalcompre- hensionofwhatisreal;forhedonism,itisplea- sure;etc.Thehighestgood,however,neednot beteleologicallyconstrued.Itmaysimplybe posited,orsupposed,thatitisknown,through someintuitiveprocess,thatacertaintypeof thingis"intrinsicallygood."Onsuchaview,the relevantcontrastisnotsomuchbetweenwhatis goodasanendandwhatisgoodasameansto thisend,asbetweenwhatisgoodpurelyinitself andwhatisgoodonlyincombinationwithcer- tainotherelements(the"extrinsicallygood"). Perhapsthebestexampleofsuchaviewofthe highestgoodwouldbethepositionofMoore. Mustthesummumbonumbejustonething,or onekindofthing?Yes,tothisextent:although onecouldcertainlycombinepluralism(theview thattherearemany,irreduciblydifferentgoods) withanassertionthatthesummumbonumis "complex,"thenotionofthehighestgoodhas typicallybeentheprovinceofmonists(believers inasinglegood),notpluralists.J.A.M. summumgenus.Seegenusgeneralissimum. SungHsing,alsocalledSungTzu(c.360-290 b.c),Chinesephilosopherassociatedwith MohismandtheHuang-Laoschool.Hewasa memberoftheChi-hsiaAcademyofCh'i,alate WarringStatescenterthatattractedintellectuals ofeverypersuasion.HisMohistideasincludean emphasisonutility,thrift,meritocracy,anda reluctancetowagewar.Heispraisedbythe TaoistChuangTzuforhisbeliefsthatone'sessen- tialdesiresandneedsarefewandthatone shouldheedinternalcultivationratherthan socialjudgments.Thecombinationofinternal tranquillityandpoliticalactivismischaracteris- ticofHuang-Laothought.Seealsomohism. R.P.P.&R.T.A. sunyatä(Sanskrit,'emptiness'),apropertysaid bysomeIndianBuddhistphilosopherstobepos- sessednecessarilybyeverythingthatexists.If somethingisemptyitpossessesnoessentialor inherentnature(svabhäva),whichistosaythat bothitsexistenceanditsnaturearedependent onthingsoreventsotherthanitself.Thethesis 'everythingisempty'isthereforeapproximately equivalentto'everythingiscausallydependent'; thecontradictoriesofthesethesesweretypically arguedbydefendersofemptinesstobeincoher- entandthusnotworthyofassent.Todeny emptinesswasalsotakentorequiretheaffirma- 889 SunYat-sen supersedingcause tionofpermanenceandnon-contingency:if somethingisnon-emptyinanyrespect,itisin justthatrespectpermanentandnon-contingent. Seealsobuddhism,mädhyamika,nägär- JUNA.P.J.G. SunYat-sen(1866-1925),Chinesestatesman, founderoftheRepublicofChinain1911.Edu- catedasamedicaldoctorinEngland,hebecame arevolutionarytoendthereignofthelast dynastyinChina.HefoundedtheNationalist Partyanddevelopedtheso-calledThreePeople's Principles:thenationalist,democratic,and socialistprinciples.Heclaimedtobetransmitting theConfucianWay.Sunadoptedapolicyof cooperationwiththeCommunists,buthissuc- cessorChiangKai-shek(1887-1975)brokewith them.Heisnowalsohonoredonthemainland asabourgeoissocialdemocratpavingthewayfor theCommunistRevolution.Seealsochinese PHILOSOPHY.S.-h.L. superaltern.Seesquareofopposition. superego.SeeFREUD. supererogation,thepropertyofgoingbeyondthe callofduty.Supererogatoryactionsaresome- timesequatedwithactionsthataremorallygood inthesensethattheyareencouragedbymoral- itybutnotrequiredbyit.Sometimestheyare equatedwithmorallycommendableactions,i.e., actionsthatindicateasuperiormoralcharacter. Itisquitecommonformorallygoodactionstobe morallycommendableandviceversa,sothatit isnotsurprisingthatthesetwokindsof supererogatoryactionsarenotclearlydistin- guishedeventhoughtheyarequitedistinct. Certainkindsofactionsarenotnormallycon- sideredtobemorallyrequired,e.g.,givingto charity,thoughmoralitycertainlyencourages doingthem.However,ifoneiswealthyandgives onlyasmallamounttocharity,then,although one'sactissupererogatoryinthesenseofbeing morallygood,itisnotsupererogatoryinthe senseofbeingmorallycommendable,foritdoes notindicateasuperiormoralcharacter.Certain kindsofactionsarenormallymorallyrequired, e.g.,keepingone'spromises.However,whenthe harmorriskofharmofkeepingone'spromiseis sufficientlygreatcomparedtotheharmcaused bybreakingthepromisetoexcusebreakingthe promise,thenkeepingone'spromisecountsasa supererogatoryactinthesenseofbeingmorally commendable. Someversionsofconsequentialismclaimthat everyoneisalwaysmorallyrequiredtoactsoas tobringaboutthebestconsequences.Onsucha theorytherearenoactionsthataremorally encouragedbutnotrequired;thus,forthose holdingsuchtheories,iftherearesupereroga- toryacts,theymustbemorallycommendable. Manyversionsofnon-consequentialismalsofail toprovideforactsthataremorallyencouraged butnotmorallyrequired;thus,iftheyallowfor supererogatoryacts,theymustregardthemas morallyrequiredactsdoneatsuchsignificant personalcostthatonemightbeexcusedfornot doingthem. Theviewthatallactionsareeithermorally required,morallyprohibited,ormorallyindiffer- entmakesitimpossibletosecureaplacefor supererogatoryactsinthesenseofmorallygood acts.Thisviewthattherearenoactsthatare morallyencouragedbutnotmorallyrequired maybetheresultofmisleadingterminology. BothKantandMilldistinguishbetweendutiesof perfectobligationanddutiesofimperfectobliga- tion,acknowledgingthatadutyofimperfect obligationdoesnotspecifyanyparticularactthat oneismorallyrequiredtodo.However,since theyusetheterm'duty'itisveryeasytoviewall actsfallingunderthese"duties"asbeingmorally required. Onewayofavoidingtheviewthatallmorally encouragedactsaremorallyrequiredistoavoid thecommonphilosophicalmisuseoftheterm 'duty'.Onecanreplace'dutiesofperfectobliga- tion'with'actionsrequiredbymoralrules'and 'dutiesofimperfectobligation'with'actions encouragedbymoralideals'.However,atheory thatincludesthekindsofactsthatare supererogatoryinthesenseofbeingmorally goodhastodistinguishbetweenthatsenseof 'supererogatory'andthesensemeaning'morally commendable',i.e.,indicatingasuperiormoral characterintheagent.Foraspointedoutabove, notallmorallygoodactsaremorallycommend- able,norareallmorallycommendableacts morallygood,eventhoughaparticularactmay besupererogatoryinbothsenses. Seealsoduty,ethics,utilitarianism. B.Ge. superman.Seenietzsche. supernaturalism.Seemiracle,naturalism,theo- LOGICALNATURALISM. supernaturaltheology.Seetheologianaturalis. supersedingcause.Seecausation. 890 superset supervenience superset.Seesettheory. supervaluation.Seesettheory,vagueness. supervaluations,methodof.Seevagueness. supervaluationsemantics.Seefreelogic. supervenience,adependencerelationbetween propertiesorfactsofonetype,andpropertiesor factsofanothertype.Moore,forinstance,held thatthepropertyintrinsicvalueisdependentin therelevantwayoncertainnon-moralproper- ties(althoughhedidnotemploytheword 'supervenience').Asheputit,"ifagiventhing possessesanykindofintrinsicvalueinacertain degree,thennotonlymustthatsamethingpos- sessit,underallcircumstances,inthesame degree,butalsoanythingexactlylikeit,must, underallcircumstances,possessitinexactlythe samedegree"(PhilosophicalStudies,1922).The conceptofsupervenience,asarelationbetween properties,isessentiallythis:PropertiesoftypeA aresupervenientonpropertiesoftypeBifand onlyiftwoobjectscannotdifferwithrespectto their/1-propertieswithoutalsodifferingwith respecttotheirB-properties.Propertiesthat allegedlyaresupervenientonothersareoften calledconsequentialproperties,especiallyin ethics;theideaisthatifsomethinginstantiatesa moralproperty,thenitdoessoinvirtueof,i.e.,as a(non-causal)consequenceof,instantiatingsome lower-levelpropertyonwhichthemoralprop- ertysupervenes. Inanother,relatedsense,supervenienceisa featureofdiscourseofonetype,vis-å-visdis- courseofanothertype.Thetermwassoused, againinconnectionwithmorals,byHare,who wrote: First,letustakethatcharacteristicof"good" whichhasbeencalleditssupervenience.Sup- posethatwesay,"St.Franciswasagood man."Itislogicallyimpossibletosaythisand tomaintainatthesametimethattheremight havebeenanothermanplacedexactlyinthe samecircumstancesasSt.Francis,andwho behavedinexactlythesameway,butwho differedfromSt.Francisinthisrespectonly, thathewasnotagoodman.(TheLanguageof Morals,1952) Heretheideaisthatitwouldbeamisuseof morallanguage,aviolationofthe"logicofmoral discourse,"toapply'good'toonethingbutnot tosomethingelseexactlysimilarinallpertinent non-moralrespects.Hareisametaethicalirreal- ist:hedeniesthattherearemoralpropertiesor facts.Soforhim,moralsupervenienceisafea- tureofmoraldiscourseandjudgment,notarela- tionbetweenpropertiesorfactsoftwotypes. Thenotionofsuperveniencehascometobe usedquitewidelyinmetaphysicsandphilosophy ofmind,usuallyinthefirstsenseexplained above.ThisusewasheraldedbyDavidsonin articulatingapositionabouttherelationbe- tweenphysicalandmentalproperties,orstate- types,thateschewsthereducibilityofmental propertiestophysicalones.Hewrote: AlthoughthepositionIdescribedeniesthere arepsychophysicallaws,itisconsistentwith theviewthatmentalcharacteristicsarein somesensedependent,orsupervenient,on physicalcharacteristics.Suchsupervenience mightbetakentomeanthattherecannotbe twoeventsalikeinallphysicalrespectsbut differinginsomementalrespects,orthatan objectcannotalterinsomementalrespects withoutalteringinsomephysicalrespects. Dependenceorsupervenienceofthiskind doesnotentailreducibilitythroughlawor definition.("MentalEvents,"1970) Avarietyofsuperveniencetheseshavebeenpro- poundedinmetaphysicsandphilosophyof mind,usually(althoughnotalways)inconjunc- tionwithattemptstoformulatemetaphysical positionsthatarenaturalistic,insomesense, withoutbeingstronglyreductionistic.Forin- stance,itisoftenassertedthatmentalproperties andfactsaresupervenientonneurobiological properties,and/oronphysicochemicalproper- tiesandfacts.Anditisoftenclaimed,moregen- erally,thatallpropertiesandfactsaresuper- venientonthepropertiesandfactsofthekind describedbyphysics. Muchattentionhasbeendirectedathowto formulatethedesiredsuperveniencetheses,and thushowtocharacterizesupervenienceitself.A distinctionhasbeendrawnbetweenweaksuper- venience,assertingthatinanysinglepossible worldw,anytwoindividualsinwthatdifferin their^-propertiesalsodifferintheirB-proper- ties;andstrongsupervenience,assertingthatfor anytwoindividualsiandj,eitherwithinasin- glepossibleworldorintwodistinctones,ifiandj differin^4-propertiesthentheyalsodifferinB- properties.Itissometimesallegedthattradi- tionalformulationsofsupervenience,like Moore'sorHare's,articulateonlyweaksuperve- nience,whereasstrongsupervenienceisneeded toexpresstherelevantkindofdeterminationor dependence.Itissometimesreplied,however, 891 supervenientbehaviorism survival thatthetraditionalnatural-languageformula- tionsdoinfactexpressstrongsupervenience- andthatformalizationsexpressingmereweak superveniencearemistranslations. Questionsabouthowbesttoformulatesuper- veniencethesesalsoariseinconnectionwith intrinsicandnon-intrinsicproperties.For instance,thepropertybeingabank,instantiated bythebrickbuildingonMainStreet,isnot supervenientonintrinsicphysicalpropertiesof thebuildingitself;rather,thebuilding'shaving thissocial-institutionalpropertydependsona considerablybroaderrangeoffactsandfeatures, someofwhichareinvolvedinsubservingthe socialpracticeofbanking.Theterm'superve- niencebase'isfrequentlyusedtodenotethe rangeofentitiesandhappeningswhoselower- levelpropertiesandrelationsjointlyunderliethe instantiationofsomehigher-levelproperty(like beingabank)bysomeindividual(likethebrick buildingonMainStreet). Superveniencethesesaresometimesformu- latedsoastosmoothlyaccommodateproperties andfactswithbroadsuperveniencebases.For instance,theideathatthephysicalfactsdeter- mineallthefactsissometimesexpressedasglobal supervenience,whichassertsthatanytwophysi- callypossibleworldsdifferinginsomerespect alsodifferinsomephysicalrespect.Or,some- timesthisideaisexpressedasthestrongerthesis ofregionalsupervenience,whichassertsthatfor anytwospatiotemporalregionsrands,either withinasinglephysicallypossibleworldorin twodistinctones,ifrandsdifferinsomeintrin- sicrespectthentheyalsodifferinsomeintrinsic physicalrespect. Seealsonaturalism,philosophyof MIND,RESULTANCE.T.E.H. supervenientbehaviorism.Seephilosophyof MIND. suppositio(Latin,'supposition'),intheMiddle Ages,reference.Thetheoryofsupposition,the centralnotioninthetheoryofproprietatestermi- norum,wasdevelopedinthetwelfthcentury,and wasrefinedanddiscussedintoearlymodem times.Ithastwoparts(theirnamesareamod- ernconvenience). (1)Thetheoryofsuppositionproper.Thistyp- icallydividedsuppositiointo"personal"reference toindividuals(notnecessarilytopersons,despite thename),"simple"referencetospeciesorgen- era,and"material"referencetospökenorwrit- tenexpressions.Thus'man'in'Everymanisan animal'haspersonalsupposition,in'Manisa species'simplesupposition,andin'Manisa monosyllable'materialsupposition.Thetheory alsoincludedanaccountofhowtherangeofa term'sreferenceisaffectedbytenseandby modalfactors. (2)Thetheoryof"modes"ofpersonalsuppo- sition.Thispartofsuppositiontheorydivided personalsuppositiontypicallyinto"discrete" ('Socrates'in'Socratesisaman'),"determinate" ('man'in'SomemanisaGreek'),"confusedand distributive"('man'in'Everymanisananimal'), and"merelyconfused"('animal'in'Everyman isananimal').Thepurposeofthissecondpartof thetheoryisamatterofsomedispute.Bythelate fourteenthcentury,ithadinsomeauthors becomeatheoryofquantification.Theterm'sup- positio'wasalsousedintheMiddleAgesinthe ordinarysense,tomean'assumption','hypothe- sis'.P.V.S. supposition,material.Seesuppositio. supposition,personal.Seesuppositio. supposition,simple.Seesuppositio. sure-thingprinciple.Seeallais'sparadox,deci- SIONTHEORY. surfacegrammar.Seegrammar. surfacestructure.Seegrammar,philosophyof LANGUAGE. surplusvalue.Seemarx. survival,continuedexistenceafterone'sbiologi- caldeath.Sounderstood,survivalcanpertain onlytobeingsthatareorganismsatsometimeor other,nottobeingsthataredisembodiedatall times(asängelsaresaidtobe)ortobeingsthat areembodiedbutneverasorganisms(asmight besaidofcomputers).Theoriesthatmaintain thatone'sindividualconsciousnessisabsorbed intoauniversalconsciousnessafterdeathorthat onecontinuestoexistonlythroughone'sde- scendants,insofarastheydenyone'sowncon- tinuedexistenceasanindividual,arenot theoriesofsurvival.Althoughsurvivaldoesnot entailimmortalityoranythingaboutrewardor punishmentinanafterlife,manytheoriesofsur- vivalincorporatethesefeatures. Theoriesaboutsurvivalhaveexpresseddiffer- ingattitudesabouttheimportanceofthebody. 892 sustainingcause Swinburne,Richard Somephilosophershavemaintainedthatper- sonscannotsurvivewithouttheirownbodies, typicallyespousingadoctrineofresurrection; suchaviewwasheldbyAquinas.Others,includ- ingthePythagoreans,havebelievedthatonecan surviveinotherbodies,allowingforreincarna- tionintoabodyofthesamespeciesorevenfor transmigrationintoabodyofanotherspecies. Some,includingPlatoandperhapsthePytha- goreans,haveclaimedthatnobodyisnecessary, andthatsurvivalisfullyachievedbyone'sescap- ingembodiment.Thereisasimilarspectrumof opinionabouttheimportanceofone'smental life.Some,suchasLocke,havesupposedthat survivalofthesamepersonwouldrequiremem- oryofone'shavingexperiencedspecificpast events.Plato'sdoctrineofrecollection,incon- trast,supposesthatonecansurvivewithoutany experientialmemory;allthatonetypicallyis capableofrecollectingareimpersonalnecessary truths. Philosophershavetestedtherelativeimpor- tanceofbodilyversusmentalfactorsbymeansof variousthoughtexperiments,ofwhichthefol- lowingistypical.Supposethataperson'swhole mentallife-memories,skills,andcharacter traits-weresomehowduplicatedintoadata bankanderasedfromtheperson,leavingaliv- ingradicalamnesiac.Supposefurtherthatthe person'smentallifeweretranscribedinto anotherradicallyamnesiacbody.Hastheperson survived,andifso,aswhom? Seealsopersonalidentity,soul. W.E.M. sustainingcause.Seecausation. sutra(fromSanskritsutra,'thread','precept'),a singleverseoraphorismofHinduorBuddhist teaching,oracollectionofthem.Writtentobe memorized,theyprovideameansofencoding andtransmittinglawsandrulesofgrammar,rit- ual,poeticmeter,andphilosophicaldisputation. Typicallyusingtechnicaltermsandwrittensoas tobemnemonic,theyservewellforpassingon informationinanoraltradition.Whatmakes themserviceableforthispurposealsomakes themlargelyunintelligiblewithoutcommentary. Thesutrastyleistypicalinphilosophicaltradi- tions.TheBrahma-SutrasofBadharanaarean exampleofasetofsutrasregardedasauthorita- tivebyVedantabutinterpretedinvastlydiffer- entwaysbyShahkara,Rämänuja,andMadhva. ThesutrasassociatedwithBuddhismtypically aremoreexpansivethanthoseassociatedwith Hinduism,andthusmoreintelligibleontheir own.TheTripitaka("BasketoftheTeachings")is acollectionofsutrasthatBuddhisttradition ascribestoAnanda,whoissaidtohaverecited themfrommemoryatthefirstBuddhistcouncil; eachsutraisintroducedbythewords'Thushave Iheard'.SutrasareassociatedwithTheravadaas wellasMahayanaBuddhismanddealwithboth religiousandphilosophicaltopics.K.E.Y. Swedenborgianism,thetheosophyprofessedbya worldwidemovementestablishedastheNew JerusalemChurchinLondonin1788bythefol- lowersofEmanuelSwedenborg(1688-1772),a Swedishnaturalphilosopher,visionary,andbib- licalexegete.Authorofgeologicalandcosmo- logicalworks,hefusedtherationalist(Cartesian) andempiricist(Lockean)legadesintoanatural philosophy(PrincipiaRerumNaturalium,1734) thatpropoundedtheharmonyofthemechanis- ticuniversewithbiblicalrevelation.Inspiredby Liebniz,Malebranche,Platonism,andNeopla- tonism,heunfoldedadoctrineofcorrespon- dence(AHieroglyphicKey,1741)toaccountfor therelationbetweenbodyandsoulandbetween thenaturalandspiritualworlds,andapplieditto biblicalexegesis.Whatattractedthewidefol- lowingofthe"Spirit-Seer"werehistheosophic speculationsinthelineofBoehmeandthemys- tical,prophetictraditioninwhichheexcelled (HeavenlyArcana,1749-56).J.-L.S. Swinburne,Richard(b.1934),Britishphilosopher ofreligionandofscience.Inphilosophyofsci- ence,hehascontributedtoconfirmationtheory andtothephilosophyofspaceandtime.Hiswork inphilosophyofreligionisthemostambitious projectinphilosophicaltheologyundertakenby aBritishphilosopherinthetwentiethcentury.Its firstpartisatrilogyonthecoherenceandjustifi- cationoftheisticbeliefandtherationalityofliv- ingbythatbelief:TheCoherenceofTheism(1977), TheExistenceofGod(1979),andFaithandReason (1981).Since1985,whenSwinburnebecame NollothProfessorofthePhilosophyofthe ChristianReligionattheUniversityofOxford,he haswrittenatetralogyaboutsomeofthemost centralofthedistinctivelyChristianreligious doctrines:ResponsibilityandAtonement(1989), Revelation(1992),TheChristianGod(1994),and ProvidenceandtheProblemofEvil(1998). Themostinterestingfeatureofthetrilogyisits contributiontonaturaltheology.UsingBayesian reasoning,Swinburnebuildsacumulativecase fortheismbyarguingthatitsprobabilityisraised 893 syllogism syllogism bysuchthingsastheexistenceoftheuniverse, itsorder,theexistenceofconsciousness,human opportunitiestodogood,thepatternofhistory, evidenceofmiracles,andreligiousexperience. Theexistenceofevildoesnotcountagainstthe existenceofGod.Onourtotalevidencetheismis moreprobablethannot.Inthetetralogyhe explicatesanddefendssuchChristiandoctrines asoriginalsin,theAtonement,Heaven,Hell,the Trinity,theIncarnation,andProvidence.Healso analyzesthegroundsforsupposingthatsome Christiandoctrinesarerevealedtruths,and arguesforaChristiantheodicyinresponsetothe problemofevil. Seealsobayesianrationality,philoso- PHYOFRELIGION,TRINITARIANISM.P.L.Q. syllogism,inAristotle'swords,"adiscoursein which,acertainthingbeingstated,something otherthanwhatisstatedfollowsofnecessity frombeingso"(PriorAnalytics,24b18).Three typesofsyllogismwereusuallydistinguished: categorical,hypothetical,anddisjunctive.Each willbetreatedinthatorder. Thecategoricalsyllogism.Thisisanargument consistingofthreecategoricalpropositions,two servingaspremisesandoneservingasconclu- sion.E.g.,'Somecollegestudentsarehappy;all collegestudentsarehighschoolgraduates; therefore,somehighschoolgraduatesare happy'.Ifasyllogismisvalid,thepremisesmust besorelatedtotheconclusionthatitisimpossi- bleforbothpremisestobetrueandtheconclu- sionfalse.Therearefourtypesofcategorical propositions:universalaffirmativeorA-proposi- tions-'AllSareP',or'SaP';universalnegative orE-propositions-'NoSareP',or'SeP';particu- laraffirmativeorI-propositions-'SomeSareP', or'SiP';andparticularnegativeorO-proposi- tions:'SomeSarenotP',or'SoP'.Themediate basiccomponentsofcategoricalsyllogismare termsservingassubjectsorpredicatesinthe premisesandtheconclusion.Theremustbethree andonlythreetermsinanycategoricalsyllogism,the majorterm,theminorterm,andthemiddle term.Violationofthisbasicruleofstructureis calledthefallacyoffourterms(quaterniotermi- norum);e.g.,'Whateverisrightisuseful;only oneofmyhandsisright;thereforeonlyoneof myhandsisuseful'.Here'right'doesnothave thesamemeaninginitstwooccurrences;we thereforehavemorethanthreetermsandhence nogenuinecategoricalsyllogism. Thesyllogistictermsareidentifiableanddefin- ablewithreferencetothepositiontheyhaveina givensyllogism.Thepredicateoftheconclusion isthemajorterm;thesubjectoftheconclusionis theminorterm;thetermthatappearsonceineach premisebutnotintheconclusionisthemiddle term.Asitisusedinvarioustypesofcategorical propositions,atermiseitherdistributed(stånds foreachandeverymemberofitsextension)or undistributed.Thereisasimpleruleregarding thedistribution:universalpropositions(SaPand SeP)distributetheirsubjectterms;negativeproposi- tions(SePandSoP)distributetheirpredicateterms. NotermsaredistributedinanI-proposition. Varioussetsofrulesgoverningvalidityofcat- egoricalsyllogismshavebeenoffered.Thefol- lowingisa"traditional"setfromthepopulär Port-RoyalLogic(1662). Rl:Themiddletermmustbedistributedatleast once.Violation:'Allcatsareanimals;someani- malsdonoteatliver;thereforesomecatsdonot eatliver'.Themiddleterm'animals'isnotdis- tributedeitherinthefirstorminorpremise, beingthepredicateofanaffirmativeproposition, norinthesecondormajorpremise,beingthe subjectofaparticularproposition;hence,thefal- lacyofundistributedmiddle. R2:Atermcannotbedistributedintheconclusion ifitisundistributedinthepremises.Violation:'All dögsarecarnivorous;noflowersaredögs;there- fore,noflowersarecarnivorous'.Herethemajor, 'carnivorous',isdistributedintheconclusion, beingthepredicateofanegativeproposition,but notinthepremise,servingthereaspredicateof anaffirmativeproposition;hence,thefallacyof illicitmajorterm.AnotherviolationofR2:'Allstu- dentsarehappyindividuals;nocriminalsarestu- dents;therefore,nohappyindividualsare criminals'.Heretheminor,'happyindividuals', isdistributedintheconclusion,butnotdistrib- utedintheminorpremise;hencethefallacyof illicitminorterm. R3:Noconclusionmaybedrawnfromtwonegative premises.Violation:'Nodögsarecats;somedögs donotlikeliver;therefore,somecatsdonotlike liver'.HereRlissatisfied,sincethemiddleterm 'dögs'isdistributedintheminorpremise;R2is satisfied,sinceboththeminorterm'cats'aswell asthemajorterm'thingsthatlikeliver'aredis- tributedinthepremisesandthusnoviolationof distributionoftermsoccurs.Itisonlybyvirtue ofR3thatwecanproclaimthissyllogismtobe invalid. R4:Anegativeconclusioncannotbedrawnwhere bothpremisesareaffirmative.Violation:'Alledu- catedpeopletakegoodcareoftheirchildren;all 894 syllogism syllogism whotakegoodcareoftheirchildrenarepoor; therefore,somepoorpeoplearenoteducated'. Here,itisonlybyvirtueoftheruleofqualityR4, thatwecanproclaimthissyllogisminvalid. R5:Theconclusionmustfollowtheweakerpremise; i.e.,ifoneofthepremisesisnegative,theconclusion mustbenegative,andifoneofthemisparticular,the conclusionmustbeparticular. R6:Fromtwoparticularpremisesnothingfollows. Letusofferanindirectproofforthisrule.Ifboth particularpremisesareaffirmative,notermis distributedandthereforethefallacyofundistrib- utedmiddleisinevitable.Toavoidit,wehaveto makeoneofthepremisesnegative,whichwill resultinadistributedpredicateasmiddleterm. ButbyR5,theconclusionmustthenbenegative; thus,themajortermwillbedistributedinthe conclusion.ToavoidviolatingR2,wemustdis- tributethatterminthemajorpremise.Itcould notbeinthepositionofsubjectterm,sinceonly universalpropositionsdistributetheirsubject termand,byhypothesis,bothpremisesarepar- ticular.Butwecouldnotusethesamenegative premiseusedtodistributethemiddleterm;we mustmaketheotherparticularpremisenega- tive.ButthenweviolateR3.Thus,anyattempt tomakeasyllogismwithtwoparticularpremises validwillviolateoneormorebasicrulesofsyl- logism.(ThissetofrulesassumesthatA-andE- propositionshaveexistentialimportandhence thatanI-oranO-propositionmaylegitimately bedrawnfromasetofexclusivelyuniversal premises.) Categoricalsyllogismsareclassifiedaccording tofigureandmood.Thefigureofacategoricalsyl- logismreferstotheschemadeterminedbythe possiblepositionofthemiddleterminrelation tothemajorandminorterms.In"modernlogic," foursyllogisticfiguresarerecognized.Using'M' formiddleterm,'P'formajorterm,and'5"for minorterm,theycanbedepictedasfollows: Fig.1Fig.2Fig.3Fig.4 MisPPisMMisPPisM 5isAfSisMMis5MisS :.SisP.-.SisP.-.SisP/.SisP Aristotlerecognizedonlythreesyllogisticfig- ures.Heseemstohavetakenintoaccountjust thetwopremisesandtheextensionofthethree termsoccurringinthem,andthenaskedwhat conclusion,ifany,canbederivedfromthose premises.Itturnsout,then,thathisprocedure leavesroomforthreefiguresonly:oneinwhich theMtermisthesubjectofoneandpredicateof theotherpremise;anotherinwhichtheMterm ispredicatedinbothpremises;andathirdonein whichtheMtermisthesubjectinbothpremises. Medievalsfollowedhim,althoughallconsidered theso-calledinvertedfirst(i.e.,moodsofthefirst figurewiththeirconclusionconvertedeither simplyorperaccidens)tobelegitimatealso.Some medievals(e.g.,Albalag)andmostmodems sinceLeibnizrecognizeafourthfigureasadis- tinctfigure,consideringsyllogistictermsonthe basisnotoftheirextensionbutoftheirposition intheconclusion,theStermoftheconclusion beingdefinedastheminortermandthePterm beingdefinedasthemajorterm. Themoodofacategoricalsyllogismreferstothe configurationoftypesofcategoricalpropositions determinedonthebasisofthequalityandquan- tityofthepropositionsservingaspremisesand conclusionofanygivensyllogism;e.g.,'Noani- malsareplants;allcatsareanimals;thereforeno catsareplants','(MeP,SaMI:.SeP)',isasyllogism inthemoodEAEinthefirstfigure.'Allmetals conductelectricity;nostonesconductelectricity; thereforenostonesaremetals','(PaM,SeM/.'. SeP)',isthemoodAEEinthesecondfigure.In thefoursyllogisticfiguresthereare256possible moods,butonly24arevalid(only19inmodern logic,onthegroundofanon-existentialtreat- mentofA-andE-propositions).Asamnemonic deviceandtofacilitatereference,nameshave beenassignedtothevalidmoods,witheach vowelrepresentingthetypeofcategoricalpropo- sition.WilliamSherwoodandPeterofSpain offeredthefamouslistdesignedtohelpstudents torememberwhichmoodsinanygivenfigure arevalidandhowthe"inevident"moodsinthe secondandthirdfiguresareprovablebyreduc- tiontothoseinthefirstfigure:bärbara,celarent, darii,ferio(directFig.1);baralipton,celantes, dabitis,fapesmo,frisesomorum(indirectFig.1); cesare,camestres,festino,baroco(Fig.2);darap- ti,felapton,disamis,datisi,bocardo,ferison(Fig. 3). Thehypotheticalsyllogism.Thepurehypo- theticalsyllogismisanargumentinwhichboth thepremisesandtheconclusionarehypotheti- cal,i.e.conditional,propositions;e.g.,'Ifthesun isshining,itiswarm;ifitiswarm,theplantswill grow;thereforeifthesunisshining,theplants willgrow'.Symbolically,thisargumentformcan berepresentedby'A—>B,B—>CI:.A—>C".Itwas notrecognizedassuchbyAristotle,butAris- totle'spupilTheophrastusforeshadowedit,even 895 syllogism,demonstrative syncategoremata thoughitisnotclearfromhisexampleofit-'If manis,animalis;ifanimalis,thensubstanceis; ifthereforemanis,substanceis'-whetherthis wasseentobeaprincipleoftermlogicoraprin- cipleofpropositionailogic.ItwastheMegaric- StoicphilosophersandBoethiuswhofully recognizedhypotheticalpropositionsandsyllo- gismsasprinciplesofthemostgeneraltheoryof deduction. Mixedhypotheticalsyllogismsarearguments consistingofahypotheticalpremiseandacate- goricalpremise,andinferringacategorical proposition;e.g.,'Ifthesunisshining,theplants willgrow;thesunisshining;thereforetheplants willgrow'.Symbolically,thisisrepresentedby'P —>Q,P/.'.Q'.Thisargumentformwasexplicitly formulatedinancienttimesbytheStoicsasone ofthe"indemonstrables"andisnowknownas modusponens.Anotherequallybasicformof mixedhypotheticalsyllogismis'P—»Q,~QI:. ~P',knownasmodustollens. Thedisjunctivesyllogism.Thisisanargument inwhichtheleadingpremiseisadisjunction,the otherpremisebeingadenialofoneofthealter- natives,concludingtotheremainingaltemative; e.g.,'ItisrainingorIwillgoforawalk;butitis notraining;thereforeIwillgoforawalk'.Itis notalwaysclearwhetherthe'or'ofthedisjunc- tivepremiseisinclusiveorexclusive.Symbolic logicremovestheambiguitybyusingtwodiffer- entsymbolsandthusclearlydistinguishes betweeninclusiveorweakdisjunction,'PVQ', whichistrueprovidednotbothalternativesare false,andexclusiveorstrongdisjunction,'PYQ', whichistrueprovidedexactlyonealtemativeis trueandexactlyonefalse.Thedefinitionof'dis- junctivesyllogism'presupposesthatthelead premiseisaninclusiveorweakdisjunction,on thebasisofwhichtwoformsarevalid:'PVQ, ~P/.-.Q'and'PVQ,~Q/.-.P'.Ifthedisjunctive premiseisexclusive,wehavefourvalidargu- mentforms,andweshouldspeakhereofan exclusivedisjunctivesyllogism.Thisisdefinedas anargumentinwhicheitherfromanexclusive disjunctionandthedenialofoneofitsdisjuncts weinfertheremainingdisjunct-'PYq/~p I:.Q',and'PYq/~q/.-.p'(modustollendoponens); orelse,fromanexclusivedisjunctionandoneof itsdisjunctsweinferthedenialoftheremaining disjunct-'PYQ,p/.-.~Q',and'PYQ,Ql:.~P' (modusponendotollens).I.Bo. syllogism,demonstrative.Seearistotle. syllogism,practical.Seepracticalreasoning. symbol.Seepeirce,syncategoremata. symbol,complete.Seesyncategoremata. symbol,improper.Seesyncategoremata. symbol,incomplete.Seesyncategoremata. symbol,primitive.Seelogisticsystem. symbol,proper.Seesyncategoremata. symboliclogic.Seeformållogic symmetrical.Seerelation. symmetry.Seephilosophyofscience. symmetrythesis.Seecoveringlawmodel,phi- losophyofscience. symptom.Seecriterion. synaesthesia,aconsciousexperienceinwhich qualitiesnormallyassociatedwithonesensory modalityareorseemtobesensedinanother. Examplesincludeauditoryandtactilevisions suchas"loudsunlight"and"softmoonlight"as wellasvisualbodilysensationssuchas"dark thoughts"and"brightsmiles."Twofeaturesof synaesthesiaareofphilosophicinterest.First,the experiencemaybeusedtojudgetheappropri- atenessofsensorymetaphorsandsimiles,such asBaudelaire's"sweetasoboes."Themetaphor isappropriatejustwhenoboessoundsweet.Sec- ond,synaesthesiachallengesthemannerin whichcommonsensedistinguishesamongthe externalsenses.Itiscommonlyacknowledged thattaste,e.g.,isnotonlyunlikehearing,smell, oranyothersense,butdiffersfromthembecause tasteinvolvesgustatoryratherthanauditory experiences.Insynaesthesia,however,one mighttastesounds(sweet-soundingoboes). G.A.G. syncategoremata,(1)ingrammar,wordsthat cannotservebythemselvesassubjectsorpredi- catesofcategoricalpropositions.Theoppositeis categoremata,wordsthatcandothis.Forexam- ple,'and','if,'every','because','insofar',and 'under'aresyncategorematicterms,whereas 'dog','smooth',and'sings'arecategorematic ones.Thisusagecomesfromthefifth-century LatingrammarianPriscian.Itseemstohavebeen theoriginalwayofdrawingthedistinction,and tohavepersistedthroughlåterperiodsalong 896 syncategorematic synergism withotherusagesdescribedbelow.(2)In medievallogicfromthetwelfthcenturyon,the distinctionwasdrawnsemantically.Categore- mataarewordsthathavea(defmite)indepen- dentsignification.Syncategorematadonothave anyindependentsignification(or,accordingto someauthors,notadefmiteoneanyway),but acquireasignificationonlywhenusedina propositiontogetherwithcategoremata.The examplesusedaboveworkhereaswell.(3) Medievallogicdistinguishednotonlycategore- maticandsyncategorematicwords,butalsocat- egorematicandsyncategorematicusesofasingle word.Themostimportantistheword'is',which canbeusedbothcategorematicallytomakean existenceclaim('Socratesis'inthesense 'Socratesexists')orsyncategorematicallyasa copula('Socratesisaphilosopher').Butother wordsweretreatedthiswaytoo.Thus'whole' wassaidtobeusedsyncategorematicallyasa kindofquantifierin'Thewholesurfaceiswhite' (fromwhichitfollowsthateachpartofthesur- faceiswhite),butcategorematicallyin'The wholesurfaceistwosquarefeetinarea'(from whichitdoesnotfollowthateachpartofthesur- faceistwosquarefeetinarea).(4)Inmedieval logic,again,syncategoremataweresometimes takentoincludewordsthatcanservebythem- selvesassubjectsorpredicatesofcategorical propositions,butmayinterferewithstandard logicalinferencepatternswhentheydo. Themostnotoriousexampleistheword 'nothing'.Ifnothingisbetterthanetemalbliss andtepidteaisbetterthannothing,stillitdoes notfollow(bythetransitivityof'betterthan') thattepidteaisbetterthanetemalbliss.Again, considertheverb'begins'.Everythingrediscol- ored,butnoteverythingthatbeginstobered beginstobecolored(itmighthavebeensome othercolorearlier).Suchwordswereclassifiedas syncategorematicbecauseananalysis(calledan expositio)ofpropositionscontainingthemreveals implicitsyncategorematainsense(1)orperhaps (2).Thusananalysisof'Theäpplebeginstobe red'wouldincludetheclaimthatitwasnotred earlier,and'not'issyncategorematicinboth senses(1)and(2).(5)Inmodernlogic,sense(2) isextendedtoapplytoalllogicalsymbols,not justtowordsinnaturallanguages.Inthisusage, categoremataarealsocalled"propersymbols"or "completesymbols,"whilesyncategoremataare called"impropersymbols"or"incompletesym- bols."Intheterminologyofmodernformål semantics,themeaningofcategoremataisfixed bythemodelsforthelanguage,whereasthe meaningofsyncategoremataisfixedbyspecify- ingtruthconditionsforthevariousformulasof thelanguageintermsofthemodels. Seealsoformålsemantics,quantifica- TION,SYLLOGISM.P.V.S. syncategorematic.Seelogicalform,syncate- goremata. synderesis,inmedievalmoraltheology,con- science.St.Jeromeusedtheterm,anditbecame afixturebecauseofPeterLombard'sinclusionof itinhisSentences.Despitethisorigin,'synderesis' isdistinguishedfrom'conscience'byAquinas, forwhomsynderesisisthequasi-habitualgrasp ofthemostcommonprinciplesofthemoral order(i.e.,naturallaw),whereasconscienceis theapplicationofsuchknowledgetofleetingand unrepeatablecircumstances. 'Conscience'isambiguousinthewayinwhich 'knowledge'is:knowledgecanbethemental stateoftheknowerorwhattheknowerknows. But'conscience',like'synderesis',istypically usedforthementalstate.Sometimes,however, conscienceistakentoincludegeneralmoral knowledgeaswellasitsapplicationhereand now;butthecontentofsynderesisisthemost generalprecepts,whereasthecontentofcon- science,ifgeneralknowledge,willbelessgeneral precepts.Sinceconsciencecanbeerroneous,the questionarisesastowhethersynderesisandits object,naturallawprecepts,canbeobscuredand forgottenbecauseofbadbehaviororupbringing. Aquinasheldthatwhilegreatattritioncantake place,suchcommonmoralknowledgecannotbe whollyexpungedfromthehumanmind.Thisis aversionoftheAristoteliandoctrinethatthere arestartingpointsofknowledgesoeasilygrasped thatthegraspingofthemisadefiningmarkof thehumanbeing.Howeverperverselythe humanagentbehavestherewillremainnotonly thecomprehensiverealizationthatgoodistobe doneandevilavoided,butalsotherecognition ofsomesubstantivehumangoods. Seealsoaquinas,aristotle,ethics. R.M. syndicalism.Seesorel. synechism.Seepeirce,tychism. synergism,inChristiansoteriology,thecoopera- tionwithinhumanconsciousnessoffreewilland divinegraceintheprocessesofconversionand regeneration.Synergismbecameanissueinsix- teenth-centuryLutheranismduringacontro- versypromptedbyPhilipMelanchthon(1497- 897 synergy systemstheory 1569).UndertheinfluenceofErasmus, Melanchthonmentioned,inthe1533editionof hisCommonPlaces,threecausesofgoodactions: "theWord,theHolySpirit,andthewill."Advo- catedbyPfeffinger,aPhilipist,synergismwas attackedbytheorthodox,predestinarian,and monergistpartyAmsdorfandFlacius,who retortedwithGnesio-Lutheranism.Theensuing FormulaofConcord(1577)officializedmonergism. Synergismoccupiesamiddlepositionbetween uncriticaltrustinhumannoeticandsalvific capacity(Pelagianismanddeism)andexclusive trustindivineagency(CalvinistandLutheran fideism).Catholicism,Arminianism,Anglican- ism,Methodism,andnineteenth-andtwenti- eth-centuryliberalProtestantismhaveprofessed versionsofsynergism.Seealsoerasmus, FIDEISM,JUSTIFICATIONBYFAITH.J.-L.S. synergy.Seesynergism. synonymousdefinition.Seedefinition. synonymy.Seemeaning. syntacticambiguity.Seeambiguity. syntacticconsistency.Seeconsistency. syntacticterm.Seegrammar. syntax.Seegrammar. syntax,logical.Seelogicalsyntax. synthesis.Seehegel. synthetic.Seeanalytic-syntheticdistinction. syntheticapriori.Seeapriori,kant. Syrianschool.Seemiddleplatonism. Syrianus.Seecommentariesonaristotle,mid- dleplatonism. system,axiomatic.Seeaxiomaticmethod. system,interpretive.Seeoperationalism. system,logical.Seeformålsemantics,logistic SYSTEM. systemsanalysis.Seecognitivescience,com- PUTERTHEORY,SYSTEMSTHEORY. systemstheory,thetransdisciplinarystudyofthe abstractorganizationofphenomena,indepen- dentoftheirsubstance,type,orspatialortem- poralscaleofexistence.Itinvestigatesboththe principlescommontoallcomplexentitiesand the(usuallymathematical)modelsthatcanbe usedtodescribethem. Systemstheorywasproposedinthe1940sby thebiologistLudwigvonBertalanffyandfur- theredbyRossAshby(IntroductiontoCybernetics, 1956).VonBertalanffywasbothreactingagainst reductionismandattemptingtorevivetheunity ofscience.Heemphasizedthatrealsystemsare opento,andinteractwith,theirenvironments, andthattheycanacquirequalitativelynew propertiesthroughemergence,resultingincon- tinualevolution.Ratherthanreduceanentity (e.g.thehumanbody)tothepropertiesofits partsorelements(e.g.organsorcells),systems theoryfocusesonthearrangementofandrela- tionsamongthepartsthatconnectthemintoa whole(ef.holism).Thisparticularorganization determinesasystem,whichisindependentof theconcretesubstanceoftheelements(e.g.par- ticles,cells,transistors,people).Thus,thesame conceptsandprinciplesoforganizationunderlie thedifferentdisciplines(physics,biology,tech- nology,sociology,etc),providingabasisfortheir unification.Systemsconceptsinclude:system- environmentboundary,input,output,process, state,hierarchy,goal-directedness,andinforma- tion. Thedevelopmentsofsystemstheoryare diverse(Klir,FacetsofSystemsScience,1991), includingconceptualfoundationsandphiloso- phy(e.g.thephilosophiesofBunge,Bahm,and Laszlo);mathematicalmodelingandinformation theory(e.g.theworkofMesarovicandKlir);and practicalapplications.Mathematicalsystems theoryarosefromthedevelopmentofisomor- phiesbetweenthemodelsofelectricalcircuits andothersystems.Applicationsincludeengi- neering,computing,ecology,management,and familypsychotherapy. Systemsanalysis,developedindependentlyof systemstheory,appliessystemsprinciplestoaid adecisionmakerwithproblemsofidentifying, reconstrueting,optimizing,andcontrollingasys- tem(usuallyasocio-technicalorganization), whiletakingintoaccountmultipleobjectives, constraints,andresources.Itaimstospecifypos- siblecoursesofaction,togetherwiththeirrisks, costs,andbenefits.Systemstheoryiscloselycon- nectedtocybernetics,andalsotosystemdynam- ics,whichmodelschangesinanetworkof 898 szu szu coupledvariables(e.g.the"worlddynamics" modelsofJayForresterandtheClubofRome). Relatedideasareusedintheemerging"sciences ofcomplexity,"studyingself-organizationand heterogeneousnetworksofinteractingactors, andassociateddomainssuchasfar-from-equi- libriumthermodynamics,chaoticdynamics,arti- ficiallife,artificialintelligence,neuralnetworks, andcomputermodelingandsimulation. Seealsoartificialintelligence,com- puterTHEORY,INFORMATIONTHEORY. F.H.&C.J. szu.Seekung,szu. 899 tableofcategories.Seekant. tableofjudgments.Seekant. tabularasa.Seeleibniz,locke. tacitconsent.Seesocialcontract. tacitknowledge.Seeepistemology. Ta-hsiieh,apartoftheChineseConfucianclassic BookofRiteswhosetitleisstandardlytranslated asGreatLearning.ChuHsisignificantlyamended thetext(composedinthethirdorsecondcen- turyb.c.)andelevatedittothestatusofaninde- pendentclassicasoneoftheFourBooks.He regardeditasaquotationfromConfuciusanda commentarybyConfucius'sdiscipleTseng-tzu, butneitherhisemendationsnorhisinterpreta- tionofthetextisbeyonddispute. TheTa-hsilehinstructsarulerinhowtobring ordertohisstatebyself-cultivation.Muchdis- cussionofthetextrevolvesaroundthephraseko wu,whichdescribesthefirststepinself-cultiva- tionbutisleftundefmed.TheTa-hsilehclaims thatone'svirtuousnessorviciousnessisneces- sarilyevidenttoothers,andthatvirtuemanifests itselffirstinone'sfamilialrelationships,which thenserveasanexemplaroforderinbothfam- iliesandthestate. Seealsoconfucianism.B.W.V.N. TaiChen(1724-77),Chinesephilologist,phi- losopher,mathematician,andastronomer.A prominentmemberoftheK'ao-eheng(evidential research)School,TaiattackedtheNeo-Confu- ciandualismofIi(pattern)andch'i(ether), insistingthatIiissimplytheorderlystructureof ch'i.Intermsofethics,/;'consistsof"feelingsthat donoterr."InhisMeng-tzutzu-yishu-cheng ("MeaningsofTermsintheMenciusExplained andAttested"),Taiarguesfortheneedtomove frommereyi-chien(opinions)topu-techih-yi (undeviatingstandards)byapplyingtheConfu- ciangoldenrule-notasaformålprincipledeter- miningrightactionbutasawinnowingpro- cedurethatcullsoutimproperdesiresandallows onlyproperonestoinformone'sactions.Begin- ningwithtzujan(natural)desires,oneteststheir universalizabilitywiththegoldenrule,thereby identifyingthosethataccordwithwhatispi-jan (necessary).Onespontaneouslyk'o(approves of)the"necessary,"andTaiclaimsthisiswhat Menciusdescribesasthe"joy"ofmoralaction. Seealsomencius.P.J.I. fai-chi,Chinesetermmeaning'GreatUltimate', anideafirstdevelopedinthe"Appended Remarks"oftheI-Ching,whereitissaidthatin thesystemofChangethereistheGreatUltimate. ItgeneratestheTwoModes(yinandyang);the TwoModesgeneratetheFourForms(majorand minoryinandyang);andtheFourFormsgen- eratetheEightTrigrams.Inhis"Explanationof theDiagramoftheGreatUltimate,"ChouTun- yi(1017-73)spökeof"Non-ultimateiwu-chi) andalsotheGreatUltimate!"Hegeneratedcon- troversies.ChuHsi(1130-1200)approved Chou'sformulationandinterpretedt'ai-chiasIi (principle),whichisformlessontheonehand andhasprincipleontheotherhand.Seealso ch'ien,k'un;choutun-yi;chuhsi.S.-h.L. "PangChiin-i(1909-78),Chinesephilosopher,a leadingcontemporaryNewConfucianand cofounder,withCh'ienMu,ofNewAsiaCollege inHongKongin1949.Heacknowledgedthatit wasthroughtheinfluenceofHsiungShih-lithat hecouldseethetrueinsightsinChinesephilos- ophy.Hedraftedamanifestopublishedin1958 andsignedbyCarsunChang(1887-1969),Hsu Fu-kuan,andMouTsung-san.Theycriticized currentsinologicalstudiesassuperficialand inadequate,andmaintainedthatChinamust learnscienceanddemocracyfromtheWest,but theWestmustalsolearnhuman-heartedness andloveofharmonyandpeacefromChinese culture.Seealsoch'ienmu,chinesephilos- OPHY,HSIUNGSHIH-LI,HSUFU-KUAN.S.-h.L. T'anSsu-t'ung(1864-98),Chinesephilosopher ofthelateChingdynasty,acloseassociateof K'angYu-weiandLiangCh'i-ch'ao.Hewasa syncretistwholumpedtogetherConfucianism, Mohism,Taoism,Buddhism,Christianity,and Westernscience.HisbookonJen-hsileh(philos- ophyofhumanity)identifiedhumanitywith ether,acosmicforce,andgaveanewinterpreta- 900 tao Taoism tiontotheunitybetweennatureandhumanity. Jenforhimisthesourceofallexistenceandcrea- tures;itisnoneotherthanrealityitself.Hepar- ticipatedintheHundredDaysReformin1898 anddiedamartyr.Hispersonalexampleinspired manyrevolutionariesafterward.Seealsokang YU-WEI,LIANGCH'l-CH'AO.S.-h.L. tao,Chinesetermmeaning'path','way', 'account'.Fromthesenseofaliteralpath,road, orway,thetermcomestomeanawayofdoing something(e.g.,livingone'slifeororganizing society),especiallythewayadvocatedbyapar- ticularindividualorschoolofthought("theway oftheMaster,""thewayoftheMohists,"etc.). Frequently,itreferstothewayofdoingsome- thing,therightway(e.g.,"TheWayhasnotbeen putintopracticeforalongtime").Taoalsocame torefertothelinguisticaccountthatembodiesor describesaway.Finally,insometextsthetaoisa metaphysicalentity.Forexample,inNeo-Con- fucianism,taoisidentifiedwithIi(principle).In somecontextsitisdifficulttotellwhatsenseis intended.Seealsoli1,neo-confucianism. B.W.V.N. tao-hsin,jen-hsin,ChinesetermsusedbyNeo- Confucianphilosopherstocontrastthemind accordingtotheWay(tao-hsin)andthemind accordingtoman'sartificial,selfishdesires(jen- hsin).Whenonerespondsspontaneouslywith- outmakingdiscrimination,oneisacting accordingtotheWay.Oneisnaturallyhappy, sad,angry,andjoyfulascircumstancesrequire. Butwhenone'sselfisalienatedfromtheWay, oneworksonlyforself-interest,andtheemo- tionsanddesiresareexcessiveanddeviatefrom theMean.IntheConfuciantraditionsagesand worthiestakeHeavenastheirmodel,whilecom- monpeopleareurgedtotakechiln-tzu(thesupe- riormen)astheirmodel.Seealso neo-confucianism;t'ienli,jen-yu. S.-h.L. Taoism,aChinesephilosophyidentifiedwiththe Tao-chia(SchooloftheWay),representedby ChuangTzuandLaoTzu.Thetermmayalso refertotheHuang-LaoSchool;Neo-Taoists, suchasWangPiandKuoHsiang;andTao-chiao, adiversereligiousmovement.OnlytheTao-chia isdiscussedhere. Theschoolderivesitsnamefromthewordtao (Way),atermusedbyChinesethinkersofalmost everypersuasion.Taoistswerethefirsttousethe termtodescribethecomprehensivestructure anddynamicofthecosmos.Taoistsbelievethat (1)thereisawaytheworldshouldbe,away that,insomedeepsense,itis;(2)humanbeings canunderstandthisandneedtohaveandfollow suchknowledgeiftheyandtheworldaretoexist inharmony;and(3)theworldwasonceinsuch astate.MostearlyChinesethinkerssharedsim- ilarbeliefs,butTaoistsaredistinctinclaiming thattheWayisnotcodifiable,indeedisineffable. Taoiststhusaremetaphysicalandethicalrealists, butepistemologicalskepticsofanunusualsort, beinglanguageskeptics.Taoistsfurtherdenythat onecanstrivesuccessfullytoattaintheWay; Taoistself-cultivationisaprocessnotofaccu- mulationbutofparingaway.Onemustunweave thesocialfabric,forsakeone'sculturalcondi- tioning,andabandonrationalthought,tobeled insteadbyone'stzujan(spontaneous)inclina- tions.Withahsil(tenuous)mind,onethenwill perceivetheli(pattern)ofthecosmosandlive bywuwei(non-action). Thoughsharingastrongfamilyresemblance, theTaoismsofLaoTzuandChuangTzuaredis- tinct.LaoTzuadvocatesaprimitiveutopianism inwhichpeopleenjoythesimplelifeofsmall agrariancommunities,indifferenttowhatishap- peningintheneighboringvillage.Havingaban- donedculturalachievementssuchaswriting, theykeepaccountsbyknottingcords.LaoTzu blameshuman"cleverness,"whichimposesthe "human"onthe"Heavenly,"formostofwhatis badintheworld.Forhim,anotionlikebeauty givesrisetoitsoppositeandonlyservesto increaseanxietyanddissatisfaction;extollinga virtue,suchasbenevolence,onlyencourages peopletoaffectithypocritically.LaoTzuadvo- cates"turningback"tothetimewhenintellect wasyoungandstillobedienttointuitionand instinct.Toaccomplishthis,theTaoistsagemust ruleandenforcethisviewupontheelever,if theyshould"dåretoact." ChuangTzuemphasizeschangingoneself morethanchangingsociety.Hetooisakindof anti-rationalistandseeswisdomasa"knowing how"ratherthana"knowingthat."Heinvokes arepertoireofskillfulindividualsasexemplars oftheWay.Suchindividualsengagetheworld throughaknackthateludesdefinitivedescrip- tionanddisplayalltheTaoistvirtues.Their mindsarehsil(empty)ofpreconceptions,andso theyperceivetheli(pattern)ineachsituation. Theyrespondspontaneouslyandsoaretzujan; theydon'tforcethingsandsopracticewuwei.In accordwiththetao,theyleadafrictionlessexis- tence;they"walkwithouttouchingthe ground." Seealsoneo-taoism,tao.P.J.I. 901 TaoTeChing tautology TaoTeChing.Seelaotzu. tao-t'ung,Chinesetermmeaning'theorthodox lineoftransmissionoftheWay'.Accordingto ChuHsi(1130-1200),thefirsttousethisterm, thelineoftransmissioncanbetracedbackto ancientsage-emperors,ConfuciusandMencius. ThelinewasbrokensinceMenciusandwasonly revivedbytheCh'engbrothersintheSung dynasty.Theinterestingfeatureisthattheline hasexcludedimportantConfucianscholarssuch asHsunTzu(fl.298-238b.c.)andTungChung- shu(c.179-c.104b.c).Theideaoftao-fungcan betracedbacktoHanYii(768-824)andMen- cius.Seealsochuhsi,confucianism,con- fucius,HANYU,HSUNTZU,MENCIUS,NEO- CONFUCIANISM,TUNGCHUNG-SHU. S.-h.L. Tarski,Alfred(1901-83),Polish-bornAmerican mathematician,logician,andphilosopherof logicfamousforhisinvestigationsofthecon- ceptsoftruthandconsequenceconductedinthe 1930s.Hisanalysisoftheconceptoftruthinsyn- tacticallyprecise,fullyinterpretedlanguages resultedinadefinitionoftruthandanarticulate defenseofthecorrespondencetheoryoftruth. Sentencesofthefollowingkindarenowknown asTarskianbiconditionals:'Thesentence"Every perfectnumberiseven"istrueifandonlyif everyperfectnumberiseven.'OneofTarski's majorphilosophicalinsightsisthateachTarskian biconditionalis,inhiswords,apartialdefinition oftruthand,consequently,allTarskianbicondi- tionalswhoseright-handsidesexhaustthesen- tencesofagivenformållanguagetogether constituteanimplicitdefinitionof'true'as applicabletosentencesofthatgivenformållan- guage.Thisinsight,becauseofitspenetrating depthanddisarmingsimplicity,hasbecomea stapleofmodernanalyticphilosophy.Moreover, itineffectreducedthephilosophicalproblemof definingtruthtothelogicalproblemofcon- structingasinglesentencehavingtheformofa definitionandhavingasconsequenceseachof theTarskianbiconditionals.Tarski'ssolutionto thisproblemisthefamousTarskitruthdefini- tion,versionsofwhichappearinvirtuallyevery mathematicallogictext. Tarski'ssecondmostwidelyrecognizedphilo- sophicalachievementwashisanalysisandexpli- cationoftheconceptofconsequence.Conse- quenceisinterdefinablewithvalidityasapplied toarguments:agivenconclusionisaconse- quenceofagivenpremise-setifandonlyifthe argumentcomposedofthegivenconclusionand thegivenpremise-setisvalid;conversely,agiven argumentisvalidifandonlyifitsconclusionisa consequenceofitspremise-set.Shortlyafterdis- coveringthetruthdefinition,Tarskipresented his"no-countermodels"definitionofconse- quence:agivensentenceisaconsequenceofa givensetofsentencesifandonlyifeverymodel ofthesetisamodelofthesentence(inother words,ifandonlyifthereisnowaytoreinter- pretthenon-logicaltermsinsuchawayasto renderthesentencefalsewhilerenderingallsen- tencesinthesettrue).AsQuinehasemphasized, thisdefinitionreducesthemodalnotionoflogi- calnecessitytoacombinationofsyntacticand semanticconcepts,thusavoidingreferenceto modalitiesand/orto"possibleworlds." AfterTarski'sdefinitiveworkontruthandon consequencehedevotedhisenergieslargelyto morepurelymathematicalwork.Forexample, inanswertoGödel'sproofthatarithmeticis incompleteandundecidable,Tarskishowedthat algebraandgeometryarebothcompleteand decidable.Tarski'struthdefinitionandhisconse- quencedefinitionarefoundinhis1956collec- tionLogic,Semantics,Metamathematics(2ded., 1983):artideVIII,pp.152-278,containsthe truthdefinition;articleXVI,pp.409-20,con- tainstheconsequencedefinition.Hispublished artides,nearly3,000pagesinall,havebeen availabletogethersince1986inthefour-volume AlfredTarski,CollectedPapers,editedbyS.Givant andR.McKenzie. Seealsogödel'sincompletenesstheo- REMS,LOGICALCONSEQUENCE,TRUTH.J.Cor. Tarskianbiconditional.Seeconventiont,tarski. Tarskiansatisfaction.Seesatisfaction. Tarskiansemantics.Seeformålsemantics. Tarski'stheorem.Seesemanticparadoxes. Tarski's(T)schema.Seetruth. taskverb.Seeactionverb. tautology,apropositionwhosenegationisincon- sistent,or(self-)contradictory,e.g.'Socratesis Socrates','Everyhumaniseithermaleornon- male','Nohumanisbothmaleandnon-male', 'Everyhumanisidenticaltoitself,'IfSocratesis humanthenSocratesishuman'.Aproposition thatis(orislogicallyequivalentto)thenegation ofatautologyiscalleda(self-)contradiction. Accordingtoclassicallogic,thepropertyofbeing 902 Taylor,Charles Taylor,Charles impliedbyitsownnegationisanecessaryand sufficientconditionforbeingatautologyandthe propertyofimplyingitsownnegationisaneces- saryandsufficientconditionforbeingacontra- diction.Tautologiesarelogicallynecessaryand contradictionsarelogicallyimpossible. Epistemically,everypropositionthatcanbe knowntobetruebypurelylogicalreasoningisa tautologyandeverypropositionthatcanbe knowntobefalsebypurelylogicalreasoningis acontradiction.Theconversesofthesetwostate- mentsarebothcontroversialamongclassical logicians.Everypropositioninthesamelogical formasatautologyisatautologyandevery propositioninthesamelogicalformasacontra- dictionisacontradiction.Forthisreasonsome- timesatautologyissaidtobetrueinvirtueofform andacontradictionissaidtobefalseinvirtueof form;beingatautologyandbeingacontradiction (tautologousnessandcontradictoriness)arefor- målproperties.Sincethelogicalformofapropo- sitionisdeterminedbyitslogicalterms('every', 'some','is',etc),atautologyissometimessaidto betrueinvirtueofitslogicaltermsandlikewise mutatismutandisforacontradiction. Sincetautologiesdonotexcludeanylogical possibilitiestheyaresometimessaidtobe "empty"or"uninformative";andthereisaten- dencyeventodenythattheyaregenuinepropo- sitionsandthatknowledgeofthemisgenuine knowledge.Sinceeachcontradiction"includes" (implies)alllogicalpossibilities(whichofcourse arejointlyinconsistent),contradictionsare sometimessaidtobe"overinformative."Tau- tologiesandcontradictionsaresometimessaidto be"useless,"butforoppositereasons.Morepre- cisely,accordingtoclassicallogic,beingimplied byeachandeverypropositionisnecessaryand sufficientforbeingatautologyand,coordinately, implyingeachandeverypropositionisnecessary andsufficientforbeingacontradiction. Certaindevelopmentsinmathematicallogic, especiallymodeltheoryandmodallogic,seemto supportuseofLeibniz'sexpression'trueinall possibleworlds'inconnectionwithtautologies. Thereisaspecialsubclassoftautologiescalled truth-functionaltautologiesthataretrueinvirtue ofaspecialsubclassoflogicaltermscalledtruth- functionalconnectives('and','or','not','if,etc). Somelogicalwritingsuse'tautology'exclusively fortruth-functionaltautologiesandthusreplace "tautology"initsbroadsensebyanotherexpres- sion,e.g.'logicaltruth'.Tarski,Gödel,Russell, andmanyotherlogicianshaveusedthewordin itsbroadsense,butuseofitinitsnarrowsense iswidespreadandentirelyacceptable. Propositionsknowntobetautologiesareoften givenasexamplesofaprioriknowledge.Inphi- losophyofmathematics,thelogistichypothesis oflogicismisthepropositionthateverytrue propositionofpuremathematicsisatautology. Somewritersmakeasharpdistinctionbetween theformålpropertyofbeingatautologyandthe non-formalmetalogicalpropertyofbeingalaw oflogic.Forexample,'Oneisone'isnotmeta- logicalbutitisatautology,whereas'Notautol- ogyisacontradiction'ismetalogicalbutisnota tautology. Seealsolawsofthought,logical FORM,LOGICISM.J.Cor. Taylor,Charles(b.1931),Canadianphilosopher andhistorianofmodernity.Taylorwaseducated atMcGillandOxfordandhastaughtprimarilyat theseuniversities.Hisworkhasabroadlyana- lyticcharacter,althoughhehasconsistently opposedthenaturalisticandreductionistten- denciesthatwereassociatedwiththepositivist dominationofanalyticphilosophyduringthe 1950sand1960s.Hewas,forexample,astrong opponentofbehaviorismanddefendedthe essentiallyinterpretivenatureofthesocialsci- encesagainsteffortstoreducetheirmethodology tothatofthenaturalsciences.Taylorhasalso doneimportantworkonthehistioryofphiloso- phy,particularlyonHegel,andhasconnectedhis workwiththatofContinentalphilosopherssuch asHeideggerandMerleau-Ponty.Hehascon- tributedtopoliticaltheoryandwrittenoncon- temporarypoliticalissuessuchasmulti- culturalism(in,e.g.,TheEthicsofAuthenticity, 1991),oftenwithspecificreferencetoCanadian politics.Hehasalsotakenanactivepoliticalrole inQuebec. Taylor'smostimportantwork,SourcesoftheSelf (1989),isahistoricalandcriticalstudyofthe emergenceofthemodernconceptoftheself. Likemanyothercriticsofmodernity,Taylor rejectsmoderntendenciestoconstruepersonal identityinentirelyscientificornaturalisticterms, arguingthattheseconstrualsleadtoaviewof theselfthatcanmakenosenseofourundeni- ableexperienceofourselvesasmoralagents. Hedevelopsthiscritiqueinahistoricalmode throughdiscussionoftheradicalEnlighten- menfs(e.g.,Locke's)reductionoftheselftoan atomicindividual,essentiallydisengagedfrom everythingexceptitsownideasanddesires. Butunlikemanycritics,Tayloralsofindsin modernityother,richersourcesforaconception oftheself.Theseincludetheideaoftheselfs inwardness,traceableasfarbackasAugustine 903 Taylor,Harriet TeilharddeChardin,Pierre butdevelopedinadistinctivelymodernwayby MontaigneandDescartes;theaffirmationof ordinarylife(andofourselvesasparticipantsin it),particularlyassociatedwiththeReformation; andtheexpressivism(of,e.g.,theRomantics)for whichtheselffulfillsitselfbyembracingand articuiatingthevoiceofnaturepresentinits depths.Taylorthinksthatthesesourcesconsti- tuteamodernselfthat,unlikethe"punctual self"oftheradicalEnlightenment,isameaning- fulethicalagent.Hesuggests,nonetheless,that anadequateconceptionofthemodernselfwill furtherrequirearelationofhumaninwardness toGod.Thissuggestionsofarremainsundevel- oped. Seealsoenlightenment,personaliden- TITY,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND.G.G. Taylor,Harriet(1807-58),Englishfeministand writer.ShewasthewifeofJ.S.Mill,whocalled herthe"mostadmirableperson"hehadever met;butaccordingtohercritics,Taylorwas"a stupidwoman"with"aknackforrepeatingpret- tilywhatJ.S.M.said."AlthoughMillmayhave exaggeratedhermoralandintellectualvirtues, herwritingsonmarriage,theenfranchisement ofwomen,andtolerationdidinfluencehisSub- jectionofWomenandOnLiberty.InTheEnfran- chisementofWomen,Taylorrejectedthereigning "ängelinthehouse"idealofwoman.Sheargued thatconfiningwomentothehouseimpeded bothsexes'development.Taylorwasafeminist philosopherinherownright,whoarguedeven morestronglythanMillthatwomenareentitled tothesameeducational,legal,andeconomic opportunitiesthatmenenjoy.R.T te,Chinesetermmeaning'moralcharisma'or 'virtue'.Initsearliestuse,teisthequality bestowedonarulerbyHeaven(t'ien)which makeshissubjectswillinglyfollowhim.Ruleby teistraditionallythoughttobenotjustethically preferabletorulebyforcebutalsomoreeffective instrumentally.Itisanecessaryconditionfor havingtethatonebeethicallyexemplary,but traditionalthinkersdifferöverwhetherbeing virtuousisalsosufficientforthebestowalofte, andwhetherthebestowaloftemakesoneeven morevirtuous.Tesooncamealsotoreferto virtue,inthesenseofeitheradispositionthat contributestohumanflourishing(benevolence, courage,etc.)orthespecificexcellenceofany kindofthing.B.W.V.N. techne(Greek,'art','craft'),ahumanskillbased ongeneralprinciplesandcapableofbeing taught.Inthissense,amanualcraftsuchascar- pentryisatechne,butsoaresciencessuchasmed- icineandarithmetic.AccordingtoPlato(Gorgias 501a),agenuinetechneunderstandsitssubject matterandcangivearationalaccountofits activity.Aristotle(Metaphysics1.1)distinguishes technefromexperienceonthegroundsthattechne involvesknowledgeofuniversalsandcauses, andcanbetaught.Sometimes'techne'is restrictedtotheproductive(asopposedtotheo- reticalandpractical)arts,asatNicomacheanEthics VI.4.Techneanditsproductsareoftencontrasted withphysis,nature(PhysicsII.1).Seealsoaris- totle,PHYSIS,PLATO.W.J.R Teichmuller,Gustav(1832-88),Germanphi- losopherwhocontributedtothehistoryofphi- losophyanddevelopedatheoryofknowledge andametaphysicalconceptionbasedonthese historicalstudies.BorninBraunschweig,he taughtatGöttingenandBaselandwasinflu- encedbyLotzeandLeibniz.Hismajorworksare AristotelischeForschungen(AristotelianInvesti- gations,1867-73)andDiewirklicheundscheinbar Welt(TheActualandtheApparentWorld,1882). HisotherworksareUeberdieUnsterblichkeitder Seele(1874),StudienzurGeschichtederBegriffe (1874),DarwinismusundPhilosophie(1877), UeberdasWesenderLiebe(1879),Religions- philosophie(1886),andtheposthumouslypub- lishedNeueGrundlegungderPsychologieundLogik (1889). Teichmullermaintainedthattheselfofimme- diateexperience,the"I,"isthemostfundamen- talrealityandthattheconceptualworldisa projectionofitsconstitutingactivity.Onthebasis ofhisstudiesinthehistoryofmetaphysicsand hissympathieswithLeibniz'smonadology,he heldthateachmetaphysicalsystemcontained partialtruthsandconstruedeachmetaphysical standpointasaperspectiveonacomplexreality. Thinkingofbothmetaphysicalinterpretationsof realityandthesubjectivityofindividualimme- diateexperience,Teichmullerchristenedhisown philosophicalposition"perspectivism."Hiswork influencedlåterEuropeanthoughtthroughits impactonthephilosophicalreflectionsofNie- tzsche,whowasprobablyinfluencedbyhimin thedevelopmentofhisperspectivaltheoryof knowledge. Seealsoleibniz,lotze.G.J.S. TeilharddeChardin,Pierre(1881-1955),French paleontologist,Jesuitpriest,andphilosopher.His 904 telekinesis teleology philosophicalwork,whilepublishedonlypost- humously,wasvigorouslydiscussedthroughout hiscareer.Hiswritingsgeneratedconsiderable controversywithinthechurch,sinceoneofhis principalconcernswastobringaboutaforceful yetgenerousreconciliationbetweenthetradi- tionalChristiandogmaandthedramatic advancesyieldedbymodernscience.Hisphilos- ophyconsistedofsystematicreflectionsoncos- mology,biology,physics,anthropology,social theory,andtheology-reflectionsguided,he maintained,byhisfascinationwiththenatureof life,energy,andmatter,andbyhisprofound respectforhumanspirituality. Teilhardwaseducatedinphilosophyand mathematicsattheJesuitcollegeofMongré, nearLyons.HeenteredtheJesuitorderattheage ofeighteenandwasordainedapriestin1911.He wentontostudyatAix-en-Provence,Laval,and Caen,aswellasontheIsleofJerseyandatHast- ings,England. ReturningtoParisafterthewar,hestudied biologygeology,andpaleontologyatthe MuseumofNaturalHistoryandattheInstitut Catholique,receivingadoctoraldegreeingeol- ogyin1922.In1923,shortlyafterappointment tothefacultyofgeologyattheInstitutCath- olique,hetookleavetopursuefieldresearchin China.Hisresearchresultedinthediscovery,in 1929,ofPekingman(Sinanthropuspekin- ensis)-whichhesawas"perhapsthenexttothe laststeptraceablebetweentheanthropoidsand man."ItwasduringthisperiodthatTeilhard begantocomposeoneofhismajortheoretical works,ThePhenomenonofMan(1955),inwhich hestressedthedeepcontinuityofevolutionary developmentandtheemergenceofhumanity fromtheanimalrealm.Hearguedthatreceived evolutionarytheorywasfullycompatiblewith Christiandoctrine.Indeed,itisthesynthesisof evolutionarytheorywithhisownChristianthe- ologythatperhapsbestcharacterizesthebroad tenorofhisthought. Startingwiththeveryinceptionoftheevolu- tionarytrajectory,i.e.,withwhathetermedthe "Alphapoint"ofcreation,Teilhard'sgeneralthe- oryresistsanyabsolutedisjunctionbetweenthe inorganicandorganic.Indeed,matterandspirit aretwo"stages"or"aspects"ofthesamecosmic stuff.Thesetransitionsfromonestatetoanother maybesaidtocorrespondtothosebetweenthe somaticandpsychic,theexteriörandinteriör, accordingtothestateofrelativedevelopment, organization,andcomplexity.Hence,forTeil- hard,muchasforBergson(whoseworkgreatly influencedhim),evolutionarydevelopmentis characterizedbyaprogressionfromthesimplest componentsofmatterandenergy(whathe termedthelithosphere),throughtheorganiza- tionoffloraandfauna(thebiosphere),tothe complexformationsofsentientandcognitive humanlife(thenoosphere).Inthissense,evo- lutionisa"progressivespiritualizationofmat- ter."Heheldthistobeanorthogeneticprocess, oneof"directedevolution"or"Genesis,"by whichmatterwouldirreversiblymetamorphose itself,inaprocessofinvolutionandcomplexifi- cation,towardthepsychic. Specifically,Teilhard'saccountsoughttoover- comewhathesawasaprescientificworldview, onebasedonalargelyantiquatedandindefensi- blemetaphysicaldualism.Byaccomplishingthis, hehopedtorealizeaproductiveconvergenceof scienceandreligion.Theendofevolution,what hetermed"theOmegapoint,"wouldbethefull presenceofChrist,embodiedinauniversal humansociety.ManyhavetendedtoseeaChris- tianpantheismexpressedinsuchviews.Teilhard himselfstressedaprofoundlypersonalist,spiri- tualperspective,drawnnotonlyfromthetheo- logicaltraditionofThomism,butfromthatof PaulineNeoplatonismandChristianmysticism aswell-especiallythattraditionextendingfrom MeisterEckhartthroughCardinalBérulleand Malebranche.D.A1. telekinesis.Seeparapsychology. teleofunctionalism.Seefödor. teleologicalargument.Seephilosophyofreli- gion. teleologicalethics.Seeethics. teleologicalexplanation.Seeteleology. teleologicalIaw.Seecausallaw. teleologicalsuspensionoftheethical.Seekierke- gaard. teleology,thephilosophicaldoctrinethatallof nature,oratleastintentionalagents,aregoal- directedorfunctionallyorganized.Platofirstsug- gestedthattheorganizationofthenaturalworld canbeunderstoodbycomparingittothebehav- iorofanintentionalagent-externatteleology.For example,humanbeingscananticipatethefuture andbehaveinwayscalculatedtorealizetheir 905 telepathy telos intentions.Aristotleinvestednatureitselfwith goals-intemalteleology.Eachkindhasitsown finalcause,andentitiesaresoconstructedthat theytendtorealizethisgoal.Heavenlybodies travelasnearlyastheyareableinperfectcircles becausethatistheirnature,whilehorsesgive risetootherhorsesbecausethatistheirnature. Naturaltheologianscombinedthesetwoteleo- logicalperspectivestoexplainallphenomenaby referencetotheintentionsofabeneficent,omni- scient,all-powerfulGod.Godsoconstructedthe worldthateachentityisinvestedwiththeten- dencytofulfillitsownGod-givennature.Darwin explainedtheteleologicalcharacteroftheliving worldnon-teleologically.Theevolutionary processisnotitselfteleological,butitgivesrise tofunctionallyorganizedsystemsandinten- tionalagents. Present-dayphilosophersacknowledgeinten- tionalbehaviorandfunctionalorganizationbut attempttoexplainbothwithoutreferencetoa supernaturalagentorintemalnaturesofthe moremetaphysicalsort.Instead,theydefine 'function'cybemetically,intermsofpersistence towardagoalstateundervaryingconditions,or etiologically,intermsofthecontributionthata structureoractionmakestotherealizationofa goalstate.Thesedefinitionsconfrontabatteryof counterexamplesdesignedtoshowthatthecon- ditionmentionediseithernotnecessary,notsuf- ficient,orboth;e.g.,missinggoalobjects,too manygoals,orfunctionalequivalents.Thetrend hasbeentodecreasethescopeofteleological explanationsfromallofnature,totheorganiza- tionofthoseentitiesthatarisethroughnatural selection,totheirfinalrefugeinthebehaviorof humanbeings.Behavioristshaveattemptedto eliminatethislastvestigeofteleology.Justas naturalselectionmakestheattributionofgoals forbiologicalspeciesredundant,theselectionof behaviorintermsofitsconsequencesisdesigned tomakeanyreferencetointentionsonthepart ofhumanbeingsunnecessary. Seealsomechanisticexplanation. D.L.H. telepathy.Seeparapsychology. Telesio,Bernardino(1509-88),Italianphiloso- pherwhoseearlyscientificempiricisminflu- encedFrancisBaconandGalileo.Hestudiedin Padua,wherehecompletedhisdoctoratein 1535,andpracticedphilosophyinNaplesand Cosenzawithoutholdinganyacademicposition. Hismajorwork,theninevolumesofDererum naturaiuxtapropriaprincipia("OntheNatureof ThingsAccordingtoTheirPrinciples,"1586), containsanattempttointerpretnatureonthe basisofitsownprinciples,whichTelesioidenti- fieswiththetwoincorporealactiveforcesofheat andcold,andthecorporealandpassivephysical substratum.Asthetwoactiveforcespermeateall ofnatureandareendowedwithsensation,Tele- sioarguesthatallofnaturepossessessome degreeofsensation.Humanbeingssharewith animalsamaterialsubstanceproducedbyheat andcomingintoexistencewiththebody,called spirit.TheyarealsogivenamindbyGod.Telesio knewboththeAverroisticandtheAlexandrist interpretationsofAristotle.However,hebroke withboth,criticizingAristotle'sPhysicsand claimingthatnatureisinvestigatedbetterbythe sensesthanbytheintellect.P.Gar. telishment,punishmentofonesuspectedof wrongdoing,butwhomtheauthoritiesknowto beinnocent,imposedasadeterrenttofuture wrongdoers.Telishmentisthusnotpunishment insofaraspunishmentrequiresthattherecipi- ent'sharshtreatmentbedeserved.Telishmentis classicallygivenasoneofthethoughtexperi- mentschallengingutilitarianism(andmore broadly,consequentialism)asatheoryofethics, forsuchatheoryseemstojustifytelishmenton someoccasions.Seealsopunishment. M.S.M. telos,ancientGreektermmeaning'end'or'pur- pose'.TelosisakeyconceptnotonlyinGreek ethicsbutalsoinGreekscience.Thepurposeof ahumanbeingisagoodlife,andhumanactivi- tiesareevaluatedaccordingtowhethertheylead toormanifestthistelos.Plants,animals,andeven inanimateobjectswerealsothoughttohavea telosthroughwhichtheiractivitiesandrelations couldbeunderstoodandevaluated.Thougha teloscouldbesomethingthattranscendshuman activitiesandsensiblethings,asPlatothought,it neednotbeanythingapartfromnature.Aristo- tle,e.g.,identifiedthetelosofasensiblething withitsimmanentform.Itfollowsthatthepur- poseofthethingissimplytobewhatitisand that,ingeneral,athingpursuesitspurpose whenitendeavorstopreserveitself.Aristotle's viewshowsthat'purposeinnature'neednot meanahigherpurposebeyondnature.Yet,his immanentpurposedoesnotexclude"higher" purposes,andAristotelianteleologywaspressed intoservicebymedievalthinkersasaframework forunderstandingGod'sagencythroughnature. Thinkersinthemodernperiodarguedagainst theprominentroleaccordedtotelosbyancient 906 temperance term,major andmedievalthinkers,andtheyreplaceditwith analysesintermsofmechanismandlaw. E.C.H. temperance.Seecardinalvirtues. template.Seecognitivescience. temporalbecoming.Seetime. tensedidentity.Seeidentity. tenselogic,anextensionofclassicallogicintro- ducedbyArthurPrior(Past,Present,andFuture, f967),involvingoperatorsPandFforthepast andfuturetenses,or'itwasthecasethat...' and'itwillbethecasethat...'.Classicalor mathematicallogicwasdevelopedasalogicof unchangingmathematicaltruth,andcanbe appliedtotenseddiscourseonlybyartificialreg- imentationinspiredbymathematicalphysics, introducingquantificationöver"times"or "instants."Thus'Itwillhavebeenthecasethat p/whichPriorrepresentssimplyasFPp,classi- callogicrepresentsas'There[exists]aninstant tandthere[exists]aninstantt'suchthatt[is] låterthanthepresentandt'[is]earlierthant, andatt'it[is]thecasethatp',or3f3i'(tPPpandFp—>FFp.Lessisexpressibleusing PandFthanisexpressiblewithexplicitquan- tificationöverinstants,andfurtheroperatorsfor 'since'and'until'or'now'and'then'havebeen introducedbyHansKampandothers.Theseare especiallyimportantincombinationwithquan- tification,asin'Whenhewasinpower,allwho nowcondemnhimthenpraisedhim.' Astenseiscloselyrelatedtomood,sotense logiciscloselyrelatedtomodallogic.(AsKripke modelsformodallogicconsisteachofasetXof "worlds"andarelationRof'xisanalternativeto y,sofortenselogictheyconsisteachofasetXof "instants"andarelationRof'xisearlierthany': Thusinstants,banishedfromthesyntaxorproof theory,reappearinthesemanticsormodelthe- ory.)Modalityandtensearebothinvolvedinthe issueoffuturecontingents,andoneofPrior's motiveswasadesiretoproduceaformalism inwhichtheviewsonthistopicofancient,medi- eval,andearlymodernlogicians(fromAristotle withhis"seafighttomorrow"andDiodorus Cronoswithhis"MasterArgument"through OckhamtoPeirce)couldberepresented. ThemostimportantprecursortoPrior'swork ontenselogicwasthatonmany-valuedlogicsby Lukasiewicz,whichwasmotivatedlargelybythe problemoffuturecontingents.Alsorelatedto tenseandmoodisaspect,andmodificationsto representthisgrammaticalcategory(evaluating formulasatperiodsratherthaninstantsoftime) havealsobeenintroduced.Likemodallogic, tenselogichasbeentheobjectofintensivestudy intheoreticalcomputerscience,especiallyin connectionwithattemptstodeveloplanguages inwhichpropertiesofprogramscanbe expressedandproved;variantsoftenselogic (undersuchlabelsas"dynamiclogic"or"process logic")havethusbeenextensivelydeveloped fortechnologicalratherthanphilosophical motives. Seealsofuturecontingents,many- valuedlogic.J.Bur. TeresaofÅvila,Saint(1515-82),Spanishreli- gious,mystic,andauthorofspiritualtreatises. HavingenteredtheCarmeliteorderatÅvilaat twenty-two,Teresaspentthenexttwenty-five yearsseekingguidanceinthepracticeofprayer. Despitevariouslyineptspiritualadvisers,she seemstohaveundergoneanumberofmystical experiencesandtohavemadeincreasingly importantdiscoveriesaboutinteriörlife.After 1560Teresatookonapublicrolebyattaching herselftothereformingpartywithintheSpanish Carmelites.Herremainingyearswereoccupied withthereform,inwhichshewasassociated mostfamouslywithJohnoftheCross.Shealso composedseveralworks,includingaspiritual autobiography(theVida)andtwomasterpieces ofspirituality,theWayofPerfectionandtheInteriör Castle.Thelattertwo,butespeciallytheCastle, offerphilosophicalsuggestionsaboutthesoul's passions,activities,faculties,andground.Their principalmotiveistoteachthereaderhowto progress,bysuccessivesurrender,towardthe divineTrinitydwellingatthesoul'scenter. M.D.J. term.Seerelation,russell,syllogism. term,major.Seesyllogism. 907 term,minor testability term,minor.Seesyllogism. term,observation.Seephilosophyofscience. term,transcendental.Seetranscendentals. terministlogic,aschooloflogicoriginatingin twelfth-centuryEuropéanddominantinthe universitiesuntilitsdemiseinthehumanistic reforms.Itschiefgoalwastheelucidationofthe logicalform(the"exposition")ofpropositions advancedinthecontextofScholasticdisputa- tion.Itscentraltheoryconcernedtheproperties ofterms,especiallysupposition,anddidthe workofmodernquantificationtheory.Impor- tantlogiciansintheschoolincludePeterof Spain,WilliamSherwood,WalterBurley, WilliamHeytesbury,andPaulofVenice.See alsoBURLEY,HEYTESBURY,PAULOFVENICE, PETEROFSPAIN,SHERWOOD.J.Lo. terminusadquetn.Seeterminusaquo. terminusaquo(Latin,'termfromwhich'),the startingpointofsomeprocess.Theterminusad quemistheendingpoint.Forexample,changeis aprocessthatbeginsfromsomestate(thetermi- nusaquo)andproceedstosomestateatwhichit ends(theterminusadquem).Inparticular,inthe ripeningofanäpple,thegreenäppleistheter- minusaquoandtheredäppleistheterminusad quem.A.P.M. tertiaryqualities.Seequalities. Tertullian(a.d.c.155-c.240),Latintheologian, anearlyfatheroftheChristianchurch.Alayman fromCarthage,helaidtheconceptualandlin- guisticbasisforthedoctrineoftheTrinity. Thoughappearinghostiletophilosophy("What hasAthenstodowithJerusalem?")andtoratio- nality("Itiscertainbecauseitisimpossible"), TertullianwassteepedinStoicism.He denouncedalleclecticismnotgovernedbythe normativetraditionofChristiandoctrine,yet commonlyusedphilosophicalargumentand Stoicconcepts(e.g.,thecorporealityofGodand thesoul).Despiteinsistingonthesoleauthority oftheNewTestamentapostles,hejoinedwith Montanism,whichtaughtthattheHolySpirit wasstillinspiringprophecyconcerningmoral discipline.ReflectingthisinterestintheSpirit, Tertullianponderedthedistinctions(towhichhe gavetheneologismtrinitas)withinGod.Godis one"substance"butthree"persons":aplurality withoutdivision.TheFather,Son,andSpiritare distinct,butshareequallyintheoneGodhead. Thisthreenessismanifestonlyinthe"economy" ofGod'stemporalactiontowardtheworld;låter orthodoxy(e.g.Athanasius,BasiltheGreat, Augustine),wouldpostulateaTriunitythatis eternaland"immanent,"i.e.,internaltoGod's being.Seealsomontanism,stoicism,trini- TARIANISM.A.E.L. testability,inthesciences,capacityofatheoryto undergoexperimentaltesting.Theoriesinthe naturalsciencesareregularlysubjectedtoexper- imentaltestsinvolvingdetailedandrigorous controlofvariablefactors.Notnaiveobservation oftheworkingsofnature,butdisciplined, designedinterventioninsuchworkings,isthe hallmarkoftestability.Logicallyregarded,testing takestheformofseekingconfirmationoftheo- riesbyobtainingpositivetestresults.Wecanrep- resentatheoryasaconjunctionofahypothesis andastatementofinitialconditions,(H.A).This conjunctiondeductivelyentailstestableor observationalconsequencesO.Hence,(H.A)—» O.IfOobtains,(H.A)issaidtobeconfirmed,or renderedprobable.Butsuchconfirmationisnot decisive;Omaybeentailedby,andhence explainedby,manyothertheories.Forthisrea- son,Popperinsistedthatthetestabilityoftheo- riesshouldseekdisconfirmationsorfalsifica- tions.Thelogicalschema (H.A)->O not-O not-(H.A) isdeductivelyvalid,henceapparentlydecisive. Onthisview,scienceprogresses,notbyfind- ingthetruth,butbydiscardingthefalse.Testa- bilitybecomesfalsifiability.Thisdeductive schema(modustollens)isalsoemployedinthe analysisofcrucialtests.Considertwohypothe- sesHandH2,bothintroducedtoexplainsome phenomenon.Hlpredictsthatforsometestcon- ditionC,wehavethetestresult'ifCthene',and H2,theresult'ifCthene',whereeande2are logicallyincompatible.Ifexperimentfalsifies'ifC thene'(eldoesnotactuallyoccurasatest result),thehypothesisHisfalse,whichimplies thatH2istrue.Itwasoriginallysupposedthatthe experimentsofJ.B.L.Foucaultconstituteda decisivefalsificationofthecorpusculartheoryof thenatureoflight,andthusprovidedadecisive establishmentofthetruthofitsrival,thewave theoryoflight. Thisaccountofcrucialexperimentsneglects certainpointsinlogicandalsotheroleofauxil- iaryhypothesesinscience.AsDuhempointed 908 testimony Tetens,JohannNicolas out,rarely,ifever,doesahypothesisfacethe factsinisolationfromothersupportingassump- tions.Furthermore,itisafaetoflogicthatthefal- sificationofaconjunctionofahypothesisandits auxiliaryassumptionsandinitialconditions (not-(H-A))islogicallyequivalentto(not-Hor not-A),andthetestresultitselfprovidesnowar- rantforchoosingwhichalternativetoreject. Duhemfurthersuggestedthatrejectionofany componentpartofacomplextheoryisbasedon extra-evidentialconsiderations(factorslikesim- plicityandfruitfulness)andcannotbeforcedby negativetestresults.AcceptanceofDuhem's viewledQuinetosuggestthatatheorymustface thetribunalofexperienceenbloc;nosingle hypothesiscanbetestedinisolation.Original conceptionsoftestabilityandfalsifiabilitycon- struedscientificmethodashypothetico-deduc- tive.Difficultieswiththesereconstruetionsofthe logicofexperimenthaveledphilosophersofsci- encetofavöranexplicationofempiricalsupport basedonthelogicofprobability. Seealsocrucialexperiment,duhem, HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVEMETHOD,PROBA- BILITY.R.E.B. testimony,anactoftelling,includingallasser- tionsapparentlyintendedtoimpartinformation, regardlessofsocialsetting.Inanextendedsense personallettersandmessages,books,andother publishedmaterialpurportingtocontainfactual informationalsoconstitutetestimony.Testi- monymaybesincereorinsincere,andmay expressknowledgeorbaselessprejudice.When itexpressesknowledge,anditisrightlybelieved, thisknowledgeisdisseminatedtoitsrecipients, nearorremote.Secondhandknowledgecanbe passedonfurther,producinglongchainsoftes- timony;butthesechainsalwaysbeginwiththe reportofaneyewitnessorexpert. Inanysocialgroupwithacommonlanguage thereispotentialforthesharing,throughtesti- mony,ofthefruitsofindividuals'idiosyncratic acquisitionofknowledgethroughperception andinference.Inadvancedsocietiesspecializa- tioninthegatheringandproduetionofknowl- edgeanditswiderdisseminationthroughspöken andwrittentestimonyisafundamentalsocio- epistemicfact,andaverylargepartofeachper- son^bodyofknowledgeandbeliefstemsfrom testimony. Thusthequestionwhenapersonmayprop- erlybelievewhatanothertellsher,andwhat groundsherepistemicentitlementtodoso,isa crucialoneinepistemology.Reductionistsabout testimonyinsistthatthisentitlementmustderive fromourentitlementtobelievewhatweper- ceivetobeso,andtodrawinferencesfromthis accordingtofamiliargeneralprinciples.(Seee.g., Hume'sclassicdiscussion,inhisEnquiryinto HumanUnderstanding,sectionX.)Onthisview,I canperceivethatsomeonehastoldmethatp,but cantherebycometoknowthatponlybymeans ofaninference-onethatgoesviaadditional, empiricallygroundedknowledgeofthetrust- worthinessofthatperson.Anti-reductionists insist,bycontrast,thatthereisageneralentitle- menttobelievewhatoneistoldjustas such-defeatedbyknowledgeofone'sinfor- manfslackoftrustworthiness(hermendacityor incompetence),butnotneedingtobebolstered positivelybyempiricallybasedknowledgeofher trustworthiness.Anti-reductioniststhusseetes- timonyasanautonomoussourceofknowledge onaparwithperception,inference,andmem- ory.Oneargumentadducedforanti-reduetion- ismistranscendental:Wehavemanybeliefs acquiredfromtestimony,andthesebeliefsare knowledge;theirstatusasknowledgecannotbe accountedforinthewayrequiredbythereduc- tionist-thatis,thereliabilityoftestimonycan- notbeindependentlyconfirmed;thereforethe reduetionisfsinsistenceonthisismistaken. However,whileitisperhapstruethattherelia- bilityofallthebeliefsonehasthatdependon pasttestimonycannotbesimultaneouslycon- firmed,onecancertainlysometimesascertain, withoutcircularity,thataspecificassertionbya particularpersonislikelytobecorrect-if, e.g.,one'sownexperiencehasestablishedthat thatpersonhasagoodtrackrecordofreliability aboutthatkindofthing. Seealsoepistemology,hume,inferen- TIALKNOWLEDGE.E.R Tetens,JohannNicolas(1736-1807),German philosopherandpsychologist,sometimescalled theGermanLocke.AfterhisstudiesinRostock andCopenhagen,hetaughtatBiitzowandKiel (until1789).Hehadasecondsuccessfulcareer asapublicservantinDenmark(1790-1807) thatdidnotleavehimtimeforphilosophical work. TetenswasoneofthemostimportantGerman philosophersbetweenWolffandKant.Like Kant,whomhesignificantlyinfluenced,Tetens attemptedtofindamiddlewaybetweenempiri- cismandrationalism.Hismostimportantwork, thePhilosophischeVersucheilberdiemenschliche NaturundihreEntwicklung("PhilosophicalEssays onHumanNatureanditsDevelopment,"1777), isindicativeofthestateofphilosophicaldiscus- 909 Tetractys theodicy sioninGermanybeforeKanfsCritiqueofFure Reason.Tetens,whofollowedthe"psychological method"ofLocke,tendedtowardanaturalism, likethatofHume.However,Tetensmadeamore radicaldistinctionbetweenreasonandsensation thanHumeallowedandattemptedtoshowhow basicrationalprinciplesguaranteetheobjectiv- ityofhumanknowledge.M.K. Tetractys.Seepythagoras. ThalesofMiletus(fl.c.585b.c),Greekphiloso- pherwhowasregardedasoneoftheSevenSages ofGreece.Hewasalsoconsideredthefirst philosopher,founderoftheMilesians.Thalesis alsoreputedtohavebeenanengineer,astron- omer,mathematician,andstatesman.Hisdoc- trinesevenearlyGreeksourcesknowonlyby hearsay:hesaidthatwateristhearche,andthat theearthfloatsonwaterlikearaft.Themagnet hasasoul,andallthingsarefullofthegods. Thales'attempttoexplainnaturalphenomenain naturalratherthanexclusivelysupematural termsborefruitinhisfollowerAnaximander. Seealsopre-socratics.D.W.G. thema(plural:themata),inStoiclogic,aground ruleusedtoreduceargumentformstobasic forms.TheStoicsanalyzedargumentsbytheir form(schema,ortropos).Theyrepresentedforms usingnumberstorepresentclaims;forexample, 'ifthefirst,thesecond;butthefirst;thereforethe second'.Someformswereundemonstrable;oth- erswerereducedtotheundemonstrableargu- mentformsbygroundrules(themata);e.g.,ifR followsfromP8-Q,~QfollowsfromP&~R.The fiveundemonstrableargumentsare:(1)modus ponens;(2)modustollens;(3)notboth(PandQ), P,sonot-Q;(4)PorQbutnotboth,P,sonot-Q; and(5)disjunctivesyllogism.Theevidence aboutthefourgroundrulesisincomplete,buta soundandconsistentsystemforpropositional logiccanbedevelopedthatisconsistentwiththe evidencewehave.(SeeDiogenesLaertius,Lives ofthePhilosophers,776-81,föranintroductionto theStoictheoryofarguments;otherevidenceis morescattered.)Seealsodoxographers, FORMÅLLOGIC,LOGICALFORM,STOICISM. H.A.I. Themistius.Seecommentariesonaristotle. theodicy(fromGreektheos,'God',anddike,'jus- tice'),adefenseofthejusticeorgoodnessofGod inthefaceofdoubtsorobjectionsarisingfrom thephenomenaofevilintheworld('evil'refers heretobadstatesofaffairsofanysort).Many typesoftheodicyhavebeenproposedandvigor- ouslydebated;onlyafewcanbesketchedhere. (1)Ithasbeenarguedthatevilsarelogically necessaryforgreatergoods(e.g.,hardshipsfor thefullexemplificationofcertainvirtues),so thatevenanomnipotentbeing(roughly,one whosepowerhasnologicallycontingentlimits) wouldhaveamorallysufficientreasontocause orpermittheevilsinordertoobtainthegoods. Leibniz,inhisTheodicy(1710),proposedapar- ticularlycomprehensivetheodicyofthistype. Onhisview,Godhadadequatereasontobring intoexistencetheactualworld,despiteallits evils,becauseitisthebestofallpossibleworlds, andallactualevilsareessentialingredientsinit, sothatomittinganyofthemwouldspoilthe designofthewhole.Asidefromissuesabout whetheractualevilsareinfactnecessaryfor greatergoods,thisapproachfacesthequestion whetheritassumeswronglythattheendjusti- fiesthemeans. (2)Animportanttypeoftheodicytracessome orallevilstosinfulfreeactionsofhumansor otherbeings(suchasängels)createdbyGod. Proponentsofthisapproachassumethatfree actionincreaturesisofgreatvalueandislogi- callyincompatiblewithdivinecausalcontrolof thecreatures'actions.ItfollowsthatGod'snot interveningtopreventsinsisnecessary,though thesinsthemselvesarenot,tothegoodofcre- atedfreedom.Thisisproposedasamorallysuf- ficientreasonforGod'snotpreventingthem.Itis amajortaskforthistypeoftheodicytoexplain whyGodwouldpermitthoseevilsthatarenot themselvesfreechoicesofcreaturesbutareat mostconsequencesofsuchchoices. (3)Anothertypeoftheodicy,bothancientand currentlyinfluentialamongtheologians,though lesscongenialtoorthodoxtraditionsinthemajor theisticreligions,proposestodefendGod'sgood- nessbyabandoningthedoctrinethatGodis omnipotent.Onthisview,Godiscausally,rather thanlogically,unabletopreventmanyevils whilepursuingsufficientlygreatgoods.Aprinci- palsponsorofthisapproachatpresentisthe movementknownasprocesstheology,inspired byWhitehead;itdependsonacomplexmeta- physicaltheoryaboutthenatureofcausalrela- tionships. (4)Othertheodiciesfocusmoreonoutcomes thanonorigins.Somereligiousbeliefssuggest thatGodwillturnouttohavebeenverygoodto createdpersonsbyvirtueofgifts(especiallyreli- giousgifts,suchascommunionwithGodas supremeGood)thatmaybebestowedinalife 910 Theodorus theoreticalconstruct afterdeathorinreligiousexperienceinthepre- sentlife.Thisapproachmaybecombinedwith oneoftheothertypesoftheodicy,oradoptedby peoplewhothinkthatGod'sreasonsforpermit- tingevilsarebeyondourfindingout. Seealsodivineattributes,freewill PROBLEM,PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION,PRO- CESSTHEOLOGY.R.M.A. Theodorus.Seecyrenaics. theologianaturalis(Latin,'naturaltheology'), theologythatusesthemethodsofinvestigation andstandardsofrationalityofanyotherareaof philosophy.Traditionally,thecentralproblemsof naturaltheologyareproofsfortheexistenceof Godandtheproblemofevil.Incontrastwith naturaltheology,supernaturaltheologyuses methodsthataresupposedlyrevealedbyGod andacceptsasfactbeliefsthataresimilarlyout- sidetherealmofrationalacceptability.Relying onaprophetorapopetosettlefactualquestions wouldbeacceptabletosupernatural,butnotto natural,theology.Nothingpreventsanatural theologianfromanalyzingconceptsthatcanbe usedsanguinelybysupernaturaltheologians, e.g.,revelation,miracles,infallibility,andthe doctrineoftheTrinity. Theologiansoftenworkinbothareas,asdid, e.g.,AnselmandAquinas.Forhisbrilliantcri- tiquesoftraditionaltheology,Humedeservesthe titleof"naturalanti-theologian." Seealsophilosophyofreligion.A.RM. theologicalcreationism.Seepreexistence. theologicalnaturalism,theattempttodevelopa naturalisticconceptionofGod.Asaphilosophi- calposition,naturalismholds(1)thattheonly reliablemethodsofknowingwhatthereisare methodscontinuouswiththoseofthedeveloped sciences,and(2)thattheapplicationofthose methodssupportstheviewthattheconstituents ofrealityareeitherphysicalorarecausally dependentonphysicalthingsandtheirmodifi- cations.SincesupernaturalismaffirmsthatGodis purelyspiritualandcausallyindependentof physicalthings,naturalistsholdthateitherbelief inGodmustbeabandonedasrationallyunsup- portedortheconceptofGodmustbereconsti- tutedconsistentlywithnaturalism.Earlier attemptstodothelatterincludetheworkof FeuerbachandComte.Intwentieth-century Americannaturalismthemostsignificant attemptstodevelopanaturalisticconceptionof GodareduetoDeweyandHenryNelsonWie- man(1884-1975).InACommonFaithDewey proposedaviewofGodastheunityofidealends resultingfromhumanimagination,endsarous- ingustodesireandaction.Supernaturalism,he argued,wastheproductofaprimitiveneedto converttheobjectsofdesire,thegreatestideals, intoanalreadyexistingreality. IncontrasttoDewey,Wiemaninsistedon viewingGodasaprocessinthenaturalworld thatleadstothebestthathumanscanachieveif theybutsubmittoitsworkingintheirlives.In hisearlierworkheviewedGodasacosmic processthatnotonlyworksforhumangoodbut iswhatactuallyproducedhumanlife.Låterhe identifiedGodwithcreativeinterchange,a processthatoccursonlywithinalreadyexisting humancommunities.WhileWieman'sGodis notahumancreation,asareDewey'sidealends, itisdifficulttoseehowloveanddevotionare appropriatetoanaturalprocessthatworksasit doeswithoutthoughtorpurpose.Thus,while Dewey'sGod(idealends)lackscreativepower butmaywellqualifyasanobjectofloveand devotion,Wieman'sGod(aprocessinnature)is capableofcreativepowerbut,whileworthyof ourcareandattention,doesnotseemtoqualify asanobjectofloveanddevotion.Neitherview, then,satisfiesthetwofundamentalfeatures associatedwiththetraditionalideaofGod:pos- sessingcreativepowerandbeinganappropriate objectofsupremeloveanddevotion. Seealsonaturalism,philosophyof religion,processtheology.W.L.R. theologicalvirtues.Seeaquinas. theologicalvoluntarism.Seevoluntarism. theology,natural.Seephilosophyofreligion, THEOLOGIANATURALIS. theology,philosophical.Seemetaphysics. theology,supernatural.Seetheologianaturalis. theologyofliberation.Seelatinamericanphilos- ophy. Theophrastus.Seehellenisticphilosophy,peri- PATETICSCHOOL. theorem.Seeaxiomaticmethod,deduction. theoreticalconcept.Seetheoreticalterm. theoreticalconstruct.Seetheoreticalterm. 911 theoreticalentity theoreticalterm theoreticalentity.Seetheoreticalterm. theoreticalidentity.Seephilosophyofmind. theoreticaljudgment.Seetheoreticalreason. theoreticalrationality.Seerationality. theoreticalreason,initstraditionalsense,afac- ultyorcapacitywhoseprovinceistheoretical knowledgeorinquiry;morebroadly,thefaculty concernedwithascertainingtruthofanykind (alsosometimescalledspeculativereason).In Book6ofhisMetaphysics,Aristotleidentifies mathematics,physics,andtheologyasthesub- jectmatteroftheoreticalreason.Theoreticalrea- sonistraditionallydistinguishedfrompradical reason,afacultyexercisedindeterminingguides togoodconductandindeliberatingaboutproper coursesofaction.Aristotlecontrastsit,aswell, withproductivereason,whichisconcernedwith "making":shipbuilding,sculpting,healing,and thelike. Kantdistinguishestheoreticalreasonnotonly frompracticalreasonbutalso(sometimes)from thefacultyofunderstanding,inwhichthecate- goriesoriginate.Theoreticalreason,possessedof itsownaprioriconcepts("ideasofreason"),reg- ulatestheactivitiesoftheunderstanding.Itpre- supposesasystematicunityinnature,setsthe goalforscientificinquiry,anddeterminesthe "criterionofempiricaltruth"(CritiqueofPureRea- son).Theoreticalreason,onKanfsconception, seeksanexplanatory"completeness"andan "unconditionedness"ofbeingthattranscend whatispossibleinexperience. Reason,asafacultyorcapacity,maybe regardedasahybridcomposedoftheoreticaland practicalreason(broadlyconstrued)orasaunity havingboththeoreticalandpracticalfunctions. SomecommentatorstakeAristotletoembrace theformerconceptionandKantthelatter.Rea- soniscontrastedsometimeswithexperience, sometimeswithemotionanddesire,sometimes withfaith.Itspresenceinhumanbeingshas oftenbeenregardedasconstitutingtheprimary differencebetweenhumanandnon-humanani- mals;andreasonissometimesrepresentedasa divineelementinhumannature.Socrates,in Plato'sPhilebus,portraysreasonas"thekingof heavenandearth."Hobbes,inhisLeviathan, paintsamoresoberingpicture,contendingthat reason,"whenwereckonitamongthefaculties ofthemind,...isnothingbutreckoning-thatis, addingandsubtracting-oftheconsequencesof generalnamesagreeduponforthemarkingand signifyingofourthoughts." Seealsopracticalreason,rationality. A.R.M. theoreticalreasoning.Seepracticalreasoning. theoreticalterm,atermoccurringinascientific theorythatpurportstomakereferencetoan unobservableentity(e.g.,'electron'),property (e.g.,'themonatomicityofamolecule'),orrela- tion('greaterelectricalresistance').Thequalifi- cation'purportsto'isrequiredbecausein- strumentalistsdenythatanysuchunobservables exist;nevertheless,theyacknowledgethatasci- entifictheory,suchastheatomictheoryofmat- ter,maybeausefultoolfororganizingour knowledgeofobservablesandpredictingfuture experiences.Scientificrealists,incontrast,main- tainthatatleastsomeofthetheoreticalterms (e.g.,'quark'or'neutrino')actuallydenoteenti- tiesthatarenotdirectlyobservable-theyhold, i.e.,thatsuchthingsexist.Foreithergroup,the- oreticaltermsarecontrastedwithsuchobserva- tionaltermsas'rope','smooth',and'louder than',whichrefertoobservableentities,proper- ties,orrelations. Muchphilosophicalcontroversyhascentered onhowtodrawthedistinctionbetweenthe observableandtheunobservable.DidGalileo observethemoonsofJupiterwithhistelescope? Doweobservebacteriaunderamicroscope?Do physicistsobserveelectronsinbubblechambers? Doastronomersobservethesupernovaexplo- sionswithneutrinocounters?Doweobserve ordinarymaterialobjects,oraresense-datathe onlyobservables?Arethereanyobservational termsatall,orarealltermstheory-laden? Anotherimportantmeaningof'theoretical term'occursifoneregardsascientifictheoryas asemiformalaxiomaticsystem.Itisthennatural tothinkofitsvocabularyasdividedintothree parts,(i)termsoflogicandmathematics,(ii) termsdrawnfromordinarylanguageorfrom othertheories,and(iii)theoreticaltermsthat constitutethespecialvocabularyofthatparticu- lartheory.Thermodynamics,e.g.,employs(i) termsfornumbersandmathematicaloperations, (ii)suchtermsas'pressure'and'volume'thatare commontomanybranchesofphysics,and(iii) suchspecialthermodynamicaltermsas'temper- ature','heat',and'entropy'.Inthissecondsense, atheoreticaltermneednotevenpurporttorefer tounobservables.Forexample,althoughspecial equipmentisnecessaryforitsprecisequantita- 912 theoreticalunderdetermination theoryofappearing tivemeasurement,temperatureisanobservable property. Eveniftheoriesarenotregardedasaxiomatic systems,theirtechnicaltermscanbeconsidered theoretical.Suchtermsneednotpurporttorefer tounobservables,norbetheexclusiveproperty ofoneparticulartheory.Insomecases,e.g., 'work'inphysics,anordinarywordisusedinthe theorywithameaningthatdepartssignificantly fromitsordinaryuse. Seriousquestionshavebeenraisedaboutthe meaningoftheoreticalterms.Somephiloso- phershaveinsistedthat,tobemeaningful,they mustbegivenoperationaldefinitions.Others haveappealedtocoordinativedefinitionsto secureatleastpartialinterpretationofaxiomatic theories.Theverifiabilitycriterionhasbeen invokedtosecurethemeaningfulnessofscien- tifictheoriescontainingsuchterms. Atheoreticalconcept(orconstruct)isaconcept expressedbyatheoreticalterminanyofthe foregoingsenses.Theterm'theoreticalentity' hasoftenbeenusedtorefertounobservables, butthisusageisconfusing,inpartbecause,with- outintroducinganyspecialvocabulary,wecan talkaboutobjectstoosmalltobeperceived directly-e.g.,spheresofgamboge(ayellow resin)lessthan10~6metersindiameter,which figuredinahistoricallyimportantexperimentby JeanPerrin. Seealsooperationalism,philosophyof SCIENCE.W.C.S. theoreticalunderdetermination.Seeoperational- ism,THEORY-LADEN. theoria.Seearistotle. theory,scientific.Seephilosophyofscience. theory-laden,dependentontheory;specifically, involvingatheoreticalinterpretationofwhatis perceivedorrecorded.Intheheydayoflogical empiricismitwasthought,byCarnapandoth- ers,thatarigiddistinctioncouldbedrawn betweenobservationalandtheoreticalterms. Låter,N.R.Hanson,PaulFeyerabend,andoth- ersquestionedthisdistinction,arguingthatper- hapsallobservationsaretheory-ladeneither becauseourperceptionoftheworldiscoloredby perceptual,linguistic,andculturaldifferencesor becausenoattempttodistinguishsharply betweenobservationandtheoryhasbeensuc- cessful.Thisshiftbringsahöstofphilosophical problems.Ifweaccepttheideaofradicaltheory- ladenness,relativismoftheorychoicebecomes possible,for,givenrivaltheorieseachofwhich conditionsitsownobservationalevidence,the choicebetweenthemwouldseemtohavetobe madeonextra-evidentialgrounds,sincenothe- ory-neutralobservationsareavailable.Inits mostperplexingform,relativismholdsthat,the- ory-ladennessbeinggranted,onetheoryisas goodasanyother,sofarastherelationshipof theorytoevidenceisconcerned.Relativistscou- plethethesisoftheory-ladennesswiththe allegedfactoftheunderdeterminationofathe- orybyitsobservationalevidence,whichyields theideathatanynumberofalternativetheories canbesupportedbythesameevidence.The questionbecomesoneofwhatitisthatcon- strainschoicesbetweentheories.Iftheory-laden observationscannotconstrainsuchchoices,the individualsubjectivepreferencesofscientists,or rulesoffraternalbehavioragreeduponby groupsofscientists,becometheoperativecon- straints.Thelogicofconfirmationseemstobe intrinsicallycontaminatedbybothidiosyncratic andsocialfactors,posingathreattotheveryidea ofscientificrationality.Seealsoconfirma- tion,EPISTEMOLOGY,HYPOTHETICO-DEDUC- TIVEMETHOD,INCOMMENSURABILITY,TEST- ABILITY.R.E.B. theoryofappearing,thetheorythattoperceive anobjectissimplyforthatobjecttoappear(pre- sentitself)tooneasbeingacertainway,e.g., lookingroundorlikearock,smellingvinegary, soundingraucous,ortastingbitter.Nearlyevery- onewouldacceptthisformulationonsome interpretation.Butthetheorytakesthistobea rock-bottomcharacterizationofperception,and notfurtheranalyzable.Ittakes''appearingto subjectSasso-and-so"asabasic,irreducible relation,onereadilyidentifiableinexperience butnotsubjecttodefinitioninotherterms.The theorypreservestheideathatinnormalpercep- tionwearedirectlyawareofobjectsinthephys- icalenvironment,notawareofthemthrough non-physicalsense-data,sensoryimpressions,or otherintermediaries.Whenatreelookstomea certainway,itisthetreeandnothingelseof whichIamdirectlyaware.Thatinvolves"hav- ing"asensoryexperience,butthatexperience justconsistsofthetree'slookingacertainwayto me. Afterenjoyingacertaincurrencyearlyinthis centurythetheorywaslargelyabandonedunder theimpactofcriticismsbyPrice,Broad,and Chisholm.Themostwidelyadvertiseddifficulty 913 theoryofdescriptions theoryofdescriptions isthis.Whatisitthatappearstothesubjectin completelyhallucinatoryexperience?Perhaps thegreateststrengthofthetheoryisitsfidelityto whatperceptualexperienceseemstobe. Seealsoperception.W.P.A. theoryofdescriptions,ananalysis,initially developedbyRussell,ofsentencescontaining descriptions.Descriptionsincludeindefinitede- scriptionssuchas'anelephanfanddefinite descriptionssuchas'thepositivesquarerootof four'.OnRusselfsanalysis,descriptionsare "incompletesymbols"thataremeaningfulonly inthecontextofothersymbols,i.e.,onlyinthe contextofthesentencescontainingthem. Althoughthewords'thefirstpresidentofthe UnitedStates'appeartoconstituteasingular termthatpicksoutaparticularindividual,much asthename'GeorgeWashington'does,Russell heldthatdescriptionsarenotreferringexpres- sions,andthattheyare"analyzedout"ina properspecificationofthelogicalformofthesen- tencesinwhichtheyoccur.Thegrammatical formof'ThefirstpresidentoftheUnitedStatesis tall'issimplymisleadingastoitslogicalform. AccordingtoRussell'sanalysisofindefinite descriptions,thesentence'Isawaman'asserts thatthereisatleastonethingthatisaman,and Isawthatthing-symbolically,(Ex)(Mx&Sx). Theroleoftheapparentsingularterm'aman'is takenöverbytheexistentialquantifier'(Ex)'and thevariablesitbinds,andtheapparentsingular termdisappearsonanalysis.Asentencecontain- ingadefinitedescription,suchas'Thepresent kingofFranceisbald',istakentomakethree claims:thatatleastonethingisapresentkingof France,thatatmostonethingisapresentking ofFrance,andthatthatthingisbald-symboli- cally,(Ex){[Fx&(y)(FyDy=x)]&Bx}.Again, theapparentreferringexpression'thepresent kingofFrance'isanalyzedaway,withitsrole carriedoutbythequantifiersandvariablesinthe symbolicrepresentationofthelogicalformofthe sentenceinwhichitoccurs.Noelementinthat representationisasingularreferringexpression. Russellheldthatthisanalysissolvesatleast threedifficultpuzzlesposedbydescriptions.The firstishowitcouldbetruethatGeorgeIVwished toknowwhetherScottwastheauthorof Waverly,butfalsethatGeorgeIVwishedtoknow whetherScottwasScott.SinceScottistheauthor ofWaverly,weshouldapparentlybeabletosub- stitute'Scott'for'theauthorofWaverly'andinfer thesecondsentencefromthefirst,butwecan- not.OnRussell'sanalysis,'GeorgeIVwishedto knowwhetherScottwastheauthorofWaverly' doesnot,whenproperlyunderstood,containan expression'theauthorofWaverly'forwhichthe name'Scott'canbesubstituted.Thesecondpuz- zleconcernsthelawofexcludedmiddle,which rulesthateither'ThepresentkingofFranceis bald'or'ThepresentkingofFranceisnotbald' mustbetrue;theproblemisthatneitherthelist ofbaldmennorthatofnon-baldmencontains anentryforthepresentkingofFrance.Russell's solutionisthat'ThepresentkingofFranceisnot bald'isindeedtrueifitisunderstoodas'Itisnot thecasethatthereisexactlyonethingthatis nowKingofFranceandisbald',i.e.,as~(Ex)[Fx &(y){[Fy—'y=x)\&Bx}.Thefinalpuzzleishow 'ThereisnopresentkingofFrance'or'Thepre- sentkingofFrancedoesnotexist'canbetrue-if 'thepresentkingofFrance'isareferringexpres- sionthatpicksoutsomething,howcanwetruly denythatthatthingexists?Sincedescriptionsare notreferringexpressionsonRussell'stheory,itis easyforhimtoshowthatthenegationofthe claimthatthereisatleastandatmost(i.e., exactly)onepresentkingofFrance,~(Ex)[Fx& (y)(pyDy=*)Listrue. Strawsonofferedthefirstrealchallengeto Russell'stheory,arguingthat'Thepresentking ofFranceisbald'doesnotentailbutinsteadpre- supposes'ThereisapresentkingofFrance',so thattheformerisnotfalsifiedbythefalsityofthe latter,butisinsteaddeprivedofatruth-value. Strawsonarguedforthenaturalviewthatdefi- nitedescriptionsareindeedreferringexpres- sions,usedtosinglesomethingoutforpre- dication.Morerecently,KeithDonnellanargued thatbothRussellandStrawsonignoredthefact thatdefinitedescriptionshavetwouses.Used attributively,adefinitedescriptionisintendedto saysomethingaboutwhateveritistrueof,and whenasentenceissouseditconformstoRus- sell'sanalysis.Usedreferentially,adefinite descriptionisintendedtosinglesomethingout, butmaynotcorrectlydescribeit.Forexample, seeinganinebriatedmaninapoliceman'suni- form,onemightsay,"Thecoponthecorneris drunk!"Donnellanwouldsaythatevenifthe personwereadrunkenactordressedasapolice- man,thespeakerwouldhavereferredtohim andtrulysaidofhimthathewasdrunk.Ifitis forsomereasoncrucialthatthedescriptionbe correct,asitmightbeifonesaid,"Thecoponthe cornerhastheauthoritytoissuespeedingtick- ets,"theuseisattributive;andbecause'thecop onthecorner'doesnotdescribeanyonecor- rectly,noonehasbeensaidtohavetheauthor- itytoissuespeedingtickets.Donnellancriticized Russellforoverlookingreferentialusesof 914 theoryofeffluxes theosophy descriptions,andStrawsonforbothfailingto acknowledgeattributiveusesandmaintaining thatwithreferentialusesonecanrefertosome- thingwithadefinitedescriptiononlyifthe descriptionistrueofit.DiscussionofStrawson's andDonnellan'scriticismsisongoing,andhas provokedveryusefulworkinbothsemantics andspeechacttheory,andonthedistinctions betweensemanticsandpragmaticsandbetween semanticreferenceandspeaker'sreference, amongothers. Seealsocausaltheoryofproper NAMES,PRESUPPOSITION,RUSSELL.R.B. theoryofeffluxes.Seedemocritus. theoryofForms.SeepLATo. theoryoffrequency.Seeprobability. theoryofrelativity.Seerelativity. theoryofsigns,thephilosophicalandscientific theoryofinformation-carryingentities,commu- nication,andinformationtransmission.The term'semiotic'wasintroducedbyLockeforthe scienceofsignsandsignification.Theterm becamemorewidelyusedasaresultoftheinflu- entialworkofPeirceandCharlesMorris.With regardtolinguisticsigns,threeareasofsemiotic weredistinguished:pragmatics-thestudyofthe waypeople,animals,ormachinessuchascom- putersusesigns;semantics-thestudyofthe relationsbetweensignsandtheirmeanings, abstractingfromtheiruse;andsyntax-the studyoftherelationsamongsignsthemselves, abstractingbothfromuseandfrommeaning.In Europé,thenear-equivalentterm'semiology' wasintroducedbyFerdinanddeSaussure,the Swisslinguist. Broadly,asignisanyinformation-carrying entity,includinglinguisticandanimalsignaling tokens,maps,roadsigns,diagrams,pictures, models,etc.Examplesincludesmokeasasignof fire,andaredlightatahighwayintersectionas asigntostop.Linguistically,vocalaspectsof speechsuchasprosodicfeatures(intonation, stress)andparalinguisticfeatures(loudnessand tone,gestures,facialexpressions,etc),aswellas wordsandsentences,aresignsinthemostgen- eralsense.Peircedefinedasignas"something thatståndsforsomethinginsomerespector capacity."Amongsigns,hedistinguishedsymbols, icons,andindices. Asymbol,orconventionalsign,isasign,typical ofnaturallanguageforms,thatlacksanysignifi- cantrelevantphysicalcorrespondencewithor resemblancetotheentitiestowhichtheform refers(manifestedbythefactthatquitedifferent formsmayrefertothesameclassofobjects),and forwhichthereisnocorrelationbetweenthe occurrenceofthesignanditsreferent. Anindex,ornaturalsign,isasignwhoseoccur- renceiscausallyorstatisticallycorrelatedwith occurrencesofitsreferent,andwhoseproduc- tionisnotintentional.Thus,yawningisanatural signofsleepiness;abirdcallmaybeanatural signofalarm.Linguistically,loudnesswitharis- ingpitchisasignofanger. Aniconisasignwhoseformcorrespondstoor resemblesitsreferentoracharacteristicofitsref- erent.Forinstance,atailor'sswatchisaniconby beingasignthatresemblesafabricincolor,pat- tern,andtexture.Alinguisticexampleisono- matopoeia-aswith'buzz'.Ingeneral,thereare conventionalandculturalaspectstoasignbeing anicon. Seealsogrammar,meaning,philosophy OFLANGUAGE,SEMIOSIS.W.K.W. theoryoftypes.Seetypetheory. theorytheory.Seesimulationtheory. theosophy,anyphilosophicalmysticism,espe- ciallythosethatpurporttobemathematicallyor scientificallybased,suchasPythagoreanism, Neoplatonism,orgnosticism.VedicHinduism, andcertainaspectsofBuddhism,Taoism,and IslamicSufism,canalsobeconsideredtheosoph- ical. Innarrowersenses,'theosophy'mayreferto thephilosophyofSwedenborg,Steiner,or MadameHelenaPetrovnaBlavatsky(1831-91). Swedenborg'stheosophyoriginallyconsistedof arationalisticcosmology,inspiredbycertainele- mentsofCartesianandLeibnizianphilosophy, andaChristianmysticism.Swedenborglabored toexplaintheinterconnectionsbetweensoul andbody.Steiner'stheosophyisareactionto standardscientifictheory.Itpurportstobeasrig- orousasordinaryscience,butsuperiortoitby incorporatingspiritualtruthsaboutreality. Accordingtohistheosophy,realityisorganicand evolvingbyitsownresource.Genuineknowl- edgeisintuitive,notdiscursive.Madame BlavatskyfoundedtheTheosophicalSocietyin 1875.Herviewswereeclectic,butwerestrongly influencedbymysticalelementsofIndianphi- losophy. Seealsomysticism,steiner,swedenbor- GIANISM.A.PM. 915 TheravadaBuddhism Thomism TheravadaBuddhism.Seebuddhism. thermodynamics,firstlawof.Seeentropy. thermodynamics,secondlawof.Seeentropy. thesis.Seehegel. theurgy.Seeneoplatonism. thing.Seemetaphysics. thing-in-itself.Seekant. ThirdManargument.Seeplato. thirdness.Seepeirce. thisness.Seehaecceity. ThomasAquinas.Seeaquinas. Thomism,thetheologyandphilosophyof ThomasAquinas.Thetermisappliedbroadlyto variousthinkersfromdifferentperiodswhowere heavilyinfluencedbyAquinas'sthoughtintheir ownphilosophizingandtheologizing.Herethree differenterasandthreedifferentgroupsof thinkerswillbedistinguished:thosewhosup- portedAquinas'sthoughtinthefiftyyearsorso foilowinghisdeathin1274;certainhighlyskilled interpretersandcommentatorswhofiourished duringtheperiodof"SecondThomism"(six- teenth-seventeenthcenturies);andvariousiate nineteenth-andtwentieth-centurythinkers whohavebeendeeplyinfluencedintheirown workbyAquinas. Thirteenth-andfourteenth-centuryThomism. AlthoughAquinas'sgeniuswasrecognizedby manyduringhisownlifetime,anumberofhis viewswereimmediatelycontestedbyother Scholasticthinkers.Controversiesranged,e.g., överhisdefenseofonlyonesubstantialformin humanbeings;hisclaimthatprimematteris purelypotentialandcannot,therefore,bekept inexistencewithoutsomesubstantialform,even bydivinepower;hisemphasisontheroleofthe humanintellectintheactofchoice;hisespousal ofarealdistinctionbetweeenthesoulandits powers;andhisdefenseofsomekindofobjec- tiveor"real"ratherthanamerelymind-depen- dentcompositionofessenceandactofexisting (esse)increatures. SomeofAquinas'spositionswereincluded directlyorindirectlyinthe219propositionscon- demnedbyBishopStephenTempierofParisin 1277,andhisdefenseofonesinglesubstantial forminmanwascondemnedbyArchbishop RobertKilwardbyatOxfordin1277,with renewedprohibitionsbyhissuccessorasarch- bishopofCanterbury,JohnPeckham,in1284 and1286.OnlyafterAquinas'scanonizationin 1323weretheParisprohibitionsrevokedinsofar astheytouchedonhisteaching(in1325).Even withinhisownDominicanorder,disagreement aboutsomeofhisviewsdevelopedwithinthe firstdecadesafterhisdeath,notwithstandingthe order'shighlysympatheticespousalofhiscause. EarlyEnglishDominicandefendersofhisgeneral viewsincludedWilliamHothum(d.1298), RichardKnapwell(d.c.1288),RobertOrford(b. after1250,fl.1290-95),ThomasSutton(d. c.1315?),andWilliamMacclesfield(d.1303). FrenchDominicanThomistsincludedBernardof Trilia(d.1292),GilesofLessinesinpresent-day Belgium(d.c.1304?),JohnQuidortofParis(d. 1306),BernardofAuvergne(d.after1307), HervéNédélec(d.1323),ArmandofBellevue(fl. 1316-34),andWilliamPeterGodin(d.1336). ThesecularmasteratParis,PeterofAuvergne(d. 1304),whileremainingveryindependentinhis ownviews,knewAquinas'sthoughtwelland completedsomeofhiscommentarieson Aristotle. Sixteenth-andseventeenth-centuryThomism. SometimesknownastheperiodofSecond Thomism,thisrevivalgainedimpetusfromthe earlyfifteenth-centurywriterJohnCapreolus (1380-1444)inhisDefensesofThomas'sTheology (DefensionestheologiaeDiviThomae),acommen- taryontheSentences.Anumberoffifteenth-cen- turyDominicanandsecularteachersinGerman universitiesalsocontributed:KasparGrunwald (Freiburg);CorneliusSneekandJohnStoppe(in Rostock);LeonardofBrixental(Vienna);Gerard ofHeerenberg,LambertofHeerenberg,andJohn Versor(allatCologne);GerhardofElten;andin BelgiumDenistheCarthusian.Outstanding amongvarioussixteenth-centurycommentators onThomaswereTommasodeVio(Cardinal) Cajetan,FrancisSylvesterofFerrara,Francisco deVitoria(Salamanca),andFrancisco'sdisciples DomingodeSotoandMelchiorCano.Most importantamongearlyseventeenth-century ThomistswasJohnofSt.Thomas,wholectured atPiacenza,Madrid,andAlcalå,andisbest knownforhisCursusphilosophicusandhisCursus theologicus. 916 Thomson,JudithJarvis Thomson,JudithJarvis Thenineteenth-andtwentieth-centuryrevival. Bytheearlytomid-nineteenthcenturythestudy ofAquinashadbeenlargelyabandonedoutside Dominicancircles,andinmostRomanCatholic collegesandseminariesakindofCartesianand SuarezianScholasticismwastaught.Longbefore hebecamePopeLeoXIII,JoachimPecciandhis brotherJosephhadtakenstepstointroducethe teachingofThomisticphilosophyatthediocesan seminaryatPerugiain1846.Earliereffortsinthis directionhadbeenmadebyVincenzoBuzzetti (1778-1824),byBuzzetti'sstudentsSerafino andDomenicoSordi,andbyTaparellid'Aglezio, whobecamedirectoroftheCollegioRomano (GregorianUniversity)in1824. Leo'sencyclicalAeterniPatris(1879)markedan officialeffortonthepartoftheRomanCatholic churchtofosterthestudyofthephilosophyand theologyofThomasAquinas.Theintentwasto drawuponAquinas'soriginalwritingsinorderto preparestudentsofphilosophyandtheologyto dealwithproblemsraisedbycontemporary thought.TheLeonineCommissionwasestab- lishedtopublishacriticaleditionofallof Aquinas'swritings;thiseffortcontinuestoday. ImportantcentersofThomisticstudiesdevel- oped,suchastheHigherInstituteofPhilosophy atLouvain(foundedbyCardinalMercier),the DominicanSchoolofSaulchoirinFrance,and thePontificalInstituteofMediaevalStudiesin Toronto.DifferentgroupsofRoman,Belgian,and FrenchJesuitsacknowledgedadeepindebted- nesstoAquinasfortheirpersonalphilosophical reflections.Therewasalsoaconcentrationof effortintheUnitedStatesatuniversitiessuchas TheCatholicUniversityofAmerica,St.Louis University,NotreDame,Fordham,Marquette, andBostonCollege,tomentionbutafew,andby theDominicansatRiverForest. Agreatweaknessofmanyofthenineteenth- andtwentieth-centuryLatinmanualsproduced duringthiseffortwasalackofhistoricalsensi- tivityandexpertise,whichresultedinanunreal andhighlyabstractpresentationofan"Aris- totelian-Thomistic"philosophy.Thisweakness waslargelyoffsetbythedevelopmentofsolid historicalresearchbothinthethoughtof Aquinasandinmedievalphilosophyandtheol- ogyingeneral,championedbyscholarssuchas H.Denifle,M.DeWulf,M.Grabmann,P.Man- donnet,F.VanSteenberghen,E.Gilsonand manyofhisstudentsatToronto,andbyahöstof morerecentandcontemporaryscholars.Much ofthishistoricalworkcontinuestodayboth withinandwithoutCatholicscholarlycircles. Atthesametime,remarkablediversityin interpretingAquinas'sthoughthasemergedon thepartofmanytwentieth-centuryscholars. Witness,e.g.,theheavyinfluenceofCajetanand JohnofSt.ThomasontheThomismofMaritain; themuchmorehistoricallygroundedapproaches developedinquitedifferentwaysbyGilsonandF. VanSteenberghen;theemphasisonthemeta- physicsofparticipationinAquinasinthevery differentpresentationsbyL.GeigerandC.Fabro; theemphasisonexistence(esse)promotedby Gilsonandmanyothersbutresistedbystillother interpreters;themovementknownasTrans- cendentalThomism,originallyinspiredbyP. RousselotandbyJ.Marechal(indialoguewith Kant);andthelongcontroversyabouttheappro- priatenessofdescribingThomas'sphilosophy (andthatofothermedievals)asaChristianphi- losophy.Anincreasingnumberofnon-Catholic thinkersarecurrentlydirectingconsiderable attentiontoAquinas,andthevaryingback- groundstheybringtohistextswillundoubtedly resultinstillotherinterestinginterpretationsand applicationsofhisthoughttocontemporarycon- cerns. Seealsoaquinas,gilson,johnofsaint THOMAS,MARITAIN,NEO-THOMISM.J.F.W. Thomson,JudithJarvis(b.1929),Americanana- lyticphilosopherbestknownforhercontribu- tiontomoralphilosophyandforherpaper"A DefenseofAbortion"(1971).Thomsonhas taughtatM.I.Tsince1964.Herworkiscentrally concernedwithissuesinmoralphilosophy,most notablyquestionsregardingrights,andwith issuesinmetaphysicssuchastheidentityacross timeofpeopleandtheontologyofevents.Her ActsandOtherEvents(1977)isastudyofhuman actionandprovidesananalysisofthepart- wholerelationamongevents. "ADefenseofAbortion"hasnotonlyinflu- encedmuchlåterworkonthistopicbutisoneof themostwidelydiscussedpapersincontempo- raryphilosophy.Byappealtoimaginativesce- nariosanalogoustopregnancy,Thomsonargues thatevenifthefetusisassumedtobeaperson, itsrightsareinmanycircumstancesoutweighed bytherightsofthepregnantwoman.Thusthe paperadvancesanargumentforarighttoabor- tionthatdoesnotturnuponthequestionof whetherthefetusisaperson.SeveralofThom- son^essays,including"PreferentialHiring" (1973),'TheRighttoPrivacy"(1975),and "Killing,LettingDie,andtheTrolleyProblem" (1976),addressthequestionsofwhatconstitutes 917 Thoreau,HenryDavid Vi,yung aninfringementofrightsandwhenitismorally permissibletoinfringearight.Thesearecol- lectedinRights,Restitution,andRisk:Essaysin MoralTheory(1986).Thomson'sTheRealmof Rights(1990)offersasystematicaccountof humanrights,addressingfirstwhatitistohave arightandsecondwhichrightswehave. Thomson'sworkisdistinguishedbyitsexcep- tionallylucidstyleanditsrelianceonhighly inventiveexamples.Thecentralityofexamples toherworkreflectsamethodologicalconviction thatourviewsaboutactualandimaginedcases providethedataformoraltheorizing. Seealsoactiontheory,ethics,rights. A.E.B. Thoreau,HenryDavid(1817-62),American naturalistandwriter.BorninConcord,Massa- chusetts,heattendedHarvard(1833-37)and thenretumedtoConcordtostudynatureand write,makingafrugallivingasaschoolteacher, landsurveyor,andpencilmaker.Commentators haveemphasizedthreeaspectsofhislife:hislove andpenetratingstudyofthefloraandfaunaof theConcordarea,recordedwithphilosophical reflectionsinWalden(1854);hiscontinuouspur- suitofsimplicityintheextemalsoflife,thus avoidingalifeof"quietdesperation";andhisacts ofcivildisobedience.Thelastitemhasbeen somewhatoveremphasized;notpayingapolltax bywayofprotestwasnotoriginalwithThoreau. However,hisessay"ResistancetoCivilGovern- ment"immortalizedhisprotestandinfluenced peoplelikeGandhiandMartinLutherKing,Jr., inlåteryears.Thoreaueventuallyhelpedrun- awayslavesatconsiderablerisk;still,heconsid- eredhimselfastudentofnatureandnota reformer.Seealsotranscendentalism. E.H.M. thought,languageof.Seemeaning,mentalese, PHILOSOPHYOFLANGUAGE. thoughtexperiment,atechniquefortestinga hypothesisbyimaginingasituationandwhat wouldbesaidaboutit(ormorerarely,happenin it).Thistechniqueisoftenusedbyphilosophers toarguefor(oragainst)ahypothesisaboutthe meaningorapplicabilityofaconcept.Forexam- ple,Lockeimaginedaswitchofmindsbetween aprinceandacobblerasawaytoarguethatper- sonalidentityisbasedoncontinuityofmemory, notcontinuityofthebody.Toarguefortherel- ativityofsimultaneity,Einsteinimaginedtwo observers-oneonatrain,theotherbeside it-whoobservedlightningbolts.Andaccording tosomescholars,Galileoonlyimaginedthe experimentoftyingtwofive-poundweights togetherwithafinestringinordertoarguethat heavierbodiesdonotfallfaster.Thoughtexper- imentsofthislasttypearerarebecausetheycan beusedonlywhenoneisthoroughlyfamiliar withtheoutcomeoftheimaginedsituation. J.A.K. Thrasymachus(fl.427b.c),GreekSophistfrom Bithyniawhoisknownmainlyasacharacterin BookIofPlato'sRepublic.Hetraveledandtaught extensivelythroughouttheGreekworld,and waswellknowninAthensasateacherandasthe authoroftreatisesonrhetoric.Innovativeinhis style,hewascreditedwithinventingthe"mid- dlestyle"ofrhetoric.Theonlysurvivingfrag- mentofaspeechbyThrasymachuswaswritten fordeliverybyanAtheniancitizenintheassem- bly,atatimewhenAthenswasnotfäringwellin thePeloponnesianWar;itshowshimconcerned withtheefficiencyofgovernment,pleadingwith theAthenianstorecognizetheircommoninter- estsandgiveuptheirfactionalism.Ouronly othersourceforhisviewsonpoliticalmattersis Plato'sRepublic,whichmostscholarsacceptas presentingatleastahalf-truthaboutThrasy- machus.There,Thrasymachusisrepresentedas afoiltoSocrates,claimingthatjusticeisonly whatbenefitsthestronger,i.e.,therulers.From thepointofviewofthosewhoareruled,then, justicealwaysservestheinterestofsomeone else,andrulerswhoseektheirownadvantage areunjust.Seealsosophists.P.Wo. ThreeProfoundTreatises.Seene O-TAOISM. three-valuedlogic.Seemany-valuedlogic. ThreeWays.Seebonaventure. threshold,absolute.Seefechner. threshold,relative.Seefechner. Vi,yung,ChinesetermsoftenrenderedintoEng- lishas'substance'and'function',respectively. Ch'engYi(1033-1107),intheprefacetohis CommentarytotheBookofChanges,says:"Sub- stance(t'i)andfunction(yung)comefromthe samesource,andthereisnogapbetweenthe manifestandthehidden."Suchthoughtischar- acteristicoftheChinesewayofthinking.ChuHsi (1130-1200)appliedthepairofconceptstohis theoryofhumannature;hemaintainedthatjen (humanity)isnature,substance,whileloveis 918 fien Tillich,Paul feeling,function.InthelateCh'ingdynasty (1644-1912)ChangChih-tung(1837-1909) advocatedChineselearningfort'iandWestern learningforyung.Seealsochinesephilos- OPHY,CHUHSI.S.-h.L. fien,Chinesetermmeaning'heaven','sky'. Tienhasarangeofusesrunningfromthemost totheleastanthropomorphic.Atoneextreme, fienisidentifiedwithshangti.Tiencanbespö- kenofashavingdesiresandengaginginpurpo- siveactions,suchasbestowingtheMandateof Heaven(fienming).Tienminghasapoliticaland anethicaluse.Itcanbethemandatetorule giventoavirtuousindividual.Itcanalsobethe moralrequirementsthatapplytoeachindivid- ual,especiallyastheseareembodiedinone's nature.Attheotherextreme,thinkerssuchas Hstin-Tzuidentifyfienwiththenaturalorder. Evenintextswherefienissometimesused anthropomorphically,itcanalsobeusedassyn- onymouswithming(inthesenseoffäte),orsim- plyrefertothesky.Aftertheintroductionof BuddhismintoChina,thephrase'Hallof Heaven'(fienfång)isusedtorefertothepar- adiseawaitingsomesoulsafterdeath.Seealso CHUNG-YUNG,HSING,MING,SHANGTI. B.W.V.N. fien-jenho-i,Chinesetermfortherelationship betweenfien(Heaven)andhumanbeings.Most ancientChinesephilosophersagreedontheideal fien-jenho-i:theunityandharmonyofHeaven orthenaturalorderofeventsandhumanaffairs. Theydifferedonthemeansofachievingthis idealvision.TheTaoists,LaoTzuandChuang Tzu,focusedonadaptabilitytoallnaturaloccur- renceswithouthumanintervention.TheConfu- ciansstressedthecultivationofvirtuessuchas jen(benevolence),i(rightness),andIi(propri- ety),bothintherulersandthepeople.Some låterConfucians,alongwithMoTzu,empha- sizedthemutualinfluenceandresponseorinter- actionofHeavenandhumans.Perhapsthemost distinctiveConfucianconceptionisHstinTzu's thesisthatHeavenprovidesresourcesforcom- pletionbyhumanefforts.A.S.C. fienIi,jen-yii,Chinesetermsliterallymeaning 'heavenlyprinciples'and'humandesires', respectively.Sung-MingNeo-Confucianphi- losophersbelievedthatHeavenenablesusto understandprinciplesandtoactaccordingto them.Thereforewemusttryourbesttopreserve heavenlyprinciplesandeliminatehuman desires.Whenhungry,onemusteat;thisisact- ingaccordingtofienIi.Butwhenoneeraves gourmetfood,theonlythingonecaresaboutis gratificationofdesire;thisisjen-yii.Neo-Confu- cianphilosopherswerenotteachingasceticism; theyonlyurgedusnottobeslavesofourexces- sive,unnatural,artificial,"human"desires. Seealsoneo-confucianism;tao-hsin, JEN-HSIN.S.-h.L. fienming.Seeming. Tillers.SeeHsiihsing. Tillich,Paul(1886-1965),German-bornAmeri- canphilosopherandtheologian.Bomin Starzeddel,easternGermany,hewaseducatedin philosophyandtheologyandordainedinthe PrussianEvangelicalChurchin1912.Heserved asanarmychaplainduringWorldWarIandlåter taughtatBerlin,Marburg,Dresden,Leipzig,and Frankfurt.InNovember1933,followingsuspen- sionfromhisteachingpostbytheNazis,heemi- gratedtotheUnitedStates,wherehetaughtat ColumbiaandUnionTheologicalSeminaryuntil 1955,andthenatHarvardandChicagountilhis death.Apopulärpreacherandspeaker,hedevel- opedawideaudienceintheUnitedStates throughsuchwritingsasTheProtestantEra (1948),SystematicTheology(threevolumes:1951, 1957,1963),TheCouragetoBe(1952),and DynamicsofFaith(1957).Hissometimesuncon- ventionallifestyle,aswellashissyncreticyet originalthought,moved"ontheboundary" betweentheologyandotherelementsofcul- ture-especiallyart,literature,politicalthought, anddepthpsychology-inthebeliefthatreligion shouldrelätetothewholeextent,andthevery depths,ofhumanexistence. Tillich'sthought,despiteitsdistinctive"onto- logical"vocabulary,wasgreatlyinfluencedby thevoluntaristictraditionfromAugustine throughSchelling,Schopenhauer,Marx,Nie- tzsche,andFreud.Itwasasystematictheology thatsoughttostatefreshChristiananswersto deepexistentialquestionsraisedbyindividuals andeultures-hismethodofcorrelation.Everyage hasitsdistinctivekairos,"crisis"or"fullnessof time,"therighttimeforcreativethoughtand action.InWeimarGermany,Tillichfoundthe timesripeforreligioussocialism.Inpost-World WarIIAmerica,hefocusedmoreonpsycholog- icalthemes:inthemidstofanxietyöverdeath, meaninglessness,andguilt,everyoneseeksthe couragetobe,whichcomesonlybyavoidingthe abyssofnon-being(wellingupinthedemonic) andbyplacingone'sunconditionalfaith-ulti- 919 time time mateconcern-notinanyparticularbeing(e.g. God)butinBeing-Itself("theGodaboveGod," thegroundofbeing).Thisisessentiallythe Protestantprinciple,whichprohibitslodgingulti- mateconcerninanyfiniteandlimitedreality (includingstate,race,andreligiousinstitutions andsymbols). TillichwasespeciallyinfluentialafterWorld WarII.Herepresentedformanyawelcomecrit- icalopennesstothespiritualdepthsofmodern culture,opposingbothdemonicidolatryofthis world(asinNationalSocialism)andsectarian denialofculturalresourcesforfaith(asin Barthianneo-orthodoxy). Seealsoaugustine,existentialism, FREUD,NIETZSCHE.W.L.S. time,"amovingimageofeternity"(Plato);''the numberofmovementsinrespectofthebefore andafter"(Aristotle);"theLifeoftheSoulin movementasitpassesfromonestageofactor experiencetoanother"(Plotinus);"apresentof thingspast,memory,apresentofthingspresent, sight,andapresentofthingsfuture,expecta- tion"(Augustine).Thesedefinitions,likeall attemptstoencapsulatetheessenceoftimein someneatformula,areunhelpfullycircular becausetheyemploytemporalnotions. Althoughtimemightbetoobasictoadmitofdef- inition,therestillaremanyquestionsabouttime thatphilosophershavemadesomeprogressin answeringbyanalysisbothofhowweordinarily experienceandtalkabouttime,andofthedeliv- erancesofscience,therebyclarifyinganddeep- eningourunderstandingofwhattimeis.What followsgivesasampleofsomeofthemore importantoftheseissues. TemporalbecomingandtheA-andB-theories oftime.AccordingtotheB-theory,timeconsists innothingbutafixed"B-series"ofeventsrun- ningfromearliertolåter.TheA-theoryrequires thattheseeventsalsoforman"A-series"going fromthefuturethroughthepresentintothe pastand,moreover,shiftinrespecttothese determinations.Thelattersortofchange,com- monlyreferredtoas"temporalbecoming,"gives risetowell-knownperplexitiesconcemingboth whatdoestheshiftingandthesortofshift involved.Oftenitissaidthatitisthepresentor nowthatshiftstoever-latertimes.Thisquickly leadstoabsurdity.'Thepresent'and'now',like 'thistime',areusedtorefertoamomentoftime. Thus,tosaythatthepresentshiftstolåtertimes entailsthatthisverymomentoftime-thepre- sent-willbecomesomeothermomentoftime andthusceasetobeidenticalwithitself! Sometimestheentitythatshiftsistheproperty ofnownessorpresentness.Theproblemisthat everyeventhasthispropertyatsometime, namelywhenitoccurs.Thus,whatmustqual- ifysomeeventasbeingnowsimpliciterisitshav- ingthepropertyofnownessnow;andthisisthe startofaninfiniteregressthatisviciousbecause ateachstageweareleftwithanunexpurgated useof'now',theverytermthatwassupposedto beanalyzedintermsofthepropertyofnowness. Ifeventsaretochangefrombeingfuturetopre- sentandfrompresenttopast,asisrequiredby temporalbecoming,theymustdosoinrelation tosomemysterioustranscendententity,since temporalrelationsbetweeneventsand/ortimes cannotchange.Thenatureoftheshiftisequally perplexing,foritmustoccurataparticularråte; butaråteofchangeinvolvesacomparison betweenonekindofchangeandachangeof time.Herein,itischangeoftimethatiscom- paredtochangeoftime,resultingintheseem- ingtautologythattimepassesorshiftsattheråte ofonesecondpersecond,surelyanabsurdity sincethisisnotaråteofchangeatall.Broad attemptedtoskirttheseperplexitiesbysaying thatbecomingissidgenerisandtherebydefies analysis,whichputshimonthesideofthemys- ticallyinclinedBergsonwhothoughtthatit couldbeknownonlythroughanactofineffable intuition. Toescapetheclutchesofbothperplexityand mysticism,aswellastosatisfythedemandofsci- encetoviewtheworldnon-perspectivally,the B-theoryattemptedtoreducetheA-seriestothe B-seriesviaalinguisticreductioninwhichatern- poralindexicalpropositionreportinganeventas past,present,orfutureisshowntobeidentical withanon-indexicalpropositionreportinga relationofprecedenceorsimultaneitybetween itandanothereventortime.Itisgenerallycon- cededthatsuchareductionfails,since,ingen- eral,noindexicalpropositionisidenticalwith anynon-indexicalone,thisbeingduetothefact thatonecanhaveapropositionalattitude towardoneofthemthatisnothadtotheother; e.g.,Icanbelievethatitisnowrainingwithout believingthatitrains(tenselessly)att7.The friendsofbecominghavedrawnthewrong moralfromthisfailure-thatthereisamysteri- ousMr.Xouttheredoing"TheShift."Theyhave overlookedthefactthattwosentencescan expressdifferentpropositionsandyetreportone andthesameeventorstateofaffairs;e.g.,'This 920 time time iswater'and'thisisacollectionofH2mole- cules',thoughdifferinginsense,reportthesame stateofaffairs-thisbeingwaterisnothingbut thisbeingacollectionofH_,0molecules. Itcouldbeclaimedthatthesameholdsforthe appropriateuseofindexicalandnon-indexical sentences;thetokeningatt7of'Georgiefliesat thistime(atpresent)'iscoreportingwiththe non-synonymous'Georgieflies(tenselessly)at t'sinceGeorgie'sflyingatthistimeisthesame eventasGeorgie'sflyingatt7,giventhatthistime ist7.Thiseffectsthesameontologicalreduction ofthebecomingofeventstotheirbearingtem- poralrelationstoeachotherasdoesthelinguis- ticreduction.The"coreportingreduction"also showstheabsurdityofthe"psychologicalreduc- tion"accordingtowhichanevenfsbeingpre- sent,etc,requiresarelationtoaperceiver, whereasanevenfshavingatemporalrelationto anothereventortimedoesnotrequirearelation toaperceiver.GiventhatGeorgie'sflyingatthis timeisidenticalwithGeorgie'sflyingatt,itfol- lowsthatoneandthesameeventbothdoesand doesnothavethepropertyofrequiringrelation toaperceiver,therebyviolatingLeibniz'slaw thatidenticalsareindiscemible. Continuousversusdiscretetime.Assumethat theinstantsoftimearelinearlyorderedbythe relationRof'earlierthan'.Tosaythatthisorder iscontinuousis,first,toimplythepropertyof densityorinfinitedivisibility:foranyinstantsi andi2suchthatRiJ-,,thereisathirdinstant£3, suchthatRi-Jjandi?i3;7.Butcontinuityimplies somethingmoresincedensityallowsfor"gaps" betweentheinstants,aswiththerationalnum- bers.(ThinkofRasthe'lessthan'relationand theiasrationals.)Toruleoutgapsandthereby assuregenuinecontinuityitisnecessaryto requireinadditiontodensitythateveryconver- gentsequenceofinstantshasalimit.Tomake thispreciseoneneedsadistancemeasured(,) onpairsofinstants,whered(im,i)isinterpreted asthelapseoftimebetweeniandi.The requirementofcontinuityproperisthenthatfor anysequenceiyi2,£3,...,ofinstants,ifd(imi) —>asm,n—>°°,thereisalimitinstantifsuch thatd(i,ie)—>asn—>°°.Theanalogousprop- ertyobviouslyfailsfortherationals.Buttaking thecompletionoftherationalsbyaddinginthe limitpointsofconvergentsequencesyieldsthe realnumberline,agenuinecontinuum. Numerousobjectionshavebeenraisedtothe ideaoftimeasacontinuumandtothevery notionofthecontinuumitself.Thus,itwas objectedthattimecannotbecomposedofdura- tionlessinstantssinceastackofsuchinstants cannotproduceanon-zeroduration.Modern measuretheoryresolvesthisobjection.Leibniz heldthatacontinuumcannotbecomposedof pointssincethepointsinany(finiteclosed) intervalcanbeputinone-to-onecorrespon- dencewithasmallersubinterval,contradicting theaxiomthatthewholeisgreaterthanany properpart.WhatLeibniztooktobeacontra- dictoryfeatureisnowtakentobeadefiningfea- tureofinfinitecollectionsortotalities. Modern-dayZenoians,whilegrantingthevia- bilityofthemathematicaldoctrineofthecon- tinuumandeventheusefulnessofitsemploy- mentinphysicaltheory,willdenythepossibility ofitsapplyingtoreal-lifechanges.Whitehead gaveananalogueofZeno'sparadoxofthe dichotomytoshowthatathingcannotendure inacontinuousmanner.Forif(/£2)istheinter- valöverwhichthethingissupposedtoendure, thenthethingwouldfirsthavetoendureuntil theinstantz'3,halfwaybetween£andz'2;but beforeitcanendureuntili,itmustfirstendure untiltheinstantihalfwaybetweeni1andi,etc. Theseductivenessofthisparadoxrestsuponan implicitanthropomorphicdemandthattheoper- ationsofnaturemustbeunderstoodintermsof conceptsofhumanagency.Hereinitisthe demandthatthephysicisfsdescriptionofacon- tinuouschange,suchasarunnertraversinga unitspatialdistancebyperforminganinfinityof runsofever-decreasingdistance,couldbeused asanaction-guidingrecipeforperformingthis feat,which,ofcourse,isimpossiblesinceitdoes notspecifyanyinitialorfinaldoing,asrecipes thatguidehumanactionsmust.Buttomakethis anthropomorphicdemandexplicitrendersthis deploymentofthedichotomy,aswellasthe argumentsagainstthepossibilityofperforminga "supertask,"dubious.Anti-realistsmightdeny thatwearecommittedtoreal-lifechangebeing continuousbyouracceptanceofaphysicalthe- orythatemploysprinciplesofmathematicalcon- tinuity,butthisisquitedifferentfromthe Zenoianclaimthatitisimpossibleforsuch changetobecontinuous. Tomaintainthattimeisdiscretewouldrequire notonlyabandoningthecontinuumbutalsothe densitypropertyaswell.Givingupeithercon- flictswiththeintuitionthattimeisone-dimen- sional.(Foranexplanationofhowthe topologicalanalysisofdimensionalityentails thatthedimensionofadiscretespaceis0,seeW. Hurewicz,DimensionTheory,1941.)Thephilo- 921 timelagargument timeslice sophicalandphysicsliteraturescontainspecula- tionsaboutadiscretetimebuiltof"chronons"or temporalatoms,butthusfarsuchhypothetical entitieshavenotbeenincorporatedintoasatis- factorytheory. Absoluteversusrelativeandrelationaltime.In ascholiumtothePrincipia,Newtondeclaredthat "Absolute,trueandmathematicaltime,ofitself andfromitsownnature,flowsequablywithout relationtoanythingexternal."Thereareatleast fiveinterrelatedsensesinwhichtimewas absoluteforNewton.First,hethoughtthatthere wasaframe-independentrelationofsimultane- ityforevents.Second,hethoughtthattherewas aframe-independentmeasureofdurationfor non-simultaneousevents.Heused'flows equably'nottorefertotheabovesortofmyste- rious"temporalbecoming,"butinsteadtocon- notethesecondsenseofabsolutenessandpartly toindicatetwofurtherkindsofabsoluteness.To appreciatethelatter,notethat'flowsequably'is modifiedby'withoutrelationtoanythingexter- nal'.HereNewtonwasasserting(thirdsenseof 'absolute')thatthelapseoftimebetweentwo eventswouldbewhatitisevenifthedistribu- tionandmotionsofmaterialbodieswerediffer- ent.Hewasalsopresupposingarelatedformof absoluteness(fourthsense)accordingtowhich themetricoftimeisintrinsictothetemporal interval. Leibniz'sphilosophyoftimeplacedhimin agreementwithNewtonasregardsthefirsttwo sensesof'absolute',whichassertthenon-rela- tiveorframe-independentnatureoftime.How- ever,LeibnizwasverymuchopposedtoNewton onthefourthsenseof'absolute'.Accordingto Leibniz'srelationalconceptionoftime,anytalk aboutthelengthofatemporalintervalmustbe unpackedintermsoftalkabouttherelationof theintervaltoanextrinsicmetricstandard.Fur- thermore,Leibnizusedhisprinciplesofsufficient reasonandidentityofindiscerniblestoargue againstafifthsenseof'absolute',implicitinNew- ton^philosophyoftime,accordingtowhich timeisasubstratuminwhichphysicaleventsare situated.Onthecontrary,therelationalview holdsthattimeisnothingöverandabovethe structureofrelationsofevents. Einstein'sspecialandgeneraltheoriesofrela- tivityhavedirectbearingonpartsofthesecon- troversies.Thespecialtheorynecessitatesthe abandonmentofframe-independentnotionsof simultaneityandduration.Foranypairofspace- likerelatedeventsinMinkowskispace-time thereisaninertialframeinwhichtheeventsare simultaneous,anotherframeinwhichthefirst eventistemporallyprior,andstillathirdin whichthesecondeventistemporallyprior.And thetemporalintervalbetweentwotimelike relatedeventsdependsontheworldlinecon- nectingthem.Infact,foranye>0,nomatter howsmall,thereisaworldlineconnectingthe eventswhoseproperlengthislessthane.(This istheessenceoftheso-calledtwinparadox.)The generaltheoryofrelativityabandonsthethird senseofabsolutenesssinceitentailsthatthe metricalstructureofspace-timecovarieswith thedistributionofmass-energyinamanner specifiedbyEinstein'sfieldequations.Butthe heartoftheabsolute-relationalcontroversy-as focusedbythefourthandfifthsensesof 'absolute'-isnotsettledbyrelativisticconsider- ations.Indeed,opponentsfrombothsidesofthe debateclaimtofindsupportfortheirpositionsin thespecialandgeneraltheories. Seealsoeinstein,metaphysics,relativ- ity,space,space-time.J.Ea.&R.M.Ga. timelagargument.Seeperception. timeslice,atemporalpartorstageofanycon- creteparticularthatexistsforsomeintervalof time;athree-dimensionalcrosssectionofafour- dimensionalobject.Tothinkofanobjectascon- sistingoftimeslicesortemporalstagesistothink ofitasrelatedtotimeinmuchthewaythatitis relatedtospace:asextendingthroughtimeaswell asspace,ratherthanasenduringthroughit.Just asanobjectmadeupofspatialpartsisthought ofasawholemadeupofpartsthatexistatdif- ferentlocations,soanobjectmadeupoftime slicesisthoughtofasawholemadeupofparts orstagesthatexistatsuccessivetimes;hence, justasaspatialwholeisonlypartlypresentin anyspacethatdoesnotincludeallitsspatial parts,soawholemadeupoftimeslicesisonly partlypresentinanystretchoftimethatdoesnot includeallitstemporalparts. Acontinuant,bycontrast,ismostcommonly understoodtobeaparticularthatendures throughtime,i.e.,thatiswhollypresentateach momentatwhichitexists.Toconceiveofan objectasacontinuantistoconceiveofitas relatedtotimeinaverydifferentwayfromthat inwhichitisrelatedtospace.Acontinuantdoes notextendthroughtimeaswellasspace;itdoes notexistatdifferenttimesbyvirtueoftheexis- tenceofsuccessivepartsofitatthosetimes;itis thecontinuantitselfthatiswhollypresentat eachsuchtime.Toconceiveanobjectasacon- tinuant,therefore,istoconceiveitasnotmade 922 TimonofPhilius tonk upoftemporalstages,ortimeslices,atall.There isanother,lesscommon,useof'continuant'in whichacontinuantisunderstoodtobeanypar- ticularthatexistsforsomestretchoftime, regardlessofwhetheritisthewholeofthepar- ticularoronlysomepartofitthatispresentat eachmomentoftheparticular'sexistence. Accordingtothisusage,anentitythatismadeup oftimesliceswouldbeakindofcontinuant ratherthansomeotherkindofparticular. Philosophershavedisputedwhetherordinary objectssuchascabbagesandkingsendure throughtime(arecontinuants)oronlyextend throughtime(aresequencesoftimeslices). Somearguethattounderstandthepossibilityof changeonemustthinkofsuchobjectsas sequencesoftimeslices;othersarguethatforthe samereasononemustthinkofsuchobjectsas continuants.Ifanobjectchanges,itcomestobe differentfromitself.Somearguethatthiswould bepossibleonlyifanobjectconsistedofdistinct, successivestages;sothatchangewouldsimply consistinthedifferencesamongthesuccessive temporalpartsofanobject.Othersarguethat thisviewwouldmakechangeimpossible;that differencesamongthesuccessivetemporalparts ofathingwouldnomoreimplythethinghad changedthandifferencesamongitsspatialparts would. Seealsometaphysics,whitehead.RF. TimonofPhilius.Seeskeptics. Tindal,Matthew.Seedeism. Tisberi,William.Seeheytesbury. token.Seeactiontheory,type-tokendistinc- TION. tokenepiphenomenalism.Seephilosophyof MIND. tokenphysicalism.Seephilosophyofmind. token-reflexive,anexpressionthatreferstoitself inanactofspeechorwriting,suchas'this token'.ThetermwascoinedbyReichenbach, whoconjecturedthatallindexicals,allexpres- sionswhosesemanticvaluedependspartlyon featuresofthecontextofutterance,aretoken- reflexiveanddefinableintermsofthephrase 'thistoken'.HesuggestedthatTmeansthe sameas'thepersonwhouttersthistoken', 'now'meansthesameas'thetimeatwhichthis tokenisuttered','thistable'meansthesameas 'thetablepointedtobyagestureaccompanying thistoken',andsoforth.(Russellmadeasome- whatsimilarsuggestioninhisdiscussionofego- centricparticulars.)Reichenbach'sconjectureis widelyregardedasfalse;althoughTdoespick outthepersonusingit,itisnotsynonymous with'thepersonwhouttersthistoken'.Ifit were,asDavidKaplanobserves,Tfnoonewere toutterthistoken,Iwouldnotexist'wouldbe true.Seealsoegocentricparticular, INDEXICAL.R.B. token-tokenidentity.Seephilosophyofmind. Toletus,Francisco(1532-96),SpanishJesuit theologianandphilosopher.BorninCordoba,he studiedatValencia,Salamanca,andRome,and becamethefirstJesuitcardinalin1594.Hecom- posedcommentariesonseveralofAristotle's worksandacommentaryonAquinas'sSumma theologiae. ToletusfollowedaThomisticline,butdeparted fromThomisminsomedetails.Heheldthatindi- vidualsaredirectlyapprehendedbytheintellect andthattheagentintellectisthesamepoweras thepossibleintellect.HerejectedtheThomistic doctrinesoftherealdistinctionbetweenessence andexistenceandofindividuationbydesignated matter;forToletusindividuationresultsfrom form. Seealsoaquinas.J.J.E.G. tonk,asententialconnectivewhosemeaning andlogicarecompletelycharacterizedbythe tworules(oraxioms) (1)[P->(PtonkQ)]and (2)[(PtonkQ)->Q]. If(1)and(2)areaddedtoanynormalsystem, theneveryQcanbederivedfromanyP.Arthur Priorinvented'tonk'toshowthatdeductive validitymustnotbeconceivedasdepending solelyonarbitrarysyntacticallydefinedrulesor axioms.Wemayprohibit'tonk'ontheground thatitisnotanatural,independentlymeaning- fulnotion,butwemayalsoprohibititonpurely syntacticalgrounds.E.g.,wemayrequirethat, foreveryconnectiveC,theC-introductionrule [(xxx)->(...C...)] andtheC-eliminationrule [( C- ->(m)] besuchthatthe(yyy)ispartof(xxx)orisrelated to(xxx)insomeothersyntacticalway.Seealso RELEVANCELOGIC.D.H. 923 top-down toxinpuzzle top-down.Seecognitivescience. topic-neutral,noncommittalbetweentwoor moreontologicalinterpretationsofaterm.J.J. C.Smart(in1959)suggestedthatintrospective reportscanbetakenastopic-neutral:composed oftermsneutralbetween"dualisticmetaphysics" and"materialisticmetaphysics."Whenone asserts,e.g.,thatonehasayellowish-orange afterimage,thisistantamounttosaying'Thereis somethinggoingonthatislikewhatisgoingonwhen Ihavemyeyesopen,amawake,andthereisan orangeilluminatedingoodlightinfrontofme, i.e.,whenIreallyseeanorange'.Theitalicized phraseis,inSmarfsterms,topic-neutral;itrefers toanevent,whileremainingnoncommittal aboutwhetheritismaterialorimmaterial.The termhasnotalwaysbeenrestrictedtoneutrality regardingdualismandmaterialism.Smartsug- geststhattopic-neutraldescriptionsarecom- posedof"quasi-logical"words,andhencewould besuitableforanyoccasionwherearelatively noncommittalexpressionofaviewisrequired. Seealsophilosophyofmind.D.C.D. topics,theanalysisofcommonstrategiesof argumentation,låteragenreofliteratureana- lyzingsyllogisticreasoning.Aristotleconsidered theanalysisoftypesofargument,or"topics," thebestmeansofdescribingtheartofdialecti- calreasoning;healsousedthetermtoreferto theprincipleunderlyingthestrategy'sproduc- tionofanargument.Låterclassicalcommenta- torsonAristotle,particularlyLatinrhetoricians likeCicero,developedAristotle'sdiscussionsof thetheoryofdialecticalreasoningintoaphilo- sophicalform.Boethius'sworkontopicsexem- plifiesthelåterclassicalexpansionofthescope oftopicsliterature.Forhim,atopiciseithera self-evidentlytrueuniversalgeneralization,also calleda"maximalproposition,"oradifferentia,a memberofthesetofamaximalproposition's characteristicsthatdetermineitsgenusand species.Manisarationalanimalisamaximal proposition,andlikefromgenus,thedifferentia thatcharacterizesthemaximalpropositionas concerninggenera,itisatopic.Becausehe believeddialecticalreasoningleadstocategori- cal,notconditional,conclusions,Boethiusfelt thatthediscoveryofanargumententaileddis- coveringamiddletermunitingthetwo,previ- ouslyunjoinedtermsoftheconclusion. Differentiaearethegeneraofthesemiddle terms,andoneconstructsargumentsbychoos- ingdifferentiae,therebydeterminingthemiddle termleadingtotheconclusion. Intheeleventhcentury,Boethius'slogical structureofmaximalpropositionsanddifferen- tiaewasusedtostudyhypotheticalsyllogisms, whiletwelfth-centurytheoristslikeAbelard extendedtheapplicabilityoftopicsstructureto thecategoricalsyllogism.Bythethirteenthcen- tury,PeterofSpain,RobertKilwardby,and BoethiusofDaciaappliedtopicsstructureexclu- sivelytothecategoricalsyllogism,principally thosewithnon-necessary,probablepremises. Withinacentury,discussionoftopicsstructureto evaluatesyllogisticreasoningwassubsumedby consequencesliterature,whichdescribedimpli- cation,entailment,andinferencerelationsbe- tweenpropositions.Whilethetheoryof consequencesasanapproachtounderstanding relationsbetweenpropositionsisgroundedin Boethian,andperhapsStoic,logic,itbecame prominentonlyinthelåterthirteenthcentury withBurley'srecognitionofthelogicalsignifi- canceofpropositionallogic. Seealsoabelard,aristotle,boethius, BURLEY,CICERO,KILWARDBY,PETEROF SPAIN,SYLLOGISM.S.E.L. total.Seerelation. totalevidence,ruleof.Seeinductton. totalordering.Seeordering. toxinpuzzle,apuzzleaboutintentionandprac- ticalrationalityposedbyGregoryKavka.Atrust- worthybillionaireoffersyouamilliondollarsfor intendingtonighttodrinkacertaintoxintomor- row.Youareconvincedthathecantellwhatyou intendindependentlyofwhatyoudo.Thetoxin wouldmakeyoupainfullyillforaday,butyou needtodrinkittogetthemoney.Constraintson theformationofaprize-winningintentionin- cludeprohibitionsagainst"gimmicks,""external incentives,"andforgettingrelevantdetails.For example,youwillnotreceivethemoneyifyou haveahypnotist"implanttheintention"orhire ahitmantokillyoushouldyounotdrinkthe toxin.If,bymidnighttonight,withoutviolating anyrules,youformanintentiontodrinkthe toxintomorrow,youwillfindamilliondollarsin yourbankaccountwhenyouawaketomorrow morning.Youprobablywoulddrinkthetoxinfor amilliondollars.Butcanyou,withoutviolating therules,intendtonighttodrinkittomorrow? Apparently,youhavenoreasontodrinkitand anexcellentreasonnottodrinkit.Seemingly, youwillinferfromthisthatyouwilleschew drinkingthetoxin,andbelievingthatyouwill 924 Toynbee,Arnold transcendentalargument eschewdrinkingitseemsinconsistentwith intendingtodrinkit.Evenso,thereareseveral reportsinthephilosophicalliteratureof(possi- ble)peoplewhostruckitrichwhenofferedthe toxindeal!Seealsoactiontheory,inten- tion,PRACTICALREASONING.A.R.M. Toynbee,Arnold.Seephilosophyofhistory. tracking.Seenozick,reliabilism,skepticism. Tractarian.Seeanalyticphilosophy,wittgen- STEIN. traducianism.Seecreationexnihilo,preexis- TENCE. transcendence,broadly,thepropertyofrising outoforaboveotherthings(virtuallyalways understoodfiguratively);inphilosophy,the propertyofbeing,insomeway,ofahigherorder. Abeing,suchasGod,maybesaidtobetran- scendentinthesenseofbeingnotmerelysupe- rior,butincomparablysuperior,tootherthings, inanysortofperfection.God'stranscendence,or beingoutsideorbeyondtheworld,isalsocon- trasted,andbysomethinkerscombined,with God'simmanence,orexistencewithinthe world. Inmedievalphilosophyoflogic,termssuchas 'being'and'one',whichdidnotbelonguniquely toanyoneoftheAristoteliancategoriesortypes ofpredication(suchassubstance,quality,and relation),butcouldbepredicatedofthings belongingtoany(ortonone)ofthem,were calledtranscendental.InKanfsCritiqueofPureRea- son,principlesthatprofess(wrongly)totakeus beyondthelimitsofanypossibleexperienceare calledtranscendent;whereasanythingbelonging tonon-empiricalthoughtthatestablishes,and drawsconsequencesfrom,thepossibilityand limitsofexperiencemaybecalledtranscendental. Thusatranscendentalargument(inasensestill current)isonethatproceedsfrompremises aboutthewayinwhichexperienceispossibleto conclusionsaboutwhatmustbetrueofany experiencedworld. Transcendentalismwasaphilosophicalorreli- giousmovementinmid-nineteenth-century NewEngland,characterized,inthethoughtofits leadingrepresentative,RalphWaldoEmerson, bybeliefinatranscendent(spiritualanddivine) principleinhumannature. Seealsoemerson,immanence,kant,phi- losophyofreligion,transcendental argument,transcendentalism.R.M.A. transcendental.Seekant,transcendence. transcendentalanalytic.Seekant. transcendentalargument,anargumentthatelu- cidatestheconditionsforthepossibilityofsome fundamentalphenomenonwhoseexistenceis unchallengedoruncontroversialinthephilo- sophicalcontextinwhichtheargumentispro- pounded.Suchanargumentproceeds deductively,fromapremiseassertingtheexis- tenceofsomebasicphenomenon(suchasmean- ingfuldiscourse,conceptualizationofobjective statesofaffairs,orthepracticeofmaking promises),toaconclusionassertingtheexistence ofsomeinteresting,substantiveenablingcondi- tionsforthatphenomenon.Thetermderives fromKanfsCritiqueofPureReason,whichgives severalsucharguments. TheparadigmaticKantiantranscendental argumentisthe"TranscendentalDeductionof thePureConceptsofUnderstanding."Kant arguedtherethattheobjectivevalidityofcertain pure,orapriori,concepts(the"categories")is aconditionforthepossibilityofexperience. Amongtheconceptsallegedlyrequiredforhav- ingexperiencearethoseofsubstanceandcause. Theirapriorityconsistsinthefactthatinstances oftheseconceptsarenotdirectlygiveninsense experienceinthemannerofinstancesofempir- icalconceptssuchasred.Thisfactgaverisetothe skepticismofHumeconcerningtheverycoher- enceofsuchallegedaprioriconcepts.Nowif theseconceptsdohaveobjectivevalidity,asKant endeavoredtoproveinoppositiontoHume, thentheworldcontainsgenuineinstancesofthe concepts.Inatranscendentalargumentcon- cerningtheconditionsforthepossibilityofexpe- rience,itiscrucialthatsomefeatureentailedby thehavingofexperienceisidentified.Thenitis arguedthatexperiencecouldnothavethisfea- turewithoutsatisfyingsomesubstantivecondi- tions.IntheTranscendentalDeduction,the featureofexperienceonwhichKantconcen- tratesistheabilityofasubjectofexperienceto beawareofseveraldistinctinnerstatesasall belongingtoasingleconsciousness.Thereisno generalagreementonhowKanfsargument actuallyunfolded,thoughitseemscleartomost thathefocusedontheroleofthecategoriesin thesynthesisorcombinationofone'sinnerstates injudgments,wheresuchsynthesisissaidtobe requiredforone'sawarenessofthestatesas beingallequallyone'sownstates. AnotherfamousKantiantranscendentalargu- ment-the"RefutationofIdealism"intheCri- 925 transcendentaldeduction transcendentals tiqueofFureReason-sharesanoteworthytrait withtheTranscendentalDeduction.TheRefuta- tionproceedsfromthepremisethatoneiscon- sciousofone'sownexistenceasdeterminedin time,i.e.,knowsthetemporalorderofsomeof one'sinnerstates.AccordingtotheRefutation,a conditionforthepossibilityofsuchknowledgeis one'sconsciousnessoftheexistenceofobjects locatedoutsideoneselfinspace.Ifoneisindeed soconscious,thatwouldrefutetheskeptical view,formulatedbyDescartes,thatonelacks knowledgeoftheexistenceofaspatialworlddis- tinctfromone'smindanditsinnerstates. BothoftheKantiantranscendentalarguments wehaveconsidered,then,concludethatthefal- sityofsomeskepticalviewisaconditionforthe possibilityofsomephenomenonwhoseexis- tenceisacknowledgedevenbytheskeptic(the havingofexperience;knowledgeoftemporal factsaboutone'sowninnerstates).Thus,wecan isolateaninterestingsubclassoftranscendental arguments:thosewhichareanti-skepticalin nature.BarryStroudhasraisedthequestion whethersuchargumentsdependonsomesortof suppressedverificationismaccordingtowhich theexistenceoflanguageorconceptualization requirestheavailabilityoftheknowledgethat theskepticquestions(sinceverificationismhasit thatmeaningfulsentencesexpressingcoherent concepts,e.g.,'Therearetables',mustbeverifi- ablebywhatisgiveninsenseexperience). Dependenceonahighlycontroversialpremiseis undesirableinitself.Further,Stroudargued, suchadependencewouldrendersuperfluous whateverothercontenttheanti-skepticaltran- scendentalargumentmightembody(sincethe suppressedpremisealonewouldrefutetheskep- tic).Thereisnogeneralagreementonwhether Stroud'sdoubtsaboutanti-skepticaltranscen- dentalargumentsarewellfounded.Itisnot obviouswhetherthedoubtsapplytoarguments thatdonotproceedfromapremiseassertingthe existenceoflanguageorconceptualization,but insteadconformmorecloselytotheKantian model.Evenso,noanti-skepticaltranscendental argumenthasbeenwidelyaccepted.Thisisevi- dentlyduetothedifficultyofuncoveringsub- stantiveenablingconditionsforphenomenathat evenaskepticwillcountenance. Seealsokant,skepticism.A.B. transcendentaldeduction.Seekant. transcendentaldialectic.Seedialectic. transcendentalego.Seekant. transcendentalia.Seetranscendentals. transcendentalidealism.Seekant. transcendentalism,areligious-philosophical viewpointheldbyagroupofNewEnglandintel- lectuals,ofwhomEmerson,Thoreau,and TheodoreParkerwerethemostimportant.Adis- tinctiontakenöverfromSamuelTaylor Coleridgewastheonlybondthatuniversally unitedthemembersoftheTranscendentalClub, foundedin1836:thedistinctionbetweenthe understandingandreason,theformerproviding uncertainknowledgeofappearances,thelattera prioriknowledgeofnecessarytruthsgained throughintuition.Thetranscendentalistsin- sistedthatphilosophicaltruthcouldbereached onlybyreason,acapacitycommontoallpeople unlessdestroyedbylivingalifeofexternalsand acceptingastrueonlysecondhandtraditional beliefs.Onalmosteveryotherpointtherewere disagreements.Emersonwasanidealist,while Parkerwasanaturalrealist-theysimplyhad conflictingaprioriintuitions.Emerson,Thoreau, andParkerrejectedthesupernaturalaspectsof Christianity,pointingoutitsunmistakable parochialnatureandsociologicaldevelopment; whileJamesMarsh,FrederickHenryHedge,and CalebHenryremainedintheChristianfold.The influencesonthetranscendentalistsdiffered widelyandexplainthediversityofopinion.For example,EmersonwasinfluencedbythePla- tonictradition,GermanRomanticism,Eastern religions,andnaturepoets,whileParkerwas influencedbymodernscience,theScottishreal- ismofReidandCousin(whichalsoemphasized aprioriintuitions),andtheGermanHigher Critics. Emerson,Thoreau,andParkerwerealso bondedbynegativebeliefs.Theynotonly rejectedCalvinismbutUnitarianismaswell;they rejectedtheordinaryconceptofmaterialsuccess andputinitsplaceanAristoteliantypeofself- realizationthatemphasizedtherationaland moralselfastheessenceofhumanityand decriedidiosyncraticself-realizationthat admireswhatisuniqueinpeopleasconstituting theirrealvalue. Seealsoemerson,thoreau.E.H.M. transcendentalnumber.Seemathematicalanaly- sis. transcendentals,alsocalledtranscendentalia, termsorconceptsthatapplytoallthingsregard- lessofthethings'ontologicalkindorcategory. 926 transcendentalsubjectivity translation,radical Termsorconceptsofthissortaretranscendental inthesensethattheytranscendoraresuperor- dinatetoallclassificatorycategories.Theclassi- caldoctrineofthetranscendentals,developedin detailinthelåterMiddleAges,presupposesan Aristotelianontologyaccordingtowhichall beingsaresubstancesoraccidentsclassifiable withinoneofthetenhighestgenera,theten Aristoteliancategories.Inthisschemebeing (Greekon,Latinens)isnotitselfoneofthecate- goriessinceallcategoriesmarkoutkindsof being.Butneitherisitacategoryabovetheten categoriesofsubstanceandaccidents,anulti- mategenusofwhichthetencategoriesare species.Thisisbecausebeingishomonymousor equivocal,i.e.,thereisnosinglegenericproperty ornaturesharedbymembersofeachcategoryin virtueofwhichtheyarebeings.Thetencate- goriesidentifytenirreducible,mostbasicwaysof being.Being,then,transcendsthecategorial structureoftheworld:anythingatallthatis ontologicallyclassifiableisabeing,andtosayof anythingthatitisabeingisnottoidentifyitas amemberofsomekinddistinctfromotherkinds ofthings. Accordingtothisclassicaldoctrine,beingisthe primarytranscendental,butthereareother termsorconceptsthattranscendthecategories inasimilarway.Themostcommonlyrecognized transcendentalsotherthanbeingareone(unum), true(verum),andgood(bonum),thoughsome medievalphilosophersalsorecognizedthing (res),something(aliquid),andbeautiful(pul- chrum).Theseothertermsorconceptsaretran- scendentalbecausetheontologicalgroundof theirapplicationtoagiventhingispreciselythe sameastheontologicalgroundinvirtueof whichthatthingcanbecalledabeing.Forexam- ple,forathingwithacertainnaturetobegood isforittoperformwelltheactivitythatspecifies itasathingofthatnature,andtoperformthis activitywellistohaveactualizedthatnatureto acertainextent.Butforathingtohaveactual- izeditsnaturetosomeextentisjustwhatitisfor thethingtohavebeing.Sotheactualitiesor propertiesinvirtueofwhichathingisgoodare preciselythoseinvirtueofwhichithasbeing. Giventhisaccount,medievalphilosophersheld thattranscendentaltermsareconvertible(con- vertuntur)orextensionallyequivalent(idem secundumsupposita).Theyarenotsynonymous, however,sincetheyareintensionallydistinct (differuntsecundumrationem).Thesesecondary transcendentalsaresometimescharacterizedas attributes(passiones)ofbeingthatarenecessarily concomitantwithit. Inthemodernperiod,thenotionofthetran- scendentalisassociatedprimarilywithKant, whomade'transcendental'acentraltechnical terminhisphilosophy.ForKantthetermno longersignifiesthatwhichtranscendscategorial classificationbutthatwhichtranscendsour experienceinthesenseofprovidingitsground orstructure.Kantallows,e.g.,thatthepure formsofintuition(spaceandtime)andthepure conceptsofunderstanding(categoriessuchas substanceandcause)aretranscendentalinthis sense.Formsandconceptsofthissortconstitute theconditionsofthepossibilityofexperience. Seealsoaristotle,kant.S.Ma. transcendentalsubjectivity.Seemerleau-ponty. transcendentalterms.Seetranscendentals. transeuntcausation.Seeagentcausation. transferableutility.Seegametheory. transfiniteinduction.Seemathematicalinduc- tion. transfinitenumber,insettheory,aninfinitecar- dinalorordinalnumber.Seealsocontinuum PROBLEM,SETTHEORY.P.Mad. transformationalgrammar.Seegrammar. transformationrule,anaxiom-schemaorruleof inference.Atransformationruleisthusarulefor transforminga(possiblyempty)setofwell- formedformulasintoaformula,wherethatrule operatesonlyuponsyntacticinformation.Itwas thisconceptionofanaxiom-schemaandruleof inferencethatwasoneofthekeystocreatinga genuinelyrigorousscienceofdeductivereason- ing.Inthe1950s,theideawasimportedintolin- guistics,givingrisetothenotionofatrans- formationalride.Sucharuletransformstree structuresintotreestructures,takingonefrom thedeepstructureofasentence,whichdetermines itssemanticinterpretation,tothesurfacestructure ofthatsentence,whichdeterminesitsphonetic interpretation.Seealsogrammar,logistic system.G.F.S. transitive.Seerelation. transitiveclosure.Seeancestral. translation,radical.Seeindeterminacyoftrans- lation. 927 transparent Trinitarianism transparent.Seereferentiallytransparent. transparentcontext.Seereferentiallytranspar- ent. transubstantiation,changeofonesubstanceinto another.Aristotelianmetaphysicsdistinguishes betweensubstancesandtheaccidentsthat inhereinthem;thus,Socratesisasubstanceand beingsnub-nosedisoneofhisaccidents.The RomanCatholicandEastemOrthodoxchurches appealtotransubstantiationtoexplainhow JesusChristbecomesreallypresentinthe Eucharistwhentheconsecrationtakespiace:the wholesubstancesofthebreadandwineare transformedintothebodyandbloodofChrist, buttheaccidentsofthebreadandwinesuchas theirshape,color,andtastepersistafterthe transformation.Thisseemstocommititsadher- entstoholdingthatthesepersistingaccidents subsequentiyeitherinhereinChristordonot inhereinanysubstance.Lutherproposedan alternativeexplanationintermsofconsubstantia- tionthatavoidsthishärdchoice:thesubstances ofthebreadandwinecoexistintheEucharist withthebodyandbloodofChristafterthecon- secration;theyareunitedbuteachremains unchanged.P.L.Q. transvaluationofvalues.Seenietzsche. transversality,transcendenceofthesovereignty ofidentityorself-samenessbyrecognizingthe alterityoftheOtherasUnterschied-touseHei- degger'sterm-whichsignifiesthesenseofrelat- ednessbywayofdifference.Aninnovativeidea employedandappropriatedbysuchdiverse philosophersasMerleau-PontySartre,Gilles Deleuze,andFelixGuattari,transversalityis meanttoreplacetheEurocentricformulationof truthasuniversalinanagewhentheworldis saidtoberushingtowardtheglobalvillage.Uni- versalityhasbeenaEurocentricideabecause whatisparticularintheWestisuniversalized, whereaswhatisparticularelsewhereremains particularized.Sinceitscenteriseverywhereand itscircumferencenowhere,truthispolycentric andcorrelative.Particularlynoteworthyisthe AmericanphenomenologistCalvinO.Schrag's attempttoappropriatetransversalitybysplitting thedifferencebetweenthetwoextremesofabso- lutismandrelativismontheonehandand modernity'stotalizingpracticesandpostmoder- nity'sfragmentarytendenciesontheother.See alsoHEIDEGGER,MERLEAU-PONTY,PHENOM- ENOLOGY,SARTRE.H.Y.J. treeofPorphyry,astructuregeneratedfromthe logicalandmetaphysicalapparatusofAristotle's Categories,assystematizedbyPorphyryandlåter writers.Atreeinthecategoryofsubstance beginswithsubstanceasitshighestgenusand dividesthatgenusintomutuallyexclusiveand collectivelyexhaustivesubordinategeneraby meansofapairofopposites,calleddifferentiae, yielding,e.g.,corporealsubstanceandincorpo- realsubstance.Theprocessofdivisionbydiffer- entiaecontinuesuntilalowestspeciesisreached, aspeciesthatcannotbedividedfurther.The species"humanbeing"issaidtobealowest specieswhosederivationcanberecapturedfrom theformula"mortal,rational,sensitive,animate, corporealsubstance."Seealsoaristotle, INFIMASPECIES,PORPHYRY.W.E.M. SUBSTANCE CorporealIncorporeal AnimateInanimate SensitiveInsensitive RationalIrrational MortalImmortal (HumanBeing) trichotomous.Seerelation. TreeofPorphyry trichotomy,Iawof.Seechoicesequence,rela- tion. Trinitarianism,thetheologicaldoctrinethatGod consistsofthreepersons.Thepersonswhocon- stitutetheHolyTrinityaretheFather;theSon, whoisJesusChrist;andtheHolySpirit(orHoly Ghost).Thedoctrinestatesthateachofthese threepersonsisGodandyettheyarenotthree GodsbutoneGod.Accordingtoatraditionalfor- mulation,thethreepersonsarebutonesub- stance.IntheopinionofAquinas,theexistence ofGodcanbeprovedbyhumanreason,butthe existenceofthethreepersonscannotbeproved andisknownonlybyrevelation.Accordingto Christiantradition,revelationcontainsinforma- tionabouttherelationsamongthethreeper- sons,andtheserelationsgroundproper attributesofeachthatdistinguishthemfromone another.Thus,sincetheFatherbegetstheSon,a properattributeoftheFatherispaternityanda properattributeoftheSonisfiliation.Procession 928 Trinity truth (orspiration)isaproperattributeoftheHoly Spirit.Adisagreementaboutprocessionhascon- tributedtodividingEasternandWesternChris- tianity.TheEasternOrthodoxchurchteaches thattheHolySpiritproceedsfromtheFather throughtheSon.Atheoryofdoubleprocession accordingtowhichtheHolySpiritproceedsfrom theFatherandtheSonhasbeenwidelyaccepted intheWest.Thisdisagreementisknownasthe filioque('andtheSon')controversybecauseit arosefromthefactthataddingthisLatinphrase totheNiceneCreedbecameacceptableinthe WestbutnotintheEast.Unitarianismdeniesthat Godconsistsofthreepersonsandsoiscommit- tedtodenyingthedivinityofJesus.The monotheisticfaithsofJudaismandIslamare unitarian,butthereareunitarianswhoconsider themselvesChristians. Seealsophilosophyofreligion.P.L.Q. Trinity.Seetrinitarianism. Troeltsch,Ernst(1865-1923),Germanphiloso- pherandhistorianwhoseprimaryaimwasto provideascientificfoundationfortheology.Edu- catedatErlangen,Göttingen(underRitschland Lagarde),andBerlin,heinitiallytaughttheology atHeidelbergandlåterphilosophyinBerlin.He launchedtheschoolofhistoryofreligionwith hisepoch-making"OnHistoricalandDogmatical MethodinTheology"(1896).Hiscontributions totheology(TheReligionsApriori,1904),philoso- phy,sociology,andhistory(HistoricismandIts Problems,1922)werevastlyinfluential.Troeltsch claimedthatonlyaphilosophyofreligiondrawn fromthehistoryanddevelopmentofreligious consciousnesscouldstrengthenthestandingof thescienceofreligionamongthesciencesand advancetheChristianstrategyagainstmaterial- ism,naturalism,skepticism,aestheticism,and pantheism. Hishistoricalmasterpiece,Protestantismand Progress(1906),arguesthatearlyProtestantism wasamodifiedmedievalCatholicismthat delayedthedevelopmentofmodernculture.As asociologist,headdressed,inTheSocialTeachings oftheChristianChurches(1912),thetwofoldissue ofwhetherreligiousbeliefsandmovementsare conditionedbyexternalfactorsandwhether,in turn,theyaffectsocietyandculture.FromChris- tiansocialhistoryheinferredthreetypesof "sociologicalself-formationoftheChristian idea":thechurch,thesect,andthemystic. J.-L.S. trope,inrecentphilosophicalusage,an"abstract particular";aninstanceofapropertyoccurring ataparticularplaceandtime,suchasthecolor ofthecoverofthisbookorthispage.Thewhite- nessofthispageandthewhitenessoftheprevi- ouspagearetwodistincttropes,identicalneither withtheuniversalwhitenessthatisinstantiated inbothpages,norwiththepageitself;although thewhitenessofthispagecannotexistindepen- dentlyofthispage,thispagecouldbedyedsome othercolor.Anumberofwriters,perhapsbegin- ningwithD.C.Williams,havearguedthattropes mustbeincludedinourontologyifweareto achieveanadequatemetaphysics. Moregenerally,atropeisafigureofspeech,or theuseofanexpressioninafigurativeornon- literalsense.Metaphorandirony,e.g.,fallunder thecategoryoftropes.Ifyouarehelpingsome- onemoveaglasstablebutdröpyourend,and yourcompanionsays,"Well,you'vecertainly beenabighelp,"herutteranceisprobablyironi- cal,withtheintendedmeaningthatyouhave beennohelp.Oneimportantquestioniswheth- er,inordertoaccountfortheironicaluseofthis sentence,wemustsupposethatithasanironi- calmeaninginadditiontoitsliteralmeaning. Quitegenerally,doesasentenceusableto expresstwodifferentmetaphorshave,inaddi- tiontoitsliteralmeaning,twometaphorical meanings-andanotherifitcanbehyperbolic, andsoforth?Manyphilosophersandotherthe- oristsfromAristotleonhaveansweredyes,and postulatedsuchfigurativemeaningsinaddition toliteralsentencemeaning.Recently,philoso- phersloathtomultiplysentencemeaningshave deniedthatsentenceshaveanynon-literal meanings;theirburdenistoexplainhow,e.g.,a sentencecanbeusedironicallyifitdoesnothave anironicalsenseormeaning.Suchphilosophers disagreeonwhethertropesaretobeexplained semanticallyorpragmatically.Asemanticac- countmighthypothesizethattropesaregener- atedbyviolationsofsemanticalrules.Anim- portantpragmaticapproachisGrice'ssuggestion thattropescanbesubsumedunderthemore generalphenomenonofconversationalimplica- ture. Seealsoimplicature,metaphor,meta- physics,SKEPTICS.R.B. Trotter,Catherine.Seecockburn. truth,thequalityofthosepropositionsthat accordwithreality,specifyingwhatisinfactthe case.Whereastheaimofascienceistodiscover whichofthepropositionsinitsdomainaretrue i.e.,whichpropositionspossessthepropertyof 929 truth truth truth-thecentralphilosophicalconcernwith truthistodiscoverthenatureofthatproperty. ThusthephilosophicalquestionisnotWhatis true?butrather,Whatistruth?-Whatisone sayingaboutapropositioninsayingthatitis true?Theimportanceofthisquestionstems fromthevarietyanddepthoftheprinciplesin whichtheconceptoftruthisdeployed.Weare temptedtothink,e.g.,thattruthistheproper aimandnaturalresultofscientificinquiry,that truebeliefsareuseful,thatthemeaningofasen- tenceisgivenbytheconditionsthatwouldren- derittrue,andthatvalidreasoningpreserves truth.Thereforeinsofaraswewishtounder- stand,assess,andrefinetheseepistemological, ethical,semantic,andlogicalviews,some accountofthenatureoftruthwouldseemtobe required.Suchathing,however,hasbeennoto- riouslyelusive. Thebeliefthatsnowiswhiteowesitstruthto acertainfeatureoftheexternalworld:thefact thatsnowiswhite.Similarly,thebeliefthatdögs barkistruebecauseofthefactthatdögsbark. Suchtrivialobservationsleadtowhatisperhaps themostnaturalandwidelyheldaccountof truth,thecorrespondencetheory,accordingto whichabelief(statement,sentence,proposition, etc.)istrueprovidedthereexistsafactcorre- spondingtoit.ThisAristotelianthesisisunex- ceptionableinitself.However,ifitistoprovidea completetheoryoftruth-andifitistobemore thanmerelyapicturesquewayofassertingall instancesof'thebeliefthatpistrueifandonlyif p'-thenitmustbesupplementedwithaccounts ofwhatfactsare,andwhatitisforabelieftocor- respondtoafact;andthesearetheproblemson whichthecorrespondencetheoryoftruthhas foundered. Apopuläralternativetothecorrespondence theoryhasbeentoidentifytruthwithverifiabil- ity.Thisideacantakeonvariousforms.Onever- sioninvolvesthefurtherassumptionthat verificationisholistic-i.e.,thatabeliefisveri- fiedwhenitispartofanentiresystemofbeliefs thatisconsistentand"harmonious."Thisis knownasthecoherencetheoryoftruthandwas developedbyBradleyandBrandBlanchard. Anotherversion,duetoDummettandPutnam, involvestheassumptionthatthereis,foreach proposition,somespecificprocedureforfinding outwhetheroneshouldbelieveitornot.Onthis account,tosaythatapropositionistrueistosay thatitwouldbeverifiedbytheappropriatepro- cedure.Inmathematicsthisamountstotheiden- tificationoftruthwithprovabilityandis sometimesreferredtoasintuitionistictruth.Such theoriesaimtoavoidobscuremetaphysical notionsandexplainthecloserelationbetween knowabilityandtruth.Theyappear,however,to overstatetheintimacyofthatlink:forwecan easilyimagineastatementthat,thoughtrue,is beyondourpowertoestablishastrue. AthirdmajoraccountoftruthisJames'sprag- matictheory.Aswehavejustseen,theverifica- tionistselectsaprominentpropertyoftruthand considersittobetheessenceoftruth.Similarly thepragmatistfocusesonanotherimportant characteristic-namely,thattruebeliefsarea goodbasisforaction-andtakesthistobethe verynatureoftruth.Trueassumptionsaresaid tobe,bydefinition,thosethatprovokeactions withdesirableresults.Againwehaveanaccount withasingleattractiveexplanatoryfeature.But againthecentralobjectionisthattherelation- shipitpostulatesbetweentruthanditsalleged analysans-inthiscase,utility-isimplausibly close.Granted,truebeliefstendtofostersuccess. Butoftenactionsbasedontruebeliefsleadtodis- aster,whilefalseassumptions,bypurechance, producewonderfulresults. Oneofthefewfairlyuncontroversialfacts abouttruthisthatthepropositionthatsnowis whiteistrueifandonlyifsnowiswhite,the propositionthatlyingiswrongistrueifandonly iflyingiswrong,andsoon.Traditionaltheories oftruthacknowledgethisfactbutregarditas insufficientand,aswehaveseen,inflateitwith somefurtherprincipleoftheform'Xistrueif andonlyifXhaspropertyF(suchascorre- spondingtoreality,verifiability,orbeingsuitable asabasisforaction),whichissupposedtospec- ifywhattruthis.Acollectionofradicalalterna- tivestothetraditionaltheoriesresultsfrom denyingtheneedforanysuchfurtherspecifica- tion.Forexample,onemightsuppose(with Ramsey,Ayer,andStrawson)thatthebasicthe- oryoftruthcontainsnothingmorethanequiva- lencesoftheform,'Thepropositionthatpistrue ifandonlyifp'(excludinginstantiationbysen- tencessuchas'Thispropositionisnottrue'that generatecontradiction). Thisso-calleddeflationarytheoryisbestpre- sented(followingQuine)inconjunctionwithan accountoftheraisond'étreofournotionof truth:namely,thatitsfunctionisnottodescribe propositions,asonemightnaivelyinferfromits syntacticform,butrathertoenableustocon- structacertaintypeofgeneralization.Forexam- ple,'WhatEinsteinsaidistrue'isintuitively equivalenttotheinfiniteconjunctionTfEinstein saidthatnothinggoesfasterthanlight,then nothinggoesfasterthanlight;andifEinsteinsaid 930 truth,coherencetheoryof truthtable thatnuclearweaponsshouldneverbebuilt,then nuclearweaponsshouldneverbebuilt;...and soon.'Butwithoutatruthpredicatewecould notcapturethisstatement.Thedeflationist argues,moreover,thatalllegitimateusesofthe truthpredicate-includingthoseinscience, logic,semantics,andmetaphysics-aresimply displaysofthisgeneralizingfunction,andthat theequivalenceschemaisjustwhatisneededto explainthatfunction. Withinthedeflationarycamptherearevarious competingproposals.AccordingtoFrege'sso- calledredundancytheory,correspondinginstances of'Itistruethatp'and'p'haveexactlythesame meaning,whereastheminimalisttheoryassumes merelythatsuchpropositionsarenecessarily equivalent.Otherdeflationistsareskeptical abouttheexistenceofpropositionsandtherefore takesentencestobethebasicvehiclesoftruth. Thusthedisquotationtheorysupposesthattruthis capturedbythedisquotationprinciple,'p'istrue ifandonlyifp'.Moreambitiously,Tarskidoes notregardthedisquotationprinciple,also knownasTarski's(T)schema,asanadequatethe- oryinitself,butasaspecificationofwhatany adequatedefinitionmustimply.Hisownaccount showshowtogiveanexplicitdefinitionoftruth forallthesentencesofcertainformållanguages intermsofthereferentsoftheirprimitivenames andpredicates.Thisisknownasthesemanticthe- oryoftruth. Seealsoepistemology,metaphysical REALISM,SEMANTICHOLISM,SET-THEORETIC PARADOXES.P.Hor. truth,coherencetheoryof.Seetruth. truth,correspondencetheoryof.Seetruth. truth,disquotationtheoryof.Seetruth. truth,pragmatictheoryof.Seepragmatism, TRUTH. truth,redundancytheoryof.Seetruth. truth,semantictheoryof.Seetruth. truth-conditionalsemantics.Seemeaning. truth-conditionaltheoryofmeaning.Seemean- ing. truthconditions.Seetruth. truthdefinition.Seetruth. truth-functions.Seetruthtable. truthlikeness,atermintroducedbyKarlPopper in1960toexplicatetheideathatonetheorymay haveabettercorrespondencewithreality,orbe closertothetruth,orhavemoreverisimilitude, thananothertheory.Truthlikeness,whichcom- binestruthwithinformationcontent,hastobe distinguishedfromprobability,whichincreases withlackofcontent.LetTandi7betheclassesof alltrueandfalsesentences,respectively,andA andBdeductivelyclosedsetsofsentences. AccordingtoPopper'squalitativedefinition,Ais moretruthlikethanBifandonlyifBnTCAfl TandADFCBP\F,whereoneoftheseset- inclusionsisstrict.Inparticular,whenAandB arenon-equivalentandbothtrue,Aismore truthlikethanBifandonlyifAlogicallyentails B.DavidMillerandPavelTichyprovedin1974 thatPopper'sdefinitionisnotapplicabletothe comparisonoffalsetheories:ifAismoretruth- likethanB,thenAmustbetrue. Sincethemid-1970s,anewapproachtotruth- likenesshasbeenbasedupontheconceptofsim- ilarity:thedegreeoftruthlikenessofastatement Adependsonthedistancesfromthestatesof affairsallowedbyAtothetruestate.InGraham Oddie'sLikenesstoTruth(1986),thisdependence isexpressedbytheaveragefunction;inIlkka Niiniluoto'sTruthlikeness(1987),bytheweighted averageoftheminimumdistanceandthesumof alldistances.Theconceptofverisimilitudeisalso usedintheepistemicsensetoexpressarational evaluationofhowclosetothetruthatheory appearstobeonavailableevidence. Seealsoconfirmation,information THEORY,INSTRUMENTALISM,PROBABILITY. I.N. truthmakerprinciple.Seearmstrong. truthpredicate.Seesemanticparadoxes. truthtable,atabulardisplayofoneormore truth-functions,truth-functionaloperators,or representativesoftruth-functionsortruth-func- tionaloperators(suchaswell-formedformulas ofpropositionallogic).Inthetabulardisplay, eachrowdisplaysapossibleassignmentoftruth- valuestotheargumentsofthetruth-functions ortruth-functionaloperators.Thus,thecollec- tionofallrowsinthetabledisplaysallpossible assignmentsoftruth-valuestothesearguments. Thefollowingsimpletruthtablerepresentsthe truth-functionaloperatorsnegationandcon- junction: 931 truth-tablemethod truth-valuesemantics Q Not-PP-and-Q TT TF FT FF F F T T F F Becauseatruthtabledisplaysallpossible assignmentsoftruth-valuestotheargumentsof atruth-function,truthtablesareusefuldevices forquicklyascertaininglogicalpropertiesof propositions.If,e.g.,allentriesinthecolumnof atruthtablerepresentingapropositionareT, thenthepropositionistrueforallpossible assignmentsoftruth-valuestoitsultimatecon- stituentpropositions;inthissortofcase,the propositionissaidtobelogicallyortautologically true:atautology.Ifallentriesinthecolumnofa truthtablerepresentingapropositionareF,then thepropositionisfalseforallpossibleassign- mentsoftruth-valuestoitsultimateconstituent propositions,andthepropositionissaidtobe logicallyortautologicallyfalse:acontradiction.If apropositionisneitheratautologynoracontra- diction,thenitissaidtobeacontingency.The truthtableaboveshowsthatbothNot-PandP- and-Qarecontingencies. Forthesamereasonthattruthtablesareuse- fuldevicesforascertainingthelogicalqualitiesof singlepropositions,truthtablesarealsouseful forascertainingwhetherargumentsarevalidor invalid.Avalidargumentisonesuchthatthere isnopossibility(norowintherelevanttruth table)inwhichallitspremisesaretrueandits conclusionfalse.Thustheabovetruthtable showsthattheargument'P-and-Q;therefore,P' isvalid. Seealsocontingent,formållogic,tau- tology.R.W.B. truth-tablemethod.Seetruthtable. truth-value,mostnarrowly,oneofthevaluesT (for'true')orF(for'false')thataproposition maybeconsideredtohaveortakeonwhenitis regardedastrueorfalse,respectively.More broadly,atruth-valueisanyoneofarangeof valuesthatapropositionmaybeconsideredto havewhentakentohaveoneofarangeofdif- ferentcognitiveorepistemicstatuses.Forexam- ple,somephilosophersspeakofthetruth-value I(for'indeterminate')andregardaproposition ashavingthevalueIwhenitisindeterminate whetherthepropositionistrueorfalse.Logical systemsemployingaspecificnumbernoftruth- valuesaresaidtobe»-valuedlogicalsystems;the simplestsortofusefullogicalsystemhastwo truth-values,TandF,andaccordinglyissaidto betwo-valued.Truth-functionsarefunctions thattaketruth-valuesasargumentsandthat yieldtruth-valuesasresultantvalues.Thetruth- tablemethodinpropositionallogicexploitsthe ideaoftruth-functionsbyusingtabulardisplays. SeealsoTRUTHTABLE.R.W.B. truth-valuegaps.Seemany-valuedlogic,presup- POSITION. truth-valuesemantics,interpretationsofformål systemsinwhichthetruth-valueofaformula restsultimatelyonlyontruth-valuesthatare assignedtoitsatomicsubformulas(where'sub- formula'issuitablydefined).Thelabelisdueto HuguesLeblanc.Onatruth-valueinterpretation forfirst-orderpredicatelogic,forexample,the formulaatomic\fxFxistrueinamodelifand onlyifallitsinstancesFm,Fn,...aretrue,where thetruth-valueoftheseformulasissimply assignedbythemodel.OnthestandardTarskian orobjectualinterpretation,bycontrast,VxFxis trueinamodelifandonlyifeveryobjectinthe domainofthemodelisanelementofthesetthat interpretsFinthemodel.Thusatruth-value semanticsforpredicatelogiccomprisesasubsti- tutionalinterpretationofthequantifiersanda "non-denotational"interpretationoftermsand predicates.Ifft2,...areallthetermsofsome first-orderlanguage,thenthereareobjectual modelsthatsatisfytheset(3x-Fx,Ft1,Ft2....}, butnotruth-valueinterpretationsthatdo.One canensurethattruth-valuesemanticsdelivers thestandardlogic,however,bysuitablemodifi- cationsinthedefinitionsofconsistencyandcon- sequence.AsetFoiformulasoflanguageLis saidtobeconsistent,forexample,ifthereissome PobtainedfromFbyreletteringtermssuch thatPissatisfiedbysometruth-valueassign- ment,or,alternatively,ifthereissomelanguage L+obtainedbyaddingtermstoLsuchthat.Tis satisfiedbysometruth-valueassignmenttothe atomsofL+. Truth-valuesemanticsisofbothtechnicaland philosophicalinterest.Technically,itallowsthe completenessoffirst-orderpredicatelogicanda varietyofotherformålsystemstobeobtainedin anaturalwayfromthatofpropositionallogic. Philosophically,itdramatizesthefactthatthe formulasinone'stheoriesabouttheworlddo not,inthemselves,determineone'sontological commitments.Itisatleastpossibletointerpret first-orderformulaswithoutreferencetospecial 932 TsouYen Turingmachine domarnsofobjects,andhigher-orderformulas withoutreferencetospecialdomarnsofrelations andproperties. Theideaoftruth-valuesemanticsdatesatleast tothewritingsofE.W.Bethonfirst-orderpred- icatelogicin1959andofK.Schtitteonsimple typetheoryin1960.Inmorerecentyearssimi- larsemanticshavebeensuggestedforsecond- orderlogics,modalandtenselogics,intuitionistic logic,andsettheory. Seealsoformålsemantics,meaning, QUANTIFICATION,TRUTHTABLE.S.T.K. TsouYen(3507-270?b.c),Chinesecosmologist, amemberoftheChi-hsiaAcademyandinfluen- tialpoliticalfigurewhoappliedyin-yangfive- phasesthinkingtodynasticcycles.TsouYen believedthatthenaturalorder,thehumanorder, andtherelationbetweenthetwowereallgov- ernedandmadeintelligiblebythedynamic interplayamongyin-yangandthefivephases (wu-hsing:earth,wood,metal,fire,andwater). Hegainedpoliticalfameforhisideathattherise andfallofdynastiesarecorrelatedwiththefive phasesandaccordwiththesamecyclicalpattern: earth,wood,metal,fire,andwater.Thus,the reignoftheYellowEmperor,correlatedwiththe earthphase,wasfollowedbytheHsia(wood), theShang(metal),andtheChou(fire)dynasties. TsouYenpredictedthattheascendancyofthe waterphasewouldsignaltheendoftheChou andthebeginningofanewdynasty.Seealso CHINESEPHILOSOPHY.R.P.P.&R.T.A. TungChung-shu(c.179-c.104b.c),Chinese philosopher,aHanscholarfamousforhis answerstoquestionsbyEmperorWu,which wereinstrumentalinmakingConfucianismthe statedoctrinein136b.c.HewroteCh'un-ch'iu fan-lu("LuxuriantGemsoftheSpringand AutumnAnnals"),inwhichhereadmoralmes- sagesfromhistoricaleventsrecordedintheclas- sicinsuchawaythattheycouldbeappliedto futurehistory.Tung'steachingswereactually quitedifferentfromthoseofConfuciusandMen- dus.HebelievedthatHeavenandtheWaydo notchange,andhetaughttheso-calledThree Bonds,accordingtowhichtheruler,thefather, andthehusbandaretobethestandardsofthe ruled,theson,andthewife.Theseaddedacon- servativeringtoConfucianism,sothattherulers werehappytouseitincombinationwithLegal- istpracticetocreateastateConfucianism.He alsoincorporatedmanyideasfromtheyin-yang schoolinhisphilosophy.Hebelievedthathistory goesincycles,thefivepowers(wood,fire,earth, metal,water)succeedeachother,andthereisa strictcorrelationbetweennaturalaffairsand humanaffairs.Hesawnaturaldisastersaswarn- ingsignsfortherulerstocultivatevirtuesand nottoabusetheirpowers.Seealsoconfu- cianism,confucius,mencius.S.-h.L. tuquoque.Seeinformalfallacy. Turingdegree.Seedegreeofunsolvability. Turingmachine,anabstractautomatonorimag- inedcomputerconsistingofafiniteautomaton operatinganindefinitelylongstoragetape.The finiteautomatonprovidesthecomputingpower ofthemachine.Thetapeisusedforinput,out- put,andcalculationworkspace;inthecaseofthe universalTuringmachine,italsospecifies anotherTuringmachine. Initially,onlyafinitenumberofsquaresofthe tapearemarkedwithsymbols,whiletherestare blank.Thefiniteautomatonpartofthemachine hasafinitenumberofinternalstatesandoper- atesdiscretely,attimest=0,1,2,....Ateach time-steptheautomatonexaminesthetape squareunderitstapehead,possiblychanges whatisthere,movesthetapeleftorright,and thenchangesitsinternalstate. Thelawgoverningthissequenceofactionsis deterministicandisdefinedinastatetable.For eachinternalstateandeachtapesymbol(or blank)underthetapehead,thestatetablede- scribesthetapeactionperformedbythemachine andgivesthenextinternalstateofthemachine. Sinceamachinehasonlyafinitenumberof internalstatesandoftapesymbols,thestatetable ofamachineisfiniteinlengthandcanbestored onatape.ThereisauniversalTuringmachineM thatcansimulateeveryTuringmachine(includ- ingitself):whenthestatetableofanymachine MiswrittenonthetapeofM,theuniversal machineMuwillperformthesameinput-output computationthatMperforms.Mdoesthisby usingthestatetableofMtocalculateM'scom- pletehistoryforanygiveninput. Turingmachinesmaybethoughtofascon- ceptualdevicesforenumeratingtheelementsof aninfiniteset(e.g.,thetheoremsofaformållan- guage),orasdecisionmachines(e.g.,decidingof anytruth-functionalformulawhetheritisatau- tology).A.M.Turingshowedthattherearewell- definedlogicaltasksthatcannotbecarriedoutby anymachine;inparticular,nomachinecansolve thehaltingproblem. 933 Turingmachinefunctionalism types,theoryof Turing'sdefinitionofamachinewastheoreti- cal;itwasnotapracticalspecificationfora machine.Afterthemodernelectroniccomputer wasinvented,heproposedatestforjudging whetherthereisacomputerthatisbehaviorally equivalenttoahumaninreasoningandintellec- tualcreativepower. TheTuringtestisa''blackbox"typeofexperi- mentthatTuringproposedasawayofdeciding whetheracomputercanthink.Tworoomsare fittedwiththesameinput-outputequipment goingtoanoutsideexperimenter.Apersonis placedinoneroomandaprogrammedelectronic computerintheother,eachincommunication withtheexperimenter.Byissuinginstructions andaskingquestions,theexperimentertriesto decidewhichroomhasthecomputerandwhich thehuman.Iftheexperimentercannottell,that outcomeisstrongevidencethatthecomputer canthinkaswellastheperson.Moredirectly,it showsthatthecomputerandthehumanare equivalentforallthebehaviorstested.Sincethe computerisafiniteautomaton,perhapsthemost significanttesttaskisthatofdoingcreativemath- ematicsaboutthenon-enumerableinfinite. Seealsobehaviorism,computertheory, CÖDEL'SINCOMPLETENESSTHEOREMS,INFIN- ITY,LÖWENHEIM-SKOLEMTHEOREM.A.W.B. Turingmachinefunctionalism.Seefunctionalism. Turingtest.Seeturingmachine. Turnbull,George(1698-1748),Scottishmoral sensephilosopherandeducationaltheorist.He wasbrieflyaphilosophyregentatAberdeen (1721-27)andateacherofReid.HisPrinciplesof MoralandChristianPhilosophy(1740)andDis- courseupontheNatureandOriginofMoralandCivil Laws(1741)showhimasthemostsystematicof thosewhoaimedtorecastmoralphilosophyon aNewtonianmodel,derivingmorallaws"exper- imentally"fromhumanpsychology.InATreatise onAncientPainting(1740),ObservationsUponLib- eralEducation(1742),andsomesmallerworks, heextolledhistoryandtheartsaspropaedeutic totheteachingofvirtueandnaturalreligion. SeealsoMORALSENSETHEORY.M.A.St. Twardowski.Seeact-objectpsychology,polish LOGIC Twin-Earth,afictitiousplanetfirstvisitedby HilaryPutnaminathoughtexperimentdesigned toshow,amongotherthings,that"'meanings' justain'tinthehead"("TheMeaningof'Mean- ing',"1975).Twin-EarthisexactlylikeEarth withonenotableexception:ponds,rivers,and icetraysonTwin-Earthcontain,notH20,but XYZ,aliquidsuperficiallyindistinguishablefrom waterbutwithadifferentchemicalconstitution. AccordingtoPutnam,althoughsomeinhabi- tantsofTwin-Earthcloselyresembleinhabitants ofEarth,'water',whenutteredbyaTwin-Earth- ling,doesnotmeanwater.WaterisH20,and,on Twin-Earth,theword'water'designatesadiffer- entsubstance,XYZ,Ttv/w-water.Themoral drawnbyPutnamisthatthemeaningsofatleast someofourwords,andthesignificanceofsome ofourthoughts,depend,inpart,onhowthings ståndoutsideourheads.Two"moleculardupli- cates,"twoagentswithqualitativelysimilar mentallives,mightmeanverydifferentthingsby theirutterancesandthinkverydifferent thoughts.AlthoughTwin-Earthhasbecomea populärstopping-offplaceforphilosophersen routetotheoriesofmeaningandmentalcontent, othersregardTwin-Earthashopelesslyremote, doubtingthatusefulconclusionscanbedrawn aboutourEarthlycircumstancesfromresearch conductedthere.Seealsomeaning,philoso- phyOFLANGUAGE.J.F.H. tychism(fromGreektyche,'chance'),Peirce's doctrinethatthereisabsolutechanceintheuni- verseanditsfundamentallawsareprobabilistic andinexact.Peirce'stychismispartofhisevolu- tionarycosmology,accordingtowhichallregu- laritiesofnatureareproductsofgrowthand development,i.e.,resultsofevolution.Thelaws ofnaturedevelopövertimeandbecomeincreas- inglyrigidandexact;theapparentlydeterminis- ticlawsofphysicsarelimitingcasesofthebasic, probabilisticlaws.Underlyingallotherlawsis "thetendencyofallthingstotakehabits";Peirce callsthistheLawofHabit.Inhiscosmologyhis tychismisassociatedwithsynechism,thedoctrine ofthecontinuityofnature.Hissynechismin- volvesthedoctrineofthecontinuityofmindand matter;Peircesometimesexpressedthisviewby sayingthat"matteriseffetemind."R.Hi. type.Seeactiontheory,darwinism,determin- ism,TYPETHEORY,TYPE-TOKENDISTINCTION. typeepiphenomenalism.Seephilosophyofmind. typephysicalism.Seephysicalism. types,simpletheoryof.Seetypetheory. types,theoryof.Seetypetheory. 934 typetheory typetheory typetheory,broadly,anytheoryaccordingto whichthethingsthatexistfallintonatural,per- hapsmutuallyexclusive,categoriesortypes.In mostmoderndiscussions,'typetheory'refersto thetheoryoflogicaltypesfirstsketchedbyRus- sellinThePrinciplesofMathematics(1903).Itisa theoryoflogicaltypesinsofarasitpurportsonly toclassifythingsintothemostgeneralcategories thatmustbepresupposedbyanadequatelogical theory.Russellproposedhistheoryinresponse tohisdiscoveryofthenow-famousparadoxthat bearshisname.Theparadoxisthis.Common sensesuggeststhatsomeclassesaremembersof themselves(e.g.,theclassofallclasses),while othersarenot(e.g.,theclassofphilosophers). LetRbetheclasswhosemembershipconsistsof exactlythoseclassesofthelattersort,i.e.,those thatarenotmembersofthemselves.IsRamem- berofitself?Ifso,thenitisamemberoftheclass ofallclassesthatarenotmembersofthemselves, andhenceisnotamemberofitself.If,onthe otherhand,itisnotamemberofitself,thenit satisfiesitsownmembershipconditions,and henceisamemberofitselfafterall.Eitherway thereisacontradiction. Thesourceoftheparadox,Russellsuggested, istheassumptionthatclassesandtheirmembers formasingle,homogeneouslogicaltype.Tothe contrary,heproposedthatthelogicaluniverseis stratifiedintoaregimentedhierarchyoftypes. Individuahconstitutethelowesttypeinthehier- archy,type0.(Forpurposesofexposition,indi- vidualscanbetakentobeordinaryobjectslike chairsandpersons.)Type1consistsofclassesof individuals,type2ofclassesofclassesofindi- viduals,type3classesofclassesofclassesofindi- viduals,andsoon.Unlikethehomogeneous universe,then,inthetypehierarchythemem- bersofagivenclassmustallbedrawnfromasin- glelogicaltypen,andtheclassitselfmustreside inthenexthighertypen+1.(Russell'ssketch inthePrinciplesdiffersfromthisaccountincer- taindetails.) Russell'sparadoxcannotariseinthisconcep- tionoftheuniverseofclasses.Becausethemem- bersofaclassmustallbeofthesamelogicaltype, thereisnosuchclassasR,whosedefinitioncuts acrossalltypes.Rather,thereisonly,foreach typen,theclassRnofallnon-self-membered classesofthattype.SinceRnitselfisoftypen+1, theparadoxbreaksdown:fromtheassumption thatRisnotamemberofitself(asinfactitisnot inthetypehierarchy),itnolongerfollowsthatit satisfiesitsownmembershipconditions,since thoseconditionsapplyonlytoobjectsoftypen. Mostformåltypetheories,includingRussell's own,enforcetheclassmembershiprestrictions ofsimpletypetheorysyntacticallysuchthata canbeassertedtobeamemberofbonlyifbisof thenexthighertypethana.Insuchtheories,the definitionofR,hencetheparadoxitself,cannot evenbeexpressed. Numerousparadoxesremainunscathedbythe simpletypehierarchy.Ofthese,themostpromi- nentarethesemanticparadoxes,socalledbe- causetheyexplicitlyinvolvesemanticnotions liketruth,asinthefollowingversionoftheliar paradox.SupposeEpimenidesassertsthatallthe propositionsheassertstodayarefalse;suppose alsothatthatistheonlypropositionheasserts today.Itfollowsimmediatelythat,underthose conditions,thepropositionheassertsistrueif andonlyifitisfalse.Toaddresssuchparadoxes, Russellwasledtothemorerefinedandsubstan- tiallymorecomplicatedsystemknownasrami- fiedtypetheory,developedindetailinhis1908 paper"MathematicalLogicasBasedontheThe- oryofTypes."Intheramifiedtheory,propositions andproperties(orpropositionalfunctions,inRus- sell'sjargon)cometoplaythecentralrolesinthe type-theoreticuniverse.Propositionsarebest construedasthemetaphysicalandsemantical counterpartsofsentences-whatsentences express-andpropertiesasthecounterpartsof "opensentences"like'xisaphilosopher'that containavariable'x'inplaceofanounphrase. Todistinguishlinguisticexpressionsfromtheir semanticcounterparts,thepropertyexpressed by,say,'xisaphilosopher',willbedenotedby'i isaphilosopher',andthepropositionexpressedby 'Aristotleisaphilosopher'willbedenotedby 'Aristotleisaphilosopher'.Aproperty...x...is saidtobetrueofanindividualaif...a...isa trueproposition,andfalseofaif...a...isafalse proposition(where'...a...'istheresultof replacing'i'with'a'in'...x...').So,e.g.,xisa philosopheristrueofAristotle.Therangeofsignif- icanceofapropertyPisthecollectionofobjects ofwhichPistrueorfalse.flisapossibleargument forPifitisinP'srangeofsignificance. Intheramifiedtheory,thehierarchyofclasses issupplantedbyahierarchyofproperties:first, propertiesofindividuals(i.e.,propertieswhose rangeofsignificanceisrestrictedtoindividuals), thenpropertiesofpropertiesofindividuals,and soon.Paralleltothesimpletheory,then,the typeofapropertymustexceedthetypeofits possibleargumentsbyone.Thus,Russell'spara- doxwithRnowintheguiseofthepropertyxis apropertythatisnottrueofitself-isavoidedalong analogouslines.FollowingtheFrenchmathe- maticianHenriPoincaré,Russelltracedthe 935 typetheory,ramified type-tokendistinction sourceofthesemanticparadoxestoakindof illicitself-reference.So,forexample,intheliar paradox,Epimenidesostensiblyassertsapropo- sitionpaboutallpropositions,pitselfamong them,namelythattheyarefalseifassertedby himtoday.pthusreferstoitselfinthesensethat it-ormoreexactly,thesentencethatexpresses it-quantifiesöver(i.e.,refersgenerallytoallor someoftheelementsof)acollectionofentities amongwhichpitselfisincluded.Thesourceof semanticparadoxthusisolated,Russellformu- latedtheviciouscircleprinciple(VCP),whichpro- scribesallsuchself-referenceinpropertiesand propositionsgenerally.Theliarpropositionpand itsilkwerethuseffectivelybanishedfromthe realmoflegitimatepropositionsandsothe semanticparadoxescouldnotarise. Weddedtotherestrictionsofsimpletypethe- ory,theVCPgeneratesaramifiedhierarchybased onamorecomplicatedformoftyping.Thekey notionisthatofanobjecfsorder.Theorderofan individual,likeitstype,is0.However,theorder ofapropertymustexceedtheordernotonlyof itspossiblearguments,asinsimpletypetheory, butalsotheordersofthethingsitquantifiesöver. Thus,type1propertieslikexisaphilosopherand xisaswiseasallotherphilosophersarefirst-order properties,sincetheyaretrueofand,inthesec- ondinstance,quantifyöver,individualsonly. Propertieslikethesewhoseorderexceedsthe orderoftheirpossibleargumentsbyoneare calledpredicative,andareofthelowestpossible orderrelativetotheirrangeofsignificance.Con- sider,bycontrast,theproperty(callitQ)xhasall the(first-order)propertiesofagreatphilosopher.Like thoseabove,Qalsoisapropertyofindividuals. However,sinceQquantifiesöverfirst-order properties,bytheVDP,itcannotbecounted amongthem.Accordingly,intheramifiedhier- archy,Qisasecond-orderpropertyofindividuals, andhenceKow-predicative(orimpredicative). LikeQ,thepropertyxisa(first-order)propertyofall greatphilosophersisalsosecond-order,sinceits rangeofsignificanceconsistsofobjectsoforder 1(anditquantifiesonlyöverobjectsoforder0); butsinceitisapropertyoffirst-orderproperties, itispredicative.Inlikemanneritispossibleto definethird-orderpropertiesofindividuals, third-orderpropertiesoffirst-orderproperties, third-orderpropertiesofsecond-orderproperties ofindividuals,third-orderpropertiesofsecond- orderpropertiesoffirst-orderproperties,and then,inthesamefashion,fourth-orderproper- ties,fifth-orderproperties,andsoonadinfini- tum. Aseriousshortcomingoframifiedtypetheory, fromRussell'sperspective,isthatitisaninade- quatefoundationforclassicalmathematics.The mostprominentdifficultyisthatmanyclassical theoremsappealtodefinitionsthat,thoughcon- sistent,violatetheVCP.Forinstance,awell- knowntheoremofrealanalysisassertsthat everyboundedsetofrealnumbershasaleast upperbound.Intheramifiedtheory,realnum- bersareidentifiedwithcertainpredicativeprop- ertiesofrationals.Undersuchanidentification, theusualprocedureistodefinetheleastupper boundofaboundedsetSofrealstobetheprop- erty(callitb)somerealnumberinSistrueofx,and thenprovethatthispropertyisitselfarealnum- berwiththerequisitecharacteristics.However,b quantifiesövertherealnumbers.Hence,bythe VCP,bcannotitselfbetakentobearealnumber: althoughofthesametypeasthereals,and althoughtrueoftherightthings,bmustbe assignedahigherorderthanthereals.So,con- trarytotheclassicaltheorem,Sfailstohavea leastupperbound.Russellintroducedaspecial axiomtoobviatethisdifficulty:theaxiomof reducibility.Reducibilitysays,ineffect,thatfor anypropertyP,thereisapredicativepropertyQ thatistrueofexactlythesamethingsasP. Reducibilitythusassuresthatthereisapredica- tivepropertyVtrueofthesamerationalnum- bersasb.Sincetherealsarepredicative,hence ofthesameorderasV,itturnsoutthatb'isa realnumber,andhencethatShasaleastupper boundafterall,asrequiredbytheclassicaltheo- rem.Thegeneralroleofreducibilityisthusto undothedraconianmathematicaleffectsofram- ificationwithoutunderminingitscapacityto fendoffthesemanticparadoxes. Seealsohierarchy,paradox,russell. CM. typetheory,ramified.Seetypetheory. type-tokendistinction,asdrawnbyPeirce,the contrastbetweenacategoryandamemberof thatcategory.Anindividualortokenissaidto exemplifyatype;itpossessesthepropertythat characterizesthattype.Inphilosophythisdis- tinctionisoftenappliedtolinguisticexpressions andtomentalstates,butitcanbeappliedalsoto objects,events,properties,andstatesofaffairs. Relatedtoitarethedistinctionsbetweentype andtokenindividuationandbetweenqualitative andnumericalidentity.Distincttokensofthe sametype,suchastwoants,maybequalitatively identicalbutcannotbenumericallyidentical. Irrespectiveofthecontroversialmetaphysical viewthateveryindividualhasanessence,atype 936 type-typeidentity tzujan towhichitbelongsessentially,everyindividual belongstomanytypes,althoughforacertain theoreticalorpracticalpurposeitmaybelongto oneparticularlysalienttype(e.g.,theentomolo- gisfsFormicidaeorthepicnicker'sbuttinsky). Thetype-tokendistinctionasappliedinthe philosophyoflanguagemarksthedifference betweenlinguisticexpressions,suchaswords andsentences,whicharethesubjectoflinguis- tics,andtheproductsofactsofwritingorspeak- ing(thesubjectofspeechacttheory).Confusing thetwocanleadtoconflatingmattersofspeaker meaningwithmattersofwordorsentence meaning(asnotedbyGrice).Anexpressionisa linguistictypeandcanbeusedöverandöver, whereasatokenofatypecanbeproducedonly once,thoughofcourseitmaybereproduced (copied).Awritercomposesanessay(atype) andproducesamanuscript(atoken),ofwhich theremightbemanycopies(moretokens).A tokenofatypeisnotthesameasanoccurrenceof atype.Intheprevioussentencetherearetwo occurrencesoftheword'type';ineachinscrip- tionofthatsentence,therearetwotokensofthat word. Inphilosophyofmindthetype-tokendistinc- tionunderliesthecontrastbetweentwoformsof physicalism,thetype-typeidentitytheoryor typephysicalismandthetoken-tokenidentity theoryortokenphysicalism. Seealsoactiontheory,peirce,philoso- phyOFMIND.K.B. type-typeidentity.Seephilosophyofmind. tzujan,Chinesetermmeaning'naturally','spon- taneity',or'so-of-itself.ItisaTaoisttermofart describingtheidealstateofagentsandqualityof actions.Acoordinateconceptiswuwei(non- action),particularlyintheTaoTeChing.Taoists seektoeliminatetherational"human"perspec- tiveandreturntospontaneous"Heavenly"incli- nations.Actionsthenwillbeunself-conscious, andweandwhatwedowillbetzujan(sponta- neous).WangCh'ungpresentsanearlycritique ofthisTaoistnotioninchapter54ofhisLunHeng. Låterthinkersappropriatethetermtosupport theirownpositions.Forexample,Neo-Confu- ciansregardparticularfamilialandsocialobliga- tionsastzujan,asarecertainvirtuousin- clinations.Seealsoneo-taoism,taoism. P.J.I. 937 Ubermensch.Seenietzsche. Udana.Seenyäya-vaishesika. Unamuno,Miguelde(1864-1936),Spanish philosopher,scholar,andwriter.BorninBilbao, hestudiedinBilbaoandMadridandtaught GreekandphilosophyinSalamanca.Hisopen criticismoftheSpanishgovernmentledtodis- missalfromtheuniversityandexile(1924-30) and,again,todismissalfromtherectorshipin 1936. UnamunoisanimportantfigureinSpanish letters.LikeOrtegayGasset,hisaimwastocap- turelifeinitscomplexemotionalandintellectual dimensionsratherthantodescribetheworldsci- entifically.Thus,hefavoredfictionasamedium forhisideasandmaybeconsideredaprecursor ofexistentialism.Hewroteseveralphilosophi- callysignificantnovels,acommentaryonDon Quijote(1905),andsomepoetryanddrama;his philosophicalideasaremostexplicitlystatedin Delsentimientotrågicodelavida("TheTragicSense ofLife,"1913). Unamunoperceivedatragicsensepermeating humanlife,asensearisingfromourdesirefor immortalityandfromthecertaintyofdeath.In thispredicamentmanmustabandonallpretense ofrationalismandembracefaith.Faithcharac- terizestheauthenticlife,whilereasonleadsto despair,butfaithcannevercompletelydisplace reason.Tornbetweenthetwo,wecanfindhope onlyinfaith;forreasondealsonlywithabstrac- tions,whileweare"fleshandbones"andcan findfulfillmentonlythroughcommitmenttoan ideal.J.J.E.G. unaryquantifier.Seepluralitivelogic. uncertaintyprinciple.Seephilosophyofscience, QUANTUMMECHANICS. unconscious.Seefreud,jung. uncountable.Seecantor. undecidable.Seeconventionalism. undefeated.Seeepistemology. undemonstrableargument.Seethema. underdetermination,perceptual.Seefigure- ground. underdetermination,theoretical.Seeoperational- ISM,THEORY-LADEN. underdeterminationthesis.Seephilosophyofsci- ence. understanding.Seedilthey,explanation,verste- hen. understanding,categoriesofthe.Seekant. unexpectedexaminationparadox,aparadox aboutbeliefandprediction.Oneversionisasfol- lows:Itseemsthatateachercouldbothmake, andacton,thefollowingannouncementtohis class:"SometimeduringthenextweekIwillset youanexamination,butatbreakfasttimeonthe dayitwilloccur,youwillhavenogoodreason toexpectthatitwilloccuronthatday."Ifhe announcesthisonFriday,couldhenotdowhat hesaidhewouldby,say,settingtheexamination onthefollowingWednesday?Theparadoxis thatthereisanargumentpurportingtoshow thattherecouldnotbeanunexpectedexamina- tionofthiskind.Forletussupposethatthe teacherwillcarryouthisthreat,inbothitsparts; i.e.,hewillsetanexamination,anditwillbe unexpected.Thenhecannotsettheexamination onFriday(assumingthistobethelastpossible dayoftheweek).For,bythetimeFridaybreak- fastarrives,andweknowthatalltheprevious dayshavebeenexamination-free,wewould haveeveryreasontoexpecttheexaminationto occuronFriday.Soleavingtheexamination untilFridayisinconsistentwithsettinganunex- pectedexamination.Forsimilarreasons,the examinationcannotbeheldonThursday.Given ourpreviousconclusionthatitcannotbe delayeduntilFriday,wewouldknow,when Thursdaymorningcame,andthepreviousdays hadbeenexamination-free,thatitwouldhave tobeheldonThursday.Soifitwereheldon Thursdayitwouldnotbeunexpected.Soitcan- notbeheldonThursday.Similarreasoningsup- 938 unifiedscience unityofscience posedlyshowsthatthereisnodayoftheweek onwhichitcanbeheld,andsosupposedlyshows thatthesuppositionthattheteachercancarry outhisthreatmustberejected.Thisisparadox- ical,foritseemspiainthattheteachercancarry outhisthreat.Seealsoparadox.R.M.S. unifiedscience.Seeunityofscience. uniformityofnature,astateofaffairsthoughtto berequiredifinductionistobejustified.For example,inductivelystrongarguments,suchas 'Thesunhasriseneverydayinthepast;there- före,thesunwillrisetomorrow',arethoughtto presupposethatnatureisuniforminthesense thatthefuturewillresemblethepast,inthiscase withrespecttothediurnalcycle. TheScottishempiricistHumewasthefirstto makeexplicitthattheuniformityofnatureisa substantialassumptionininductivereasoning. Humearguedthat,becausethebeliefthatthe futurewillresemblethepastcannotbegrounded inexperience-forthefutureisasyetunob- served-inductioncannotberationallyjustified; appealtoitindefenseofinductioniseitherques- tion-beggingorillicitlymetaphysical.Francis Bacon's"inductionbyenumeration"andJ.S. Mill's"fivemethodsofexperimentalinquiry" presupposethatnatureisuniform.Whewell appealedtotheuniformityofnatureinorderto accountforthe"consilienceofinductions,"the tendencyofahypothesistoexplaindatadiffer- entfromthoseitwasoriginallyintroducedto explain.ForreasonssimilartoHume's,Popper holdsthatourbeliefintheuniformityofnature isamatteroffaith.Reichenbachheldthat althoughthisbeliefcannotbejustifiedin advanceofanyinstanceofinductivereasoning, itspresuppositionisvindicatedbysuccessful inductions. Ithasproveddifficulttoformulateaphilo- sophicalstatementoftheuniformityofnature thatisbothcoherentandinformative.Itappears contradictorytosaythatnatureisuniforminall respects,becauseinductiveinferencesalways markdifferencesofsomesort(e.g.,frompresent tofuture,fromobservedtounobserved,etc), anditseemstrivialtosaythatnatureisuniform insomerespects,becauseanytwostatesof nature,nomatterhowdifferent,willbesimilar insomerespect. Notallobservedregularitiesintheworld(örin data)aretakentosupportsuccessfulinductive reasoning;notalluniformitiesare,touseGood- man^term,"projectible."Philosophersofsci- encehavethereforeproposedvariousrulesof projectibility,involvingsuchnotionsassimplic- ityandexplanatorypower,inanattempttodis- tinguishthoseobservedpatternsthatsupport successfulinductions(andthusaretakentorep- resentgenuinecausalrelations)fromthosethat areaccidentalorspurious. Seealsocausation,grueparadox,law- LIKEGENERALIZATION,PROBLEMOFINDUC- TION.J.D.T union.Seesettheory. unitarianism.Seetrinitarianism. unity,organic.Seeorganic. unityindiversity,inaesthetics,theprinciplethat thepartsoftheaestheticobjectmustcohereor hängtogetherwhileatthesametimebeingdif- ferentenoughtoallowfortheobjecttobecom- plex.Thisprincipledefinesanimportantformål requirementusedinjudgingaestheticobjects.If anobjecthasinsufficientunity(e.g.,acollection ofcolorpatcheswithnorecognizablepatternsof anysort),itischaoticorlacksharmony;itis moreacollectionthanoneobject.Butifithas insufficientdiversity(e.g.,acanvasconsisting entirelyofonecolorwithnointernaldifferenti- ations),itismonotonous.Thus,theformålpat- terndesiredinanaestheticobjectisthatof complexpartsthatdiffersignificantlyfromeach otherbutättogethertoformoneinterdependent wholesuchthatthecharacterormeaningofthe wholewouldbechangedbythechangeofany part.Seealsoaesthetics,organic.J.A.K. unityofscience,asituationinwhichallbranches ofempiricalscienceformacoherentsystem calledunifiedscience.Unifiedscienceissometimes extendedtoincludeformålsciences(e.g., branchesoflogicandmathematics).'Unityofsci- ence'isalsousedtorefertoaresearchprogram aimedatunifiedscience. Interestintheunityofsciencehasalonghis- torywithmanyroots,includingancientatomism andtheworkoftheFrenchEncyclopedists.In thetwentiethcenturythisinterestwaspromi- nentinlogicalempiricism(seeOttoNeurathet al.,InternationalEncyclopediaofUnifiedScience,vol. I,1938).Logicalempiricistsoriginallyconceived ofunifiedscienceintermsofaunifiedlanguage ofscience,inparticular,auniversalobservation language.Alllawsandtheoreticalstatementsin anybranchofscienceweretobetranslatableinto suchanobservationlanguage,orelsebeappro- priatelyrelatedtosentencesofthislanguage.In 939 universal universalizability additiontoencounteringtechnicaldifficulties withtheobservational-theoreticaldistinction, thisconceptionofunifiedsciencealsoleaves openthepossibilitythatphenomenaofone branchmayrequirespecialconceptsand hypothesesthatareexplanatorilyindependent ofotherbranches. Anotherconceptofunityofsciencerequires thatallbranchesofsciencebecombinedbythe intertheoreticreductionofthetheoriesofall non-basicbranchestoonebasictheory(usually assumedtobesomefuturephysics).These reductionsmayproceedstepwise;anoversimpli- fiedexamplewouldbereductionofpsychology tobiology,togetherwithreductionsofbiologyto chemistryandchemistrytophysics.Thecondi- tionsforreducingtheoryT2totheoryTare complex,butincludeidentificationoftheontol- ogyofT2withthatofTalongwithexplanation ofthelawsofT2bylawsofT1togetherwith appropriateconnectingsentences.Thesecondi- tionsforreductioncanbesupplementedwith conditionsfortheunityofthebasictheory,to produceageneralresearchprogramfortheuni- ficationofscience(seeRobertL.Causey,Unityof Science,1977). Adoptingthisresearchprogramdoesnotcom- mitonetothepropositionthatcompleteunifica- tionwilleverbeachieved;thelatterisprimarily anempiricalproposition.Thisprogramhasbeen criticized,andsomehavearguedthatreductions areimpossibleforparticularpairsoftheories,or thatsomebranchesofscienceareautonomous. Forexample,somewritershavedefendedaview ofautonomousbiology,accordingtowhichbiolog- icalscienceisnotreducibletothephysicalsci- ences.Vitalismpostulatednon-physicalattri- butesorvitalforcesthatweresupposedtobe presentinlivingorganisms.Morerecentneo- vitalisticpositionsavoidthesepostulates,but attempttogiveempiricalreasonsagainstthefea- sibilityofreducingbiology.Other,sometimesa priori,argumentshavebeengivenagainstthe reducibilityofpsychologytophysiologyandof thesocialsciencestopsychology.Thesedisputes indicatethecontinuingintellectualsignificance oftheideaofunityofscienceandthebroad rangeofissuesitencompasses. Seealsoexplanation,philosophyof SCIENCE,PHILOSOPHYOFTHESOCIALSCI- ENCES,REDUCTION.R.L.C. universal.Seemetaphysics. universal,concrete.Seehegel. universalcharacteristic.Seeleibniz. universalconstructor.Seeself-reproducing AUTOMATON. universaldisposition.Seedisposition. universalgeneralization.Seeuniversalinstantia- TION. universalgrammar.Seechomsky,grammar. universalinstantiation,alsocalleduniversalquan- tifierelimination.(1)Theargumentform'Every- thingis§;thereforeais',andargumentsofthis form.(2)Theruleofinferencethatpermitsone toinferthatanygiventhingis§fromthepremise thateverythingis;andsoare theconjunction($&~)andthedisjunction (-0v~0).Sometheoristsobjecttothese results,butdefendersoffuzzylogichaveargued infavörofthem. Othertheoristshaveattemptedtocapturethe elusivelogicofvaguenessbyemployingmodal logic,havingtheoperators□(meaning'0is definite')and(meaning'isvague').The logicgeneratedinthiswayispeculiarinthat□ (0ErT)^(\30ErDf)isnotatheorem.E.g.,(p Er~p)isdefmitelyfalse,hencedefinite;hence□ (pEr~p).Yetneitherpnor~pneedbedefinite. (Technically,itisanon-Kripke-normalmodal logic.)Someotherpeculiaritiesarethat(D0 □~)isatheorem,andthat(D(P—>0)isnot. Therearealsopuzzlesaboutwhether((00—> □OcP)shouldbeatheorem,andaboutiterated modalitiesingeneral.Modallogictreatmentsof vaguenesshavenotattractedmanyadvocates, exceptasaportionofageneralepistemiclogic (i.e.,modallogicsmightbeseenasanaccountof so-calledepistemicvagueness). Athirddirectionthathasbeenadvocatedasa logicalaccountofvaguenesshasbeenthe methodofsupervaluations(sometimescalled "supertruth").Theunderlyingideahereisto allowthevaguepredicateinasentencetobe "precisified"inanarbitrarymanner.Thus,forthe sentence'FriarTuckisbald',wearbitrarily chooseaprecisenumberofhairsonthehead thatwilldemarcatethebald/not-baldbörder.In thisvaluationFriarTuckiseitherdefmitelybald ordefmitelynotbald,andthesentenceeitheris trueorisfalse.Next,wealterthevaluationso thatthereissomeotherbald/not-baldborder- 946 Vaihinger,Hans Valentinianism line,etc.Asentencetrueinallsuchvaluationsis deemed"reallytrue"or"supertrue";onefalsein allsuchvaluationsis"reallyfalse"or"super- false."Allothersarevague.Notethat,inthis conceptionofvagueness,if(Pisvague,sois~&~&'isnoteval- uatedasvague-itisfalseineveryvaluationand henceissuperfalse.And'4>v~

3)onlyon thebasisofunderstandingstillotherwords.This leadstoaninfiniteregress.Sincenooneunder- standsanywordsatbirth,theregressimpliesthat nooneevercomestounderstandanywords.But thisisclearlyfalse.Sincetheexistenceofthis regressisinconsistentwithanobvioustruth,we mayconcludethattheregressisviciousandcon- sequentlythattheprinciplethatgeneratesitis false. Seealsoepistemicregressargument, REDUCTIOADABSURDUM.W.T. Vico,Giambattista(1668-1744),Italianphiloso- pherwhofoundedmodernphilosophyofhis- tory,philosophyofculture,andphilosophyof mythology.Hewasbornandlivedallhislifein ornearNaples,wherehetaughtLatineloquence attheuniversity(1699-1741).TheInquisition wasaforceinNaplesthroughoutVico'slifetime. Aturningpointinhiscareerwashislossofthe concourseforachairofcivillaw(1723). Althoughadisappointmentandaninjustice,it enabledhimtoproducehismajorphilosophical work.Hewasappointedroyalhistoriographerby CharlesofBourbonin1735. Vico'smajorworkistheNewScience(Lascienza nuova,1725),completelyrevisedinasecond, definitiveversionin1730.Inthe1720s,hepub- lishedthreeconnectedworksinLatinon jurisprudence,underthetitleUniversalLaw,one containsasketchofhisconceptionofa"newsci- ence"ofthehistoricallifeofnations.Vico'sprin- cipalworksprecedingthisareOntheStudy MethodsofOurTime(1709),comparingthean- cientswiththemodernsregardinghumanedu- cation,andOntheMostAncientWisdomofthe Italians(1710),attackingtheCartesianconcep- tionofmetaphysics.HisAutobiography(1728- 31)inauguratestheconceptionofmodernintel- lectualautobiography. BasictoVico'sphilosophyishisprinciplethat "thetrueisthemade"(verumipsumfactum),that whatistrueisconvertiblewithwhatismade. Thisprincipleiscentralinhisconceptionof"sci- ence"(scientia,scienza).Ascienceispossibleonly forthosesubjectsinwhichsuchaconversionis possible.Therecanbeascienceofmathematics, sincemathematicaltruthsaresuchbecausewe makethem.Analogously,therecanbeascience ofthecivilworldofthehistoricallifeofnations. Sincewemakethethingsofthecivilworld,itis possibleforustohaveascienceofthem.Asthe makersofourownworld,likeGodasthemaker whomakesbyknowingandknowsbymaking, wecanhaveknowledgepercaussas(through causes,fromwithin).Inthenaturalscienceswe canhaveonlyconscientia(akindof"conscious- ness"),notscientia,becausethingsinnatureare notmadebytheknower. Vico's"newscience"isascienceoftheprinci- pleswhereby"menmakehistory";itisalsoa demonstrationof"whatprovidencehaswrought inhistory."Allnationsriseandfallincycles withinhistory(corsiericorsi)inapatterngov- ernedbyprovidence.Theworldofnationsor,in theAugustinianphraseVicouses,"thegreatcity ofthehumanrace,"exhibitsapatternofthree agesof"idealeternalhistory"(storiaidealeeterna). Everynationpassesthroughanageofgods (whenpeoplethinkintermsofgods),anageof heroes(whenallvirtuesandinstitutionsare formedthroughthepersonalitiesofheroes),and anageofhumans(whenallsenseofthedivine islöst,lifebecomesluxuriousandfalse,and thoughtbecomesabstractandineffective);then thecyclemustbeginagain.Inthefirsttwoages alllifeandthoughtaregovernedbytheprimor- dialpowerof"imagination"(fantasia)andthe worldisorderedthroughthepowerofhumans toformexperienceintermsof"imaginativeuni- versals"(universalifantastici).Thesetwoagesare governedby"poeticwisdom"(sapienzapoetica). AtthebasisofVico'sconceptionofhistory,soci- ety,andknowledgeisaconceptionofmythical thoughtastheoriginofthehumanworld.Fan- tasiaistheoriginalpowerofthehumanmind throughwhichthetrueandthemadearecon- vertedtocreatethemythsandgodsthatareat thebasisofanycycleofhistory. MicheletwastheprimarysupporterofVico's ideasinthenineteenthcentury;hemadethem thebasisofhisownphilosophyofhistory. Coleridgewastheprincipaldisseminatorof VichianviewsinEngland.JamesJoyceusedthe NewScienceasasubstructureforFinnegansWake, makingplaysonVico'sname,beginningwith oneinLatininthefirstsentence:"byacom- modiusvicusofrecirculation."Crocerevived Vico'sphilosophicalthoughtinthetwentieth century,wishingtoconceiveVicoastheItalian Hegel.Vico'sideashavebeenthesubjectof 955 ViennaCircle ViennaCircle analysisbysuchprominentphilosophical thinkersasHorkheimerandBerlin,byanthro- pologistssuchasEdmundLeach,andbyliterary criticssuchasRenéWellekandHerbertRead. Seealsocroce,philosophyofhistory. D.P.V. ViennaCircle,agroupofphilosophersandsci- entistswhometperiodicallyfordiscussionsin Viennafrom1922to1938andwhoproposeda self-consciouslyrevolutionaryconceptionofsci- entificknowledge.TheCirclewasinitiatedbythe mathematicianHansHahntocontinueaprewar forumwiththephysicistPhilipFrankandthe socialscientistOttoNeurathafterthearrivalin ViennaofMoritzSchlick,aphilosopherwhohad studiedwithMaxPlanck.Carnapjoinedin1926 (from1931inPrague);othermembersincluded HerbertFeigl(from1930inIowa),Friedrich Waismann,Bergmann,ViktorKraft,andBela vonJuhos.VienneseassociatesoftheCircle includedKurtGödel,KarlMenger,FelixKauf- mann,andEdgarZilsel.(Popperwasnotamem- berorassociate.)Duringitsformativeperiodthe Circle'sactivitieswereconfinedtodiscussion meetings(manyonWittgenstein'sTractatus).In 1929theCircleentereditspublicperiodwiththe formationoftheVereinErnstMach,thepublica- tionofitsmanifestoWissenschaftlicheWeltauffäs- sung:DerWienerKreisbyCamap,Hahn,and Neurath(translatedinNeurath,Empiricismand Sociology,1973),andthefirstofaseriesofphilo- sophicalmonographseditedbyFrankand Schlick.Italsobegancollaborationwiththe independentbutbroadlylike-mindedBerlin "SocietyofEmpiricalPhilosophy,"including Reichenbach,KurtGrelling,KurtLewin, FriedrichKraus,WalterDubislav,Hempel,and RichardvonMises:thegroupstogetherorga- nizedtheirfirstpublicconferencesinPragueand Königsberg,acquirededitorshipofaphilosophi- caljournalrenamedErkenntnis,andlåterorga- nizedtheinternationalUnityofSciencecon- gresses.Thedeathanddispersionofkeymem- bersfrom1934onward(Hahndiedin1934, NeurathleftforHollandin1934,Carnapleftfor theUnitedStatesin1935,Schlickdiedin1936) didnotmeantheextinctionofViennaCirclephi- losophy.Throughthesubsequentworkofearlier visitors(Ayer,ErnestNagel,Quine)andmem- bersandcollaboratorswhoemigratedtothe UnitedStates(Camap,Feigl,Frank,Hempel,and Reichenbach),thelogicalpositivismoftheCircle (ReichenbachandNeurathindependentlypre- ferred''logicalempiricism")stronglyinfluenced thedevelopmentofanalyticphilosophy. TheCircle'sdiscussionsconcernedthephilos- ophyofformålandphysicalscience,andeven thoughtheirindividualpublicationsranged muchwider,itistheattitudetowardsciencethat definestheCirclewithinthephilosophicalmove- mentsofcentralEuropéatthetime.TheCircle rejectedtheneedforaspecificallyphilosophical epistemologythatbestowedjustificationon knowledgeclaimsfrombeyondscienceitself.In this,theCirclemayalsohavedrawnonadistinct Austriantradition(athesisofitshistorianNeu- rath):inmostofGermany,scienceandphiloso- phyhadpartedwaysduringthenineteenth century.StartingwithHelmholtz,ofcourse, therealsoaroseamovementthatsoughttodis- tinguishthescientificrespectabilityoftheKant- iantraditionfromthespeculationsofGerman idealism,yetafter1880neo-Kantiansinsistedon theautonomyofepistemology,disparagingear- lierfellowtravelersas"positivist."Yetthepro- gramofreducingtheknowledgeclaimofscience andprovidinglegitimationstowhafsleftfound widefavörwiththemoreempirical-mindedlike Mach.Comprehensivedescription,notexplana- tion,ofnaturalphenomenabecamethetaskfor theoristswhonolongerlookedtophilosophyfor foundations,butfoundthemintheutilityof theirpreferredempiricalprocedures.Alongwith thepositivists,theViennaCirclethoughtuneco- nomicaltheKantiananswertothequestionof thepossibilityofobjectivity,thesyntheticapriori. Moreover,theViennaCircleanditsconvention- alistprecursorsPoincaréandDuhemsawthem contradictedbytheresultsofformålscience.Rie- mann'sgeometriesshowedthatquestionsabout thegeometryofphysicalspacewereopento morethanoneanswer:Wasphysicalspace Euclideanornon-Euclidean?ItfelltoEinstein andthepre-CircleSchlick(SpaceandTimeinCon- temporaryPhysics,1917)toarguethatrelativity theoryshowedtheuntenabilityofKanfscon- ceptionofspaceandtimeasforeverfixedsyn- theticaprioriformsofintuition.YetFrege's anti-psychologisticcritiquehadalsoshown empiricismunabletoaccountforknowledgeof arithmeticandtheconventionalistshadended thepositivistdreamofatheoryofexperiential elementsthatbridgedthegapbetweendescrip- tionsoffactandgeneralprinciplesofscience. How,then,couldtheViennaCircledefendthe claim-underattackasjustoneworldview amongothers-thatscienceprovidesknowl- edge? TheCircleconfrontedtheproblemofconstitu- tiveconventions.Asbefittedtheirself-image beyondKantandMach,theyfoundtheirpara- 956 ViennaCircle ViennaCircle digmaticanswerinthetheoryofrelativity:they thoughtthatirreducibleconventionsofmea- surementwithwide-rangingimplicationswere sharplyseparablefrompurefactslikepointcoin- cidences.Empiricaltheorieswereviewedaslog- icalstructuresofstatementsfreelycreated,yet accountabletoexperientialinputviatheirpre- dictiveconsequencesidentifiablebyobservation. TheViennaCircledefendedempiricismbythe reconceptualizationoftherelationbetweena prioriandaposterioriinquiries.First,inaman- nersympathetictoFrege'sandRussell'sdoctrine oflogicismandguidedbyWittgenstein'snotion oftautology,arithmeticwasconsideredapartof logicandtreatedasentirelyanalytical,without anyempiricalcontent;itstruthwasheldtobe exhaustedbywhatisprovablefromthepremises andrulesofaformålsymbolicsystem.(Carnap's LogicalSyntaxofLanguage,1934,assimilated Gödel'sincompletenessresultbyclaimingthat noteverysuchproofcouldbedemonstratedin thosesystemsthemselveswhicharepowerful enoughtorepresentclassicalarithmetic.)The syntheticaprioriwasnotneededforformålsci- encebecauseallofitsresultswerenon-synthetic. Second,theCircleadoptedverificationism:sup- posedlyempiricalconceptswhoseapplicability wasindiscerniblewereexcludedfromscience. Thetermsforunobservablesweretoberecon- structedbylogicaloperationsfromtheobserva- tionalterms.Onlyifsuchreconstructionswere provideddidthemoretheoreticalpartsofscience retaintheirempiricalcharacter.(Justwhatkind ofreductionwasaimedforwasnotalwaysclear andearlierradicalpositionsweregradually weakened;Reichenbachinsteadconsideredthe relationbetweenobservationalandtheoretical statementstobeprobabilistic.)Empiricalscience needednosyntheticapriorieither;allofitsstate- mentswereaposteriori. Combinedwiththeviewthattheanalysisof thelogicalformofexpressionsallowedforthe exactdeterminationoftheircombinatorial value,verificationismwastoexhibittheknowl- edgeclaimsofscienceandeliminatemeta- physics.Whatevermeaningdidnotsurvive identificationwiththescientificwasdeemed irrelevanttoknowledgeclaims(Reichenbachdid notsharethisvieweither).SincetheCirclealso observedthethenlong-discussedbanonissuing unconditionalvaluestatementsinscience,its metaethicalpositionsmaybebroadlycharacter- izedasendorsingnoncognitivism.Itsmembers werenotsimplyemotivists,however,holding thatvaluejudgmentsweremereexpressionsof feeling,butsoughttodistinguishthefactualand evaluativecontentsofvaluejudgments.Those who,likeSchlick(QuestionsofEthics,1930), engagedinmetaethics,distinguishedtheexpres- sivecomponent(xdesiresy)ofvaluejudgments fromtheirimplieddescriptivecomponent(doing zfurthersaimy)andheldthatthedemandinher- entinmoralprinciplespossessedvalidityifthe implieddescriptionwastrueandtheexpressed desirewasendorsed.Thisanalysisofnormative conceptsdidnotrenderthemmeaninglessbut allowedforpsychologicalandsociologicalstud- iesofethicalsystems;Menger'sformålvariant (Morality,DecisionandSocialOrganization,1934) provedinfluentialfordecisiontheory. Thesemioticviewthatknowledgerequired structuredrepresentationswasdevelopedin closecontactwithfoundationalresearchin mathematicsanddependedonthe"new"logic ofFrege,Russell,andWittgenstein,outofwhich quantificationtheorywasemerging.Majornew resultswerequicklyintegrated(albeitcontro- versially)andCarnap'sworksreflectthedevel- opmentoftheconceptionoflogicitself.Inhis LogicalSyntaxheadoptedthe"PrincipleofToler- ance"vis-å-visthequestionofthefoundationof theformålsciences:thechoiceoflogics(andlan- guages)wasconventionalandconstrained,apart fromthedemandforconsistency,onlybyprag- maticconsiderations.Theproposedlanguage formanditsdifferencefromalternativessimply hadtobestatedasexactlyaspossible:whethera logico-linguisticframeworkasawholecorrectly representedrealitywasacognitivelymeaning- lessquestion.Yetwhatwasthestatusofthever- ifiabilityprinciple?Carnap'ssuggestionthatit representsnotadiscoverybutaproposalfor futurescientificlanguageusedeservestobe takenseriously,foritnotonlycharacterizeshis ownconventionalism,butalsoamplifiestheCir- cle^linguistictum,accordingtowhichallphilos- ophyconcernedwaysofrepresenting,rather thanthenatureoftherepresented.Whatthe ViennaCircle"discovered"washowmuchofsci- encewasconventional:itsverificationismwasa proposalforaccommodatingthecreativityofsci- entifictheorizingwithoutaccommodatingideal- ism. Whetheranempiricalclaiminordertobe meaningfulneededtobeactuallyverifiedoronly potentiallyverifiable,orfallibleoronlypoten- tiallytestable,andwhethersobycurrentoronly byfuturemeans,becamemattersofdiscussion duringthe1930s.Equallyimportantforthe questionwhethertheCircle'sconventionalism avoidedidealismandmetaphysicswerethe issuesofthestatusoftheoreticaldiscourseabout 957 Vijnanavada Vijnanavada unobservablesandthenatureofscience'sempir- icalfoundation.TheviewsuggestedinSchlick's earlyGeneralTheoryofKnowledge(1918,2d.ed. 1925)andFrank'sTheCausalLawanditsLimita- tions(1932)andelaboratedinCarnap's"Logical FoundationsoftheUnityofScience"(inFounda- tionsoftheUnityofSciencel.\,1938)characterized thetheoreticallanguageasanuninterpretedcal- culusthatisrelatedtothefullyinterpreted observationallanguageonlybypartialdefini- tions.Didsuchaninstramentalismrequireforits empiricalanchorthesharpseparationofobser- vationalfromtheoreticalterms?Couldsucha separationevenbemaintained? Considertheunityofsciencethesis.Accordingto themethodologicalversion,endorsedbyall members,allofscienceabidesbythesamecrite- ria:nobasicmethodologicaldifferencesseparate thenaturalfromthesocialorculturalsciences (Geisteswissenschaften)asclaimedbythosewho distinguishbetween'explanation'and'under- standing'.Accordingtothemetalinguisticver- sion,allobjectsofscientificknowledgecouldin principlebecomprehendedbythesame"uni- versal"language.Physicalismassertsthatthisis thelanguagethatspeaksofphysicalobjects. WhileeverybodyintheCircleendorsedphysi- calisminthissense,theunderstandingofits importancevaried,asbecameclearintheso- calledprotocolsentencedebate.(Thenomologi- calversionoftheunitythesiswasonlylåter clearlydistinguished:whetherallscientificlaws couldbereducedtothoseofphysicswasanother matteronwhichNeurathcametodiffer.)Osten- sively,thisdebateconcernedthequestionofthe form,content,andepistemologicalstatusofsci- entificevidencestatements.Schlick'sunrevisable "affirmations"talkedaboutphenomenalstatesin statementsnotthemselvespartofthelanguage ofscience("TheFoundationofKnowledge," 1934,translatedinAyer,ed.,LogicalPositivism). Carnap'spreferencechangedfromunrevisable statementsinaprimitivemethodologicallysolip- sisticprotocollanguagethatwerefalliblytrans- latableintothephysicalisticsystemlanguage (1931;seeUnityofScience,1934),viaarbitrary revisablestatementsofthatsystemlanguagethat aretakenastemporaryrestingpointsintesting (1932),torevisablestatementsinthescientific observationlanguage(1935;see"Testabilityand Meaning,"PhilosophyofScience,1936-37).These changeswerepartlypromptedbyNeurath, whoseownrevisable"protocolstatements" spöke,amongstothermatters,oftherelation betweenobserversandtheobservedina"uni- versalslang"thatmixedexpressionsofthephys- icalisticallycleansedcolloquialandthehighsci- entificlanguages("ProtocolStatements,"1932, translatedinAyer,ed.,LogicalPositivism).Ulti- mately,theseproposalsansweredtodifferent projects.Sinceallagreedthatallstatementsof sciencewerehypothetical,thequestionsoftheir "foundation"concernedrathertheverynature ofViennaCirclephilosophy.ForSchlickphilos- ophybecametheactivityofmeaningdetermina- tion(inspiredbyWittgenstein);Carnappursued itastherationalreconstructionofknowledge claimsconcernedonlywithwhatReichenbach calledthe"contextofjustification"(itslogical aspects,notthe"contextofdiscovery");and Neurathreplacedphilosophyaltogetherwitha naturalistic,interdisciplinary,empiricalinquiry intoscienceasadistinctivediscursivepractice, precludingtheorthodoxconceptionoftheunity ofscience. TheViennaCirclewasneitheramonolithic noranecessarilyreductionistphilosophical movement,andquickassimilationtothetradi- tionofBritishempiricismmistakesitsstruggles withtheform-contentdichotomyforfounda- tionalism,wheninsteadsophisticatedresponses tothequestionofthepresuppositionsoftheir owntheoriesofknowledgewerebeingdevel- oped.Initstimeandplace,theCirclewasa minorityvoice;thesociopoliticaldimensionofits theories-stressedmorebysome(Neurath)than others(Schlick)-asarenewalofEnlightenment thought,ultimatelyagainsttherisingtideofBlut- und-Bodenmetaphysics,isgainingrecognition. Afterthecelebrated"death"ofreductionistlogi- calpositivisminthe1960sthehistoricalVienna Circleisreemergingasamultifacetedobjectof thehistoryofanalyticalphilosophyitself,reveal- inginnucedifferentstrandsofreasoningstillsig- nificantforpostpositivisttheoryofscience. Seealsomeaning,operationalism,phi- losophyOFSCIENCE,REDUCTION,UNITYOF SCIENCE.TU. Vijnanavada,anidealistschoolofBuddhist thoughtinIndiainthefourthcenturya.d.It engagedinlivelydebatesonimportantepiste- mologicalandmetaphysicalissueswiththeBud- dhistMädhyamikaschool(knownforits relativisticandnihilisticviews),withBuddhist realistschools,andwithvariousHinduphilo- sophicalsystemsofitstime.Mädhyamikaphi- losophyusedeffectivedialectictoshowthe contradictionsinoureverydayphilosophical notionssuchascause,substance,self,etc,but theVijnanavadaschool,whileagreeingwiththe Mädhyamikasonthispoint,wentfurtherand 958 vijhapti virtueepistemology gaveinnovativeexplanationsregardingtheori- ginandthestatusofourmentalconstructions andoftheminditself.UnliketheMädhyamikas, whoheldthatrealityis"emptiness"(sunyotä), theVijnänavädinsheldthattherealityiscon- sciousnessorthemind(vijnäna).TheVijnäna- vädaschoolisalsoknownasYogäcära.Its idealismisremarkablysimilartothesubjective idealismofBerkeley.Consistentwiththeprocess ontologyofalltheBuddhistschoolsinIndia, Vijnänavädinsheldthatconsciousnessorthe mindisnotasubstancebutanever-changing streamofideasorimpressions.Seealsobud- DHISM.D.K.C. vijnapti,IndianBuddhisttermmeaning'repre- sentation',usedbysomephilosophersasalabel foramentaleventthatappears,phenomenally, tohaveanintentionalobjectandtorepresentor communicatetoitspossessorsomeinformation aboutextramentalreality.Thetermwasused mostlybyBuddhistswithidealisttendencies whoclaimedthatthereisnothingbutrepresen- tation,nothingbutcommunicativemental events,andthatacompleteaccountofhuman experiencecanbegivenwithoutpostulatingthe existenceofanythingextramental.Thisview wasnotuncontroversial,andindefendingit IndianBuddhistsdevelopedargumentsthatare inimportantwaysanalogoustothosecon- structedbyWesternidealists.P.J.G. Vio,Tommasode.Seecajetan. violence,(1)theuseofforcetocausephysical harm,death,ordestruction(physicalviolence); (2)thecausingofseverementaloremotional harm,asthroughhumiliation,deprivation,or brainwashing,whetherusingforceornot(psy- chologicalviolence);(3)morebroadly,profan- ing,desecrating,defiling,orshowingdisrespect for(i.e.,"doingviolence"to)somethingvalued, sacred,orcherished;(4)extremephysicalforce inthenaturalworld,asintornados,hurricanes, andearthquakes. Physicalviolencemaybedirectedagainstper- sons,animals,orproperty.Inthefirsttwocases, harm,pain,suffering,anddeathfigurepromi- nently;inthethird,illegalityorillegitimacy(the forcefuldestructionofpropertyistypicallycon- sideredviolencewhenitlacksauthorization). Psychologicalviolenceappliesprincipallytoper- sons.Itmaybeunderstoodastheviolationof beingsworthyofrespect.Butitcanapplyto higheranimalsaswell(asinthedamagingmen- taleffectsofsomeexperimentation,e.g.,involv- ingisolationanddeprivation).Environmental- istssometimesspeakofviolenceagainstthe environment,implyingbothdestructionanddis- respectforthenaturalworld. Sometimestheconceptofviolenceisusedto characterizeactsorpracticesofwhichone morallydisapproves.Tothisextentithasanor- mativeforce.Butthisprejudgeswhethervio- lenceiswrong.Onemay,ontheotherhand, regardinflictingharmordeathasonlyprima faciewrong(i.e.,wrongallotherthingsbeing equal).Thisgivesviolenceanormativecharac- ter,establishingitsprimafaciewrongness.Butit leavesopentheultimatemoraljustifiabilityofits use.Establishedpracticesofphysicalorpsycho- logicalviolence-e.g.,war,capitalpunishment- constituteinstitutionalizedviolence.Sodoillegal orextralegalpracticeslikevigilantism,torture, andstateterrorism(e.g.,deathsquads).Anar- chistssometimesregardthecourts,prisons,and policeessentialtomaintainingthestateasvio- lence.Racismandsexismmaybeconsidered institutionalviolenceowingtotheirassociated psychologicalaswellasphysicalviolence. Seealsononviolence.R.L.H. vipassanä(Pali,'insighf,'discernment'),Indian Buddhisttermusedtodescribebothaparticular kindofmeditationalpracticeandthestatesof consciousnessproducedbyit.Themeditational practiceisaimedatgettingthepractitionerto perceiveandcognizeinaccordwiththemajor categoriesofBuddhistmetaphysics.Sincethat metaphysicsisconstitutivelydeconstructive, beingconcernedwithpartsratherthanwholes, themethodtooisanalyticanddeconstructive. Thepractitionerisencouragedtoanalyzethe perceivedsoliditiesandcontinuitiesofherevery- dayexperienceintotransitoryevents,andsoto cultivatetheperceptionofsucheventsuntilshe experiencestheworldnolongerintermsof medium-sizedphysicalobjectsthatendure throughtime,butsolelyintermsoftransitory events.Arrivingatsuchaconditioniscalledthe attainmentofvipassanä.P.J.G. virtu.Seeclassicalrepublicanism,machiavelli. virtue,epistemic.Seevirtueepistemology. virtueepistemology,thesubfieldofepistemology thattakesepistemicvirtuetobecentraltounder- standingjustificationorknowledgeorboth.An epistemicvirtueisapersonalqualityconducive tothediscoveryoftruth,theavoidanceoferror, orsomeotherintellectuallyvaluablegoal.Fol- 959 virtueethics virtueethics lowingAristotle,weshoulddistinguishthese virtuesfromsuchqualitiesaswisdomorgood judgment,whicharetheintellectualbasisof practical-butnotnecessarilyintellectual-suc- cess. Theimportance,andtoanextent,thevery definition,ofthisnotiondepends,however,on largerissuesofepistemology.Forthosewho favöranaturalistconceptionofknowledge(say, asbeliefformedina"reliable"way),thereisrea- sontocallanytruth-conducivequalityorprop- erlyworkingcognitivemechanismanepistemic virtue.Thereisnoparticularreasontolimitthe epistemicvirtuestorecognizablepersonalquali- ties:ahighmathematicalaptitudemaycountas anepistemicvirtue.Forthosewhofavöramore "normative"conceptionofknowledge,thecor- respondingnotionofanepistemicvirtue(or vice)willbenarrower:itwillbetiedtopersonal qualities(likeimpartialityorcarelessness)whose exerciseonewouldassociatewithanethicsof belief. Seealsoreliabilism,virtueethics. J.A.M. virtueethics,alsocalledvirtue-basedethicsand agent-basedethics,conceptionsortheoriesof moralityinwhichvirtuesplayacentralorinde- pendentrole.Thus,itismorethansimplythe accountofthevirtuesofferedbyagiventheory. Sometaketheprincipalclaimofvirtueethicsto beaboutthemoralsubject-that,inlivingherlife, sheshouldfocusherattentiononthecultivation ofher(orothers')virtues.Otherstaketheprin- cipalclaimtobeaboutthemoraltheorist-that,in mappingthestructureofourmoralthought,she shouldconcentrateonthevirtues.Thislatter viewcanbeconstruedweaklyasholdingthatthe moralvirtuesarenolessbasicthanothermoral concepts.Inthistypeofvirtueethics,virtuesare independentofothermoralconceptsinthat claimsaboutmorallyvirtuouscharacteroraction are,inthemain,neitherreducibletonorjusti- fiedonthebasisofunderlyingclaimsabout moraldutyorrights,oraboutwhatisimperson- allyvaluable.Itcanalsobeconstruedstronglyas holdingthatthemoralvirtuesaremorebasic thanothermoralconcepts.Insuchavirtue ethics,virtuesarefundamental,i.e.,claimsabout othermoralconceptsareeitherreducibleto underlyingclaimsaboutmoralvirtuesorjusti- fiedontheirbasis. FormsofvirtueethicspredominatedinWest- ernphilosophybeforetheRenaissance,most notablyinAristotle,butalsoinPlatoand Aquinas.Severalancientandmedievalphiloso- phersendorsedstrongversionsofvirtueethics. Theseviewsfocusedoncharacterratherthanon discretebehavior,identifyingillicitbehavior withviciousbehavior,i.e.,conductthatwould beseriouslyoutofcharacterforavirtuousper- son.Avirtuousperson,inturn,wasdefinedas onewithdispositionsrelevantlylinkedtohuman flourishing.Ontheseviews,whileapersonof goodcharacter,orsomeonewhocarefully observesher,maybeabletoarticulatecertain principlesorrulesbywhichsheguideshercon- duct(ortowhich,atleast,itoutwardlycon- forms),theprinciplesarenotanultimatesource ofmoraljustification.Onthecontrary,theyare justifiedonlyinsofarastheconducttheyendorse wouldbeincharacterforavirtuousperson. ForAristotle,theconnectionbetweenflour- ishingandvirtueseemsconceptual.(Hecon- ceivedmoralvirtuesasdispositionstochoose undertheproperguidanceofreason,and definedaflourishinglifeasonelivedinaccor- dancewiththesevirtues.)Whilemostaccounts ofthevirtueslinkthemtotheflourishingofthe virtuousperson,thereareotherpossibilities.In principle,theflourishingtowhichvirtueistied (whethercausallyorconceptually)maybe eitherthatofthevirtuoussubjectherself,orthat ofsomepatientwhoisarecipientofhervirtu- ousbehavior,orthatofsomelargeraffected group-theagenfscommunity,perhaps,orall humanity,orevensentientlifeingeneral. ForthephilosophersofancientGreece,itwas humannature,usuallyconceivedteleologically, thatfixedthecontentofthisflourishing. MedievalChristianwritersreinterpretedthis, stipulatingboththattheflourishinglifetowhich thevirtuesleadextendspastdeath,andthat humanflourishingisnotmerelythefulfillment ofcapacitiesandtendenciesinherentinhuman nature,butistherealizationofadivineplan.In latetwentieth-centuryversionsofvirtueethics, sometheoristshavesuggestedthatitisneitherto ateleologyinherentinhumannaturenortothe divinewillthatweshouldlookindetermining thecontentofthatflourishingtowhichthe virtueslead.Theyunderstandflourishingmore asamatterofaperson'slivingalifethatmeets thestandardsofhercultural,historicaltradition. Inhismostgeneralcharacterization,Aristotle calledathing'svirtuesthosefeaturesofitthat madeitanditsoperationgood.Themoralvirtues werewhatmadepeoplelivewell.Thisuseof 'making'isambiguous.Whereheandotherpre- modernthinkersthoughttheconnectionbe- tweenvirtuesandlivingwelltobeconceptual, moraltheoristsofthemodernisterahaveusually 960 virtues,cardinal Vishnu understooditcausally.Theycommonlymaintain thatavirtueisacharactertraitthatdisposesa persontodowhatcanbeindependentlyidenti- fiedasmorallyrequiredortoeffectwhatisbest (bestforherself,accordingtosometheories;best forothers,accordingtodifferentones).Ben- jaminFranklin,e.g.,deemeditvirtuousforaper- sontobefrugal,becausehethoughtfrugality waslikelytoresultinherhavingalesstroubled life.Onviewsofthissort,alivelyconcernforthe welfareofothershasmoralimportanceonly inasmuchasittendstomotivatepeopleactually toperformhelpfulactions.Inshort,benevolence isavirtuebecauseitconducestobeneficentcon- duct;veracity,becauseitconducestotruth telling;fidelity,becauseitconducestopromise keeping;andsoon.Reactingtothisaspectof modernistphilosophy,recentproponentsof virtueethicsdenythatmoralvirtuesderivefrom priordeterminationsofwhatactionsarerightor ofwhatstatesofaffairsarebest.Some,especially certaintheoristsofliberalism,assignvirtuesto whattheyseeasonecompartmentofmoral thoughtanddutiestoaseparate,andonly looselyconnectedcompartment.Forthem,the life(andtheory)ofvirtueisautonomous.They holdthatvirtuesanddutieshaveindependent sourcesofjustification,withvirtueschieflycon- cernedwiththeindividual'spersonal"ideals," self-image,orconceptionofherlifegoals,while dutiesandrightsarethoughttoderivefrom socialrulesregulatinginterpersonaldealings. Proponentsofvirtueethicsmaintainthatithas certainadvantagesövermoremodernalterna- tives.Theyarguethatvirtueethicsisproperly concrete,becauseitgroundsmoralityinfacts abouthumannatureorabouttheconcrete developmentofparticularculturaltraditions,in contrastwithmodernistattemptstoground moralityinsubjectivepreferenceorinabstract principlesofreason.Theyalsoclaimthatvirtue ethicsistruertohumanpsychologyinconcen- tratingonthelessconsciousaspectsofmotiva- tion-onrelativelystabledispositions,habits, andlong-termgoals,forexample-wheremod- ernethicsfocusesondecisionmakingdirectedby principlesandrules.Virtueethics,somesay, offersamoreunifiedandcomprehensivecon- ceptionofmorallife,onethatextendsbeyond actionstocomprisewants,goals,likesanddis- likes,and,ingeneral,whatsortofpersononeis andaimstobe.Proponentsofvirtueethicsalso contendthat,withoutthesensitivityandappre- ciationoftheirsituationanditsopportunities thatonlyvirtuesconsistentlymakeavailable, agentscannotproperlyapplytherulesthatmod- ernistethicaltheoriesoffertoguidetheiractions. Nor,intheirview,willtheagentfollowthose rulesunlesshervirtuesofferhersufficientclarity ofpurposeandperseveranceagainsttemptation. Severalobjectionshavebeenraisedagainst virtueethicsinitsmostrecentforms.Criticscon- tendthatitisantiquarian,becauseitrelieson conceptionsofhumannaturewhoseteleology rendersthemobsolete;circular,becauseit allegedlydefinesrightactionintermsofvirtues whiledefiningvirtuesintermsofrightaction; arbitraryandirrelevanttomodemsociety,since thereistodaynoacceptedstandardeitherof whatconstituteshumanflourishingorofwhich dispositionsleadtoit;ofnopracticaluse,because itoffersnoguidancewhenvirtuesseemtocon- flict;egoistic,inthatitultimatelydirectsthesub- jecfsmoralattentiontoherselfratherthanto others;andfatalistic,inallowingthemoralityof one'sbehaviortohingefinallyonluckinone's constitution,upbringing,andopportunities. Theremaybeversionsofvirtueethicsthat escapetheforceofallormostoftheobjections, butnoteveryformofvirtueethicscanclaimfor itselfalltheadvantagesmentionedabove. Seealsoaquinas,aristotle,ethics, PLATO.J.L.A.G. virtues,cardinal.Seecardinalvirtues. virtues,theological.Seeaquinas. virtuetheory.Seevirtueethics. Vishnu(fromSanskritVisnu),majorHindugod andSupremeLordforhisdevotees,theVaish- navites.VaishnavitephilosophersregardVishnu asthereferentoftheterm'Brahman'inthe Vedictexts.Låtertextsattemptasynthesisof Vishnuwithtwootherdeitiesintoatrimurti ('threeforms'oftheAbsolute),withBrahmaas Creator,VishnuasPreserver,andSivaas Destroyer.Thisrelativelyunpopularideaisused bymodernthinkerstospeakofthesegodsas threeformsoftheformlessAbsolute.Madhva andRämänujaregardVishnuastheHighest Lord,possessedofinfinitegoodqualitiesand superiortothequalitylessAbsoluteofthenon- dualistthinkers.Vaishnavitethinkersidentify VishnuwiththePurusa,theprimeval,cosmic person,andPräjapati,Creatorgod,oftheVedas, andgivehimepithetsthatidentifyVishnuwith otherrepresentativesofaSupremeBeing.Heis Creator,Preserver,andDestroyeroftheUni- verse.Vishnuisbestknownforthedoctrineof avatar,his"descents"intotheworldinvarious 961 VisistadvaitaVedanta Vives,JuanLuis formstopromoterighteousness.Throughthis andtheconceptofvyuhas,aspectsorfragments, Vaishnavitesincorporatedotherdeities,hero cults,andsaviormythsintotheirfold.Hewasa minordeityintheearlyVedicliterature,known forhis"threestrides"acrosstheuniverse,which indicatethathepervadesall.Duringtheepic period(400b.c.-a.d.400),Vishnubecameone ofthemostpopulärgodsinIndia,represented iconographicallyasdark-complexionedand holdingaconchanddiscus.Hisconsortisusually LaksmlandhisvehiclethebirdGaruda.Seealso AVÅTAR,BRAHMAN.R.N.Mi. VisistadvaitaVedanta,aformofHinduismfor whichBrahmanisanindependentlyexisting, omnipotent,omniscientpersonaldeity.Incre- ative,morallyserioussport,Brahmaneverlast- inglysustainsinexistenceaworldofbothminds andphysicalthings,thesetogetherbeingthe bodyofBrahmaninthesensethatBrahmancan actonanypartoftheworldwithoutfirstacting onsomeotherpartandthattheworldmanifests (thoughinsomewaysitalsohides)Brahman's nature.Inresponsetorepentanceandtrust, Brahmanwillforgiveone'ssinsandbringone intoagraciousrelationshipthatendsthecycleof rebirths.Seealsohinduism.K.E.Y. vitalism.Seephilosophyofbiology. vitallie,(1)aninstanceofself-deception(or lyingtooneself)whenitfostershope,confi- dence,self-esteem,mentalhealth,orcreativity; (2)anyfalsebelieforunjustifiedattitudethat helpspeoplecopewithdifficulties;(3)alieto otherpeopledesignedtopromotetheirwell- being.Forexample,self-deceivingoptimism aboutone'sprospectsforsuccessinworkorper- sonalrelationshipsmaygeneratehope,mobilize energy,enrichlife'smeaning,andincrease chancesforsuccess.HenrikIbsendramatized "life-lies"asessentialforhappiness(TheWild Duck,1884),andEugeneO'Ne01portrayed"pipe dreams"asnecessarycrutches(TheIceman Cometh,1939).Nietzscheendorsed"piousillu- sions"or"holyfictions"aboutthepastthatlib- erateindividualsandsocietiesfromshameand guilt(OntheAdvantageandDisadvantageofHistory forLife,1874).Schillerpraisednormaldegreesof vanityandself-conceitbecausetheysupportself- esteem(ProblemsofBelief,1924).Seealsobad FAITH,FALSECONSCIOUSNESS.M.W.M. Vitoria,Franciscode(1492/93-1546),Spanish Dominicanjurist,politicalphilosopher,andthe- ologianwhoisregardedasthefounderofmod- emintemationallaw.BorninVitoriaorBurgos, hestudiedandtaughtattheCollegeofSaint- JacquesinParis,wherehemetErasmusand Vives.HealsotaughtattheCollegeofSanGre- gorioinValladolidandatSalamanca. Hismostfamousworksarethenotes(relec- tiones)fortwelvepublicaddresseshedeliveredat Salamanca,publishedposthumouslyin1557. Tworeledionesståndout:DeIndisandDejurebelli. Theywereresponsestothelegalandpolitical issuesraisedbythediscoveryandcolonizationof America.IncontrastwithMariana'scontract Arianism,Vitoriaheldthatpoliticalsocietyisour naturalstate.Theaimofthestateistopromote thecommongoodandpreservetherightsofcit- izens.Citizenshipistheresultofbirthplace(jus solis)ratherthanblood(jussanguini).The authorityofthestateresidesinthebodypolitic butistransferredtorulersforitsproperexercise. Thebestformofgovemmentismonarchy becauseitpreservestheunitynecessaryforsocial actionwhilesafeguardingindividualfreedoms. Apartfromthesocietiesofindividualstates, humansbelongtoanintemationalsociety.This societyhasitsownauthorityandlawsthatestab- lishtherightsanddutiesofthestates.Theselaws constitutethelawofnations(jusgentium). J.J.E.G. Vives,JuanLuis(14927-1540),Spanishhuman- istandteacher.BorninValencia,heattendedthe UniversityofParis(1509-14)andlivedmostof hislifeinFlanders.WithhisfriendErasmushe preparedawidelyusedcommentary(1522)of Augustine'sDecivitateDei.From1523to1528 VivesvisitedEngland,taughtatOxford, befriendedMore,andbecameCatherineof Aragon'sconfidant.WhileinParis,Vivesrepudi- atedmedievallogicasuseless(Adversuspseudodi- alecticos,1520)andproposedinsteadadialectic emphasizingresourcefulreasoningandclearand persuasiveexposition(Detradendisdisciplinis, 1532).Hismethodwaspartiallyinspiredby RudolphAgricolaandprobablyinfluentialupon PeterRamus. LessinterestedintheologythanErasmusor More,hesurpassedbothinphilosophicaldepth. Asoneofthegreatpedagoguesofhisage,Vives proposedaplanofeducationthatsubstitutedthe Aristotelianidealofspeculativecertaintyfora pragmaticprobabilitycapableofguidingaction. Vivesenlargedthescopeofwomen'seducation (DeinstitutionefeminaeChristianae,1524)andcon- tributedtotheteachingofclassicalLatin(Exerci- tatiolinguaelatinae,1538).AchampionofEuro- 962 volition volition peanunityagainsttheTurks,heprofessedthe beliefthatinternationalorder(Deconcordia, 1526)dependeduponthecontrolofpassion(De animaetvita,1538).Asasocialreformer,Vives pioneeredthesecularizationofwelfare(Desub- ventionepauperum,1526)andopposedtheabuse oflegaljargon(Aedeslegum,1520).Althoughhis JewishparentswerevictimizedbytheInquisi- tion,VivesremainedaCatholicandmanagedto writeanapologyofChristianitywithouttaking sidesincontroversialtheologicalmatters(Dever- itatefidei,1543).C.G.Nore. volition,amentaleventinvolvedwiththeiniti- ationofaction.'Towill'issometimestakentobe thecorrespondingverbformof'volition'.The conceptofvolitionisrootedinmodernphiloso- phy;contemporaryphilosophershavetrans- formeditbyidentifyingvolitionswithordinary mentalevents,suchasintentions,orbeliefsplus desires.Volitions,especiallyincontemporary guises,areoftentakentobecomplexmental eventsconsistingofcognitive,affective,andcona- tiveelements.Theconativeelementistheimpe- tus-theunderlyingmotivation-fortheaction. Avelleityisaconativeelementinsufficientby itselftoinitiateaction.Thewillisafaculty,orset ofabilities,thatyieldsthementalevents involvedininitiatingaction. Therearethreeprimarytheoriesaboutthe roleofvolitionsinaction.Thefirstisareductive accountinwhichactionisidentifiedwiththe entirecausalsequenceofthementalevent(the volition)causingthebodilybehavior.J.S.Mill, forexample,says:"Nowwhatisaction?Notone thing,butaseriesoftwothings:thestateofmind calledavolition,followedbyaneffect....[T]he twotogetherconstitutetheaction"(Logic). Mary'sraisingherarmisMary'smentalstate causingherarmtorise.NeitherMary'svolitional statenorherarm'srisingarethemselvesactions; rather,theentirecausalsequence(the"caus- ing")istheaction.Theprimarydifficultyforthis accountismaintainingitsreductivestatus.There isnowaytodelineatevolitionandtheresultant bodilybehaviorwithoutreferringtoaction. Therearetwonon-reductiveaccounts,one thatidentifiestheactionwiththeinitiatingvoli- tionandanotherthatidentifiestheactionwith theeffectofthevolition.Intheformer,avolition istheaction,andbodilymovementsaremere causalconsequences.Berkeleyadvocatesthis view:"TheMind...istobeaccountedactive in...sofarforthasvolitionisincluded....In pluckingthisflowerIamactive,becauseIdoit bythemotionofmyhand,whichwasconse- quentuponmyvolition"(ThreeDialogues).Inthis century,Prichardisassociatedwiththistheory: "toactisreallytowillsomething"(MoralObliga- tion,1949),wherewillingissidgeneris(thoughat otherplacesPrichardequateswillingwiththe actionofmentallysettingoneselftodosome- thing).Inthissense,avolitionisanactofwill. ThisaccounthascomeunderattackbyRyle (ConceptofMind,1949).Rylearguesthatitleads toaviciousregress,inthattowilltodosome- thing,onemustwilltowilltodoit,andsoon.It hasbeencounteredthattheregresscollapses; thereisnothingbeyondwillingthatonemustdo inordertowill.AnothercriticismofRyle's, whichismoretelling,isthat'volition'isan obscurantictermofart;"[volition]isanartificial concept.Wehavetostudycertainspecialistthe- oriesinordertofindouthowitistobemanipu- lated....[Itislike]'phlogiston'and'animal spirits'...[which]havenownoutility"(Concept ofMind). Anotherapproach,thecausaltheoryofaction, identifiesanactionwiththecausalconsequences ofvolition.Locke,e.g.,says:"Volitionorwillingis anactoftheminddirectingitsthoughttothe productionofanyaction,andtherebyexerting itspowertoproduceit....[VJolitionisnothing butthatparticulardeterminationofthemind, whereby...themindendeavorstogiverise, continuation,orstop,toanyactionwhichit takestobeinitspower"(EssayconcerningHuman Understanding).Thisisafunctionalaccount,since aneventisanactioninvirtueofitscausalrole. Mary'sarmrisingisMary'sactionofraisingher arminvirtueofbeingcausedbyherwillingto raiseit.Ifherarm'srisinghadbeencausedbya nervoustwitch,itwouldnotbeaction,evenif thebodilymovementswerephotographically thesame. InresponsetoRyle'schargeofobscurantism, contemporarycausaltheoriststendtoidentify volitionswithordinarymentalevents.For example,Davidsontakesthecauseofactionsto bebeliefsplusdesiresandWilfridSellarstakes volitionstobeintentionstodosomethinghere andnow.Despiteitsplausibility,however,the causaltheoryfacestwodifficultproblems:the firstispurportedcounterexamplesbasedon waywardcausalchainsconnectingthean- tecedentmentaleventandthebodilymove- ments;thesecondisprovisionofanenlightening accountofthesementalevents,e.g.intending, thatdoesjusticetotheconativeelement. Seealsoactiontheory,freewillprob- lem,PRACTICALREASONING, CAUSALCHAIN. WAYWARD M.B. 963 Voltaire voluntaryeuthanasia Voltaire,pennameofFrancois-MarieArouet (1694-1778),Frenchphilosopherandwriter whowonearlyfameasaplaywrightandpoet andlåterwasaninfluentialpopularizerofNew- toniannaturalphilosophy.Hisenduringreputa- tionrestsonhisacerbicallywittyessayson religiousandmoraltopics(especiallythePhilo- sophicalLetters,1734,andthePhilosophicalDictio- nary,1764),hisbrilliantstories,andhispassion- atepolemicsagainsttheinjusticesoftheanden régime.InWhitehead'sphrase,hewasmore"a philosophethanaphilosopher"inthecurrent specializeddisciplinarysense.Heborrowedmost ofhisviewsonmetaphysicsandepistemology fromLocke,whosework,alongwithNewton's, hecametoknowandextravagantlyadmiredur- inghisstay(1726-28)inEngland.Hisisbest placedinthelineofgreatFrenchliterarymoral- iststhatincludesMontaigne,Pascal,Diderot,and Camus. Voltaire'spositionisskeptical,empirical,and humanistic.Hisskepticismisnotoftheradical sortthatconcernedDescartes.Buthedeniesthat wecanfindadequatesupportforthegrand metaphysicalclaimsofsystematicphilosophers, suchasLeibniz,orforthedogmatictheologyof institutionalreligions.Voltaire'sempiricism urgesustobecontentwiththelimitedandfalli- bleknowledgeofoureverydayexperienceand itsdevelopmentthroughthemethodsofempir- icalscience.Hishumanismmakesaplea,based onhisempiricistskepticism,forreligiousand socialtolerance:noneofuscanknowenoughto bejustifiedinpersecutingthosewhodisagree withusonfundamentalphilosophicalandtheo- logicalmatters.Voltaire'spositiveviewisthatour humancondition,forallitsflawsandperils,is meaningfulandlivablestrictlyinitsownterms, quiteapartfromanyconnectiontothethreats andpromisesofdubioustranscendentalrealms. Voltaire'spositioniswellillustratedbyhis viewsonreligion.Althoughcomplexdoctrines abouttheTrinityortheIncarnationstrikehimas gratuitousnonsense,henonethelessisfirmly convincedoftherealityofagoodGodwho enjoinsusthroughourmoralsensetoloveone anotherasbrothersandsisters.Indeed,itispre- ciselythismoralsensethathefindsoutragedby theintoleranceofinstitutionalChristianity.His deepestreligiousthinkingconcernstheproblem ofevil,whichhetreatedinhis"PoemoftheLis- bonEarthquake"andtheclassictalesZadig (1747)andCandide(1759).HerejectsthePan- glossianview(heldbyCandide'sDr.Pangloss,a caricatureofLeibniz)thatwecanseethehand ofprovidenceinourdailylifebutispreparedto acknowledgethatanall-goodGoddoesnot(as anextremedeismwouldhold)lethisuniverse justblindlyrun.Whatevermetaphysicaltruth theremaybeinthethoughtthat"allisforthe bestinthebestofallpossibleworlds,"Voltaire insiststhatthisideaisludicrousasapractical responsetoevilandrecommendsinsteadcon- creteactiontosolvespecificlocalproblems:"We mustcultivateourgarden." Voltairewasandremainsanimmenselycon- troversialfigure.WillDurantregardedhimas "thegreatestmanwhoeverlived,"whileJoseph deMaistremaintainedthat"admirationfor Voltaireisaninfalliblesignofacorruptsoul." Perhapsitisenoughtosaythathewrotewith unequaledcharmandwitandstoodforvalues thatareessentialto,ifperhapsnottheverycore of,ourhumanity. Seealsoencyclopedia,leibniz.G.G. voluntarism,anyphilosophicalviewthatmakes ourabilitytocontrolthephenomenainquestion anessentialpartofthecorrectunderstandingof thosephenomena.Thus,ethicalvoluntarismis thedoctrinethatthestandardsthatdefineright andwrongconductareinsomesensechosenby us.Doxasticvoluntarismisthedoctrinethatwe haveextensivecontrolöverwhatwebelieve;we choosewhattobelieve.Aspecialcaseofdoxas- ticvoluntarismistheologicalvoluntarism,which impliesthatreligiousbeliefrequiresasubstantial elementofchoice;theevidencealonecannot decidetheissue.Thisisaviewthatiscloselyasso- ciatedwithPascal,Kierkegaard,andJames.His- toricalvoluntarismisthedoctrinethatthe humanwillisamajorfactorinhistory.Such viewscontrastwithMarxistviewsofhistory. Metaphysicalvoluntarismisthedoctrine,linked withSchopenhauer,thatthefundamentalorga- nizingprincipleoftheworldisnottheincarna- tionofarationaloramoralorderbutratherthe will,whichforSchopenhauerisanultimately meaninglessstrivingforsurvival,tobefoundin allofnature.Seealsoepistemology.R.Fo. voluntarism,doxastic.Seevoluntarism. voluntarism,ethical.Seenaturallaw. voluntarism,metaphysical.Seevoluntarism. voluntarism,theological.Seevoluntarism. voluntaryact.Seeactiontheory. voluntaryeuthanasia.Seeeuthanasia. 964 vonNeumann,John vonWright,G.H. vonNeumann,John(1903-57),Hungarian-born Americanmathematician,physicist,logician, economist,engineer,andcomputerscientist. BorninBudapestandtrainedinHungary, Switzerland,andGermany,hevisitedPrinceton Universityin1930andbecameaprofessoratthe InstituteforAdvancedStudyatPrincetonin 1933.Hismostoutstandingworkinpuremathe- maticswasonringsofoperatorsinHilbertspaces. Inquantummechanicsheshowedtheequiva- lenceofmatrixmechanicstowavemechanics, andarguedthatquantummechanicscouldnot beembeddedinanunderlyingdeterministicsys- tem.Heestablishedimportantresultsinsetthe- oryandmathematicallogic,andworkedon HilberfsProgramtoprovetheconsistencyof mathematicswithinmathematicsuntilhewas shockedbyGödel'sincompletenesstheorems.He establishedthemathematicaltheoryofgames andlåtershoweditsapplicationtoeconomics. Inthesemanydifferentareas,vonNeumann demonstratedaremarkableabilitytoanalyzea subjectmatteranddevelopamathematicalfor- malismthatansweredbasicquestionsaboutthat subjectmatter;formalizationinlogicisthespe- cialcaseofthisprocesswherethesubjectmatter islanguageandreasoning.Withtheadventof WorldWarIIvonNeumannturnedhisgreat analyticalabilitytomoreappliedareasofhydro- dynamics,ballistics,andnuclearexplosives.In 1945hebegantoworkonthedesign,use,and theoryofelectroniccomputers.Helåterbecame aleadingscientistingovernment. VonNeumanncontributedtothehardware architectureofthemodernelectroniccomputer, andheinventedthefirstmodernprogramlan- guage.Aprograminthislanguagecouldchange theaddressesofitsowninstructions,sothatit becamepossibletousethesamesubroutineon differentdatastructuresandtowriteprogramsto processprograms.VonNeumannproposedto useacomputerasaresearchtoolforexploring verycomplexphenomena,suchasthediscon- tinuousnatureofshockwaves.Hebeganthe developmentofatheoryofautomatathatwould covercomputing,communication,andcontrol systems,aswellasnaturalorganisms,biological evolution,andsocieties.Tothisend,heinitiated thestudyofprobabilisticautomataandofself- reproducingandcellulärautomata. Seealsocognitivescience,computer THEORY,CYBERNETICS,PHILOSOPHYOFMIND, SELF-REPRODUCINGAUTOMATON.A.W.B. vonWright,C.H.(b.1916),Finnishphilosopher, oneofthemostinfluentialanalyticphilosophers ofthetwentiethcentury.Hisearlywork,influ- encedbylogicalempiricism,isonlogic,proba- bility,andinduction,includingcontributionsin modalanddeonticlogic,thelogicofnormsand action,preferencelogic,tenselogic,causality, anddeterminism.Inthe1970shisideasabout theexplanationofactionhelpedtolinktheana- lytictraditiontoContinentalhermeneutics.His mostimportantcontributionisATreatiseon InductionandProbability(1951),whichdevelops asystemofeliminativeinductionusingthecon- ceptsofnecessaryandsufficientcondition. In1939vonWrightwenttoCambridgeto meetBroad,andheattendedWittgenstein'slec- tures.RegulardiscussionswithMoorealsohad animpactonhim.In1948vonWrightsucceeded WittgensteinasprofessoratCambridgeUniver- sity.AfterWittgenstein'sdeathin1951,von WrightreturnedtoHelsinki.TogetherwithAns- combeandRushRhees,hebecameexecutorand editorofWittgenstein'sNachlass.Thestudy,orga- nization,systematization,andpublicationofthis exceptionallyrichworkbecamealifelongtask forhim. InhisCambridgeyearsvonWrightbecame interestedinthelogicalpropertiesofvarious modalities:alethic,deontic,epistemic.AnEssay inModalLogic(1951)studies,syntactically,vari- ousdeductivesystemsofmodallogic.Thatyear hepublishedhisfamousartide"DeonticLogic" inMind.Itmadehimthefounderofmodem deonticlogic.Theselogicalworksprofoundly influencedanalyticphilosophy,especiallyaction theory.VonWrightdistinguishestechnical oughts(means-endsrelationships)fromnorms issuedbyanorm-authority.HisNormandAction (1963)discussesphilosophicalproblemscon- cerningtheexistenceofnormsandthetruthof normativestatements.Hismainworkon metaethicsisTheVarietiesofGoodness(1963). InExplanationandUnderstanding(1971)he turnedtophilosophicalproblemsconcerningthe humansciences.Hedefendsamanipulationview ofcausality,wheretheconceptofactionisbasic forthatofcause:humanactioncannotbe explainedcausallybylaws,butmustbeunder- stoodintentionally.Thebasicmodelofintention- alityisthepracticalsyllogism,whichexplains actionbyalogicalconnectionwithwantsand beliefs.Thiswork,sometimescharacterizedas anti-positivistanalyticalhermeneutics,bridges analyticandContinentalphilosophy.Hisstudies intruth,knowledge,modality,lawlikeness, causality,determinism,norms,andpractical inferencewerepublishedin1983-84inhis PhilosophicalPapers. 965 Vorstellung votingparadox In1961vonWrightbecameamemberofthe AcademyofFinland,thehighesthonorFinland givestoitsscientists.Övermanyyearshehas written,inSwedishandFinnish,eloquentessays inthehistoryofideasandthephilosophyofcul- ture.Hehasbecomeincreasinglycriticalofthe modernscientific-technologicalcivilization,its narrowlyinstrumentalconceptofrationality, anditsmythofprogress.Hispublicpleasfor peace,humanrights,andamoreharmonious coexistenceofhumanbeingsandnaturehave madehimthemostesteemedintellectualinthe Scandinaviancountries. Seealsoactiontheory,deonticlogic, EPISTEMICLOGIC,PRACTICALREASONING, PROBLEMOFINDUCTION,WITTGENSTEIN. I.N. Vorstellung.Seeperception. vortextheory.Seedescartes. votingparadox,thepossibilitythatifthereare threecandidates,A,B,andC,fordemocratic choice,withatleastthreechoosers,andthe choosersareaskedtomakesequentialchoices amongpairsofcandidates,AcoulddefeatBbya majorityvote,BcoulddefeatC,andCcould defeatA.(Thiswouldbetheoutcomeifthe choosers'preferenceswereABC,BCA,and CAB.)Hence,althougheachindividualvoter mayhaveaclearpreferenceorderingöverthe candidates,thecollectivemayhavecyclicpref- erences,sothatindividualandmajoritariancol- lectivepreferenceorderingsarenotanalogous. Whilethisfactisnotalogicalparadox,itisper- plexingtomanyanalystsofsocialchoice.Itmay alsobemorallyperplexinginthatitsuggests majorityrulecanbequitecapricious.Forexam- ple,supposewevotesequentiallyövervarious pairsofcandidates,withthewinnerateachstep facinganewcandidate.Ifthecandidatesare favoredbycyclicmajorities,thelastcandidateto enterthefraywillwinthefinalvote.Hence,con- trolöverthesequenceofvotesmaydetermine theoutcome. Itiseasytofindcyclicpreferencesöversuch candidatesasmoviesandothermattersoftaste. Hence,theproblemofthevotingparadoxis clearlyrealandnotmerelyalogicalcontrivance. Butisitimportant?Institutionsmayblockthe generationofevidenceforcyclicmajoritiesby makingchoicespairwiseandsequentially,as above.Andsomeissuesöverwhichwevotepro- vokepreferencepattemsthatcannotproduce cycles.Forexample,ifourissueisoneofunidi- mensionalliberalismversusconservatismon somemajorpoliticalissuesuchaswelfarepro- grams,theremaybenoonewhowouldpreferto spendbothmoreandlessmoneythanwhatis spentinthestatusquo.Hence,everyonemay displaysingle-peakedpreferenceswithprefer- encesfallingaswemoveineitherdirection (towardmoremoneyortowardless)fromthe peak.Ifallimportantissuesandcombinationsof issueshadthispreferencestructure,thevoting paradoxwouldbeunimportant.Itiswidelysup- posedbymanypublicchoicescholarsthatcol- lectivepreferencesarenotsingle-peakedfor manyissuesor,therefore,forcombinationsof issues.Hence,collectivechoicesmaybequite chaotic.Whatordertheydisplaymayresultfrom institutionalmanipulation.Ifthisiscorrect,we maywonderwhetherdemocracyinthesenseof thesovereigntyoftheelectorateisacoherent notion. Seealsoarrow'sparadox,decision THEORY,SOCIALCHOICETHEORY.R.Ha. 966 wang,pa,Chinesepoliticaltitlesmeaning'king' and'hegemon',respectively.Atruewanghasthe MandateofHeavenandrulesbyteratherthan byforce.Theinstitutionofthepadevelopeddur- ingaperiodinwhichthekingsofChinalacked anyrealpower.Inordertobringanendtopolit- icalchaos,themostpowerfulofthenobleswas appointedpa,andeffectivelyruledwhilethe wangreigned.DuringtheWarringStatesperiod inChina(403-221b.c),rulersbegantoassume thetitleofwangregardlessofwhethertheyhad eitherthepowerofapaortherighttoruleofa wang.Afterthisperiod,thetitleofEmperor(tior huang-ti)replacedwang.B.W.V.N. WangCh'ung(a.d.27-100?),Chinesephiloso- pher,commonlyregardedasthemostindepen- dent-mindedthinkerintheLåterHanperiod (25-220).HewrotetheLun-heng("Balanced Inquiries").SinceTungChung-shu,Confucian doctrineoftheunityofmanandnaturehad degeneratedintooneofmutualinfluence,with talkofsträngephenomenaandcalamities abounding.WangCh'ungcastseriousdoubtson suchsuperstitions.Heevendaredtochallenge theauthorityofConfuciusandMencius.Hisout- lookwasnaturalistic.Accordingtohim,thingsin theworldareproducedbytheinteractionof materialforces(ch'i).Herejectedtheteleological pointofviewandwasfatalistic.Seealsotung chung-shu.S.-h.L. WangFu-chih(1619-92),Chinesephilosopher andinnovativeConfucianthinker.Wang attackedtheNeo-Confuciandualismof//'(pat- tern)andch'i(ether),arguingthatIiisthe orderlystructureofindividualch'i(imple- ments/thingsandevents),whicharecomposed ofch'i(ether).Wangrejectedalltranscendental ontologyandbelievedsocietyevolvesand improvesövertime.Heistoutedasa"material- ist"byMarxistthinkersincontemporaryChina, thoughthetermishardlyapplicable,asisclear fromhiscriticismsofShaoYung.Wangattacked Shao'soverly"objective"accountoftheworld, arguingthatallsuchformåldescriptionsfail becausetheydisregardintuition,ouronlyaccess tothelively,shen(spiritual)natureoftheuni- verse.Seealsoconfucianism.P.J.I. WangPi(a.d.226-49),Chinesephilosopherof theHstianhsiieh(MysteriousLearning)School. Heisdescribed,alongwiththinkerslikeKuo Hsiang,asaNeo-Taoist.UnlikeKuo,whobe- lievedtheworldtobeself-generated,Wang claimeditarosefromamysteriousunifiedstate calledwu(non-being).ButlikeKuo,Wang regardedConfuciusastheonetruesage,arguing thatLaoTzuandChuangTzuonly"talked about"non-being,whereasConfuciusembodied it.Wangisimportantforhisdevelopmentofthe notionIi(pattem)andhispioneeringuseofthe pairedconceptst'i(substance)andyung(func- tion).HiscommentaryontheTaoTeChing,the oldestknown,hashadaprofoundandpersistent influenceonlåterChinesethought.Seealso NEO-TAOISM,TAOISM.P.J.I. WangYang-ming(1472-1529),Chinesephiloso- pherknownforhisdoctrinesoftheunityof knowledgeandaction(chih-hsingho-i)andliang- chih(innateknowledgeofthegood).Wangwas alsoknownasasortofmetaphysicalidealist, anticipatedbyLuHsiang-shan,forhisinsistence onthequasi-identityofmindandIi(principle, reason).ThebasicconcernofWang'sphilosophy isthequestion,Howcanonebecomea Confuciansage(sheng)?Thisisaquestionintelli- gibleonlyinthelightofunderstandingandcom- mitmenttotheConfucianvisionofjenoridealof theuniverseasamoralcommunity.Wang remindedhisstudentsthattheconcretesignifi- canceofsuchavisioninhumanlifecannotbe exhaustedwithanyclaimtofinality.Hestressed thatonemustgetridofanyselfishdesiresinthe pursuitofjen.UnlikeChuHsi,Wangshowedlit- tleinterestinempiricalinquiryconcerningthe rationalesofexistingthings.Forhim,"things" aretheobjectivesofmoralwill.Toinvestigate thingsistorectifyone'smind,togetridofevil thoughtsandtodogood.Rectificationofthe mindinvolves,inparticular,anacknowledgment oftheunityofmoralknowledgeandaction(chih- hsingho-i),anenlargementofthescopeofmoral conceminthelightofthevisionofjen,rather thanextensiveacquisitionoffactualknowledge. Seealsochih-hsingho-i,confucianism, LIANG-CHIH.A.S.C. 967 want-beliefmodel Weber,Max want-beliefmodel.See INTENTION. Ward,James(1843-1925),Englishphilosopher andpsychologist.InfluencedbyLotze,Herbart, andBrentano,WardsharplycriticizedBain's associationismanditsalliednineteenth-century reductivenaturalism.Hispsychologyrejected theassociationists'sensationism,whichregarded mindaspassive,capableonlyofsensoryrecep- tivityandcomposedsolelyofcognitivepresenta- tions.Wardemphasizedthemind'sinherent activity,asserting,likeKant,thepriorexistence ofaninferredbutnecessarilyexistingegoorsub- jectcapableoffeelingand,mostimportantly,of conation,shapingbothexperienceandbehavior bythewillfulexerciseofattention.Byitsstress onattentionandwill,Ward'spsychologyresem- blesthatofhiscontemporary,James.Inhis metaphysics,Wardresistedthenaturalists' mechanisticmaterialism,proposinginsteada teleologicalspiritualisticmonism.Whilehiscrit- icismsofassociationismandnaturalismwere telling,Wardwasatransitionalfigurewhosepos- itiveinfluencewaslimited.Althoughsympa- thetictoscientificpsychology-hefounded scientificpsychologyinBritainbyestablishinga psychologylaboratoryatCambridgein1891- he,withhisstudentStout,representedtheend ofarmchairpsychologyinBritain;throughStout heinfluencedthehormicpsychologyof McDougall.Ward'smajorworkis"Psychology" (EncyclopediaBritannica,9thed.,1886),reworked asPsychologicalPrinciples(1918).Seealsoasso- ciationism,JAMES,KANT.T.H.L. warrantedassertability.Seedewey. WarsawSchool.Seepolishlogic. wavemechanics.Seequantummechanics. waywardcausalchain,acausalchain,referredto inaproposedcausalanalysisofakeyconcept, thatgoesawry.Causalanalyseshavebeenpro- posedforkeyconcepts-e.g.,reference,action, explanation,knowledge,artwork.Therearetwo maincasesofwayward(ordeviant)causal chainsthatdefeatacausalanalysis:(1)thosein whichtheprescribedcausalrouteisfollowed, buttheexpectedeventdoesnotoccur;and(2) thoseinwhichtheexpectedeventoccurs,but theprescribedcausalrouteisnotfollowed.Con- sideraction.Oneproposedanalysisisthataper- son^doingsomethingisanactionifandonlyif whathedoesiscausedbyhisbeliefsanddesires. Thepossibilityofwaywardcausalchainsdefeats thisanalysis.Forcase(1),suppose,whileclimb- ing,Johnfindsheissupportinganothermanon arope.Johnwantstoridhimselfofthisdanger, andhebelievesthathecandosobyloosening hisgrip.Hisbeliefanddesireunnervehim,caus- inghimtoloosenhishold.Theprescribedcausal routewasfollowed,buttheensuingevent,his griploosening,isnotanaction.Forcase(2),sup- poseHarrywantstokillhisrichuncle,andhe believesthathecanfindhimathome.Hisbeliefs anddesiressoagitatehimthathedrivesreck- lessly.Hehitsandkillsapedestrian,who,by chance,ishisuncle.Thekillingoccurs,butwith- outfollowingtheprescribedcausalroute;the killingwasanaccidentalconsequenceofwhat Harrydid.Seealsoactiontheory.M.B. weaklawoflargenumbers.Seebernoulli'stheo- REM,PROBABILITY. weaknessofwill.Seeakrasia. weaksemanticcompleteness.Seecompleteness. weaksoundness.Seesoundness. weaksupervenience.Seesupervenience. Weber,Max(1864-1920),Germansocialtheo- ristandsociologist.BorninBerlininaliberaland intellectualhousehold,hetaughteconomicsin Heidelberg,wherehiscircleincludedleading sociologistsandphilosopherssuchasSimmel andLukacs.AlthoughWebergaveuphisprofes- sorshipafteranervousbreakdownin1889,he remainedimportantinpubliclife,anadviserto thecommissionsthatdraftedthepeacetreatyat VersaillesandtheWeimarconstitution. Weber'ssocialtheorywasinfluencedphilo- sophicallybybothneo-KantianismandNie- tzsche,creatingtensionsinatheoristwho focusedmuchofhisattentiononOccidental rationalismandyetwasanoncognitivistin ethics.Hewrotemanycomparativestudieson topicssuchaslawandurbanizationandacele- bratedstudyoftheculturalfactorsresponsible fortheriseofcapitalism,TheProtestantEthicand theSpiritofCapitalism(1904).Buthismajor,syn- theticworkinsocialtheoryisEconomyandSoci- ety(1914);itincludesamethodological introductiontothebasicconceptsofsociology thathasbeentreatedbymanyphilosophersof socialscience. OneofthemaintheoreticalgoalsofWeber's workistounderstandhowsocialprocesses become"rationalized,"takingupcertainthemes 968 Weber'slaw Weil,Simone oftheGermanphilosophyofhistorysinceHegel aspartofsociaftheory.Culture,e.g.,became rationalizedintheprocessofthe"disenchant- mentofworldviews"intheWest,aprocessthat Weberthoughthad"universalsignificance."But becauseofhisgoal-orientedtheoryofactionand hisnoncognitivisminethics,Webersawratio- nalizationexclusivelyintermsofthespreadof purposive,ormeans-endsrationality(Zweckra- tionalität).Rationalactionmeanschoosingthe mosteffectivemeansofachievingone'sgoalsand impliesjudgingtheconsequencesofone's actionsandchoices.Incontrast,valuerational- ity(Wertrationalität)consistsofactionsoriented toultimateends,whereconsiderationsofconse- quencesareirrelevant.Althoughsuchactionis rationalinsofarasitdirectsandorganizeshuman conduct,thechoiceofsuchendsorvaluesthem- selvescannotbeamatterforrationalorscientific judgment.Indeed,forWeberthismeantthatpol- iticswasthesphereforthestrugglebetweenirre- duciblycompetingultimateends,where"gods anddemonsfightitout"andcharismaticleaders inventnewgodsandvalues.Professionalpoliti- cians,however,shouldactaccordingtoan "ethicsofresponsibility"(Verantwortungsethik) aimedatconsequences,andnotan"ethicsof conviction"(Gesinnungsethik)aimedatabstract principlesorultimateends.Weberalsobelieved thatrationalizationbroughttheseparationof "valuespheres"thatcanneveragainbeunified byreason:art,science,andmoralityhavetheir own"logics." Weber'sinfluentialmethodologicalwritings rejectpositivistphilosophyofscience,yetcallfor "valueneutrality."Heacceptstheneo-Kantian distinction,commoninhisdayundertheinflu- enceofRickert,betweenthenaturalandthe humansciences,betweentheNatur-andthe Geisteswissenschaften.Becausehumansocial actionispurposiveandmeaningful,theexpla- nationsofsocialsciencesmustberelatedtothe values(Wertbezogen)andidealsoftheactorsit studies.Againstpositivism,Webersawanine- liminableelementofVerstehen,orunderstanding ofmeanings,inthemethodologyofthehuman sciences.Forexample,hecriticizedthelegalpos- itivistnotionofbehavioralconformityforfailing torefertoactors'beliefsinlegitimacy.Butfor WeberVerstehenisnotintuitionorempathyand doesnotexcludecausalanalysis;reasonscanbe causes.Thus,explanationsinsocialsciencemust havebothcausalandsubjectiveadequacy. Weberalsothoughtthatadequateexplanations oflarge-scale,macrosocialphenomenarequire theconstructionofidealtypes,whichabstractand summarizethecommonfeaturesofcomplex, empiricalphenomenasuchas"sects,""author- ity,"oreven"theProtestantethic."Weberian idealtypesareneithermerelydescriptivenor simplyheuristic,butcomeattheendofinquiry throughthesuccessfultheoreticalanalysisof diversephenomenainvarioushistoricalandcul- turalcontexts. Weber'sanalysisofrationalityasthedisen- chantmentoftheworldandthespreadofpur- posivereasonledhimtoarguethatreasonand progresscouldturnintotheiropposites,anotion thatenormouslyinfluencedcriticaltheory. Weberhadacritical"diagnosisofthetimes"and apessimisticphilosophyofhistory.Attheendof TheProtestantEthicWeberwarnsthatrationalism isdesiccatingsourcesofvalueandconstructing an"ironcage"ofincreasingbureaucratization, resultinginalossofmeaningandfreedomin sociallife.AccordingtoWeber,thesebasicten- sionsofmodernrationalitycannotberesolved. Seealsocriticaltheory,dilthey, EXPLANATION,PHILOSOPHYOFTHESOCIAL SCIENCES.J.Bo. Weber'slaw.Seefechner. wedgeargument.Seeslipperyslopeargument. Weil,Simone(1909-43),Frenchreligious philosopherandwriter.BorninParis,Weilwas oneofthefirstwomentograduatefromthe ÉcoleNormaleSupérieure,havingearlierstud- iedunderthephilosopherAlain.Whileteaching invariousFrenchlycéesWeilbecameinvolvedin radicalleftistpolitics,andherearlyworkscon- cernsocialproblemsandlabor.Theyalsoshow anattempttoworkoutatheoryofactionasfun- damentaltohumanknowing.Thisisseenfirstin herdiplomaessay,"ScienceandPerceptionin Descartes,"andlåterinhercritiqueofMarx,cap- italism,andtechnocracyin"Reflectionscon- cerningtheCausesofSocialOppressionand Liberty."Believingthathumanscannotescape certainbasicharshnecessitiesofembodiedlife, Weilsoughttolindawaybywhichfreedomand dignitycouldbeachievedbyorganizinglaborin suchawaythatthemindcouldunderstandthat necessityandtherebycometoconsenttoit. Afterayearoftestinghertheoriesbyworking inthreefactoriesin1934-35,Weil'searlyopti- mismwasshatteredbythediscoveryofwhatshe called"affliction"(malheur),adestructionofthe humanpersontowhichonecannotconsent. Threeimportantreligiousexperiences,however, causedhertoattempttoputtheproblemintoa 969 welfareeconomics Whewell,William largercontext.Byarguingthatnecessityobeysa transcendentgoodnessandthenbyusinga kenoticmodelofChrisfsincarnationandcruci- fixion,shetriedtoshowthatafflictioncanhave apurposeandbemorallyenlightening.Thekey istherenunciationofanyultimatepossessionof poweraswellasthesocialpersonalityconsti- tutedbythatpower.Thisisaprocessof"atten- tion"and"decreation"bywhichoneshedsthe veilthatotherwiseseparatesonefromappreciat- inggoodnessinanythingbutoneself,butmost especiallyfromGod.SheunderstandsGodasa goodnessthatisrevealedinself-emptyingandin incarnation,andcreationasanactofrenuncia- tionandnotpower. Duringherlastmonths,whileworkingforthe FreeFrenchinLondon,Weil'ssocialandreli- giousinterestscametogether,especiallyinThe NeedforRoots.Beginningwithacritiqueofsocial rightsandreplacingitwithobligations,Weil soughttoshow,ontheonehand,howmodern societieshadillegitimatelybecomethefocusof value,andontheotherhand,howcultures couldbereconstructedsothattheywouldroot humansinsomethingmoreultimatethanthem- selves.Returningtoherearlierthemes,Weil arguedthatinorderforthisrootednesstooccur, physicallabormustbecomethespiritualcoreof culture.Weildiedoftuberculosiswhilethisbook wasinprogress. Oftenregardedasmysticalandsyncretistic, Weil'sphilosophyowesmuchtoanoriginal readingofPlato(e.g.,inIntimatiomofChristianity AmongtheAncientGreeks)aswellastoMarx, Alain,andChristianity.Recentstudies,however, havealsoseenherassignificantlycontributingto social,moral,andreligiousphilosophy.Hercon- cernwithproblemsofactionandpersonsisnot dissimilartoWittgensteinV Seealsomarx,philosophyofreligion. E.O.S. welfareeconomics.Seephilosophyofeconom- ics. welfareliberalism.Seepoliticalphilosophy. well-formedformula,agrammaticallywell- formedsentenceor(structured)predicateofan artificiallanguageofthesortstudiedbylogicians. Awell-formedformulaissometimesknownasa wff(pronounced'woof')orsimplyaformula. Delineatingtheformulasofalanguageinvolves providingitwithasyntaxorgrammar,composed ofbothavocabulary(aspecificationofthesym- bolsfromwhichthelanguageistobebuilt, sortedintogrammaticalcategories)andformation rules(apurelyformålorsyntacticalspecification ofwhichstringsofsymbolsaregrammatically well-formedandwhicharenot).Formulasare classifiedaseitheropenorclosed,dependingon whetherornottheycontainfreevariables(vari- ablesnotboundbyquantifiers).Closedformulas, suchas(x)(FxDGx),aresentences,thepoten- tialbearersoftruth-values.Openformulas,such asFxDGx,arehandledinanyofthreeways.On someaccounts,theseformulasareonaparwith closedones,thefreevariablesbeingtreatedas names.Onothers,openformulasare(struc- tured)predicates,thefreevariablesbeingtreated asplaceholdersforterms.Andonstillother accounts,thefreevariablesareregardedas implicitlyboundbyuniversalquantifiers,again makingopenformulassentences.Seealsofor- malLOGIC,LOGICALCONSTANT,LOGICAL SYNTAX,QUANTIFICATION.G.F.S. well-orderedset.Seemathematicalinduction, SET-THEORETICPARADOXES. wellordering.Seeordering. Weltanschauung.Seedilthey. Wertrationalität.SeewEBER. Westermarck,Edward(1862-1939),Finnish anthropologistandphilosopherwhospenthis lifestudyingthemoresandmoralsofcultures. Hismainworks,TheOriginandDevelopmentof MoralIdeas(1906-08)andEthicalRelativity (1932),attacktheideathatmoralprinciples expressobjectivevalue.Indefendingethicalrel- ativism,hearguedthatmoraljudgmentsare basednotonintellectualbutonemotional grounds.Headmittedthatculturalvariabilityin itselfdoesnotproveethicalrelativism,butcon- tendedthatthefundamentaldifferencesareso comprehensiveanddeepastoconstituteastrong presumptioninfavörofrelativism.Seealso ETHICALOBJECTIVISM,RELATIVISM.L.RR Wff.SeeWELL-FORMEDFORMULA. wheelofrebirth.Seeb UDDHISM,SAMSARA. Whewell,William(1794-1866),Englishhisto- rian,astronomer,andphilosopherofscience.He wasamasterofTrinityCollege,Cambridge (1841-66).FrancisBacon'searlyworkoninduc- tionwasfurtheredbyWhewell,J.F.W.Herschel, andJ.S.Mill,whoattemptedtocreatealogicof 970 Whichcote,Benjamin Whitehead,AlfredNorth induction,amethodologythatcanbothdiscover generalizationsaboutexperienceandprove themtobenecessary. Whewell'stheoryofscientificmethodisbased onhisreadingofthehistoryoftheinductivesci- ences.Hethoughtthatinductionbeganwitha non-inferentialact,thesuperimpositionofan ideaondata,a"colligation,"awayofseeingfacts ina"newlight."Colligationsgeneralizeöver data,andmustsatisfythree"testsoftruth."First, colligationsmustbeempiricallyadequate;they mustaccountforthegivendata.Anynumberof ideasmaybeadequatetoexplaingivendata,so amoreseveretestisrequired.Second,because colligationsintroducegeneralizations,theymust applytoeventsorpropertiesofobjectsnotyet given:theymustprovidesuccessfulpredictions, therebyenlargingtheevidenceinfavörofthe colligation.Third,thebestinductionsarethose whereevidenceforvarioushypothesesorigi- nallythoughttocoverunrelatedkindsofdata "jumpstogether,"providingaconsilienceof inductions.Consiliencecharacterizesthosethe- oriesachievinglargemeasuresofsimplicity,gen- erality,unification,anddeductivestrength. Furthermore,consilienceisatestoftheneces- sarytruthoftheories,whichimpliesthatwhat manyregardasmerelypragmaticvirtuesofthe- orieslikesimplicityandunifyingforcehavean epistemicstatus.Whewellthusprovidesastrong argumentforscientificrealism.Whewell'sexam- plesofconsilienttheoriesareNewton'stheoryof universalgravitation,whichcoversphenomena asseeminglydiverseasthemotionsoftheheav- enlybodiesandthemotionsofthetides,andthe undulatorytheoryoflight,whichexplainsboth thepolarizationoflightbycrystalsandthecol- orsoffringes.ThereisevidencethatWhewell's methodologywasemployedbyMaxwell,who designedtheinfluentialCavendishLaboratories atCambridge.PeirceandMachfavoredWhew- ell'saccountofmethodöverMill'sempiricistthe- oryofinduction. Seealsoexplanation,philosophyof SCIENCE.R.E.B. Whichcote,Benjamin.SeeCambridgeplatonists. Whitehead,AlfredNorth(1861-1947),English mathematician,logician,philosopherofscience, andmetaphysician.EducatedfirstattheSher- borneSchoolinDorsetshireandthenatTrinity College,Cambridge,Whiteheademergedasa first-classmathematicianwitharichgeneral background.In1885hebecameafellowofTrin- ityCollegeandremainedthereinateachingrole until1910.Intheearly1890sBertrandRussell enteredTrinityCollegeasastudentinmathe- matics;bythebeginningofthenewcenturyRus- sellhadbecomenotonlyastudentandfriendbut acolleagueofWhitehead'satTrinityCollege. Eachhadwrittenafirstbookonalgebra(White- head^ATreatiseonUniversalAlgebrawonhim electiontotheRoyalSocietyin1903).When theydiscoveredthattheirprojectedsecond bookslargelyoverlapped,theyundertookacol- laborationonavolumethattheyestimated wouldtakeaboutayeartowrite;infact,itwas adecadelåterthatthethreevolumesoftheir ground-breakingPrincipiaMathematicaappeared, launchingsymboliclogicinitsmodernform. IntheseconddecadeofthiscenturyWhite- headandRusselldriftedapart;theirresponsesto WorldWarIdifferedradically,andtheirintellec- tualinterestsandorientationsdiverged.White- head^Londonperiod(1910-24)isoftenviewed asthesecondphaseofathree-phasecareer.His associationwiththeUniversityofLondon involvedhiminpracticalissuesaffectingthe characterofworking-classeducation.Fora decade(1914-24)Whiteheadheldaprofessor- shipattheImperialCollegeofScienceandTech- nologyandalsoservedasdeanoftheFacultyof ScienceintheUniversity,chairoftheAcademic Council(whichmanagededucationalaffairsin London),andchairofthecouncilthatmanaged GoldsmiuVsCollege.HisbookTheAimsofEduca- tion(1928)isacollectionofessayslargelygrow- ingoutofreflectionsontheexperiencesofthese years.Intellectually,Whitehead'sinterestswere movingtowardissuesinthephilosophyofsci- ence.Intheyears1919-22hepublishedAn EnquiryConcerningthePrinciplesofNaturalKnowl- edge,TheConceptofNature,andThePrincipleofRel- ativity-thethirdledtohislåter(1931)election asafellowoftheBritishAcademy. In1924,attheageofsixty-three,Whitehead madeadramaticmove,bothgeographicallyand intellectually,tolaunchphasethreeofhiscareer: neverhavingformallystudiedphilosophyinhis life,heagreedtobecomeprofessorofphilosophy atHarvardUniversity,apositionhehelduntil retirementin1937.Theaccompanyingintellec- tualshiftwasamovefromphilosophyofscience tometaphysics.Theearlierinvestigationshad assumedtheself-containednessofnature: "natureisclosedtomind."Thephilosophyof natureexaminednatureatthelevelofabstrac- tionentailedbythisassumption.Whiteheadhad cometoregardphilosophyas"thecriticof abstractions,"anotionintroducedinScienceand theModernWorld(1925).Thisbooktracedthe 971 Whitehead,AlfredNorth Whitehead,AlfredNorth intertwinedemergenceofNewtonianscience anditsphilosophicalpresuppositions.Itnoted thatwiththedevelopmentofthetheoryofrela- tivityinthetwentiethcenturyscientificunder- standinghadleftbehindtheNewtoniancon- ceptualitythathadgeneratedthestill-dominant philosophicalassumptions,andthatthosephilo- sophicalassumptionsconsideredinthemselves hadbecomeinadequatetoexplicateourfullcon- creteexperience.Philosophyasthecriticof abstractionsmustrecognizethelimitationsofa stancethatassumesthatnatureisclosedtomind, andmustpushdeeper,beyondsuchanabstrac- tion,tocreateaschemeofideasmoreinhar- monywithscientificdevelopmentsandableto dojusticetohumanbeingsaspartofnature.Sci- enceandtheModernWorldmerelyoutlineswhat suchaphilosophymightbe;in1929Whitehead publishedhismagnumopus,titledProcessand Reality.Inthisvolume,subtitled"AnEssayin Cosmology,"hismetaphysicalunderstandingis givenitsfinalform.Itiscustomarytoregardthis bookasthecentraldocumentofwhathas becomeknownasprocessphilosophy,though Whiteheadhimselffrequentlyspökeofhissys- temofideasasthephilosophyoforganism. ProcessandRealitybeginswithasentencethat shedsagreatdealoflightuponWhitehead's metaphysicalorientation:"Theselecturesare baseduponarecurrencetothatphaseofphilo- sophicthoughtwhichbeganwithDescartesand endedwithHume."Descartes,adaptingtheclas- sicalnotionofsubstancetohisownpurposes, beginsa"phaseofphilosophicthought"by assumingtherearetwodistinct,utterlydifferent kindsofsubstance,mindandmatter,each requiringnothingbutitselfinordertoexist.This assumptionlaunchesthereignofepistemology withinphilosophy:ifknowingbeginswiththe experiencingofamentalsubstancecapableof existingbyitselfandcutofffromeverything externaltoit,thenthephilosophicalchallengeis totrytojustifytheclaimtoestablishcontactwith arealityexternaltoit.Thephrase"andended withHume"expressesWhitehead'sconviction thatHume(andmoreelegantly,henotes,San- tayana)showedthatifonebeginswith Descartes'smetaphysicalassumptions,skepti- cismisinevitable.Contemporaryphilosophers havetalkedabouttheendofphilosophy.From Whitehead'sperspectivesuchtalkpresupposesa fartoonarrowviewofthenatureofphilosophy. Itistruethataphaseofphilosophyhasended,a phasedominatedbyepistemology.Whitehead's responseistoofferthedictumthatallepistemo- logicaldifficultiesareatbottomonlycamou- flagedmetaphysicaldifficulties.Onemustretum tothatmomentofCartesianbeginningand replacethesubstancemetaphysicswithanori- entationthatavoidstheepistemologicaltrap, meshesharmoniouslywiththescientificunder- standingsthathavedisplacedthemuchsimpler physicsofDescartes'sday,andisconsonantwith thefactsofevolution.Thesearetheconsidera- tionsthatgenerateWhitehead'sfundamental metaphysicalcategory,thecategoryofanactual occasion. Anactualoccasionisnotanenduring,sub- stantialentity.Rather,itisaprocessofbecoming, aprocessofweavingtogetherthe"prehensions" (aprimitiveformof'apprehension'meantto indicatea"takingaccountof,"or"feeling," devoidofconsciousawareness)oftheactual occasionsthatareintheimmediatepast.White- headcallsthisprocessofweavingtogetherthe inheritancesofthepast"concrescence."An actualentityisitsprocessofconcrescence,its processofgrowingtogetherintoaunifiedper- spectiveonitsimmediatepast.(Theseedsof Whitehead'sepistemologicalrealismareplanted inthesefundamentalfirstmoves:"Thephiloso- phyoforganismistheinversionofKanfsphi- losophy....ForKant,theworldemergesfrom thesubject;forthephilosophyoforganism,the subjectemergesfromtheworld.")Itiscustom- arytocompareanactualoccasionwithaLeib- nizianmonad,withthecaveatthatwhereasa monadiswindowless,anactualoccasionis"all window."ItisasthoughoneweretotakeAris- totle'ssystemofcategoriesandaskwhatwould resultifthecategoryofsubstanceweredisplaced fromitspositionofpreeminencebythecategory ofrelation-theresultwould,mutatismutandis, beanunderstandingofbeingsomewhatonthe modelofaWhiteheadianactualoccasion. InmovingfromDescartes'sdualismofmental substanceandmaterialsubstancetohisown notionofanactualentity,Whiteheadhasbeen doingphilosophyconceivedofasthecritiqueof abstractions.Heholdsthatbothmindandmat- terareabstractionsfromtheconcretelyreal. Theyareimportantabstractions,necessaryfor everydaythoughtand,ofsupremeimportance, absolutelyessentialinenablingtheseventeenth throughnineteenthcenturiestoaccomplish theirmagnificentadvancesinscientificthinking. Indeed,Whitehead,inhisphilosophyofscience phase,byproceedingasthough"natureisclosed tomind,"wasoperatingwiththoseselfsame abstractions.Hecametoseethatwhilethese abstractionswereindispensableforcertainkinds ofinvestigations,theywere,atthephilosophical 972 Whitehead,AlfredNorth Whitehead,AlfredNorth level,asHumehaddemonstrated,adisaster.In consideringmindandmattertobeontological ultimates,DescarteshadcommittedwhatWhite- headtermedthefallacyofmisplacedconcreteness. Thecategoryofanactualoccasiondesignatesthe fullyreal,thefullyconcrete.Thechallengefor suchanorientation,thechallengethatProcess andRealityisdesignedtomeet,issotodescribe actualoccasionsthatitisintelligiblehowcollec- tionsofactualoccasions,termed"nexus"orsoci- eties,emerge,exhibitingthecharacteristicswe findassociatedwith"minds"and"materialstruc- tures."Perhapsmostsignificantly,ifthischal- lengeismetsuccessfully,biologywillbeplaced, intheeyesofphilosophy,onanevenfooting withphysics;metaphysicswilldojusticebothto humanbeingsandtohumanbeingsasapartof nature;andsuchvexingcontemporaryproblem areasasanimalrightsandenvironmentalethics willappearinanewlight. Whitehead'slasttwobooks,Adventuresofldeas (1933)andModesofThought(1938),areless technicalandmorelyricalthanisProcessand Reality.Adventuresofldeasisclearlythemoresig- nificantofthesetwo.Itpresentsaphilosophical studyofthenotionofcivilization.Itholdsthat thesocialchangesinacivilizationaredrivenby twosortsofforces:brute,senselessagenciesof compulsionontheonehand,andformulated aspirationsandarticulatedbeliefsontheother. (Thesetwosortsofforcesareepitomizedbybar- bariansandChristianityintheancientRoman worldandbysteamanddemocracyintheworld oftheindustrialrevolution.)Whitehead'sfocal pointinAdventuresofldeasisaspirations,beliefs, andidealsasinstrumentsofchange.Inparticu- lar,heisconcernedtoarticulatetheidealsand aspirationsappropriatetoourownera.The characterofsuchidealsandaspirationsatany momentislimitedbythephilosophicalunder- standingsavailableatthatmoment,becausein theirstruggleforreleaseandefficacysuchideals andaspirationscanappearonlyintheforms permittedbytheavailablephilosophicaldis- course.InthefinalsectionofAdventuresofldeas Whiteheadpresentsastatementofidealsand aspirationsfitforoureraashisownphilosophy oforganismallowsthemtotakeshapeandbe articulated.Thenotionsofbeauty,truth,adven- ture,zest,Eros,andpeacearegivenacontent drawnfromthetechnicalunderstandingselabo- ratedinProcessandReality.ButinAdventuresof Ideasalesstechnicallanguageisused,alanguage reminiscentofthepoeticimageryfoundinthe styleofPlato'sRepublic,alanguagemakingthe ideasaccessibletoreaderswhohavenotmas- teredProcessandReality,butatthesametimefar richerandmoremeaningfultothosewhohave. WhiteheadnotesinAdventuresofIdeasthat Plato'slåterthought"circlesroundtheinter- weavingofsevenmainnotions,namely,The Ideas,ThePhysicalElements,ThePsyche,The Eros,TheHarmony,TheMathematicalRe- lations,TheReceptacle.Thesenotionsareas importantforusnow,astheywerethenatthe dawnofthemodemworld,whencivilizationsof theoldtypeweredying."Whiteheadusesthese notionsinquitenovelandmodernways;one whoisunfamiliarwithhismetaphysicscanget somethingofwhathemeansashespeaksofthe ErosoftheUniverse,butifoneisfamiliarfrom ProcessandRealitywiththenotionsofthe PrimordialNatureofGodandtheConsequent NatureofGodthenoneseesmuchdeeperinto themeaningspresentinAdventuresofldeas. Whiteheadwasnotreligiousinanynarrow, doctrinal,sectariansense.Heexplicitlylikened hisstancetothatofAristotle,dispassionately consideringtherequirementsofhismetaphysi- calsystemastheyrefertothequestionofthe existenceandnatureofGod.Whitehead's thoughtsonthesemattersaremostfullydevel- opedinChapter11ofScienceandtheModern World,inthefinalchapterofProcessandReality, andinReligionintheMaking(1926).These thoughtsareexpressedatahighlevelofgener- ality.Perhapsbecauseofthis,alargepartofthe interestgeneratedbyWhitehead'sthoughthas beenwithinthecommunityoftheologians.His ideasfairlybegforelaborationanddevelopment inthecontextofparticularmodesofreligious understanding.Itisasthoughmanymodernthe- ologians,recallingtherelationbetweenthethe- ologyofAquinasandthemetaphysicsof Aristotle,cannotresistthetemptationtoplay AquinastoWhitehead'sAristotle.Processtheol- ogy,orNeo-ClassicalTheologyasitisreferredto byHartshorne,oneofitsleadingpractitioners, hasbeenthearenawithinwhichagreatdealof clarificationanddevelopmentofWhitehead's ideashasoccurred. Whiteheadwasagentleman,soft-spoken, neveroverbearingorthreatening.Heconstantly encouragedstudentstostepoutontheirown,to developtheircreativecapacities.Hisconcernnot toinhibitstudentsmadehimanotoriouslyeasy grader;itwassaidthatanA-minusinoneofhis courseswasequivalenttofailure.LucienPrice's DialoguesofAlfredNorthWhiteheadchronicles manyeveningsofdiscussionintheWhitehead household.HetheredescribedWhiteheadasfol- lows: 973 whitehorseparadox WilliamofMoerbeke hisface,serene,luminous,oftensmiling,the complexionpinkandwhite,theeyesbrilliant blue,clearandcandidasachild'syetwiththe depthofthesage,oftenlaughingortwinkling withhumour.Andtherewashisfigure,slen- der,frail,andbentwithitslifetimeofa scholar'stoil.Alwaysbenign,therewasnota grainofillwillanywhereinhim;forallhis formidablearmament,neverawounding word. Seealsoleibniz,metaphysics,process THEOLOGY,RUSSELL.D.W.S. whitehorseparadox.Seekung-sunlungtzu. widecontent.Seephilosophyofmind. widereflectiveequilibrium.Seereflectiveequi- LIBRIUM. will.Seevolition. will,general.Seerousseau. will,weaknessof.SeeAKRAsiA. Wille.Seekant. WilliamOckham.Seeockham. WilliamofAlnwick(d.1333),EnglishFranciscan theologian.WilliamstudiedunderDunsScotus atParis,andwrotetheReportatioParisiensia,a centralsourceforDunsScotus'steaching.Inhis ownworks,WilliamopposedScotusontheuni- vocityofbeingandhaecceitas.Someofhisviews wereattackedbyOckham.Seealsodunssco- tus,HAECCEITY.J.Lo. WilliamofAuvergne(cl190-1249),French philosopherwhowasborninAurillac,taughtat Paris,andbecamebishopofParisin1228.Criti- calofthenewAristotelianismofhistime,he insistedthatthesoulisanindividual,immortal formofintellectualactivityalone,sothatasec- ondformwasneededforthebodyandsensation. Thoughherejectedthenotionofanagentintel- lect,hedescribedthesoulasamirrorthatreflects bothexemplaryideasinGod'smindandsensible singulars.Heconceivedbeingassomethingcom- montoeverythingthatis,afterthemannerof DunsScotus,butrejectedtheAvicennandoc- trinethatGodnecessarilyproducestheuniverse, arguingthatHiscreativeactivityisfreeofall determination.Heisthefirstexampleofthe complexofideaswecallAugustinianism,which wouldpassonthroughAlexanderofHalesto BonaventureandotherFranciscans,forminga pointofdepartureforthephilosophyofDuns Scotus.Seealsoaugustine,dunsscotus. J.Lo. WilliamofAuxerre(cl140-1231),Frenchthe- ologianandrenownedteacherofgrammar,arts, andtheologyattheUniversityofParis.In1231 hewasappointedbyPopeGregoryIXtoacom- missionchargedwitheditingAristotle'swritings fordoctrinalpurity.Thecommissionneversub- mittedareport,perhapspartlyduetoWilliam's deathlåterthatsameyear. William'smajorwork,theSummaaurea (1215-20),representsoneoftheearliestsys- tematicattemptstoreconciletheAugustinian andAristoteliantraditionsinmedievalphiloso- phy.Williamtempers,e.g.,theAristoteliancon- cessionthathumancognitionbeginswiththe receptioninthematerialintellectofaspeciesor sensiblerepresentationfromacorporealthing, withtheAugustinianideathatitisnotpossible tounderstandtheprinciplesofanydiscipline withoutaninteriör,supernaturalillumination. Healsooriginatedthetheologicaldistinction betweenperfecthappiness,whichisuncreated andpropertoGod,andimperfecthappiness, whichpertainstohumanbeings.Williamwas alsooneofthefirsttoexpresswhatbecame,in låtercenturies,theimportantdistinction betweenGod'sabsoluteandordainedpowers, taking,withGilbertofPoitiers,theviewthatGod could,absolutelyspeaking,changethepast. TheSummaaureahelpedshapethethoughtof severalimportantphilosophersandtheologians whowereactivelåterinthecentury,including AlbertusMagnus,Bonaventure,andAquinas. Williamremainedanauthorityintheological discussionsthroughoutthefourteenthandfif- teenthcenturies. Seealsoaristotle,augustine.J.A.Z. WilliamofHeytesbury.Seeheytesbury. WilliamofMoerbeke(c.1215-1286),French scholarwhowasthemostimportantthirteenth- centurytranslatorfromGreekintoLatinof worksinphilosophyandnaturalscience.Having joinedtheDominicansandspentsometimein Greek-speakingterritories,Williamservedatthe papalcourtandthenas(Catholic)archbishopof Corinth(1278-C.1286).Butheworkedfromthe 1260sonasacarefulandliteral-mindedtransla- tor.WilliamwasthefirsttorenderintoLatin 974 WilliamofSherwood Wilson,JohnCook someofthemostimportantworksbyAristotle, includingthePolitics,Poetics,andHistoryofAni- mals.Heretranslatedorrevisedearliertransla- tionsofseveralotherAristotelianworks.William alsoprovidedthefirstLatinversionsofcom- mentariesonAristotlebyAlexanderofAphro- disias,Themistius,Ammonius,JohnPhiloponus, andSimplicius,nottomentionhiseffortson behalfofGreekoptics,mathematics,andmedi- cine.WhenWilliamprovidedthefirstLatin translationofProclus'sElementsofTheology,West- ernreaderscouldatlastrecognizetheLiberde causisasanArabiccompilationfromProclus ratherthanasaworkbyAristotle.M.D.J. WilliamofSherwood.Seesherwood. Williams,Bernard(b.1929),Englishphilosopher whohasmademajorcontributionstomany fieldsbutisprimarilyknownasamoralphiloso- pher.Hisapproachtoethics,setoutinEthicsand theLimitsofPhilosophy(1985),ischaracterizedby awide-rangingskepticism,directedmainlyat thecapacityofacademicmoralphilosophyto furthertheaimofreflectivelylivinganethical life. Onelineofskepticalargumentattacksthevery ideaofpracticalreason.Attributionsofpractical reasonstoaparticularagentmust,inWilliams's view,beattributionsofstatesthatcanpotentially explaintheagenfsaction.Thereforesuchrea- sonsmustbeeitherwithintheagenfsexisting setofmotivationsorwithintherevisedsetof motivationsthattheagentwouldacquireupon soundreasoning.Williamsarguesfromthese minimalassumptionsthatthisviewofreasonsas internalreasonsunderminestheideaofreason itselfbeingasourceofauthorityöverpractice. Williams'sconnectedskepticismaboutthe claimsofmoralrealismisbasedbothonhisgen- eralstancetowardrealismandonhisviewof thenatureofmodernsocieties.Inopposition tointernalrealism,Williamshasconsistently arguedthatreflectiononourconceptionofthe worldallowsonetodevelopaconceptionofthe worldmaximallyindependentofourpeculiar waysofconceptualizingreality-anabsolute conceptionoftheworld.Suchabsolutenessis,he argues,aninappropriateaspirationforethical thought.Ourethicalthinkingisbetterviewedas onewayofstructuringaformofethicallifethan astheethicaltruthabouthowlifeisbestlived. Thepervasivereflectivenessandradicalplural- ismofmodernsocietiesmakestheminhospitable contextsforviewingethicalconceptsasmaking knowledgeavailabletogroupsofconceptusers. Modernityhasproducedattheleveloftheory adistortionofourethicalpractice,namelya conceptionofthemoralitysystem.Thisviewis reductionist,isfocusedcentrallyonobligations, andrestsonvariousfictionsaboutresponsibility andblamethatWilliamschallengesinsuch worksasShameandNecessity(1993).Muchaca- demicmoralphilosophy,inhisview,isshaped bythecovertinfluenceofthemoralitysystem, andsuchdistinctivelymodemoutlooksas Kantianismandutilitarianismmonopolizethe termsofcontemporarydebatewithinsufficient attentiontotheirorigininadistortedviewofthe ethical. Williams'sviewsarenotskepticalthroughand through;heretainsacommitmenttothevalues oftruth,truthfulnessinalife,andindividualism. Hismostrecentwork,whichthematizesthe long-implicitinfluenceofNietzscheonhisethi- calphilosophy,explicitlyoffersavindicatory "genealogical"narrativefortheseideals. Seealsoexternalism,morality,moral REALISM,NIETZSCHE,PRACTICALREASON. A.T Willkur.Seekant. willtobelieve.Seejames. willtopower.Seenietzsche. Wilson,JohnCook(1849-1915),Englishlogi- cian,anOxfordrealist.CookWilsonstudiedwith T.H.GreenbeforebecomingWykehamProfes- sorofLogicatOxfordandleadingtheOxford reactionagainstthethenentrenchedabsolute idealism.Moreinfluentialasateacherthanasa writer,hismajorwork,StatementandInference, wasposthumouslyreconstructedfromdraftsof papers,philosophicalcorrespondence,andan extensivesetofofteninconsistentlecturesforhis logiccourses.Astaunchcriticofmathematical logic,CookWilsonconceivedoflogicasthe studyofthinking,anactivityunifiedbythefact thatthinkingeitherisknowledgeordependson knowledge.Heclaimedthatknowledgeinvolves apprehendinganobjectthatinmostcasesis independentoftheactofapprehensionandthat knowledgeisindefinablewithoutcircularity, viewshedefendedbyappealingtocommon usage.ManyofCookWilson'sideasweredis- seminatedbyH.W.B.Joseph(1867-1944), especiallyinhisIntroductiontoLogic(1906). Rejecting"symboliclogic,"Josephattemptedto reinvigoratetraditionallogicconceivedalong CookWilsonianlines.Todosohecombineda 975 Windelband,Wilhelm Wittgenstein,Ludwig carefulexpositionofAristotlewithinsights drawnfromidealisticlogicians.BesidesJoseph, CookWilsondecisivelyinfluencedageneration ofOxfordphilosophersincludingPrichardand Ross.J.W.A. Windelband,Wilhelm(1848-1915),German philosopherandoriginatorofBadenneo- Kantianism.HestudiedunderKunoFischer (1824-1907)andLotze,andwasprofessorat Ziirich,Freiburg,Strasbourg,andHeidelberg. WindelbandgaveBadenneo-Kantianismitsdis- tinctivemarkofKantianaxiologyasthecoreof criticalphilosophy.Heiswidelyrecognizedfor innovativeworkinthehistoryofphilosophy,in whichproblemsratherthanindividualphiloso- phersarethefocusandorganizingprincipleof exposition.Heisalsoknownforhisdistinction, firstdrawnin"GeschichteundNaturwissen- schaft"("HistoryandNaturalScience,"1894), betweenthenomotheticknowledgethatmost naturalsciencesseek(thediscoveryofgeneral lawsinordertomasternature)andtheidio- graphicknowledgethatthehistoricalsciences pursue(descriptionofindividualandunique aspectsofrealitywiththeaimofself-affirma- tion).Hismostimportantstudent,andsuccessor atHeidelberg,wasHeinrichRickert(1863- 1936),whomadelastingcontributionstothe methodologyofthehistoricalsciences.Seealso NEO-KANTIANISM.H.V.d.L. wisdom,anunderstandingofthehighestprinci- plesofthingsthatfunctionsasaguideforliving atrulyexemplaryhumanlife.Fromthepre- SocraticsthroughPlatothiswasaunifiednotion. ButAristotleintroducedadistinctionbetween theoreticalwisdom(sophia)andpracticalwis- dom(phronesis),theformerbeingtheintellec- tualvirtuethatdisposedonetograspthenature ofrealityintermsofitsultimatecauses(meta- physics),thelatterbeingtheultimatepractical virtuethatdisposedonetomakesoundjudg- mentsbearingontheconductoflife.Theformer invokedacontrastbetweendeepunderstanding versuswideinformation,whereasthelatter invokedacontrastbetweensoundjudgment andmeretechnicalfacility.Thisdistinctionbe- tweentheoreticalandpracticalwisdompersisted throughtheMiddleAgesandcontinuestoour ownday,asisevidentinouruseoftheterm 'wisdom'todesignatebothknowledgeofthe highestkindandthecapacityforsoundjudg- mentinmattersofconduct.Seealsoaristo- tle,PRACTICALREASON, REASON. THEORETICAL C.F.D. Wittgenstein,Ludwig(1889-1951),Austrian- bornBritishphilosopher,oneofthemostorigi- nalandchallengingphilosophicalwritersofthe twentiethcentury.BorninViennaintoanassim- ilatedfamilyofJewishextraction,hewentto Englandasastudentandeventuallybecamea protegéofRussell'satCambridge.Hereturnedto AustriaatthebeginningofWorldWarI,but wentbacktoCambridgein1928andtaught thereasafellowandprofessor.Despitespending muchofhisprofessionallifeinEngland, WittgensteinneverlöstcontactwithhisAustrian background,andhiswritingscombineina uniquewayideasderivedfromboththeAnglo- SaxonandtheContinentalEuropeantradition. Histhoughtisstronglymarkedbyadeepskepti- cismaboutphilosophy,butheretainedthecon- victionthattherewassomethingimportanttobe rescuedfromthetraditionalenterprise.Inhis BhieBook(1958)herelerredtohisownworkas "oneoftheheirsofthesubjectthatusedtobe calledphilosophy." Whatstrikesreadersfirstwhentheylookat Wittgenstein'swritingsisthepeculiarformof theircomposition.Theyaregenerallymadeupof shortindividualnotesthataremostoftennum- beredinsequenceand,inthemorefmishedwrit- ings,evidentlyselectedandarrangedwiththe greatestcare.Thosenotesrangefromfairlytech- nicaldiscussionsonmattersoflogic,themind, meaning,understanding,acting,seeing,mathe- matics,andknowledge,toaphoristicobserva- tionsaboutethics,culture,art,andthemeaning oflife.Becauseoftheirwide-rangingcharacter, theirunusualperspectiveonthings,andtheir oftenintriguingstyle,Wittgenstein'swritings haveprovedtoappealtobothprofessional philosophersandthoseinterestedinphilosophy inamoregeneralway.Thewritingsaswellashis unusuallifeandpersonalityhavealreadypro- ducedalargebodyofinterpretiveliterature.But givenhisuncompromisingstånd,itisquestion- ablewhetherhisthoughtwilleverbefullyinte- gratedintoacademicphilosophy.Itismorelikely that,likePascalandNietzsche,hewillremainan uneasypresenceinphilosophy. FromanearlydateonwardWittgensteinwas greatlyinfluencedbytheideathatphilosophical problemscanberesolvedbypayingattention totheworkingoflanguage-athoughthe mayhavegainedfromFritzMauthner'sBeiträge zueinerKritikderSprache(1901-02).Wittgen- stein^affinitytoMauthneris,indeed,evident inallphasesofhisphilosophicaldevelopment, thoughitisparticularlynoticeableinhislåter thinking. 976 Wittgenstein,Ludwig Wittgenstein,Ludwig Untilrecentlyithasbeencommontodivide Wittgenstein'sworkintotwosharplydistinct phases,separatedbyaprolongedperiodofdor- mancy.Accordingtothisschematheearly ("Tractarian")periodisthatoftheTractatus Logico-Philosophicus(i921),whichWittgenstein wroteinthetrenchesofWorldWarI,andthe låterperiodthatofthePhilosophicalInvestigations (1953),whichhecomposedbetween1936and 1948.Butthedivisionofhisworkintothesetwo periodshasprovedmisleading.First,inspiteof obviouschangesinhisthinking,Wittgenstein remainedthroughoutskepticaltowardtradi- tionalphilosophyandpersistedinchanneling philosophicalquestioninginanewdirection. Second,thecommonviewfailstoaccountforthe factthatevenbetween1920and1928,when Wittgensteinabstainedfromactualworkinphi- losophy,hereadwidelyinphilosophicaland semiphilosophicalauthors,andbetween1928 and1936herenewedhisinterestinphilosophi- calworkandwrotecopiouslyonphilosophical matters.Theposthumouspublicationoftexts suchasTheBlueandBrownBooks,Philosophical Grammar,PhilosophicalRemarks,andConversations withtheViennaCirclehasledtoacknowledgment ofamiddleperiodinWittgenstein'sdevelop- ment,inwhichheexploredalargenumberof philosophicalissuesandviewpoints-aperiod thatservedasatransitionbetweentheearlyand thelatework. Earlyperiod.Asthesonofagreatlysuccessful industrialistandengineer,Wittgensteinfirst studiedengineeringinBerlinandManchester, andtracesofthatearlytrainingareevident throughouthiswriting.Buthisinterestshifted soontopuremathematicsandthefoundations ofmathematics,andinpursuingquestionsabout themhebecameacquaintedwithRusselland Fregeandtheirwork.Thetwomenhadapro- foundandlastingeffectonWittgensteineven whenhelåtercametocriticizeandrejecttheir ideas.Thatinfluenceisparticularlynoticeablein theTractatus,whichcanbereadasanattemptto reconcileRussell'satomismwithFrege'saprior- ism.Butthebookisatthesametimemovedby quitedifferentandnon-technicalconcerns.For evenbeforeturningtosystematicphilosophy Wittgensteinhadbeenprofoundlymovedby Schopenhauer'sthoughtasitisspelledoutinThe WorldasWillandRepresentation,andwhilehewas servingasasoldierinWorldWarI,herenewed hisinterestinSchopenhauer'smetaphysical, ethical,aesthetic,andmysticaloutlook.The resultingconfluenceofideasisevidentinthe TractatusLogico-Philosophicusandgivesthebook itspeculiarcharacter. Composedinadauntinglysevereandcom- pressedstyle,thebookattemptstoshowthattra- ditionalphilosophyrestsentirelyonamis- understandingof"thelogicofourlanguage." FollowinginFrege'sandRussell'sfootsteps, Wittgensteinarguedthateverymeaningfulsen- tencemusthaveapreciselogicalstructure.That structuremay,however,behiddenbeneaththe clothingofthegrammaticalappearanceofthe sentenceandmaythereforerequirethemost detailedanalysisinordertobemadeevident. Suchanalysis,Wittgensteinwasconvinced, wouldestablishthateverymeaningfulsentence iseitheratruth-functionalcompositeofanother simplersentenceoranatomicsentenceconsist- ingofaconcatenationofsimplenames.He arguedfurtherthateveryatomicsentenceisa logicalpictureofapossiblestateofaffairs,which must,asaresult,haveexactlythesameformål structureastheatomicsentencethatdepictsit. Heemployedthis"picturetheoryofmeaning"- asitisusuallycalled-toderiveconclusions aboutthenatureoftheworldfromhisobserva- tionsaboutthestructureoftheatomicsentences. Hepostulated,inparticular,thattheworldmust itselfhaveapreciselogicalstructure,even thoughwemaynotbeabletodetermineitcom- pletely.Healsoheldthattheworldconsistspri- marilyoffacts,correspondingtothetrueatomic sentences,ratherthanofthings,andthatthose facts,inturn,areconcatenationsofsimple objects,correspondingtothesimplenamesof whichtheatomicsentencesarecomposed. Becausehederivedthesemetaphysicalconclu- sionsfromhisviewofthenatureoflanguage, Wittgensteindidnotconsideritessentialto describewhatthosesimpleobjects,theircon- catenations,andthefactsconsistingofthemare actuallylike.Asaresult,therehasbeenagreat dealofuncertaintyanddisagreementamong interpretersabouttheircharacter. ThepropositionsoftheTractatusareforthe mostpartconcernedwithspellingoutWittgen- stein^accountofthelogicalstructureoflan- guageandtheworldandthesepartsofthebook haveunderstandablybeenofmostinterestto philosopherswhoareprimarilyconcernedwith questionsofsymboliclogicanditsapplications. ButforWittgensteinhimselfthemostimportant partofthebookconsistedofthenegativecon- clusionsaboutphilosophythathereachesatthe endofhistext:inparticular,thatallsentences thatarenotatomicpicturesofconcatenationsof objectsortruth-functionalcompositesofsuch 977 Wittgenstein,Ludwig Wittgenstein,Ludwig arestrictlyspeakingmeaningless.Amongthese heincludedallthepropositionsofethicsandaes- thetics,allpropositionsdealingwiththemean- ingoflife,allpropositionsoflogic,indeedall philosophicalpropositions,andfinallyallthe propositionsoftheTractatusitself.Theseareall strictlymeaningless;theyaimatsayingsome- thingimportant,butwhattheytrytoexpressin wordscanonlyshowitself. AsaresultWittgensteinconcludedthatany- onewhounderstoodwhattheTractatuswassay- ingwouldfinallydiscarditspropositionsas senseless,thatshewouldthrowawaytheladder afterclimbinguponit.Someonewhoreached suchastatewouldhavenomoretemptationto pronouncephilosophicalpropositions.She wouldseetheworldrightlyandwouldthenalso recognizethattheonlystrictlymeaningful propositionsarethoseofnaturalscience;but thosecouldnevertouchwhatwasreallyimpor- tantinhumanlife,themystical.Thatwouldhave tobecontemplatedinsilence.For"whereofone cannotspeak,thereofonemustbesilent,"asthe lastpropositionoftheTractatusdeclared. Middleperiod.Itwasonlynaturalthat Wittgensteinshouldnotembarkonanacademic careerafterhehadcompletedthatwork.Instead hetrainedtobeaschoolteacherandtaughtpri- maryschoolforanumberofyearsinthemoun- tainsoflowerAustria.Inthemid-1920shealso builtahouseforhissister;thiscanbeseenasan attempttogivevisualexpressiontothelogical, aesthetic,andethicalideasoftheTractatus.In thoseyearshedevelopedanumberofinterests seminalforhislåterdevelopment.Hisschool experiencedrewhisattentiontothewayin whichchildrenlearnlanguageandtothewhole processofenculturation.Healsodevelopedan interestinpsychologyandreadFreudandoth- ers.ThoughheremainedhostiletoFreud'sthe- oreticalexplanationsofhispsychoanalyticwork, hewasfascinatedwiththeanalyticpracticeitself andlåtercametospeakofhisownworkasther- apeuticincharacter.Inthisperiodofdormancy Wittgensteinalsobecameacquaintedwiththe membersoftheViennaCircle,whohadadopted hisTractatusasoneoftheirkeytexts.Forawhile heevenacceptedthepositivistprincipleof meaningadvocatedbythemembersofthatCir- cle,accordingtowhichthemeaningofasen- tenceisthemethodofitsverification.Thishe wouldlåtermodifyintothemoregenerousclaim thatthemeaningofasentenceisitsuse. Wittgenstein'smostdecisivestepinhismiddle periodwastoabandonthebeliefoftheTractatus thatmeaningfulsentencesmusthaveaprecise (hidden)logicalstructureandtheaccompanying beliefthatthisstructurecorrespondstothelogi- calstructureofthefactsdepictedbythosesen- tences.TheTractatushad,indeed,proceededon theassumptionthatallthedifferentsymbolic devicesthatcandescribetheworldmustbecon- structedaccordingtothesameunderlyinglogic. Inasense,therewasthenonlyonemeaningful languageintheTractatus,andfromitonewas supposedtobeabletoreadoffthelogicalstruc- tureoftheworld.InthemiddleperiodWittgen- steinconcludedthatthisdoctrineconstituteda pieceofunwarrantedmetaphysicsandthatthe Tractatuswasitselfflawedbywhatithadtriedto combat,i.e.,themisunderstandingofthelogicof language.Wherehehadpreviouslyhelditpos- sibletogroundmetaphysicsonlogic,henow arguedthatmetaphysicsleadsthephilosopher intocompletedarkness.Turninghisattention backtolanguageheconcludedthatalmost everythinghehadsaidaboutitintheTractatus hadbeeninerror.Therewere,infact,manydif- ferentlanguageswithmanydifferentstructures thatcouldmeetquitedifferentspecificneeds. Languagewasnotstrictlyheldtogetherbylogi- calstructure,butconsisted,infact,ofamulti- plicityofsimplersubstructuresorlanguagegames. Sentencescouldnotbetakentobelogicalpic- turesoffactsandthesimplecomponentsofsen- tencesdidnotallfunctionasnamesofsimple objects. Thesenewreflectionsonlanguageserved Wittgenstein,inthefirstplace,asanaidtothink- ingaboutthenatureofthehumanmind,and specificallyabouttherelationbetweenprivate experienceandthephysicalworld.Againstthe existenceofaCartesianmentalsubstance,he arguedthatthewordT'didnotserveasaname ofanything,butoccurredinexpressionsmeant todrawattentiontoaparticularbody.Fora while,atleast,healsothoughthecouldexplain thedifferencebetweenprivateexperienceand thephysicalworldintermsoftheexistenceof twolanguages,aprimarylanguageofexperience andasecondarylanguageofphysics.Thisdual- languageview,whichisevidentinboththe PhilosophicalRemarksandTheBlueBook,Wittgen- steinwastogiveuplåterinfavöroftheassump- tionthatourgraspofinnerphenomenais dependentontheexistenceofoutercriteria. Fromthemid-1930sonwardhealsorenewedhis interestinthephilosophyofmathematics.In contrasttoFregeandRussell,hearguedstrenu- ouslythatnopartofmathematicsisreducible purelytologic.Insteadhesetouttodescribe 978 Wittgenstein,Ludwig Wittgenstein,Ludwig mathematicsaspartofournaturalhistoryandas consistingofanumberofdiverselanguage games.Healsoinsistedthatthemeaningofthose gamesdependedontheusestowhichthemath- ematicalformulaswereput.Applyingtheprin- cipleofverificationtomathematics,heheldthat themeaningofamathematicalformulaliesinits proof.Theseremarksonthephilosophyofmath- ematicshaveremainedamongWittgenstein's mostcontroversialandleastexploredwritings. Låterperiod.Wittgenstein'smiddleperiod wascharacterizedbyintensivephilosophical workonabroadbutquicklychangingfront.By 1936,however,histhinkingwasfinallyreadyto settledownonceagainintoasteadierpattern, andhenowbegantoelaboratetheviewsfor whichhebecamemostfamous.Wherehehad constructedhisearlierworkaroundthelogic devisedbyFregeandRussell,henowconcerned himselfmainlywiththeactualworkingofordi- narylanguage.Thisbroughthimclosetothetra- ditionofBritishcommonsensephilosophythat Moorehadrevivedandmadehimoneofthe godfathersoftheordinarylanguagephilosophy thatwastoflourishinOxfordinthe1950s.Inthe PhilosophicalInvestigationsWittgensteinempha- sizedthattherearecountlessdifferentusesof whatwecall"symbols,""words,"and"sen- tences."Thetaskofphilosophyistogainaper- spicuousviewofthosemultipleusesandthereby todissolvephilosophicalandmetaphysicalpuz- zles.Thesepuzzlesweretheresultofinsufficient attentiontotheworkingoflanguageandcould beresolvedonlybycarefullyretracingthelin- guisticstepsbywhichtheyhadbeenreached. Wittgensteinthuscametothinkofphilosophy asadescriptive,analytic,andultimatelythera- peuticpractice.IntheInvestigationshesetoutto showhowcommonphilosophicalviewsabout meaning(includingthelogicalatomismofthe Tractatus),aboutthenatureofconcepts,about logicalnecessity,aboutrule-following,andabout themind-bodyproblemwerealltheproductof aninsufficientgraspofhowlanguageworks.In oneofthemostinfluentialpassagesofthebook hearguedthatconceptwordsdonotdenote sharplycircumscribedconcepts,butaremeantto markfamilyresemblancesbetweenthethings labeledwiththeconcept.Healsoheldthatlogi- calnecessityresultsfromlinguisticconvention andthatrulescannotdeterminetheirownappli- cations,thatrule-followingpresupposesthe existenceofregularpractices.Furthermore,the wordsofourlanguagehavemeaningonlyinso- farasthereexistpubliccriteriafortheircorrect application.Asaconsequence,heargued,there cannotbeacompletelyprivatelanguage,i.e.,a languagethatinprinciplecanbeusedonlyto speakaboutone'sowninnerexperience. Thisprivatelanguageargumenthascaused muchdiscussion.Interpretershavedisagreednot onlyöverthestructureoftheargumentand whereitoccursinWittgenstein'stext,butalso överthequestionwhetherhemeanttosaythat languageisnecessarilysocial.Becausehesaid thattospeakofinnerexperiencestheremustbe externalandpubliclyavailablecriteria,hehas oftenbeentakentobeadvocatingalogical behaviorism,butnowheredoeshe,infact,deny theexistenceofinnerstates.Whathesaysis merelythatourunderstandingofsomeone's painisconnectedtotheexistenceofnaturaland linguisticexpressionsofpain. InthePhilosophicalInvestigationsWittgenstein repeatedlydrawsattentiontothefactthatlan- guagemustbelearned.Thislearning,hesays,is fundamentallyaprocessofinculcationanddrill. Inlearningalanguagethechildisinitiatedina formoflife.InWittgenstein'slåterworkthe notionofformoflifeservestoidentifythewhole complexofnaturalandculturalcircumstances presupposedbyourlanguageandbyaparticular understandingoftheworld.Heelaboratedthose ideasinnotesonwhichheworkedbetween 1948andhisdeathin1951andwhicharenow publishedunderthetitleOnCertainty.Heinsisted inthemthateverybeliefisalwayspartofasys- temofbeliefsthattogetherconstituteaworld- view.Allconfirmationanddisconfirmationofa beliefpresupposesuchasystemandareinternal tothesystem.Forallthishewasnotadvocating arelativism,butanaturalismthatassumesthat theworldultimatelydetermineswhichlanguage gamescanbeplayed. Wittgenstein'sfinalnotesvividlyillustratethe continuityofhisbasicconcernsthroughoutall thechangeshisthinkingwentthrough.Forthey revealoncemorehowheremainedskeptical aboutallphilosophicaltheoriesandhowhe understoodhisownundertakingastheattempt tounderminetheneedforanysuchtheorizing. TheconsiderationsofOnCertaintyareevidently directedagainstbothphilosophicalskepticsand thosephilosopherswhowanttorefuteskepti- cism.AgainstthephilosophicalskepticsWittgen- steininsistedthatthereisrealknowledge,but thisknowledgeisalwaysdispersedandnotnec- essarilyreliable;itconsistsofthingswehave heardandread,ofwhathasbeendrilledintous, andofourmodificationsofthisinheritance.We havenogeneralreasontodoubtthisinherited 979 Wodeham,Adamde Wolff,Christian bodyofknowledge,wedonotgenerallydoubtit, andweare,infact,notinapositiontodoso.But OnCertaintyalsoarguesthatitisimpossibleto refuteskepticismbypointingtopropositionsthat areabsolutelycertain,asDescartesdidwhenhe declared'Ithink,thereforeIam'indubitable,or asMooredidwhenhesaid,"lknowforcertain thatthisisahandhere."Thefactthatsuch propositionsareconsideredcertain,Wittgenstein argued,indicatesonlythattheyplayanindis- pensable,normativeroleinourlanguagegame; theyaretheriverbedthroughwhichthethought ofourlanguagegameflows.Suchpropositions cannotbetakentoexpressmetaphysicaltruths. Here,too,theconclusionisthatallphilosophical argumentationmustcometoanend,butthatthe endofsuchargumentationisnotanabsolute, self-evidenttruth,butacertainkindofnatural humanpractice. Seealsofrege,meaning,ordinarylan- guagePHILOSOPHY,PRIVATELANGUAGE ARGUMENT,RUSSELL,VIENNACIRCLE.H.S. Wodeham,Adamde(c.1295-1358),English Franciscanphilosopher-theologianwholectured onPeterLombard'sSentencesatLondon,Nor- wich,andOxford.Hispublishedworksinclude theTractatusdeindivisibilibus;hisLecturasecunda (Norwichlectures);andanabbreviationofhis OxfordlecturesbyHenryTottingofOyta,pub- lishedbyJohnMajorin1512.Wodeham'smain work,theOxfordlectures,themselvesremain unpublished. AbrilliantinterpreterofDunsScotus,whose originalmanuscriptsheconsulted,Wodeham deemedDunsScotusthegreatestFranciscan doctor.WilliamOckham,Wodeham'steacher, wastheothergreatinfluenceonWodeham's philosophicaltheology.Wodehamdefended Ockham'sviewsagainstattacksmountedby WalterChatton;healsowrotetheprologueto Ockham'sSummalogicae.Wodeham'sowninflu- encerivaledthatofOckham.Amongtheauthors hestronglyinfluencedareGregoryofRimini, JohnofMirecourt,NicholasofAutrecourt, Pierred'Ailly,PeterCeffons,AlfonsoVargas, PeterofCandia(AlexanderV),HenryTottingof Oyta,andJohnMajor. Wodeham'stheologicalworkswerewritten foranaudiencewithaverysophisticatedunder- standingofcurrentissuesinsemantics,logic,and medievalmathematicalphysics.Contraryto DunsScotusandOckham,Wodehamargued thatthesensitiveandintellectivesoulswerenot distinct.Hefurtherdevelopsthetheoryofintu- itivecognition,distinguishingintellectualintu- itionofourownactsofintellect,will,andmem- oryfromsensoryintuitionofexternalobjects. Scientificknowledgebasedonexperiencecanbe basedonintuition,accordingtoWodeham.He distinguishesdifferentgradesofevidence,and allowsthatsensoryperceptionsmaybemis- taken.Nonetheless,theycanformthebasisfor scientificknowledge,sincetheyarereliable;mis- takescanbecorrectedbyreasonandexperience. Insemantictheory,Wodehamdefendstheview thattheimmediateobjectofscientificknowledge isthecomplexesignificabile,thatwhichthecon- clusionisdesignedtosignify. Seealsodunsscotus,ockham,peter LOMBARD.R.W. Wolff,Christian(1679-1754),Germanphiloso- pherandthemostpowerfuladvocateforsecular rationalisminearlyeighteenth-centuryGer- many.AlthoughhewasaLutheran,hisearly educationinCatholicBreslaumadehimfamiliar withboththeScholasticismofAquinasand Suårezandmoremodernsources.Hislåterstud- iesatLeipzigwerecompletedwithadissertation ontheapplicationofmathematicalmethodsto ethics(1703),whichbroughthimtotheatten- tionofLeibniz.Heremainedincorrespondence withLeibnizuntilthelatter'sdeath(1716),and becameknownasthepopularizerofLeibniz's philosophy,althoughhisviewsdidnotderive fromthatsourcealone.Appointedtoteach mathematicsinHallein1706(hepublished mathematicaltextbooksandcompendiathat dominatedGermanuniversitiesfordecades), Wolffbeganlecturingonphilosophyaswellby 1709.HisrectoraladdressOnthePracticalPhiloso- phyoftheChinese(1721)arguedthatrevelation andevenbeliefinGodwereunnecessaryfor arrivingatsoundprinciplesofmoralandpoliti- calreasoning;thisbroughthisuneasyrelations withtheHallePietiststoahead,andin1723they securedhisdismissalandindeedbanishment. WolffwasimmediatelywelcomedinMarburg, wherehebecameaheroforfreedomofthought, anddidnotreturntoPrussiauntiltheascension ofFredericktheGreatin1740,whenheresumed hispostatHalle. Wolffpublishedanimmenseseriesoftextson logic,metaphysics,ethics,politics,naturaltheol- ogy,andteleology(1713-24),inwhichhecre- atedthephilosophicalterminologyofmodern German;hethenpublishedanevenmoreexten- siveseriesofworksinLatinfortherestofhislife, expandingandmodifyinghisGermanworksbut alsoaddingworksonnaturalandpositivelaw andeconomics(1723-55).Heacceptedthetra- 980 Wollaston,William works,justificationby ditionaldivisionoflogicintothedoctrinesof concepts,judgment,andinference,whichinflu- encedtheorganizationofKanfsCritiqueofPure Reason(1781-87)andevenHegefsScienceof Logic(1816).Inmetaphysics,heincludedgeneral ontologyandthenthespecialdisciplinesofratio- nalcosmology,rationalpsychology,andrational theology(KantreplacedWolff'sgeneralontology withhistranscendentalaestheticandanalyfic, andthendemolishedWolffsspecialmetaphysics inhistranscendentaldialectic). WolffsmetaphysicsdrewheavilyonLeibniz, butalsoonDescartesandevenempiricistslike Locke.Methodologically,heattemptedtoderive theprincipleofsufficientreasonfromthelogical lawofidentity(liketheunpublishedLeibnizof the1680sratherthanthepublishedLeibnizof the1700s);substantivelyhebeganhisGerman metaphysicswithareconstructionofDescartes's cogitoargument,thenarguedforasimple,imma- terialsoul,allofitsfacultiesreducibletoformsof representationandrelatedtobodybypreestab- lishedharmony.AlthoughrejectedbyCrusius andthenKant,Wolffsattempttofoundphilos- ophyonasingleprinciplecontinuedtoinfluence GermanidealismaslateasReinhold,Fichte,and Hegel,andhisexampleofbeginningmetaphysics fromtheuniquerepresentativepowerofthesoul continuedtoinfluencenotonlylåterwriters suchasReinholdandFichtebutalsoKanfsown conceptionofthetranscendentalunityofapper- ception. Inspiteoftheacademicinfluenceofhismeta- physics,WolffsimportanceforGermanculture layinhisrationalistratherthantheological ethics.Hearguedthatmoralworthliesinthe perfectionoftheobjectiveessenceofmankind; astheessenceofahumanistobeanintellectand awill(withthelatterdependentontheformer), whicharephysicallyembodiedanddependent fortheirwell-beingonthewell-beingoftheir physicalbody,moralityrequiresperfectionofthe intellectandwill,physicalbody,andexternal conditionsforthewell-beingofthatcombina- tion.Eachpersonisobligedtoperfectallinstan- tiationsofthisessence,butinpracticedoesso mosteffectivelyinhisowncase;dutiestooneself thereforeprecededutiestoothersandtoGod. Becausepleasureisthesensiblesignofperfec- tion,Wolffsperfectionismresemblescontempo- raryutilitarianism.Sinceheheldthathuman perfectioncanbeunderstoodbyhumanreason independentlyofanyrevelation,Wolffjoined contemporaryBritishenlightenerssuchas ShaftesburyandHutchesoninarguingthat moralitydoesnotdependondivinecommands, indeedtherecognitionofdivinecommands dependsonanantecedentcomprehensionof morality(althoughmoralitydoesrequirerespect forGod,andthustheatheisticmoralityofthe Chinese,eventhoughsoundasfarasitwent, wasnotcomplete).Thiswasthedoctrinethatput Wolffslifeindanger,butithadtremendous repercussionsfortheremainderofhiscentury, andcertainlyinKant. Seealsokant,leibniz.RGu. Wollaston,William(1659-1724),Englishmoral- istnotoriousforarguingthattheimmoralityof actionsliesintheirimplyingfalsepropositions. Anassistantheadmasterwholåtertookpriestly orders,Wollastonmaintainsinhisonepublished work,TheReligionofNatureDelineated(1722), thatthefoundationsofreligionandmoralityare mutuallydependent.Godhaspreestablisheda harmonybetweenreason(ortruth)andhappi- ness,sothatactionsthatcontradicttruth throughmisrepresentationtherebyfrustrate humanhappinessandarethusevil.Forinstance, ifapersonstealsanother'swatch,herfalselyrep- resentingthewatchasherownmakestheact wrong.Wollaston'sviews,particularlyhistaking moralitytoconsistinuniversalandnecessary truths,wereinfluencedbytherationalistsRalph CudworthandClarke.Amonghismanycritics themostfamouswasHume,whocontendsthat Wollaston'stheoryimpliesanabsurdity:any actionconcealedfrompublicview(e.g.,adul- tery)conveysnofalsepropositionandtherefore isnotimmoral.E.S.R. Wollstonecraft,Mary(1759-97),Englishauthor andfeministwhoseAVindicationoftheRightsof Women(1792)isacentraltextoffeministphi- losophy.HerchieftargetisRousseau:hergoalis toargueagainsttheseparateanddifferentedu- cationRousseauprovidedforgirlsandtoextend hisrecommendationstogirlsaswellasboys. Wollstonecraftsawsuchanimprovededucation forwomenasnecessarytotheirassertingtheir rightas''humancreatures"todeveloptheirfac- ultiesinawayconducivetohumanvirtue.She alsowroteAVindicationoftheRightsofMen (1790),anattackonEdmundBurke'spamphlet ontheFrenchRevolution,aswellasnovels, essays,anaccountofhertravels,andbooksfor children.Seealsofeministphilosophy. M.At. woof.Seewell-formedformula. works,justificationby.Seejustificationbyfaith. 981 worldline Wyclif,John worldline.Seespace-time. worldview.Seedilthey. Wright,Chauncey(1830-75),Americanphi- losopherandmathematician.Hegraduatedfrom Harvardin1852anduntil1872wasemployed bytheperiodicalAmericanEphemeris.Hisphilo- sophicaldiscussionswerestimulatingand attractedmany,includingPeirce,James,and OliverWendellHolmes,Jr.,whothoughtofhim astheir"intellectualboxingmaster."Wright eventuallyacceptedBritishempiricism,espe- ciallythatofJ.S.Mill,thoughunderDarwinian influencehemodifiedMill'sviewconsiderablyby rejectingtheempiricistclaimthatgeneralpropo- sitionsmerelysummarizeparticulars.Wright claimedinsteadthatscientifictheoriesare hypothesestobefurtherdeveloped,andinsisted thatmoralrulesareirreducibleandneednoutil- itarian"proof."Thoughhedeniedthe"sum- mary"viewofuniversals,hewasnotstrictlya pragmatist,sinceforhimalow-levelempirical propositionlikePeirce's'thisdiamondishärd'is notahypothesisbutaself-containedirreducible statement.Seealsopeirce,pragmatism. E.H.M. Wright,G.H.von.Seevonwright. wu.Seeyu,wu. wu-hsing,Chinesetermmeaning'fivephases, processes,orelements'.Thefivephases-earth, wood,metal,fire,andwater-alongwithyinand yang,werethebasisofChinesecorrelativecos- mologiesdevelopedintheWarringStatesperiod (403-221b.c.)andearlyHandynasty(206b.c- a.d.220).Thesecosmologiespositedarelation betweenthehumanworldandthenaturalorder. Thusthefivephaseswerecorrelatedtopatterns inhumanhistorysuchasthecyclicalriseandfall ofdynasties,tosociopoliticalorderandthe monthlyritualsofrulers,tomusicalnotesand tastes,eventoorgansofthebody.Whereasthe goalofearlycosmologistssuchasTsouYenwas tobringthehumanorderintoharmonywiththe naturalorderviathefivephases,Handynasty cosmologistsandimmortalityseekerssoughtto controlnatureandprolonglifebymanipulating thefivephases,particularlywithinthebody. R.P.P.&R.T.A. Wundt,WilhelmMaximilien(1832-1920),Ger- manphilosopherandpsychologist,afounderof scientificpsychology.Althoughtrainedasa physician,heturnedtophilosophyandin1879, attheUniversityofLeipzig,establishedthefirst recognizedpsychologylaboratory.ForWundt, psychologywasthescienceofconsciousexperi- ence,adefinitionsoonovertakenbybehavior- ism.Wundfspsychologyhadtwodepartments: theso-calledphysiologicalpsychology(Grund- zugederphysiologischenPsychologie,3vols.,1873- 74;onlyvol.1ofthefifthedition,1910,was translatedintoEnglish),primarilytheexperi- mentalstudyofimmediateexperiencebroadly modeledonFechner'spsychophysics;andthe Volkerpsychologie(Volkerpsychologie,10vols., 1900-20;fragmenttranslatedasTheLanguageof Gestlires,1973),thenon-experimentalstudyof thehighermentalprocessesviatheirproducts, language,myth,andcustom.AlthoughWundt wasaprodigiousinvestigatorandauthor,and wasreveredaspsychology'sfounder,histheo- ries,unlikehismethods,exertedlittleinfluence. AtypicalGermanscholarofhistime,healso wroteacrossthewholeofphilosophy,including logicandethics.T.H.L. wuwei,Chinesephilosophicaltermoftentrans- latedas'non-action'andassociatedwithTaoism. ItisactuallyusedinbothTaoistandnon-Taoist textstodescribeanidealstateofexistenceor idealformofgovernment,interpreteddifferently indifferenttexts.IntheChuangTzu,itdescribes astateofexistenceinwhichoneisnotguidedby preconceivedgoalsorprojects,includingmoral ideals;intheLaoTzu,itreferstotheabsenceof strivingtowardworldlygoals,andalsodescribes theidealformofgovernment,whichdoesnot teachorimposeonthepeoplestandardsof behavior,includingthoseofconventionalmoral- ity.Inothertexts,itissometimesusedtodescribe theeffortlessnessofmoralaction,andsometimes usedtorefertotheabsenceofanyneedforactive participationingovernmentbytheruler,result- ingeitherfromtheappointmentofworthyand ableofficialsinspiredbythemoralexampleofthe ruler,orfromtheestablishmentofaneffective machineryofgovernmentpresidedöverbya rulerwithprestige.Seealsotaoism.K.-l.S. Wyclif,John(c.1330-84),Englishtheologian andreligiousreformer.Heworkedformostofhis lifeinOxfordasasecularclerk,teachingphilos- ophyandlåtertheologyandwritingextensively inbothfields.Themodeofthoughtexpressedin hissurvivingworksisoneofextremerealism, andinthishisthoughtfosteredthesplitof Bohemian,låterHussite,philosophyfromthatof theGermanmastersteachinginPrague.His 982 Wyclif,John Wyclif,John philosophicalsummawasmostinfluentialforhis teachingonuniversals,butalsodealtextensively withthequestionofdeterminism;theseissues underlayhislåterhandlingofthequestionsof theEucharistandoftheidentityofthechurch respectively.HisinfluenceonEnglishphilosophy wasseverelycurtailedbythegrowinghostilityof thechurchtohisideas,thecondemnationof manyofhistenets,thepersecutionofhisfol- lowers,andthedestructionofhiswritings. A.Hu. 983 Xenocrates.Seeacademy. Xenophanes(c.570-c.475b.c),Greekphiloso- pher,aproponentofanidealizedconceptionof thedivine,andthefirstofthepre-Socraticsto propoundepistemologicalviews.Bomin Colophon,anIonianGreekcityonthecoastof AsiaMinor,heemigratedasayoungmantothe GreekWest(SicilyandsouthernItaly).Thefor- mativeinfluenceoftheMilesiansisevidentinhis rationalism.Heisthefirstofthepre-Socraticsfor whomwehavenotonlyancientreportsbutalso quiteafewverbatimquotations-fragments fromhis"Lampoons"(Silloi)andfromother didacticpoetry. XenophanesattackstheworldviewofHomer, Hesiod,andtraditionalGreekpiety:itisanout- ragethatthepoetsattributemoralfailingstothe gods.Traditionalreligionreflectsregionalbiases (blondgodsfortheNortherners;blackgodsfor theAfricans).Indeed,anthropomorphicgods reflecttheultimatebias,thatofthehumanview- point("Ifcattle,orhorses,orlions...coulddraw picturesofthegods...,"frg.15).Thereisasin- gle"greatest"god,whoisnotatalllikeahuman being,eitherinbodyorinmind;heperceives withouttheaidoforgans,heeffectschanges without"moving,"throughthesheerpowerof histhought.TherainbowisnosignfromZeus;it issimplyaspecialcloudformation.Norarethe sunorthemoongods.Allphenomenainthe skies,fromtheelusive"TwinSonsofZeus"(St. Elmo'sfire)tosun,moon,andstars,arevarieties ofcloudformation.Therearenomysterious infernalregions;thefamiliarstrataofearth stretchdownadinfinitum.Theonlycosmiclimit istheonevisibleatourfeet:thehorizontal börderbetweenearthandair.Remarkably, Xenophanestempershistheologicalandcosmo- logicalpronouncementswithanepistemological caveat:whatheoffersisonlya"conjecture." InlåterantiquityXenophanescametobe regardedasthefounderoftheEleaticSchool, andhisteachingswereassimilatedtothoseof ParmenidesandMelissus.Thisappearstobe basedonnothingmorethanXenophanes' emphasisontheonenessandutterimmobilityof God. Seealsoeleaticschool,pre-socratics. A.P.D.M. Xenophon(c.430-c.350b.c),Greeksoldierand historian,authorofseveralSocraticdialogues, alongwithimportantworksonhistory,educa- tion,politicaltheory,andothertopics.Hewas interestedinphilosophy,andhewasapenetrat- ingandintelligent"socialthinker"whoseviews onmoralityandsocietyhavebeeninfluential övermanycenturies.Hisperspectiveon Socrates'characterandmoralsignificancepro- videsavaluablesupplementandcorrectiveto thebetter-knownviewsofPlato. Xenophon'sSocraticdialogues,theonlyones besidesPlato'stosurviveintact,helpusobtaina broaderpictureoftheSocraticdialogueasalit- erarygenre.Theyalsoprovidepreciousevidence concemingthethoughtsandpersonalitiesof otherfollowersofSocrates,suchasAntisthenes andAlcibiades.Xenophon'slongestandrichest SocraticworkistheMemorabilia,or"Memoirsof Socrates,"whichstressesSocrates'self-suffi- ciencyandhisbeneficialeffectonhiscompan- ions.Xenophon'sApologyofSocratesandhis Symposiumwereprobablyintendedasresponses toPlato'sApologyandSymposium.Xenophon's Socraticdialogueonestatemanagement,the Oeconomicus,isvaluableforitsunderlyingsocial theoryanditsevidenceconcerningtheroleand statusofwomeninclassicalAthens. Seealsosocrates.D.R.M. 984 yang. SeeYIN,YANG. YangChu,alsocalledYangTzu(c.370-319b.c), Chinesephilosophermostfamousfortheasser- tion,attributedtohimbyMencius,thatone oughtnotsacrificeevenasinglehairtosavethe wholeworld.Widelycriticizedasaselfishegotist andhedonist,YangChuwasaprivateperson whovaluedbodilyintegrity,health,and longevityöverfame,fortune,andpower.He believedthatbecauseone'sbodyandlifespan werebestowedbyHeaven(t'ien),onehasaduty (andnaturalinclination)tomaintainbodily healthandliveoutone'syears.Farfromsanc- tioninghedonisticindulgence,thisHeaven- imposeddutyrequiresdiscipline. R.P.P.&R.T.A. YangHsiung(53b.c.-a.d.18),Chinesephiloso- pherwhowrotetwobooks:Tai-hsiianching ("ClassicoftheSupremelyProfoundPrinciple"), animitationofthel-Ching,andFa-yen("Model Sayings"),animitationoftheAnalects.Thefor- merwasignoredbyhiscontemporaries,butthe latterwasquitepopulärinhistime.Histhoughts wereeclectic.Hewasthefirstinthehistoryof Chinesethoughttoadvancethedoctrineof humannatureasamixtureofgoodandevilin ordertoavoidtheextremesofMenciusandHstin Tzu.Seealsohsuntzu,mencius.S.-h.L. YenYuan(1635-1704),Chinesetraditionalist andsocialcritic.LikeWangFu-chih,heattacked Neo-Confucianmetaphysicaldualism,regarding theNeo-Confucians'viewsaswildspeculations obscuringthetruenatureofConfucianism.Chu Hsiinterpretedkowu(investigatingthings)as discoveringsometranscendent"thing"calledIi (pattern),andWangYang-mingunderstoodko wuasrectifyingone'sthoughts,butYenargued itmeantakindofknowledgebyacquaintance: the"hands-on"practiceoftraditionalritualsand disciplines.As"proof"thatSung-MingConfu- cianswerewrong,Yenpointedtotheirsocialand politicalfailures.Likemany,hebelievedConfu- cianismwasnotonlytruebutefficaciousaswell; failuretoreformtheworldcouldbeunderstood onlyasapersonalfailuretograspandimplement theWay.Seealsoconfucianism,wangfu- chih.P.J.I. yi,Chinesetermprobablywithanearliermean- ingof'senseofhonor',subsequentlyusedto refertothefittingorrightwayofconducting oneself(whensoused,itisoftentranslatedas 'rightness'or'duty'),aswellastoacommitment todoingwhatisfittingorright(whensoused,it isoftentranslatedas'righteousness'or'dutiful- ness').ForMohists,yiisdeterminedbywhat benefits(Ii)thepublic,wherebenefitisunder- stoodintermsofsuchthingsasorderand increasedresourcesinsociety.ForConfucians, whileyibehaviorisoftenbehaviorinaccordance withtraditionalnorms,itmayalsocallfordepar- turefromsuchnorms.Yiisdeterminednotby specificrulesofconduct,butbytheproper weighing(chiiari)ofrelevantconsiderationsina givencontextofaction.Yiinthesenseofafirm commitmenttodoingwhatisfittingorright, eveninadversecircumstances,isanimportant componentoftheConfucianethicalideal.See alsoconfucianism,motzu.K.-l.S. YiChing.Seei-ching. yin,yang,metaphorsusedintheclassicaltradi- tionofChinesephilosophytoexpresscontrast anddifference.Originallytheydesignatedthe shadysideandthesunnysideofahill,andgrad- uallycametosuggestthewayinwhichonething "overshadows"anotherinsomeparticularaspect oftheirrelationship.Yinandyangarenot"prin- ciples"or"essences"thathelpclassifythings; rather,theyareadhocexplanatorycategories thatreportonrelationshipsandinteractions amongimmediateconcretethingsoftheworld. Yinandyangalwaysdescribetherelationships thatareconstitutiveofuniqueparticulars,and provideavocabularyfor"reading"thedistinc- tionsthatobtainamongthem.Thecomplemen- tarynatureoftheoppositioncapturedinthis pairingexpressesthemutuality,interdepen- dence,diversity,andcreativeefficacyofthe dynamicrelationshipsthataredeemedimmanent inandvalorizetheworld.Thefullrangeofdif- ferenceintheworldisdeemedexplicable 985 Yoga yung throughthispairing.Seealsochinesephilos- ophy.R.P.P.frR.T.A. Yoga.Seesankhya-yoga. YogäcaräBuddhism.Seebuddhism. YoungHegelians.Seehegel. yu,Chinesetermmeaning'desire'.Onecanfeel yutowardsexobjectsorfood,butonecanalso yutobeamorevirtuousperson.Yuispairedcon- trastivelywithwu(aversion),whichhasasimi- larlybroadrangeofobjects.Afterthein- troductionofBuddhismintoChina,some thinkerscontendedthattheabsenceofyuandwu wasthegoalofself-cultivation.Generally,how- ever,thepresenceofatleastsomeyuandwuhas beenthoughttobeessentialtomoralperfection. B.W.V.N. yu,wu,Chinesetermsliterallymeaning'having' and'nothing',respectively;theyareoftenren- deredintoEnglishas'being'and'non-being'. ButtheChineseneverdevelopedthemutually contradictoryconceptsofBeingandNon-Being inParmenides'sense.Inchapter2ofTaoTeChing, LaoTzusaysthat"being(yu)andnon-being(wu) produceeachother."Theyappeartobeapairof interdependentconcepts.Butinchapter40Lao Tzualsosaysthat"beingcomesfromnon-being." ItseemsthatforTaoismnon-beingismorefun- damentalthanbeing,whileforConfucianism theoppositeistrue.Thetwotraditionswereseen tobecomplementarybylåterscholars.Seealso CHINESEPHILOSOPHY,CONFUCIANISM,LAO TZU,PARMENIDES,TAOISM.S.-h.L. yung,Chinesetermusuallytranslatedas 'courage'or'bravery'.Differentformsofyungare describedinChinesephilosophicaltexts,suchas areadinesstoavengeaninsultortocompete withothers,oranabsenceoffear.Confucians advocateanidealformofyungguidedbyright- ness(yi).Apersonwithyungoftheidealkindis fullycommittedtorightness,andwillabideby rightnessevenattheriskofdeath.Also,realiz- inguponself-examinationthatthereisnofault inoneself,thepersonwillbewithoutfearor uncertainty.K.-l.S. 986 Z.SeeSETTHEORY. Zabarella,Jacopo(1532-89),ItalianAristotelian philosopherwhotaughtattheUniversityof Padua.Hewroteextensivecommentarieson Aristotle'sPhysicsandOntheSoulandalsodis- cussedotherinterpreterssuchasAverroes.How- ever,hismostoriginalcontributionwashiswork inlogic,Operalogica(1578).Zabarellaregards logicasapreliminarystudythatprovidesthe toolsnecessaryforphilosophicalanalysis.Two suchtoolsareorderandmethod:orderteaches ushowtoorganizethecontentofadisciplineto apprehenditmoreeasily;methodteachesus howtodrawsyllogisticinferences.Zabarella reducesthevarietiesofordersandmethodsclas- sifiedbyotherinterpreterstocompositiveand resolutiveordersandmethods.Thecompositive orderfromfirstprinciplestotheirconsequences appliestotheoreticaldisciplines.Theresolutive orderfromadesiredendtomeansappropriateto itsachievementappliestopracticaldisciplines. ThismuchwasalreadyinAristotle.Zabarella offersanoriginalanalysisofmethod.Thecom- positivemethodinfersparticularconsequences fromgeneralprinciples.Theresolutivemethod infersoriginatingprinciplesfromparticularcon- sequences,asininductivereasoningorinrea- soningfromeffecttocause.Ithasbeensuggested thatZabarella'sterminologymighthaveinflu- encedGalileo'smechanics.P.Gar. Zarathustra.Seenietzsche,zoroastrianism. ZC.Seesettheory. Zeigarnikeffect,theselectiverecallofuncom- pletedtasksincomparisontocompletedtasks. TheeffectwasnamedforBlumaZeigarnik,astu- dentofK.Lewin,whodiscovereditand describeditinapaperpublishedinthePsycho- logischeForschungin1927.Subjectsreceivedan arrayofshorttasks,suchascountingbackward andstringingbeads,forrapidcompletion.Per- formanceonhalfofthesewasinterrupted.Sub- sequentrecallforthetasksfavoredthe interruptedtasks.Zeigarnikconcludedthatrecall isinfluencedbymotivationandnotmerelyasso- ciationalstrength. TheeffectwasthoughtrelevanttoFreud's claimthatunfulfilledwishesarepersistent. Lewinattemptedtoderivetheeffectfromfield theory,suggestingthatanattempttoreachagoal createsatensionreleasedonlywhenthatgoalis reached;interruptionoftheattemptproducesa tensionfavoringrecall.Conditionsaffectingthe Zeigarnikeffectareincompletelyunderstood,as isitssignificance.R.C.R. Zen.Seebuddhism. ZenoofCitium.Seestoicism. ZenoofElea.Seepre SOCRATICS. Zeno'sparadoxes,fourparadoxesrelatingto spaceandmotionattributedtoZenoofElea(fifth centuryb.c):theracetrack,Achillesandthetor- toise,thestadium,andthearrow.Zeno'sworkis knowntousthroughsecondarysources,inpar- ticularAristotle. Theracetrackparadox.Ifarunneristoreach theendofthetrack,hemustfirstcompletean infinitenumberofdifferentjourneys:gettingto themidpoint,thentothepointmidwaybetween themidpointandtheend,thentothepointmid- waybetweenthisoneandtheend,andsoon. Butitislogicallyimpossibleforsomeonetocom- pleteaninfiniteseriesofjourneys.Thereforethe runnercannotreachtheendofthetrack.Since itisirrelevanttotheargumenthowfartheend ofthetrackis-itcouldbeafootoraninchora micronaway-thisargument,ifsound,shows thatallmotionisimpossible.Movingtoany pointwillinvolveaninfinitenumberofjour- neys,andaninfinitenumberofjourneyscannot becompleted. TheparadoxofAchillesandthetortoise. Achillescanrunmuchfasterthanthetortoise,so whenaraceisarrangedbetweenthemthetor- toiseisgivenalead.ZenoarguedthatAchilles cannevercatchupwiththetortoisenomatter howfastherunsandnomatterhowlongthe racegoeson.ForthefirstthingAchilleshastodo istogettotheplacefromwhichthetortoise started.Butthetortoise,thoughslow,isunflag- 987 ZenotheStoic Zoroastrianism ging:whileAchilleswasoccupiedinmakingup hishandicap,thetortoisehasadvancedalittle farther.SothenextthingAchilleshastodoisto gettothenewplacethetortoiseoccupies.While heisdoingthis,thetortoisewillhavegonealit- tlefartherstill.Howeversmallthegapthat remains,itwilltakeAchillessometimetocross it,andinthattimethetortoisewillhavecreated anothergap.SohoweverfastAchillesruns,all thatthetortoisehastodo,inordernottobe beaten,isnottostop. Thestadiumparadox.Imaginethreeequal cubes,A,B,andC,withsidesalloflength/, arrangedinalinestretchingawayfromone.Ais movedperpendicularlyoutoflinetotherightby adistanceequalto/.Atthesametime,andatthe sameråte,Cismovedperpendicularlyoutofline totheleftbyadistanceequalto/.Thetimeit takesAtotravel111(relativetoB)equalsthe timeittakesAtotravelto/(relativetoC).So,in Aristotle'swords,"itfollows,he[Zeno]thinks, thathalfthetimeequalsitsdouble"(Physics 259b35). Thearrowparadox.Atanyinstantoftime,the flyingarrow''occupiesaspaceequaltoitself." Thatis,thearrowataninstantcannotbemov- ing,formotiontakesaperiodoftime,andatem- poralinstantisconceivedasapoint,notitself havingduration.Itfollowsthatthearrowisat restateveryinstant,andsodoesnotmove.What goesforarrowsgoesforeverything:nothing moves. ScholarsdisagreeaboutwhatZenohimselftook hisparadoxestoshow.Thereisnoevidencethat heofferedany"solutions"tothem.Oneviewis thattheywerepartofaprogramtoestablishthat multiplicityisanillusion,andthatrealityisa seamlesswhole.Theargumentcouldberecon- structedlikethis:ifyouallowthatrealitycanbe successivelydividedintoparts,youfindyourself withtheseinsupportableparadoxes;soyoumust thinkofrealityasasingleindivisibleOne. Seealsoparadox,pre-socratics,time. R.M.S. ZenotheStoic.Seestoicism. Zermelo.Seequine,settheory. zero-sumgame.Seegametheory. ZF.Seesettheory. ZFC.Seeindependenceresults. Zohar.Seecabala. Zorn'slemma.Seesettheory. Zoroaster.Seezoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism,thenationalreligionofancient Iran.Zoroastrianismsufferedasteepdeclineafter theseventhcenturya.d.becauseofconversion toIslam.Ofaremnantofroughly100,000 adherentstoday,three-fourthsareParsis("Per- sians)"inorfromwesternIndia;theothersare IranianZoroastrians.Thetraditionisidentified withitsprophet;hisnameinPersian,Zarathush- tra,ispreservedinGerman,buttheancient Greekrenderingofthatname,Zoroaster,isthe formusedinmostothermodernEuropeanlan- guages. Zoroaster'shymnstoAhuraMazda("theWise Lord"),calledtheGathas,areinterspersed amongritualhymnstootherdivinepowersin thecollectionknownastheAvesta.Inthem, Zoroasterseeksreassurancethatgoodwillulti- matelytriumphöverevilandthatAhuraMazda willbeaprotectortohiminhispropheticmis- sion.TheGathasexpectthathumans,byalign- ingthemselveswiththeforceofrighteousness andagainstevil,willreceiveblissandbenefitin thenextexistence. Thedatingofthetextsandoftheprophethim- selfisanelusivematterforscholars,butitisclear thatZoroasterlivedsomewhereinIransome- timepriortotheemergenceoftheAchaemenid empireinthesixthcenturyb.c.Hisownfaithin AhuraMazda,reflectedintheGathas,cametobe integratedwithotherstrainsofoldIndo-Iranian religion.WeseetheseintheAvesta'shymnsand thereligion'sritualpractices.Theyveneratean arrayofIraniandivinepowersthatresemblein functionthedeitiesfoundintheVedasofIndia. AcommonIndo-Iranianheritageisindicated conclusivelybysimilaritiesoflanguageandof contentbetweentheAvestaandtheVedas.Clas- sicalZoroastrianorthodoxydoesnotreplacethe Indo-IraniandivinitieswithAhuraMazda,but insteadincorporatesthemintoitsthinkingmore orlessasAhuraMazda'sagents. TheAchaemenidkingsfromthesixththrough thefourthcenturiesb.c.mentionAhuraMazda intheirinscriptions,butnotZoroaster.The Parthians,fromthethirdcenturyb.c.tothethird centurya.d.,highlightedMithraamongthe Indo-Iranianpantheon.Butitwasunderthe 988 Zweckrationalität Zweckrationalität Sasanians,whoruledIranfromthethirdtothe seventhcenturies,thatZoroastrianismbecame theestablishedreligion. Asalientdoctrineistheteachingconcerning thestrugglebetweengoodandevil.Thetime framefromtheworld'screationtothefinalres- olutionorjudgmentfindstheWiseLord,Ahura Mazda(orOhrmazd,inthePahlavilanguageof Sasaniantimes),lockedinastrugglewiththeevil spirit,ÅngraMainyu(inPahlavi,Ahriman).The teachingexpandsonanimplicationinthetextof theGathas,particularlyYasna30,thatthegood andevilspirits,comingtogetherinthebeginning andestablishingthelivingandinanimaterealms, determinedthatattheendbenefitwouldaccrue totherighteousbutnotthewicked. InSasaniantimes,therewasspeculativecon- cerntoassertAhuraMazda'sinfinity,omnipo- tence,andomniscience,qualitiesthatmay indicateanimpactofMediterraneanphilosophy. Forexample,theBundahishn,aPahlavicosmo- logicalandeschatologicalnarrative,portrays AhuraMazdaasinfiniteinallfourcompass directionsbuttheevilspiritaslimitedinoneand thereforedoomedtoultimatedefeat. Suchdoctrinehasbeentermedbysomedual- istic,inthatithas(atleastinSasaniantimes)seen thepowerofGodrivaledbythatofanevilspirit. Zoroastrianstodayassertthattheyaremonothe- ists,anddonotworshiptheevilspirit.Buttothe extentthatthecharacterizationmayholdhistor- ically,Zoroastrianismhasmanifestedan"ethi- cal"dualism,ofgoodandevilforces.Although capableofritualpollutionthroughwasteprod- uctsanddecay,thephysicalworld,God'scre- ation,remainspotentiallymorallygood.Con- trast"ontological"dualism,asingnosticand Manichaeanteaching,wherethephysicalworld itselfistheresultofthefallorentrapmentof spiritinmatter. Inthenineteenthcentury,Zoroastriantexts newlyaccessibletoEuropéproducedanaware- nessoftheprophefsconcernforethicalmatters. Nietzsche'svaluesinhisworkThusSpake Zarathustra,however,arehisown,notthoseof theancientprophet.Thetitleisarresting,butthe connectionofNietzschewithhistoricalZoroas- trianismisaconnectioninthemeonly,inthat theworkadvancesideasaboutgoodandevilin anoracularstyle.W.G.O. Zweckrationalität.Seeweber. 989 APPENDIXOFSPECIALSYMBOLS ANDLOGICALNOTATION Thefollowingarethemostcommonuses,thoughothersareencountered.Someof thesesymbolsmightalsoappearindifferentfonts(e.g.,'P','?',or'P'for'P'). N & A K V V v t A D C E V n 3 M L □ -3 A A Fortheseandotherlogicalsymbols, SeeLOGICALNOTATION. SeeSHEFFERSTROKE. Usedtoexpressconjunctionofa(pos- siblyinfinite)setofformulas. V V T ± 1} l) G H Ka Ba 0(1) P ?(/) > o-» A(t/x) Usedtoexpressthedisjunctionofa (possiblyinfinite)setofformulas. (1)Shorthandforanarbitrarilycho- sentautology.(2)Alogicalconstant (theverum)thattakesthetruth-value trueundereveryvaluation.(3)Name ofthetruth-valuetrue. (1)Shorthandforanarbitrarilycho- sencontradiction.(2)Alogicalcon- stant(thefalsum)thattakesthe truth-valuefalseundereveryvalua- tion.(3)Nameofthetruth-valuefalse. Shorthandfor'thereexistsaunique' (pronounced'Eshriek',with'V knownastheshriekoperator). SeeTENSELOGIC. Shorthandfor'italwayswillbethat'. Shorthandfor'italwayswasthat'. SeeEPISTEMICLOGIC,KK-THESIS. Shorthandfor'abelievesthat'. SeeDEONTICLOGIC. Shorthandfor'itispermissiblethat' andfrequentlydefinedas'~0~' Frequentlydefinedas'~0(~/)'and expressingconditionalpermission. Usedtoexpresssubjunctivecondi- tionals,insomecasescounterfactual orcausalconditionalsinparticular. Nameoftheresultofreplacingall occurrencesofvariablexinformulaA bythetermt. 991 APPENDIXOFSPECIALSYMBOLSANDLOGICALNOTATION A PC ;c) S4 S5 MP1 DEJ MT &I Al VI &E AE VE DN DS CP| DII RAA UG] VGJ EG] 3GJ UI VI Nameofanoperatoronopensen- tences(knownasthedefinitedescrip- tionoperatororiotaoperator)usedto formdefinitedescriptions.'(Jx)0x'is thusreadas'the(f)'.Seetheoryof DESCRIPTIONS. Nameofanoperatoronopensen- tencesusedtoformnames(knownas abstracts)ofsetsorproperties.'x(/)x' namesthesetofall0sortheproperty ofbeinga). (1)Variantof'G'.(2)Nameofan operatoronopensentencesusedto formepsilonterms,'exfix7namesatf>if thereisoneandsomearbitraryindi- vidualifthereisnot. SeeCOMBINATORYLOGIC. SeeFORMÅLLOGIC. Namesoftheintuitionistpropositional calculus.Seeintuitionism. SeeMODALLOGIC. Seemodusponens. Seemodustollens. SeeCONJUNCTIONINTRODUCTION. SeeDISJUNCTIONINTRODUCTION. SeeCONJUNCTIONELIMINATION. SeeDISJUNCTIONELIMINATION. SeeDOUBLENEGATION. Disjunctivesyllogism.See SYLLOGISM. SeeCONDITIONALPROOF. SeeREDUCTIOADABSURDUM. Universalgeneralization. SeeEXISTENTIALGENERALIZATION. SeeUNIVERSALINSTANTIATION. El 31 PM h E {} C u n <> A O C <3> SeeEXISTENTIALINSTANTIATION. AbbreviationforPrincipiaMathematica, byWhiteheadandRussell.Seerus- SELL,TYPETHEORY. Nameofthededucibilityrelation. 'T\-A'isthusshorthandfor'Ais deduciblefromthesetFofformulas'. (2)Usedtoexpresstheoremhood. '\-A'isthusshorthandfor'Aisatheo- rem'.(3)Frege'sassertionsign,usedto indicatethatapropositionisbeing judgedtobetrue. Usedtoexpresstheoremhood,or sometimesdeducibility,inthelogicL. Usedtoexpresstruth(provability)in thetheoryT. SeeLOGICALCONSEQUENCE. Usedtoformanameofthesemantic valueofalinguisticitem.Thus, dependingonthegrammaticalcate- goryofa,\\a\\mightbeanindividual,a truth-value,anintension,aproposi- tion,orasetofpossibleworlds. SeeSETTHEORY. u n Variantsof'0'. Usedtoexpressthefactthatonesetis apropersubsetofanother.ThusXC 7ifandonlyifXCyand^^y. Usedtoformanameofthepowerset (setofallsubsets)ofaset. Usedtoformanameoftheunionofa collectionofsets.ThusU/e;X;.isthe setthatcontainsaifandonlyifaisin X.forsomeiin7. i Usedtoformanameoftheintersec- tionofacollectionofsets.Thusnz.G7 X{isthesetthatcontainsaifandonly ifaisinX.foralliinI. 992 APPENDIXOFSPECIALSYMBOLSANDLOGICALNOTATION WSeeOMEGA,SETTHEORY. xUsedtoformanameoftheCartesian productoftwosets.ThusXXYisthe setofallorderedpairs,thefirstentry ofwhichcomesfromXandthesec- ondofwhichcomesfromY.Seeset THEORY. ]yNameofthesetofallorderedn- tuplesofmembersofthesetD. ~Usedtoexpresssamenessofsize(or cardinality)ofsets. SUsedtoexpressthefactthatonesetis smallerthanorthesamesizeas anotherset. Usedtoexpressthefactthatonesetis smallerinsizethananotherset. < ZF ZFC AC SeeSETTHEORY. Nameoftheaxiomofchoke,which saysthatforanysetXofnon-empty pairwisedisjointsets,thereexistsaset (achokesetforX)containingasmem- bersoneandonlyonememberof eachmemberofX. CHSeecontinuumproblem. GCHNameofthegeneralizedcontinuum hypothesis,whichsaysthatforevery infinitesetXthereisnosetinterme- diateincardinalitybetweenXandthe powersetofX. 2°]Usedtorefertosentencesofarith- ^Jmeticobtainedbyprefixingzeroor moreexistentialquantifierstoa nu PA M T„ Mn CT Pr Pr( n formulabuiltupfromatomicformu- lasbymeansoftruth-functionalcon- nectivesandboundeduniversal quantifiers.Seehierarchy. Usedtorefertosentencesofarith- meticobtainedbyprefixingzeroor moreuniversalquantifierstoafor- mulabuiltupfromatomicformulas bymeansoftruth-functionalconnec- tivesandboundedexistentialquanti- fiers.Seehierarchy. NameofPeanoariihmetk,thearith- meticaltheorybaseduponthePeano postulates.Seepeanopostulates. Nameoftheintendedmodelofariih- metk,withthesetofnaturalnumbers asitsdomainandthesymbolsfor zero,addition,multiplication,and successorassignedzeroandtheaddi- tion,multiplication,andsuccessor functions,respectively.Seemodel THEORY. Namesofthe«thTuringmachineina givenenumerationofallsuch machines. Seechurch'sthesis. Seeprobability. Seecorners. Shorthandfor'therefore'. Nameoftheactualworld. (Pronounced'Around',asin"A roundhere"-D.Lewis.) G.F.S. 993 INDEXOFSELECTEDNAMES MostthinkerscitedintheDictionaryarethemselvesthesubjectsofentries.Thefollowingisalistof selectednamescitedbycontributorsbutnotseparatelyentered. AbeMasao:Japanesephilosophy Abu-Sulaymän:Arabicphilosophy Abfl-Zayd:Arabicphilosophy Ackermann,Robert:sortalpredicate Ackermann,Wilhelm:prooftheoryrelevancelogic Addams,Jane:Mead,pragmatism,professional ethics Agricola,Rudolph:Vives Ajdukiewicz,Kasimir:Polishlogic al-'Äiri:Arabicphilosophy al-Baghdädl,Abd-al-Latif:Arabicphilosophy Albalag:Averroes,syllogism al-Balkhi,Abu-Zayd:Arabicphilosophy Alberdi,JuanBautista:LatinAmericanphilosophy Alexander:philosophyofmind Alison,Archibald:beauty Allais,Maurice:Allais'sparadox Allén,R.G.D.:decisiontheory al-Muqammis,Da'ud:Saadiah Amelius:Neoplatonism,Plotinus Anderson,Alan:relevancelogic AnnaComnena:commentariesonAristotle AnselmofLaon:Abelard Åqvist,Lennart:deonticparadoxes,erotetic Aristarchus:StratoofLampsacus Aristoxenus:Lyceum,Plato ArmandofBellevue:Thomism ar-RäzT,Fakhr-ad-Din:Arabicphilosophy ar-Räzi,Qutb-ad-Din:Arabicphilosophy Arrow,Kenneth:Arrow'sparadox,decisiontheory Asclepius:AlexandrianSchool as-Sarakhsi:Arabicphilosophy as-Sijistäni,Abu-Sulaymän:Arabicphilosophy at-Tusi,Nasir-ad-Din:Arabicphilosophy Baier,Kurt:impartiality Bar-Hillel,Y.:informationtheory Barth,Karl:apocatastasis,evidentialism BasilofCesarea:patristicauthors BasiltheGreat:Tertullian Bataille,Georges:Foucault Baudrillard,Jean:structuralism Bauer,Bruno:Hegel Beardsley,Monroe:intentionalfallacy Bell,JohnS.:quantummechanics Bello,Andres:LatinAmericanphilosophy Belnap,NuelD.:erotetic,philosophyoflanguage, relevancelogic Benacerraf,Paul:philosophyofmathematics Benjamin,Walter:Adorno,FrankfurtSchool, Marxism Bennet,Jonathan:event BernardinoofSiena,Saint:Olivi BernardofAuvergne:Thomism BernardofTrilia:Thomism Bernays,Paul:consistencyprooftheory BernierofNivelles:Averroes Bernoulli,Daniel:decisiontheory,SaintPetersburg paradox Bernoulli,Jakob:Bernoullfstheorem Bertrand,Joseph:Bertrand'sboxparadox,Bertrand's paradox Beth,Evert:Beth'sdefinabilitytheorem,model theory Biel,Gabriel:divinecommandethics Birkhoff,G.:quantumlogic 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Hebb,D.O.:hologram Hedge,FrederickHenry:transcendentalism Heisenberg,Werner:quantummechanics Helm,Georg:energeticism Henry,Caleb:transcendentalism HerbertofCherbury,Edward:deism Herbrand,Jacques:cut-eliminationtheorem,proof theory Hermeias:AlexandrianSchool,commentarieson Plato HermesTrismegistus:Bruno,Ficino,hermetism HerpocrationofArgus:commentariesonPlato Herschel,J.F.W.:Mill'smethods,Whewell Heyting,Arend:mathematicalintuitionism Hick,John:philosophyofreligion Hicks,John:decisiontheory HilaryofPoitiers:patristicauthors Hill,Christopher:philosophyofmind Hilpinen,Risto:Hintikka Hippolytus:Valentinianism Hocking,Ernest:Royce Höfler,Alois:act-objectpsychology HoLin:Chinesephilosophy Holmes,OliverWendell,Jr.:pragmatism Holt,EdwinB:NewRealism,Perry Honderich,Ted:philosophyofmind Honoré,H.M.:Hart Hothum,William:Thomism HoYen:Neo-Taoism Hull,C.L.:behaviorism Hull,David:evolutionaryepistemology,naturalistic epistemology Humphreys,Paul:scientificrealism 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